On the Meaning of Screens: Towards a Phenomenological Account of Screenness Author(s): Lucas D. Introna and Fernando M.

Ilharco Source: Human Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Jan., 2006), pp. 57-76 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27642736 . Accessed: 06/06/2011 04:33
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Human Studies (2006) 29: 57-76 DOI: 10.1007/s 10746-005-9009-y

? Springer

2006

On

Account

the Meaning of Screens: of Screenness

Towards

a Phenomenological

LUCAS D. INTRONA1 and FERNANDO M. ILHARCO2

^Lancaster (E-mail: 1 Catholic (E-mail: LAI 4XY, United Lancaster, University, ac. uk) I. introna@lancaster. Lisbon 1649-023, of Portugal, University ilharco@fch.ucp.pt) Kingdom

Portugal

Abstract and

In a world of screens. phenomenological analysis a great many we of human submit aspects pervade experience, an interesting in a traditional methodological that phenomenology, much and form, can provide our analysis novel basis for our understanding of screens. We ground in the ontology of Martin This an epoch paper where presents screens as that screens will only show themselves claiming the phenomenon of screen is not investigated Thus, It is rather taken as a grounding intentional orientation ourselves of screen towards in a new them and

a Heideggerian

and Time Being [1927/1962], Heidegger's they are if taken as screens-in-the-world. in its empirical that conditions "as screens." meaningful Key words: form our

or conceptually. as we comport with certain surfaces engagement In doing this we claim to have opened up the phenomenon

way. communication, phenomenology, computer, screens, Heidegger, television information systems, information technol

ogy, media,

1. Introduction It seems world. evident now that screens are a relevant part of our contemporary at work, at home, in some form of traveling, or immersed most of us find ourselves in front of screens increasingly cinema screens,

Whether

personal computer screens, mobile phone screens, palmtop computer screens, and so forth. The last decades have wit screens into people's day-to-day nessed amassive diffusion of television lives. In 1969, 100 million the landing on the moon. In 1985, the people watched attracted an estimated festival, in London and Philadelphia, of 1.5 billion (RM, 2002). More recently, the majority of the world's watched the terrorist attacks on New York and population D.C. on the Internet, that is, on screens. In 2005, the funeral Washington of Pope John Paul II was followed by a television audience of approximately "Live Aid" music television audience two billion people.

entertainment, television screens,

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consider the screens of personal computers and the mobile phone, is even more impressive. It is projected that by 2007 the number of personal computers in use will reach 1,150 million it (CIAI 2004). When comes to the mobile its diffusion is even more pervasive than that of phone, this diffusion the personal computer. According to Nokia there will be two billion mobile in use worldwide It is quite possible 2006 (Wearden, 2005). that phones by we will soon inhabit a world where more screens than people. there will be a medium, a way, or a mode It seems evident that screens are increasingly into the real as well as a part ofthat same reality. The world we encounter is a screened world. increasingly screen context, we want to inquire into the signif Within this pervasive with screens for our understanding icance of our increasing of engagement ourselves and the world of everyday life inwhich we have our being. What does are the this ever-increasing it mean, of screens in our lives? What presence or indirectly of our engagement with screens? Directly fundamental meanings in various disciplines 1993, (such as Heim, more particularly in the phenomenological and 1999; Manovich, 1995,2001), tradition (for example, the work of Ihde, 1990, 2002; Sobchack, 1991, 1994, to these, one should also mention the work of Marshall 1999). In addition on media as human extensions, which not McLuhan (e.g., 1962, 1964/1994) these themes have been discussed only bears portant screened world. will interesting phenomenological insights for our understanding affinities of the contemporary but also provides some im and increasingly

This paper does not aim to replicate this existing work, or to ignore it. It rather add to it through a phenomenological analysis of the screen as a and important, phenomenon in our contemporary way of living. particular, We suggest that a suitable response to the questions above could in part be found in a phenomenological of the meaning of the screen understanding that is, in its essential unfolding in-the-world where it already qua screen screens (Heidegger, In doing our analysis we do not want to fo 1927/1962). cus on the experience of watching screens, nor do we want to focus on the content of screens. We want to suggest that there is something prior to all of these, namely that which conditions us to turn to it "as a screen" in the first in stance. Thus, the phenomenon of screen in this paper is not investigated in its relevance nor is it conceptually The screen is phenomeno empirical analyzed. our intentional orientation that conditions logically analyzed as the grounding towards engagement with certain surfaces in as much as we comport ourselves them as screens (Husserl, This might be formally indicated as 1913/1964).
the screenness of screen.

