The Contribution of Critical Realism as an Underpinning Philosophy for OR/MS and Systems

Author(s): J. Mingers
Source: The Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 51, No. 11 (Nov., 2000), pp. 1256
-1270
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The contributionof critical realism as an

underpinningphilosophy for OR/MS and systems
J Mingers*
WarwickUniversity, UK
Many issues are underdebateas to the philosophicalnatureof OR/MS: is it science or technology?Is it naturalor social
science? Can it be realist as well as being interpretivist?There are also many debateswithin the philosophy of science
itself. This paperproposesthat a particularaccountof the philosophyof science, known as 'criticalrealism',is especially
suitableas an underpinningof OR/MS. The structureof the argumentof this paperis to outlinethe main positionswithin
the philosophy of science and highlight their problems,especially from the point of view of OR/MS; then to introduce
critical realism and to show how it addresses these problems and how it is particularlyappropriatefor OR/MS; and
finally to illustratethis by consideringexamples of various practicalOR methods.

Keywords: critical realism;epistemology;multimethodology;ontology; philosophy;systems

Introduction There is the traditionalpositivist or empinrcistviewpoint

This paper considers the tangled issue of what might be an
appropriate philosophy underpinning the theory and prac-
tice of OR/MS, and suggests that what has come to be
known as 'critical realism' (CR), developed largely by the
philosopher Roy Bhaskar, -4 may be appropriate. It is
argued that CR both successfully addresses the major
divisive issues within the philosophy of science-natural
vs social, positivist vs critical, realist vs constructivist,
structure vs agency-and fits particularly well with
OR/MS's methodological approach and systemic concepts.
The relevance and importance of critical realism for OR/MS
was first highlighted in earlier papers by Mingers,5 - 7but is
developed much more fully here.
In dealing with the main point of a suitable philosophy
for OR/MS, we will cut across several significant debates
within the literature:
* The issue as to whether OR/MS is best viewed as science
or technology. Clearly the early pioneers were scientists
who saw their work as doing science,8-'10 a view
supported by Miser." ,12 However, the weight of
more recent opinion has been in favour of OR as
technology. 13 -- 15
* Accepting that OR/MS is at least related to science,
should it be seen as natural science, social science, 16-20
or indeed critical science?62'1- 24
* What, in any case, is an appropriate model for, or
philosophy of, science, whether it is natural or social?
*Correspondence: Prof J Mingers, Warwick Business School,
Warwvick
Universit, Coventrw CV4 7AL, UK.
E-mail: j.mingers(t@)warwick.ac.uk
with various flavours inductivist,deductivist,falsifica-
tionist;25 a wider view of science as craft, developed by
Ravetz26 and debated by Miser, Keys and
Ormerod;'3'30 various types of constructivist,interpretive
or post-modem stances that to a greateror lesser extent
deny the possibility of an observer-independent
reality;203 -35 or the social studies of science argument
that successful science is actuallythe result of a political
and social process.'4'36
Clearly, this paper cannot address all these issues in
detail, but the critical realist approach proposed does
proffer resolutions or dissolutions of several and these
will be discussed at appropriatepoints.
The structureof the argumentof this paper is to outline
the main positions within the philosophy of science and
highlight their problems, especially from the point of view
of OR/MS; then to introducecritical realism and to show
how it addresses these problems and how it may well be
appropriatefor OR/MS; and finally to illustrate this by
considering examples of practical OR. The argument is
put forward from the point of view of critical realism. It
does not claim to make a balanced appraisal of com-
peting philosophies since such a task would presume the
possibility of an independent, presuppositionless stand-
point, a possibility that, the author believes, is illusory.
Philosophy of science and its problems
In general, a realist understandingof science takes the view
that certaintypes of entities be they objects, forces, ideas
or categories-exist in the world, independentof human
beings, and that we can gain reliable knowledge of them.
 J Mingers-The
This may seem so obvious and commonsensical as to
requireno defence and, indeed, it does have a long history
within philosophy from Aristotle through to Locke.
However, from as long ago as the eighteenth century
Hume and Berkeley underminedsuch a view by denying
fundamentalslike causal necessity or unobservableentities.
During the twentieth century, 'naive realism' has been
under constant attack from empiricism (which restricts
science to mathematicalformulationsof empirical regula-
rities) on the one hand, to the many different forms of
conventionalism or constructivism (that deny human-
independent existence) on the other. For reviews of the
philosophy of science see Outhwaite,37Keat and Urryj3
and Chalmers,39while Klemke et al.40 contains many of
the seminal papers.
Empiricism
In very broad terms, empiricism refers to those philoso-
phies that see science as explaining events that can be
empirically observed. That which is not manifest and
capable of observation must be nonscientific or even, in
the extreme case of the Vienna Circle philosophers,
literally meaningless. Events are expected to display regu-
larities or patternsthat can be explained as being particular
instances of universal laws of the form 'given certain
conditions, whenever event X occurs then event Y will
occur'. Science is seen as the systematic observation of
event regularities,the hypothesis of general laws, and the
prediction of particularoutcomes from the laws.
Logical empiricismwas developed duringthe 1920s by a
group known as the Vienna Circle (eg Schlick, Carnap,
Neurath)who aimed to specify a truly scientific conception
of knowledge and the world. Their main tenets were: (i)
scientific knowledge must rest ultimately on that which is
empiricallyopen to the senses. This meantthatany scientific
propositionsmust be able to be empiricallyverified,and that
anythingunableto be directlyor indirectlyobservedmustbe
nonscientific or even meaningless. (ii) Empiricalobserva-
tions must then be reformulatedinto some strict mathema-
tical or logical language (following the work of Frege and
Russell), generally expressed in terms of universal laws.
(iii) There must be a unity of method across all sciences,
thus social science and history must also be formulatedin
such a way.
These propositions rested on particular fundamental
assumptions: (i) the idea that observation and perception
were unproblematic-simply providinga mirroron nature;
(ii) the Humeanprinciple that the observationof one event
following anotherdid not enable us to prove some under-
lying causal mechanism-all that we can claim are
'constant conjunctions of events'; (iii) the principle of
induction-that universal laws could be derived from a
set ofparticular observationsaccompaniedby the deduction
of predictionsfrom the laws.
ofcritical
contribution asanunderpinning
realism philosophy andsystems 1257
forOR/MS
Although much criticized (see below), we can see that
this philosophy underlies much of the traditionalview of
the nature of OR.4143 As Dery25 documents, Morse's44
descriptionof the methods of OR (observation,mathema-
tical model construction,experimentation,derivation of a
theory and prediction) or Beer's45 descriptionof scientific
method formed the basis for textbook descriptions of OR
right up to the presentday. Even Miser'2 (p 208), in a 1993
discussion of an appropriatescience for OR, suggests it
must involve facts that are the result of careful observation,
induction to generate theories and models, deduction to
produceconsequencesand predictions,and thatit shouldbe
the same for all sciences.
