Human Studies' 19: 365-384, 1996.

365
@ 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

How to Do Things with Things

Objets trouvOs and symbolization

JI~IRGEN STREECK
DeparmTent of Speech Communication, The Univers'ity of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712,
U.S.A.
jstreeck@mail, utexas, edu

Abstract. J.L. Austin has demonstrated that people can "do things" - bring about social facts
- w i t h words. Here we describe how some people do things with things. This is a study
of the symbolic use and situated history of material objects during a business negotiation
between two German entrepreneurs: of the practical transformation of things-at-hand from
objects of use into exemplars, or into forms-at-hand that can be used for the construction of
transitory symbolic artifacts. Arranging boxes in a particular fashion can be the equivalent of
an illocutionary act, but unlike words things remain on the scene as indexical monuments to
prior interactional arrangements.

Distributed Meaning

Science needs abstraction. There is therefore nothing illegitimate about the

fact that human communication is commonly studied- at least by us 'micro-
analysts' - as if the participants were naked, having nothing but their voices
and bodies to make sense with, and as if they were acting within a vacuum,
surrounded only by empty space. There is nothing wrong about this picture,
and yet it is obviously incomplete. We commonly interact in places where we
are surrounded by "material culture"-buildings, furniture, and any number
of "props" - and very often, besides communicating with one another, we
also have things to do - meals to eat, tools to operate, computer-screens to
attend to.
The complexity of communication in a world largely made up of human
artifacts is increasingly coming into view. Researchers studying communica-
tion in the work-place (Drew & Heritage, 1992; Hutchins, 1990) as well as
human-machine communication (Suchman, 1987) have suggested that "talk
and activity in such a setting mutually structure each other in ways that require
a rethinking of some of the basic frameworks for the analysis of human inter-
action" (Goodwin, 1993: 1). It is of particular importance to take account of
the fact that quite often in such settings "meaning" and "information" are not
366 JI~IRGEN STREECK

only inherent in linguistic and embodied components of the communicative

process - talk and gesture - , but are distributed across a variety of "places"
(Duranti, 1992) and representation systems (Lynch & Woolgar, 1988), which
include "internal as well as external knowledge representations (knowledge,
skills, tools, etc.)" (Hutchins & Klausen, 1990). 2 Meaning therefore does not
only flow through symbols and expressive forms that form our ancient and
primary tools for communication, and it is not just "contextualized" by the
material environment; rather, the environment, through the interpretive use
the participants make of it in their situated activities, becomes a component of
the process of communication. In this process, the minds of the interactants
interact with the minds of previous generations that are embodied in material
culture. Our image of human competence would therefore remain partial and
distorted unless we understand that it is both internal and external, and that
the "internal mind" could not function at all if it were not surrounded by
mindful things that have evolved along with it (Donald, 1991).

The power of the unaided mind is highly overrated. Without external aids,
memory, thought, and reasoning are all constrained. But human intelli-
gence is highly flexible and adaptive, superb at inventing procedures and
objects that overcome its own limits . . . . It is things that make us smart.
Some assistance comes through cooperative social behavior, some arises
through exploitation of the information present in the environment; and
some comes through the development of tools of t h o u g h t - cognitive arti-
f a c t s - that complement abilities and strengthen mental powers (Norman,
1993: 43).

Symbolic Transformations of Objects

Our study is in line with this view. We, too wilt deal with the articulation
of speech, gesture, and material setting. However, our perspective is neither
primarily cognitive - as that of Norman and others - nor are we particularly
concerned with the practices of communication in complex workplaces -
like, for example, Goodwin (1993). We come to this field of inquiry with an
interest in symbolization. What we will focus on here is symbolization with
the help of things. In other words, we will be describing how things become
situated symbols. The participants' actions and conversation are interwoven
with material objects and arrangements which thus become, both physically
and with respect to the meanings that they embody for the parties, a product of
these very actions and conversation. While the situation that we present might
 HOW TO DO THINGS WITH THINGS 367

