Name: Achuh Owen Teheng. Email: achuowen@gmail.

com

ESSAY
Case Study: MACEDONIA

Introduction.

The Republic of Macedonia is a small landlocked country located in the central Balkan Peninsula in
Southeast Europe, with mountains overlooking a valley. It is one of the successor states of the former
Yugoslavia, from which it gained independence in 1991. The Republic of Macedonia is bordered by Kosovo
to the northwest, Serbia to the north, Bulgaria to the east, Greece to the south, and Albania to the west. It
became a member of the United Nations in 1993, but, as a result of an ongoing dispute with Greece over
use of the name Macedonia, it was admitted under the provisional reference of the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (abbreviated FYROM). Macedonia is also a member of the Council of Europe.
Since December 2005 it has also been a candidate for joining the European Union and has applied for
NATO membership. It was the only former Yugoslav republic to gain its independence without a war. The
transition for Macedonia represented multiple challenges: from a federal unit to independence, from a
planned economy to a market-based one, and from a single party system to a pluralistic democracy. This
essay is divided into three main chapters: the first gives an overview of the cleavages and main socio-
political division and the type of regime. The second chapter examines the political party system together
with civil society and social movements. The third and last chapter is dedicated to considerations and
thoughts on the problems that can be encountered during an electoral observation task in such a multi-
ethnic country.

Chapter I

CLEAVAGES / MAIN SOCIO-POLITICAL DIVISION AND THE TYPE OF REGIME

A. CLEAVAGES AND MAIN SOCIO-POLITICAL DIVISION

Macedonia, Europe’s youngest nation, after its third free parliamentary election in its short and
turbulent history is still coping with “ethnic” quarrels in internal affairs with a foreign policy, which aims to
avert national claims of its neighbours, often called the “Four Wolves” – Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania and
Greece. Hardly any other country in Europe is probably regarded by its neighbours as much of an
imposition as the Republic of Macedonia. Until recently, the country could not settle any treaties with
Bulgaria because Bulgaria did not accept Macedonian as a proper language. It is true that Bulgaria was
among the first states to officially recognize the Republic of Macedonia. But it denied a Macedonian
nation and it considers its inhabitants to be Bulgarian. The Greeks speak of a “brutal rape of history.” For
they confiscate the historic regional term of Macedonia for their own Hellenistic national project. Radical
Serbs on the other hand consider Macedonia to be Serbian. They point to the Empire of Stefan Dusan,
who resided in Skopje at the end of his reign (1331-1355). Fanatic Albanians demand a “Greater Albania”
which is to comprise parts of Montenegro, Greece, West-Macedonia and the province of Kosova. Even
after the NATO intervention in Kosova, however, it is still a minority only who raises these claims.
The domestic political situation is equally tricky. Political debates and parties are formed almost
exclusively along “ethnic” cleavages. Ironically, those parties who cater most exclusively for competing
“ethnic” constituencies won the election in October 1998, consequently bridging their ideological gaps
and forming a governing coalition. The strongest party is the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary
Organization – Democratic Party for the Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), and is the most
radical representative of “ethnic” Macedonian claims. Despite this, it took with it the distinctly “ethnic”
Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) into government, and was finally joined by the center-oriented
Democratic Alternative (DA). The second paradox followed shortly thereafter in November 1999: The
VMRO also succeeded to push through its presidential candidate Boris Trajkovski – and to a large extent, it
was the “Albanian” vote which decided the race in favour of him against the social democrat Tito
Petkovski. This constellation surprisingly shows that Ethno-national counterparts seem to cooperate more
easily with one another than with political parties which attempt to transcend ethnic cleavages. According
to the data from the elections in 1991, it can be seen that 4 minority parties won 24 from 120 seats. The
Party of Democratic Prosperity won 17 seats, Peoples Democracy Party won 1, PDP-NDP won 5, the Party
of Emancipation of the Roma’s won 1 seat. At the election in 1994, 5 minority parties won 21
parliamentary seats: PDPA won 13, DPA (Democratic Party of Albanians) won 4 seats, Democratic Party of
the Turkish in Macedonia with Party for Democratic Action won 1 seat, Democratic Alliance of Albanians
won 1 seat and the Party of Emancipation of the Roma’s won 2 seats.
Nationalities: Macedonia is made up of peoples from different nationalities. The population was
about 2,060,563 in 2010 with a multi-ethnic and multi-national composition. The precise breakdown of
the Macedonian population by ethnic affiliation according to the census of 2002 is Macedonian 64.8%,
Albanian 25.17%, Turkish 3.58%, Roma 2.66%, Serb 1.78%, Vlach 0.48%, Bosniac 0.84% and Other 1.04%
Languages: The official and most widely spoken language is Macedonian, which belongs to the
Eastern branch of the South Slavic language group. Macedonian is closely related to and mutually
intelligible with Standard Bulgarian. It also has some similarities with standard Serbian and the
intermediate Torlakian and Shop dialects spoken mostly in southern Serbia and western Bulgaria (and by
speakers in the north and east of Macedonia). The standard language was codified in the period following
World War II and has accumulated a thriving literary tradition. Although it is the only language explicitly
designated as an official national language in the constitution, in municipalities where at least 20% of the
population is part of another ethnic minority, those individual languages are used for official purposes in
local government, alongside Macedonian. According to the last census, 1,344,815 Macedonian citizens
declared that they spoke Macedonian, 507,989 declared Albanian, 71,757 Turkish, 38,528 Romani, 6,884
Aromanian, 24,773 Serbian, 8,560 Bosnian, and 19,241 spoke other languages. A wide variety of languages
are spoken in Macedonia, reflecting its ethnic diversity. Besides the official national language,
Macedonian, minority languages with substantial numbers of speakers are Albanian, Romani, Turkish
(including Balkan Gagauz, Serbian/Bosnian and Aromanian (including Megleno-Romanian). There are a few
villages of Adyghe speakers and an immigrant Greek community. Macedonian Sign Language is the
primary language of those of the deaf community who did not pick up an oral language in childhood.
Religion: Eastern Orthodoxy is the majority faith of the Republic of Macedonia making up 64.7% of
the population, the vast majority of which belong to the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Various other
Christian denominations account for 0.37% of the population. Muslims comprise 33.3% of the population;
Macedonia has the fifth-highest proportion of Muslims in Europe, after those of Turkey (96%), Kosovo
(90%), Albania (56.7%), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (45%). Most Muslims are Albanians, Turks, or Roma,
although few are Macedonian Muslims. The remaining 1.63% is recorded as "unspecified" in the 2002
national census.
Altogether, there were 1,842 churches and 580 mosques in the country at the end of 2011. The
Orthodox and Islamic religious communities have secondary religion schools in Skopje. There is an
Orthodox theological college in the capital. The Macedonian Orthodox Church has jurisdiction over 10
provinces (seven in the country and three abroad), has 10 bishops and about 350 priests. A total of 30,000
people are baptized in all the provinces every year.
There is a tension between the Macedonian and Serbian Orthodox Churches which arose from the
former's separation and self-declared autocephaly in 1967. After the negotiations between the two
churches were suspended, the Serbian Orthodox Church recognized a group led by Zoran Vraniškovski
(also known as Archbishop Jovan of Ohrid, a former Macedonian church bishop, as the Archbishop of
Ohrid.
The reaction of the Macedonian Orthodox Church was to cut off all relations with the new Ohrid
Archbishopric and to prevent bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church from entering Macedonia. Bishop
Jovan was jailed for 18 months for "defaming the Macedonian Orthodox church and harming the religious
feelings of local citizens" by distributing Serbian Orthodox church calendars and pamphlets. The
Macedonian Byzantine Catholic Church has approximately 11,000 adherents in Macedonia. The Church
was established in 1918, and is made up mostly of converts to Catholicism and their descendants. The
Church is of the Byzantine Rite and is in communion with the Roman and Eastern Catholic Churches. Its
liturgical worship is performed in Macedonian. There is a small Protestant community. The most famous
Protestant in the country is the late president Boris Trajkovski. He was from the Methodist community,
which is the largest and oldest Protestant church in the Republic, dating back to the late 19th century.
Since the 1980s the Protestant community has grown, partly through new confidence and partly with
outside missionary help. The Macedonian Jewish community, which numbered some 7,200 people on the
eve of World War II, was almost entirely destroyed during the war: only 2% of Macedonian Jews survived
the Holocaust. After their liberation and the end of the War, most opted to emigrate to Israel. Today, the
country's Jewish community numbers approximately 200 persons, almost all of whom live in Skopje. Most
Macedonian Jews are Sephardic – the descendants of 15th-century refugees who had fled the Spanish and
Portuguese Inquisitions.
For during the last decade the different levels of the term “Macedonia” have been considerably
confused. “In Macedonia, the concept of a nation has created a lot of confusion,” says Ivan Toshevski, the
Macedonian ambassador to the United Nations in New York. The country’s politicians, historians and
journalists are strongly stirring this explosive mixture, consciously or carelessly. Few actors, if any,
distinguish the political- etatist, the “ethnic” and the historic-regional term. If the three levels of meaning
of “Macedonia” were clearly distinguished, there would be a chance to reduce the subjective feeling of
“imposition” towards the existence of the Macedonian state.
 The Political-Etatist Term.
“We are Macedonians. We are all citizens of this country,” says Kiro Gligorov. “On the ethnically
colourfully mixed Balkans it is impossible to form compact nation states, in which only members of one
nation live. “We see Macedonia as a multi-ethnic state, in which Macedonians, Albanians, Serbs and other
Slavs live,” says Xheladin Murati, member of the moderate Albanian Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP).
Legally, the Republic of Macedonia has created a constitutional state for all “ethnic” groups and
nationalities. The preamble of the constitution stresses the “full equality” and the “permanent co-
existence” of the “Macedonian people” with “Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanics and other nationalities
living in the Republic of Macedonia.” The meaning of the term Macedonia/Macedonians is thus related to
what is written in the citizens’ identity cards. This is close to the French national concept of the citoyen,
however, without mentioning the word “citizen” even once.
Article 48 of the constitution states: members of nationalities have a right to freely express, foster
and develop their identity and national attributes. The Republic guarantees the protection of the ethnic,
cultural, linguistic and religious identity of the nationalities.” This political-etatist concept is firmly in the
minds of many Albanians, Turks, and other groups in the country. The majority consider themselves to be
“Macedonians” of Albanian, Turkish origin, and they prefer to continue living in “Macedonia,” even though
they are not fully satisfied with the rights granted to them.