At first sight, and perhapsbecause we are so used to it,
such a view seems almost common sense but in fact it is
highly problematic.The idea of pure, objective perception
and observation was exploded by psychologists,46'47 socio-
logists48 and philosophers;49--5 l Hesse,52 Popper,5' Witt-
genstein53 and Kuhn54 showed that observational terms
were not an atomistic picturing of reality but part of a
pre-given linguistic structure-in shortthat all observation
was theory-dependent;and Popper,55'56based on Hume,
rejected the possibility of verification and induction,
replacing it with falsification and deduction.
In response to these criticisms, there developed a fairly
standardapproachcalled 'deductive-nomological(D-N)' or
'hypothetico-deductive'method based centrallyaroundthe
work of Hempel57and Popper.Science was still seen to be
based fundamentallyon empirical observations, although
recognizing their theory-dependence.From such observa-
tions theories were generated and expressed in terns of
universal (nomological) laws ('covering laws'). Explana-
tion, or prediction,then consisted of the logical deduction
of particularevents given some antecedentconditionsand a
set of laws. It was accepted that the laws might only be
expressed in terms of statisticalprobabilities,and that they
could not be proved to be true inductively. Some people
maintaineda confirmationistview that empirical evidence
could provide supportfor a theory while Popperdeveloped
the falsificationistapproachthatnegativeobservationscould
definitely refute a theory. On this view, science should
constantly aim to reject poor theories rather support or
confirm good theories. Hume's view of causationwas still
largely accepted, leading to debates about 'theoreticalenti-
ties'. That is, there was general scepticism about the
ontological status of theoreticalconcepts that could not be
observed fairly directly.Perceptibilitywas the criterionfor
existence. Within OR/MS, the falsificationistapproachhas
not had much impact, although Raitt58 emphasized that
model validation should involve strong attempts to
refute the model, and Mitchell59includes it as part of his
descriptionof a scientific approach.
The D-N approach suffers from a range of problems,
some of which will be explained in the next section on
conventionalist alternatives, but, to highlight a few:
1258 Journal Research
oftheOperational Vol.51,No.11
Society
(i) falsificationism,certainlyin simple form, does not stand
up-does a failed experimentfalsify an underlyingtheory,
or simply the experiment itself and its supplementary
theories? Theories often need to be developed despite
initial failures, not just abandoned.Does not falsification-
ism implicitly rely on induction, ie moving from particular
instances (of failure) to the general statement that it will
always fail? (ii) The covering law model was very impo-
verished simply providing a description of what happened
in highly constrained experimental conditions, with no
explanationof why it happened,or sometimes did not; and
with no mechanism for the generation of new theories or
putativelyreal entities. (iii) It did not correspond,in many
ways, with the actual practices of scientists and could not
therefore satisfactorily explain the de facto success of
science. (iv) The proposal that the social world was in
essence no different from the naturalworld simply could
not be sustained.
Conventionalism
Problemswith the empiricistview of science centre around
the impossibility of pure, unmediated observation of
empirical 'facts'. So, the term conventionalism covers a
wide range of philosophies that all emphasizethe inevitable
dependence of scientific theories on human perception,
conceptualization and judgement. Many stem from the
Kantian idealist view that basic categories such as time,
space and causalityare imposedupon phenomenaby human
thought.In this section we will considerpragmatism,Kuhn's
theory of scientific paradigms,and sociological studies of
science.
The firstposition,pragmatism,derives fromphilosophers
such as Dewey60and Peirce61 and has been developed most
radically (and perhaps somewhat illegitimately) by
Rorty.62,63 At a general level pragmatism is a view about
the purpose of science, that it is essentially a practical
activity aimed at producing useful knowledge ratherthan
understandingthe true nature of the world. Thus, Peirce
developed a pragmatisttheory of meaning such that the
meaning of a concept was specified purely in terms of the
actual practicaleffects that it would have; and a consensus
theory of truthas that which would come to be believed by a
community of scientists in the long term, rather than as
correspondence to reality.64Dewey saw knowledge and
truthas the outcome of processes that successfully resolved
problematic situations. A narrow variant of pragmatism,
instrumentalism,takes the view that theories are simply
instrumentsfor making predictions of empirical facts, and
have no necessary truth content in terms of revealing
something about the world.65Thus it may be quite reason-
able to maintaina theory we know to be incorrectbecause it
provides good predictivepower.
Clearly, this view is very compatible with the practical,
ends-oriented nature of OR and has been implicitly
suggested by Raitt,66'We do not ask if it is true, only if
it works-we validate not verify' (p 835) and Dando et
al67 'The overallaim ... is to contrivedevices by which ...
the system can, in some sense, be supposed to work better'
(p 90). Instrumentalismalso leads almost directly to the
view that OR is really a technology ratherthan a science as
both the above papers recognize. Withoutgetting into this
debate, it is certainlya position that has received consider-
able support 14,15,29,68-70 with Keys29 expressing a clear
view that 'science involves the application of scientific
methods to produce explanatory knowledge about part of
the real world.... Processes concerned with the other
problems, and especially the practical {ie OR/MS}, are
technological in nature'(p 432, emphasis added) (although
in a later paper Keys'4 acknowledged a more complex
relationship between OR/MS, science and technology).
Interestingly,pure instrumentalismwould deny this position
since, in a way, it reverses the argumentand suggests that
actually all science is technology in the sense that it is
orientedpurely to practicalusefulness.
The main problems with instrumentalism,particularly
for OR/MS are: (i) that it does not provide information
about why a particulartheory or model does or does not
work. Is it just a coincidencethatit workedthis time? Under
what circumstancesis it valid or not valid? Might there be
other techniques that would work even better? Thus, a
practitionermay use a technique or methodology and feel
that it worked but would not know whether it would be
successful elsewhere, nor if they could have actually done
better. (ii) That it does not contributetowards an under-
standing of the way in which things work since it does not
claim to generate explanations.This goes against many of
the recent developmentswithin managementscience (such
as SSM,7 1 the 'learning organization',,72 or knowledge
management73)that recognize the importanceof learning
and understandingin successful management.(iii) It also
only provides a relatively ineffective criterionof truth for
while the success of a theory provides some supportfor its
truth,the truthof a theory should ensure its success.
The second position on the natureof science comes from
those who study the actual practices of scientists and find
that they do not correspondto the standardphilosophical
theories. This becomes more than mere interestingdescrip-
tion when it is used to critique the possibility of particular
philosophical prescriptions.I shall discuss Kuhn's histor-
ical work on paradigms and also the social studies of
science movement(variantsof this are known as sociology
of knowledge, social constructionof technology,and socio-
logy of scientific knowledge). Kuhn's54'74identification of
major paradigmsof thought throughoutscience is so well
known as to need little exposition. The general idea is a
developmentof the theory-dependenceof observation at
any one time there is a broad, underlying theoretical
conceptualisation(eg Einsteinian physics) that is unques-
tioned within 'normal' scientific activity. This paradigm
 J Mingers-The
informs all actual experimentationwhich is simply puzzle-
solving within the paradigm. The failure of particular
experiments does not refute, or even question, the basic
paradigm.Only in periods of 'revolutionary'science, when
there are many anomalies, do paradigms actually become
questioned or compete.
