The Presocratics

The Western philosophical tradition began in ancient Greece in the 6th century BCE. The first
philosophers are called “Presocratics” which designates that they came before Socrates. The
Presocratics were from either the eastern or western regions of the Greek world. Athens — home of
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle — is in the central Greek region and was late in joining the philosophical
game. The Presocratic’s most distinguishing feature is emphasis on questions of physics; indeed,
Aristotle refers to them as “Investigators of Nature”. Their scientific interests included mathematics,
astronomy, and biology. As the first philosophers, though, they emphasized the rational unity of
things, and rejected mythological explanations of the world. Only fragments of the original writings
of the Presocratics survive, in some cases merely a single sentence. The knowledge we have of them
derives from accounts of early philosophers, such as Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics, The
Opinions of the Physicists by Aristotle’s pupil Theophratus, and Simplicius, a Neoplatonist who
compiled existing quotes.

The first group of Presocratic philosophers were from Ionia. The Ionian philosophers sought the
material principle (archê) of things, and the mode of their origin and disappearance. Thales of
Miletus (about 640 BCE) is reputed the father of Greek philosophy. He declared water to be the basis
of all things. Next came Anaximander of Miletus (about 611-547 BCE), the first writer on philosophy.
He assumed as the first principle an undefined, unlimited substance (to apeiron)itself without
qualities, out of which the primary opposites, hot and cold, moist and dry, became differentiated. His
countryman and younger contemporary, Anaximenes, took for his principle air, conceiving it as
modified, by thickening and thinning, into fire, wind, clouds, water, and earth. Heraclitus of Ephesus
(about 535-475 BCE) assumed as the principle of substance aetherial fire. From fire all things
originate, and return to it again by a never-resting process of development. All things, therefore, are
in a perpetual flux. However, this perpetual flux is structured by logos– which most basically means
‘word,’ but can also designate ‘argument,’ ‘logic,’ or ‘reason’ more generally. The logos which
structures the human soul mirrors the logos which structures the ever-changing processes of the
universe.

Aristotle says of the first philosophers, which includes the Milesians:

Of the first philosophers, then, most thought the principles (tas archas) which were of the
nature of matter (tas en hulês) were the only principles of all things (archas pantôn). That of
which all things that are consist, the first from which they come to be, the last into which they
are resolved (the substance remaining, but changing in its modifications), this they say is the
element and this the principle of things, and therefore they think nothing is either generated
or destroyed, since this sort of entity is always conserved, as we say Socrates neither comes to
be absolutely when he comes to be beautiful or musical, nor ceases to be when loses these
characteristics, because the substratum, Socrates himself remains, just so they say nothing
else comes to be or ceases to be; for there must be some entity-either one or more than one-
from which all other things come to be, it being conserved. (Metaphysics 983b)

Aristotle explains that the Milesian philosophers concentrate their efforts on ascertaining the
principle (archê) of all things, which they consider to be matter (hulê). By matter is meant the four
elements: earth, water, air and fire. By principle (archê) is meant that which which explains and
causes the existence of another; an archê limits and conditions. Aristotle says that the Milesians
sought to discover, "that of which all things that are consist, the first from which they come to be, the
last into which they are resolved." They pursued this intellectual course because they believed that
ultimately all things (or Being) was material and one; for them, to be able to say what everything is
made of is to explain everything. In other words, what these men sought was to determine the origin
and nature of everything by identifying the most basic material element that all things ultimately are,
that from which all things emerge and return, or, as Aristotle puts it, the principle of all things, which
is material. This is why Aristotle calls them "physicists" (physiki or physiologi), by which he meant
those who believe that all things were physical, or made of matter. An implication of Milesian
philosophy is that, ultimately there is no generation and destruction, since all things are one of the
four elements. The changes that human beings experience are accidental and not substantial: water
modifies its appearance but never ceases to be what it is, water.

