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Four door crew cabs with a short bed, each pick up is loaded with Level 4 armor (doors but not
windows), 6x 33” tires (two spares), steel front bumper with bull bar and winch, omni-directional
IR light bars and cameras (IR and thermal), and upgraded long travel suspension packages,
custom to Cold Harbor rigs.

Inside the cab, a roll cage is run along the A pillar to C pillar to protect the passengers in the event
of a rollover. A GPS-Cellular-WiFi compatible navigation/commo system is run via a Fat Band
data uplink dish, shielded and mounted to a flat roof rack.

In the bed, an additional bench seating is installed with a safety bar (seating up to 4 additional
pax), plus a hard box secured in the bed for additional storage.

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A four door SUV, legendary for its reliability and performance, the 100 Series Cold Harbor variant
includes Level 4 Armor (doors but not windows), 5x 33” tires (one spare), steel front and back
bumpers with a bull bar and winch on the front, omni-directional IR light bars and cameras (IR and
thermal), and upgraded long travel suspension packages, custom to Cold Harbor rigs.

On the inside, the Land Cruisers boast the same upgraded rollcage and nav/communications suite
as the Hiluxes. Ideal as a CASEVAC (Casualty Evacuation) vehicle, each 100 Series has a trauma
fridge, suspended stretcher (stored collapsed), and surgical kit onboard for emergency procedures.

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Back-packable strike package with a minimal acoustic signature, the Switchblade has an operational
range of 10 km with 10 minutes of flight time. Capable of interdicting and destroying small vehicles
or groups of dismounted infantry, the Switchblade is built for remote piloting or autonomous
operation where it can relay video from a specified area and engage targets based on feature- or
object-recognition systems.

Deployed en masse, these drones can interdict technicals and dismounted troops attempting to
penetrate the cordon protecting an operational area with friendly forces inside.

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Remote pilot operable out to 10 km with an additional 5 km of range in autonomous mode, CROWS
drones are capable of 20 minutes of flight time.

Typically deployed en masse, snipe drones are quadrotor reconnaissance UAVs ideal for identifying
and tracking movements of local national non-combatants as well as terrorist actors, and relaying
said intelligence to friendly forces.

Equipped with self defense systems chambered in 300 Blackout, CROWS drones can land and
employ a stabilizer system to more effectively employ this system against an armed opponent.

BEFORE


AFTER Typically flown out of Cold Harbor’s compound in the Awbari City International Airport,
Reaper Drones are exponentially larger than both the Switchblade and Snipe UAVs.

The larger and more capable version of a Predator drone, the Reaper employs a 950 shaft
horsepower turboprop carrying a significant ordinance package, capable of interdicting
everything from a patrol to a three-story building with lethal effect.

Capable of both remote piloting and autonomous flight, the Reaper has an operational radius
of 1850 km with up to 30 hours of continuous flight time.

Per contract, the company maintains two of these platforms in-country that can be tasked to
support operations by host nation forces or Cold Harbor operations.

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Throughout history, Awbari has occupied a unique niche as Europe's gateway to Africa and the
Middle East. Its coastal cities were wealthy provinces of the Roman Empire until their takeover by
the Rashidun Caliphate in the 7th Century; classical ruins still dotting the northern cityscapes. Later
absorbed into the Ottoman Empire, Awbari was the site of the first clash between the nascent United
States and an Arab country in the Barbary Wars. The modern State of Awbari as a singular political
entity most directly descends from an Italian colony established after taking the region from the
Ottomans in World War I.
After winning its independence in the wave of decolonization following World War II, the newly-es-
tablished Kingdom of Awbari survived for barely a decade before a Ba'athist clique in its military
deposed the king and instituted single-party rule. The newly-formed State of Awbari became a
member of the United Arab Republic alongside Syria and Egypt, and received generous military
support from the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. Under this facade of stability, the coastal
cities remained geographically and culturally isolated from one another, with local tribal allegiance
persisting despite the Ba'athists' attempts to fabricate a national identity.
Barely managing to weather the Arab Spring through harsh crackdowns on Islamist and regional
dissent, the Ba'athists maintained their stranglehold on power until 2021, when political and ethnic
tensions that had simmered for the past six decades finally exploded. The Ba'ath party was
overthrown, and in the absence of their military strength, local warlords arose in each of the major
cities. The Awbari Civil War has raged on since then with no end in sight, though the eastern cities
have coalesced into the internationally-recognized Awbari Unity Government.
Taking advantage of the perennial chaos of the civil war, countless foreign influences have seeped
into Awbari. Western megacorps have worked with both the Unity Government and its enemies to
secure extraction rights to Awbari's rich reserves of hydrocarbons and rare earth elements (REEs).
And in the slums of this failing nation the Islamic Emirate of Awbari (IEA) festers, accumulating
riches from selling the nation's resources to unscrupulous buyers. Working with the Aayari Network
in neighboring Qasra, the IEA operates across the war-torn country, building a lucrative empire in
plain sight - a Shadow Emirate.
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A Salafist political movement and military organization, the Islamic Emirate of Awbari (IEA,
colloquially called daesh by opposing locals) was a major player in the revolution that toppled
Awbari's Ba'athist regime in 2021.

During the early days of the military coup and the civil war, when the former Regime's national
institutions had stopped functioning, the Islamic Emirate fortified its structure through the appoint-
ment of its own city governor, district chiefs, judges, police forces, and even healthcare. In cases
where the former regime's infrastructure was still in place, the Islamic Emirate created gaps through
bombings and targeted killings.