This view leads to a much greater recognition of the
social and psychological nature of scientific activity. A
paradigm develops through consensus within a social
community of scientists through many practical mechan-
isms such as learned societies, journals, or funding bodies.
Individualscientists come to accept the underlyingassump-
tions concerningresearchpractice, theoretical validity and
core values as they become members of the community.
Theoretical innovations that challenge the paradigm are
generally rejected without serious consideration.The basic
idea of paradigms replacing each other over time has
developed, particularlywithin social science, to the idea
of there being competing paradigms existent at the same
time (eg positivist, interpretiveand critical). This is often
combined with the claim that paradigmsare incommensur-
able (although Kuhn himself did not agree with this74).
That is, each paradigm is so all inclusive in defining its
ontological and epistemological presuppositionsthat it is
literally not possible to actually compare them-each
defines its own 'reality'. This position can be interpreted analysis of OR as a practice largely shapedand conditioned
in differentways ontologically, eitherto say that there is an by the interestsof capitalism is clearly in the mould of the
independent reality but we can never access it except
througha particularparadigm,or that there is no indepen-
dent reality, our theories construct what we experience.
Clearly, the Kuhnian view has major relativistic implica-
tions for empiricism since it points out the constructed, OR, science and technology. The issues that SSK raises for
conventionalnatureof scientific theorising,and makes truth philosophy of science will be discussed in the section on
not correspondenceto some external reality but that which
is accepted by a scientific community at a particularpoint
in time. The incommensurabilitythesis is even more under-
mining since in makes it impossible to judge between
paradigmsor even assert that a later paradigmis actually
superiorto an earlier one.
Within OR/MS the paradigmnotion has become widely
used to account for the significant debates and develop-
ments since the 1970s. The period up to then could be seen
as one of successful normal science within the prevailing
empiricist paradigm75 but one in which many latent
problems had developed. New paradigms were either
called for7' or claimed to already be in competition,78 at Cambridgeon OR and the Social Sciences98which was
and the situation was alternativelyseen as one of crisis or
healthy creativity.79'80The rise of Soft OR/Systems and
ultimately Critical Systems constitutesthe establishmentof
new and to some extent competing paradigms.22There was
a period where they were seen as alternatives8l but now
they are seen as complementary.24'82
The third viewpoint, the sociology of scientific knowl-
edge (SSK), can be seen as an intensification of Kuhn's
study of the actual practice of science. It investigates the
contribution
ofcritical asanunderpinning
realism forOR/MS
philosophy andsystems 1259
way in which scientific and technological knowledge
comes to be constructed and accepted within a scientific
community.We can sketch three inter-relatedvariations:(i)
the 'strong program' in the sociology of knowledge83'84
argued that essentially scientific knowledge was a socially
conditionedbelief system not unlike others such as politics
or religion. It pointed out that, although philosophically it
appearedto be based on empiricalrationality,in practice it
depended on social and political processes and particular
sets of interestsin a similar mannerto other belief systems.
Thus science was not pure and progressive, but relativist
and socially determined. (ii) The social construction of
science and technology 5- 89 proposeda more sophisticated
view of the socially conditionednatureof knowledge. They
tend to focus on the essentially contested nature of scien-
tific frames of reference and meanings and look, for
example, at the ways in which scientific controversies
become resolved through social ratherthan simply scien-
tific means. (iii) Actor-network theory909' shows how
complex networks of people, technologies, ideas and insti-
tutions are constitutedarounda particularinterestor theory
in a play of power with other competingnetworksand how,
thereby, particularoutcomes occur or do not.
SSK ideas have been drawnon by several people within
OR/MS. For instance,25 Rosenhead and Thunhurst's92
strong program. Walsham93 has applied actor-network
theory to information systems research, and Keys'4 has
drawnon a range of SSK approachesin analysing the work
of OR practitionersand looking at the relations between
critical realism.
The relationshipbetween natural and social science
So far, the discussion has centred around the nature of
natural science on the assumption that this was most
relevant to OR/MS, but in recent years there have been
persuasive arguments'6'l9 21 22 94 that, since OR/MS is
conductedwithin social organizations,social science is also
of relevance. (Although predominantly seen as natural
science, the importance of social science was recognized
as long ago as 1964 when the OR Society held a conference
repeatedin 1989.99)This then brings into the picturemajor
philosophical debates concerning the nature of social
science in relation to natural science that can only be
sketched here.
Broadly there are three possible positions: (i) the natur-
alist view that there is one general approachto science that
applies to all domains. Withinthis category,positivists hold
that for anythingto be scientificit must follow the canons of
positivism/empiricism and thus be based on universal
 oftheOperational
1260 Journal Research Vol.51,No.11
Society
generalizationsfrom empiricalobservations.'02This was in
fact accepted by early sociologists such as Comte and,
despite much criticism,continues in areas such as empirical
and functionalist sociology. Critical realists, on the other
hand, maintaina modified naturalismthat is non-positivist
and that accepts there are some differences between the
naturaland social worlds. (ii) The antithesisis the view that
the social world is intrinsicallydifferentto the naturalworld,
being constitutedthrough language and meaning, and thus
involves entirely differenthermeneutic,'03phenomenologi-
cal'04 or social constructivist105 approaches.The argument
here would be the idealist one that ontologically social
objects do not exist in the way physical ones do (ie as
subject independent),and that epistemologicallythere is no
possibility of facts or observationsthat are independentof
actors, cultures or social practices. Both Habermas64and
Giddens?l1 fall in this category. (iii) The most radical
position denies the possibility of objective or scientific
knowledge at all, in either domain. Argumentshere come
from the strong sociology of knowledge programdiscussed
above, post-structuralistssuch as Foucault,106 who point ou-t
the extent to which even our most basic categories such as
male/female are socially constructed, and the inevitable
inter-twiningof knowledge and power, and more generally
post-modernists'07who attemptto undermineeven the most
basic categories of modernistrationality.
Within OR/MS, Checklandand his development of soft
systems methodology (SSM) most clearly articulates a
philosophy based on phenomenology: 'I would argue
that, technically, 'soft OR' refers to an OR based upon
phenomenology rather than positivism, with the important
addendumthat any piece of work based on phenomenology
can encompass within itself 'hard'studies based on positi-
vism (p 39). This stance has involved a strong ontologi-
cal move denying that 'systems' have reality in the world
and allowing the term only epistemologicalvalidityas a way
of helping our thinking: 'Systemicity is shifted from the
world to the process of enquiryinto the world: 'thesystem'
is no longer some part of the world which is to be
engineered or optimised, 'the system' is the process of
enquiry itself,7' (p 277). A critical realist view of SSM
will be discussed laterin the paper.Examplesof some of the
otherpositions within OR/MS are:Mingers22,109 and Flood
and Jackson,23"'0 who have developed critical OR/systems
based on Habermasian social theory; Taket and White,33"1"1
who espouse postmodernism, and Brocklesby and
Cummings32who have opened up ideas based on Foucault.