appear idiosyncratic, we believe that it reflects rather general and fundamental

properties of the human propensity toward symbolization: an entity that has
preordained functions (for example, a word or a thing) and is available-
" f o u n d " - in the setting, is removed from its primary contexts of use, and its
affordances- i.e., the opportunities it provides for a c t i o n - are abstracted and
used creatively in the stmcturation and conceptualization of new, unrelated,
secondary contexts. This process is known as "metaphor."
Our focus thus is on the symbolic history o f things in a situation o f interac-
tion: upon the properties with which they enter the scene, the transformations
they undergo in the course of symbolic action, and the traces of symbolization
that they finally come to be. While the symbolic use of objects - other than
in children's play - is not a common theme of research on interaction and
communication, it is nevertheless a paradigmatic process from which we can
learn something about the very nature of symbolization. It is a process that is
difficult to classify because it blurs the traditional terminological distinctions
between gesture and action, symbol and thing, between the instrumental
and the communicative. Symbolic uses of objects are not considered ges-
tures because gestures do not involve things. 3 Gestures are strictly expressive
movements made with empty hands. When things are involved, we seem to
be entering the realm of instrumental action. In our materials, however, this
boundary is successively removed, and things that start out being "just things"
first become samples (indices) and then symbols. We are always dealing with
a continuum o f symbolization: instrumental action can become gesture, and
material things can become representations.

In the Realm of the Cookies

The material for this study is a segment from a business negotiLation between
two mid-level German entrepreneurs: a cookie manufacturer and the owner
of the marketing firm that distributes his products. 4 They have come together
to flesh out a new marketing plan which would allow them to by-pass the
wholesalers and sell some of the high-end product directly to the restaurants.
The plan requires a different marketing strategy, more human-hours for the
distribution of fewer products, and it therefore warrants a readjustment of the
profit-margins between manufacturer and marketer. We enter the negotiation
after Antp6hler, the manufacturer, and Destrooper, the marketing man, have
concluded the strategic planning phase of the negotiation and are in transit
towards the profit-calculation phase. In between these two stages they com-
pare AntpOhler's cookies with ones made by the competitors that Destrooper
has brought a l o n g - so that they both know where they stand in the realm of
368 JURGEN STREECK

the cookies. We will examine the history of two kinds of objects during this
interlude: cookies and their packages.
The first object whose symbolic development we will follow, a cookie, is
unpacked, offered, looked at, broken, described, bitten, chewed, and made to
be heard - in brief, it is publicly inspected. In a series of "acts of meaning"
(Bruner, 1986) it is established as a sample which embodies a number of
qualities, and it also becomes an indexical sign to be used on future occasions.
Antp6hler has left the table for a moment to get some promotion materials
from the book-shelf in the room. In the meantime, Destrooper unpacks a
tray of cookies from their box. He takes the inner aluminum package out
of the box, opens it, and hands the tray with the cookies that is inside to
Antp6hler. Antp6hler takes it and puts it in front of himself, takes out a
cookie and looks at it intently and with demonstrative expertise. Now begins
an almost ceremonial examination of the cookies by an expert: mundane
activities such as looking and eating are enacted as transparent public acts of
informed inspection. This sense is achieved when Antp6hler intently looks at
the cookie and suggests that "one recognizes" something (lines 5-7): through
looking alone the expert can identify relevant features. 5

5 A Auch bier
also here
Here, too
6D Halt ma mal eben n Haselnul3 dagegen.
hold we once PT a hazelnut against
Let's just put a hazelnut next to it.
7 A Auch bier erkennt man
also here recognizes one
Here, too, one recognizes

Destrooper, however, suggests that the inspection be done as a comparison.

Referring to AntpOhler's cookies with a term of endearment- "hazelnut"-
 HOW TO DO THINGS WITH THINGS 369

OO
Figure 1. An arrangement for comparison

he suggests that Antp6hler put his next to it (6). Antp6hler takes two of his
cookies and arranges them on the table top: now there are two of his and one
of the competitor's - not a good gestalt, not an embodiment of justice. So he
takes another one of the competitor's cookies and arranges the four of them
in a neat row.
Note, then, that these objects on the table are no longer "just cookies;" they
are cookies arranged in a symbolic manner; the arrangement invites, enables,
and embodies comparison. Antp6hler has created a small but ordered cookie
universe on the table: a set arranged to suggest the comparability of its
members, a material world that affords cognitive actions. If the cookies were
located in different parts of the table and could not be simultaneously regarded,
the task would be much harder. "This is the essence of intelligence, for if the
370 JI~IRGENSTREECK

representation and the processes are just right, then new experiences, insights,
and creations can emerge" (Norman, 1993: 47):
AntpOhler initially gives a summary assessment in which he makes use of
the cognitive representation that he has created; he formulates his assessment
in comparative terms (12, 14, 17).

