Agrarian Law

Natalia Realty v. DAR

G.R. No. 103302 August 12, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc is the owner of three contiguous parcels of land
located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal. On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation
No. 1637 set aside land as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in
the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The
NATALIA properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite
reservation.

Petitioner Estate Developers and Investors Corporation (EDIC) as developer of

NATALIA properties, applied for and was granted preliminary approval and
locational clearances. Petitioner were likewise issued development permits after
complying with the requirements. Thus the NATALIA properties later became
the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.

On 15 June 1988, R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Law of 1988" went into effect. Conformably respondent
Department of Agrarian Reform issued a Notice of Coverage on the
undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Petitioner immediately
registered its objection to the notice of Coverage.

NATALIA wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its request

to set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither respondent Secretary nor
respondent Director took action on the protest-letters, thus compelling
petitioners to institute this proceeding more than a year thereafter.

NATALIA and EDIC both impute grave abuse of discretion to respondent DAR
for including undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the
coverage of the CARL. They argue that NATALIA properties already ceased to be
agricultural lands when they were included in the areas reserved by
presidential fiat for the townsite reservation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Natalia Property are covered by Section 4 of CARL.

RULING:
No. Natalia Property are not covered by Section 4 of CARL. Section 4 of R.A.
6657 provides that the CARL shall cover regardless of tenurial arrangement
and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands. As to what
constitute “Agricultural land”, it is referred to as “land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land”. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission confirm this limitation. “Agricultural land” are only those lands
which are “arable and suitable agricultural lands” and “do not include
commercial, industrial and residential land.”

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo
Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as "agricultural lands."
These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural
lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation.
Lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL.
These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the
effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR.

Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent
DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to include the
undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of
CARL.

The petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Notice of Coverage of 22 November

1990 by virtue of which undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision
were placed under CARL coverage is hereby SET ASIDE.
 Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 86889 December 4, 1990

FACTS:

On June 10, 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines,
which includes, among others, the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage. Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and
poultry business, avers that it would be adversely affected by the enforcement
of sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law. Hence, it prayed that
the said law be declared unconstitutional. The mentioned sections of the law
provides, among others, the product-sharing plan, including those engaged in
livestock and poultry business.

Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with
crop or tree farming. That the land is not the primary resource in this
undertaking and represents no more than 5% of the total investments of
commercial livestock and poultry raisers. That the land is incidental but not
the principal factor or consideration in their industry. Hence, it argued that it
should not be included in the coverage of RA 6657 which covers “agricultural
lands.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes
the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the
Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith are
constitutional.

RULING:

NO. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of

1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never
the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry
industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform
program of the Government. The Committee adopted the definition of
"agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as land devoted
to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fishponds,
idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).
The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word
"agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to
distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and
industrial lands and residential properties because all of them fall under the
general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was
not considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands
are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not
include commercial, industrial and residential lands.

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which
includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry
and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the
extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by
the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include
livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

The instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A.
No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine
in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated
in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being
unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby made
permanent.
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Honorable Secretary
of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

FACTS:

On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his

small landholding under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and
cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private
respondents.

The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly
before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the
doctrine of separation of powers.

The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without
due process of law and to the retention of his small parcels of rice holding as
guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CARL violates due process because landowner is divested of his
property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in
contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain.

RULING:

NO. The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall
pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here
and in other democratic jurisdictions.

It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer

as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a
portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land
owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become
a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was
understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be
made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that: All qualified
farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the
land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.

It was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said
decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and
full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the
Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the
landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer
of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as
advance payment for the land."

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash
or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. Hence, the
argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily
transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.
 DAR v. Carriedo
G.R. No. 176549 January 20, 2016

FACTS:

The land originally formed part of the agricultural land covered by TCT No.
17680, which was part of the total of 73.3157 hectares of agricultural land
owned by Roman De Jesus. Petitioner Mendoza became the tenant of the land.
Mendoza has been paying 25 piculs of sugar every crop year as lease rental to
Roman. It was later changed to P2,000.00 per crop year.

Roman died leaving the entire 73.3157 hectares to his wife Alberta Constales,
and their two sons Mario and Antonio. Antonio executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Succession with Waiver of Right which made Alberta and Mario
co-owners in equal proportion of the agricultural land.

Mario sold approximately 70.4788 hectares to respondent Romeo Carriedo. The

area sold to Carriedo included the land tenanted by Mendoza.

Mendoza, his daughter Corazon Mendoza and Orlando Gomez filed a Petition
for Coverage of the land under RA No. 6657. The petition was granted by the
Regional Director.

Carriedo filed a Protest with Motion to Reconsider the Order and to Lift
Coverage on the ground that he was denied his constitutional right to due
process. He alleged that he was not notified of the filing of the Petition for
Coverage and became aware of the same only upon receipt of the challenged
Order. Carriedo received a copy of a Notice of Coverage informing him that the
land had been placed under the coverage of the CARP.The RD denied
Carriedo's protest. Carriedo filed an appeal to the DAR-CO.

In an Order, the DAR-CO affirmed the Order of the RD granting coverage. The
DAR-CO ruled that Carriedo was no longer allowed to retain the land due to his
violation of the provisions of RA No. 6657. His act of disposing his agricultural
landholdings was tantamount to the exercise of his retention right, or an act
amounting to a valid waiver of such right in accordance with applicable laws
and jurisprudence.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Carriedo has the right to retain the land.

RULING:

Yes. Romeo Carriedo has the right to retain the land. He did not waive his right
of retention over the land.
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right. Section 4, Article
XIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes landowner retention rights.
It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the
rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that
social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.

A retained area is land which is not supposed to anymore leave the

landowner's dominion, thus sparing the government from the inconvenience of
taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards. For as long as the
area to be retained is compact or contiguous and does not exceed the retention
ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowner's choice of the area to be retained must
prevail.

Sec. 6 shows that disposition of agricultural land is not an act constituting

waiver of right of retention. Thus, as correctly held by CA, Carriedo "Inlever
committed any of the acts or omissions above stated"

Sections 6, 70 and 73(a) of RA 6657 do not provide that a sale or disposition of

land in excess of 5 hectares results in a forfeiture of the five-hectare retention
area. Hence, DAR AO 05-06 item no. 4 of the Statement of Policies is invalid,
void and of no effect for being ultra vires (beyond one's legal power or
authority).

The Petition is hereby denied for lack of merit. The Court affirmed the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals reversing the Order issued by
the DAR-CO which directed that 5-hectare piece of agricultural land (land) be
placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
 Republic v. CA
G.R. No. 139592 October 5, 2000

FACTS:

Five parcels of land in Brgy. Punta, Jala-Jala, Rizal were acquired by private
respondent (Green City Estate & Development Court) by purchase. Petitioner
DAR issued a Notice of Coverage of the 5 parcels of land under compulsory
acquisition pursuant to Section 7, Chapter II of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law as a tax declaration classified said land as agricultural.

Private respondent filed an application for exemption of the land from agrarian
reform, pursuant to DAR AO No. 6, which provides the guidelines for
exemption from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), and DOJ
Opinion No. 44 series of 1990, which authorizes the DAR to approve conversion
of agricultural lands covered by RA 6657 to non-agricultural uses.

DAR Regional Director recommended a denial of the petition, on the ground

that private respondent “failed to substantiate their allegation that the
properties are indeed in the municipality’s residential and forest conservation
zone and that portions of the properties are not irrigated nor irrigable.”

Private respondent filed an Amended Petition for Exemption/Exclusion from

CARP coverage alleging that the property should be exempted because it is
within the residential and forest conservation zones of the town plan/zoning
ordinance of Jala-Jala. Amended petition showed that a portion of about 15
hectares of the land is irrigated riceland which private respondent offered to
sell to the farmer beneficiaries or to the DAR.

DAR Secretary issued an order denying the application for exemption. Private
respondent appealed to the CA, wherein the CA created a commission to
conduct an ocular inspection and survey of the subject parcels of land. To
verify the report of the commission, DAR  constituted its own team to inspect
and report on the property in question.
Verification report of the DAR objected to the report of the commission mainly
due to the lack of specific boundaries delineating the surveyed areas. CA
issued its Decision reversing the assailed DAR orders.

ISSUE:

Whether the subject parcels of land should be exempt from the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

RULING:

Yes, the subject parcels of land were held to be exempted from the CARP as the
Court agreed with the CA in that the land use map is the more appropriate
document to consider. Petitioner’s contention could not be sustained as there
is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in
the tax declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further
inquiry.

Tax declarations are not the sole basis of the classification of a land. DAR AO
No. 6 lists other documents that must be submitted when applying for
exemption from CARP.

In Halili vs CA, it was also held that the classification made by the Land
Regulatory Board of the land in question outweighed the classification stated in
the tax declaration. CA was constrained to resort to an ocular inspection
through the commission it created considering that the opinion of petitioner
DAR conflicted with the land use map submitted in evidence by private
respondent.

 
 Central Mindanao University c. DARAB
G.R. No. 100091 October 22, 1992

FACTS:

Central Mindanao University is an agricultural educational institution owned

and run by the state in Musuan, Bukidnon. The school was established to
supplement the need for training in order to develop the agricultural potential
of Mindanao. The school was surveyed to be 3,080 hectares. In order to make
use of the land owned by the school, Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program was
implemented. This gave the teachers and the staff of the said school the
opportunity to make use of the land for training and additional income.

The agreement explicitly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship

existed. Nor can it be used as collateral for any kind of loan. The agreement
lasted for a year. Upon the termination of the same, the beneficiaries of the
Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program filed a case as they lost their source of
income. They identified themselves as the Bukidnon Free Farmers Agricultural
Laborers Organization. Their averment was hinged on the claim that they are
but landless peasants and that they deserve to be in continuous possession of
the portion of the land in question because they were tenants.

The DARAB ruled in favor of BUFFALO, stating that the land of CMU was not
used solely for academic purposes, but was in fact leased to Del Monte Corp.

CMU filed for certiorari under rule 65 stating that DARAB has no jurisdiction
to decide whether the land was used entirely for the purpose intended. CA
affirmed DARAB’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DARAB had jurisdiction to hear the case for Declaration of
Status of Tenants and coverage of land under CARP.

RULING:

No. It is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to
matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is
restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the
coverage of the aforementioned program. It does not include those which are
actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among
such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm
stations, research and pilot production centers, etc.

Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case
pending before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the
portion of the CMU land reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and
exclusively used and found by the school to be necessary for its purposes. The
CMU has constantly raised the issue of the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction and
has questioned the respondent's authority to hear, try and adjudicate the case
at bar. Despite the law and the evidence on record tending to establish that the
fact that the DARAB had no jurisdiction, it made the adjudication now subject
of review.