The paper is structured in three sections. In the first section we present the ontological the phenomenological grounds on which analysis relies. The second section of the paper presents the phenomenological analysis of screen. in the third section we relate our findings to existing work on screens. Finally,

ON THEMEANINGOF SCREENS 59 2. The Phenomenological Horizon of the Analysis

as well as ontologically Methodologically in the work of the phenomenologist horizon

this paper finds its direction and Martin Heidegger (1927/1962, that our application of the This means 1955/1977, 1950/1984, 1975/1988). to the phenomenon method of screen will be contextual phenomenological account - that is, Heidegger's ized within an explicit ontological (1927/1962) of the human way of being, as presented in Being and Time. phenomenology Although we tend to follow the major steps of the Husserlian phenomenolog our detailed analysis within ical method, these steps is based more directly on Heideggerian here. Obviously, sketch of Being analysis. We which we will existential review briefly phenomenology, for the purposes of this paper we cannot go beyond a mere and Time's central ontological claims, which will inform our its relevance will become in our evident as we proceed believe

analysis. phenomenological In Being and Time, Heidegger (1927/1962) pointed out that the human - there from the German words Da of being (which he calls Dasein; way and Sein is a being of being always and already absorbed, involved being) We and the things (such as screens) that we en and entangled in-the-world. in being this counter are never "outside" our ongoing flow of living. However, we also transcend this immediacy of the flow of life. This being-in-the-world are already somehow means that we as Dasein ahead of our transcendence the day ahead of us selves; we are projected. When we wake up in the morning is already and immediately present as "things that needs doing"; when we get for there as a possibility up from our chair the door is already and immediately or worlds etc. We do not need to "create" or invent these possibilities leaving, in around us every time, again and again. Being projected, always already that we will die. In already grasping the future, also means already knowing our being is transformed from an "I am" to an "I can be." In our this finitude our existence, to be, is always (or rather our already projectedness) projects this already In the horizon of existence, and already an issue for us, itmatters. to things show up, not as mere things before us, but as possibilities mattering, (2001) articulates Magda King "The very finiteness of Dasein for him to 'form' a world" it both possible and necessary makes (55). Hence, is that our intentional fundamental relationship with the Heidegger's insight - but rather - as assumed is not epistemic Edmund Husserl world practical and ontological. We engage with the world not to know it but rather to be our account of Heidegger life project. This ontological (which we adopt for our transforms Husserl's notion of intentionality by insisting that analysis below) must be understood in terms of the structural features of Da "intentionality is already that is, the fact that Dasein 's transcendence, sein, specially Dasein in the world, among things, and not somehow beyond itself, already dwelling be this or that particular being-in-the-world. this unity of finitude and world as follows:

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as the representationalist, locked up in the privacy of its own consciousness "all conscious 2000: 42). For Heidegger Cartesian picture assumes" (Moran are drawn on an ever present all human undertakings, all knowledge, ness, substratum: the world, a world that is always already-there, radically primary" notion of world as 1962: 84). Let us consider further Heidegger's (Thevenaz, of screens in-the-world. relevant for our understanding argues that the world (1927/1962) Early on in Being and Time Heidegger is not simply the collection of familiar and useful objects (things, practices, Such a view values, etc.) that surrounds us as we go about our projects. it is very disclosed of the world, "worlding" already draws on a more originary that is our finite human existence. Without the "mattering" through imagine that our experience "mattering" as our human way of being we might of the world would be similar to what appears on the lens of a camera. Itwould of the world

in frequency variations but merely of light. not be objects and possibilities show up as that horizon of human existence, in this ongoing Thus, things which they are, not simply because we "choose" to take them to be this or that to take them as this or that thing because they are thing, but rather it is possible already revealed human ongoing allows the familiar and useful the worlding of the world is the ongoing and dynamic instance. For Heidegger as in which whole referential things always and already have their meaning this or that familiar and useful thing. as "a pen" - namely as a possibility For example, for a pen to be disclosed - it a PVC object full of a chemical and not merely for writing compound necessarily already refers to aworld of writing. This "world of writing" already for writing on (such as paper, white board, etc). Likewise, (paper or board) necessarily already refers to a location for writing (desk, book, lap, wall, etc); which refers to the need for writing, which refers to the need for communication, and so forth. as that which are revealed or disclosed Thus, things they already are within a referential whole in which other things already refer to them and also draw to be what they already are taken to be, by Dasein in-the upon the whole presumes awriting surface as a possibility the writing surface world. When we use the term "refers to" we mean that the thing in question as that which in this case) will not be disclosed it is a pen unless (the pen we take it (the pen) as already these references. Differently stated, implying are necessary as that which it is, as a these references for it to be disclosed else. This can be seen very clearly when we pen, rather than as something as such, within existence. This the ongoing referential whole of of the world is exactly what already-worlding to "show up", as familiar and useful, in the first and through

