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Telecom Viva
Telecom Viva
So like there is no doubt these unseen and unsung cables are the true skeleton and nerve of
our world, linking our countries together in a fiber optic web.2
Since a trans-oceanic cable will cost up to $500 million, these firms often join consortiums
of 20-30 telecommunications companies to finance the design, installation, and maintenance
of a new cable in exchange for a proportionate share of bandwidth3.
The International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), established in 1958, is a trade
association whose members include the owners, operators, and manufacturers of more than
97 percent of the world’s international submarine cable networks.4
. The ICPC provides Recommendations on various submarine cable issues and has been
instrumental in preserving the security of the submarine cable network by collaborating with
states, foreign bodies, and other seabed users. It’s worth noting at this point that, unlike ships,
cables are not registered to any country.5
Submarine cable safety is a critical national security issue in the United Kingdom, according
to policymakers, who contend that the cables’ current legal status is unclear. 6 Several
situations placed submarine cables in jeopardy, jeopardizing the reliability of cabled landing
sites and undersea paths. The three main categories of risk are a lack of network diversity,
natural disasters, and human activity (both unintentional and intentional).7
1
CARTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 8.
2
U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., 59th plen. mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. A/65/PV.59 (Dec. 7, 2010).
3
Ibid.
4
INT’L CABLE PROT. COMM. (Jul. 24, 2015),
https://www.iscpc.org/about-the-icpc/.
5
Convention on the High Seas, art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 83-84.
6
Mick Green, The Submarine Cable Industry: How Does it Work? in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 41, 42 (Douglas R. Burnett et al. eds., 2014).
7
Ibid.
The lack of variety in cable routes is one significant weakness of the current undersea cable
network. Landing sites are often selected depending on how easy it is to build facilities, and
as a result, cables get choked at one landing stage
Intentional and unintentional human activity
Cable outages are caused by bottom-tending commercial fishing equipment and associated
dredging, which account for 40% of all outages
Undersea cable sabotage is a possibility during periods of war or through transnational
terrorism, but such events have traditionally been uncommon.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea11 (UNCLOS) is a key legal text in the
system that governs who owns and maintains undersea cable routes. The legal provisions of
8
Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables (Paris, 14 March 1884).
9
The Conventions and Protocol are the product of the (first) United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
held in Geneva from 24 February to 27 April 1958.
10
Mick Green, The Submarine Cable Industry: How Does it Work? in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 41, 42 (Douglas R. Burnett et al. eds., 2014).
the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, as well as some of the mandates of the
1884 Convention, were renegotiated, subsumed, or extended in UNCLOS.
While many nations have not ratified the convention, its provisions pertaining to common
ocean uses are considered customary international law.
LACK OF RECOGNITION
Although India appears to have a sound submarine cable regime, the legislative and structural
structure reflects a convoluted cable regulatory scheme with many flaws. To begin with,
neither of these instruments mention cable safety within its territorial waters or EEZ. 14
Second, when dealing with cable operations in India’s EEZ, the Indian Customs Act 1962,
immigration rules, and the Merchant Shipping Act 1958 apply to submarine cable ships, their
instruments, and crews. Furthermore, the use of a permit regime for cable repair operations is
11
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), also called the Law of the Sea Convention
or the Law of the Sea treaty, is an international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place between 1973 and 1982.
12
Ibid.
13
Maritime Zones Act, 1976.
14
Utpal Kumar Raha, Submarine Telecommunication Cable Infrastructure In South Asia Under International
Law: Opportunity For Sri Lanka And India, (2018) 26 Sri Lanka JIL 79.
incompatible with UNCLOS requirements.15 It’s worth noting that cable companies have
complete freedom to lay submarine cable in these waters. These various standards are
undoubtedly time intensive and inefficient in nature, which has a negative impact on
telecommunication effectiveness. The security concerns of coastal states clash with other
countries’ telecommunications interests.16
The relevant Indian legal regulations dealing with maritime areas on which the Union of
India has territorial rights over ocean resources are Sections 6 and 7 of the MZI Act. The
Supreme Court of India correctly pointed out and debated the definition of individual rights
and its distinction from sovereignty in the Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore Ltd. case17.
In its EEZ, the coastal state has only sovereign privileges to resource extraction, not
jurisdiction in the form of territoriality or dominium.
in many cases, including Italy v. India 18 where, Chief Justice Altamas Kabir ruled that “a
State can have territorial rights over a region that falls short of full jurisdiction... and the
EEZ continues to be part of the High Seas over which no country can exercise sovereignty.”
MAJOR ISSUE
In the case of discovery or extraction of the EEZ’s natural resources, a similar arrangement,
permission, or letter of authority issued by the Indian government is needed.19
This provision does not seem to have cable activities. Since submarine cables do not
represent a “artificial island,” “off-shore port,” or “installation,” the section’s terminology
shows that it refers to oil and gas operations. “Furthermore, Sections 6(7) and 7(8) of the MZI
Act expressly mention submarine cables. By reading the act as a whole, it seems that the
legislature did not intend for cables to be included under Section 6(4). As a result, no license
or letter of authority from the Indian government is needed for cable operations in this
maritime region.20
15
Ibid.
16
Rapp et al., ‘India’s Critical Role in the Resilience of the Global Undersea Communications Cable
Infrastructure’, (2012), 36(3) Strategic Analysis, (375-383) at 378.
17
Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore Ltd. & Anr. v Union of India & Ors., (2008) 11 SCC 439 [71].
18
Republic of Italy & Ors. v Union of India & Ors., (2013) 4 SCC 721.
19
Section 7(5), Maritime Zones Act, 1976.
20
Utpal Kumar Raha & Raju K. D., Submarine Telecommunication Cable Infrastructure in South Asia under
International Law: Opportunity for Sri Lanka and India, 26 Sri LANKA J. INT’l L. 79 (2018).
At this time, it is unlikely that any conflicts over submarine cable laying and maintenance, or
cable safety, would be taken to arbitration by any state.
\SUGGESTIONS CONCLUSION
Instead of regulations dispersed around many pieces of law, it would be preferable to follow a
specific collection of procedures for cable fixes, implemented and decided upon by central
and local government agencies. Second, the parent legislation and implementing regulations
should be simplified in order to strengthen and promote India’s role in the global submarine
cable market, as well as match its laws with the international legal framework for submarine
cables.
.