CASE TITLE YEAR PONENTE ISSUE

CORPORATION LAW
SEPARATE PERSONALITY RULE
1 GERALDO VS THE BILL 2018 PERALTA CAN THE PRESIDENT BE HELD
SENDER CORP. (GR NO. SOLIDARILY LIABLE FOR THE
222219) MONETARY CLAIMS OF THE
DISMISSED EMPLOYEE?

2 HAYDEN KHO, SR. VS 2019 REYES, JR. CAN THE PRESIDENT/GENERAL

MAGBANUA ET AL., (GR MANAGER BE MADE
NO. 237246) SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH THE
CORPORATION FOR THE
PAYMENT OF WORKER'S
MONEY CLAIMS?

3 MARICALUM MINING 2018 GESMUNDO

CORPORATION VS ELY
FLORENTINO, ET. AL.,
(GR NO. 221813)
 4 FREYSSINET FILIPINAS 2019 BERNABE IS IT PROPER TO DISREGARD
CORPORATION VS THE SEPARATED JURIDICAL
AMADO R. LAPUZ (GR PERSONALITY OF
NO. 226722) CORPORATIONS IF THESE WERE
RAN B THE SAME PEOPLE EVEN
OF THEY HAVE SEC
REGISTRATION?

PIERCING THE VEIL OF CORPORATE FICTION

5 MARC II MARKETING, 2011 PEREZ
INC. & LUCILA JOSON VS
ALFREDO JOSON (GR
NO. 171993)

6 ERIC GODFREY STANLEY 2014 BRION

LIVESEY VS
BINSAWANGER PHILS.,
& KEITH ELLIOT (GR NO.
177493)

DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY

7 TERP CONSTRUCTION 2019 LEONEN CAN A CORPORATION BE
CORP. VS BANCO BOUND BY THE LETTERS SENT
FILIPINO SAVINGS BANK BY ITS SENIOR VICE THAT IT
(GR NO. 221771) COMMITTED TO PAY
ADDITIONAL INTEREST
DIFFERENTIALS?

CORPORATE NAME
 8 DE LA SALLE 2018 JARDALEZA WON THE CORPORATE NAME
MONTESSORI INT'L OF DE LA SALLE MONTESSORI
MALOLOS, INC. VS DE LA INTERNATIONAL OF MALOLOS,
SALLE BROTHERS, INC., INC. CAN BE REGISTERED IF THE
(GR. NO. 205548) NAME DE LA SALLE IS ALREADY
REGISTERED AND OWNED BY DE
LA SALLE BROTHERS, INC.

9 LYCEUM OF THE 1993

PHILIPPINES, INC. VS
COURT OF APPEALS (GR
NO. 101897)

10 AGO REALTY DEVT. 2019 REYES, JR. IS A COMPLAINT FILED BY A

CORP. VS DR ANGELITA STOCKHOLDER WITHOUT A
AGO, ET AL., GR NO. RESOLUTION EMANATING
210906 FROM THE CORPORATION'S
BOARD OF DIRECTORS VALID?

OUTSTANIDING CAPITAL STOCKS

11 CAROLINA QUE 2018 TIJAM IN COMPUTING THE TOTAL
VILLONGCO VS CECILIA OUTSTANDING CAPITAL
QUE YABUT, GR NO. STOCKS, WILL THE DISPUTED
225022-4 SHARES OF STOCK BE
EXCLUDED IN DETERMINING
THE PRESENCE OF QUORUM?