itsworld; for example, ifwe would references, "strip" the pen of its necessary drop the pen into a society that does not have any form of writing practice. How would those in such a society encounter this thing we take as a pen? it as "a pen," not as a possibility would most certainly not encounter They for-writing. The referential whole that is necessary for it to be disclosed "as a

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- even if itwas made by someone else, familiar pen" would simply not exist with the world of writing, to be "a pen". Such prior "making" only already sense in a "world of makes the pen is already revealed as writing", where necessary. Heidegger suggests that: (1975/1988) that we calculate as the result from [T]he world is not something subsequent the sum of all beings. The world comes not afterward but beforehand, in the strict sense of the word. Beforehand: that which is unveiled and understood in every existent Dasein before any apprehending of already in advance this or that being, beforehand as that which stands forth as always already to us. (165) unveiled Joseph Kockelmans (1972) refers to this "world" as the primordial praxis: "a certain whole is also given as that in which each concrete thing can appear as meaningful.... This whole of relationships, within which things mutually as meaningful refer to one another and can manifest themselves is called 'world'" (12). It is important to reemphasize that for Heidegger (1927/1962) the primordial horizon that constitutes the disclosive of things, as possibility the things they are, is the ongoing concern born in the finitude of human exis - a tence. It is in this ongoing horizon of always already becoming manager, - that etc. for" i.e. friend, lover, politician, things show up as "possibilities have their being as this or that particular thing. they account below Based on this ontological horizon our phenomenological will screens have that screens are screens in-the-world where we will take it as evident that in order to understand Furthermore, its referential whole by exploring of screens we need to disclose are strictly necessary those references that for the screen to continue to appear with screens. In and be taken "as a screen" in our everyday involvements their being. the meaning the section phenomenon
the-world.

take as evident

to follow we will provide a phenomenological of the analysis screen as located in this horizon, the human way of being-in

3. A Phenomenology

of the Screen

In a strict phenomenological counsel (1913/1964, manner, following Husserl's will initially set aside this phenomenological 1954/1970,1931/1995), analysis screen important research that address directly or indirectly the phenomenon Sobchack, 1993,1999; Ihde, 1990,2002; Manovich, 1995,2001; (e.g., Heim, 1994). We will return to some of these in the final section of the paper when to this work. relating our findings that when we investigate Let us remind ourselves the screen phenomeno we do not aim to describe screen, nor any particu any particular logically one engages with a screen or screens. This lar empirical situation in which

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is not directed at this or that empirical screen, but rather to the investigation us to identify each and all particular appear that enables necessary meanings " ances of screens as "screens indicated in the first place. This is formally as well as the limitation of the as the screenness of screens. This is the goal approach we follow here. We must be careful not to claim phenomenological more than our phenomenological analysis provides. Hence, what we intend to consider is not the content on the television, cinema, PC or palmtop screen, does it mean when we but rather the screen as itself, in its meaning. What are else? What with a surface "as a screen" rather than as something engage or meaning in such an engagement? What is the the central meanings implied referential else? 3.1. Holding A ttention whole that discloses screens as screens, rather than as something