In the case at bar, the DARAB found that the complainants are not share
tenants or lease holders of the CMU, yet it ordered the "segregation of a
suitable compact and contiguous area of Four Hundred hectares, more or less",
from the CMU land reservation, and directed the DAR Regional Director to
implement its order of segregation. Having found that the complainants in this
agrarian dispute for Declaration of Tenancy Status are not entitled to claim as
beneficiaries of the CARP because they are not share tenants or leaseholders,
its order for the segregation of 400 hectares of the CMU land was without legal
authority. w do not believe that the quasi-judicial function of the DARAB
carries with it greater authority than ordinary courts to make an award beyond
what was demanded by the complainants/petitioners, even in an agrarian
dispute. Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the complainants/petitioners
are not entitled to the rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous
interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial body to order private property
to be awarded to future beneficiaries. The order segregation 400 hectares of the
CMU land was issued on a finding that the complainants are not entitled as
beneficiaries, and on an erroneous assumption that the CMU land which is
excluded or exempted under the law is subject to the coverage of the CARP.
Going beyond what was asked by the complainants who were not entitled to
the relief prayed the complainants who were not entitled to the relief prayed
for, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion because it implies such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court ruled to set aside DARAB’s decision which was affirmed by
the CA.

Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council,

G.R. No. 171101 April 24, 2012

FACTS:

Before the Court are the Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of
November 22, 2011 dated December 16, 2011 filed by petitioner Hacienda
Luisita, Inc. (HLI) and the Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification dated
December 9, 2011 filed by private respondents.

Hacienda Luisita Inc. maintains that the Notice of Coverage issued on January
2, 2006 may, at the very least, be considered as the date of "taking" as this was
the only time that the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita were placed under
compulsory acquisition in view of its failure to perform certain obligations
under the SDP. January 2, 2006, was the date when the Notice of Coverage
was issued by the DAR pursuant to PARC Resolution No. 2006-34-01
recalling/revoking the approval of the Stock Distribution Plan(DSP).

Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid sa Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA) contends

that if HLI or Tadeco is, at all, entitled to just compensation, the "taking"
should be reckoned as of November 21, 1989, the date when the SDP was
approved, and the amount of compensation should be PhP 40,000 per hectare
as this was the same value declared in 1989 by Tadeco to ensure that the
FWBs will not control the majority stockholdings in HLI.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in determining the just compensation, the date of "taking" is

November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP [stock distribution plan]
"in view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBS were considered to own
and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita"

RULING:

We maintain that the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, the date when
PARC approved HLI’s SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of the fact
that this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the
agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became
subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme
only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, November 21, 1989. Thus, such
approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory
acquisition.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, the Court held that "the ‘time of
taking’ is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of
his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic." It should be
noted, however, that "taking" does not only take place upon the issuance of
title either in the name of the Republic or the beneficiaries of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). "Taking" also occurs when
agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and approved by
PARC for CARP coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in the
instant case. Thus, HLI’s submitting its SDP for approval is an
acknowledgment on its part that the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita are
covered by CARP. However, it was the PARC approval which should be
considered as the effective date of "taking" as it was only during this time that
the government officially confirmed the CARP coverage of these lands.
 Estate of Vda. De Panlilio v. Dizon
G.R. Nos. 148777 and 157598

FACTS:

Encarnacion Vda. De Panlilio is the owner of the disputed landholdings over a

vast tract of land, with an aggregate area of 115.41 hectares called Hacienda
Masamat located in Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga.

Panlilio entered into a contract of lease over the said landholdings with Paulina
Mercado, wife of Panlilio’s nephew, covering agricultural years from 1961 to
1979. Sometime in 1973, pursuant to the OLT under PD 27, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued thirty eight (38) Certificates of Land Transfer
(CLTs) to Panlilio’s tenants.

Paulina Mercado filed a letter-complaint with the DAR questioning the issuance
of CLTs to Panlilio’s tenants, alleging, among others, that the DAR should not
have issued the CLTs since the land involved was principally being planted
with sugar and was outside the coverage of PD 27. She claimed that
respondents surreptitiously planted palay (rice plant) instead of sugar in order
to bring the land within the purview of the law. After proper investigation, the
DAR concluded that the CLTs were "properly and regularly issued."

Paulina Mercado likewise filed a similar complaint with the Court of Agrarian
Relations (CAR) at San Fernando, Pampanga.
The tenants of the portion of the land planted with sugar cane petitioned the
DAR to cause the reversion of their sugarland to riceland so that it may be
covered by the Agrarian Reform Law. The petition was with the conformity of
Panlilio.

Panlilio executed an Affidavit, partly quoted as follows: “That it is my desire

that my entire subject property which is referred to as Hacienda Masamat be
placed under the coverage of P.D. 27 without exception and that thereafter the
same be sold to tenant-petitioners.” The DAR Secretary ordered the distribution
of all land transfer certificates.

CAR dismissed complaint of Paulina Mercado (lessee) on the basis of the action
of the DAR Secretary. On December 29, 1986, Panlilio died.

The DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to the tenants of Panlilio.

Bacolod City RTC appointed petitioner George Lizares as executor of the estate
of Panlilio.

Petitioner Lizares filed complaint with PARAD, Region III, for annulment of
coverage of landholdings under PD 27.
On April 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the PARAD three more complaints for
cancellation of EPs. Upon petitioner’s motion, all the cases were consolidated.

On November 14, 1995, PARAD dismissed Lizares’ complaint on the strength of

the Affidavit of Panlilio. In addition, the PARAD relied on the report of the DAR
and the Bureau of Lands personnel that the subject landholding is devoted to
palay. And, finally, PARAD applied the equitable remedy of laches, in that
Panlilio failed during her lifetime to bring to the attention of the DAR and CAR
her February 3, 1977 Affidavit31 ostensibly revoking her previous January 12,
1977 Affidavit.

The DARAB likewise disregarded petitioner Lizares’ Motion for Reconsideration.

CA sustained petitioner’s position, but reversed its decision on November 29,
2000.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there is valid waiver through the January 12, 1977 Affidavit

2. Whether or not  Court of Appeal acted with grave abuse of discretion in

declaring the transfer made by the private respondents to third persons valid

RULING:
YES, the subject land was properly covered by Presidential Decree 27 since
Panlilio surrendered said lot to the DAR for coverage under Presidential Decree
27 pursuant to her January 12, 1977 Affidavit.

While PD 27 clearly applies to private agricultural lands primarily devoted to

rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified
as landed estate or not, it does not preclude nor prohibit the disposition of
landholdings planted with other crops to the tenants by express will of the
landowner under PD 27.

YES. Thus, Presidential Decree 27 is clear that after full payment and title to
the land is acquired, the land shall not be transferred except to the heirs of the
beneficiary or the Government. If the amortizations for the land have not yet
been paid, then there can be no transfer to anybody since the lot is still owned
by the Government. The prohibition against transfers to persons other than the
heirs of other qualified beneficiaries stems from the policy of the Government to
develop generations of farmers to attain its avowed goal to have an adequate
and sustained agricultural production.

Thus, it is plain to see that Sec. 6 of EO 228, part of which reads “Ownership
of lands acquired by farmer-beneficiary may be transferred after full payment
of amortizations,” principallydeals with payment of amortization and not on
who qualify as legal transferees of lands acquired under Presidential Decree No
27.
 Isidro v. CA
G.R. No. 105586 December 15, 1993

FACTS:

Respondent, Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of

4.5 hectares located in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija. In 1985, Aniceta
Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed
petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the abovementioned
land, consisting of one (1) hectare, in order to augment his (petitioner’s) income
to meet his family’s needs. The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject
to the condition that petitioner would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner
occupied the land without paying any rental and converted the same into a
fishpond.

In 1990, private respondent through her overseer demanded from petitioner

the return of the land, but the latter refused. A complaint for unlawful detainer
was filed by private respondent against petitioner before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. Petitioner set up the following defenses: (a)
that the complaint was triggered by his refusal to increase his lease rental; (b)
the subject land is a fishpond and therefore is agricultural land; and (c) that
lack of formal demand to vacate exposes the complaint to dismissal for
insufficiency of cause of action.

MTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that the land is agricultural and therefore
the dispute over it is agrarian which is under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts of agrarian relations as provided in Sec. 12(a) of
Republic Act No. 946 (now embodied in the Revised Rules of Procedure of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board).

Private respondent filed an appeal before the RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, which
affirmed MTC’s decision in toto. Private respondent appealed to CA.

CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, ordering petitioner to vacate
the parcel of land in question and surrender possession thereof to private
respondent, and to pay private respondent the sum of P5,000.00 as and for
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Municipal Trial Court has the jurisdiction in this case.

RULING:

Yes. An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial

arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over
lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farm workers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under Republic Act No. 6657 and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowners to farm workers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee. It is irrefutable in the case at bar that the subject land which used to be
an idle, swampy land was converted by the petitioner into a fishpond. And it is
settled that a fishpond is an agricultural land.

But a case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such
case an agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The fact
remains that the existence of all the requisites of a tenancy relationship was
not proven by the petitioner. In the absence of a tenancy relationship, the
complaint for unlawful detainer is properly within the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court.

Soriano v. Bravo
G.R. No. 152086 December 15, 2010

FACTS:

The center of the controversy are agricultural lands located at

Nalsian Norte and Malasiqui, Pangasinan, with a total land area of 24.5962
hectares (subject properties). The subject properties were originally owned by
spouses Patricio Posadas and Josefa Quintana.

Upon the spouses Posadas demise, the subject properties were subdivided,
distributed, and transferred by extrajudicial settlement and/or sale to
their heirs. Of the 11 subject
properties, only the ownership of Lots 4 and 9 still remains with the registered
owners, respondents Ernesto S. Bravo and Jose Israel S. Bravo. The rest of the
subject properties had again been sold and transferred to the other
respondents, who have yet to secure certificates of title in their
respective names.
A portion of the subject properties was planted with rice while the rest was
planted with mangoes. Eventually, respondents decided to relocate
their business. Pursuant to respondents plans for the subject properties,
respondent Ernesto S. Bravo entered into a Compromise Agreement on
November 3, 1992 with the people cultivating the subject properties.

Respondents filed before the DARAB a Complaint for Ejectment, Collection of

Unpaid Rentals, Recomputation of Rentals, Specific Performance and Damages.
Named as defendants in respondents Complaint were the cultivators who
signed the Compromise Agreement (with the exception of Juliana Gutierrez,
Celestiano Manipon, and Mauricia Rubio).

Respondents alleged that the defendants in DARAB Case Nos. 01-689 to 710-
WP-95, upon the instigation of a cult leader, refused to comply with the
Compromise Agreement. Instead of transferring and relocating their homes as
stated in the Compromise Agreement, the defendants demanded that the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, put the
subject properties under the OLT program provided in the Tenants
Emancipation Decree and CARL. The MARO already ruled that the subject
properties were not covered by the OLT program because each of the
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest did not own more than five
hectares of the subject properties. Respondents further averred that since
1992, defendants had refused to pay lease rentals on the portions of rice lands
they were tilling. Worse, defendants had also begun to till portions of the
subject properties that were previously untenanted and already planted with
mango trees.