12 A Es sollte
it should
It was supposed to
13 D Ich wollts Ihnen auch nur mitbringen.
I willed it to you also only with-bring
I just wanted to bring you some along
14 A etwas (- - -) Gleiches sein.
some alike be
be something similar.
15 DJa, das isja nix.=
yeah, that is PT nothing
Well, it's really nothing
16 A =Aber es is etwas (.) eigentlich ganz anderes.=
but it is some really entirely different
but it turned out to be something entirely different
17 D =n Badewannenflorentiner.
a bathtub florentine

Destooper concurs with AntpOhler's judgement, actually exaggerates it, in a

way that is perhaps not fully in line with Antp6hler's business ethics: he calls
the cookies n a m e s - "bathtub florentines" (which we take to be an insider's
derogatory term for bootleg or wannabe fancy cakes). His and Antp6hler's
utterances are nicely interlaced collaborative (re-) completions.
So far, the two partners have come to a quick, preliminary assessment of
the competition and thereby, importantly, renewed the terms of their own
partnership as one based upon superior quality of product. While Destooper,
the purveyor, keeps an eye out to other producers, for the time being there is
nothing that could draw him away from Antp6hler. Only now does Antp6hler
really display his competence. He formulates the results of his visual inspec-
tion. Solely on the basis of looking at it, he determines that the competitor's
cookie is made from ready-made dough. It is very crunchy, as an interpre-
tation of the "gloss" and the "caramel" in one part of the cookie reveals.
The categories that Antp6hler uses here index the system of relevancies by
which cookies of this type must be judged - the cognitive scheme relevant
to the situation - and instantiate the inferences that can be drawn from the
visual cues. He thereby gives his less knowing business partner a lesson in
the proper assessment of cookies.
 HOW TO DO THINGS WITH THINGS 371

18 A Hier hat man (.) mit hh (.) fertiger (.) Zuckerware oder
here has one with finished confectionery
Here they work with ready-made confectionery
19 beziehungsweise mit fertiger Masse (--) ~ih gearbeitet.
or rather with Finishedmass worked
or rather with ready-made dough
20 A Des is sehr stark(- - -) ein sehr starker Krokant .hh charakter
that is very strong a very strong crunchy character
This has a very - very crunchy character
21 D Mhm.
mhm
22 A kristallisiert sich hier raus.
crystallizes itself here out
crystallizes itself out here.
23 D Mhm.
mhm
24 A Man sieht es an dem Glanz (.) und hier auch an dem Caramel,
one sees it on the gloss and here also on the caramel
You can tell here from the gloss and also the caramel
25 in diesem Sttick
in this piece
on this piece
26 D () nicht l~ingst
by not long shot
not by a long shot

Antp6hler's actions at this point are articulations o f assessments and visual

scans. He gives a running report on the features as he is perceiving them.
These are not easily seeable by novices such as Destrooper. Antp6hler's
carefully orchestrated looks demonstrate the evidence that he collects for his
assessment, and the assessments, at the same time, motivate his looks. Surface
features make the cookie and its production history transparent to him.
At this point Antp6hler takes a cookie and presents it to Destrooper to look
at. This act completes the transformation of a simple cookie into a sample or
exemplar. Its semiotic status has been changed. It is no longer just a cookie, but
a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e - a n d thus an indexical s i g n - o f an entire class. Figuratively,
it is now a container o f meanings, put into it in a series o f symbolic acts.
G o o d m a n has pointed out repeatedly that samples have peculiar semiotic
properties. While verbal labels denote (name, predicate, describe) things,
events, and processes, "exemplification . . . . . far from being a v~,riety of deno-
tation, runs in the opposite direction, not from label to what the label applies
to but from something a label applies to back to the label . . . . Exemplifi-
cation is not mere possession o f a feature but requires also refbrence to that
feature" (Goodman, 1984: 59). The cookie, thus, by being established as a
372 JURGENSTREECK

sample, "exemplif(ies) the properties (it) possesses and refers to" (Goodman
and Elgin, 1988: 19).
But of course cookies are not primarily objects to look at, but things to be
eaten, and their value should ultimately be judged by the qualities that they
unfold during the eating experience. Again, it takes an expert to eat them
properly and subject them to an informed oral examination. The problem for
an interactional assessment of the cookie is that eating is an internal process
and a private experience. It is therefore interesting to observe how Antp0hler
externalizes the eating process so as to provide Destrooper with a vicarious
share in the experience. (Note that this is not quite as silly an issue as it may
seem. How internal body experience - for example pain - can be effectively
communicated is an issue, for example, in medical practice. Languages have
evolved various means for handling the Cartesian-Wittgensteinian problem
of communicating about internal bodily experience, and there is probably
a multitude of practices as well to facilitate the vicarious inner experience
of "other bodies". Here, the practice chosen is a shift between experiential
modes.
 HOW TO DO THINGS WITH THINGS 373