an initial description Let us start our analysis by exploring of the screen as a screen - or more correctly the screen as and when it screens. It is rather what we find when we start with the phenomenological surprising description of the screen. When trying to describe a computer screen or a television screen, we immediately note that we never seem to look at a screen, as a "screen." We rather tend to look at screens in attending to that which appears on them. What seems most evident when looking at a screen is the content being presented on that screen - the text, and so on - not the screen images, colors, graphics, itself. To try and look at a screen, and see it as a screen, not taking into account the particular content it presents, as well as all the it draws implied references is apparently not an easy task. We are not familiar with this upon, type of encounter with a screen. Rather our familiarity with screens or displays reveals them as things - maybe surfaces which function in particular contexts and for particular purposes. That is to say, we draw upon screens as we act and relate ourselves to and in the world, mainly within familiar or organizational contexts or situations. institutional This familiarity does not mean that we consciously know what a screen is as such, but rather that we are accustomed to screens. We are accustomed in life to perform the kind of activities inwhich screens are already just it is naturally "there." However, what is familiar is not known simply because familiar (Hegel, we note: "the familiar 1807/1977). With Friedrich Nietzsche is that to which we are accustomed; and that to which we are accustomed is hardest to 'know,' that is to see as a problem, that is to see as strange, as distant, as 'outside us'." (1887/1974, no. 355: 301) In our involved daily coping we take for granted what we are transparently using, as a ready-to-hand being Indeed we may fail to see that which is closest to (Heidegger, 1927/1962). us, for what it already is. In our phenomenological investigation we want to our daily

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that is, that we seem not to see screens qua take note of this strangeness screens. Nevertheless, this strangeness is not the strangeness of a turned-off as a screen. This latter strangeness is rather revealed through its presence mere object, a piece of the furniture as itwere. It might be this strangeness screen when we that often moves us to turn on the television or the computer face it. It is only when we look at the screen in the phenomenological attitude, as a screen in-the-world, and try to focus our attention on the phenomenon as such, that we can begin our phenomenological of screen(ing) description. What do we note? Screens in screening present, show, exhibit, what is supposed to be relevant at the office, or in each context, be it a spreadsheet while working information a schedule while walking in the airport, or amovie while watching television. Screens exhibit what was previously chosen, captured, processed, organized, structured, and finally presented on the screen. But what do we mean by "pre sented on the screen"? The screen, in screening, finds itself already implicated in the ongoing activity. In showing or presenting it attracts our attention, often - not in a also our physical presence, as it "locates" our activity particular space or location but rather in a particular involvement The 1927/1962). (Heidegger, screen is often the focus of our concerns in a particular environment, being at or at home, watching the office, working; the news; or in the cinema, watching a movie. Apparently the screen enters our ongoing involvement in-the-world - as a screen - when we attend to it by turning it on. When we push the "on" the screen captures our attention as it is the place, the location, the set relevant for us at that particular ting, the scene, in which what is supposedly as its necessary time is happening. Screen has condition this supposed rele vance. We rely on it as a transparent ready-to-hand being that shapes, affects our own being-in-the-world and mediates Yet, this (Heidegger, 1927/1962). and shaping of our attention, that screens are, does not sometimes capturing button not), i.e., it is not only when we push the "on" but happen (and sometimes ton that screening is present. On the contrary, that we push the "on" button means precisely as well as its that the screening of screen its possibilities - is there as a horizon of possibilities. As beings already transparency already in a "screening world" we are already relying on, and basing ourselves and our possibilities for being on, this very screenhood of screens. We will return to this claim later on in the paper. From our initial attempt at seeing the screen, as it screens, we note that a screen in screening the attention of the people that surround it. gathers The actions of those people are usually directly shaped by the presence of a turned on screen. In screening, it acts as the location where what is supposedly so far of a screen points to the notions of relevant will be seen. The description or making present, "gathering attention," "suggesting relevance," "presenting" and "acting as a medium". These all emerge in and through our involvement in particular ongoing activities inwhich we find ourselves. We now have a first

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of some central aspects of the screen, be it a phenomenological description cinema screen, or a television screen, or a PC screen, or an overhead projector and so forth. They all maintain themselves in screen, (have their meaning) in and through the phenomenon the-world of screening. 3.2. We The Screen-in-therecall World

that in our phenomenological analysis we are not directed at any screen. The object of our investigation is simply the screen as such. particular to now in one way or the other we have relied on our experiences of parti Up cular screens to describe the phenomenon of screen. Now we want to set aside

these particular experiences and attempt to describe the necessary references a screen "a screen," rather than something that makes of else, irrespective whether it refers to television screens, PC screens, cinema screens, overhead screens, or any screen for that matter. In other words, what are the projector references that are implied for us to relate ourselves to certain necessary what "as screens" is the screenness to it as a screen? surfaces rather than as something of any particular surface else? More stated, formally for us to comport ourselves

