Politics, Religion & Ideology, 2022 Forthcoming

The Chinese Communist Party’s Atheistic Approach to Religious Freedom in China
Shucheng Wang
Politics, Religion & Ideology, 2022 forthcoming
Abstract: This article examines whether and the extent to which Chinese Marxist atheism and
religious freedom exist in dualistic opposition, along with how Marxist atheism has been
instantiated in the practical restrictions on religious freedom imposed by the Chinese Communist
Party at the institutional level. Moreover, it develops an integrated model of Party–state–religion
relations, articulating the dualistic structure of both Marxist atheism and the restricted religious
freedom in China’s authoritarian context. Furthermore, it provides a nuanced analysis of the
reinforcement of the dominance of Marxist atheism as a restriction on religious freedom through
the integrated legalistic–political approach adopted in the revision of the Regulation on Religious
Affairs in 2017, taking Protestant house churches as an illustrative example.
Keywords: Right to religious freedom; Protestant house church; Marxist atheism; religion-state
relations; Chinese Communist Party
1. Introduction
There is no doubt that the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (which includes the
freedom to hold beliefs) – a ‘far-reaching and profound’ human right, as emphasised by the UN
Human Rights Committee – ‘encompasses freedom of thought on all matters, personal conviction
and the commitment to religion or belief, whether manifested individually or in community with
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4136882

others.’1 Moreover, the protection of the right to the freedom of religion covers ‘theistic, non-
theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief. The terms
“belief” and “religion” are to be broadly construed.’2 This wording clearly extends the protection
of the right to religious freedom to atheism. Atheism, while not a religion, may be referred to in
various forms (such as ‘Secular Humanism’3), and qualifies as a belief about religion.4 To some
extent, recognising these non-theistic or atheistic beliefs as a protected class may protect these
atheists and other non-believers from persecution; an illustrative example is that of the poet Ashraf
Fayadh, who was sentenced by a Saudi Arabian court to eight years in prison for ‘apostasy’ –
specifically, for spreading atheism.5
However, atheism as practiced in China exhibits certain significant differences from the situations
of these atheistic beliefs as a protected class under the right to freedom of religion. Following the
establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Marxist doctrine of atheism was first used to
suppress religion, which was declared to be a superstition. 6 During the reform era of Deng
Xiaoping, China rhetorically recognised the right to freedom of religion in the Constitution of 1982.
In particular, in line with Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic tenet that ‘black cat or white cat, if it can
catch mice, it’s a good cat’, China’s ideology of Marxism – the tradition of which is hostile to
religions – seemed to fade from society at this time. Subsequently, the Party doctrine then evolved
1
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18 (Forty-eighth session, 1993), ¶ 1. Compilation of
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 35 (1994).
2
Ibid., ¶ 2.
3
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), fn. 11.
4
Ronald Dworkin presents a detailed discussion on the possibility of religious atheism, which he argues is not an
oxymoron. See Ronald Dworkin, Religion without God (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), pp. 5-21. See
also ‘Is Atheism Protected under the First Amendment?’ American Atheist Website,
https://www.atheists.org/legal/faq/first-amendment/.
5
‘Ashraf Fayadh: Saudi Court Quashes Poet’s Death Sentence’, BBC News, 2 February 2016,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35476183.
6
See C.K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society (Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc., 1991), p. 389; Daniel L. Overmyer,
Religions of China (San Francisco: Harper & Row. 1986), p. 107.

towards a ‘mild’ Marxist atheism, in the sense that ‘mild atheists do not believe in religion but
hold a rational attitude toward religion’.7 Of course, this is not to say that China has abandoned its
political control over religion and adopted a liberal approach. Instead, the pragmatic ideology of
the Deng Xiaoping era has shifted the form of political control over religions from the ideological
to a more legalistic approach.
It has been observed that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has begun to cope with the rapid
revival of religion through legal instruments. This was initially indicated in CCP’s document of
1982, called The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on Religious Affairs during the Socialist Period of
Our Country, which is also known as Document No.19, stating that the government should draw
up workable religious legislation that will have a real impact (para 6). 8 Moreover, with the
unprecedented development of China’s legal system, the government has made attempts to
regulate religious affairs within a legal framework. In particular, the Regulations on Religious
Affairs (hereinafter ‘RRA’), which provides basic legal rules for regulating religious affairs, was
enacted by the State Council in 2004.9 The RRA, which was expected to be taken as the legal basis
for the judicial decisions made by Chinese courts, adopts a legalistic approach to religious affairs.
The existing literature has discussed religious freedom as practiced, and restricted, within the
CCP’s network of control established through the registration and approval system as prescribed
by the RRA.10 Put simply, relevant religious affairs – including the premises on which religious
7
Fenggang Yang, Religion in China: Survival and Revival under Communist Rules (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2012), p 61.
8
The Central Committee of the CCP, ‘Guanyu woguo shehui zhuyi shiqi zongjiao wenti de jiben guandian he jiben
zhengce’ [The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on Religious Affairs during the Socialist Period of Our Country],
promulgated on 31 March 1982.
9
The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Zongjiao shiwu tiaolie’ [Regulations on Religious Affairs],
promulgated by Decree No. 426 on 30 November 2004, revised and adopted at the 176 th Executive Meeting of the
State Council on 14 June 2017 and promulgated by Decree No. 686 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of
China on 26 August 2017, and effective on 1 February 2018.
10
Ping Xiong, ‘Freedom of Religion in China under the Current Legal Framework and Foreign Religious Bodies’,
Brigham Young University Law Review, 3 (2013), pp. 605-617. Baiguang Li, ‘The Legal Dimensions of Religious

activities are conducted, as well as the qualification of clergies and religious activities – must be
registered with and/or approved by the state-sanctioned religious organizations and/or the
government agencies in charge; otherwise, there is no manifest legal status.
However, despite the restrictive nature of the legal framework in place, this has not effectively
hindered the development of religion. In particular, it did not compelled unregistered house
churches to register with the state-sanctioned Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) / China
Christian Council (CCC), which are normally called the ‘two organizations’ (lianghui) and are
constituent organizations of the National Conference of Chinese Protestant Churches. 11 For
instance, the rapid growth of Christianity during and after the Cultural Revolution (1967–1976)
has seen the number of Christians reach 38 million as of April 2018, up from 22 million a decade
ago, according to government accounts; the true number is very likely higher.12 Some estimate the
number of Christians in China to be as high as 100 million if those belonging to unregistered
churches are included. 13 Moreover, even some CCP members began to display religious
inclinations or become involved in religious activities.14 Therefore, it is understandable that the
rapid upsurge of religion (particularly Christianity) in China, especially religions that fell outside
Freedom in China: The Reality and the Outlook’, Chinese Law & Religion Monitor, 9:1 (2013), pp. 7-50. Lauren B.
Homer, ‘Registration of Chinese Protestant House Churches under China’s 2005 Regulation on Religious Affairs:
Resolving the Implementation Impasse’, Journal of Church and State, 52:1 (2010), pp. 50-73.
11
Junqing Wu, ‘Globalization and the Making of Religious Modernity in China: Transnational Religions, Local
Agents, and the Study of Religion, 1800-Present’, China Quarterly, 220 (2014), pp. 1175-1176. Xiaheng Xie,
‘Religion and Modernity in China: Who is Joining the Three-Self Church and Why’, Journal of Church and State,
52:1 (2010), pp. 74-93.
12
See ‘Protestant Christianity is Booming in China’, The Economist, September 15, 2020. For a detailed discussion
on China’s religious awakening, see Rodney Stark and Eric Y. Liu, ‘The Religious Awakening in China’, Review of
Religious Research, 52:3 (2011), pp. 282-289.
13
This is estimated by Freedom House; see Tsukasa Hadano, ‘China’s Christians Keep the Faith, Rattling the
Country’s Leaders’, Nikkei Asia, 10 September 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-s-Christians-keep-the-
faith-rattling-the-country-s-leaders.
14
“Chinese Communist Party Targets Members with Religious Beliefs,” Union of Catholic Asia News, 13
September 2018, https://www.ucanews.com/news/chinese-communist-party-targets-members-with-religious-
beliefs/83313.