Summary
This section has sketched a very wide terrainand I would
just like to summarizethe main problems in the philosophy
of science that critical realism aims to address:
* The empiricisttraditionwithin naturalscience that ends
up with a very impoverishedview of explanatorytheory
as based solely on constant conjunctions of empirical
regularities,with little possibility of deeper underlying
explanationsof the phenomena.
* The strongcritiquesof such an empiricalbasis for science
because of the impossibility of objective (observer-
and theory-independent)observation and the socially
conditionednatureof actual scientific practice.
* Problemswith the logic of science whetherit be induction
or deduction, falsification or confirmation, correspon-
dence or coherence theory of truth, or paradigmatic
incommensurability.
* The potential dislocation between the social and natural
sciences.
* The appearanceof radical anti-realistpositions such as
postmodernismor extreme constructivism.
An introduction to critical realism
Critical realism has been developing for some years'12 in
response to the fundamental difficulty of maintaining a
realist position in the face of the criticisms, outlined above,
of a basically empirical and naturalistview of science. Its
original aims (which this paper will concentrateon) were:
(i) to re-establisha realist view of being in the ontological
domain whilst accepting the relativism of knowledge as
socially and historicallyconditioned in the epistemological
domain;' and (ii) to argue for a criticalnaturalismin social
science.2 In more recent work, Bhaskarhas, (iii) developed
the idea of explanatorycritiqueas a way of re-unitingfacts
and values,3 and (iv) generalizedthe notion of dialectic as
an interplay of positive and negative, presence and
absence.'13,114 CR is becoming influential in a range of
disciplines geography,' 15"'16 economics,117"118 organiza-
tion theory,' 19,120 sociology'2 -124 internationalrelations,25
and researchmethods in general.126"127
Argumentsestablishinga stratifiedontological domain
Bhaskar's12 (p 23) startingpoint is to argue, specifically
against empiricism and positivism, that scientific reality is
not just constant conjunctions of observable events but
about objects, entities and structures that exist (even
though perhaps unobservable)and generate the events the
we observe. The form of the argumentis a transcendental
(this follows a broadly Kantianinterpretationof 'transcen-
dental') one, that is it begins with some acceptedhappening
or occurrenceand asks what must the world be like for this
to occur. In this case, what is accepted by both empiricism
and many forms of idealism is that we do have perceptual
experience of the world, and that science is carried out
throughexperimentalactivityin which scientistsbringabout
particularoutcomes. The argumentis that neither empiri-
cism nor idealism can successfully explain these occur-
rences and that they necessitate some form of realist
ontology. With regard to perception, we can note that as
 J Mingers-The
humanbeings we have to learn(as babies) to perceivethings
and events; that our perceptions can change (eg visual
illusions);and that scientists,for example,have to be trained
to make observationscorrectly.These all imply that there
must be a domain of events that are independentof our
perceptions of them (what Bhaskar calls an intransitive
domain).And, indeed,that these events would exist whether
or not they were observed or there even were observers.
There is thus a domain of actual events, only a (small)
subset of which are perceivedand become empiricalexperi-
ences. That which is not experiencedis not known but that
does not mean to say that it does not exist.
Moving on to experimentalactivity, we can note: that the
experimenter causes (ie brings about) the experimental
conditions but does not cause the results, these depend
upon the causal laws that are operative;that the regularities
that are expected may or may not occur dependingon how
well the experiment is carried out ratherthan on whether
the presumed laws are or are not working; that in fact the
occurrence of empirical regularities (ie constant conjunc-
tions) in general is fairly rare that is why the experiment
is necessary to try to bring them about, but that, despite
this, results do in fact hold outside the experiment. The
implications of this are that causal laws must be different
from and independent of the patterns of events they
generate, and that the experimenter aims to produce a
constant conjunction of events by closing what would
otherwise be an open system. Thus the intelligibility and
success of experimentalactivity demonstratesthe existence
of an intransitivedomain of casual laws separatefrom the
events they generate, and the corrigibility of perception
demonstratesthe separationof events fromparticularexperi-
ences of them. The empiricist identification of causal
laws with empirical regularities thus involves a double
reduction-that of laws to events and events to experiences.
The argumentcan be expressed in terms of the mistake
that both empiricism and strong forms of idealism or
conventionalism make-that is, the epistemic fallacy.
The essential mistake is in reducing the ontological
domain of existence to the epistemological domain of
knowledge-statements about being are translated into
ones about our (human) knowledge or experience of
being. For the empiricist,that which cannotbe experienced
cannotbe. For the conventionalist,limitationsof our knowl-
edge of being are taken to be limitationson being itself. In
contrast, the realist asserts the primacy of ontology-the
world would exist whether or not humans did.
The argumentso far establishes that given the existence
of science there must be an intransitiveworld of events and
causal laws, but what exactly are causal laws? Or, rather,
what is it that causes or generates events given both the
regularitiesthat can be established in experiments,and the
common absence of regularity outside? Equally, how can
we assure ourselves that event regularities are based on
necessary connections ratherthan simply coincidence? The
contribution
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andsystems 1261
answer is that there must be enduringentities, physical (eg
atoms or organisms),social (eg the marketor the family) or
conceptual 28 (eg categories or ideas), observable or not,
that have powers or tendencies to act in particularways.
The continual operation and interaction of these entities
generates (ie causes), but is independent of, the flux of
events. Entities may have powers without exercising them
at a particulartime (it may need an experimentto trigger
them), and powers may be exercised but not become
manifest in events because of the countervailingoperation
of some other generative mechanism. The heart of this
argumentis that of a causal criterionfor existence rather
than a perceptualone. In otherwords, for an empiricistonly
that which can be perceived can exist, whereas for a realist
having a causal effect on the world implies existence,
regardlessof perceptability.
At this stage we should perhapsconsider the strengthof
Bhaskar'sargument.In essence, it is that for the practiceof
science to be intelligible there must be an intransitive
domain of objects generatingevents. Could we not equally
arguethat for the practiceof religion to be intelligible there
must be a God? Clearly this argument does not hold
what does is that the existence of religion implies a belief in
God. What makes science different is the success of its
results -the knowledge gained throughexperimentscan be
used outside the experimentalsetting and has had enormous
effects. Science is certainly a causally effective generative
mechanism.Even so, I would not want to maintainthat the
transcendentalargumentultimatelyproves the truthof CR.
As Bhaskar accepts, 'transcendental realism is fallible, as
corrigible as the ouitcome of any other piece of hutman
argument. I.. .regard it as merely 'thie best account (at
present) available"2 (p 170).