Based on these facts, respondents prayed for the DARAB to (1) order
defendants to comply with the Compromise Agreement by transferring and
relocating their homes to the lots provided by respondents; (2) order defendants
to pay lease rentals on the portions of the rice lands they we’re tilling from
1992 to present; (3) eject defendants from the subject properties for their
deliberate failure to pay lease rentals in violation of their obligations under
Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms; and
(4) order defendants to pay respondents P500,000.00 moral damages,
P500,000.00 exemplary damages, and P500,000.00 actual damages, plus
attorney’s fees.

Among the special and affirmative defenses raised by defendants in their

Answer are that respondents had no cause of action against defendants; the
respondents failed to prove their title to the subject properties and registration
of the same in their names. Thus, defendants prayed that the PARAD dismiss
respondents Complaint for lack of cause of action/merit; and order
respondents to pay jointly and solitarily to defendants P1,000,000.00
as moral damages,P1,000.00 as nominal damages, P1,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P500,000.00 for actual damages.

ISSUE:

Whether the subject properties are within the coverage of the OLT program
under the Tenants Emancipation Decree and CARL.

RULING:

Anent the first issue, it is beyond any iota of doubt that the subject
landholdings are outside the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27 and
Republic Act No. 6657. Presidential Decree No. 27 is categorical and very clear
in its provision on the retention limit allowed the landowner the landowner can
retain an area of up to seven (7) hectares. Republic Act No. 6657 is likewise
very clear that the landowners retention limit is up to five (5) hectares. The
Board agrees with the MARO of the locality that the subject landholdings
cannot be placed within the coverage of either of the laws relied upon by the
defendants-appellants. The records show that as early as March 10, 1971, the
heirs of the late Josefa Quintans (who died on July 12, 1958) subdivided the
original 24.5962-hectare landholding into parcels, none of which exceeded
seven (7) hectares (Exhibit B Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Renunciation and Quitclaim dated March 10, 1971).

When Presidential Decree No. 27 became a law on October 21, 1972, the
subdivided parcels fell outside the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer
program pursuant to said Decree, being each less than seven (7) hectares.
These landholdings were further subdivided and decreased in size until not one
parcel became more than five hectares. Despite changes in
ownership, none of the landholdings were ever consolidated under one
proprietorship in areas of more than seven hectares during the
implementation of the Operation Land Transfer program under
Presidential Decree No. 27 nor areas of more than five (5)
hectares during the implementation of Republic Act No. 6657. Presently,
each of the plaintiffs-appellees does not own more than five (5) hectares of the
subject landholdings. This fact is not disputed by the defendants-appellants.
Consequently, neither Presidential Decree No. 27 nor Republic Act No. 6657
can be relied upon for the expropriation of these parcels.
 Heirs of Herman Ray Santos v. CA
G.R. No. 109992 March 7, 2000

FACTS:

The subject of the controversy is a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan

which was levied on execution by the Municipal Trial Court of Plaridel, Bulacan
on October 24, 1989. In accordance with said levy on execution, the subject
land was sold at public auction on September 20, 1990 with Herman Rey
Santos, now substituted by his heirs represented by his widow Arsenia Garcia
Vda. de Santos, as the sole bidder for P34,532.50.

Santos registered the Deed of Sale with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on
October 15, 1990, after private respondent Exequiel Garcia failed to exercise
his right of redemption within the reglementary period.

On April 1, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Injunction and

Damages with an application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction with
the DARAB, praying that petitioner be enjoined from preventing private
respondent from gathering the mango fruits lest they "over-mature and become
useless."

The Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz of the DARAB issued an order on
April 3, 1992, allowing the gathering of the mango fruits and directing that the
proceeds thereof be deposited with the Adjudication Board.
Subsequently, on April 27, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for
Consignation before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, in an apparent
attempt to redeem his land. This petition was dismissed.

Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18, 1992 a motion to intervene
with the DARAB claiming that "he is affected in his rights and interests as the
party who tended and had the mango trees bear fruits this season."
On May 7, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint for
Annulment/Cancellation of Sale and Document, Redemption with Damages
and Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey Santos, the Deputy
Sheriff of Bulacan and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Thereafter, on July 1,
1992, the Adjudication Board suspended the hearing on Pantaleon Antonio’s
motion for intervention pending the resolution of the ownership issue raised in
the above-mentioned complaint.

On July 8, 1992, intervenor Pantaleon Antonio filed with the DARAB a Motion
to Withdraw Intervenor’s deposited share. The motion was granted and
intervenor Pantaleon Antonio was allowed to withdraw P87,300.00 out of P
174,600.00 harvest proceeds in an Order dated November 18, 1992.
Corollarily, the DARAB recognized Pantaleon Antonio as the duly constituted
agricultural tenant of the subject land.
Court of Appeals affirmed the April 3, 1992 Order of the DARAB ordering the
gathering of the mango fruits and depositing with the Board the proceeds
thereof, and the November 18, 1992 Order allowing the withdrawal of
intervenor’s share in the proceeds and recognizing him as the duly constituted
agricultural tenant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in ruling that PARAD has jurisdiction over the
ancillary matter/s raised by intervenor in DARAB Case No. 369-BUL ‘92.

RULING:
No. In the case of Morta v. Occidental, Et Al., this Court held:
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy
relationship between the parties.

Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian

relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit
of the agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over
the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent’s
petition for injunction in the first place.Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved
in this case. In fact, both are contending parties for the ownership of the
subject property.

Significantly, DARAB admitted that the issue before the Regional Trial Court
was one of ownership.The issue of who can harvest the mangoes and when
they can be harvested is an incident ancillary to the main petition for
injunction. As such, it is dependent on the main case. Inasmuch as the DARAB
has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the controversy between the parties,
necessarily, the motion for intervention loses the leg on which it can stand.
This issue, after all, can be resolved by the trial court, which has the
jurisdiction to order the gathering of the mango fruits and depositing the
proceeds with it, considering that an action has already been filed before it on
the specific issue of ownership.

Magno v. Francisco
G.R. No. 168959 March 25, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner is the owner of a 5.3 hectare lot (lot) which is a portion of an

agricultural land identified as Lot No. 593 situated in Brgy. San Fernando,
Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. Petitioner acquired the lot through a Deed of Sale
executed by Talens on 28 July 1972, but the sale was only registered on 3
September 1986. At the time of the sale, Gonzalo Francisco and Manuel Lazaro
tenanted the land and their separate areas of tillage were 2.8 and 2.5 hectares,
respectively.

In the leasehold contract entered into by petitioner and respondents, Manuel

Lazaro was obliged to pay a lease rental of 35 cavans during the regular
season, and 20 cavans during dayatan cropping season. Gonzalo Francisco, on
the other hand, was required to pay a lease rental of 35 cavans during the
regular season and 25 cavans during the cropping season.

Respondents stopped paying the rentals despite petitioner's demands, arguing

that that they have fully paid the price of the lot under the Barangay
Committee on Land Productions (BCLP) valuation. Respondents were issued
their respective Emancipation Patents (EP). Thus, petitioner filed with PARAD
of Cabanatuan City a complaint for ejectment and collection of lease rentals
against respondents. At the time of filing of the complaint, respondent
Francisco and respondent Lazaro were already in arrears of 155 cavans and
145 cavans, respectively.

The PARAD of Cabanatuan City dismissed the case for lack of merit. On
appeal, the DARAB reversed the PARADs decision. On further appeal, however,
the CA reversed the DARAB ruling and reinstated the decision of PARAD. The
CA stated that the EPs are public documents and are prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein. The EPs are presumably issued in the regular
performance of an official duty. The CA ruled that petitioner has not presented
any evidence showing that the issuance of the EPs was tainted with defects
and irregularities; hence, they are entitled to full faith and credit.

Petitioner points out that the CA disregarded a significant fact that the land
valuation came after the issuance of the EPs; hence, the issuance of the EPs
was tainted with irregularity because it was violative of Section 2 of PD 266.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the unregistered EPs issued to agricultural lessees which
appear to be irregular on their face defeat the landowner's rights to agricultural
leasehold rentals.

RULING:

No. In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Abdulwahid, the Court, quoting

Centeno v. Centeno, held: The DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian
reform program. The DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction
"to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and
matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program under RA No. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A,
R.A. No. 3844 as amended by R.A. No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian
laws and their implementing rules and regulations."

Agrarian dispute as defined in Section 3(d) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 refers
"to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating
to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants
and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or
lessor and lessee."

It is undisputed that petitioner and respondents have an established tenancy

relationship, such that the complaint for collection of back rentals and
ejectment is classified as an agrarian dispute and under the jurisdiction of the
PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB. However, in view of the conflicting claims
where petitioner asserted ownership over the lot and respondents emphasized
that the lot is subject to OLT coverage, there is a need to ascertain if the lot is
under the agrarian reform program. Since the classification and identification
of landholdings for coverage under the agrarian reform program are Agrarian
Law Implementation cases, the DAR Secretary should first resolve this issue.

Verily, there is an established tenancy relationship between petitioner and

respondents in this case. An action for Ejectment for Non-Payment of lease
rentals is clearly an agrarian dispute, cognizable at the initial stage by the
PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB. But issues with respect to the retention
rights of the respondents as landowners and the exclusion/exemption of the
subject land from the coverage of agrarian reform are issues not cognizable by
the PARAD and the DARAB, but by the DAR Secretary because, as
aforementioned, the same are Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases.

Therefore, the PARAD of Cabanatuan City had no authority to render a

decision declaring the lot under OLT coverage. In fact, when the case was
appealed, the DARAB acknowledged that it had no jurisdiction on the OLT
coverage. In an Order dated 10 October 2002, the DARAB suspended the case
proceedings until the submission of the result of the administrative
determination of the lot and thus submitted the entire records to the DAR
Secretary. Respondents themselves admitted in their Memorandum that the
DAR has not submitted the result of its administrative determination of the lot
to the DARAB. It is therefore essential that the DAR Secretary should first
resolve the issue on the lots inclusion or exclusion from OLT coverage before a
final determination of this case can be had.

Proof necessary for the resolution of the issues on OLT coverage and petitioners
right of retention should be introduced in the proper forum. The Office of the
DAR Secretary is in a better position to resolve these issues being the agency
lodged with such authority since it has the necessary expertise on the matter.
Granted.