the government’s restrictive framework, would alarm the government due to the potential
challenges or even threats that religion posed to the government’s monopoly on power and
ideology.
That being said, it may be understandable that after Xi Jinping came into power, the dominance of
Marxism and its atheistic ideology has been overwhelmingly reiterated as part of the governing
philosophy in the Xi era. This has been categorically signalled by Xi’s calling on CCP members
on the bicentennial of Marx’s birth to firmly believe in the scientific truth of Marxism. Of course,
the reembracing of Marxism in the Xi era is indicative of the CCP’s attempt to unify the population
behind a nationalist ideology through its integration into local culture in order to maximise its
effectiveness. 15 This was practically propelled by the top-down political movement, termed
‘sinicisation’ (zhongguo hua), which was officially launched by the CCP at the Central United
Front Work Conference in 2015 before later being reiterated in Xi’s report to the 19th Party
Congress. The goal of this movement was to make religions both accept and become integrated
into ‘fine traditional Chinese culture’. 16 Of course, when investigating the development of
religions in China, scholars have paid particular attention to religious freedoms and avenues for
religious expression, as well as the ways in which such freedoms and avenues were limited or
threatened in the Chinese context. 17 Furthermore, the existing literature on Chinese Marxist
15
Timothy Cheek and David Ownby, ‘Make China Marxist Again’, Dissent Magazine, Fall 2018,
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/making-china-marxist-again-xi-jinping-thought.
16
Kuei-min Chang, ‘New Wine in Old Bottles: Sinicisation and State Regulation of Religion in China’, China
Perspective, 1-2 (2018), p. 37.
17
Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke, The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and Conflict in the Twenty-
first Century (New York: Cambridge University Press 2011). Jiexia Elisa Zhai, ‘Contrasting Trends of Religious
Markets in Contemporary Mainland China and in Taiwan’, Journal of Church and State, 52:1 (2010), pp. 94-111.
Lin Lu, ‘Religious Liberty and Heresy in China - Legal Discussions Initiated from Baicheng Case’, Chinese Law &
Religion Monitor, 4:2 (2008), pp. 83-102. Bryan Edelman and James T. Richardson, ‘Imposed Limitations on
Freedom of Religion in China and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: A Legal Analysis of the Crackdown on the
Falun Gong and Other Evil Cults’, Journal of Church and State, 47:2 (2005), pp. 243-268. Ellen S. Reinstein, ‘Turn
the Other Cheek, or Demand an Eye for an Eye - Religious Persecution in China and an Effective Western
Response’, Connecticut Journal of International Law, 20:1(2004), pp. 1-38.

atheism has focused predominantly on its status as a political ideology practiced by communist
regimes that are antagonistic to religions. It is also perceived that the nature of Marxist atheism in
China’s context has shifted and transformed over time.18 However, with the revival of Marxist
atheism under Xi and the seemingly paradoxical recognition of religious freedom in the official
discourse, little attention has been paid to the nuanced differences in the practical restrictions
imposed by the revived Marxist atheism on the freedom of religion against the backdrop of
religion’s rapid rise in China. In particular, the ways in which Marxist atheism – seeming to have
once been mostly rhetoric in the political narrative – has been strengthened and instantiated in the
form of practical all-encompassing restrictions on the freedom of religion has not been sufficiently
addressed in the context. Moreover, in 2017, the RRA was further amended by the State Council
in response to the changing socio-political conditions. Relevantly, For example, the new RRA
provides the possibility for an unregistered church to register as a ‘temporary site’ (article 35).
With respect to this, some research has pointed out that ‘the ultimate goal is to create a legal
platform that legitimises the state’s control of all religious life in China’ rather than to create
freedom of religion. In addition, some Catholic priests and nuns in open churches have admitted
that the new regulation imposes more restrictions than before. 19 Nonetheless, apart from these
analyses based on the revision of the RRA, the extent to which the revision – grounded as it is in
the revival of Marxist atheism in the Xi era – has imposed further restrictions on religious freedom
has not yet been comprehensively explored.
Against this backdrop, this article aims to explore the nuanced restrictions imposed on the freedom
of religion by the revived doctrine of Marxist atheism. To achieve this, the second part of this
18
Yang, Religion in China, op. cit., pp. 45-48.
19
Magdaléna Masláková, ‘The New Regulation on Religious Affairs and Its Possible Impact on the Catholic Church
in China’, Journal of Church and State, 62:3 (2020), pp. 421–442.

article first conducts a detailed investigation into the religiously militant quality of Marxist atheism,
as officially upheld by the CCP and reiterated in the Xi era, which has imposed inherent restrictions
on the practice of religious freedom in China’s context. In the third part, it further explores the
extent to which such militant atheism as a belief system in itself has been institutionalised into the
state by the CCP. The fourth part presents an in-depth analysis of how the dyadic integration of
Marxist atheism and religious freedom has emerged, along with the integrated model of Party–
state–religion relations that has concurrently developed. Finally, in the fifth part, taking Protestant
house churches (PHCs) as an illustrative example, the article provides a holistic analysis of the
nuanced integrated legalistic–political approach to religious freedom as adopted in the 2017
revision of the RRA, which further reinforces the dominance of Marxist atheism and the associated
severe restrictions placed on religious freedom in practice. Additionally, this article sheds light on
other regimes with an ideologically dominant state religion that may impose explicit or implicit
restrictions on the freedom of other religions to practice their faith.
2. Marxist Atheism and Religious Freedom: A Dualistic Opposition?
A true understanding of how religious freedom is practiced in a socialist state would be impossible
without looking at the foundation of the attitude such a state adopts towards all religions: that is,
militant atheism. The same is true in the case of China.
Historically, after more than a century of increasing distress among the Chinese people in the Qing
dynasty, the traditional gods and symbols of old faiths declined, and the Chinese people were keen
for something new that could rejuvenate the whole nation in conformity with ‘the materialistic and
rationalistic outlook of the age’.20 Although Sun Yat-sen attempted to construct such a new faith,
20
Yang, Religion in Chinese Society, op. cit., p. 381.

specifically the Three People’s Principles (sanmin zhuyi), to foster the collective strength of the
Chinese people, this was doomed to disintegrate as a result of the Japanese invasion and subsequent
Chinese Civil War, and was soon replaced by the nontheistic Marxist faith – Communism –after
the CCP came to rule China. As the Chinese leader Mao Zedong once said, ‘Religion may be
unnecessary for China, but a faith is definitely essential’.21 Moreover, as far as ‘faith’ is concerned,
Mao stated in 1956 that, ‘Chinese Marxism is the religion of the people’.22 Antonio Gramsci also
argues that Marxism, by its very nature, does in fact meet the definition of religion in a broad sense.
23
Notably, since Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping adopted the market-oriented ‘opening-up’ policy,
and particularly since the end of the Cold War, the traditional ideology of Communism as upheld
by the Soviet Union has been largely replaced by a pragmatic one, ‘Socialism with Chinese
characteristics’, which is theoretically defined as a preparatory stage of Communism in CCP’s
political rhetoric. To some extent, the pragmatic ideology of ‘Socialism with Chinese
characteristics’ has rhetorically paved the way for the CCP to undertake reforms, particularly in
the field of economy, by pragmatically incorporating some capitalist elements to support China’s
economic prosperity and the durability of the regime. It is understandable that some Communist
traditions may be pragmatically adjusted, and that some political rhetoric may be changed
accordingly in the reform era in China’s context. To some extent, ideologically speaking, atheism
as a traditional tenet of Marxism seems to have temporarily faded from the CCP’s political rhetoric
at this time. Notably, religious freedom has been recognised by the Chinese Constitution.
Undoubtedly, however, due to the monopoly on power held by the CCP, other religions are
21
Mao Zedong, ‘Mao Zedong zaoqi wengao’ [Earlier Manuscripts of Mao Zedong], (Changsha, 1990), p. 591.
22
See Andre Malraux, Anti-Memoirs (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1970), p. 465.
23
See Walter Luiz Adamson, ‘Gramsci, Catholicism and Secular Religion’, Politics, Religion & Ideology, 14:4
(2013), p. 481.

required to be separated from the state, which can only be dominated by CCP members under the
CCP’s doctrine of compulsory atheism (regardless of whether or not these members hold atheistic
beliefs). Moreover, the government exclusively recognised only five religions, specifically
Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism. Religious bodies associated with these
five religions are established by the government and controlled through the governmental
registration and approval system established by the RRA: these include the Buddhist Association
of China, the Chinese Taoist Association, the Islamic Association of China, the TSPM/CCC, the
Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association (CPCA), the Chinese Catholic Religious Affairs
Committee, and Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China (BCCCC).
In this regard, China does not strictly follow the definition of freedom of religion laid out in
international human rights instruments according to which any serious belief, conviction or
religion can be potentially protected by the right to religious freedom; this is evidenced by China’s
exclusive recognition of five major religions, which in fact results in all other religions being
granted no manifest legal status under Chinese law.24 This has imposed a substantive restriction
on the right to freedom of religion. In practice, albeit only in some highly exceptional situations,
some other religions may be recognized by the government; examples include the case of Saint
Sophia Cathedral, an Eastern Orthodox church in the city of Harbin of Heilongjiang Province
bordering Russia, or instances in which some religious site, such as a temple, is strategically
adapted as an intangible cultural heritage site according to the Convention for the Safeguarding of
the Intangible Cultural Heritage, which is done in order to gain legal status for relevant activities.
Moreover, due to the exclusive recognition system, some folk religions that do not strictly fall
Kong Deji and Wu Rujia, ‘Dalu minjian zongjiao guanli bianju’ [The Change of Regulating Folk Religions in
24
Mainland China], Fenghuang zhoukan, 500 (2014), http://www.pacilution.com/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=4867.