Initially Antp6hler breaks the cookie in two and presents the two halves to
his companion. Then he announces that he will assess the cookie under the
category "bite". The biting experience always comes first when solid food
is eaten. But note that biting can be experienced in various ways and from
various perspectives; most importantly, it can be felt by the self, seen by the
other, and heard by other and self. While Antp6hler formulates his tactile
experience - it feels "hard" - he performs a broadcast version of biting.
He engages in an informative bite: he makes his internal bodily experience
audible and visible, and then his face gives a display of the discomfort that
the experience of biting this particular kind of cookie causes him.

27 A Er is also vom BiB (. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ) ganz- sehr hart

it is PT from bite totally very hard
As far as the bite it's totally- very hard
28 D Man hOrt's ((laughs)) man hOrt's
one hears it it one hears
I hear it I hear it

This moment shows how fuzzy and shifting the boundary between action
and symbolic-communicative action can be. The bite is not simply "done"
but "performed," in a manner sensitive to the informational needs o f the
interlocutor. An internal process is externalized to enable communication.
The material qualities of the object - which, as we have seen, serves as a
sample - are selected and highlighted through the particular way in which a
routine activity - eating - is conducted. Destrooper honors the performance,
it's funniness (by his laughter) and it's communicative success ('I hear it').
And Antp6hler concludes with a dismissive gesture.
In the final sequence o f this episode, the cookie (the one competitor cookie
that remains on the table) is finally transformed into a metonymic sign: it
comes to represent its producer. During this sequence, the two businessmen
juxtapose two slightly different overall assessments of the competition, in
374 JI~IRGENSTREECK

a way that reflects cultural norms prohibiting self-praise and favoring self-
deprecation. While Destrooper suggests that there is no need not worry,
Antp6hler makes it clear that he remains vigilant o f the competition.

29 A ((clears throat) Aber (-) Herr ( )

but Mister
30D Na gut, lassenwa' s ( )
now good, let we it
Allright, let's forget about it
31 Ich mache mir also
I make me PT
I don't have
32 D lch wollt's -Ihnen auchnur mitbringen, Herr AntopOhler,
I willed-it to you also only with-bring, Mister Antp•hler
I just wanted to bring it along for you, Mr. Antp6hler
33 A nichts
nothing
any
34 A nichts vor
nothing for
illusions
35 D brauchen wer uns keine (.) Gedanken machen
need we us no thoughts make
we don't have to worry
36 A dab hier (.) unter Umstgnden ein ernstzunehmender Wettbewerber
that here under circumstances a seriously-to-take competitor
that a serious contender is perhaps entering
37 in den Markt kommt.
in the market comes
the market here
 HOW TO DO THINGS WITH THINGS 375

As he makes this statement, Antp6hler holds the cookie in an exposed posi-

tion and presents it to Destrooper (who has already found another object of
interest). The presentation is synchronized with the deictic here (36).
The cookie has thus become a local convention, a symbol - a very real
object with its own very real properties, but with additional, locally elaborated
senses. Whenever it is used or referred to during the further course of this
negotiation, as a gesticulation tool or as a target of points and looks, it will
be "loaded with meaning." The thing is no longer just a thing; it is a symbol.

Symbolic Affordances of a Cookie Box

Another set of objects undergoes a similar transformation from material object

to indexical sign, but in this instance the symbolic transformation goes further
because the objects involved eventually come to symbolize by their shape and
arrangement alone. These objects are the packages of the cookies, initially
just a single aluminum bag. Studiously, Destrooper subjects it to careful
examination, and he shows that he too knows or has learned how to consume
an object with expertise. Not unlike Antp6hler, who bit the cookie so one could
'hear' its texture, Destrooper fingers the aluminum foil so that it responds
with a sound. Through this transformation of tactile into auditory experience,
Antp6hler - who is being asked for his expert judgement - is given an
important piece of information to assess the foil.