Laguna Estates Development Corp. v. CA

G.R. No. 119357 July 5, 2000

FACTS:
On 12 December 1989, some 234.76 hectares of agricultural land situated in
Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna belonging to the Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation ("SRRDC", hereafter) was placed by the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its adjudicatory arm, public respondent
DARAB, under the compulsory acquisition scheme of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), and subsequently, Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA’s) numbered 00130422, 00130423 and 00130424
with TCT Nos. C-168, C-167 and C-169 334 were issued and award to farmers-
beneficiaries, private respondents herein, namely: Rosa T. Amante, et al.,
Rogelio O. Ayende, et al. and Juan T. Amante, et al., respectively. The
compulsory acquisition and distribution of the said 234.76 hectares of land in
favor of private respondents were effected by virtue of the Decision dated 19
December 1991 issued by public respondent DARAB in DARAB Case No. JC-R-
IV-LAG-0001-00, entitled "Juan T. Amante, et al. vs. Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corp.

It appears that the aforesaid agricultural lands in Bgy. Casile, Cabuyao,

Laguna are isolated and/or separated from the rest of the municipality of
Cabuyao, and the only passage way or access road leading to said private
respondents’ agricultural lands is the privately owned road network situated
within the premises of petitioners CSE and LEDC. Subject to reasonable
security regulations, the subject road network is open to the public. But after
private respondents were awarded the aforesaid agricultural lands under the
CARP Law, petitioners CSE and LEDC prohibited and denied private
respondents from utilizing the subject road network, thereby preventing the
ingress of support services under the CARP Law, provisions for daily
subsistence to, and egress of farm produce from, Bgy. Casile where the
farmlands awarded to private respondent are located.On motion by private
respondents, DARAB issued an Order on 25 May 1993 directing the
unhampered entry and construction of support services coming from the
national government, and other provisions for the use and benefit of private
respondents in Bgy. Casile, and giving private respondents a right of way over
the subject road network owned by petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to grant private respondents who
are beneficiaries of an agrarian reform program or tenants of adjoining
landholdings a right of way over petitioners network of private roads intended
for their exclusive use.
RULING:
No. The DARAB has no jurisdiction over such issue. For DARAB to have
jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the
parties. Obviously, the issue of a right of way or easement over private property
without tenancy relations is outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. This is not
an agrarian issue. Jurisdiction is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.

Alangilan Realty & Development Corporation v. Office of the President,

G.R. No. 180471 March 25, 2010
FACTS:

Petitioner is the owner/developer of a 17.4892-hectare land in Barangays

Alangilan and Patay in Batangas City. Petitioner filed an Application and/or
Petition for Exclusion/Exemption from Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) Coverage of the Alangilan landholding with the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). It
averred that, in 1982, the Sangguniang Bayan of Batangas City classified the
subject landholding as reserved for residential under a zoning ordinance (1982
Ordinance), which was approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory
Commission. It further alleged that, on May 17, 1994, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Batangas City approved the City Zoning Map and Batangas
Comprehensive Zoning and Land Use Ordinance (1994 Ordinance),
reclassifying the landholding as residential-1. Petitioner thus claimed
exemption of its landholding from the coverage of the CARP.

Then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao issued an Order denying petitioners

application for exemption. The DAR Secretary noted that, as of February 15,
1993, the Alangilan landholding remained agricultural, reserved for residential.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. On appeal, the
OP affirmed the decision of the DAR secretary. Petitioner went up to the CA via
a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the OP decision but the CA
dismissed the petition. Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, the
present petition is filed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property is subject to the coverage of the CARL?

RULING:

Unfortunately, petitioner failed to convince us that the Alangilan landholding

ceased to be agricultural at the time of the effectivity of the CARL.

It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as agricultural,

reserved for residential in 1982, and was reclassified as residential-1 in 1994.
However, contrary to petitioners assertion, the term reserved for residential
does not change the nature of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural.
As aptly explained by the DAR Secretary, the term reserved for residential
simply reflects the intended land use. It does not denote that the property has
already been reclassified as residential, because the phrase reserved for
residential is not a land classification category.
Indubitably, at the time of the effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the subject
landholding was still agricultural. This was bolstered by the fact that the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance in 1994, reclassifying the
landholding as residential-1. If, indeed, the landholding had already been
earmarked for residential use in 1982, as petitioner claims, then there would
have been no necessity for the passage of the 1994 Ordinance.

In order to be exempt from CARP coverage, the subject property must have
been classified as industrial/residential before June 15, 1988. In this case, the
DAR's examination of the zoning ordinances and certifications pertaining to the
subject property, as well as its field investigation, disclosed that the same
remains to be agricultural. The Zoning Certifications to the effect that the land
is within the city's potential growth area for urban expansion are
inconsequential as they do not reflect the present classification of the land but
merely its intended land use.

Not having been converted into, or classified as, residential before June 15,
1988, the Alangilan landholding is, therefore, covered by the CARP. The
subsequent reclassification of the landholding as residential-1 in 1994 cannot
place the property outside the ambit of the CARP, because there is no showing
that the DAR Secretary approved the reclassification. Petition Denied.
 Concha v. Rubio
G.R. No. 162446 March 29, 2010

FACTS:

The subject landholding was placed under the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Tiaong, Quezon, named
petitioners as beneficiaries.

Respondents filed a complaint for declaration of their tenancy and their

identification as beneficiaries and for disqualification of the petitioners to
become beneficiaries over the subject landholding. They alleged that they are
the tenants thereof and have not relinquished their rights over the same, as
they returned the monetary awards given by the landowners.

Meanwhile, the registered owners of the subject land entered into a joint
project with 1st A.M. Realty Development Corporation, represented by Atty.
Alejandro Macasaet for its development on the condition that the farmer-
beneficiary shall be paid disturbance compensation and that the remaining
18.5006 hectares of the land shall be covered by the CARP.

The MARO pursued the coverage of the remaining 18.5006 has. The petitioners
herein were identified as qualified farmer-beneficiaries where three (3)
Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOA) were issued in their favor.

Respondents, on the other hand, were paid of their disturbance compensation.

They now, however, question the validity and legality of the institution of the
petitioners as beneficiaries over the subject landholding. They filed a case for
annulment of CLOAs.

The PARAD dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the DARAB
set aside the PARAD decision. The DARAB ruled that in order for a voluntary
surrender by an agricultural tenant of his landholding to be valid, the same
must be done due to circumstances more advantageous to him and his family
− a consideration, which, the DARAB found, was bereft of any evidence as
shown by the records of the case. Upon denial of their motion for
reconsideration, petitioners appealed to the CA but the same failed. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DARAB have jurisdiction to resolve the issue of identifying and
selecting the qualified farmer- beneficiaries of a land covered by CARL.
RULING:

No. Identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving

strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter exclusively
cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform.

In Lercana v. Jalandoni, the Supreme Court was categorical in ruling that the
identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly
the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter exclusively cognizable
by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and beyond the
jurisdiction of the DARAB.

In addition, in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante, the Court

had an occasion to discuss the jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary in the
selection of farmer-beneficiaries, to wit:

Suffice it to say that under Section 15 of R.A. No. 6657, the identification of
beneficiaries is a matter involving strictly the administrative implementation of
the CARP, a matter which is exclusively vested in the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, through its authorized offices.

The administrative function of the DAR is manifest in Administrative Order No.

06-00, which provides for the Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law
Implementation Cases. Under said Rules of Procedure, the DAR Secretary has
exclusive jurisdiction over identification, qualification or disqualification of
potential farmer-beneficiaries.

Based on the foregoing, the conclusion is certain that the DARAB had no
jurisdiction to identify who between the parties should be recognized as the
beneficiaries of the land in dispute, as it was a purely administrative function
of the DAR. The PARAD was, thus, correct when it declared that it had no
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.

The finding of the MARO declaring petitioners as beneficiaries of the land in

dispute must, therefore, be accorded respect. It should also be equally binding
on the DARAB for the simple reason that the latter has no appellate
jurisdiction over the former: The DARAB cannot review, much less reverse, the
administrative findings of DAR. Instead, the DARAB would do well to defer to
DARs expertise when it comes to the identification and selection of
beneficiaries, as it did in Lercana where this Court noted with approval that, in
the dispositive portion of its decision, left to the concerned DAR Offices the
determination of who were or should be agrarian reform beneficiaries. In fact,
this course of action available to the DARAB is now embodied in Rule II of its
2003 Rules of Procedure.
In the case at bar, the DARAB has overstepped its legal boundaries in taking
cognizance of the controversy between petitioners and respondents in deciding
who should be declared the farmer-beneficiaries over the land in
dispute. Granted.
Social Legislation

Apex Mining Co. v. NLRC

G.R. No. 94951 April 22, 1991

FACTS:

Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining

Company, Inc to perform laundry services at its staff house. On December 18,
1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her
laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. As a result of the
accident she was not able to continue with her work. She was permitted to go
on leave for medication.

De la Rosa offered her the amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually

increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the
offer and preferred to return to work. Petitioner did not allow her to return to
work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.

Private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor
and Employment, which the latter rendered its Decision by ordering the Apex
Mining Co. to pay Candida the total amount of P55,161.42 for salary
differential, emergency living allowance, 13th month pay differential and
separation pay.

Petitioner appealed the case before the NLRC, which was subsequently
dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondent should be treated as house helper or

domestic servant or a regular employee.

RULING:

Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the term
"house helper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant"
and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in
and about the employer's home and which services are usually necessary or
desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively
to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family.

The definition cannot be interpreted to include house helper or laundrywomen

working in staff houses of a company, like private respondent who attends to
the needs of the company's guest and other persons availing of said facilities.
The mere fact that the house helper or domestic servant is working within the
premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection
with its business, as in its staff houses for its guest or even for its officers and
employees, warrants the conclusion that such house helper or domestic
servant is and should be considered as a regular employee. The petition is
Dismissed and the appealed decision and resolution of public respondent
NLRC are hereby Affirmed.
 Barcenas v. NLRC
G.R. No. 87210 July 16, 1990

FACTS:

The Buddhist Temple has hired petitioner who speaks the Chinese language as
secretary and interpreter. The head monk, Chua Se Su, had sexual relations
with petitioner, which resulted to the latter giving birth to a child. In May,
1982, of five months before giving birth to the alleged son of Su on October 12,
1982, petitioner was sent home to Bicol. Upon the death of Su in July, 1983,
complainant remained and continued in her job. In 1985, respondent Manuel
Chua (Chua, for short) was elected President and Chairman of the Board of the
Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Inc. and Rev. Sim Dee for
short) was elected Head Buddhist Priest. Thereafter, Chua and Dee
discontinued payment of her monthly allowance and the additional P500.00
allowance effective 1983. Petitioner and her son were evicted forcibly from their
quarters in the temple by six police officers. She was brought first to the Police
precinct in Tondo and then brought to Aloha Hotel where she was compelled to
sign a written undertaking not to return to the Buddhist temple in
consideration of the sum of P10,000.00. Petitioner refused and Chua shouted
threats against her and her son. Her personal belongings including assorted
jewelries were never returned by respondent Chua.