under the category of recognized religions, such as Luoism (luo jiao), may have to be strategically
registered with the government through, for instance, China’s Buddhist or Taoist associations,
according to the RRA.25
It is worth noting that, in practice, many CCP members wanted to be Party members not because
they truly believed in communism and the CCP’s Marxist doctrines, but rather because CCP
membership is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for those who aspire to positions in the
Party/government bureaucracy or state-owned enterprises.26 In this regard, it is understandable that
if there was no strict discipline to ensure CCP members’ observance – at least in form – of CCP’s
doctrine of atheism (regardless of whether or not they truly hold atheistic beliefs or not), it would
be possible for CCP members working in the government to turn to other religious beliefs – though
often implicitly – in a relatively liberal political environment.27 In this sense, these CCP members
existing under CCP atheism may even have ‘multiple religious belongings’ for different social
functions.28
Undoubtedly, the doctrine of Marxist atheism has been expressly reiterated since Xi Jinping came
to power.29 Xi has explicitly stated that the CCP’s decision to abide by the political theories of
Karl Marx remains totally correct.30 In particular, he emphasised that all CCP cadres must act as
25
Ibid.
26
See Bruce J. Dickson, ‘Who Wants to be a Communist? Career Incentives and Mobilized Loyalty in China’, The
China Quarterly, 217 (2013), p. 42.
27
‘Chinese Communist Party Targets Members with Religious Beliefs’, op. cit.
28
For a detailed discussion on the social functionality of multiple religious belonging in modern China, see Calida
Chu, ‘The Social Functionality of Multiple Religious Belonging in Modern China’, Review of Religion and Chinese
Society, 9:1 (2021), pp. 27-43.
29
Massimo Introvigne, ‘China is Communist, Marxist, Leninist, Stalinist, and Maoist’, Bitter Winter: A Magazine
on Religious Liberty and Human Rights in China, 24 April 2020, https://bitterwinter.org/china-is-communist-
marxist-leninist-stalinist-and-maoist/.
30
Christian Shepherd, ‘No Regrets: Xi says Marxism still ‘Totally Correct’ for China’, Reuters, 4 May 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-marx-china/no-regrets-xi-says-marxism-still-totally-correct-for-china-
idUSKBN1I50ET.
10

‘unyielding Marxist atheists’ and consolidate their atheistic belief. 31 Notably, regarding the
Marxist doctrine on religion, it is atheism that is placed at the base of the communist party, albeit
a nonreligious atheism on its surface. 32 Nonetheless, it has been argued that Marxist atheism
functions as a kind of ‘super-religion’, in the sense that it has dominated major social and national
resources compared with other religions. 33 The dominance of the CCP’s atheism underpins its
status as inherently confrontational to religions, which are not permitted to be popularised in
society. In parallel, CCP policy states in Document No. 19 that ‘religion is a historical product that
will disappear only when socioeconomic and cultural conditions have improved to the extent that
people no longer require this opiate’.34 This confrontation is exemplified by, for instance, the cross
removal campaigns conducted in the name of demolishing illegal construction in e.g. Zhejiang and
Anhui provinces, among others. 35 At the extreme end of the spectrum, during the Cultural
Revolution, all religions were abolished by the government and all houses of worship were
prohibited. The void in so-called Marxist atheism was largely filled with Maoism, which was in
effect a political religion venerating the ‘sacred’ Mao. 36 However, this did not prevent some
religions, particularly Christianity, from increasing (arguably by a factor of five or six) out of sight
of the authorities.37 Following the failure of the CCP’s efforts to eradicate religions during the
31
Charlie Campbell, ‘China’s Leader Xi Jinping Reminds Party Members to Be ‘Unyielding Marxist Atheists’,
TIME, 25 April 2016, https://time.com/4306179/china-religion-freedom-xi-jinping-muslim-christian-xinjiang-
buddhist-tibet/.
32
Adamson, op. cit., p. 469.
33
Xue Yu, ‘Zhongguo foujiao de shehui zhuyi gaizao’ [The Socialist Transformation of Chinese Buddhism] (Hong
Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2015), p. 67.
34
Xiong Ping, ‘China’s Response to Minority Religions’, in David M. Kirkham (eds) State Responses to Minority
Religions (England: Ashgate, 2013), p. 200.
35
Mark Cui, ‘Anhui Continues Cross Removal Campaign’, Church and Ministry, 22 May 2020,
http://chinachristiandaily.com/news/church_ministry/2020-05-22/anhui-continues-cross-removal-campaign_9137.
36
Jiping Zuo, ‘Political Religion: The Case of the Cultural Revolution in China’, Sociological Analysis, 52:1 (1991),
pp. 104-105.
37
It is argued that the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution actually gave Christianity an opening and an opportunity to
grow; this is due to the absence not only of the TSPM and RAB, but also that of the public security forces and the
police in many places. See Daniel H. Bays, A New History of Christianity in China (UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012),
pp. 186-187.
11

Cultural Revolution,38 the CCP came to realise the inevitability of religion in a socialist state, as
Xi Jinping reiterated in his address to senior Party leaders at a conference on religion in 2016.39 In
this regard, since the end of the Cultural Revolution, the CCP has turned away from the absolute
dualistic opposition between Marxist atheism and religion. 40 However, undoubtedly, the CCP
continues to insist on atheism as a basic doctrine, despite the fact that a provision on religious
freedom was included in the Constitution of 1982.
That being said, it is evident that Marxist atheism in China’s context differs from atheistic belief
as practiced in a liberal context.41 In fact, China’s Marxist atheism is more akin to Leninist militant
atheism. The experience of the Soviet Union shows that atheism as a militant faith, particularly for
Lenin and his Russian followers, is in actuality a revolt against God.42 A militant faith, as Berman
says, ‘…is something to be actively believed in, something to be practiced in one’s daily life…
and atheism represented man’s power to replace God, that is, to do by himself, by his intellect and
his will, through collective action’.43 Although Marxist atheism may be practiced in a mild form
in China, it essentially holds that religion in principle is to be treated as an incorrect political
ideology, and must necessarily be controlled or even eliminated in extreme cases. 44 Interestingly,
it is true that Karl Marx once wrote, in the introduction to his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of
38
Yang, Religion in China, op. cit., p. 84.
39
‘Religious Groups “Must Adhere to the Leadership of the Communist Party”’, Hong Kong Free Press, 24 April
2016, https://hongkongfp.com/2016/04/24/religious-groups-must-adhere-to-the-leadership-of-the-communist-party-
pres-xi-jinping/.
40
See Fenggang Yang, ‘Exceptionalism or Chinamerica: Measuring Religious Change in the Globalizing World
Today’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 55:1 (2016), pp. 7-22.
41
For a detailed discussion of atheism, see Elaine Howard Ecklund and David R. Johnson, Varieties of Atheism in
Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).
42
Harold Berman, Faith and Order: The Reconciliation of Law and Religion (Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 2000), p. 356.
43
Ibid.
44
12

Rights, that religion ‘is the opium of the people’, 45 and that this statement is often employed
rhetorically to illustrate the inner conflict between Marxist doctrine and religion. To some extent,
however, the statement has been contextually dislocated to acquire a different political meaning in
the context of China from that originally intended by Marx; specifically, Marx’s statement on
religion as the ‘the opium of the people’ was located in the context of a Europe dominated by
Christianity, and was relevant to the perceived need to separate the state from religion to get rid of
the ‘religious delusion’.46
More importantly, Marxist atheism as practiced in China is not simply a standalone belief like
other beliefs, but has in fact largely been synthesised into the CCP itself. This synthetisation may
be illustrated by the CCP’s ‘spiritual immutability’, as reflected by the prohibition against
destroying CCP flags during the funerals of CCP members: according to CCP regulations, a CCP
flag may cover the remains or cremation urn of a CCP member, but shall not be cremated with the
remains or buried with the urn. 47 Moreover, under the banner of ‘Chinese Marxism’, the
dominance of militant atheism has also been supplemented with an element of Chinese nationalism,
under which a religion may be politically labelled as ‘foreign’ or ‘Western’, while its believers
may even be labelled in extreme cases as ‘non-Chinese’.48
45
Joseph O’Malley (ed), Karl Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1970).
46
It is noted that, for most people, ‘religion is the opium of the people’ is almost a hearsay of what Karl Marx said
on religion. Moreover, it is worth noting that Karl Marx wrote this when he was only 25 years old, ‘a young man
impatient with the philosophies and politics of his times’. See Paul Zacharia, What Did Karl Marx Say about
Religion, The New India Express, 17 December 2020,
https://www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/2020/dec/17/what-did-karlmarx-say-about-religion-2237307.html.
47
The Organization Department of CCP, ‘Guanyu quanmian zuohao guifan zhongguo gongchandang danghui
dangqi gongzuo youguan wenti de tongzhi’ [Notice of the Work on Regulating the Use of CCP Emblem and Flag],
Document No. 14, promulgated on 29 April 2003.
48
Leah MarieAnn Klett, ‘China Vows to Rid Christianity of “Western” Influence: “One More Christian, One Less
Chinese”’, The Christian Post, 12 March 2019.
13