The parliamentary leader of the PDP, Ismet Ramadani agrees, “The Albanians fully and strongly
support the Macedonian nation.” With the following statement, he refers equally to the etatist nation
concept of Macedonia: “We want to solve all the problems within our institutions.” Ramadani sees the
PDP as balancing on a tight rope, considering the dissatisfaction of the Albanian population. This mediator
position became even trickier when the PDP had been voluntarily integrated into the coalition
government by the Social Democratic League of Macedonia (SDSM) in 1994. Since the last parliamentary
election in October 1998 both the PDP and the social democrats have been united again – on the
opposition benches. This is not a coincidence. For, as already hinted, it turned out that “ethnically”
oriented parties – even from the extreme opposite sides – were able to cooperate better politically than
they did with the PDP and SDSM who try to transcend these “ethnic” cleavages. For this purpose, the PDP
wants to get even closer to the French concept of citoyen than the constitution does. Ramadani pledges to
replace the “nationalities” in the preamble with “citizens” and to erase article 48 completely. Citizens’
rights are the rights of all nationalities, he says, they do not need any further subdivisions. “There is no
chance that the Macedonians will assimilate the Albanians. And there is no chance that the Albanians will
assimilate the Macedonians,” says Ramadani. This is why he strives to replace the “ethnic” concept by a
political concept of citizens. The PDP-politician, however, rejects a “crash solution” which could lead to
further “ethnic” conflicts. He holds that a constitutional change has to come about softly.

Ivan Toshevski has similar ideas. He is special negotiator in the Macedonian-Greek talks held in
New York and chairman of the Working Group for Missing Persons of the United Nations Human Rights
Commission. “When you say the ethnic Albanians (or Turks, for example) are a national minority in
Macedonia, this mean[s] [...]that they are an ethnic, linguistic, or religious minority of the Macedonian
nation!” For him, state and nation are “Siamese twins.” He cites Switzerland as an example, where there
are no “ethnic” groups or nations but only Swiss of different mother tongues.
 Toshevski considers the “ethnic” theory of nation to be undemocratic. For example, he criticizes
the Croatian constitution as fostering “constitutional nationalism” in that its preamble describes Croatia as
a “national state of the Croatian people and a state of the other peoples and minorities that are its citizens
(Serbs, Muslims, etc.).” According to Toshevski, this excludes Serbs and Muslims from the Croatian nation
and reduces them to second-class citizens. He sees Macedonia as a counter model to the Croatian concept
of nation.