Critical realism and natural science
For Bhaskar,reality is both intransitive(existing indepen-
dently of humans) and stratified"2 (p 41). The first form of
stratification is between structures and mechanisms, the
events that they generate, and the subset of events that are
actually experienced. These are known as the domains of
the real, the actual, and the empirical. The real contains
mechanisms, events, and experiences, ie the whole of
reality; the actual consists of events that do (or do not)
occur and includes the empirical, those events that are
observed or experienced.These distinctions arise from the
transcendentalargumentsabove-namely that we should
not reduce all events to only those thatare observed,and we
should not reduce enduringcausal mechanismsto events. A
second form of stratificationis within the realm of objects
themselves'12 (p 66) where causal powers at one level (eg
chemical reactions) can be seen as generatedby those of a
lower level (atomic valency). One stratais emergent from
another (what Bhaskar terms 'emergent powers material-
ism'). The picture of the real is thus one of a complex
1262 Journal
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interactionbetween dynamic, open, stratifiedsystems, both
materialand non-material,where particularstructuresgive
rise to certaincausal powers, tendencies, or ways of acting,
often called by Bhaskar 'generativemechanisms'2(p 170)
(although the term 'mechanism' sounds like an object, in
fact Bhaskaruses the term to refer to the powers or proper-
ties of an object; for example, a plane has the generative
mechanism of the power to fly). The interaction of
these generative mechanisms, where one often counter-
balances another,causes the presence or absence of actual
events.
Having establishedthe intransitiveobjects of knowledge,
we must recognize that the productionof knowledge is very
much the work of humans,and occurs in what we could call
the transitivedimension4(p 18). Acknowledging the work
of sociologists, the practice of science is a social process
drawingon existing theories,results, anomalies and conjec-
tures (the transitive objects of knowledge) to generate
improvedknowledge of science's intransitiveobjects. This
distinction allows us to admit the epistemic relativity of
science, the fact that knowledge is always historically and
socially located, without losing the ontological dimension.
We should also note that such epistemic relativitydoes not
imply a correspondingjldgmental relativity,ie thatall views
are equally valid and that there are no rationalgrounds for
choosing between them. We can now characterizethe realist
method of science as one of retroduction(this is the same as
'abduction' as developed by Peirce64 (p 113) in contrast to
induction and deduction)where we take some unexplained
phenomenon and propose hypotheticalmechanismsthat, if
thev existed, would generate or cause that which is to be
explained. So, we move from experiences in the empirical
domain to possible structuresin the real domain. This does
not of itself prove that the mechanism exists, and we may
have competing explanations, so the next step is to work
towards eliminating some explanations and supporting
others. Bhaskarsummarizesthis as: Description,Retroduc-
tion, Elimination,and Identification'14 (p 24) (DREI). He
also considersa variantfor appliedscience thatmay be more
relevantto OR/MS (RRREI):
* Resolultion of the event or phenomena to be explained
into its componentparts and their relations.
* Redescriptionof the phenomena in a way that makes it
theoreticallysignificant, that is that makes it relevantto
the concepts or issues of some particulartheory(ies).
* Retrodiction -the postulationof a hypotheticalmechan-
ism(s) or structure(s)that, if they existed, would generate
the observed phenomenon.The structurecould be physi-
cal, social or psychological, and may well not be directly
observable except in terms of its effects (eg social
structures).
* Elimination of alternativeexplanations and attempts to
demonstratethe existence of the mechanism by experi-
mental activity or by the predictionof other phenomena
or events.
* Identificationof the correct generativemechanism from
those considered, and appropriatedevelopment to the
theoreticalbase.
(Of potentially even more relevance, although under-
developed as yet, is a discussion'13 (p 260) of practical
problem resolution (Diagnosis, Explanation,and Action to
absent the problem), and attempting to change morals or
norms (Description, Explanation, Transformation) that
derive from and utilize RRREI.) The key point is in
going from surface observations (the empirical domain)
to underlyingexplanatorystructures(the real domain) and
back again. This will be illustratedin the next section as
typical of what happens within OR/MS. Moving briefly
from methodology to particularresearch methods, CR is
essentially pluralist since it legitimates both extensive
methods such as statistical data analysis and intensive
methods such as interviewing, case studies, or participant
observation.126,127
It could be objected that how do we know that such
hypotheticalmechanismsactuallydo exist ratherthen being
merely interestingideas. At one level the answeris that we
can never know for certain,since science is always fallible.
More practically,however, the intransitivityof real struc-
tures means that they will always have the potential for
effects that go beyond us, ie are out of our control, and the
methodology means that we should aim to eliminate
alternativeexplanationsby testing in some way for their
potential effects.
Critical realism and social science
We now move to the second major argument of critical
realism, that social science is essentially similar to natural
science in its realist characteralbeit with modifications to
reflect the particularnature of the social world. We can
begin by asking what would rule out a realist approach?
The answer being that there are no intransitiveobjects for
social science to investigate. Such an argumentcould come
from the extreme constructivists(or superidealistsas Bhas-
kar calls them) who would also apply it to the natural
world, or from those, such as Checkland,who would argue
for the distinctive nature of social phenomena as being
intrinsicallymeaningful and not existing independentlyof
social actors. Space precludes a full discussion of this
complex issue, 2,37,112,114,121,122,128,129 but I will outline:
(i) the argument for intransitive social structures; (ii)
implications for the natureof societies; and (iii) the limits
on naturalismthat follow from (i) and (ii).
The primary argument2is against methodological indi-
vidualists, such as Popper'30 (and Margaret Thatcher!),
who claim that 'society' does not exist and that all
explanationscan be couched in termsof individual'sbeliefs
and actions.The firstrefutationconcernsemergentproperties
 J Mingers-The
-there are attributesthat can be applied to people that
concern physical features, height or weight; there are
attributesthat we share with other animals such as pain
or hunger;but there are many attributes,essentially human
ones, that are unavoidably social, for example 'bachelor',
'banker', or 'nun'. These are only intelligible within the
context of a social institution or practice.'3' The second
argument is that many activities we undertake, most
obviously perhaps language, must already exist and be
available for people to learn and then use. As Wittgen-
stein53 argued, there can be no such thing as a private
language-every time anyone has a conversation, uses a
credit card, or waits for a train they are assuming the
existence of a structured,intransitivedomain of resources,
concepts, practices and relationships.The successful occur-
rence of social activities warrantsthe existence of causally
efficacious, although unobservable, social structures.
Bhaskar does accept, however, that social phenomena
are inherentlydifferent from material phenomena and that
this does put limits on the nature of social science:2
Ontological
(1) Social structures do not exist independently of the
activities they govern, or, put another way, they exist
only in their effects or occurrences. Social structures
enable social activities and through that activity are
themselves reproducedor transformed.Thus, they are
themselves the result of social activity. In contrast,the
laws of the naturalworld are not affected by their own
operation.
(2) Social structures do not exist independently of the
agents' conceptions of what they are doing. Thus
agency always requires some degree of interpretation
and understandingof the meaning of the actions under-
taken. However,this does not imply that agents cannot
be mistaken, and it does not requirethat they be fully
aware of the consequences of their activity.In contrast,
naturalphenomenaare independentof our conceptions
of them.
(3) Social structuresare localized in both space and time,
unlike natural laws or tendencies that are generally
universal.
Epistemological
(1) Social systems are inherently interactive and open.
Whilst the same is true for natural systems, it is the
case that they can be artificiallyclosed or controlledin
the laboratory,and this indeed is the principalreason for
experiments.This, however, is not (generally)possible
in social systems. The main effect is that it is difficultto
test theories since predicted effects may or may not
occur depending on a multitude of factors. It focuses
attentionon a theory'sexplanatoryratherthanpredictive
power.
contribution
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realism
asanunderpinning forOR/MS
philosophy andsystems 1263
(2) The possibilities of measurementare very limited since
intrinsicallythe phenomenaare meaningful,and mean-
ings cannot properlybe measuredand compared,only
understoodand described.