MERGER
12 FRANCISCO AND BETTY 2018 REYES, JR.
LIM ONG, ET. AL., VS BPI
FAMILY SAVINGS BANK,
INC., GR NO. 208638
DISSOLUTION
13 DR. GIL RICH VS 2018 REYES, JR.
GUILLERMO PALOMA III,
ET AL, GR NO. 210538
VIGILANCE OVER GOODS
14 ANNIE TAN VS GREAT 2019 LEONEN
HARVEST ENTERPRISES,
INC. GR NO. 220400
CAN THE SURVIVING OR
CONSOLIDATED CORPORATION
BE HELD RESPONSIBLE AND
LIABLE FOR ALL THE LIABILITIES,
COMMITMENTS AND
OBLIGATIONS OF EACH OF THE
CONSTITUENT CORPORATIONS
PRIOR TO THE MERGER?
MAY A CORPORATION NOT
INVESTED WITH CORPORATE
PERSONALITY AT THE TIME OF
REDEMPTION REDEEM A
PROPERTY (AFTER
DISSOLUTION)
TRANSPORTATION LAW
IS A COMMON CARRIER
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LOSS OF
THE GOODS DUE TO THEFT
15 PEDRO DE GUZMAN VS 1988 LOSS OF THE GOODS
CA, GR NO. L-47822

COMMON CARRIER
16 UNITRANS INT'L 2019 CAGUIOA IS THE FREIGHT FORWARDING
FORWARDERS, INC. VS AGENT LIABLE IN CASE OF
INS. CO. OF NORTH DAMAGE OR LOSS OF THE
AMERICA, GR NO. GOODS?
203865

INSURANCE CLAIM; PROOF OF LOSS
17 IPAMS VS COUNTRY 2018 CAGUIOA
BANKERS INS. CORP., GR
NO. 194126
INSURANCE LAW
CAN THE INSURER VALIDLY
DENY AN INSURANCE CLAIM
FOR THE FAILURE OF THE
INSURED TO SUBMIT
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS
WHICH THE INSURER REQUIRED
AFTER ACKNOWLEDGING
LIABILITY

SURETY
18 MERCANTILE INS CO VS 2019 CAGUIOA CAN A SURETY RAISE
DMCI-LAING "INEXCUSABLE DELAY" IN
CONSTRUCTION, GR NO. FILING THE COMPLAINT AS
205007 BASIS FOR EVADING LIABILITY
UNDER A CONTRACT OF
SURETY?

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

UNFAIR COMPETITION
19 ASIA PACIFIC RES. INT'L 2018 GESMUNDO CAN A CORPORATION BE HELD
HLDGS VS PAPERONE, GUILTY OF UNFAIR
INC. GR NO. 213365-66 COMPETITION FOR USING A
REGISTERED TRADEMARK AS
ITS CORPORATE NAME
WITHOUT ITS PRIOR CONSENT
AND AUTHORITY OF THE
TRADEMARK OWNER?

BANKING LAWS
DILIGENCE REQUIRED OF BANKS
20 CITYSTATE SAVINGS 2018 REYES, JR. CAN BANKS BE HELD LIABLE FOR
BANK VS TERESITA THE FRAUDULENT ACT OF ITS
TOBIAS AND SHELLIDIE EMPLOYEE EVEN IF IT HAS
VALDEZ, GR NO. 227990 EXERCISED A HIGH DEGREE OF
DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION
AND SUPERVISION OF ITS
EMPLOYEES?
21 BANCO FILIPINO 2018 LEONEN CAN THE CLOSED BANK UNDER
SAVINGS AND RECEIVERSHIP FILE A PETITION
MORTGAGE BANK VS FOR REVIEW WITHOUT
BSP, ET AL., GR NO. JOINING THE PDIC, ITS
200678 STATUTORY RECEIVER, AS A
PARTY TO THE CASE?

FINANCIAL REHABILITATION AND INSOLVENCY ACT

COMMENCEMENT ORDER
22 LAND BANK OF THE 2019 REYES, JR. WHEN SHOULD THE EFFECTS OF
PHILIPPINES v. POLILLO THE COMMENCEMENT ORDER
PARADISE ISLAND BE RECKONED?
CORPORATION, GR NO.
211537

EFFECT OF COMMENCEMENT ORDER

23 ALLIED BANKING CORP. 2018 MARTIRES CAN THE REHABILITATION
VS EQUITABLE PCI COURT INVALIDATE THE SET-
BANK, INC. GR NO. OFF MADE BY THE CREDITOR
191939 PRIOR TO ITS NOTICE OF THE
ISSUANCE OF THE
COMMENCEMENT ORDER?