It can therefore be observed that the relationship between Marxist atheism and religious freedom
has shifted from an absolute dualistic opposition to a somewhat dyadic integration. On the one
hand, the right to freedom of religion, being recognised in the Constitution, has enabled the
government to use the constitutional language of religious freedom as a rhetorical device to
whitewash its heavy restrictions or even repression of the practice of religion among the public.
On the other hand, the right to freedom of religion may be exercised, but only on the premise that
the dominance of CCP’s religiously militant atheism remains unchallenged. In order for this to
occur, the CCP has in practice developed an institutionalised approach to religious freedom under
the dominance of Marxist atheism, which is addressed in the following section.
3. CCP’s Institutionalised Approach to the Dominance of Marxist Atheism
Institutionally, CCP has created an all-encompassing apparatus for the control of religions; this
results from the way that Marxist atheism has been synthesized into the CCP itself, ensuring the
dominance of its militant atheism. The relevant agencies, as mentioned in Document No. 19,
include ‘the united front department, the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB), the nationalities affairs
commission, the political-legal ministry, the ministries of propaganda, culture, education, science
and technology, and health, and the people’s associations of the Workers Union, the Communist
Youth League, and the Women’s Union’.49
At the general level, Marxist atheism has been enforced through systematic atheistic education and
propaganda across the country. The government has created a seamless atheistic education system
based on the principle of separating religion from education. The Education Law of the PRC
stipulates in article 8 that ‘[t]he State separates education from religion. No organisation or
49
14

individual may make use of religion to conduct activities that interfere with the educational system
of the State.’ In short, all education systems must only practice and strengthen the teaching of
atheism, as clearly required by the central government.50
That being said, this does not indicate that there is no restriction on the freedom to disseminate
religious teachings to all persons at a registered religious activity site. For registered religions, it
is possible that certain forms of religious teaching (e.g., in the form of sermons) may be carried
out during a worship service at a registered religious activity site. Nonetheless, the government
may still have concerns about the potential threat posed by this kind of religious teaching,
particularly as regards the impact of theistic education on young people. Evidence of this can be
found in the Party’s efforts to prohibit minors under the age of 18 from entering a religious activity
site. For instance, the CPCA and BCCCC of Henan Province issued a notice stating that any
attempt to provide religious teaching to a minor under the age of 18 is prohibited in a religious
activity site, and that religious adherents are prohibited from taking their minor children to receive
any form of teaching at such sites. If this prohibition is violated, the pastoral staff in charge of the
site may be disqualified, and the religious activity site may be closed.51
As a result, historically (for example, during the Cultural Revolution), this official atheistic
ideology led many government officials and Chinese people to become accustomed to ‘view[ing]
religion as a mere superstition – a product of ignorance – or as an unstable force in society’.52 In
addition, due to the overwhelmingly atheistic nature of education in China, many people even
50
See Guowuyuan guanyu Shenhua gaige jiakuai fazhan minzu jiaoyue de jueding (Decision of The State Council
on Deepening reform and accelerating the development of Ethnic Education), Guo Fa (2002) No. 4, promulgated by
the State Council, 7 July 2002.
51
Notice of the CCPA and BCCCC of Henan Province, 8 April 2018 (on file with author).
52
Zhang Qianfan and Zhu Yingping, ‘Religious Freedom and its Legal Restrictions in China’, Brigham Young
University Law Review, 3 (2011). p. 783.
15

today continue to treat religious faiths as mere feudal superstitions.53 Of course, as religion in
China has continued to develop, an increasing number of people have begun to realise, through
their own observation or even experience, that religion is different from superstitions, and have
therefore come to adopt a non-hostile attitude towards religion. 54 Nonetheless, as all forms of
education are supervised by the government with its atheistic ideology, it is understandable that
many people may become convinced that religion is a negative force. 55 For example, as one
Christian originally from Mainland China who now works in Hong Kong admitted, when her
parents in the countryside learned that she had become a Christian in Hong Kong, they were
extremely worried about her situation, became afraid that she might be in some way mentally ill,
and were unable to sleep well at night – after all, based on their understanding, the religious
adherents around them were usually those who no longer wished to make progress in their lives
(such as retirees, the elderly, the unemployed, etc.). Of course, upon visiting her church in Hong
Kong and seeing the large number of young people in attendance, including those with a range of
professional talents, they came to respect her religious beliefs.56
53
Ibid., p. 785.
54
It is highly interesting to note that due to the rapid parallel development of China’s economy and Christianity in
China since 1978, some researchers have argued that Christianity in fact played a role in boosting China’s economic
growth, which tended to occur in the areas of China where Christian congregations and institutions are most prevalent.
Of course, China as a whole is culturally different from European countries with their tradition of Christianity. Due to
the commonalities between Confucianism and Christianity identified by Confucian scholars, some scholars argue that,
in China’s cultural context, this economic success can be ascribed to Confucian culture, which makes Chinese people
‘ambitious, hardworking, thrifty, caring for their families and relentlessly pursuing good education and success’. See
Qunyong Wang and Xinyu Lin, ‘Does Religious Beliefs Affect Economic Growth? Evidence from Provincial-Level
Panel Data in China’, China Economic Review, 31 (2014), pp. 277-287. Yukong Zhao, ‘What Drives China’s Success’,
Forbes, 2 October 2014, https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/10/02/what-drives-chinas-
success/?sh=5d19b9e25852.
55
Empirical research shows that most nonreligious Chinese people still tend to think people should believe in
communism and science while rejecting religion. See Jun Lu and Qin Gao, ‘Contesting Chineseness: An
Examination of Religion and National Identity in Mainland China’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 57:2
(2018), pp. 336.
56
Interview with a church elder of a Hong Kong Protestant church with a Shanghai branch unregistered with the
government in Hong Kong, 15 December 2019.
16

Moreover, the CCP has institutionalised itself as an atheistic organisation. A CCP member is
politically prohibited from becoming a religious believer. It is clearly written in Document No. 19
that,
The fact that our Party proclaims and implements a policy of freedom of religious belief
does not, of course, mean that Communist Party members can freely believe in religion.
The policy of freedom of religious belief is directed toward the citizens of our country; it
is not applicable to Party members. Unlike the average citizen, the Party member belongs
to a Marxist political party, and there can be no doubt at all that s/he must be an atheist and
not a theist. Our Party has clearly stated on many previous occasions: A Communist Party
member cannot be a religious believer; s/he cannot take part in religious activities. Any
member who persists in going against this proscription should be told to leave the Party.57
Therefore, although it is possible that, in practice, an individual Party member may not think much
about Marxism in itself – particularly the pragmatically revised version of Marxism prevalent in
China’s context – it is clear that atheism as upheld by the CCP can function in practice as an
ideological discipline that politically requires a Party member to follow the atheistic doctrine, and
not to expressly hold non-atheistic beliefs (even if they do not hold atheistic beliefs). 58 CCP
members who disobey may risk facing disciplinary sanctions, particularly if they express their
religious belief(s) explicitly in the public sphere. For this purpose, CCP has stated its position
clearly in its 2018 amendment to the Regulations on Disciplinary Sanctions of the Communist
57
Document No. 19, para. 9.
58
A religious believer is forbidden from joining the CCP. See John Powers, ‘China’s Religion Problem: Why the
Chinese Communist Party Views Religious Belief as a Threat’, The Asia Dialogue, 17 October 2019,
https://theasiadialogue.com/2019/10/17/chinas-religion-problem-why-the-chinese-communist-party-views-religious-
belief-as-a-threat/.
17