Relational
(1) Social science is itself a social practiceand is, therefore,
inherentlyself-referential.This means both that social
science knowledge can itself affect the social world,and
perhapschange it (eg the self-fulfilling prophesy);and
that it is itself a social product and thereforewill be
shaped by the social conditions of its production.This
does not make social science totally transitive-once
an event has occurred,or some theory been produced,
it becomes intransitiverelative to possible explanations
of it.
(2) I would drawa second conclusion from this, that social
theories must be self-consistent in not contradicting
their own premises since they are part of their own
domain.
All of the above place limits or constraints on the
practice of social science, but do not make it different in
principle from natural science. It is still driven by the
existence of an intransitivedomain of generative mechan-
isms; a recognition of the epistemic (but not judgmental)
relativity of knowledge; and a retroductivemethodology
that explains events by hypothesizing causal mechanisms.
Applying critical realism to examples of operational
research
Having discussed at some length the main problems in the
philosophy of science and the ways that CR can address
them, it is now time to show more specifically why CR is
highly appropriate as a philosophy for OR/MS. In
summary,I would argue that: (i) CR enables us to take a
basically realist stance (which I am sure is intuitively held
by the vast majority of OR/MS colleagues) whilst accept-
ing the major critiques of naive realism; (ii) it addresses
both naturaland social science and thus encompasses both
hard and soft (and critical) approaches;and (iii) it poten-
tially fits well with the reality of OR/MS as an applied
discipline. The argument for point (iii) could be made
either by considering the theory of OR or by looking
empirically at its practice. The former is difficult
because there is little theory as such simply a range of
techniques with some methodologies for applying them;
the latter is hard because there is such an incredible
diversity of examples of practical interventionsthat could
be considered.
Given the limitationsof space, I shall try to addressboth
aspects by discussing three specific OR/MS approaches
with examples of each. The three have been chosen for
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theoretical reasons systems dynamics because it seems
to epitomize some of the major premises of CR; statistical
analysis (especially regression and time-series decomposi-
tion) because it is arguablyincompatiblewith CR, embody-
ing an empiricist philosophy; and soft OR which would
seem to conflict with CR from the opposite direction,
namely interpretivism. These latter two examples are
important for my argument since it could be counter-
argued that, because OR/MS has paid little attention to
CR and because many of its techniques appearprimafacie
to be based on antagonisticfoundations,CR cannotpossibly
fit OR/MS. Against this, my analysis seeks to show thatthe
fact that a researchtechnique develops within a particular
paradigm, and implicitly accepts the assumptions of that
paradigm, does not prevent it being re-interpreted,or re-
constructed, in another way. CR allows us both to see
limitations of the prevailing interpretation, and to
reconceptualizethe technique in a more powerfulway.
Svytem dvnamics
System dynamics (SD) is a form of simulation that was
developed in the 1960s by Forrester,132 and popularizedin
recent years throughthe work of Senge72and the develop-
ment of user-friendlysoftware such as Stella and Powersim.
Space precludes a descriptionof SD, for introductionssee
Vennix133 and Morecroft and Sterman'34 and a special issue
of this Journalin May 1999 (50(4): 291-450) this paper I
include under SD both causal loop/influence diagrams,and
the further development of these into an actual computer
model. It is possible to see SD as embodying many of the
main tenets of critical realism.
(i) It is rooted in a systems-basedview that corresponds
well with CR's description of the domain of the real. The
assumption is that the events we experience (and wish to
explain) are causally generatedby the structuresof under-
lying systems. 'The system dynamics approachto complex
problems ... takes the philosophical position that feedback
structuresare responsible for the changes we experience
over time. The premise is that dynamic behaviour is a
consequence of system structure.'35 (p 15). In this quote
we can discern essentially the same distinctionthat Bhaskar
makes between the real and the actual. The actual
behaviour we experience is generated by the underlying
structuresof systems.
SD focuses in particularon the importanceof feedback
loops and, although using different terminology, this also
links to CR's view that tendencies (or generative mechan-
isms) may or may not be realized because of the counter-
vailing tendency of some other system. Within SD, the
actual behaviourthat occurs depends on the balance of the
feedback loops and their relative strengths. Particular
events or patterns of behaviour may or may not occur in
relation to particular parameter values. Indeed, an SD
model could be used to explain the absence of an event
as much as it's occurrence.We can also use SD to highlight
Bhaskar's related distinction between the actual and the
empirical, ie, that which is observed rather than occurs
unobserved. In running a SD model, the various causal
relationshipswill be interactingwith each other (the real)
and generatingparticularpatternsof presence and absence
(the actual). The modeller will choose some of these to
observe (the empirical)by opening various table and graph
windows within the software, and these will be explained
with referenceback to the underlyingsystem's structure.
(ii) A furthertentative isomorphismis between genera-
tive mechanisms in CR and what are called systems
archetypes in SD. 133,136 A generative mechanism is a
potential emergent propertyor a causal power that results
from a particular structuralconfiguration. Such mechan-
isms are relatively enduring and their interplay generates
the actual pattern of events and behaviours. Systems
archetypes are similar they are specific feedback struc-
tures that may be said to be generic as they are observed in
many situations and produce particularbehaviours when
they operate. For instance, 'success to the successful'
occurs when two activities compete for the same limited
resource. The two inter-linked positive feedback loops
result in one activity flourishingat the expense of the other.
(iii) The explicit methodology of SD can also be related
well to CR's retroductiveapproach(Resolution,Redescrip-
tion, Retroduction, Elimination, Identification). For
instance, Vennix'33 (p 50) suggests that: 'The process
startswith the identificationof some problematicbehaviour
... the 'reference mode of behaviour'.... The model-
builder will attempt to construct a simulation model
which is capable of replicating this reference mode of
behaviour'. The logic is clearly one of retroduction a
situation of concern is identified (which could be some
unwantedbehaviour,or something that is desired but does
not occur), and hypotheses are made as to the type of
systemic structurethat could generatethis. This is modelled
by an influence diagramswhich may be developed into a
computer simulation. If the model can replicate the
observed (or desired) behaviour this is good, although not
definite, evidence that the model capturesthe actual causal
mechanismat work. It is also recognisedwithin SD that the
model cannotbe proved to correspondto reality, and that in
the validation stage of model building the process will at
least partly involve attempts to eliminate or disprove
alternativepossibilities. 'The notion of validity as equiva-
lent to confidence conflicts with the view many seem to
hold which equatesvalidity with absolutetruth.We believe
confidence is the proper criterionbecause there can be no
proof of the absolute correctness with which a model
represents reality.... [O]ne tests a system dynamics
model against a diversity of empirical evidence, seeks
disproofs,and develops confidenceas the model withstands
tests '137 (p 211).