FINANCIAL REHABILITATION AND INSOLVENCY ACT

REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE LAW
24 ROMA FE C. VILLALON 2019 PERALTA WILL THE FIRST MORTGAGEE
VS RURAL BANK OF HAVE SUPERIOR RIGHT OVER
AGOO, INC., GR NO. THE SECOND MORTGAGEE
239986 EVEN IF THE LATTER HAS
FORECLOSED THE MORTGAGED
PROPERTY AHEAD OF THE FIRST
MORTGAGEE?
25 CONCORDE COND., INC. 2018 GESMUNDO IS A BANK DEEMED A
VS PNB, ET AL., GR NO. MORTGAGEE IN GOOD FAITH
228354 WHEN IT ONLY RELIED ON THE
CORRECTNESS OF THE
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE BUT DID
NOT LOOKED BEYOND THE
CERTIFICATE IN ORDER TO
DETERMINE THE ACTUAL
OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTY?

26 PLANTERS 2018 REYES, JR. IS PERSONAL NOTICE TO THE

DEVELOPMENT BANK VS MORTGAGOR IN
LUBIYA AGRO EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
INDUSTRIAL PROCEEDINGS NECESSARY?
CORPORATION, GR NO.
207976

27 SOFIA TABUADA, NOVEE 2018 BERSAMIN WAS THE MORTGAGE

YAP, MA. LORETA EXECUTED BY ONE WHO IS NOT
NADAL, AND GLADYS THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY,
EVIDENTE VS ELEANOR OR HAVE THE RIGHT OF FREE
TABUADA, JULIETA DISPOSAL OF IT VALID?
TRABUCO, LAURETA
REDONDO, AND SPS.
BERNAN CERTEZA &
ELEANOR D. CERTEZA,
GR NO. 196510
28 SPOUSES FLAVIO P. 2018 BERSAMIN IS THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
BAUTISTA AND ZENAIDA FORECLOSURE SALE VALID
L. BAUTISTA VS DESPITE THE FAILURE TO
PREMIERE PUBLISH AND POST THE NOTICE
DEVELOPMENT BANK, OF THE RESCHEDULED
ET AL., GR NO. 201881 FORECLOSURE SALE?

PDIC LAW
29 CARLITO B. LINSANGAN 2019 REYES, JR. CAN THE PDIC CAN
VS PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT CONSOLIDATE OTHER
INSURANCE DEPOSITS WITH THE SOURCE
CORPORATION, GR NO. ACCOUNT FOR PURPOSES OF
228807 COMPUTING THE INSURABLE
DEPOSIT?
 COMPETITION LAW
30 GIOS-SAMAR, INC., VS 2019 JARDELEZA WILL THE BUNDLING OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AIRPORT PROJECTS VIOLATE
TRANSPORTATION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMUNICATIONS PROVISIONS AGAINST
AND CIVIL AVIATION MONOPOLIES AND
AUTHORITY OF THE COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT
PHILIPPINES, GR NO. OF TRADE?
217158
 RULING
ORATION LAW

NO. The president of the corporation cannot be held personall and

solidarily liable with the company for the monetary claims of Geraldo.

As a general rule, a corporate officer cannot be held liable for acts done in
his official capacity because a corporation, by legal fiction, has a
personality separate and distinct from its officers, stockholders, and
members.

If there is no showing that the respondent, as a President of the company,

was guilty of malice or bad faith in terminating the employment of the
emploee, she should not be held personally liable for his monetary claims.

Note: Should not be confused with the case of Marc II Marketing, Joson vs
Joson, and Livesey vs Binswanger Phils.ith the company for the monetary
claims of Geraldo.

NO. It is settled that a corporation is a juridical entity with legal

personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf
and, in general, from the people comprising it. As a juridical entity, a
corporation may act only through its directors, officers, and employees.
As such, obligations incurred b the corporation, acting through its
directors, officers, and employees, are its sole liabilities.

