n°07/2022
22 June 2022
China plans for naval dominance
BAKU – This is the Fujian carrier, leaving the drydock
at its launch ceremony outside Shanghai. The Fujian is
a new-generation aircraft carrier equipped with the
latest weaponry and technology. Going by tonnage, it
is almost 40 per cent bigger than previous Chinese
aircraft carriers, which places the Fujian carrier in the
same category as the US supercarriers. The Fujian is
also China’s first domestically designed and built
aircraft carrier – an important milestone for the
Chinese military-industrial complex. China is now
officially capable of manufacturing the full range of
surface combat ships associated with modern naval
warfare.
The US Navy remains at the top of the food chain, but
China’s growing sea power is changing the equation.
Beijing is transforming from a continental power to a
sea power. Its strategy can be summed up in two
phases: naval dominance in the first island chain by
2030 and naval supremacy in the second island chain
by 2050. As Beijing passes one milestone after
another, alarm bells are ringing in Washington. At the
end of the day, peace is maintained by the equilibrium
of forces and will only continue for as long as this
equilibrium exists.
Never forget, never forgive
The true measure of power is a blue-water navy. It is
also the surest guarantee of deterrence. About 40 per
cent of the global population lives within 100
kilometres of the coast. A navy capable of operating
across the open oceans is a force for dissuasion.
Governments tend to talk softly when the adversary
can bring the machinery of war to their shorelines.
Ergo, a powerful navy gives diplomatic leverage in
negotiations, even if it is unintentional.
Shirvan Neftchi
A blue-water navy also helps to sustain commerce by
sea. With globalisation being the order of business,
national supply chains stretch across oceans and
continents. For China, that is especially distressing
since much of its trade goes by sea. A blockade by the
Malacca Strait could inflict serious damage on the
Chinese GDP.
So, the interplay between security and economy
necessitates a blue-water navy. China was reminded
of this as recently as 1996. The US Navy sent two
aircraft carrier battle groups near Taiwan, which, at
the time, was preparing to hold its first democratic
election. The carriers were the pinnacle of American
supremacy, and the Chinese green-water navy
withdrew to its coast. They stood helplessly by as
Taiwan exercised its mandate. For Beijing, it was a
turning point. Something had to be done.
Immediately after the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the
People’s Liberation Army Navy, or PLA Navy for short,
purchased destroyers from abroad, secured
technology transfers, set up naval shipyards, designed
warships for mass production, and so on. This process
was so gradual that much of it went under the radar
of media outlets.
Things have changed considerably since then. China’s
current naval policy is sea-denial by means of anti-
access area denial systems. These are a variety of
missiles, air defences, and electronic capabilities that
can neutralise hostile forces and assets. The PLA Navy
has invested vigorously in its anti-access area denial
systems. While doing so, it has also developed lethal
conventional forces that can exploit the openings
their area denial weapons would create.
By comparison, in 1996, during the Taiwan Strait
Crisis, China’s area denial weapons weren’t even
capable of defending its coastline. The PLA Navy’s
missile arsenal could reach only as far as Taiwan and
the US bases in South Korea. By 2003, however, China
had expanded its inventory to hundreds of missiles,
enough to deter foreign powers away from its
coastline. By 2010, its inventory grew to over 1,000
conventional short-range ballistic missiles. At the
same time, it had developed more sophisticated
missiles like the DF-21C with an estimated range of
1,700 kilometres, capable of reaching targets in Japan
and the Philippines. By 2017, China had built 1,000s of
conventional medium-range ballistic missiles and 100s
of conventional intermediate-range ballistic missiles
capable of reaching as far as Guam.
Dominance by 2030
Today, Chinese firepower at sea, complemented by its
missile umbrella, is turning the scale in the Pacific. The
PLA Navy is moving more routinely beyond its comfort
zone. In some places, like the Yellow Sea, the East
China Sea, and the South China Sea, the PLA Navy is
openly contesting international waters. Going by gross
tonnage, in 2019, the US Navy accounted for more
than twice as much as the PLA Navy, 4.6 million tons
to 1.8 million tons. That means the US Navy is still the
top dog in combat capability.