This makes Toshevski one of the most distinct critics of the present Macedonian Constitution.
Relating to the preamble, he says: “It is clear that the meaning of the words nation and national is purely
ethnic. I have the impression that this part of our Constitution looks more like an ethnic map than a
contemporary political legal document.” According to him, the root of the evil is that the preamble talks of
a “national state of the Macedonian people.” These terms, he says, were taken over all too uncritically
from the constitutions of the republics of the former Yugoslavia. He concludes: “The Republic of
Macedonia should neither have been nor should it remain a ‘national state of the Macedonian people’,
but the unique and inseparable nation that is comprised of all its citizens, regardless of language, religion
or customs or any other attributes. There are only Macedonians in the Republic of Macedonia! This is the
only civic and democratic formula on the basis of which the Constitution must be changed, considering the
declarative determinations for our full accession to Europe.” With this criticism in mind, the question
remains whether those political representatives of the country who speak of an "etatist" Macedonia really
mean it. Are they are conscious of the problem which they create when they confuse the political and
“ethnic” meanings of the word nation? Or do they pursue a kind of nepotism in favour of “ethnic”
Macedonians – and thus in favour of the majority of votes in the country.

These questions create potential points of attack. During the 1994 election campaign, Angelka
Peeva, the Vice President of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) reproached the government for “playing
the card of inter-ethnic conflict.” “Always when an economic crisis comes up, the inter-ethnic tensions get
the first news in the state-owned television, not the economic questions.” she said. According to Peeva,
the LDP stands for a clearly articulated cross-ethnic and economically orientated policy. Paradoxically,
however, she did not follow the Western European concept of the citizens’ state. Instead, she stuck to the
“ethnic” orientation of the constitution. “This is the Balkans,” she justified her view. “If you delete the
nationalities from the constitution, you will die!”

The political success of Macedonia depends decisively on its capacity to accommodate ethno-
political claims. Natasha Gaber, author of a study on the Macedonian voting system, pleaded to loosen the
majority voting system. People, she said, had ceased to vote in “ethnic” blocks: “Things are ripening.
Earlier, we had one Albanian party only. Now we have three. This is healthy. For such a big group cannot
have one single interest.” The votes cast by many Albanians for the VMRO presidential candidate in 1999
supports her view in an unprecedented manner.

On the opposite side, law-professor Gorgi Ivanov favoured keeping the majority vote system. “The
parliament must be a strong decision-maker beyond ethnic cleavages which is able to solve problems of
every-day life, like economics,” Ivanov said. What he has in mind is to remove “ethnic” conflicts from the
parliamentary agenda and address them instead through a Council for “ethnic” Affairs. According to his
ideas, it should be elected through proportional representation as a second chamber and cope with
language-problems, questions of education etc.

Ivanov holds the consensus-model of Arend Lijphart – including proportional representation and
clear power-sharing mechanisms – to be misplaced in an environment of “ethnic” tensions. This model, he
said, already paralyzed the executive power in today’s Bosnia-Hercegovina. Finally, before the
parliamentary elections in October 1998, a compromise on the voting system was adopted similar to the
German one. It is a mixed version of proportional representation (party lists) and majority vote (direct
candidates), with a scale of 85:35 seats in the parliament of 120 members.

These debates show that politicians and scientists in Macedonia are trying to bridge “ethnic” cleavages by
converting them into social and economic ones by new institutions. Thus, Samuel P. Huntington’s
observations are turned upside down. Pointing to societal transitions, he stated: “The primary problem of
politics is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change.”
However, in Macedonia, like in the other republics of the former Yugoslavia, institutions are being sought
and created which are themselves supposed to bring about societal change and to help overcome the
“ethnic” orientation of politics.

If this endeavour succeeds, the political nation concept of the Republic of Macedonia could be
strengthened. In this way, the country would gain plausibility and legitimacy.

 The “Ethnic” Term.