A finding of personal liability against a director, trustee, or a corporate

officer requires the concurrence of these two (2) requisites, namely:
(a) a clear allegation in the complaint of gross negligence, bad faith or
malice, fraud, or any of the enumerated exceptional instances; and
(b) clear and convincing proof of said grounds relied upon in the
complaint45 sufficient to overcome the burden of proof borne by the
complainant.

Absent any finding that Kho was a corporate officer of the Corporation
who willfully and knowingly assented to patently unlawful acts of the
latter, or who is guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its
affairs, or is guilty of conflict of interest resulting in damages thereto, he
cannot be held personally liable for the corporate liabilities arising from
the instant case.

Concomitantly, employees of a corporation have no cause of action for

labor-related claims against another unaffiliated corporation, which does
not exercise control over them.
NO. Neither is the existence of interlocking directors, corporate officers,
and shareholders enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate
fiction in the absence of fraud or other public policy considerations.

The employee was not given the required one-month prior notice that the
corporation will already cease its business operations. Worse, the
employee was not given the separation pay considering that the
corporation's cessation of business was not due to business losses or
financial reversals.

Elliot's plan to close the corporation and organize another for the purpose
of evading the corporation's liabilities to Livesy and its other financial
liabilities makes him liable.

YES. A corporation may be bound by the letter sent by its officer if such
action has been ratified by the corporation or whose benefits have been
accepted by the corporation.

A corporation exercises its corporate powers through its board of

directors. This power may be validly delegated to its officers, committees,
or agencies. "The authority of such individuals to bind the corporation is
generally derived from law, corporate bylaws or authorization from the
board, either expressly or impliedly by habit, custom or acquiescence in
the general course of business[.]"

The rule is of course settled that "[a]lthough an officer or agent acts

without, or in excess of, his actual authority if he acts within the scope of
an apparent authority with which the corporation has clothed him by
holding him out or permitting him to appear as having such authority, the
corporation is bound thereby in favor of a person who deals with him in
good faith in reliance on such apparent authority, as where an officer is
allowed to exercise a particular authority with respect to the business, or
a particular branch of its continuously and publicly, for a considerable
time."

Here, respondent relied on Escalona's apparent authority to promise

interest payments over and above the guaranteed 8.5%, considering that
Escalona was petitioner's then senior vice president. His apparent
authority was further demonstrated by petitioner paying respondent
what Escalona promised during the Margarita Bonds' term.
NO. The phrase "De La Salle" is not merely a generic term. Respondents'
use of the phrase being suggestive and may properly be regarded as
fanciful, arbitrary and whimsical, it is entitled to legal protection.

Petitioner's use of the phrase "De La Salle" in its corporate name is

patently similar to that of respondents that even with reasonable care
and observation, confusion might arise. The Court notes not only the
similarity in the parties' names, but also the business they are engaged in.

NOTE: should not be confused with the ruling in the case of Lyceum of the
Phils. vs Court of Appeals (GR no. 101897)

Petitioner institution is not entitled to a legally enforceable exclusive right

to use the word "Lyceum" in its corporate name and that other
institutions may use "Lyceum" as part of their corporate names.

The word "Lyceum" became associated with schools and other

institutions providing public lectures and concerts and public discussions.
Thus today, the word "Lyceum" generally refers to a school or an
institution of learning.

NO. One of the powers expressly granted by law to corporations is the

power to sue. As with other corporate powers, the power to sue is lodged
in the BOD, acting as collegial body.

NO. The total outstanding capital stocks, without distinction as to the

disputed or undisputd shares of stock, is the basis in determining the
presence of quorum.

The law provides that:

Section 52. Quorum in meetings. - Unless otherwise provided for in this

Code or in the by-laws, a quorum shall consist of the stockholders
representing a majority of the outstanding capital stock or a majority of
the members in the case of non-stock corporations.