 J Mingers-The
Once a validated model is developed it can be used to
improve understandingof how the system may respond to
particulartriggers, and to test out the impact of possible
changes to the situation.Again the philosophy is similar to
that of CR (as opposed to positivism) in that it is recog-
nized that the main purpose is not accurateprediction of
what will occur, but instead greater learning and under-
standing of the causal mechanisms involved in the situa-
tion.138,139 The argumentis the same as in CR, namely that
social systems are inherentlyopen (althoughthey have to be
artificiallyclosed within the modelling process) and thatit is
impossible to properlyquantifythe various factorsand their
relationships. This fits well with Bhaskar's Diagnosis,
Explanation, Action methodology for bringing about
change .4 141
We can illustratethe above comments with an example
by Lane.'42 The problem is that every winter there is a
major crisis within hospital casualty (A&E) departments.
Patientswho should get a bed within 2 h often have to wait
for over 8; and sometimes departmentsactually have to
close even for emergencies. A variety of possible explana-
tions have been put forward-reduction in beds available,
patients unable to vacate a bed because of lack of care in
the community resources, competition between hospitals
driving up bed occupancy rates-but it is difficult to
determine the relative importance and interaction of
them. A causal-loop model was developed based on the
interaction of several feedback loops possibly governing
the flows of patients in and out of A&E. A considerable
amountof data was producedin orderto validate the model
both in terms of its internal structureand in its ability to
reproducea realistic patternof behaviour.Use of the model
enabled the most important factors (generative mechan-
isms) causing behaviourto be identified,and also enabled a
range of possible changes to be examined. The resultswere
sometimes surprising and led to considerable learning
about the situation and several importantpolicy lessons.
Statistical modelling- the empiricistapproach
In considering statistical modelling including regression,
other multivariate techniques, time-series decomposition
and ARIMA, we are moving to an approachthat, in varying
degrees, goes against critical realism in being essentially
empiricist. In this section I shall show the weaknesses of
the conventional interpretationof statistics, but also how it
can be better employed within a realist framework.
Consider first multiple regression, a technique used in a
range of social sciences as well as OR/MS. It claims to be a
causally orientedtechnique (in comparisonwith, say, time-
series analysis) that aims to explain the variation in a
dependentvariable in terms of a set of supposedly causally
related independentvariables. A linear functional form is
assumed and parametersare estimated from a sample of
data. Inferences are drawn towards a wider population. In
ofcritical
contribution asanunderpinning
realism philosophy
forOR/MS
andsystems 1265
practice,where it has been used extensively, for example in
econometrics, its predictive ability has been extremely
poor.118From a CR viewpoint this is hardly surprising
since there are severe limitations in this approach.
(i) The notion of causality is extremely impoverished
being essentially the Humeanone of a constantconjunction
of events as underlying empiricism.143 A set of empirical
observations are made, and a mathematical procedure
produces an equation that best links them on the basis of
an assumed model (typically multivariatenormality). The
equation is then often used for predictive purposes. The
justification for this procedure is either that the variables
'really are' linked by some such universal law that the
regression is capturing,or the instrumentalistversion that
the model is useful predictively even though it is not
representing 'real' relationships. The main problem with
this is that it remains in the superficial world of the
empirical,with no attemptto get at underlyingmechanisms
that may be responsible for the observed regularities.This
is manifest in the truismthatthe correlationcoefficient only
identifiesassociationnot causality.This remainsjust as true
in complex and sophisticatedregression models as it does
at the level of a simple bivariate correlation.There is no
way from the model to decide if a correlationis genuine or
spurious.
(ii) The procedure rests on an implicit assumption of
closure'17'144 which, as we have already seen, cannot be
expected to occur in social systems. By this I mean that the
stabilityof the coefficients, and their statisticalsignificance,
rests on assuming that the factors that have not been
included, usually because they are unknown or impossible
to measure, have only a small and essentially random
effect. In practice, the effect may well be large and there
is no way of knowing what the influence will be outside of
the sample data.
(iii) The main assumptionsof regression-multivariate
normal distributions,independence of variables, one-way
causality, linearity,etc are highly implausibleto say the
least. As we have seen, the real world is characterizedby
complex, often circular,chains of interactionthat occur at
many different levels. This underminesthe traditionalidea
of significancetests, the logic of which is: if we assume that
the model is true in reality (null hypothesis) then alpha is
the probabilityof obtaining the observed values (and then
wrongly rejecting the null hypothesis). Since, almost by
definition, the model will not be 'true', it makes no real
sense to accept that it is.
(iv) All of this makes it very difficult to choose be-
tween competing models for the same data. Elaborate
methods have been devised, eg stepwise, best-subsets,
fragility analysis, but in practice many different models
are developed and choices made on essentially subjective
grounds such as experience, usefulness, or perhaps just
intuition.145 Even more problematic is the very nature of
the data itself which tends to be taken for granted, but
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which CR would recognize as being highly dependent on
the processes of its production.'46
Given these problems, it might seem that CR would
abandon statistical analysis altogether, especially since
empirical verification is not a necessary featureof a realist
scientific explanation (since causal tendencies may be
possessed but not actualized). This is not the case, but it
does requirea re-thinkingof the purpose of such analysis,
and also a differentiation between different techniques.
Critical realism proceeds by trying to discover underlying
structures that generate particular patterns of events (or
non-events). Statistical analysis can help in several areas:
(i) It can be very useful in the exploratorystage in detecting
particularpatterns within the data. Any non-randomness
must imply some structure or set of constraints that is
generatingit, although,of course, this may be just as much
a result of the mechanism of data production as any
underlying generative mechanism. Nevertheless, detecting
such patternswithin large sets of multivariatedata is very
difficult and methods such principal components, factor
analysis, cluster analysis and regression are very valuable.
The results, though, will merely be the starting point for
more substantive investigations. (ii) Some techniques do
lend themselves more towardsidentifying underlyingstruc-
tures, especially something like factor analysis that aims to
identify common factors generatingobserved variables, or
path analysis144 that involves a series of inter-related
equations. Even here, however, the results are merely
suggestive, not conclusive, (iii) Perhaps the main use
might be in validatingpossible explanationsby corroborat-
ing, or falsifying them. This could be done eitherby testing
the implications of a theory throughcollecting and analys-
ing data.'47 Or, more sophisticatedly, by regarding the
analysis as a quasi-experiment,inducing artificial closure
on a system by controlling for the influence of nornally
uncontrolled factors.'43 Techniques such as multivariate
analysis of variance and covariance are useful here.
These points can be illustratedwith a practical experi-
ence of my own using time series decomposition, a tech-
nique that at face-value is even more empiricist than
regression in ignoring outside causal factors completely.
The project concerned a major UK bank who wanted to
better control the amount of cash kept in cash machines.
This required good forecasting of daily cash demand at
individual machines. We had a large dataset of actual
withdrawalsfrom machines over 2y, and also ideas about
particularunderlying factors influencing demand (genera-
tive mechanisms). The project proceeded in two ways-
the data itself was interrogatedto identify particularseaso-
nal patternsand, at the same time, theoretical suggestions
were investigated by seeing if the data supported them.