Aristotle explains Thales' philosophical views as follows:

Of the first philosophers, then, most thought the principles (tas archas) which were of the
nature of matter (tas en hulês) were the only principles of all things (archas pantôn)....Yet
they do not all agree as to the number and the nature of these principles. Thales, the founder
of this type of philosophy, says the principle is water (for which reason he declared that the
earth rests on water), getting the notion perhaps from seeing that the nutriment of all things
is moist, and that heat itself is generated from the moist and kept alive by it (and that from
which they come to be is a principle of all things). He got his notion from this fact, and from
the fact that the seeds of all things have a moist nature, and that water is the origin of the
nature of moist things.

Some think that even the ancients who lived long before the present generation, and first
framed accounts of the gods, had a similar view of nature; for they made Ocean and Tethys
the parents of creation, and described the oath of the gods as being by water, to which they
give the name of Styx; for what is oldest is most honorable, and the most honorable thing is
that by which one swears. It may perhaps be uncertain whether this opinion about nature is
primitive and ancient, but Thales at any rate is said to have declared himself thus about the
first cause. Hippo no one would think fit to include among these thinkers, because of the
paltriness of his thought. (Metaphysics 983b 7-27)

The diversity of the world of common sense is the result of the modification of water to appear as
something other than water. Water is that which is unchanging in a world of becoming. In one sense,
Thales's view is that there is no true coming to be or passing away because all things are ultimately
water, so that change is mere appearance, and is not ultimately real. In this way, according to Thales,
reality is different from appearance because not everything appears to be one unchanging
thing.Aristotle also relates that Thales believes that the earth rests on water (983b 21; see also On the
Heavens 294a 28). It seems that if it must rest upon anything at all, the earth, which is water, must
rest upon the first material principle, water.

Anaximander shares Thales' assumption that all things originate from one original element and
ultimately are that element; to use Aristotle's terminology, he holds that there is a first (material)
principle (archê) of all things. Unlike Thales, however, Anaximander asserts that the first principle is
not water, but what he calls the apeiron, translated as the Indeterminate or Limitless. Simplicius,
drawing upon Theophrastus' work, gives the following account of Anaximander's view:

Anaximander named the archê and element of existing things the apeiron (the infinite),
being the first to introduce this name for the archê. He says that it is neither water nor any
other of the so-called elements, but a different substance that is limitless or indeterminate,
from which there come into being all the heavens and the worlds within them. Things perish
into those things out of which they have their being, according to necessity. (Phys. 24. 13)

For Anaximander, the archê, or first principle, is not any of the elements—earth, water, air or fire—
but that which precedes the elements (and everything else), from which the elements emerge and
which they all ultimately are From it comes all things, but it is none of those things: "all the heavens
and the worlds within them." Because this archê is no existing thing, but the source and foundation
of them, Anaximander names it the apeiron (the infinite), by which he means that the archê is
indeterminate and has no characteristics: it is before and beyond all distinctions made with respect
to being.
According to Simplicius (and previous interpreters), Anaximander reasons that the first principle
(archê) cannot be one of the elements derivative of it, such as water: "It is clear that when he
observed how the four elements change into one another, he did not think it reasonable to conceive
as one of these as underlying the rest, but posited something else" (Phys. 24.13). If all four elements
change into one another, then the first principle cannot be one of these elements but must be prior to
all of them; in other words, there must be a source of the four elements that itself has no source, for
only that which is not any of the elements could give rise to them. It seems that Anaximander put
this forth as a necessary or logical truth: implicitly he is appealing to the impossibility of infinite
regress in explanation. Probably alluding to Anaximander, Aristotle explains, "There are some people
who make this [a body distinct from the four elements] the infinite (apeiron), and not air or water, in
order that the other elements may not be annihilated by the element which is infinite. They have
contrariety with each other—air is cold, water moist, fire hot; if one were infinite (apeiron), the
others by now would have ceased to be. As it is, they say, the infinite is different from them and is
their source" (Phys. 204b). By "infinity" in this passage, Aristotle means temporal infinity. If any of
the elements were temporally infinite, and so the archê, there would no longer be a balance between
opposite elements, such as hot fire and cold earth, because the one infinite element would never be
transformed into its opposite, but would remain eternally what it is. Instead, this infinite element
would in the long run destroy all the other elements without itself ever being destroyed.