We note first and foremost that these things that we comport ourselves to as screens are not some pure isolated and abstract things that have in meaning as such. It seems self-evident themselves for us that to grasp the meaning of the screen we need to have already presumed its world - the screening world (the cinema, the office, the lecture, the airport, and so forth). The screen shows it is, in and only in its world. By "world" we mean, following up, as that which the referential whole within which Heidegger (1927/1962), things have mean above. When we consider the screen, ings and are what they are, as discussed as it appears in its world, it seems to appear as something that calls for or grabs our attention. Without this already calling for our attention, screens would no does this taking hold of our attention come from? longer be screens. Where We already hinted that it lies in the world where the screen already appears as a screen. For example, in the cinema the screen is in front of us and the whole of the space suggests that that which is relevant (the movie) will configuration there. Thus screens, in their screen-ness, often appear or confront us appear as promises to bring into being, to make visible, that which is relevant in that a movie, world a lecture, etc.) (be it watching reading an e-mail, attending while simultaneously hiding their physical being behind that same relevance. Screens have their meaning in the flow of our involvement in the world, that Because the is, transparently as ready-to-hand things (Heidegger, 1927/1962). content in front of us always shows up within our involvement to the (going

movie, reading my e-mail, attending a lecture) it is already presumed relevant, as deserving our attention. This aspect is crucial. The content in front of us is not just presumed relevant. In soliciting relevant, but is already presumed

ON THE MEANING

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our attention

its relevance

does

particular lecture I initially attend to the overhead projector (OHP) screen, it already in the calls for my attention, not because of its particular content but because of teaching I take that as the location where what is relevant will appear. world it already has my attention. Even if I subsequently In screening discover that what I had taken to be relevant is just an old slide that the previous lecturer left by mistake. The fact that the OHP screen, as a screen, keeps its meaning of supposed relevance is stressed by the often urgent comportment by both slide as soon as possible. Thus, the lecturer and students to replace the wrong we would of a screen is a phenomenon that already suggest that the meaning has our attention when and as long as it screens in and through our ongoing activity the kind of diffi This last point can be made more clearly by realizing one has in continuing to attend to screens that do not present assumed culty a PC monitor at the NY relevant content at all, as if they do. For example, some foreign Stock Exchange the schedule of the bus service of displaying of the cash registers of a supermarket city; or the monitor showing air traffic this cu control information, may have an initially curiosity value. However, and itmight even become value will quickly fade into the background riosity irritant. We might these surfaces as screens as initially attempt to recognize we expect them to be; yet, we would not be able to continue to relate to them as "screens." They will have lost their screenness because they will cease to in a world where they appear as such. Obviously, in an art hold our attention indeed hold our attention but then it is in a different world gallery they may and our relationship with them will be different. of stripping its referential the screen whole of example us to clarifying we want to stress that might the point (worldliness) help here. Can we imagine what a man from the Fifteenth think century might when confronted with a screen of an Automatic Teller Machine (ATM)? That curious object surface we refer to as a "screen" would merely be a potentially Another to him. The screen would not be "a screen" for as it shows up within an involvement whole, was - he it as such. For would simply not recognize not have any meaning, and therefore do not exist or hold his attention - except initially as curious the man because the screen, not already a screen for him him, screens, as screens, do in-the-world.

involvement

in-the-world

not depend on its specific content but on a in which we dwell. For example, in the

as such; they do not call for objects. These cases demon as strate the difficulty to refer to the surfaces in the examples of continuing screens because in order to do so we would need to abandon the meaning our attention and framing of the screen - holding This is made relevance. us who are already familiar with the screening world difficult for especially

that already has our attention. in screening, Screens, already hold our attention and display what is sup to them posedly relevant for us in each situation inwhich we relate ourselves

66 as screens. as focal Screens

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their ongoing in-the-world existence, relevant content for our involvement entities, presenting, displaying, If we are in the cinema we expect certain content; and action in the world. if we are in front of our computers, doing our e-mail, we expect different a screen screens - captures our attention and holds it - in and content. Thus, in the world (the world of entertainment, involvements through our particular claim the world involvement screens flow along by making of work, etc). Moreover, evident our in-the-world. They present an already screened world to us which in that world. Hence, involvement fore consistent with our ongoing

their being,

is already most and primarily what screens show is not the content that appears on the a way of being and perhaps more screen, but simultaneously, fundamentally, in that world. As screens we look at them but also simultaneously, immedi we look through them to encounter our way and more fundamentally, ately, of screen shows how closely reduced description the ideas of attention, relevance, and world are in the meaning of intertwined the screen and as such it also hints of the necessary notions of agreement the step just presented is not enough for a fully and perhaps truth. However, screen. In order to of the phenomenon characterization phenomenological reach the full meaning of the screening of screens we must now try to reach beyond this common screen phenomenon 3.3. Screens, ground to identify the strictly necessary to be what it already is. and Truth elements for the of being-in-the-world. This phenomenologically