Chua alleges that she was never an employee of the temple, but only attended
to the personal needs of the former head monk, hence was co-terminus with
such.
LA ruled in favour of the petitioner. NLRC reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is an employee of the temple.

RULING:

Petitioner is an employee of the temple as secretary and interpreter.Moreover,

the work that petitioner performed in the temple could not be categorized as
mere domestic work. We find that petitioner, being proficient in the Chinese
language, attended to the visitors, mostly Chinese, who came to pray or seek
advice before Buddha for personal or business problems; arranged meetings
between these visitors and Su and supervised the preparation of the food for
the temple visitors; acted as tourist guide of foreign visitors; acted as liaison
with some goverment offices; and made the payment for the temple’s Meralco,
MWSS and PLDT bills. Indeed, these tasks may not be deemed activities of a
household helper. They were essential and important to the operation and
religious functions of the temple.

In spite of this finding, her status as a regular employee ended upon her return
to Bicol in May, 1982 to await the birth of her love-child allegedly by Su. The
records do not show that petitioner filed any leave from work or that a leave
was granted her. Neither did she return to work after the birth of her child on
October 12, 1982, whom she named Robert Chua alias Chua Sim Tiong. The
NLRC found that it was only in July, 1983 after Su died that she went back to
the Manila Buddhist Temple. Petitioner’s pleadings failed to rebut this finding.
Clearly, her return could not be deemed as a resumption of her old position
which she had already abandoned.

Thus, her return to the temple was no longer as an employee but rather as Su’s
mistress who is bent on protecting the proprietary and hereditary rights of her
son and nephew. Finally, while petitioner contends that she continued to work
in the temple after Su died, there is, however, no proof that she was re-hired by
the new Head Monk.
 Paul Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management
G.R. No. 162419 July 10, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management Inc. for
about 5 years. On February 3, 1998, he signed a new contract of employment
with respondent to be deployed on board the MSV Seaspread, which was
scheduled to leave for Canada on February 13, 1998.

A week before the scheduled date of departure, the respondent’s Vice President
sent a message to the captain of MSV Seaspread saying that the VP received a
call from Santiago’s wife asking him not to send her husband to MSV
Seaspread and if he is allowed to depart he will jump ship in Canada just like
his brother.
On 9 February 1998, petitioner was thus told that he would not be leaving for
Canada anymore, but he was reassured that he might be considered for
deployment at some future date.

Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent and its
foreign principal.

On appeal by respondent, the NLRC ruled that there is no employer-employee

relationship between petitioner and respondent because under the POEA
Standard Contract, the employment contract shall commence upon actual
departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport at the point of hire and
with a POEA-approved contract. The CA agreed with the NLRC’s finding that
petitioner’s non-deployment was a valid exercise of respondent’s management
prerogative. It added that since petitioner had not departed from the Port of
Manila, no employer-employee relationship between the parties arose and any
claim for damages against the so-called employer could have no leg to stand
on.

ISSUE:
Whether or not employer-employee relationship has already commenced

RULING:

There is no question that the parties entered into an employment contract on

February 3, 1998, whereby petitioner was contracted by respondent to render
services on board “MSV Seaspread” for 9 months. However, respondent failed
to deploy petitioner from the port of Manila to Canada. Considering that
petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of
hire, the employment contract did not commence, and no employer-employee
relationship was created between the parties.

However, a distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment

contract and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The
perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of
execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the
object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein.
The commencement of the employer-employee relationship would have taken
place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even
before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with
the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and
obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the
erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or
refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.
 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009

FACTS:

Serrano signed a Contract of Employment for Chief Officer, with basic monthly
salary of US$1,400, with Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Ltd for 12 months.However on the date of his departure, March
19, 1998, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment
contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000,
upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made
Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise. Hence, petitioner refused to stay
on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.
Petitioner had only served 2 months and 7 days of his contract, leaving an
unexpired portion of 9 months and 23 days.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against respondents for
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims, for the unexpired
portion of his contract plus adjustments to chief mate’s salary, totaling
US$26,442.73.

The last clause in paragraph 10 of RA 8042 states that “In case of termination
of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by
law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.”

Relying on this, the LA based his computation on the salary period of 3 months
only rather than the entire unexpired portion of 9 months and 23 days of the
petitioner’s employment contract. Thus, the LA awarded petitioner monetary
benefits in the sum $8,770.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the source of authority of the state to protect seafarers?

RULING:

Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the
Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest
against crushing inequities in Philippine society. To address these inequities,
our Constitution, has adopted the policy of social justice to guarantee social
and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Under
the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the
interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less
privilege in life should have more in law.

While these provisions on social justice are described as nonself-executing and

does not directly bestow on the working class any actual enforceable rights, the
provisions urges not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on
the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality.

The law guarantees equal protection to all – that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the law.

Section 18,63 Article II and Section 3,64 Article XIII accord all members of the
labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of
their rights and welfare. To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the
foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity:
all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category,
while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none
should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the
burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.

Laws are presumed constitutional until they are proclaimed by the court to be
otherwise. Generally, the petitioner has the burden of proof in proving that a
statute is unconstitutional. But if the challenge to the statute is premised on
the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against
persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, it is incumbent
upon the government to prove that there is a compelling state interest for the
denial of such right.
 Becmen Service Exporter and Promotions v. Sps. Cuaresm
G.R. No.182978-79 April 27,2009

FACTS:

On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen

Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. (Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in
Al-Birk Hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), for a contract duration
of three years, with a corresponding salary of US$247.00 per month. Over a
year later, she died allegedly of poisoning. Jessie Fajardo, a co-worker of
Jasmin, narrated that on June 21, 1998, Jasmin was found dead by a female
cleaner lying on the floor inside her dormitory room with her mouth foaming
and smelling of poison.

Based on the police report and the medical report of the examining physician of
the Al-Birk Hospital, who conducted an autopsy of Jasmin’s body, the likely
cause of her death was poisoning.

Jasmin’s body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The following

day, the City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the
resulting medical report indicated that Jasmin died under violent
circumstances, and not poisoning as originally found by the KSA examining
physician. The toxicology report of the NBI, however, tested negative for non-
volatile, metallic poison and insecticides.

Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas), Jasmin’s parents and her
surviving heirs, received from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration
(OWWA) the following amounts: P50,000.00 for death benefits; P50,000.00 for
loss of life; P20,000.00 for funeral expenses; and P10,000.00 for medical
reimbursement.
On November 22, 1999, the Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and
its principal in the KSA, Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab), claiming death and
insurance benefits, as well as moral and exemplary damages for Jasmin’s
death, Jasmin’s death was work-related, having occurred at the employer’s
premises; that under Jasmin’s contract with Becmen, she is entitled to “iqama
insurance” coverage; that Jasmin is entitled to compensatory damages in the
amount of US$103,740.00, which is the sum total of her monthly salary of
US$247.00 per month under her employment contract, multiplied by 35 years
(or the remaining years of her productive life had death not supervened at age
25, assuming that she lived and would have retired at age 60).

In their position paper, Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin committed
suicide, citing a prior unsuccessful suicide attempt sometime in March or April
1998 and relying on the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-
Birk Hospital. They likewise deny liability because the Cuaresmas already
recovered death and other benefits totaling P130,000.00 from the OWWA. They
insist that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to “iqama insurance” because this
refers to the “issuance” – not insurance – of iqama, or residency/work permit
required in the KSA. On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, they claim
that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to the same because they have not acted
with fraud, nor have they been in bad faith in handling Jasmin’s case.

While the case was pending, Becmen filed a manifestation and motion for
substitution alleging that Rajab terminated their agency relationship and had
appointed White Falcon Services, Inc. (White Falcon) as its new recruitment
agent in the Philippines. Thus, White Falcon was impleaded as respondent as
well, and it adopted and reiterated Becmen’s arguments in the position paper it
subsequently filed.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary claims, by way of

benefits and damages, for the death of their daughter Jasmin.

2. Whether or not Jasmin’s death be considered as work-connected and thus

compensable even while she was not on duty.

RULING:

Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Article 21 of the Code states that
any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage. And, lastly, Article 24 requires that in all contractual, property
or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of
his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or
other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.

Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon’s acts and omissions are against
public policy because they undermine and subvert the interest and general
welfare of our OFWs abroad, who are entitled to full protection under the law.
They set an awful example of how foreign employers and recruitment agencies
should treat and act with respect to their distressed employees and workers
abroad. Their shabby and callous treatment of Jasmin’s case; their uncaring
attitude; their unjustified failure and refusal to assist in the determination of
the true circumstances surrounding her mysterious death, and instead finding
satisfaction in the unreasonable insistence that she committed suicide just so
they can conveniently avoid pecuniary liability; placing their own corporate
interests above of the welfare of their employee’s – all these are contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy, and constitute taking advantage of the
poor employee and her family’s ignorance, helplessness, indigence and lack of
power and resources to seek the truth and obtain justice for the death of a
loved one.

Giving in handily to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide, and adamantly
insisting on it just to protect Rajab and Becmen’s material interest – despite
evidence to the contrary – is against the moral law and runs contrary to the
good custom of not denouncing one’s fellowmen for alleged grave wrongdoings
that undermine their good name and honor.

Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective
mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the
contrary notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic
public policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed,
and regulate the relations between workers and employers. This ruling is
likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil Code which states that
laws which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The relations between capital and labor are so impressed with public
interest,and neither shall act oppressively against the other, or impair the
interest or convenience of the public. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and
all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for
the laborer.

The grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of misconduct on the

part of the employer is sanctioned by Article 2219 (10) of the Civil Code, which
allows recovery of such damages in actions referred to in Article 21. Thus, in
view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Cuaresmas are entitled to moral
damages, which Becmen and White Falcon are jointly and solidarily liable to
pay, together with exemplary damages for wanton and oppressive behavior,
and by way of example for the public good.

On the second issue: While the “employer’s premises” may be defined very
broadly not only to include premises owned by it, but also premises it leases,
hires, supplies or uses, we are not prepared to rule that the dormitory wherein
Jasmin stayed should constitute employer’s premises as would allow a finding
that death or injury therein is considered to have been incurred or sustained in
the course of or arose out of her employment. There are certainly exceptions,
but they do not appear to apply here. Moreover, a complete determination
would have to depend on the unique circumstances obtaining and the overall
factual environment of the case, which are here lacking.
Rajab & Silsilah Company, White Falcon Services, Inc., Becmen Service
Exporter and Promotion, Inc., and their corporate directors and officers are
found jointly and solidarily liable and ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of
Jasmin Cuaresma, spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma.
 Amanquiton v. People
G.R. No. 186080 August 14, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Julius Amanquiton was a purok leader of Barangay Western

Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. At 10:45 p.m. on October 30, 2001, petitioner
heard an explosion. He, together with two auxiliary tanod, Dominador Amante
and Cabisudo, proceeded to Sambong Street where the explosion took place.
They saw complainant Leoselie John Bañaga being chased by Gil Gepulane.