Anaximenes takes exception to Anaximander's teaching about the apeiron, reverting to Thales'
position that the first material principle must be one of the four elements. Different from Thales,
however, Anaximenes chooses air as the archê. Simplicius, in dependence on Theophrastus, explains
Anaximenes' position, "Anaximenes ... also says that the underlying nature is one and infinite like
[Anaximander], but not undefined as Anaximander said, but definite, for he identifies it as air"
(Phys. 24. 26). Similarly, Hippolytus writes, "Anaximenes said that infinite air was the principle,
from which things that are becoming, and that are, and that shall be, and gods and things divine, all
come into being, and the rest from its product.... It is always in motion: for things that change do not
change unless there is movement" (Refut. 1. 6) (see also Aristotle, Metaphysics 984a 5). For
Anaximenes, all things come from air and ultimately are air. He says that air as the archê is infinite
by which he seems to mean unlimited or unconditioned in the sense that it owes its existence to
nothing and is not determined to be what it is by anything. Since it is infinite it is therefore
unoriginate, from which it follows that it is the source of the other three elements and the things
composed of them and itself. If it were from a source, air would be finite, being limited or
conditioned by its source. Since air is infinite and perpetually in motion it can produce all things
without being produced by anything. Even the gods and other divine things derive from air and
ultimately are air. It would seem that Anaximenes did not accept Anaximander's view that the (first)
principle (archê) of all things could not be one of the elements which arise from it.

According to Anaximenes, the mechanism whereby air was transformed into other basic elements
(earth, water and fire) and the things composed of these elements is condensation and rarefaction.
When compressed, by itself presumably, air becomes first water and then earth; when rarefied, again
under its own compunction, it becomes fire. All other things are composites of varying degrees of
these four elements; as such they are the effect of the varying densities of air. Simplicius explains,
"Being made finer it [air] becomes fire, being made thicker it become wind, then cloud, then (when
thicker still more) water, then earth, then stones; and the rest come into being through these" (Phys.
24. 26). Hippolytus adds this interesting comment, "The result is that the most influential
components of generation are opposites, hot and cold" (Refut. 1. 6). What he means is that for
Anaximenes the hot and cold are not things but qualities of the two extremes phases of air, fire and
stone. Air as perpetually in motion condenses itself and rarefies itself to produce the multitude of all
other things.
Philosophy was first brought into connection with practical life by Pythagoras of Samos (about 582-
504 BCE), from whom it received its name: “the love of wisdom”. Regarding the world as perfect
harmony, dependent on number, he aimed at inducing humankind likewise to lead a harmonious
life. His doctrine was adopted and extended by a large following of Pythagoreans, including Damon,
especially in Lower Italy.

That country was also the home of the Eleatic doctrine of the One, called after the town of Elea, the
headquarters of the school. It was founded by Xenophanes of Colophon (born about 570 BCE), the
father of pantheism, who declared God to be the eternal unity, permeating the universe, and
governing it by his thought. His great disciple, Parmenides of Elea (born about 511), affirmed the one
unchanging existence to be alone true and capable of being conceived, and multitude and change to
be an appearance without reality. This doctrine was defended by his younger countryman Zeno in a
polemic against the common opinion, which sees in things multitude, becoming, and change. Zeno
propounded a number of celebrated paradoxes, much debated by later philosophers, which try to
show that supposing that there is any change or multiplicity leads to contradictions. The primary
legacy of Zeno is that subsequent scholars became very aware of the difficulty of properly handling
the concept of infinity.

