ENRILE vs. SALAZAR (G.R. No.

92163 June 5, 1990)

FACTS:
Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement
officers on the strength of a warrant charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters,
without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest
warrant. The following morning, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where
he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig.
Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus,
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being.
The Court issued the writ prayed for and the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return
for the respondents in this case. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within
the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in Hernandez
charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and
frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion.
The Court issued its Resolution granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses
provisional liberty.

ISSUE:
WON the Hernandez ruling/doctrine remains binding doctrine in this case.

RULING:
Yes. Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means
necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
The ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all
subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a
complete reversal.
Also, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should be,
limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of
rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance,
thereof. The consensus was that the proponents' arguments were not sufficient to overcome
what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with
any other offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48.
Said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing
him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by
him were punished separately.
In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case,
and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be
considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction,
that must now be accepted as a correct proposition.
Hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right.