38 D Was hat der denn fOr ne Folie?

whathas he PT for a foil
What kind of foil does he use?
39 D Is die anders, leichter? Preisweter?
is she different, lighter? cheaper?
Is it different, lighter? cheaper?
40 A .hh Wir benutzen eine (. . . . ) fonfhundert # Folie?
we use a fivehundred/1,foil
We use a fivehundred # foil
376 JURGEN STREECK

41 D PVC bestimmt.
PVC for sure
42 D Ah so
oh so
I see
43 A Mhm. Sie wissen dab wir(.) unsere Ware grundsatzlich(.) seit Jahren
mhm you know that we our product principally since years
Mhm. You know that for years we have been 'safe-gasing' our product
44 als erste Geb~tckhersteller tiberhaupt (.) schutzbegasen,
the first confectionery makers overall safe-gas-on
the first confectionery makers at all to do that!
45 D MhM.
mhm
46 A Schutzbegasen heigt dab wir den Stickst- den Sauerstoff
safe-gas-on means that we the nitrog- the oxygen
Safe-gasing means that we take the nitrog- the oxygen out
47 rausnehmen?
out-take
48 D Der wird rausgedrtickt, ne?
it gets outpressed, no?
It gets pressed out, right?
49 A .hhh rausgespOlt hh ge-sptilt
outrinsed rinse-d
Washed out! Washed
50 D Ja weil das StickstofffMlt und dann- (.) geht (.)
yes because the nitrogen falls and then goes
Yeah, because the nitrogen sinks and so the
51 Sauerstoff raus, ne?
oxygen out, no?
oxygen gets out, right?
52 A und mit Sauers- mit mit tih Stickstoff, mit Kohlens~ure wird das
and with oxyg- with with uh nitrogen with carbonic acid gets this
and, using oxyg- uh nitrogen, carbonic acid, it gets
53 wieder aufgetfallt.
again up-filled
filled up again
54 D Ah so.
oh so
I see

Rather than explaining the features o f the competitor's foil, Antp6hler gives
his business partner an extended lesson about the kind o f packaging that his
c o m p a n y uses, as well as about the other measures they take to keep his
products fresh. Destrooper, in other words, also transforms an object into a
sample (the particular foil represents the entire class). AntpOhler, however,
goes on to use it as a gesture tool.
 HOW TO DO THINGS WITH THINGS 377

After Destrooper puts it away, AntpOhler fingers it and eventually picks it

up, idly, without any overt purpose. He thereby establishes symbolic potential.
The wrap remains in play. He puts it down and picks it up again. The package
thus remains in the field of interaction, but no longer in its primary capacity or
as a sample, but as a generic representation of the topic, freshness. It remains
exposed and visible as long as it fits with the content of the conversation. But
finally it is put away. However, it is put away in a gestural fashion: it serves as
a baton. Antp0hler, still holding it, makes a dismissive gesture that signifies
'not a chance' ( line 66). Without the quality that the foil has come to represent
- freshness - you have "no chance to get into the American market."

64 A Wenn Sie den Amerikanern zum

if you the Americans for
If you don't guarantee to the Americans
65 Beispiel nich garantieren dab die Ware mindestens sechs Monate h~ilt,
example not guarantee that the are minimally six months holds
for example, that the product stays fresh for at least six months,
66 (.) haben Sie keine Chance (.)
have you no chance
you have no chance
67 D reinzukommen
in-to-come
()
68 A tiberhaupt in den Markt zu kommen.
at all in the market to come
to get into the market at all.

In this sequence then, the meaning that the object has acquired in the course
o f this interaction is made to articulate with the meaning of the concurrent
utterance. The object, we might say is incorporated in the gesture, not unlike
sentence objects that are incorporated into verbs in incorporating languages.
This is a very economical way of combining resources to generate complex
378 JURGEN STREECK

representations. Like the cookie, the foil has thus become a "container" for
locally produced meanings.
In the last segment of this episode the cookie packages are used in yet
another symbolic fashion. The segment begins when Antp~Shler puts the foil on
the neat pile o f boxes that Destooper has arranged, the interaction's junkyard.
We tend to think about the ways in which people arrange things in piles,
rows, and so on, in individualistic, psychological terms. We do not make
much of the form that is created and attribute the neatness of a pile to the
actor's disposition, assuming that the man may have a compulsion. However,
where two Or more people share the "compulsion," it can become a code, an
inventory of structural, representational possibilities. Observe the following
sequence then, which comes off as an equally neat pair of pairs: Antp/Shler
puts an aluminum wrap on the pile of boxes and Destrooper rearranges it so
that it is flush with them; Antp6hler adds another wrap, and Destrooper aligns
it again.