In the next section of On Nature, Parmenides draws out implications for his conclusion that what is,
is and what is not, cannot be. He says:

It is [i.e. what is], is uncreated and indestructible; for it is complete, immovable, and without
end. Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now it is, all at once, a continuous one. For what kind
of origin for it will you look for? In what way and from what source could it have drawn its
increase? I shall not let you say nor think that it came from what is not; for it can neither be
thought nor uttered that anything is not. And, if it came from nothing, what need could have
made it arise later rather than sooner? Therefore must it either be altogether or be not at all.
Nor will the force of truth suffer anything to arise besides itself from that which is not.
Wherefore, Justice does not loose her fetters and let anything come into being or pass away,
but holds it fast. Our judgment thereon depends on this: "Is it or is it not?" Surely it is
adjudged, as it must be, that we are to set aside the one way as unthinkable and nameless (for
it is no true way), and that the other path is real and true. How, then, can what is be going to
be in the future? Or how could it come into being? If it came into being, it is not; nor is it if it
is going to be in the future. Thus is becoming extinguished and passing away not to be heard
of.

If what is (or Being) is, then what is has always been what it is and will not cease being what it is. In
other words, what is did not become what it is, but has always been that, nor will it become other
than it is. This is what he means when he says that what is, "is uncreated and indestructible...and
without end." The implication of what he is saying is that generation in time is ultimately unreal:
"Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now it is, all at once, a continuous one." The reason that
Parmenides holds this view is that to say otherwise is to affirm that something comes from nothing,
which is nonsensical since nothing comes from nothing. In his view, only two alternatives are given:
it is or it not. He states, "Therefore must it either be altogether or be not at all." But the latter
statement is contradictory, which leaves only the former statement as true: "Surely it is adjudged, as
it must be, that we are to set aside the one way as unthinkable and nameless (for it is no true way)."
For him, generation and destruction are impossible since these require that something not be: "If it
came into being, it is not; nor is it if it is going to be in the future. Thus is becoming extinguished and
passing away not to be heard of." He adds that something cannot come from nothing because, even if
this were possible, there could be no reason found for why something would come from nothing at
one time and not another: "And, if it came from nothing, what need could have made it arise later
rather than sooner?" Aristotle further explains the rationale behind Parmenides' view as follows:
"First, if it comes into being from something, then it does not come into being at all, since it already
exists; second, if it comes into being from nothing, then it cannot come into being, since something
cannot come from nothing” (Physics 187a 34). It follows that, if becoming is impossible, then what is
(or Being) is eternally the same, unchanging. This Parmenides expresses by saying that what is, "is
complete, immovable." It is immovable because becoming is impossible and it is complete because it
already is what it is. He writes poetically, "Wherefore, Justice does not loose her fetters and let
anything come into being or pass away, but holds it fast".

Parmenides also concludes that what is (or Being) is indivisible: "Nor is it divisible, since it is all
alike, and there is no more of it in one place than in another, to hinder it from holding together, nor
less of it, but everything is full of what is. Wherefore it is wholly continuous; for what is, is in contact
with what is" (8). Divisibility means the separation of what is from itself. What is (or Being) could
not divide itself from itself, however, since it is uniform and continuous. Although he does not say so
explicitly, it seems that he holds that what is (or Being) is indivisible because nothing could separate
what is from itself, since nothing cannot be something by which to produce this effect.

Parmenides says further that what is (or Being) is not infinite, in the sense of being unformed or
unfinished. Rather, "It is immovable in the bonds of mighty chains, without beginning and without
end." For what is to be "immovable in the bonds of mighty chains" makes it finite, since, if it were
infinite, it would not be something, but be incomplete and therefore have a lack in its being .

Empedocles of Agrigentum (born 492 BCE) appears to have been partly in agreement with the
Eleatic School, partly in opposition to it. On the one hand, he maintained the unchangeable nature of
substance; on the other, he supposes a plurality of such substances — i. e. the four elements, earth,
water, air, and fire. Of these the world is built up, by the agency of two ideal principles as motive
forces — namely, love as the cause of union, strife as the cause of separation. Empedocles was also
the first person to propound an evolutionary account of the development of species.

Empedocles accepts Parmenides' view that ultimately there is no generation or destruction; what is,
is and cannot come into being or perish. Frs. 11, 12 says,

Fools!—for they have no far-reaching thoughts—who deem that what before was not comes
into being, or that anything can perish and be utterly destroyed. For it cannot be that
anything can arise from what in no way is, and it is impossible and unheard of that what is
should perish; for it will always be, wherever one may keep putting it. R. P. 165 a.