Upon learning that Bañaga was the one who threw the pillbox that caused the
explosion, petitioner and his companions also went after him. On reaching
Bañaga’s house, petitioner, Cabisudo and Amante knocked on the door. When
no one answered, they decided to hide some distance away. After five minutes,
Bañaga came out of the and petitioner and his companions immediately
apprehended him. Bañaga's aunt, Marilyn Alimpuyo, followed them to the
barangay hall. Bañaga was later brought to the police station. On the way to
the police station, Gepulane suddenly appeared from nowhere and boxed
Bañaga in the face. This caused petitioner to order Gepulane’s apprehension
along with Bañaga.

An incident report was made. During the investigation, petitioner learned

Bañaga had been previously mauled by a group made up of a certain Raul,
Boyet and Cris but failed to identify two others. The mauling was the result of
gang trouble in a certain residental compound in Taguig City. Bañaga’s
mauling was recorded in a barangay blotter. Thereafter, an Information for
violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI, RA 7160 in relation to Section 5 (j) of R.A.
8369 was filed against petitioner, Amante and Gepulane.

On arraignment, petitioner and Amante both pleaded not guilty. Gepulane

remains atlarge. On May 10, 2005, the RTC found petitioner and Amante guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Amanquiton's motion for
reconsideration was denied. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was given
due course. On August 28, 2008, the CA rendered a decision which affirmed
the conviction but increased the penalty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the facts of the case as established constitute a violation of

Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7160.

RULING:

NO. The Constitution itself provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. An accused is
entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. It is
the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and
persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion, with moral certainty.

The RTC and CA hinged their finding of petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt (of the crime of child abuse) solely on the supposed positive identification
by the complainant and his witness (Alimpuyo) of petitioner and his co-accused
as the perpetrators of the crime. We note Bañaga’s statement that, when he
was apprehended by petitioner and Amante, there were many people around.
Yet, the prosecution presented only Bañaga and his aunt, Alimpuyo, as
witnesses to the mauling incident itself. Where were the other people who could
have testified, in an unbiased manner, on the alleged mauling of Bañaga by
petitioner and Amante, as supposedly witnessed by Alimpuyo.

The testimonies of the two other prosecution witnesses, Dr. Paulito Cruz and
Rachelle Bañaga, did not fortify Bañaga’s claim that petitioner mauled him, for
the following reasons: Dr. Cruz merely attended to Bañaga’s injuries, while
Rachelle testified that she saw Bañaga only after the injuries have been
inflicted on him. We note furthermore that, Bañaga failed to controvert the
validity of the barangay blotter he signed regarding the mauling incident which
happened prior to his apprehension by petitioner. Neither did he ever deny the
allegation that he figured in a prior battery by gang members.
All this raises serious doubt on whether Bañaga’s injuries were really inflicted
by petitioner, et al., to the exclusion of other people. In fact, petitioner testified
clearly that Gepulane, who had been harboring a grudge against Bañaga, came
out of nowhere and punched Bañaga while the latter was being brought to the
police station. Gepulane, not petitioner, could very well have caused Bañaga's
injuries. Alimpuyo admitted that she did not see who actually caused the
bloodied condition of Bañaga’s face because she had to first put down the baby
she was then carrying when the melee started. More importantly, Alimpuyo
stated that she was told by Bañaga that, while he was allegedly being held by
the neck by petitioner, others were hitting him. Alimpuyo was obviously
testifying not on what she personally saw but on what Bañaga told her. We
apply the pro reo principle and the equipoise rule in this case. Where the
evidence on an issue of fact is in question or there is doubt on which side the
evidence weighs, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.

Bernardo v. NLRC
G.R. No. 122917 July 12, 1999

FACTS:

Complainants are deaf-mutes who were hired by Far East Bank and Trust Co.
as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called
“Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers.” Their employments were
renewed every 6 months.

Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, Far East Bank and
Trust Company maintained that complainants who are a special class of
workers were hired temporarily under a special employment arrangement
which was a result of overture made by some civic and political personalities to
the respondent Bank.

The LA and NLRC ruled against herein petitioners. Respondent Commission

ratiocinated that Art. 280 is not controlling in this case. As complainants were
hired as an accommodation to the recommendation of civic oriented
personalities whose employment were covered by Employment Contracts with
special provisions on duration of contract as specified under Art. 80, the terms
of the contract shall be the law between the parties.

The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not
applicable, “considering the prevailing circumstances/milieu of the cases.
ISSUE:

Whether or nor the provision of the RA 7277 on proscription against

discrimination against disabled persons applicable in this case

RULING:
The renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of
others leads to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to
the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform
the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not
render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.

In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified
disabled employee should be given the same terms and conditions of
employment as a qualified able-bodied person.

The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily
removes the employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the
Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are
thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code.
The noble objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled Persons are not based merely
on charity or accommodation, but on justice and the equal treatment of
qualified persons, disabled or not. In the present case, the handicap of
petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a hindrance to their work. The eloquent proof of
this statement is the repeated renewal of their employment contracts. The
Court believes, that, after showing their fitness for the work assigned to them,
they should be treated and granted the same rights like any other regular
employees.
 Gonzales v. Serrano
G.R. No. 175433 March 11, 2015

FACTS:

This case arose from an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Maila Clemen F.
Serrano (respondent) against her direct superior, Atty. Jacinto C. Gonzales
(petitioner), Chief, Legal Division of the Philippine Racing Commission
(PHILRACOM), for grave misconduct, sexual harassment and acts of
lasciviousness.

While seated at the table waiting for their food to be served, petitioner suddenly
took hold of respondent's face and forcefully kissed her lips. Respondent tried
to ward off petitioner by pulling her head away from him, but he persisted on
kissing her against her will. After releasing her, petitioner said: “Ang sarap pala
ng labi ni Maila”.

Petitioner alleged that at the prodding of his staff, he agreed to treat them for
lunch, as it was respondent's birthday, and she had no money for a “blowout”.
He greeted respondent and planted an innocent birthday greeting kiss on her
left cheek, near her lips. The Office of the Ombudsman Administrative
Adjudication Bureau, through Graft Investigation Officer Marlon T. Molina,
issued a Decision finding petitioner guilty of GRAVE MISCONDUCT Penalty of
DISMISSAL.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Ombudsman Administrative
Adjudication Bureau DENIED. However, on January 3, 2003, the Overall
Deputy Ombudsman approved the Memorandum issued by Graft Investigation
Officer II Julita M. Calderon with a decretal portion that: from GRAVE
MISCONDUCT to SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and from DISMISSAL from the
Service to a mere ONE (1) MONTH SUSPENSION.

Respondent brought the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari. The CA
sustained respondent and rendered the herein assailed decision. Thus: The CA
REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decision of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman.

Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for
Reconsideration, but the CA DENIED it. Hence, petitioner filed the instant
Petition for Review.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA gravely erred in reversing the Memorandum-Order of the

Overall Deputy Ombudsman which downgraded petitioner's infraction from
grave misconduct to simple misconduct (through sexual harassment).

RULING:

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action;

unlawful behaviour or gross negligence by a public officer. It is considered as
grave if it involves additional elements such as corruption or wilful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proven by
substantial evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Corruption
consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully uses his
character to procure benefits for himself or for another, contrary to duty and
the rights of others. In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be
evident.

SC disagree with the CA that neither corruption, clear intent to violate the law
or flagrant disregard of an established rule attended the incident in question.
RA 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, took effect on March 5,
1995. Gonzales was charged with knowledge of the existence of this law and its
contents, more so because he was a public servant.

His act of grabbing Serrano and attempting to kiss her without her consent
was an unmistakable manifestation of his intention to violate laws that
specifically prohibited sexual harassment in the work environment.
Assuming that Gonzales never intended to violate RA 7877, his attempt to kiss
Serrano was a flagrant disregard of a customary rule that had existed since
time immemorial – that intimate physical contact between individuals must be
consensual.

The Court agrees with the CA that Gonzales should be held liable for grave
misconduct, but holds that a reduction of the penalty from dismissal from
service to a mere suspension of six (6) months without pay, is in order. Like in
Veloso v. Caminade, there is only one incident of sexual harassment in this
case where Gonzales forcibly kissed Serrano who was his subordinate.

The Court's reduced penalty of six (6)-months suspension without pay is in

conformity with Civil Service Commission Resolution (CSC) No. 01-0940
entitled the Administrative Disciplinary Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases.
Section 53, Rule X thereof classifies acts of sexual harassment as grave, less
grave and light offenses, while Sections 55 and 56, Rule XI provides the
corresponding penalties.

Applying the foregoing provisions, the Court finds that the sexual harassment
offense Gonzales committed falls under less grave offenses which is analogous
to “unwanted touching or brushing against a victim’s body”, and to “derogatory
or degrading remarks or innuendoes directed toward the members of one sex”,
with the corresponding maximum penalty of six (6) months suspension without
pay. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES taking undue advantage of official
position, taking undue advantage of subordinate education Where more
aggravating circumstances are present than mitigating ones, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed. Hence, the Court imposes the penalty of suspension
of six (6) months without pay.
 Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Atty. Cresencio P. Co Untian, Jr.
A.C. No. 5900 April 10,2019

FACTS:

On May 14, 2002, an anonymous complaint was made against Atty. Cresencio
P. Co Untian, Jr., alleging that he has sexually harassed three (3) of his
students in Xavier University. Co Untian lamented the complaints and claimed
that the students were only making such allegations because they failed his
subject for the 2001-2002 school year. He further claimed that his lewd actions
are without malice and are only “jokes”. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to disbar Co Untian on the grounds of
gross immoral conduct, but the later moved for reconsideration. In its 2017
Extended Resolution, Director Ramon S. Esguerra explained that respondent is
not guilty of sexual harassment as defined in RA 7877, and that Co-Untian
should only be penalized with a two-year suspension.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Co Untian committed sexual harassment against his students.

RULING:

Yes, there was sexual harassment. The Supreme Court ruled that it is not
necessary that there was an offer for sex for there to be sexual harassment as a
superior’s conduct with sexual underpinnings, which offends the victim or
creates a hostile environment, would suffice. Further, it is clear based on CSC
Resolution No. 01-0940 that the respondent’s actions towards the students
concerned definitely constitute sexual harassment. Finally, it can also be noted
that a reading of the respondent’s answers would show that he substantially
admitted the accusations against him, although providing a justification for
each of them. Wherefore, Atty. Cresencio P. Co Untian has been suspended
from the practice of law for five (5) years, and ten (10) years from teaching law
in any school.

Domingo v. Rayala
G.R. No. 155831 February 18, 2008

FACTS:

Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo, then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a
Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido
Laguesma of DOLE. The complaint contains the following allegations : Holding
and squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and
tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money
allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making
statements with unmistakable sexua lover tones all these acts of Rayala
resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.