Party of China.59 It states, in article 62, that Party members who believe in a religion shall receive
ideological education from the Party and make a conversion to atheism, shall be persuaded to
withdraw from the Party in the event that they undergo no change following this education, and
shall be ‘removed from Party’s rolls’ (chuming) if this persuasion is in vain.
In addition, institutionally, CCP has established a nationwide, uniform system of personnel files
(renshi dang’an) for its cadres and other personnel in Mainland China.60 In line with its principles
of ‘Party controls cadres’ (dangguan ganbu) and ‘Party controls talents’ (dangguan rencai), CCP
has attempted to exercise all-sided political control over all talents in Mainland China. 61 In
particular, according to the CCP principle of ‘Party controls cadres’, powerful elites in leadership
positions within CCP-led public sector organisations are in principle required to be Party members.
As Bian notes, ‘Party membership is a prerequisite for high-ranking positions, and young people
recruited into low-ranking positions are encouraged to apply for Party membership in order to be
promoted’.62 This requirement has caused the government to be overwhelmingly dominated by
CCP atheism.
Moreover, under this system, detailed personnel files are kept on all cadres and talents; the content
of these files includes detailed resumes, autobiographical and ideological materials, performance
evaluations, materials pertaining to educational background and professional qualifications,
investigative materials on their political and historical situation, date on joining the CCP and the
youth league or a democratic party, any disciplinary action taken, etc. More importantly, these
59
The Central Committee of the CCP, ‘Zhongguo gongchandang jilv chufen tiaoli’ [Regulations on Disciplinary
Sanctions of the Communist Party of China], promulgated on 27 August 2018.
60
John P. Burns, ‘China’s Cadre Dossier System’, Chinese Law and Government, 27:5 (1994), pp. 5-18.
61
Lance L.P. Gore, The Chinese Communist Party and China’s Capitalist Revolution (London and New York:
Routledge, 2011), p. 32.
62
Bian, op. cit., p. 131.
18

personnel dossiers, which are categorized as state secrets of various levels, are the property of
CCP.63 The staff, whose identity is linked with these personnel dossiers throughout their entire
working life, do not have access to their own dossiers. 64 If a cadre member moves from one
position to another, his personnel dossier shall go with him. 65 This means that political
performance, which may be assessed by the Party organ of their work unit in various forms, is
extremely important for career development. Consider, for example, a staff member who is
formally identified as a religious believer in a relevant form of dossier, or upon whom the party
has imposed a disciplinary action for whatever reason: all of this information is recorded in his
personnel file, representing a ‘permanent stain’ on his political identity for the entire working life,
and will of course be extremely disadvantageous for him. In fact, a CCP-led work unit provides
its staff not only with an economic reward for their work, but also with relevant social guarantees
and welfare services.66 Within this spatial unit of China’s socialist system, it has been perceived
that ‘it forms integrated communities through which urban residents derive their sense of place
and social belonging’.67 In particular, under CCP rule, CCP membership for those working in
CCP-led public sector organisations ‘is a status or privilege rather than a choice according to one’s
political orientation’.68 Party members may have more chances to be assigned administrative and
managerial positions in these CCP-led organisations. 69 Moreover, ‘Jobs are not just technical
duties. Nor do they merely represent socioeconomic status. In a Communist workplace, there is a
specific political dimension to occupational groups, varying with their significance to the party
63
Burns, op. cit., p. 8.
64
Ibid., p. 10.
65
Ibid., p. 7.
66
Li Hanlin, ‘Zhongguo danwei xianxiang yu chengshi shequ de zhenghe jizhi’ [China’s Danwei Phenomenon and
the Mechanism of Conformity in Urban Communities], Shehui xue yanjiu, 5 (1993), pp. 23-32.
67
David Bray, Social Space and Governance in Urban China: The Danwei System from Origins to Reform
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 5.
68
Yanjie Bian, Work and Inequality in Urban China (New York: State of New York Press, 1994), p. 143.
69
Ibid., p. 86.
19

branch’.70 In this regard, as religion is a politically sensitive issue under the dominance of CCP’s
militant atheism, a religious believer, working in a CCP-led public sector organisation, usually
refrain from mentioning his or her religious faith or other relevant matters in the politically
atheistic environment of the work unit, particularly during the periods of increased restrictions on
religious freedom imposed as part of certain political movements.71
Of course, CCP rules permit a CCP member to withdraw from the Party. 72 However, there may
be certain pressures discouraging this, because according to ‘Party controls cadres’, leadership
positions in principle are occupied by CCP members in a CCP-led public sector organisation. In
response to this problem, CCP members who hold some religious belief may strategically choose
to continue their CCP membership on paper, entering into no pro forma confrontation with the
CCP’s principles and practices, and participate in religious activities in a relatively private sphere,
or at least a low-profile way, so as to avoid impacting their jobs in the CCP-led public sector
organisations. It is certainly possible in practice that, living as they do under the dominance of
militant atheism, these individuals may act according to their religious belief without expressing
their religious identity in public.
Of course, since China adopted its opening up policy in 1978 and consequently embarked on a
series of market-oriented reforms, any religious adherent may be granted more religious freedom
in the private sector, as a free market typically ‘values entrepreneurship and deemphasizes loyalty
and obedience to the Party or to any parties’.73 In contrast to those working in the public sector
70
Ibid., p. 131.
71
Interview with a PHC preacher in Nanjing City, Jiangsu Province, 21 October 2018.
72
‘Zeyang zhengque duidai dangyuan tuidang wenti’ [How to Deal with the Withdrawal of CCP Membership], CCP
News Website, 19 September 2012, http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n/2012/0919/c349309-19046375.html.
73
Lance L.P. Gore, The Chinese Communist Party and China’s Capitalist Revolution (London and New York:
Routledge, 2011), p. 32.
20

organisation, CCP has attempted to implement co-optation strategies 74 for those working in a
private company or joint venture; the personnel files of those working for private entrepreneurs
are often managed in a market-oriented way by the ‘talent service center’ (rencai fuwu zhongxin)
attached to the relevant government personnel agency, and in practice, ‘they usually have very few
pressures imposed by their company because of their religious belief’.75
On the precondition of this institutionalized militant atheism, China has in reality formed an
integrated model of Party–state–religion relations, which are arranged in a political hierarchy
according to their political importance, as addressed in the section below.
4. Marxist Atheism and Party–state–religion Relations
Historically speaking, premodern China was in fact a religious state, and the legitimization of
power was based on the concept of the divine Mandate of Heaven (tianming) in a religious way.
As Pan-chiu Lai recounted, ‘the emperor as the head of state was called the Son of Heaven (tianzi)
and regarded as a sacral king who received the divine mandate from heaven to govern’.76 Moreover,
it has been noted that, in line with this tradition, China has actually formed a subordination model
of religion-state relations.77 On the one hand, religions were monitored and supervised by the state,
and were sometimes suppressed if they became a political threat to the emperor; on the other hand,
religions were strategically incorporated and absorbed into the state through the patronage of
government. As a result, the three major religions in premodern China – Confucianism, Daoism,
74
See Bruce J. Dickson, ‘Integrating Wealth and Power in China: The Communist Party’s Embrace of the Private
Sector’, China Quarterly, 192 (2007), pp. 827-854.
75
Interview with a worshiper of PHC in Nanjing City, Jiangsu Province, 21 October 2018.
76
Pan-chiu Lai, ‘Subordination, Separation, and Autonomy: Chinese Protestant Approaches to the Relationship
between Religion and State’, Journal of Law and Religion, 35:1 (2020), p. 151.
77 In Chinese, the subordination model is called ‘zhengzhu jiaocong’ [政主教从] or ‘zhengzhu jiaofu’ [政主教辅].
See Zhang Jian, ‘Zhongguo gudai zhengzhu jiaocong zhengzhu jiaofu guanxi shi ruhe xingcheng de?’ (How
Religion-State Relations were Formed in Ancient China’, China News Website, 25 April 2022,
https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2022/04-25/9739081.shtml.
21

and Buddhism – all accepted the authority of the emperor and state, albeit with a certain degree of
competition among themselves for patronage. 78 Buddhism, as a religion of foreign origin, once
attempted to resist the subordination model and strive for the independence of Buddhism from the
state, although this was ultimately in vain. Religious leaders knew that support from the emperor
was quite essential for their development.79 As Buddhist monk Dao’an said, the matters of the
Dharma largely depended on the emperor, who was effectively the lord of religion. 80 In truth, as
Yu noted,
There has never been a period in China’s historical past in which the government of the
state, in imperial and post-imperial form, has pursued a neutral policy toward religion, let
alone encouraged, in terms dear to American idealism, its “free exercise”’. And ‘the
impetus to encourage religion, on the part of the central government, is for the purpose of
regulation, control, and exploitation whenever it is deemed feasible and beneficial to the
state. Such an attitude and the history of its policy have been fostered and given powerful
implementation not only recently and not only by the Chinese communists. That motivation
had already taken shape in China’s high antiquity.81
However, this subordination model does not address the nuance of the dominance of militant
atheism as integrated in religion–state relations. As illustrated in Figure 1, China has formed an
integrated model of Party–state–religion relations in context.
78
Lai, op. cit., p. 152.
79
Zhang Jian, The Religion-State Relations in Chinese History (zhongguo gudai zhengjiao guanxi shi) (Beijing:
China Social Science Press, 2012), pp. 1211-12.
80
Lai, op. cit., p. 153.
81
Authony C. Yu, ‘On State and Religion in China: A Brief Historical Reflection’, Religion East and West, 3
(2003), p. 3.
22