Section 137. Outstanding capital stock defined. - The term "outstanding

capital stock", as used in this Code, means the total shares of stock issued
under binding subscription agreements to subscribers or stockholders,
whether or not fully or partially paid, except treasury shares.
 YES. The surviving or consolidated corporation shall be responsible and
liable for all the liabilities and obligations of each of the constituent
corporations in the same manner as if such surviving or consolidated
corporation had itself incurred such liabilities or obligations; and any
pending claim, action, or proceeding brought by or against any of such
constituent corporations may be prosecuted by or against the surviving or
consolidated corporation.

Since the credit facility that BSA extended to petitioners was a credit line
total of ₱20,000,000.00, its refusal to release the balance on the omnibus
line prevented full performance of its obligation to petitioners. There
being no release of the full loan amount, no default could be attributed to
petitioners.

BPI was remiss in its duty of looking into the transaction involving the
mortgage it sought to foreclose.

As BSA's successor-in-interest, it cannot feign ignorance of transactions

entered into by the former especially when it seeks to benefit from the
same by foreclosing the mortgage thereon.

NO. The law empowers every corporation whose corporate existence has
been legally terminated to continue as a body corporate for three (3)
years after the time when it would have been dissolved.

This continued existence would only be for the purposes of "prosecuting

and defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its
affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to distribute its assets."

Under the Corporation Code, the extended authority necessarily excludes

the purpose of continuing the business for which it was established. The
reason for this is simple: the dissolution of the corporation carries with it
the termination of the corporation's juridical personality.

Any new business in which the dissolved corporation would engage in,
other than those for the purpose of liquidation, "will be a void transaction
because of the non-existence of the corporate party."

PORTATION LAW

NO. Common carriers are obligated to exercise extraordinary diligence

over the goods entrusted to their care. This is due to the nature of their
business, with the public policy behind it geared toward achieving
allocative efficiency and minimizing the inherently inequitable dynamics
between the parties to the transaction.

NOTE: should not be confused with the ruling in the case of Pedro De
Guzman vs CA and Ernesto Cendana (1988)
 Under Article 1745 (6) above, a common carrier is held responsible — and
will not be allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility — even for
acts of strangers like thieves or robbers, except where such thieves or
robbers in fact acted "with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force."

The Court ruled that the limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost
as a result of a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat,
violence or force."

The occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond

the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous
event.

It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made absolute
insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are not
held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable,
provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of
extraordinary diligence.

YES. A freight forwarding entity and an accredited non-vessel operating is

a common carrier. As a common carrier, one of its obligations was to pick
up the shipment and then transport and deliver the same to the
consignee's premises in good condition.

In handling the subject shipment and making sure that it was delivered to
the consignee's premises in good condition as the delivery/forwarding
agent, Unitrans was acting as a freight forwarding entity and an
accredited non-vessel operating common carrier.

URANCE LAW

NO. The insurer cannot validly deny an insurance claim if the insured fails
to submit additional documents after the insurer has acknowledged its
liability.

Section 92 of the Insurance Code must be taken into consideration. The

said provision states that all defects in the proof of loss, which the
insured might remedy, are waived as grounds for objection when the
insurer omits to specify to him without unnecessary delay.

It is the duty of the insurer to indicate the defects on the proofs of loss
given, so that the deficiencies may be supplied by the insured. When the
insurer recognizes his liability to pay the claim, there is waiver by the
insurer of any defect in the proof of loss.
 NO. While the contract of surety stands secondary to the principal
obligation, the surety's liability is direct, primary and absolute, albeit
limited to the amount for which the contract of surety is issued. The
surety's liability attaches the moment a demand for payment is made by
the creditor.

Through a contract of suretyship, one party called the surety, guarantees

the performance by another party, called the principal or obligor, of an
obligation or undertaking in favor of another party, called the obligee. As
a result, the surety is considered in law as being the same party as the
debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching upon the obligation
of the latter, and their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable.

UAL PROPERTY LAW

YES. The element of intent to deceive and to defraud may be inferred

from the similarity of the appearance of the goods as offered for sale to
the public. Actual fraudulent intent need not be shown.