Similarly, in Fr. 8, he says, "There is no substance (phusis) of any of all the things that perish, nor
any cessation for them of baneful death." Empedocles also accepts Parmenides belief that there can
be no void or emptiness in Being, since nothing cannot exist.

Empedocles departs from Eleatic philosophy insofar as he asserts that Being is not one, but many. In
fact, for him, there are four basic elements, each of which is imperishable and unchanging, from
which all things are composed; he calls these "the roots of all things" (Fr. 6), and they are identified
with fire, earth, water, and air (Fr. 17; Metaphysics, 1. 7; 987a 26-27). Similarly, Clement of
Alexandria quotes Empedocles as follows, “The four roots of all things first do you hear—Fire, water,
earth, and ether's boundless height: For of these all that was, is, shall be, comes” (Strom. 6.2).
Aristotle explains Empedocles' view:

Empedocles, then, in contrast with his predecessors, was the first to introduce the dividing of
this cause, not positing one source of movement, but different and contrary sources. Again,
he was the first to speak of four material elements; yet he does not use four, but treats them
as two only; he treats fire by itself, and its opposite—earth, air, and water—as one kind of
thing. We may learn this by study of his verses. (Metaphysics 1.4; 985a 29-985b 3

As Aristotle makes clear, Empedocles identifies not one archê but four archai. Although it is not clear
what is meant, Aristotle further clarifies his statement by saying that that actually these four
elements are really two archai: fire and the other three elements, earth air and water, which are said
to be the opposite of fire. Empedocles was the first of the pre-Socratics to posit that there was a
plurality ofarchai to explain all movement or becoming.

Empedocles agrees with the Eleatic dictum that there can be no true generation and destruction: the
four elements remain what they are eternally. Nevertheless, he also asserts that his senses do not
deceive him when they tell him that there is becoming, but this is of an non-ultimate sort of
becoming. Although what is, in the ultimate sense, is imperishable and changeless, yet these four
archaiintermingle with one another in varying proportions to become all things and so cause non-
ultimate or apparent change. Empedocles says about the archai:

For all these are equal and alike in age, yet each has a different prerogative and its own
peculiar nature, but they gain the upper hand in turn when the time comes round. And
nothing comes into being besides these, nor do they pass away; for, if they had been passing
away continually, they would not be now, and what could increase this All and whence could
it come? How, too, could it perish, since no place is empty of these things? There are these
alone; but, running through one another, they become now this, now that and like things
evermore. (Fr. 17)

Whether the four elements—fire, earth, water, and air—are continuous and flowing or whether they
were composed of minute, discrete particles is not clear from the extant fragments. In other words, it
is not clear from what remains of his writings whether Empedocles adopts some form of atomism.
Aristotle, however, says that Empedocles taught that all composites are made of small particles of the
elements juxtaposed one to another (Gen. et Corr. 334a 28-30). Aetius likewise explains that,
"Empedocles said that prior to the four elements were minimum particles (thrausmata),
homeomerous and as it were elements before the elements" and "He constructs the elements out of
smaller bodies (ogkoi), which are the least of all and as it were elements of the elements" (Aet. 1.13
and 1.17.3). If reports about his views are to be believed, It seems that for Epedocles the four
elements were composed of minute, minimum particles that resembled the four elements in every
way; when enough aggregate together, then the elements become perceptible.

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (born about 500 BCE) also maintained the existence of an ordering
principle as well as a material substance, and while regarding the latter as an infinite multitude of
imperishable primary elements, qualitatively distinguished, he conceived divine reason or Mind
(nous) as ordering them. He referred all generation and disappearance to mixture and resolution
respectively. To him belongs the credit of first establishing philosophy at Athens, in which city it
reached its highest development, and continued to have its home for one thousand years without
intermission.