---Figure 1 inserted here---
It can be observed that, apart from those ‘religions’ that are excluded and accorded no legal status
under Chinese law, as well as those ‘evil cults’ deemed unlawful, all five major religions are
politically subordinate to the control of the government (upholding the CCP’s atheism), even while
religious freedom is permitted according to the constitutional narrative. This reflects the binary of
‘normal’ and ‘illegal’ in China’s approach to religion.82 Such an approach includes both ‘positive
endorsement of religion’ through co-optation and ‘negative restrictions’ imposed through
repression.83 The dominance of militant atheism, as upheld by the CCP, has in fact resulted in the
formation of a political hierarchy of various religions, as Table 1 shows.
---Table 1 inserted here---
Although China’s government lays claim to the principle of separation between religion and the
state, this is by no means done to safeguard religions from a secular state, for example because
‘religious concerns are viewed as being too high and too holy to be subject to the prevailing fallible
will of civil authorities or to popular sovereignty’.84 Instead, in China’s socio-political context,
this separation means that religion shall not intervene in affairs of the government agency,
judiciary, education, etc., which is compatible with the Marxian stance that religion is fallible.85
Comparatively, this is similar to the case of the Soviet Union, in which ‘churches were forbidden
82
See Chi Zhang, ‘“Illegal Religious Activities” and Counter-Terrorism in China’, Politics and Religion, 14:2
(2021), pp. 269-293.
83
See Elina Schelutker, ‘Co-optation and Repression of Religion in Authoritarian Regimes’, 14 (2021), p. 211.
83
James E. Wood, ‘An Apologia for Religious Human Rights’, in Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective
(The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1996), p. 470.
84
James E. Wood, ‘An Apologia for Religious Human Rights’, in Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective
(The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1996), p. 470.
85
Xi Jinping, ‘Zai quanguo zongjiao gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua’ [Address for the National Conference on
Religious Affairs], 22 April 2016.
23

to engage in any activities that were within the sphere of responsibilities of the state’.86 Moreover,
such separationism usually means that ‘a secular state must necessarily have a demarcation
between religion and government’.87 Nonetheless, as mentioned above, CCP’s atheism, while not
labelled as a ‘religion’ per se, has a religiously militant quality, and in particular has been
seamlessly integrated into the structure of government under CCP leadership. To some extent, this
kind of caesaropapism is instilled to ensure that secular authority, with its overwhelming political
faith and ideology, is deemed superior to any other spiritual authority in society. This does in fact
reflect the realistic standard of Marxism in society, specifically that the secular–atheistic culture
as a faith, based upon scientific thinking, is hegemonic.88
These principles are also put in place in order to ensure that the five major religions play only a
supplementary and decorative role in society. It has been perceived that, in an authoritarian regime,
the government must learn how to maintain control over these religious actors through strategies
of patronage, and thereby ensure that ‘both parties can secure favorable outcomes through their
interaction’. 89 Given that the government has the authority to offer a variety of resources to
religious groups in order to contain them and oversee their religious affairs, religious groups are
incentivized to ally with the government in order to achieve their strategic goals and spiritual
interests. Accordingly, these groups are often supportive of those in political power, although they
may maintain a strategic distance from the secular regime.90 Pastor Z, who is the head of a state-
86
Berman, op. cit., p. 395.
87
Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 92.
88
Adamson, op. cit., p. 482.
89
Karrie J. Koesel, Religion and Authoritarianism: Cooperation, Conflict, and the Consequence (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 29.
90
Ibid., pp. 27-8.
24

sanctioned Protestant church, the President of the TSPM and a member of the Standing Committee
of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference of HZ City, said,
We definitely need the support from the government, without which it would be extremely
difficult for us to move even a single step. If we can gain its support and permission, we
can have more room to do Christian work. For example, we successfully organized a large
Christian evangelical music concert in a plaza in last Christmas Eve, and so many people
were determined to believe in Jesus Christ on the scene.91
Of course, both state and religious actors have distinct primary principles that govern the way they
approach this kind of (often implicit) cooperation. On the one hand, the head of a state-sanctioned
religious group will try to maintain the group’s moral authority by avoiding any perception on the
part of their followers that they are ‘puppets of the regime and abandoning their spiritual mission
for a political one’, as far as possible.92 On the other hand, the government will ensure that these
religious activities are carried out within the confines of its restrictive legal regime and in a way
that poses no potential threat to the dominance of the CCP’s atheism in public; at the same time,
the existence of these limited activities lends a certain support to the Party’s political narrative of
‘religious freedom’. In line with the above, the government in reality adopts varying attitudes
towards different religions based on their different political salience; this can be reflected by the
distinctions drawn between religions considered ‘insider’ and those considered ‘outsider’.
According to this distinction, religious ‘insiders’ are those that have been culturally assimilated
into the regime and pose no substantial political threat from an ideological perspective, such as
Daoism and Buddhism. By contrast, ‘outsider’ religions are those that have strong connections to
91
Interview with a pastor of government-sanctioned Protestant church in Huizhou City, Guangdong Province, 5
November 2018.
92
Koesel, op. cit., p. 24.
25

foreign countries, such as Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam. As Yang points out, ‘Chinese
authorities have shown favouritism toward Buddhism and imposed greater restrictions on
Christianity’.93 In parallel, in order to maintain the dominance of the official political ideology,
other atheist states such as North Korea also adopt this approach to avoid the infiltration of religion
from the outside.94
Of course, it has been observed that ideological construction is politically used by the CCP to
‘shape mass consciousness and equate the Party’s interest with the popular interests of society at
large’, and finally to render the ideology natural and self-evident in the space of everyday life,
thereby enabling it to serve as a key node rightly situated in the triad of politics, culture and
economy that works to secure the CCP’s hegemony. 95 In this regard, militant atheism is evidently
not an ideological vacuum, but rather typically fills this vacuum with scientific materialism and
nationalism, which have historically ‘stirred the emotions of the Chinese people and moved them’
for centuries. 96 Moreover, in a broad sense, such a ‘supreme concern’ – i.e. the synthesis of
scientific materialism, nationalism and atheism – ‘transcends divergent interests and claims,
commands undivided national dedication, and at the same time provides a centred act in which the
individual could reintegrate the emotional and rational aspects of his personality toward a central
goal’.97 This ‘supreme concern’ has in fact become a system of faith for the national community,
as well as individuals. Finally, this faith is based on the believer’s absolute certainty, obtained
through state-instigated indoctrination, that the official ideology (i.e. CCP’s leadership with
93
Fenggang Yang, ‘Oligopoly Dynamics: Consequences of Religious Regulation’, Social Compass, 57:2 (2010), p.
650.
94
Jeroen Temperman, State-Religion Relationships and Human Rights Law: Towards a Right to Religiously Neutral
Governance (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), p. 144.
95
Xiaobo Su, ‘Revolution and Reform: The Role of Ideology and Hegemony in Chinese Politics’, Journal of
Contemporary China 20 (2011), p. 314, 324.
96
Yang, Religion in Chinese Society, op. cit., p. 382.
97
Ibid., p. 380.
26

Marxist principles) is the most suitable form of guidance for the nation’s destiny, national strength
and economic improvement.98
5. An Integrated Legalistic–Political Approach to Restricting Religious Freedom
Due to the potential challenges that the development of religion may pose to the dominance of
Marxist atheism, the legislative framework for governing religions as prescribed by the RRA was
further improved in the 2017 amendment in order to ensure that all religions are adaptable to the
socialist regime upholding Marxist atheism. As analysed below, the revised RRA has in fact
adopted an integrated legalistic–political approach to religious freedom that is more restrictive
than before. First, it has strengthened the ‘illegality’ approach, according to which practicing a
religion could be labelled as ‘unlawful’ by the government in practice if the religion does not
register with and obtain approval from the state-sanctioned religious organisations and/or RABs.
As stated in article 21 of the RRA, an application for the establishment of a religious activity site
can be made through existing religious organisations to the RAB of the county-level government
for the area in which the religious activity will take place. However, this system in fact puts any
religious believers worshipping at an unregistered religious activity site in a very uncomfortable
position, because according to this article, a religious activity site can only be registered through
the submission of an application to the state-sanctioned religious organisations (e.g. TSPM/CCC),
and is ultimately approved by the government. If approved, religious adherents currently attending
the unregistered religious activity site will be required to hold future religious activities at state-
sanctioned religious activity sites associated with official religious organisations.
98
Ibid., p. 382.
27