69 D Naja gut, lassen wer's. So!

oh yes well, let we it. Now!
Allright, let's forget about it. Now!
70 A Gut!
Good!
 HOW TO DO THINGSWITH THINGS 379

/"i " \"

i
/ .¢
I ¢.,'
j-/
/

Figure 2. Gestalt closure in the arranging of packaging materials

This is a scenic symbol for the completion of the activity, the topic, and
the phase of the negotiation. The ceremony is interlaced with a speech act
sequence that also formulates this completion. But a little monument to the
competitors remains from this joint enactment - the pile, which is revisited
later. But note that in this ritual sequence, certain features are abstracted
from the cookie boxes and used in the representation that bear no intrinsic
relationship to the topic of the conversation that was previously symbolized
by the foil. Now, the symbolic affordances of the cookie boxes are found in
their formal and esthetic features: the square shape, the availab~ility of several
o f a kind, etc. These features are selected by the action that is performed
with the boxes: Destrooper extracts their squareness by making them flush.
Whenever a thing is used as a representation, only certain features are selected
for the construction o f the image; others are dimmed. The sequence in which
the pile is arranged is a practical, material metaphor.
The practical action of arranging the foils and boxes "describes" the current
moment in the discourse in a metaphorical fashion. Formal features of the
boxes are abstracted - and the instrumental meaning as well as the locally
established indexical reference to the competitors that the object has pre-
viously carried, are temporarily suppressed; the formal properties serve as
a scheme to visually represent an abstract sense of "completion." We can
represent this by a simple diagram (Figure 2).
This scenic symbol - that is, the way in which Destrooper finishes what
Antp6hler has b e g u n - follows simple Gestalt principles: the greater simplic-
ity o f the figure on the right provides a relaxation of tension; conversely, the
figure on the left is perceived as incomplete (Arnheim, 1974) and crooked.
Note, however, that this "crooked" sense is only established in retrospect,
through the act of rearranging the boxes and the contrasting fig~tre of"flush-
ness" that it produces.
AntpOhler now engages in a very formal, solemn, ritualistic expression of
gratitude- which itself constitutes a ritual of completion. At the same time he
produces a similar scenic symbol: he takes a sheet of paper that is on the table
380 JOR~EN STgEECK

and folds it neatly in the middle. He closes something that does not normally
require closure.

76 A Herr Destrooper.
Mister Destrooper
77 A Ich danke lhnen auch far das uns und unserem Hause
I thank you also for the to us and to our house
Let me thank you for the trust you have in us and our company,
entgegengebrachte Vertrauen?
towards-brought trust

Here, too, esthetic features o f the object are extracted and applied metaphor-
ically to the moment's discourse. And again, we do not commonly call such
an act a gesture, even though it shares some of its most conspicuous fea-
tures with other gestural acts that can symbolize sequence-completions, for
example, the folding o f hands.
While the stack o f boxes is used as a schematic representation o f discourse
features in this sequence, it also retains its indexical meaning as a represen-
tation o f the "competitors." Just after they complete the stack, Destrooper
makes a sanctifying gesture above the pile. He says: "We have s e e n . . , that
we don't need to hide from (from the competition)." The utterance compo-
nent 'we have seen,' refering back to AntpOhler's negative assessment o f the
cookies contained in them, inscribes the interactionally achieved meanings
o f the boxes in the interactional text, but also in the boxes. The gesture ties
'we have seen' to the boxes. The pile o f boxes and aluminum foils has thus
become a manifest trace o f symbolic action.

71 B lch wollt's Ihnen auch mitbringen damit Sie informiert sind was s-
1 willed it to you also with-bring so that you informed are what s-
I just wanted to bring it along for you so you are informed what
 HOW TO DO THINGS WITH THINGS 381

r,'nige.

Figure 3. Aluminum foil over time

72 also andere machen also w-wir sehnja selber, ich hab's ja auch schon
PT others do PT we see PT ourselves, I have PT also ready
others are doing, well, we can see ourselves, I've already seen it myself before
73 gesehen, also im Vergleich zu Ihrer Ware sind die ja also
seen PT in comparison to your product are they PT PT
that, in comparison to your product, they are
74 A Ja
Yes
75 B Brauchen wer uns nich verstecken.
need we us not hide
We don't have to hide.