The confusion between the political-etatist and the “ethnic” terms of Macedonia is present both
in the country’s mass media and in every-day life. This worries neighbouring countries and the internal
non-Macedonian minorities (in the “ethnic” sense). As already stated above, even the Macedonian
constitution has failed to make a clear distinction between these two notions. Journalists, politicians and
historians are trying to carve out the long tradition of the Macedonian ethnicity. Therefore, they
frequently air new “historic proofs.” This is very similar to what Eric J. Hobsbawm observed. He said that
nation building goes with the “invention of traditions” in order to create “ethnic” solidarity. “Modern
nations and all their impedimenta generally claim to be the opposite of novel, namely rooted in the
remotest antiquity, and the opposite of constructed, namely human communities so ‘natural’ as to require
no definition other than self-assertion.” Ernest Gellner points it and says that nationalism is gaining
importance only when people, folk and mass culture become artificial.
Whereas the official Bulgarian and Greek positions thoroughly deny a Macedonian “ethnicity”, the
“ethnic Macedonians” tirelessly point to a “long history”, which is to legitimize them as an (“ethnic”)
nation. Dependent on which magazine one picks or which literature one reads, the “Macedonian
consciousness” begins in the 10th, in the 19th or in the 20th century. The handbook on the country,
published by the Macedonian government, emphasizes: “The first Macedonian Slav state was the Kingdom
of Samuel (976-1018). The tradition of this state has remained deeply rooted into the minds of the
Macedonian people”, and later on: “The 19th century is a period of growth of national awareness among
the Macedonian people.”
Georgi Ivanov holds that an “ethnic” consciousness of the Macedonians has come up in the 1820s
as a reaction to the upcoming nation state of the Greeks. Another option would be to take the
Osmanization during the 14th and 15th centuries as a cut and an impulse for the process of “ethnic”
identification.
In September 1997, the government-friendly newspaper The Macedonian Times proclaimed
euphorically, that the Russian historian Zhila Lenina found three documents from 1829 in the central
archive of St. Petersburg; a poem on Macedonia, a proclamation for the Macedonian people, and a
memorandum to the chief of the Second Russian Army, who was supposed to free Macedonia from its
“misfortunes.” Probably referring to the actual flag of the Republic, the paper was titled: “The Bright Sun
Rises in the East” and concluded that the documents “included the formation of a vast Macedonian state,
but not a separate state of Bulgaria.”
This is a typical construction of national history in the Gellnerian sense. It is supposed to reach as
far into the past as possible. For Gellner, this is a characteristic corner stone of nation building. In this
context, Stefan Troebst emphasizes the flexibility and dynamics of the “ethnic” and the national concept.
He points to the different “states of aggregation” of social cohesion which distinguish ethnicities, nations,
and nationalism (Georg Elwert32). The term “nationalism” is differentiated by Miroslav Hroch and his
model of three phases. In this concept, the idea of a nation can turn from elitist circles to the agitation of
minorities to a mass-based movement. Young Macedonia is about to enter the third phase.
Troebst sees the Macedonian process of nation building as a perfect example of Gellner’s theory
of nationalism. Since the foundation of the Yugoslav republic this construction was conducted in haste and
hurry: “National language, national literature, national history and national church were not available in
1944, but they were accomplished in a short time. The south-east-Slavic regional idiom of the area of
Prilep-Veles was codified as the script, normed orthographically by means of the Cyrillic Alphabet, and
taken over immediately by the newly created media.” And the people have been patching up the national
history ever since. Thus, they are forming more of an “ethnic” than a political concept of nation.
The linguistic history, in particular, is experiencing its high season. On the 24th of May, the
Macedonians (or better: their historians) celebrate “the Day of Slav Enlightenment and Culture.” “We, the
Macedonians [...] feel this celebration with pride,” proclaimed The Macedonian Times in May 1997. It is
the clerical scholars Cyril and Methodius who are put up against the Bulgarian nationalists. In the 9th
century, they had developed the first Macedonian script in Ohrid by standardizing the aforementioned
regional idiom. Thus, the Slavic alphabet and literature had been created “as an everlasting flame [which]
lit the path through the centuries of darkness, heroic deeds, fame and slavery.” The Macedonian Times
emphasized that Cyril and Methodius had additionally pushed forward Christianization in the Balkans –
Christianizing the Macedonians before the Bulgarians. With this evidence, the author intended to reject
any Bulgarian claims on the two Saints, and on the Macedonian language as such. Historic justifications of
this kind can be found in each edition of the Macedonian Times and many other papers. The permanent
emphasis on the “ethnic”-Macedonian creates a climate of mistrust and irritation. It also triggers
defensive reactions among the minorities.
The Albanians have, for a long time, raised claims to introduce their tongue as the second official
language. The field of education has been particularly affected by the controversy. The so-called Mala
Recica University in the predominantly Albanian city of Tetovo has called into question Albanian loyalty to
the Macedonian state. Albanian students want to take lessons there in Albanian, although the
Macedonian constitution provides this for primary and secondary schools only. The former Macedonian
government had even taken the risk of bloodshed in order to prevent the lessons. Another conflict broke
out over the use of Albanian and Turkish flags which were hoisted provocatively over official buildings in
the cities of Tetovo and Gostivar. Riots broke out when the police tore them off on July 9th, 1997.
 It is precisely Gellner’s criteria of nation-building which are stirring the moods: The national use of
education, language and symbols. The political concept of nation has got visible cracks. In such an
environment, former President Gligorov’s attempt to calm down the flag controversy did not help much,
although he conjured the political state project: “Respect and duties toward the state also encompasses
respecting the state symbols, because they express the territorial integrity, independence of the state and
the right of all citizens of Macedonia to decide about their destiny.” With Gellner’s criteria as a
measurement, several nations are being formed on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. This is also
reflected in the societal discourses which follow “ethnic” cleavages. The Albanian and the Macedonian
media alike follow the “ethnic” nation project of their respective clients. “Unfortunately, journalists spread
the ethnic hatred,” complains Aleksandar Damovski, chief editor of the independent daily Dnevnik. He
even observes an increase in “ethnic” thinking among the young colleagues: “We are living in parallel roles
without crossroads between our worlds.”

The police reports and the government papers always mention the “ethnic” origin of a criminal,
says Damovski. “We get the impression that all Albanians are smugglers and muggers.” On the other hand:
“When you hit a smuggler with a club on his head, he says this is because of ethnic reasons,” jokes Georgi
Ivanov. The high standards of minority rights granted by the constitution seem, in comparison, to have
only little effect on the moods.

Mistrust of the country’s neighbours is another consequence. With the same frequency as articles
appear on language and national history, there are reports on Macedonian minorities in neighboring
countries. The Macedonian Times claims that “practical and statistical genocide” was done to
Macedonians in Bulgaria, Albania and Greece.

Above all, a study by law professor Vladimir Ortakovski has sparked debates on “ethnic”
minorities. He criticized neighbouring states of not recognizing the Macedonians who live in their
countries. Indeed, Bulgarians and Greeks deny the existence of Macedonian minorities. For the Bulgarians
see Macedonians as Bulgarians anyway, and the Greeks see them as a mixture of Slavs, Albanians and
Turks etc.

Ortakovski hailed Macedonia as an example for its neighbours because, he said, minority rights
were dealt with there in an exemplary way. He stated enthusiastically “Luckily, the process of
disintegration could stop in our country, because throughout its history and in its collective memory there
have been no ethnic clashes, and the equal position of minorities has always been one of the clearly stated
and realized principles.” This quotation shows clearly a mixing of the “ethnic” and the political term of
nation. With “history” and “collective memory” he refers to the “ethnic” term of nation; with the “equal
position of minorities” he probably refers to the situation of the Republic as a political project.

The same kind of confusion was apparent in a remark by the former Macedonian foreign minister,
Blagoj Handzhiski, directed against the Greeks: “I think the knowledge that our name, which we had for
centuries, is connected with our identity – is ripening and nobody has the right to demand changes of the
constitutional name of the country!” With the “century-long tradition” he refers to the – supposed or
actual – Macedonian “ethnicity”. The name, of course, is connected with the Republic which, however,
does not exist out of “ethnic” Macedonians only.

With such a fragile situation in the young state, a meticulous statistic science of minorities cannot
remain a purely academic project. The interest of the Macedonian media (in the “ethnic” sense!) and the
prominence of Ortakovski’s studies show that numbers do indeed make politics. The OSCE observers, too,
had to go through this experience when they supervised the census in 1994. Albanians still contest the
results. Albanian refugees from Kosova could finally tip the delicate demographic and political balance.

The (“ethnic”) Macedonians justify their reference to minorities on the other side of their borders
with the high standards which European institutions demand from the Republic in respect to minority
rights. However, in an international surrounding as tenuous as Macedonia’s, it does make little sense to
pass on the blame to the neighbouring “wolves.” The Macedonians should rather look ahead, try to bring
their own house in order, and strive for good neighbourly relations in order to solve minority problems
instead of creating new reasons for domestic and international affronts.

 The Historic-Regional Term

“Mother Macedonia is very weakened. After it gave birth to Saint Cyril and Methodius, mother
Macedonia is lying, very weak and exhausted.” Here, the ancient term gets mixed up with the “ethnic”-
Macedonian one. The national appropriation of Cyril and Methodius, and the simultaneous appropriation
of Alexander the Great can only terrify neighbouring Greece. Things are further complicated since the
Greek position also claims the name “Macedonia” for its own Hellenistic-nationalistic state project.