Let us further consider these unregistered PHCs. Legally speaking, assuming that the house church
makes the application and that the application is then approved, the church then becomes a state-
sanctioned entity with a manifest legal status. However, at the same time, such registration will
cause religious adherents to be affiliated with the state-sanctioned church. Accordingly, pastors of
the state-sanctioned church will also be those sanctioned by the government, rather than those that
may have otherwise or previously been in charge of these unregistered house churches. In practice,
this is hardly practicable for a house church, since a primary reason why a house church insists on
its independence from the government is that it largely disagrees with the patriotic religious
organisations supervised by the government and its churches from a theological perspective, and
often views these government-monitored registered churches as unsuitable places to worship God
according to their supreme evangelical or some other religious mission. In reality, many PHCs,
operating as they do outside government control, consider the cooperation of the TSPM/CCC with
authorities to be evidence of collusion with a hegemonic agenda to create ‘false’ churches under
Communist domination. 99 For example, it was observed that some religious believers who
attended a house church even attempted to poach religious adherents who attended regular service
at the registered religious activity site to its unregistered house church on Sundays. 100 In response,
the state-sanctioned church warned these attendees of the ‘illegality’ of canvassing outside the
state-sanctioned church on Sundays. Therefore, it is understandable that many house churches
have resisted this kind of legalistic approach and continue to operate independently and without
99
Carsten T. Vala, ‘The State-Religion Relationship in Contemporary China’, in Jennifer Y.J Hsu and Reza
Hasmath (eds) The Chinese Corporatist State: Adaption, Survival and Resistance (Abingdon and New York:
Routledge, 2013), pp. 102-119.
100
The participant observation was conducted in a state-sanctioned Protestant church in Changchun City, Jilin
Province, on 26 August 2018, when Sunday worship services were provided to the public.
28

registration, usually on a small scale outside the political reach of the state, regardless of the
political circumstances.
Moreover, the revised RRA significantly increases the penalty on these organising large-scale
activities in an unregistered religious activity site. Under the new RRA, if unauthorised large-scale
religious activities are uncovered, the religious affairs department, together with other relevant
departments, can put a stop to the activities, confiscate any unlawful gains or illegal assets, and
may impose a fine of between RMB100,000 and 300,000 (article 64); this is much more severe
than the penalty in the previous version, and may certainly have a meaningful deterrent effect on
the organising of large-scale activities in an unregistered religious activity site. In terms of the
penalty for operating as an unregistered religious site without authorisation, its ‘unlawful’ gains or
‘illegal’ assets may be confiscated, and a fine of up to RMB 50,000 may be imposed (article 69).
In practice, these unlawful ‘gains and assets’ may be broadly defined to include not just those
gained directly from relevant religious activities, but also those that are used directly (e.g. by an
unregistered church) to undertake religious activities, even though a legal entitlement for these
activities may exist. Taking unregistered PHCs as an example, these ‘unlawful’ gains, according
to the RRA (articles 41, 65, 69, etc.), could include offerings made by worshippers at the
unregistered church, external donations, and the incomes earned from relevant activities (such as
the sale of religious books, etc.),101 as well as the private property, personal vehicles, etc. that are
directly used for the unregistered church’s religious activities. 102 At the extreme end of the
101
See ‘Huang mou yu Zhuhai minzu zongjiao shiwu ju ershen xingzheng panjue shu’ [Administrative Judgement
on Huang v. Ethical and Religious Affairs Bureau of Zhuhai City], produced by Zhuhai Intermediate People’s Court
in 2015 (Ruling Number: ‘Zhu Zhong Fa Xing Zhong Zi 51 Hao’).
102
See ‘Chaoguang cun jidujiao juhui dian, Liaoyang shi taizihe qu minzu zongjiao shiwu ju ershen xingzheng
caiding shu’ [Administrative Ruling of Second Instance on Chaoguang Village Christian Worship Place v. Ethical
and Religious Affairs Bureau of Taizihe District of Liaoyang City], produced by Liaoyang Intermediate People’s
Court of Liaoning Province in 2019 (Ruling Number: Liao 10 Xing Zhong 107 Hao).
29

spectrum, the ‘unlawful’ activities undertaken (for example, by the unregistered church) may be
subject to severe criminal prosecution for offences including ‘illegal business operations’ and
‘inciting subversion of state power’ under China’s criminal law.103
In the meantime, the revised RRA has adopted an interim legalistic approach towards these
religious activities at unregistered religious activity sites, which seems to reflect the government’s
efforts to draw these kinds of activities (particularly those of PHCs) over to its side. A newly added
article states that, in cases where citizens wish to regularly conduct collective religious activities
but do not meet the conditions governing the establishment of religious activity sites, a
representative of the religious citizens may submit an application to the government to be
designated a temporary activity site (article 35).104 The article stipulates that the RAB shall solicit
103
Linda Lew and Guo Rui, ‘Chinese Pastor Wang Yi Gets Nine Years in Jail for “Inciting Subversion”’, South
China Morning Post, 30 December 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3043887/chinas-pastor-
wang-yi-gets-9-years-jail-inciting-subversion.
104
Article 20 of the RRA states that,
Religious activity sites shall meet the following conditions to be established:
(1) The purpose of their establishment is not contrary to articles 4 and 5 of this Regulation;
(2) The local religious citizens have need to regularly conduct collective religious activities;
(3) There are religious professionals or other personnel meeting the requirements of the religion
who intend to preside over the religious activities;
(4) Have the necessary funds from legal sources and channels;
(5) Have a reasonable configuration meeting the requirements of urban and rural planning, and
not impeding the ordinary lives and production of surrounding units and residents.
In addition, Article 4 states that,
The State, in accordance with the law, protects normal religious activities, actively guides religion
to fit in with socialist society, and safeguards the lawful rights and interests of religious groups,
religious schools, religious activity sites and religious citizens.
Religious groups, religious schools, religious activity sites, and religious citizens shall abide by
the Constitution, laws, regulations and rules; practice the core socialist values; and preserve the
unification of the country, ethnic unity, religious harmony and social stability.
Religion must not be used by any individual or organization to engage in activities that endanger
national security, disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or obstruct the State
educational system, as well as other activities that harm State or societal public interests, or
citizens’ lawful rights and interests, and other such illegal activities.
Individuals and organizations must not create contradictions and conflicts between different
religions, within a single religion, or between religious and non-religious citizens; must not
advocate, support, or fund, religious extremism; and must not use religion to undermine ethnic
unity, divide the nation or carry out terrorist activities.
Moreover, Article 5 states that,
30

the opinions of local religious organizations and the township-level government before it
designates a temporary site. In this way, this new channel enables the citizens to make an
application to the RAB of the county-level government for the status of ‘temporary activity site’
by bypassing the TSPM/CCC. Such an approach seems to reflect the government’s effort to draw
these religious adherents falling outside the government’s restrictive framework over to its side.
Moreover, in order to implement this interim measure, the National Religious Affairs
Administration (NRAA) drew up a specific set of rules, namely the Regulations on Approval and
Administration of Religious Temporary Sites (hereinafter Regulations), containing the detailed
requirements for applying for temporary site status. It states in article 5 that the requirements for
registration of a temporary site include the following: (1) a certain number of religious citizens
regularly attending the collective religious activities; (2) representatives of religious citizens; (3)
legal premise for collective activities; (4) not impeding the ordinary lives, study and production of
surrounding units and residents; and, in particular, (5) there shall be no religious site or temporary
site of the same religion in the surrounding area.105 It is worth noting that, in China’s context, there
are no substantially distinguished denominations within the same officially recognised religion,
although these may operate in various ways that may be influenced by a specific denominational
tradition, local culture, etc. This means that if a registered religious site or temporary site for a
certain religion (for example, Protestantism) exists in the surrounding area as delimited by the
All religions shall adhere to the principle of independence and self-governance; religious groups,
religious schools, and religious activity sites and religious affairs, are not to be controlled by
foreign forces.
Religious bodies, religious schools, religious activity sites, and religious professionals are to
develop external exchange on the basis of mutual respect, equality, and friendship; other
organizations or individuals must not accept any religious conditions in external cooperation or
exchange in economic, cultural or other fields.
105
National Religious Affairs Administration, ‘Zongjiao linshi huodong didian shenpi guanli banfa’ [Regulations on
Approval and Administration of Religious Temporary Sites], issued on 22 February 2018.
31

government, there is usually no way for an unregistered religious body to submit an application of
this kind. Taking a PHC as an example, in practice, it is only under exceptional circumstances (for
example, through personal social connections with the government) that a PHC may gain legal
status through registering a temporary site with the government. However, the PHC, once
registered, can be likened to a bird confined in a cage, as it can only hold religious activities at the
designated site as registered, without exceeding the authorized number of people, and with all the
personal information of its representatives and congregation filed with the government.
In the meantime, the Regulation specifically prohibits, in article 11, the following acts: (1) holding
large-scale religious activities; (2) printing or circulating internal religious materials, or selling
religious goods and publications; (3) constructing outdoor religious statues; (4) setting up religious
symbols outside the site; (5) providing any form of training or education; (6) carrying out social
activities in the name of the temporary site; (7) allowing ineligible persons or unqualified religious
personnel to carry out relevant activities; (8) receiving overseas donations from either an individual
or organization, or allowing those from overseas to carry out relevant activities. Undoubtedly,
these strict restrictions tightly confine religious activities to a fixed venue under government
control. To a certain extent, agreeing to registration of this kind seems like the house church, which
has previously enjoyed its freedom (usually out of sight of the authorities), surrendering to the
control of the government, dominated as it is by Marxist atheism.
Furthermore, it should by no means be concluded that an application for registration, if submitted,
will be supported by the government. On the contrary, in practice, the government is typically
reluctant to support this kind of application; this is because, given the dominance of CCP’s atheistic
politics as discussed, the practical principle underpinning the government’s control of public
resources is that of curbing the development of religion as far as possible and prioritising CCP
32