We can represent the history of symbolic transformations oflLhe aluminum

foil by another diagram (Figure 3).
It is important to note that in the successive transformations o f things into
symbols, prior meanings are retained. These can alternate, or articulate one
another, or combine to complex predications. Different situationally acquired
meanings o f the sign can be invoked at different times to anchor referential
expressions or structure and give images to different aspects o f the situation
at hand. We have seen that the aluminum foil can become a sample, a topic-
marker, a gesture tool "full o f local meaning," as well as a part of a complex
construction in which it participates in part as "just another square." This
382 JORGEN STREECK

multiplicity of symbolic affordances, local senses, as well conceptual and

referential functions, is characteristic of many types of symbols, including
not least, of course, words in a language.

The Continuum of Symbolization

We mentioned initially that we came to this study of symbolic uses of objects

with an interest in symbolization, particularly symbolization in gestures, and
we pointed out how arbitrary some of the categorical boundaries are that
students of communication commonly draw around their objects. Actions
such as the arranging of cookies in a row, the piling up of aluminum wraps
and boxes, and the folding of a piece of paper, are commonly excluded from
the definition of gesture simply because they involve real things. Gestures are
naked, fleeting, and symbolic; things are material, enduring, and real.
While this dichotomy appears rather arbitrary, it also obscures various fea-
tures of these representations that should rouse our interests, because these
are features that the activities in question have in common with other sym-
bolic actions, for example speech. In contrast to gestures, symbolic actions
performed with and upon things typically leave traces: once the action is
completed, there is still a material thing that embodies meaning. This, how-
ever, is something that these acts have in common with speech, for in speech,
too, "objets trouv6s" (Kellerer, 1982) are used to create novel representations,
inventive conceptualizations that "make sense." We call them metaphors, and
they begin with serendipity: whatever material is available - locally and his-
torically- is used and extended in imaginative ways to structure new realms of
experience. Occasionally, these extensions become part of our "langue," that
is, they endure. They endure as pairs of forms (sound-shapes) and meanings,
and they are stored as material traces in the brains of communities' members,
and perhaps as graphic signs in dictionaries, books, or memos. While rep-
resentation via material objects obviously takes place in a different medium
than speech, it is important to note that language, too, is a material artefact
which originates from local inventions in fleeting moments of face-to-face
communication. "Langue" is an immensely complex trace of "parole." In a
nutshell, the transformation of the cookie packages in this situation exem-
plifies the same process: slowly, the symbolic actions performed with them
convert them from situated "parole" to situated "langue," an agreed-upon,
publicly available code and repertoire of sense-making devices. That is to say
that, no matter whether we study language or gesture or representations that
involve material things, we always deal with a continuum of symbolization,
not with dead matter but with living processes of symbolic creation, not with
"ergon" but "energeia"(Humboldt, 1988 (1836)).
 HOW TO DO THINGSWITHTHINGS 383

" C o n t i n u u m o f symbolization" means that symbolization is an ongoing

transfer between kinds o f experience, types o f action, and media o f repre-
sentation. Johnson has called this process " i m a g e - s c h e m a transformation"
(Johnson, 1987). M a n y gestures are abstracted from object manipulations,
and we can call t h e m gestures o f making, taking, giving, and so on (Flusser,
1991). To understand h o w their forms signify, we must see them as schemat-
ic actions, and this involves that we need to project generic virtual objects
into the hands. While this is a transfer from manipulation to gesture, similar
i m a g e r y is involved in language, because spoken languages, too, frequently
conceptualize c o m m u n i c a t i v e (and cognitive) actions as metaphoric manip-
ulations: we offer our opinions, grasp each other's ideas, and take things into
account. Although in this study we have examined idiosyncratic, local s y m -
bolic inventions, there is no doubt that the conceptual tools that are passed
on to us in the f o r m o f "langue" have originated in similar local "acts o f
meaning."
W h e n we need to symbolize something, we take whatever material c o m e s
our way. It is the transfer, the schematic projection, that counts, because it
is what we call ' m a k i n g sense.' Making sense has a lot to do with making,
b e c a u s e sense needs material forms and schematic images. A m o n g the entities
that have forms and that are capable o f generating images are words on the
one hand, things on the other, and h a n d - m o v e m e n t s "in between."