The irony is not lost when both sides refer ardently to the writers and heroes of antique Greece and
Macedonia. The bust of Alexander the Great stands in the corner of a conference room in the foreign
ministry in Skopje. The Macedonian Times published a series on ancient history; one particular article was
titled “Arguments for the Undying Saga of Ancient Macedonia.” Interestingly, the relatively progressive
constitution of the Republic of Macedonia contains precautions against such attempts of appropriation. In
this context, there is again a juxtaposition of the political-etatist and the historic-regional term. The
constitution was amended in two important ways on January 6th, 1992:

- The Republic of Macedonia has no territorial claims against neighbouring states.

- The borders of the Republic of Macedonia could be changed only in accordance with the Constitution,
and based on the principle of voluntariness and generally accepted international norms.
- The Republic shall not interfere in the sovereign rights of other states and their internal affairs.

But what is the reality? The Greek position points to, above all, the existing political forces who
strive for a “Greater-Macedonia”. The strongest representative of this position has been the presently
ruling VMRO – which has conquered the political stage with the party attribute DPMNE. The VMRO itself
was founded as a resistance movement in Thessaloniki in 1893. It fought not only against the Ottoman
rule but also against Greek and Serb claims on Macedonia.

Radical members of VMRO demand a unification of the three parts of the historic region of
Macedonia: Pirin Macedonia in southern Bulgaria, the Republic of Macedonia and the Greek regions of
Macedonia, including its capital Thessaloniki. The VMRO-DPMNE’s wing which demands a unification of
the Republic of Macedonia with Bulgaria has been particularly vocal. They often make reference to Gotse
Delchev, the founder of the VMRO. Macedonians cherish him as a Macedonian national hero, and
Bulgarians do the same. “Some Macedonian politicians have grown beards like Gotse Delchev had one,”
says Nano Ruzin, a member of parliament for the SDSM, and a sociologist. With this knowledge, it
becomes clear why moderate “ethnic” Macedonians consider the VMRO to be the most important internal
enemy, and Bulgaria as the most important external one. Both threaten their young state project.

Obviously, the different levels of meaning ascribed to the term “Macedonia” serve to justify
particular positions. A contradiction appears among those who advocate the political state project against
the VMRO and Bulgaria, and in the same breath, talk about Cyril and Methodius and the “long historic
consciousness” of a Macedonian people as predecessors of the present Republic.

The Greeks fell into the same argumentative trap during the name controversy with their northern
neighbours. They might have still been on the same level of terminology when they called for a removal of
the Star of Vergina from the Macedonian flag because the symbol had been found on the grave of Philip II
modern day Greece. Both countries’ present territory lies partly in the former historic-regional Macedonia.
Any symbol from the ancient age has no place on the label of a modern national state (this is true for
Macedonia as well as for Greece).

The Greek have tried to fight 20th century political problems through references to Homer,
Herodotus, Pausanias etc. In this endeavour, they refer, among others, to the Olympic Games in ancient
Greece. As an example, they cite the time when the Macedonian Alexander I had applied to participate in
the Games: “His Greek descent was recognized. He could participate in the race, and he arrived at the goal
together with the winner.” Alexander I himself is also quoted, telling the envoys: “Report to the King, who
sent you, that a Greek ruler from Macedonia has received you well.”

The community of Thessaloniki has published a scroll as a tourist souvenir with the “Oath of
Alexander the Great,” in several languages. Within the text, the ruler says to tribal representatives of the
city of Opis in 324 B.C.: “I do not make discriminations between Greeks and barbarians as narrow-minded
people do. [...] I will consider you all equal, white or black. And I would like you to be not only subjects of
my Commonwealth but also participants and partners.” The scroll tries to fight the impression that Greeks
and Macedonians are different people. Such a position is typically articulated by those in the Republic of
Macedonia; the claim is that the Greeks have labelled the Macedonians as “barbarians” without accepting
them as Greeks.

The Macedonians, however, can only legitimately argue consequently against the Greek position if
they stick to their political state project. For they have hardly anything in common with the ancient land of
Macedonia, apart from parts of the territory. The “ethnic” composition of the local population has
fluctuated throughout history. The "core" land of ancient Macedonia was supposedly initially inhabited by
the Dorics. After them, the Celts, Romans, Kumans, Avars, Goths and Slavs passed through the lands, with
continuous “ethnic” mixing. During the 18th century, nomadic clans crossed the territory, mostly Muslim
Albanians. In today’s administrative regions of West-, Central- and East-Macedonia in northern Greece,
the present population originates mainly from Greek immigrants who crossed over from Asia Minor after
the Greek-Turkish war in 1923 (and concurrently, Turks from Greece moved towards the East in great
numbers). Thus, neither Greece nor the Republic of Macedonia can truly substantiate territorial or
population claims to ownership of the historic heritage of “Macedonia”.

On the one hand, Pantelis Giakoumis is correct when he says, “The multinational Republic of
Skopje has equally little to do with the history and the culture of the Macedonians as, for example, the
Germans have to do with Eskimos.” On the other hand, in his argumentation he also confuses historic-
regional terms with the terminology of a modern “nation state” like Greece. Therefore, his attack against
the name and the Republic of Macedonia has equally little to do with his references to ancient history as
Germans have to do with Eskimos – under the condition, that the Macedonians themselves keep apart the
different levels of the terms!

B. TYPE OF REGIME
Macedonia is a parliamentary democracy, whereby the Prime Minister is the head of government,
and of a multi-party system. The current constitution was adopted in November 1991 and the last
amendment was made in 2010. In the Republic of Macedonia, Executive power is exercised by the
government. Legislative power is vested in both the government and parliament. The Judiciary is
independent of the executive and the legislature. Due to the multicultural nature of the Republic, power
sharing is one of the elements used to prevent conflict.

1. The Principle of Separation of Power.

The political system of the Republic of Macedonia consists of three branches: Legislative,
Executive and Judicial. The Constitution is the highest law of the country.

- Legislative Power: The unicameral Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia (Sobranie) is a

representative body of the citizens. Legislative power of the Republic is vested in both the government
and parliament. The organization and functioning of the Assembly are regulated by the Constitution
and by the Rules of Procedure (Art. 61 of the Constitution). The Assembly is composed of 120 to 140
Representatives (Art. 62).
- Executive Power: The executive power is vested in the Government of the Republic of Macedonia. The
Government exercises its rights and competence on the basis and within the framework of the
Constitution and law (Art. 88).
- Judicial Power: Judicial power is exercised by the courts, whose power is autonomous and
independent (Art. 98). The court system consists of a Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, local and
appeals courts, and administrative and higher administrative courts.
Its political system of parliamentary democracy was established with the Constitution of 1991,
which stipulates the basic principles of democracy and guarantees democratic civil freedom. The political
institutions are constituted by the will of its citizens by secret ballot at direct and general elections. The
Elections for Representatives in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia is held in October. The
Assembly is composed of 120 Representatives, who are elected for a period of four years. Out of this
number, 85 are elected according to the majority principle in 85 constituencies and 35 according to the
proportional principle (the territory of the Republic of Macedonia representing one constituency). The
voting for the Representatives according to the majority principle can be conducted in two electoral
rounds, whereas the voting according to the proportional principle ends in the first round.