atheism in the political agenda. Otherwise, given the sensitivity of religious matters, it is possible
that the government body may get itself into trouble for some political reason. Of course, for
applications of this kind, due to the political sensitivity of the issue, government officials may use
certain tactics to refuse and settle it informally at a very early stage to the greatest extent possible.
As handling religious cases is politically and socially sensitive, and moreover falls within the
domain of social stability concerns in China’s context, any protest and dispute of this kind in the
public sphere may be seen as potentially threatening to the nation’s political life and even the
Party’s future.106 In this regard, it is understandable that a formal application, if formally processed
and finally rejected, may result in some other potential social stability concerns (a top national
concern of the Chinese authorities) during the handling process, subsequently requiring the
government in charge to invest more time and energy to settle it (in particular, if not handled
appropriately, the government’s annual performance assessment regarding social stability
maintenance may be negatively affected), particularly if the applicant views the formal decision
as a reason to strategically step up protest action for their religious freedom.
In addition, the newly revised RRA integrates a grassroots-level political approach to religious
affairs, whereby local government has the task of managing religious affairs within its own
administrative area, with help from villagers’ committees and residents’ committees (article 6).
Although no details about the specific legal role of these grassroots-level organizations are
provided, the underlying political approach can be gleaned by considering CCP’s latest
institutional reform to unify the function of administering religious affairs, transferring it to CCP’s
United Front Work Departments from the State Council. This means that religious affairs will be
106
Xin He, ‘“No Malicious Incident”: The Concern for Stability in China’s Divorce Law Practice’, Social & Legal
Studies, 26:4 (2014), p. 3.
33

regulated by the CCP directly, while the RAB, although retaining the same signboard, will
substantially become a CCP department with the task of implementing relevant policies and laws.
Given that the CCP has ultimate authority over organizations, such a move reveals the CCP’s
attempts to strengthen its comprehensive leadership over religious affairs, with the goal of ensuring
that it is able to efficiently unify and mobilize the different authorities involved (such as national
security, public security, building authorities, etc.) to manage religious affairs. Moreover, this has
cleared the way for CCP to employ its ‘mass line’ method to mobilize people to become involved
in political movements.107 It can further be seen that the revised RRA has attempted to weave a
network of complete control over religious affairs in an attempt to bring them within the political
reach of a Party-state dominated by Marxist atheism.
6. Conclusion
China has technically enshrined the right to religious freedom in its Constitution. However, the
practice of such a right can hardly be understood without examining the CCP’s doctrine of Marxist
atheism.108 With the establishment of a comprehensive legal system since 1978 and the revival of
Marxism in the Xi era, China’s practices related to religious freedom can be seen to deviate from
the common practice of the international community,109 as well as communist traditions in many
aspects. Based on the above analysis, it can be seen that Marxist atheism as revived in the Xi era
has in practice imposed restrictions on the religious freedom promised by the Constitution of the
PRC. Furthermore, it points out that the CCP’s atheism, while not rhetorically labelled a ‘religion’,
does in fact have a religiously militant quality, and is inherently confrontational to other religions.
107
Marc Blecher, ‘Consensual Politics in Rural Chinese Communities: The Mass Line in Theory and Practice’,
Modern China, 5:1 (1979), pp. 105-126.
108
Songfeng Li, op. cit., p. 121.
109
Ibid., p. 122.
34

Moreover, this militant atheism has been largely institutionalised into the CCP in itself; this
subsequently leads to an integrated model of Party–state–religion relations with a political
hierarchy of religions, where militant atheism is dominant over other religions. In practice, only
five major religions are officially recognised through the state registration system under Chinese
law; all other religions are excluded from the scope of legal protection, and are thus accorded no
manifest legal status. To ensure the monopoly of militant atheism, the government in principle
only allows a religion to be supplementary (posing no particular challenge or threat) to the CCP’s
monopoly on power.
In addition, the integrated legalistic–political approach to religious affairs, as adopted in the
revised RRA in 2017, has further reinforced the CCP’s monopoly on power and the dominance of
its militant atheism. It is a fact that China’s ‘cultural Christians’ have attempted to promote the
idea of ‘religious law’, with the hope of having a ‘real’ law (as opposed to the current hodge-podge
of rules and regulations) enacted by the National People’s Congress that would impose some legal
restraints on the arbitrariness of government actions.110 However, as analysed above, it can be seen
that the law – in whatever form it may take – may be instrumentally used as a restraint on religious
freedom in itself. To some extent, the RRA has been instrumentally employed by the government
as a legalistic basis for restraining religious freedom. Moreover, the political approach that has
been incorporated into the legalistic approach may enable the CCP to mobilise the masses to
engage in political campaigns against any threat to the CCP’s monopoly on power and the
dominance of militant atheism. Of course, this is not to say that there is no way for religion to
develop or even flourish under restrictive, or even repressive, conditions.
110
Bays, op. cit., p. 201.
35

Figure 1: Party–state–religion Relations in China
CCP (Marxist Atheism)
Cooptation approach
Disciplinary approach (with the government)
CCP cadres Religious elites
Lead Manage
Control Five religions:

State-sanctioned Buddhism;
State religious bodies Islam; Daoism;
(CCP members) Protestantism;
Catholicism
Tolerate/
repress Other ‘religions’/ ‘evil cults’
36

Table 1: A Political Hierarchy of Various Religions in China
Religion/faith Legal Political Religion-state relation Key measures

status importance
Militant Legal Dominant Merged with the Party- Propaganda, atheist
Atheism state education, discipline
imposed on CCP
members, etc.
Five major Legal Supplementary Separated from the state, Governmental
religions: but subject to CCP’s registration and
Buddhism, leadership approval, state
Catholicism, patronage, CCP
Daoism, leadership (through its
Islam, and United Front Work
Protestantism Department)
Other Illegal Almost none Separated from the state, Largely suppressed,
religions but under the control of sometimes tolerated
the Party-state
37

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The Chinese Communist Party’s Atheistic Approach to Religious Freedom in China

Politics, Religion & Ideology, 2022 forthcoming

Party at the institutional level. Moreover, it develops an integrated model of Party–state–religion

freedom in China’s authoritarian context. Furthermore, it provides a nuanced analysis of the

reinforcement of the dominance of Marxist atheism as a restriction on religious freedom through

Affairs in 2017, taking Protestant house churches as an illustrative example.

relations; Chinese Communist Party

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specifically, for spreading atheism.5

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to a more legalistic approach.

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government agencies in charge; otherwise, there is no manifest legal status.

constituent organizations of the National Conference of Chinese Protestant Churches. 11 For

number of Christians in China to be as high as 100 million if those belonging to unregistered

inclinations or become involved in religious activities.14 Therefore, it is understandable that the

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has not yet been comprehensively explored.

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nuanced integrated legalistic–political approach to religious freedom as adopted in the 2017

restrictions on the freedom of other religions to practice their faith.

2. Marxist Atheism and Religious Freedom: A Dualistic Opposition?

militant atheism. The same is true in the case of China.

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characteristics’, which is theoretically defined as a preparatory stage of Communism in CCP’s

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Committee, and Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China (BCCCC).

Mainland China], Fenghuang zhoukan, 500 (2014), http://www.pacilution.com/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=4867.

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according to the RRA.25

Party/government bureaucracy or state-owned enterprises.26 In this regard, it is understandable that

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status as inherently confrontational to religions, which are not permitted to be popularised in

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freedom was included in the Constitution of 1982.

in China, it essentially holds that religion in principle is to be treated as an incorrect political

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the ‘religious delusion’.46

be illustrated by the CCP’s ‘spiritual immutability’, as reflected by the prohibition against

may even be labelled in extreme cases as ‘non-Chinese’.48

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government to use the constitutional language of religious freedom as a rhetorical device to

the dominance of Marxist atheism, which is addressed in the following section.

3. CCP’s Institutionalised Approach to the Dominance of Marxist Atheism

Youth League, and the Women’s Union’.49

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atheism, as clearly required by the central government.50

religion as a mere superstition – a product of ignorance – or as an unstable force in society’.52 In

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professional talents, they came to respect her religious beliefs.56

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shall be ‘removed from Party’s rolls’ (chuming) if this persuasion is in vain.

promoted’.62 This requirement has caused the government to be overwhelmingly dominated by

evaluations, materials pertaining to educational background and professional qualifications,

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