But the PLA Navy is growing at a remarkable rate, and
Beijing isn’t done yet. If naval construction keeps
pace, China will have 5 or 6 aircraft carriers by 2030.
That still falls short compared to America’s 11, but
China’s naval objectives for phase one are closer to
home. While the US Navy operates in every theatre of
the world, the PLA Navy’s focus sits within the first
island chain. For context, the first island chain is an arc
of archipelagos that runs from Borneo to the
Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan. By 2030, as part of
phase one, the PLA Navy plans to rule the waves
within that space.
China doesn’t need to match America ship-for-ship or
tonnage-for-tonnage to accomplish supremacy in the
first island chain. In case of hostilities, the PLA Navy
would operate under cover of land-based missiles and
warplanes coming in from the mainland. Any hostile
fleet within the first island chain would be
overwhelmed by missiles and torpedoes.
China’s disputed territories, whether in the Yellow
Sea, the East China Sea, or the South China Sea, serve
this strategic end. Every island under Chinese control
is another location for area denial weapons, which
then push foreign navies out of what China considers
its backyard. Through this strategy, phase one, China
hopes to achieve naval dominance by 2030.
Supremacy by 2050
Looking even further, by 2050, China is predicted to
possess 10 aircraft carriers, considering the current
rate of construction. Meanwhile, the PLA Marine
Corps will have grown to 100,000 strong. In many
ways, the PLA Navy will resemble the US Navy in
capabilities. And, much like its American counterpart,
China will likely start acting with impunity. Beijing
could test the boundaries of its surface vessels,
aircraft carriers, and amphibious capabilities; the PLA
Navy would likely operate across the Indian and
Pacific oceans.
By 2050, China will also have expanded its logistics
bases around the globe. It already has a base in
Djibouti, and negotiations are currently underway to
establish similar bases in Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and the
Solomon Islands. By phase two, China will likely have
an extensive list of bases, which will be key to its
power projection.
If Taiwan is subdued by 2050, China will enjoy a
tactical advantage extending as far as the second
island chain, which is a line of islands stretching from
Japan to the islands of Micronesia. Guam, in
particular, a US territory located at the centre of the
second island chain, will become a strategic
anchorage for power projection. Guam is home to
thousands of US troops and hosts a naval base and an
air force base. Both Beijing and Washington will look
to replicate such military installations across the
Pacific.
Still beyond Guam is the third island chain, which runs
through the centre of the Pacific, with the Hawaiian
Islands marking the most strategic points. By 2050,
small pairs of Chinese vessels will likely start moving in
and about America’s backyard to demonstrate the
freedom of navigation – just as pairs of American
ships move into China’s backyard. It will be a tit-for-
tat between the US Navy and the PLA Navy, with the
primary area of competition sitting somewhere
between the first and second island chains.
Meanwhile, in the Indian Ocean, the line running from
Gwadar, the Maldives, and Diego Garcia, and a
parallel line running from Djibouti to Kenya to
Mozambique, marks the boundary for the next
Chinese-American rivalry. These lines, dubbed the
fourth and fifth islands chains, have numerous
strategic sites. Diego Garcia, a British territory, is one
of the most valuable islands. It holds a large base and
is likely to act as a point of anchorage for naval
operations in the future. For its part, China seeks to
use the String of Pearls network to enhance the
number of ports available to Chinese vessels.
Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kenya, and
Mozambique are some of the candidates that could
host new Chinese bases.
That said, China’s expansion in the Indian Ocean
depends on India’s political will to step up its naval
game. The QUAD alliance, which Washington is
spearheading, looks to contain China’s naval
aspirations by joining the resources of Japan, India,
Australia, and the United States. QUAD, in one form
or another, could play an indispensable part going
into the future.
For now, though, the PLA Navy looks to prioritise sea
denial in the first island chain while contesting control
over the second island chain while probing the waters
of the third, fourth, and fifth island chains. China still
has a long way to go before its 2030, and 2050 plans
come into maturity, but nothing worth having was
ever achieved without effort.
References
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Theory Practice and Implications by Michael
McDevitt (Naval Institute Press, October
2020)
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James R. Holmes (Naval Institute Press,
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