Upon receipt of the Complaint, DOLE Secretary referred it to the OP, Rayala
being a presidential appointee. The OP,through then Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary Laguesma to investigate the allegations in
the Complaint and create a committee for such purpose. On December 4,
1998, Secretary Laguesma issued Admin. Order. No. 280, Series of 1998,
constituting a Committee on Decorum and Investigation (Committee) in
accordance with Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of
1995.

The Committee heard the parties and received their respective evidence. On
March 2, 2000, the Committee submitted its report and recommendation to
Secretary Laguesma. It found Rayala guilty of the offense charged and
recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under AO 250,
which it erroneously stated as suspension for six (6) months (the correct
penalty is 6months and 1 day).Executive Secretary Zamora, issued AO 119,
which dismissed Rayala from service effective upon receipt of the Order.

Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a Resolution.

Under Rule 65, Filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order. However, it was dismissed for disregarding the
hierarchy of courts. Motion for reconsideration was filed and the case was
referred to CA for appropriate action.

CA: Sufficient evidence on record to create moral certainty that Rayala

committed the acts he was charged with.Dismissed for disgraceful and immoral
conduct in violation of RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees.

Rayala timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. CA modified its ruling in a

special division of 5, the penalty of dismissal is DELETED and instead the
penalty of suspension from service for the maximum period of one (1) year is
HEREBY IMPOSED upon the petitioner. The rest of the challenged decision
stands.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review, but was denied for having a defective
verification. MR granted, petition reinstated. Rayala likewise filed a Petition for
Review arguing that he is not guilty of any act of sexual harassment.
Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA, but was
denied.

Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual
favour, demand or request from petitioner in exchange for her continued
employment or for her promotion. According to Rayala, the acts imputed to him
are without malice or ulterior motive. It was merely Domingo’s perception of
malice and a product of her own imagination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rayala commits sexual harassment.

RULING:

YES. Factual findings are conclusive on the SC. And quite significantly, Rayala
himself admits to having committed some of the acts imputed to him.It is
noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated on the case were
unanimous in upholding the findings of the Committee and the OP. They found
the assessment made by the Committee and the OP to be a meticulous and
dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the complainant (Domingo), the
respondent (Rayala), and their respective witnesses. They differed only on the
appropriate imposable penalty.That Rayala committed the acts complained of
and was guilty of sexual harassment is, therefore, the common factual finding
of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the
CA.
It should be remembered that when supported by substantial evidence, factual
findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great
respect and even finality by the courts. The principle, therefore, dictates that
such findings should bind us. Likewise, contrary to Rayala’s claim, it is not
essential that the demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for
continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that
the respondent’s act result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the employee.

CSC v. Nierras
G.R. NO. 165121 February 14, 2008

FACTS:

The petitioner Olga allegedly was sexually harassed by Peter Nierras, the acting
general manager of the Metro Carigara Water District in Leyte. Olga left Leyte
and was endorsed to Nierras where he brought her to a home where the
harassment happened. Olga filed an incident report to CSC for grave
misconduct and conduct of unbecoming a public officer. Nierras was found
guilty but he appealed to the CA. On the CA’s decision, it modified the penalty
from dismissal to 6 months suspension without pay.
He further filed a motion for reconsideration to lower his penalty because
according to him the character of the judge who gave the decision was
questionable as he himself has been charged with sexual harrassment

ISSUE:

Whether or not the element of corruption was present when Nierras committed
the alledged acts.

RULING:

Under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1994, sexual harassment

does not necessarily or automatically constitute "grave misconduct." Besides,
under paragraph 2 of Section 1 thereof, sexual harassment constitutes a
ground for disciplinary action under the offense of "Grave Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, or Simple Misconduct." The law
does not tolerate misconduct by a civil servant. It should be sanctioned. Public
service is a public trust and whoever breaks that trust is subject to penalty.
The issue, however, concerns the appropriate penalty. Dismissal with forfeiture
of benefits, in our view, should not be imposed for all infractions involving
misconduct, particularly when it is a first offense as in the instant case.

To conclude, given the circumstances of this case and of the precedents cited,
we are in agreement that suspension of respondent for six (6) months without
pay is sufficient penalty. Nierras’ penalty remained for six months without pay.

China Banking Corp. v. HDMF

G.R. No. 131787 May 19, 1999

FACTS:

CBC filed for a certificate of waiver from participating in the PAG-IBIG fund but
were denied by the HDMF for having an inferior retirement plan. CBC is
assailing the validity of the rules and regulations implemented by HDMF,
requiring that a company must have a provident/retirement and housing plan
superior to that provided under the PAG-IBIG Fund to be entitled to
exemption/waiver from fund coverage. This, according to CBC, is in excess of
HDMF’s rule-making powers. The Court held that the respondents went beyond
their jurisdiction when they required two superior plans because the basic law
from which the IRR was based states that a superior retirement and/or
housing plan/s would be enough to qualify for the exemption. The rules and
regulations which are the product of a delegated power to create new or
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative
agency. Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority
conferred by statute.

Pursuant to Section 19 of PD 1752 (Home Development Mutual Fund Law of

1980), CBC and CBC-PCCI were granted by the HDMF certificates of waiver
dated 7 July 1995 and January 19,1996 for a Superior Retirement Plan.

In June 1994, RA 7742 amended PD 1752, stating that a company must have
a provident/retirement and housing plan superior to that provided under the
PAG-IBIG Fund to be entitled to exemption/waiver from fund coverage.

CBC and CBC-PCCI applied for renewal of waiver of coverage from the fund for
1996, but applications were disapproved because it was indicated that their
retirement plan was not superior to PAG-IBIG Fund.

CBC and CBC-PCCI filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
RTC of Makati seeking to annul and declare void the Amendment and the
Guidelines for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction alleging that in requiring
the employer to have both a retirement/provident plan and an employee
housing plan in order to be entitled to a certificate of waiver or suspension of
coverage from the HDMF, the HDMF Board exceeded its rule-making power.

RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari, stating that the denial or grant of an
application for waiver/coverage is within the power and authority of the HDMF
Board, and the said Board did not exceed its jurisdiction or act with grave
abuse of discretion in denying the applications Petitioners do not question the
power of respondent HDMF, as an administrative agency, to issue rules and
regulations to implement PD 1752 and Section 5 of RA 7742; however, the
subject amendment and guidelines issued by it should be set aside and
declared null and void for being inconsistent with the enabling law PD 1752 as
amended by RA 7742, which merely requires a pre- condition for exemption of
coverage, the existence of either a superior provident (retirement) plan or a
superior housing plan and not the concurrence of both plans.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the HDMF acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed amendment.

RULING:

Yes. It is well settled that the rules and regulations which are the product of a
delegated power to create new legal provisions that have the effect of law,
should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature
to the Administrative agency. Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun
the authority conferred by statute. In the instant case, the legal meaning of the
words “and/or” should be taken in its ordinary signification. 

The term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of the disjunctive
“or” alone will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the
use of the conjunctive “and” will exclude the efficacy of any one of the
alternatives standing alone. The intention of the legislature in using the term
“and/or” is that the word “and” and the word “or” are to be used
interchangeably. It is clear that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, intended that an
employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to that of
the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had intended that the
employee should have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in
order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words “and” instead of
“and/or”. 

By removing the disjunctive word “or” in the implementing rules the

respondent Board has exceeded its authority.  While it may be conceded that
the requirement of the concurrence of both plans to qualify for exemption
would strengthen the Home Development Mutual Fund and make it more
effective both as a savings generation and a house building program, the basic
law should prevail as the embodiment of the legislative purpose, and the rules
and regulations issued to implement said law cannot go beyond its terms and
provisions. DECISION. Petition given due course; assailed orders set aside.
Assailed rules declared null and void.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security Commission

G.R. No. L-15045 January 20, 1991

FACTS:

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila filed a request with the SSC that
Catholic Churches and all religious and charitable institutions be exempted
from the compulsory coverage of the SSL. They also allege the constitutionality
of the said law.

Petitioners argue that the provision of Sec. 9 SSL is based on the existence of
an employer-employee relationship. RCAM then contends that the term
employer is defined as those who carry on “undertakings or activities which
have the element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain”,
because the phrase, activity of any kind” in the definition is preceded by the
words “ any trade, business, industry, undertaking.”, it should follow that the
priests should not be covered by the SSL.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of

Manila filed a request with the
SSC that Catholic Churches and all
religious and charitable institutions
be exempted from the compulsory
coverage of the SSL. They also
allege the constitutionality of the
said law.
Petitioners argue that the
provisions of Sec 9 SSL is based
on the existence of an employer-
employee
relationship. RCAM then
contends that the term
employer is defined as those
who carry on
"undertakings or activities which
have the element of profit or gain,
or which are pursued for profit or
gain," because the phrase, activity
of any kind" in the definition is
preceded by the words "any trade,
business, industry, undertaking.", it
should follow that the priests
should not be covered by the SS
Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila filed a request with the
SSC that Catholic Churches and all
religious and charitable institutions
be exempted from the compulsory
coverage of the SSL. They also
allege the constitutionality of the
said law.
Petitioners argue that the
provisions of Sec 9 SSL is based
on the existence of an employer-
employee
relationship. RCAM then
contends that the term
employer is defined as those
who carry on
"undertakings or activities which
have the element of profit or gain,
or which are pursued for profit or
gain," because the phrase, activity
of any kind" in the definition is
preceded by the words "any trade,
business, industry, undertaking.", it
should follow that the priests
should not be covered by the SS
ISSUE:

Whether of not the Catholic Churches and all religious and charitable
institution are covered by the SSI.

RULING:

Being in fact a social legislation, compatible with the policy of the Church to
ameliorate living conditions of the working class, appellant cannot arbitrarily
delimit the extent of its provisions to relations between capital and labor in
industry and agriculture.

These contributions are not in the nature of taxes on employment. They are
intended for the protection of said employees against the hazards of disability,
sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.

Beronilla v. GSIS
 G.R. No. L-21723 November 26, 1970

FACTS:

A special civil action for prohibition seeking to declare Resolution No. 1497 of
the Board of Trustees of the GSIS to the effect that “petitioner Beronilla be
considered compulsorily retired from the service as Auditor of the Philippine
National Bank” as null and void.

Previously, petitioner had occupied many other positions in the government

and had been a member of the GSIS during all times required by law. In all his
applications and records including his Member’s Service Record which he
submitted to the GSIS on 1954, petitioner uniformly indicated that his date of
birth is January 14, 1898. On September 29, 1959, he requested the
Commissioner of Civil Service, thru the Auditor General, that his date of birth
indicated in the records be changed to January 14, 1900.

According to his petition, it was only in 1955 and before the demise of his
mother, he found out his true date of birth. His letter to the Civil Service
Commissioner was supported by affidavits attesting his true date of birth.