Examples of such factors are: a weekly effect where
Fridays and Saturdays are greatest; a monthly effect
where withdrawals fell towards the end of the month,
then picked up as people were paid; the effects of particular
events such as Christmas;the influence of the location of
the machine, for example those in universitieshad different
patterns from those on high streets, and those near race-
courses were affected by the occurrenceof a race meeting.
The overall approach,which I believe is typical of OR/MS,
was one of developing hypotheses about causal mechan-
isms and using the data both for discovery andjustification
without becoming trappedin the purely empirical domain
of the data in itself.
Soft OR the interpretiveapproach
Soft OR is too diverse to cover overall, so I will confine
discussion to cognitive mapping and SSM as two of the
most well known approaches. Cognitive mapping is a
diagrammatictechniquefor depictingthe way an individual
thinks about a particularissue or problem. In appearanceit
is similarto an influencediagrambut it clearly aims to map
a person s beliefs about an issue, rather than 'objective'
aspects of the situation.It is primarilyused within strategic
decision-makingas part of a wider process that was known
as SODA'48and is now called Journeymaking.149 Cognitive
mapping is based on Kelly's psychological theory of
constructs and is clearly subjectivist in limiting itself to
exploringpeople's beliefs aboutthe world. It can, therefore,
clearly be seen as interpretiveor hermeneuticin character
and as such in opposition to the intransitiveworld of real
structuresand objects. However,I would argue that this is
not wholly the case. It is part of a wider process within
which the actor-independentworld is considered.Different
peoples' individual maps can be compared and, through
discussion, group maps can be developed. This process
becomes less and less subjective,and can result in substan-
tive, real-worldresearch.'It is usual for a SODA workshop
to identify opportunitiesfor furtheranalysis, such as finan-
cial model building, simulationmodelling, marketresearch,
and statistical analysis.'148 (p 39). In one documented
case,'50 cognitive mapping was combined with a system
dynamics model that was explicitly aiming to be demon-
strablyvalid in depicting actual occurrences.Overall, it is
better seen as a qualitative component within a pluralist
researchframeworksuch as multimethodology.82
Moving to SSM, this could also be seen at first sight as
being antithetical to CR. As the quotations earlier show,
Checkland denies the ontological reality of 'systems',
instead reserving this concept for thinkng about the
world. He also distinguishes strongly between naturaland
social science, or rather positivist and interpretivist
approacheswithin social science, and allies SSM clearly
with the phenomenologicaltradition.I shall have to restrict
myself to making a few observationson SSM from a CR
perspective. The main problem is that Checkland takes
positivism as the only alternative to interpretivismas a
philosophy of (social) science. This inevitably means that
he has to adopt a full-blownphenomenologicalposition that
 J Mingers-The
then generates all kinds of contradictionsand problems in
dealing with a 'real-world'externalto the observerthat is,
after all, what SSM aims to improve.6"15' The major
advantageof a critical realist approachis that it maintains
reality whilst still recognizing the inherentmeaningfulness
of social interaction.
It might be said that SSM only concerns ideas or
concepts (root definitions or conceptual models) and that
these are somehow less real than objects. Or, that it is
strongly relativist in accepting all viewpoints as being
equally valid. Against this, critical realism demonstrates
that ideas, concepts, meanings and categories are equally as
real as physical objects.'28 They are emergent from, but
irreducibleto, the physical world, and have causal effect
both on the physical world (eg in the generation of
technology) and the social and ideational world. They are
also inevitably social products and participatein transfor-
mations of the social world,just the sort of transformations
that SSM aims to bring about. With regard to relativism,
CR makes a distinction between epistemic relativism and
judgmental relativism-people may well hold different
beliefs about processes in the world but this does not
mean that we are unable to rationally judge between
them and prefer one to another given some particular
purpose. Equally, ideas once expressed are no longer
wholly subjective-they become intransitiveand available
for investigation, debate and judgement by others. This is
an example of a more general idea, referential detach-
ment' 14 (p 52), that any communication must refer to
something, that which it is about (even if it is self-
referential),and this immediatelyestablishes an intransitive
dimension. Bhaskar goes further in arguing against the
positivist distinction between facts and values (which
would fit in well with both soft and critical OR/MS), and
eventually to a moral realism, ie the idea thatthere could be
moral truths"4 (p 108).
A final point is the weakness of SSM with regardto the
origin of the Weltanschauungenthat it explores, and an
understandingof the difficulties of individualand organisa-
tional change. These both stem from the individualistic
social theory that it embodies. With a critical realist
interpretationboth of these are avoided. On the one hand
we can generate explanationsof why particularactors may
hold the beliefs they do in terms of their social and
organizationalposition; their history of experiences parti-
cularly as these relate to underlying social characteristics
such as gender, race, and age; and, of course, their
individual personalities.'52 We are also in a position to
understandthe psychological and social structuresthat may
impede or facilitate learning and change.
Conclusions
This paper has made a case for the contributionof critical
realism to the philosophy of OR/MS and systems. It has
contribution realism
ofcritical asanunderpinning forOR/MS
philosophy andsystems 1267
approachedthis in two ways. First, in terms of the unre-
solved problems within the philosophy of science, whether
it be natural or social, that CR successfully addresses. In
particular:the impoverished view of explanatory theory
within empiricism; the major critiques of observer- and
theory-independencethat empiricism assumes; the logical
problems of induction and falsificationism;the dislocation
between natural and social science; and the radical anti-
realist positions adoptedby constructivistsand postmoder-
nists. Second, it has demonstratedacross a diversity of
methodshow CR's retroductivemethodologycan fit in well
with practical OR/MS and, indeed, generate interesting
reappraisalsof statistical modelling and SSM.
Limitations
I should point out some limitations of this particularstudy:
(1) I have presenteda fairlyuncriticaldescriptionof critical
realism itself. This is partlybecause there is not a well-
developed critical literature,and much of what does
exist is actually sympathetic to CR and is concerned
with detail.'53-155 There is a more radical critique
from King,'29"156 but this is primarily concerned with
Bhaskar'ssocial science.
(2) I have mainly confinedmyself to Bhaskar'searlierwork.
His more recent publications take this further but
introducenew and difficult terminologythat, I believe,
obscures the basic arguments.
(3) I have only begun the task of demonstratingthe connec-
tion of CR to OR/MS and exploringwhat I believe will
be a very fruitfuldialogue. This needs to be done much
more fully, both theoreticallyby looking at a greater
range of techniques, and empirically by considering
more practicalexamples.
Future research
There is much more work to be done and I believe it will
lead to stimulatingand productivediscussions:
* Addressingthe limitationsmentionedabove by consider-
ing a wider range of OR/MS methods and applications,
and incorporatingBhaskar'slater work.
* Developing a more systematic view of research and
interventionmethodology. It is generally accepted that
whilst CR endorsesa pluralityof researchmethodsit says
little about combining them together in practice.
* Consideringmuch more carefully the complex relation-
ship of critical realism to both soft systems and critical
systems.
Acknowledgement-I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of
referees.
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Received January 2000;
accepted July 2000 after one revision