Notes

1. The research reported here was invited and made possible by Wemer Kallmeyer of the
lnstitut ftlr deutsche Sprache in Mannheim (Germany); it was carried out while I was a
visiting scholar at the Institut in the summer of 1993. While the specific focus on material
objects is mine, the underlying questions - how discourse features are represented and
made visible via "mise-en-sc6ne" are his. I also wish to thank Liisa Tittula for providing the
marvellous material, and Reinhold Schmitt for his hospitality and company in Mannheim.
2. Much of the initial and continuing motivation of this work has been provided by psy-
chologists and cognitive scientists who have studied human cognition at work in real-life
settings such as grocery stores (Lave, Murtaugh, and de la Rocha, 1984) and suggested that
the human mind is not only located in individual brains but also in environments which,
after all, are themselves largely human-made (Norman, 1993b). Cognition therefore ought
to be studied as a situated activity in which individual skills and knowledge interact with
(a) skills and knowledge in other individuals, and (b) mind as it is embodied in artifacts.
The "unit of analysis" of this approach is the "culturally constituted functional group rather
than an individual mind," and it describes cognitive processes by tracing the "movement
of information through a system" which includes "the organization of the tools in the work
environment" (Hutchins and Klausen, 1990: 1). The approach is known as "distributed
cognition" or "socially shared cognition;" see Bruner, 1990; D'Andrade, 1981; Hutchins,
1995; Norman, 1988, 1993a; Resnick, Levine, and Behrend, 1990; Scribner, 1984.
3. Ekman and Friesen 1969 might call some of these processes "object adaptors." As the
analysis will show, my interpretation of these acts is very different from their psychological
3 84 JI[IRGENSTREECK

view. To my knowledge, no further research on object adaptors has followed Ekman and
Friesen's original classification system.
4. Mr. Antp6hler, the manufacturer, engages in many educational activities about small
business and manufacturing. He had this tape made by a professional video service for
instructional purposes and released it to German researchers without restrictions.
5. In the transliteration, "PT" stands for "particle."

References

Arnheim, R. (1974). Art and Visual Perception. The New Version. Berkeley: The University
of California Press.
Bruner, J. (1990). Acts of Meaning. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
D'Andrade, R. (1981). The cultural part of cognition. Cognitive Science. 5:179--195.
Donald, M. (1991). Origins of the Modern Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Drew, P. and Heritage, J. (Ed.) (1992). Talk at Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Duranti A. (1992). Language and bodies in social space: Samoan ceremonial greetings. Amer-
ican Anthropologist, 94 (3): 657--691 ~
Ekman, P. and Friesen, W. (1969). The repertoire of nonverbal behavior: categories, origins,
usage, and coding. Semiotica, 4%98.
Flusser, V. (1991). Gesten. Versueh einer Phginomenologie. Dusseldorf: Bollmann.
Goodman, N. (1984). Of Mind and other Matters. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Goodman, N. and Elgin, C.Z. (1988). Reconeeptions in Philosophy and other Arts and Sciences.
Indianapolis: Hackett.
Goodwin, C. (1993). Perception, Technology and Interaction on a Scientific Research Vessel.
Unpublished paper.
Humboldt, W.v. (1988 (1836)).On Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hutchins, E. and Klausen, T. (1990). Distributed Cognition in an Airline Cockpit. Department
of Cognitive Science, University of California, San Diego.
Johnson, M. (1987). The Body in the Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kellerer, C. (1982). Der Sprung ins Leere. Objet Trouvb, Surrealismus, Zen. K61n: DuMont.
Lave, J., Murtaugh, M. and de la Rocha, O. (1984). The dialectic of arithmetic in grocery
shopping, in B. Rogoff and J. Lave (Eds). Everyday Cognition. Its Development in Social
Context (pp. 67-94). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lynch, M. and Woolgar, S. (Ed.) (1988). Representation in Scientific Practice. Cambridge
MA: MIT Press.
Norman, D. (1988). The Design of Everyday Things. New York: Doubleday.
Norman, D. (1993a). Things that Make Us Smart. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
Norman, D.A. (1993b). Cognition in the head and in the world: An introduction to the special
issue on situated action. Cognitive Science, 17: 1-6.
Resnick, L., Levine, J. and Behrend, S. (1990). Socially Shared Cognition. New York: Amer-
ican Psychological Association.
Scribner, S. (1984). Studying working intelligence. In B. Rogoff and J. Lave (Eds). Every-
day Cognition. Its Development in Social Context (pp. 9-40). Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Suchman, L. (1987). Plans and Situated Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.