Their dominion of the city eroded and collapsed after a sustained campaign by the Ministry of then
Interior’s Counter Terrorism Bureau Adjunct Partner Unit interrupted investment, logistic, and
manpower support from within and outside the nation. Despite this, the Shadow Emirate continues
to fester.

IEA fighters are capable infantry fighters and are willing to carry out acts of unthinkable cruelty and
savage violence to display the power of the Emirate. These fighters, without exception, enter battle
with suicide belts or suicide vests on themselves and will charge an enemy en masse in the hopes of
getting close enough to clack themselves off, taking their opponents with them.

Structured intentionally as a series of franchises operating under broad strategic goals set by the
Shadow Governor, the Shadow Emirate is inherently resistant to the targeted killing campaigns.

Shadow Emirate fighters fund day-to-day operations through taxes (ushr) collected from individu-
als and businesses as well as tolls (zakat) at roadside check points. To maintain a grip on the neighbor-
hoods and families, the Emirate also runs a court system imposing Sharia on the populace, extract-
ing additional taxes, and enforcing verdicts with threat of violence.

The leadership of the Emirate, the Shadow Governor and his district commissioners, draw their
funds from the foreign establishment of black market energy trade and investment by radicalized
fundamentalists throughout the world. It is with this capital that more sophisticated operations are
bankrolled and real-estate portfolios are expanded throughout Europe. As such, Finance Emirs
responsible for this funding are protected by special guard forces to protect them targeting
operations. These special guard forces are typically trained in Qasra by the Aayari Network for this
exact purpose.

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Typically drawn from Arab states, the Balkans, and to some extent Western Europe, recruits typically
have limited to no military experience. They are trained to “hear and obey” by Chechen, Iraqi,
Syrian, and Uzbek combat veterans that fill leadership roles for fighters in training and then again in
the field. Desperate to kill kafir (including fellow Muslims who they have unilaterally excommunicat-
ed), they care little for the local population and have no sympathy for anyone existing beyond the
bounds of Sharia as it has been dictated to them.


Salafism is a fundamentalist interpretation of Sunni Islam that arose in the 1800s that includes, but
is not limited to, Wahhabism. Its name is a reference to the salaf, the first three generations of
Muslims who are described by Muhammad as the "best of my Ummah" in the Bukhari Sharif. This
Hadith is the core element of Salafism, calling for adherents to emulate the salaf as much as possible.
The ideology's ultra-conservative, uncompromising nature played a major role in the growth of
Islamic terrorism in the late 20th Century.

Starting in the 1970s, the Saudi royal family spent billions of dollars to spread Wahhabi teachings in
Sunni mosques throughout the world, and was only reined in by Crown Prince Muhammad bin
Salman in 2017. Though the vast majority of Sunni Muslims are not Salafists, these efforts have made
conservative religious beliefs more mainstream and planted seeds of extremism in countless individ-
uals.


The IEA's particular brand of Salafism is obsessed with eschatology - an especially useful trait for a
cult seeking to recruit bored young men with promises of adventure, violence, and sex.

In both Sunni and Shia Islam, the Madhi is a prophesied messianic figure who will be the first
legitimate successor to Muhammad, and whose appearance is a major step towards the final day of
judgement. Ostensibly, the IEA's ultimate goal is to plant its Black Standard in Jerusalem, an event
that would supposedly precede the coming of the Madhi.

Intoxicated by the worldly pleasures of religiously-sanctioned rape and murder, the IEA's rank and
file don't seem terribly concerned about the organization's indifference towards actually accomplish-
ing this goal.

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Despite the organization's outward religious fervor, the founders of the IEA were remnants of the old
secular regime's intelligence network. The Shadow Governor was responsible for running Ba'athist
paramilitaries before the Civil War (comparable to the Fedayeen Saddam in Iraq or Shabiha in
Syria); he used his existing tradecraft and international ties to build a doomsday cult with the
purpose of enriching himself and his allies without giving up the comfortable lifestyles they enjoyed
before the coup.

China's ever-burgeoning demand for hydrocarbons and REEs led it to forge close economic ties with
Awbari in the decade preceding the Civil War. Seeking to maintain access to these resources after the
regime change, Chinese corporations have been eager to facilitate trade with the Shadow Emirate. As
with all things in China, this is done with tacit permission from the government - just barely
removed enough to maintain some degree of deniability in the Western press.

Though the IEA has diversified into other international markets - including the sale of Classical
artifacts in the West and the human trafficking of sub-Saharan slaves to Gulf nations - their trade in
raw resources to Asia remains their primary source of revenue.



More like an organized crime syndicate than a Al-Qaeda, the Aayari Network is family affair, led by
patriarch Ibrahim Aayari and flanked by brothers, sons, and nephews who operate the various
organs of the network.

Construction companies, financial exchanges, commercial real estate properties, and an import-ex-
port business have all been critical to both their jihadist activities and their black market businesses.
This financial capacity has been critical to allowing the Network to regenerate after key leaders have
been repeatedly reduced or captured by counter terrorism forces in the region.

With a notable contingent of Germans who have waged jihad since the Syrian Civil War, the Aayari
Network is composed of a mix of Qasran nationals as well as foreign expats. Boasting a decade of
experience fighting police and military forces in the region, they are a veteran infantry force acting
most often as enablers or as a unilateral shock troop for select operations.

In Awbari, the Network works alongside the nascent jihadists of the Shadow Emirate, supplying
their forces with materiel and manpower, as well as planning and leading several of the Emirate’s
cardinal operations against the interim Unity Government of Awbari.

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