The letter was then endorsed by the Commission to the GSIS for action
“without the intervention of the Civil Service Commission”. The GSIS legal
counsel denied the petitioner’s letter-request. Upon learning of this denial,
petitioner submitted additional evidence to support his request. However, the
legal counsel reiterated his former denial.

The petitioner appealed to the General Manager of the System (Mr. Rodolfo
Andal). The latter placed “OK” at the foot of the request, thereby indicating the
approval of the request for change of birthdate. Because of such approval, the
notes of the adjustments of the date of birth of petitioner were sent to the
Auditor General and the Commissioner of Civil Service where the proceeds of
petitioner’s policy were re-computed.

The adjustment included the issuance of a new life policy no. of the petitioner,
therefore extending it. Almost three years after Mr. Andal approved the change
of petitioner’s date of birth, Mr. Ismael Mathay then Auditor of the Central
Bank detailed to the Philippine National Bank, wrote the Board of Trustees of
the GSIS about the service of the petitioner, who was continuously paid even
after reaching the age of 65, which is the compulsory retirement age from the
government service. This advice was sent to the Board of Trustees of GSIS.
Upon knowing which, the Board of Trustees of GSIS adopted the disputed
resolution of the Legal Counsel of GSIS, thereby denying the request for change
of birthdate of the petitioner.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the GSIS Board of Trustees acted within its powers when it
reversed the approval by General Manager Andal of petitioner's request for the
change of his date of birth 

RULING:

The court decided to uphold the superior authority of the Board over the
General Manager and to dismiss this petition. It is thus obvious that by
express statutory authority, the Board of Trustees directly manages the System
and the General Manager is only the chief executive officer of the Board. In the
exercise of its power to adopt rules and regulations for the administration of
the System and the transaction of its business, the Board may lodge in the
General Manager the authority to act on any matter the Board may deem
proper, but in no wise can such conferment of authority be considered as a full
and complete delegation resulting in the diminution, much less exhaustion, of
the Board's own statutorily-based prerogative and responsibility to manage the
affairs of the System and, accordingly, to decide with finality any matter
affecting its transactions or business.

In other words, even if the Board may entrust to the General Manager the
power to give final approval to applications for retirement annuities, the finality
of such approval cannot be understood to divest the Board, in appropriate
cases and upon its attention being called to a flaw, mistake or irregularity in
the General Manager's action, of the authority to exercise its power of
supervision and control which flows naturally from the ultimate and final
responsibility for the proper management of the System imposed upon it by the
charter.

Although there were substantial changes made because of the approval made
by Mr. Andal, these actions cannot make the GSIS guilty for laches or estoppel
since as a general rule, actuations by the government do not create laches or
estoppel. Further, it was only thru Mr. Mathay’s letter that the Board knew
about Mr. Andal’s action. For the sake of inequity, the Board was convinced
that the originally recorded date of birth should not be disturbed, since said
recorded date of birth was used uniformly by the petitioner decades back in all
his official records.With regards to the petitioner’s contention that he was
denied due process as when he was not notified about Mr. Mathay’s letter, the
court ruled that procedures established by GSIS does not require notice and
hearing.

Finally, with regards to petitioner’s argument that the Board’s action impaired
his constitutional right of the obligations of his contract, the court ruled that
retirement of government employees is imposed by law and is not a result of
any contractual stipulations. Petition in this case is DISMISSED.

GSIS v. CSC
G.R. Nos. 98395-102449, June 19, 1995

FACTS:

G.R. No. 98395

Dr. Manuel Baradero was a government employee, who occupied the position of
Medical Officer IV in the Philippine Medical Care Commission, until he reached
the mandatory age of retirement of 65 years old.

He served the Philippine Army as an enlisted man from 1942 to 1945. He

resumed his government career on January 1976, when he was elected a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of La Castellana, Negros
Occidental where he received per diem for every session attended. He resigned
from the Sangguniang Bayan on October 1976. On 1978, he was appointed
Medical Officer I at the Philippine Medical Care Commission, where he served
until he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years old.

Prior to turning 65 years old, Dr. Baradero applied for compulsory retirement
with GSIS, which credited in his favor 13 years of government service,
excluding his term as a Sangguniang Bayan member. He requested an
extension of service from the CSC to enable him to complete 15 years of
government service so that he may avail of retirement benefits.

The request was denied by the CSC. Instead, it ruled that Dr. Baradero's two-
year stint as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan be considered as creditable
service, hence completing the mandatory 15-year service and making him
eligible for retirement benefits.

The GSIS contested the resolution, alleging that: (1) Per diem was expressly
excluded in the definition of compensation in RA 1573 on June 16, 1956. Prior
to this, services paid on per diem basis were considered creditable. (2) Per
diems were excluded from the definition of compensation because “per diems,
by themselves are usually of minimal amounts which cannot actually support
an insurance coverage." (3) In the case of the late Commissioner Inocencio V.
Ferrer of the Social Security System, Commissioner Ferrer received per diems
not only for attending meetings of the Commission but also for hearing cases
as hearing officer. With the almost daily hearings of Commissioner Ferrer, he
was said to have been performing fulltime service and received substantial
amount of per diems such that "the socalled per diems that he received were
not really per diems but compensation.” Hence, his services as hearing
Commissioner were considered creditable, but his per diem for attending the
board meetings were excluded in the computation of his retirement benefits.

The GSIS advised that the CSC extend the services of Dr. Baradero until he
completes the required 15 years so that he may avail of retirement benefits.

CSC issued an order directing the GSIS to implement its prior ruling. GSIS
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, which was denied by the CSC
and further directed the former to comply with the CSC resolution and order
under pain of contempt.

The Solicitor General is of the opinion that the CSC's resolutions and order
crediting such services were in violation of the law, and encroached on the
power of the GSIS to administer and implement retirement laws. He therefore
recommended that the instant petition be given due course.

G.R. No. 102449

Matilde Belo retired from the government service on 1988. At the time of her
retirement, Belo was the Vice-Governor of Capiz in a hold-over capacity. She
served as Governor of Capiz from 1972 to 1988.

As an elected government official, Belo received a fixed salary of P13, 000.00

per annum from January 1976 until December 1976. Thereafter, she held the
same position in a hold-over capacity and was remunerated as follows: (1) from
December 1976 to January 1979, she received per diem for every session
attended of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and (2) from December 1979 to
February 1988, she received a fixed salary ranging from P23,000.00 to
P45,000.00 per annum.

Belo sought an opinion from the CSC to determine if the service she rendered
in which period she was paid on a per diem basis is creditable for retirement
purposes. CSC affirmed it.

Belo's application for retirement was referred to the GSIS Committee on

Claims, which adopted a position contrary to that of the CSC. Later on, GSIS
received the Order which directed its President and General Manager to show
cause why they should not be held in contempt for the delay in the
implementation of CSC Resolution.

The GSIS filed its "Manifestation/Explanation," alleging that it cannot

implement the resolution considering that it has a pending petition for
certiorari before this Court in the case of Dr. Baradero (G.R. No. 98395), where
the same issue was raised.
CSC issued an order finding the President and General Manager of GSIS guilty
of indirect contempt. The CSC noted that the mere pendency of the case of Dr.
Baradero cannot prevent the implementation of its resolution unless this Court
issues a temporary restraining order, and that said case had nothing to do with
the case of Belo.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the government service rendered on a per diem basis creditable for computing the
length of service for retirement purposes; and 2. Whether or not GSIS is the proper government
agency in determining what service is creditable for retirement purposes.

RULING:

Section 35 of Government Service Insurance Act of 1987 vests in GSIS the

power to implement the provisions of said law, which includes the guaranty of
retirement benefits. Under the epigraph "Benefits," Section 10 thereof provides
for the computation of service, and reads: xxx xxx xxx Computation of Service.
— For the purpose of this section, the term service shall include full time
service with compensation: Provided, That part-time and other services with
compensation may be included under such rules and regulations prescribed by
the System.

It is therefore material in the claim of retirement benefits that the employee

should have rendered service with compensation.

"Compensation" is defined by Section 1(c) of R.A. No. 1573, which amended

Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186 (Government Service Insurance Act), thus: (c)
"Salary, pay, or compensation" shall be construed as to exclude all bonuses,
per diems, allowances and overtime pay, or salary, pay or compensation given
in addition to the base pay of the position or rank as fixed by law or
regulations.

A similar definition is provided in Section 2(i) of P.D. No. 1146: (i)

Compensation — the basic pay or salary received by an employee, pursuant to
his employment/appointments, excluding per diems, bonuses, overtime pay,
and allowances.

The law is very clear in its intent to exclude per diem in the definition of
"compensation." Originally, per diem was not among those excluded in the
definition of compensation, not until the passage of the amending laws which
redefined it to exclude per diem.

The law not only defines the word "compensation," but it also distinguishes it
from other forms of remunerations. Such distinction is significant not only for
purposes of computing the contribution of the employers and employees to the
GSIS but also for computing the employees' service record and benefits.

In essence, the grant of retirement benefits necessitates an obligation on the

part of the employee to contribute to the insurance fund of petitioner. Such
obligation only arises where the employee is receiving "salary, pay or
compensation" and not per diem, which is not capable of paying off the
premium contributions to petitioner.

The Joint Civil Service Commission, Department of Budget and Management

and Government Service Insurance System Circular No. 1-89 is also clear that
services rendered on a per diem bases are not creditable for retirement
purposes. It likewise confirms that it is the GSIS, and not the CSC which is the
proper agency in determining services which are creditable for retirement
purposes.

In Profeta v. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 (1992), we ruled that the GSIS has the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a member is qualified
or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D. No. 1146, based on its
computation of a member's years of government service. By analogy, we
reiterate our ruling in the cases at bench.

The case of Commissioner Inocencio V. Ferrer of the Social Security System is

unapplicable. While it is true that Commissioner Ferrer was granted retirement
benefits notwithstanding being paid on a per diem basis, we find merit in the
GSIS explanation that the grant was consistent with its policy, since the service
which was creditable in Commissioner Ferrer's favor was his full time service
as Hearing Officer, and not his attendance at board meetings, which was not
credited.

Anent the CSC's power to "administer the retirement program . . . and accredit
government services . . . for retirement" (Administrative Code of 1987, Book V,
Chapter 3, Section 12), we rule that CSC role is ministerial. "Accredit" merely
means acknowledge. It must not be confused with the power to determine what
service is creditable for retirement purposes. It has been established that such
power belongs to the GSIS.

Private respondents both claim that retirement laws must be liberally

interpreted in favor of the retirees. However, the doctrine of liberal construction
cannot be applied in the instant petitions, where the law invoked is clear,
unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretation or construction.
 Cruz v Secretary of DENR
GR No. 135385 December 6, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous
People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership
over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

RULING:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the
IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over
the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the
natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the
rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on
which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of
the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native
title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any
royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by
the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and
does not include the right to alienate the same.