Anaxagoras accepts Parmenides' view that what is, or Being, neither comes into being nor passes out
of being. Like Empedocles, he holds that becoming is the result of the combining and separation of
imperishable elements. He says in Fr. 17:

The Hellenes follow a wrong usage in speaking of coming into being and passing away; for nothing
comes into being or passes away, but there is mingling and separation of things that are. So they
would be right to call coming into being mixture, and passing away separation. (Fr. 17)

What appears to be the coming into being and passing away of things is really only the mixture and
separation of "things that are," the eternal, unchanging elements. Although no statement to this
effect is found in the fragments, probably Anaxagoras rejects the idea that nothing can exist, so that
there can be no void or empty space.

Unlike Empedocles, Anaxagoras holds that anything whose parts are qualitatively the same as the
whole is composed of particles identical to the whole in every way. A piece of gold, a bone, or a stone,
for example, consist of imperishable and eternal particles qualitatively identical to the whole. This
multitude of basic elements he calls "seeds of all things," because from these everything else is
formed. He says, "And since these things are so, we must suppose that there are contained many
things and of all sorts in the things that are uniting, seeds of all things, with all sorts of shapes and
colors and savors" (Fr. 4).

Beginning from the Eleatic premise of the impossibility of ultimate becoming, Anaxagoras denies
that something can come from something else; one of the "seeds of all things" cannot become
another such seed. He asks, "How can hair come from what is not hair, or flesh from what is not
flesh?" (Fr. 10). When hair or flesh grows it must assimilate homogenous particles into itself to
increase its mass; it is impossible that the growth of hair and flesh could be the result of the
metamorphization and assimilation of other, qualitatively distinct elements.

For Anaxagoras, there are no indivisible particles, no atoms; rather, anything whose parts are
qualitatively identical to the whole can be infinitely divided into smaller parts. He writes, "Nor is
there a least of what is small, but there is always a smaller; for it cannot be that what is should cease
to be by being cut" (Fr. 3). That the "seeds of all things" are infinitely divisible follows from the
Eleatic premise that what is, is and cannot not be: if one could divide one such seed, so that it ceases
to be what it is, because one would eventually reach the component parts (or principles) of the seeds,
then one could destroy what is, which, as Parmenides has shown, is impossible. Anaxagoras
continues by affirming that the seeds can be infinitely compounded into larger aggregates, which
assumes an infinite supply of the "seeds of all things." He says, "But there is also always something
greater than what is great, and it is equal to the small in amount, and, compared with itself, each
thing is both great and small" (Fr. 3) (see Simplicius, Phys., 460.8). The enigmatic statement, "And it
[the great] is equal to the small in amount" seems to mean that any "amount" of a type of seed
contains an infinite number of parts, since the seeds are infinitely divisible.

The first explicitly materialistic system was formed by Leucippus (fifth century BCE) and his pupil
Democritus of Abdera (born about 460 BCE). This was the doctrine of atoms — literally ‘uncuttables’
— small primary bodies infinite in number, indivisible and imperishable, qualitatively similar, but
distinguished by their shapes. Moving eternally through the infinite void, they collide and unite, thus
generating objects which differ in accordance with the varieties, in number, size, shape, and
arrangement, of the atoms which compose them.

The efforts of all these earlier philosophers had been directed somewhat exclusively to the
investigation of the ultimate basis and essential nature of the external world. Hence their
conceptions of human knowledge, arising out of their theories as to the constitution of things, had
been no less various. The Eleatics, for example, had been compelled to deny that senses give one any
access to the truth, since to the world of sense, with its multitude and change, they allowed only a
phenomenal existence. However, reason can give one knowledge of what the One is like–or, more
accurately, what it is not like.

Retaining the skepticism of the Eleatics about the senses, while rejecting their doctrines about the
ability of reason to reach truth apart from the senses, the Sophists held that all thought rests solely
on the apprehensions of these senses and on subjective impression, and that therefore we have no
other standards of action than convention for the individual. Specializing in rhetoric, the Sophists
were more professional educators than philosophers. They flourished as a result of a special need for
at that time for Greek education.