2. Power Sharing Systems.

Upon independence in 1992, Macedonia was confronted by multiple challenges regarding its
legitimacy. Internationally, it was challenged by Greece, Serbia and Macedonia, while domestically, the
1991 constitution defined Macedonia as the nation-state of Macedonians effectively marginalizing the
large Albanian minority community along with other smaller communities, including Turks, Roma, Serbs
and Muslims. Since that time, the Albanian political parties, some of whom participated in government
since the first free elections in 1990, have argued for greater rights for the Albanian population, in
particular in the educational sector and in terms of representation in the public administration, especially
in the police. One of the main power sharing instruments has been the Framework Agreement, signed in
Ohrid on 13 August 2001 as a means of ending the low-scale insurgence of the Albanian National
Liberation Army (NLA). The main goal of the Ohrid Agreement has been to accommodate the grievances of
the Albanian community, while at the same time addressing the concerns of the Macedonian majority
who fear a ‘federalisation’ of the country and its eventual disintegration. The Agreement introduces some
features of power sharing, such as:
- A system of double majorities requiring consent from minorities represented in parliament to key
decisions of the Sobranie (Parliament),
- A substantial degree of municipal decentralization, proportional representation in the public
administration, as well as confidence-building measures to overcome the immediate consequences of the
2001 conflict. The granting of powerful veto rights to ethnic minorities over laws affecting their vital
interests, has increased recognition of the Albanian language, and a commitment to proportional
representation for ethnic Albanians at all levels of the civil service and police force. In addition, an
informal practice of inclusion of ethnic Albanian political parties and ministers in coalition governments,
dating back to 1991, was continued. These power sharing arrangements have survived several crises to
date, defying the predictions of many.
However, while enhancing the participation of the Albanian community in the state, the
agreement neglects three crucial issues: firstly, the agreement often enhances the rights of the Albanian
community while neglecting the interests of the smaller minorities; secondly, the lack of cross-ethnic
communication, much worsened as a result of the conflict in 2001, remains unaddressed by the Ohrid
Agreement; finally, the agreement and the power-sharing institutions it set-up underplay conflicts within
the communities, especially with respect to both the potential for extremist out-bidding and the
difficulties of advancing cross-community cooperation.
The Agreement outlines a series of constitutional amendments, passed in late 2001 and early
2002, by the Macedonian parliament. It granted languages spoken by more than 20 per cent of the
population (that is, Albanian) official status; introduced a system of double majorities—a majority of all
deputies, as well as of the Macedonian community and a majority support from all minority communities
jointly—for key areas of legislation; established equitable representation in the public administration at
the national and local level; instituted a programme of decentralization; and cleared the way for a multi-
ethnic representative police force. The above notwithstanding, key aspects of power sharing in Macedonia
cut across the following domains: electoral systems, voting mechanism in parliament, coalition
governments, public administration, and decentralization.
The informal nature of power-sharing institutions has given the Macedonian institutional
framework a degree of flexibility absent in most other post-conflict power-sharing arrangements. This
flexibility offers greater opportunities for reducing the significance of ethnic belonging in the political
system and, perhaps in the long run, preventing the dominance of collective over individual identities. At
the same time, the lack of institutionalization of some aspects of power-sharing has had a number of
negative effects on politics in Macedonia. First, it fails to provide the same degree of security for both
Macedonians and Albanians. Second, it provides insufficient protection for the smaller communities. Third,
the informal approach has at times linked government reform, such as decentralization, with ethnic
representation and power sharing. Such an approach was intended to help build cross-communal support
for some aspects of the power-sharing system as it could have been described as a general reform
benefiting all communities. Yet rather than helping to depoliticize communal identity, government
reforms have become ‘ethnified’.

Chapter II
POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM AND CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

A. POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM

The Republic of Macedonia has a multi-party system, with numerous parties which must work
with each other to form coalition governments.
Major Political Parties:

 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National

Unity (Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija-Demokratska Partija za Makedonsko
Nacionalno Edinstvo/Внатрешна Македонска Револуционерна Организација-Партија за
Македонско Национално Единство)
 Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (Socijaldemokratski Sojuz na Makedonija/
Социјалдемократски Сојуз на Македонија)
 Democratic Union for Integration (Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim/Demokratska Unija za
Integracija/Демократска Унија за Интеграција)
 Democratic Party of Albanians (Partia Demokratike Shqiptare/Demokratska Partija na
Albancite/Демократска Партија на Албанците)
 Socialist Party of Macedonia (Socijalisticka Partija na Makedonija/Социјалистичка Партија на
Македонија)
 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–People's Party (Vnatrešna Makedonska
Revolucionerna Organizacija-Narodna Partija/Внатрешна Македонска Револуционерна
Организација-Народна Партија)
 Liberal Democratic Party (Liberalno-Demokratska Partija/Либерално-Демократска Партија)
 Liberal Party of Macedonia (Liberalna Partija na Makedonija/Либерална Партија на Македонија)
 New Social Democratic Party (Nova socijaldemokratska partija/Нова Социјалдемократска
Партија)

Minor Political Parties:

 Democratic Alternative (Demokratska Alternativa/Демократска Алтернатива)

 MAAK-Conservative Party (MAAK-Konzervativna Partija/МААК-Конзервативна Партија)
 Democratic League of Bosniaks (Demokratska Liga na Boshnjacite/Демократска Лига на
Бошњаците)
 Democratic Party of Serbs (Demokratska Partija na Srbite/Демократска Партија на Србите)
 Democratic Party of Turks (Demokratska Partija na Turcite/Демократска Партија на Турците)
 Democratic Union (Demokratski sojuz/Демократски Сојуз)
 National Democratic Party (Nacionala Demokratska Partija/Национална Демократска Партија)
 Union of Tito's Left Forces (Sojuz na Titovi Levi Sili/Сојуз на Титови Леви Сили)
 United Party of Romas in Macedonia (Obedinita Partija na Romite na Makedonija/Обединета
Партија на Ромите во Македонија)
 Workers Party (Rabotnicka Partija/Работничка Партија)
 Movement for Turkish National Union (Türk Milli Birlik Hareketi/Dvizenje za Tursko Nacionalno
Edinstvo/Движенње за Турско Национално Единство)

B. CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS.

The history of Macedonia has had an important impact on the development of the country’s civil
society. Civil society in Macedonia had a significant impact during the period of national renaissance. In
fact, the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed what Macedonian historians often call “a
Macedonian national renaissance”, a reawakening or revival of Macedonian culture, which had lain
dormant for centuries. It was during this period of competing national movements in the Balkans that a
small group of Macedonian intellectuals began to form organizations and publish newspaper and journals
asserting the existence of a unique Macedonian language, culture, and nation. One of the most important
organizations in the independence movement was the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
(VMRO). A number of charity faith-based associations were functioning even before the Second World
War. After the Second World War, the establishment of the State of Macedonia within the federal and
socialist Yugoslavia resulted in important economic, social and cultural development. In that period, the
dominant role of the state had limited the space of the civil society. After the war, and with the beginning
of the modernization, the emergence of many cultural and sports organizations, and later professional
organizations started. During the entire period of socialism, the control of the Communist Party over the
societal organization and associations of citizens was strong. In this period, the role of the churches and
religious organizations was limited considerably, which resulted in almost complete absence of faith-based
organizations, compared to cultural and sports organizations.
After 1990, with the transition, there was an increase of civil society organizations. At the
beginning of the transition, Reformed Communists (the governing party in Macedonia till 1998) introduced
the concept of civil society and sponsored the re-emerging of “non-governmental organizations” in order
to offset the rise of ethnic nationalism and assert control over nationalistic elites.
In Macedonia – like in many other Western Balkan countries - civil society organizations are
predominantly located in urban areas. A significant number of organizations (43%) are registered in the
capital, Skopje, and the majority of others operate in other major cities of the country. CSOs are poorly
represented in rural areas, and organizations here are less well developed organizationally and tend to be
less active than those in urban areas.
The number of organization has significantly increased in the lasts years: in 2003 there where a
total of 5,769 registered CSOs16, in 2009 there were about 10,700 CSOs and 11,326 in 201017.
Regarding international organizations, they are less visible since they mostly represent sources of
financing. In Macedonia, there is absence of large organizations such as Oxfam or CARE, but Caritas and
the Red Cross are present. In particular, Caritas supports various categories of vulnerable people such as
refugees, displaced people and the poor, providing food, clothing and medical aid. A major aspect of the
work of Caritas Macedonia is an education project for Roma, but also, it is active in supporting the victims
of conflict in the region.
The main aim of the international Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is to
“save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disasters and crises; to enable healthy and
safe living; and to promote social inclusion and culture of non-violence and peace”.
Macedonian civil society covers a wide and varied range of target groups and fields of activities.
Apart from the numerous sports and cultural clubs, among the most active and visible are women’s
associations, which commonly work on raising awareness of gender issues. Youth associations and human
rights organizations are increasing in number and profile, while farmers associations are also emerging.
In April 2010, the Macedonian Parliament adopted the new Law on Association and Foundations, which
defines the legal framework of the CSOs and modifies the law passed in 1998. After two failed attempts
for amendments in 2005 and 2006, this new Law provides a significant improvement for the establishment
and functioning of associations and foundations in Macedonia such as introduction of public benefit
status, liberalization of the right to associate and emphasizing the principles of good governance.
Generally, the new law is harmonized with the European Convention for Human Right and in most
part with the Fundamental Principles of the Status of Non-governmental Organization in Europe adopted
within the Council of Europe. Some of the innovations are:
- Extension of freedom of association;
- Contribution for increased transparency,
- Contribution to good governance
- The reduction of the Burden and Obstacles for Exercising the Right to Freedom of Association.
Regarding the difference of definitions, the law establishes that an association of citizens can be
established by 5 adult citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, while a foundation can be established by one
or more founders. In 2004 the Office for Cooperation between the NGOs and Parliament was established
by signing of a Memorandum for Cooperation between the citizens’ association MOST and the Parliament
of the Republic of Macedonia. Among the main goals of this office, we can find: institutionalization of the
cooperation among the civil society organizations and the Parliament; connecting of the citizens with the
legislative bodies; providing relevant information and data needed for intensifying the dialogue between
the Parliament and civil society organizations, including all channels for communication.
In 2004 another office was established, under the Sector for Policy Analysis and Coordination
within the General Secretariat of the Government: the Unit for Cooperation with Non‐governmental
Organizations. The Unit is responsible for: maintaining cooperation with CSOs and institutions; preparing a
review of the legislation and its continuous updating; proposing initiatives to the Government and relevant
ministries in order to instigate drafting of new legislation for the civil society sector; anticipating the
allocation of financial resources for partially financing projects of public benefit, mediation of the inter‐
ministerial cooperation, as well as of other state authorities and civil society sector etc.
The unit has developed a Strategy for Cooperation with CSOs, which was carried out in close
coordination with civil society. Among all its functions, one of the main is to give also technical assistance
under EC‐funded projects. In 2007, with the technical assistance from the Unit and financial support from
EU, the Strategy for Cooperation of the Government with the Civil Society 2007-2011 was adopted. The
strategy’s overall objective is to improve cooperation between government and CSOs. The Strategy
embraces seven strategic objectives, which are further elaborated in specific measures together with an
action plan that defines deadlines and institutional responsibilities for the implementation of these
measures. The objectives are:

 Upgrading the Legal Framework for Development of the Civil Sector;