As in all other cases of colorable imitations, the unanswered riddle is why,

of the millions of terms and combinations of letters available, respondent
had to choose those so closely similar to another's trademark if there was
no intent to take advantage of the goodwill generated by the other mark.

NKING LAWS

YES. The business of banking is one imbued with public interest. As such,
banking institutions are obliged to exercise the highest degree of diligence
as well as high standards of integrity and performance in all its
transactions.

The law expressly imposes upon the banks a fiduciary duty towards its
clients and to treat in this regard the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care.

The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code on simple loan or mutuum, with the bank as
the debtor and the depositor as the creditor.

In light of these, banking institutions may be held liable for damages for
failure to exercise the diligence required of it resulting to contractual
breach or where the act or omission complained of constitutes an
actionable tort.
 NO. A closed bank under receivership can only sue or be sued through its
receiver, the PDIC.

Under Republic Act No. 7653, when the Monetary Board finds a bank
insolvent, it may "summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid the
institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the PDIC
as receiver of the banking institution."

A bank which has been ordered closed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(Bangko Sentral) is placed under the receivership of the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation. As a consequence of the receivership, the
closed bank may sue and be sued only through its receiver, the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation. Any action filed by the closed
bank without its receiver may be dismissed.

TATION AND INSOLVENCY ACT

The FRIA provides that the effects of the Commencement Order shall be
reckoned from the date of the filing of the petition for corporate
rehabilitation, be it voluntary or involuntary.

As the commencement date is ascertained, it is indispensable to discern

the period where the extrajudicial foreclosure sale and its effects took
place as Section 17 of the FRIA extends only to processes which occurred
after the commencement date.

The Certificate of Sale was issued and registered on August 22, 2011. As
such, the last day of the redemption period is on August 22, 2012. The
determination of such expiration date is relevant insofar as the ownership
of the subject properties is concerned. Case law dictates that the
purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property becomes the
absolute owner of the property if no redemption is made within one
year from the registration of the Certificate of Sale by those entitled to
redeem.

Hence, in this case, the ownership of the subject properties was vested
upon the petitioner on August 22, 2012 as its registered owners failed to
redeem the same. Notably, such period precedes the filing of the petition
for corporate rehabilitation on October 18, 2012.

CONSEQUENCE: The effect of such sale is to release the debtor from its
outstanding obligation.
 YES. Under the Rules, the directive of the rehabilitation court restoring
SCP's current account and crediting back the offset amount is valid and
proper.

Under the Rehabilitation Rules, the effects of such commencement order

shall retroact to the date that the petition was filed, and renders void any
attempt to collect on or enforce a claim against the debtor or to set off
any debt by the debtor's creditors, after the commencement date.

SEC. 9. EFFECTS OF THE COMMENCEMENT ORDER. - The effects of the

court's issuance of a Commencement Order shall retroact to the date of
the filing of the petition and, in addition to the effects of a Stay or
Suspension Order described in the foregoing section, shall:

XXX

XXX

(C) serve as legal basis for rendering null and void any set-off after the
commencement date of any debt owed to the debtor by any of the
debtor's creditors;

Clearly, therefore, the directive of the rehabilitation court restoring SCP's

current account and crediting back the offset amount is valid and proper,
since the offsetting was made on 15 September 2006, after the
commencement date on 11 September 2006, when the petition for
rehabilitation was filed.

TATION AND INSOLVENCY ACT

YES. A second mortgagee of an unregistered land has to wait until after

the debtor's obligation to the first mortgagee has been fully satisfied.
NO. As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land may
safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title and is no longer
required to look behind the certificate in order to determine the actual
owner.

However, a banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence

before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the
status or condition of a property offered to it as security for a loan must
be a standard and indispensable part of its operations.

Consequently, a bank cannot be considered a mortgagee in good faith if it

fails to exercise the required degree of caution in readily accepting the
collateral offered by the borrower relying solely on the title without
verifying if the title had no defect or infirmity.

NO. As a general rule, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial

foreclosure proceedings is not necessary.