 Participation of the Civil Sector in the Decision –Making Process;
 Maintaining Cross-Institutional Cooperation by establishment of a functional network contributing
to a facilitated communication and coordination of the activities related to the development of
the civil sector;
 Maintaining Inter-Sector Cooperation by promoting active cooperation between CSOs and the
Government on central and local level;
 Involvement of the Civil Sector in the Process of EU Integration;
 Provision of More Favourable Conditions for Sustainability of the Civil Society Sector;
 Continuous Development of the Civil Sector by development of CSOs outside of the capital and in
the rural areas and institutionalization of the cooperation on the local level.
 Regarding the structure of the CSOs, internally CSOs in Macedonia are well organized in different
networks and umbrella organisations. According to the Macedonian Centre of International Cooperation
(MCIC) research “Network and Coalitions in Macedonia” from 2006 there are approximately 200 networks
and coalitions in Macedonia. According to this research most of the networks and unions tend to associate
formally and to register legal entity (57%). Usually, they are organized according to the target group, their
members’ occupation of the sector activity: Macedonia without Discrimination (human rights), SEGA
(youth), UWOM (women/gender), DEM (environment), UPAM (pensioners) and the trade unions. Also,
there are legally specified umbrella bodies, for example sports unions.
In 2003 there were a total of 5,769 registered CSOs in Macedonia and, in 2010, in the absence of
updated information, it was estimated that this number has grown to around 9,000. Also the number of
active organizations is unknown, but is believed that there may be as many as 2,000.
Civil society in Macedonia is predominantly located in urban areas. Alone in the capital, Skopje,
43% of all CSOs are registered. CSOs are poorly represented in rural areas. As the TACSO Needs
Assessment Report shows, the ratio of urban to rural CSOs is 10:1 indicating that there are approximately
five CSOs per 1,000 citizens in the towns, while only 0.5 CSOs per 1,000 citizens in rural areas.
In Macedonia there are only a small number of fully professional CSOs operating at the national
level. These are well-developed, non-membership-based NGOs, usually located in the capital, working in
the field of socio-economic development, good governance and civil society strengthening through a
range of capacity building activities, advocacy and lobbying. There are also sports clubs and cultural
associations, human rights organizations and women’s associations.
Civil Society has received extensive financial support from the EU under the IPA Civil Society
Facility and national programmes, as well as through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human
Rights. Their objectives include the wider involvement of civil society in decision making and an increase
capacity of independent civil society organizations.
European integration is an important challenge for Macedonia. Values as defined by civil society
are becoming the backbone of Macedonian candidacy to join the EU, especially since candidate status for
EU membership depends on the further development of civil society. CSOs will likely be those
implementing new values, such as participative democracy, inclusion, equality, transparency and
accountability.

Chapter III
 CONSIDERATIONS/THOUGHTS ON THE PROBLEMS THAT CAN BE ENCOUNTERED DURING AN
ELECTORAL OBSERVATION TASK IN SUCH A MULTI-ETHNIC COUNTRY.

The October 1994 elections marked the first national elections in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM) since that nation declared its independence in September 1991. Macedonia's
transition from a constituent member of the Federal Yugoslav state to a sovereign nation was not without
accompanying hitches. In addition to the challenges of transforming economic and political structures
inherited from the communist era, Macedonia faces the challenge of creating entirely new state
structures. Election observation can be useful under the most favourable conditions, that is to say, when
countries are already in transition; when there is strong domestic support for reforms and when the
international community actively applies leverage. Considering the multi-ethnicity of Macedonia, the
following problems are likely to be encountered during an electoral observation task:

- District Apportionment.
Article 18 of the election law states that constituency districts shall be formed in a way that ensures
"approximately the same number of voters elect one representative." The law provides no other specific
criteria in creating district boundaries beyond this provision.
- Boycott of elections:
Given that most political parties are formed almost exclusively along ethnic cleavages, there is a
tendency that ethnic parties that are not satisfied with the electoral process can easily organise a boycott
thereby hampering election observation efforts.
- Media access and campaign content.
Although media objectivity remains a controversial issue in many western democracies, the status of
media institutions in Macedonia as "socially-owned" enterprises is problematic. The government of
Macedonia has control over the three national television frequencies and, through the Nova Makedonia
publishing house, controls access to newsprint for the small, independent print media. This situation
opens the door to accusations of undue government influence on media access and content.
- Campaign finance.
Article 70 of the election law states that 33 percent of the total state budget for the elections will be used
to cover campaign costs incurred by parties and candidates based on the number of votes they receive. In
practice, only winning candidates and parties are partially reimbursed for campaign expenses after the
election. The law, therefore, does not guarantee equal access to state financial resources during the
campaign but rather serves to reward winners after elections are held. Parties are able to accept
contributions from state sources, private donors, and other domestic sources, although contributions from
foreign sources are prohibited. Financial assistance cannot go to individual candidates running on a party
slate, but must be channelled through the party's financial apparatus. In kumanova, during the 1994
parliamentary election, IRI Observers found the contrast in terms of material resources between the
offices of the Alliance and those of the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) was as dramatic as the mood
of their representatives. PDP members thought that the organization of the second round of elections
hadn't improved compared to the first and that other parties had greater financial resources to "buy the
vote" because of their connections in the government.
- Fraud.
Fraud remains a canker worm that can erode a smooth democratic process. This happens when
political parties and their supporters in an attempt to secure victory indulge in malpractices of diverse
forms.
- Bias
The mandate to assess elections frankly and the power to validate them are necessary to motivate
progress, but this mandate is also what leads to entanglements and biases (Geisler 1993; Kelley 2010). It is
the credible threat of criticisms that can motivate domestic politicians to run honest elections. Without
this credible threat, politicians have nothing to fear and thus no reason to change. Unfortunately,
observers’ or monitors’ responsibility to assess elections is also what provokes pressure both from within
and outside the organizations to tone down their criticisms. This may occur because the organizations or
their sponsors fear the repercussions of criticizing elections, because this could damage interstate
relationships or perhaps destabilize a regime. Thus, powerful member states wield influence within IGOs,
or donor states may pressure NGOs. Biased assessments are dangerous because they can legitimize
illegitimate governments. Sometimes, organizations make very ambiguous statements, to avoid endorsing
the election when they know there are problems.

Conclusion:

The Republic of Macedonia is currently in a state of psychological nation-finding. In this process,

two levels of national concepts and national identification compete with each other: the political-etatist
and the “ethnic”. In addition, a historic-regional level has conquered the debate. Macedonian politicians,
academics, and journalists, as well as their colleagues in neighbouring countries, contribute to the current
confusion.
 The conscious or careless mixing up of the terminological meanings deepens and radicalizes
“ethnic” cleavages within the Macedonian society. Additionally, this debate encourages nationalist
tendencies in the neighbouring countries which are hostile towards the “ethnic” national project of the
Macedonians. The Republic of Macedonia has gained official recognition from the international
community. Only the name issue has been left unsolved because of Greek pressure. The level minority
rights in the country meet European Union standards. The government's foreign policy, with its caution
and balance, stands out positively against the other states of the former Yugoslavia. Tellingly, not a single
shot was fired during its process of independence in 1991.
References:

- Kelleher, Shane (2005): “Minority Veto Rights in Power Sharing Systems” Adalah's

Newsletter 13: http://www.adalah.org/newsletter/eng/may05/ar2.pdf

- Bieber, F. (2005b): “Partial Implementation, Partial Success: The Case of Macedonia”, en Rusell, D. y
O'Flynn, I. (eds.), Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies. London: Pluto, pp. 107-122.
- IRI Election Observation Mission Macedonia October 30, 1994
- The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Rethinking Election Monitoring (Judith Kelly)
- One Macedonia With Three Faces: Domestic Debates and Nation Concepts (Carsten Wieland)