Section 3 of Act No. 3135 governing extra-judicial foreclosure of real

estate mortgages only requires the FF:
1) posting of the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale in three public
places; and
2) publication of the said notice in a newspaper of general circulation

However, the exception to the rule is when the parties stipulate that
personal notice is additionally required to be given the mortgagor.
Failure to abide by the general rule, or its exception, renders the
foreclosure proceedings null and void.

NO. A person constituting a mortgage should be the owner of the

property, or should have the right of free disposal of it, or, in the absence
of the right of free disposal, such person should be legally authorized for
the purpose. Otherwise, the mortgage is null and void.

Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, a mortgage, to be valid, must have
the following requisites, namely: (a) that it be constituted to secure the
fulfillment of a principal obligation; (b) that the mortgagor be the absolute
owner of the thing mortgaged; and (c) that the person constituting the
mortgage has free disposal of the property, and in the absence of the
right of free disposal, that the person be legally authorized for the
purpose.
 NO. The publication and posting of the notice of the rescheduled
extrajudicial foreclosure sale are mandatory and jurisdictional. The
ensuing foreclosure sale held without the publication and posting of the
notice is void ab initio.

This is because the requirements of publication and posting emanate

from public policy considerations, and are not for the benefit of the
parties to the mortgage.

PDIC LAW
YES. PDIC can consolidate other deposits with the source account for
purposes of computing the insurable deposit if there is deposit splitting.

Elements. The elements of Deposit Splitting are as follows:

a. Existence of source account/s in a bank with a balance or aggregate

balance of more than the Maximum Deposit Insurance Coverage (MDIC);

b. There is a break up and transfer of said account/s into two or more

existing or new accounts in the name of another person/s or
entity/entities;

c. The transferee/s have no Beneficial Ownership over the transferred

funds; and

d. Transfer occurred within 120 days immediately preceding or during a

bank-declared bank holiday, or immediately preceding bank closure.

The PDIC shall deem that there exists Deposit Splitting for the purpose of
availing of the maximum deposit insurance coverage when all of these
elements are present.
 RELATED CONCEPTS:

1. The PDIC was created by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 35918 on June 22,
1963 as an insurer of deposits in all banks entitled to the benefits of
insurance under the PDIC Charter to promote and safeguard the interests
of the depositing public by way of providing permanent and continuing
insurance coverage of all insured deposits.

2. The PDIC has the duty to grant or deny claims for deposit insurance.

3. The term 'insured deposit' means the amount due to any bona fide
depositor for legitimate deposits in an insured bank net of any obligation
of the depositor to the insured bank as of the date of closure, but not to
exceed Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

4. In determining such amount due to any depositor, there shall be added

together all deposits in the bank maintained in the same right and
capacity for his benefit either in his own name or in the names of others."

5. To determine beneficial ownership of legitimate deposits which are

entitled to deposit insurance the following rules shall be observed:

a. In determining the depositor entitled to insured deposit payable by the

PDIC, the registered owner/holder of a Legitimate Deposit in the books of
the issuing bank shall be recognized as the depositor entitled to deposit
insurance, except as otherwise provided by this Issuance.

PETITION LAW
NO. The grant of a concession agreement to an entity, as a winning
bidder, for the exclusive development, operation, and maintenance of any
or all of the Projects, does not by itself create a monopoly violative of the
provisions of the Constitution.

While the grant may result in a monopoly, it is a type of monopoly not

violative of law. This is the essence of the policy decision of the
Government to enter into concessions with the private sector to build,
maintain and operate what would have otherwise been government-
operated services, such as airports.

RA No. 10667 does not define what constitutes a "monopoly." Instead, it

prohibits one or more entities which has/have acquired or achieved a
"dominant position" in a "relevant market" from "abusing" its dominant
position.

In other words, an entity is not prohibited from, or held liable for

prosecution and punishment for, simply securing a dominant position in
the relevant market in which it operates. It is only when that entity
engages in conduct in abuse of its dominant position that it will be
exposed to prosecution and possible punishment.
CASE TITLE DATE PONENTE ISSUE
RULING