Agreement

access to the more original meaning of the screen, To gain phenomenological common and essential to all screens, is not to generalize. Generalization itself For example, the existence of some essential meaning. already presupposes of the general idea 'red' is arrived at by leaving out of [T]he abstraction account all those respects inwhich several red objects differ in order to hold on to that respect in which they are similar. But the concept of similarity even respect) which here itself presupposes the very is in question (or to account it is supposed (of the essence of 'red') which comprehension for. (Macann 1993:9) the original meaning of in-the-world, common to all screens; but that which is screen(ing), In trying to describe the original meaning might not be strictly necessary. of the screening of screens we are searching for that which is common, not is of course common Let us pro only to the examples analyzed, but for all potential examples. or this more original meaning ceed now to attempt to describe or "uncover" common ground. We will do this through imaginative variation, to discover et al.,1991:76). We, "what one can and what one cannot imagine" (Hammond The way in which screens are screens

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who

already have our being in a world pervaded with screens, do for discovering the answers we need because empirical observation new variation in imagination we know the object we describe is an as such. Thus, the implicit that same kind, a screen, ifwe recognize it is my ability to recognize of recognition the object as the object it is

not need in every object of criterion (Husserl,

1954/1970, 1931/1995; Spiegelberg, 1975, 1994).

located in different surface, when Firstly, we note that the same empirical a screen even if it can be considered a screen and not considered worlds, of the ATM above. the same content, as is clear from our example displays if we have a mirror, the same size and shape of a screen, filled Furthermore, it to be a screen ofthat which faces it, we do not consider by the reflections we can have a screen displaying a mirror. Nonetheless, but exactly the same is as the mirror and consider it a screen and not a mirror. So, what images the criterion that is implicit in this imagined experience? We would suggest that the kind of content that mirrors reflect and screens present. This means surfaces have altogether different origins. In the displayed by these different case of amirror, it ismerely reflecting back what it receives. In the case of the and often of the screen there operates a fundamental, ongoing presentation of ordering that renders it relevant and meaningful. Screening hidden, process or "theme" in the a certain ongoing coherency always assumes as necessary a whole that will to be a jigsaw puzzle, assumes that a jigsaw puzzle, way and implied relevance does this coherency criterion. Where be its ordering from a its meaning a screen assumes or derives emanate from? In screening, - one could a form of life - that is necessary for certain pattern of life say of life. Wittgenstein in that pattern it to be taken as relevant and meaningful of a similar point with regard to the ongoing meaning made (1953/1967) true and is decides what words: "So you are saying that human agreement ... That is not agreement in opinions is false [use of words]? what [about correct use or not] but in form of life" (#241:88). He argues that the supposed those that use the is not because about the correct use of words agreement to use it in this way or that way but, more fundamentally, word have decided that makes the coherency because they already cohabit a world that provides such supposed agreement possible. relevant content that attracts and holds our attention does not Likewise, or judgments about on the perceiving subjects' perspective depend essentially the result of their as such (i.e. it is not merely is or is not relevant what these supposed choices depend on a more fun individual choices). Rather or referential whole that is "our the coherency damental namely coherency, a screen. A screen screens already appear as way of living" in a world where a certain coherency in accordance content but also and immediately presents screens it finds itself as a screen. Because with the pattern of living in which - as as screens always present relevant content ways of already meaningful them. they gather and locate the attention of the people surrounding living

68 In watching,

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one could of course disagree with the relevance of the particu on the screen (as our example above of the OHP content being presented lar of screen illustrated), but that evaluation itself draws upon the prior coherency or himself the agreement in. Hence, the pattern of life the viewer finds herself in over what is presented on the screen is already grounded or disagreement a previous our way grounds
agreement.

is that the screen means, which and more foundational agreement that of living in a world where screens screen. This original meaning screen is expressed the phenomenon through the notion of already

screens are not mirrors in that they do not reflect whatever Hence, they the face. They are rather surfaces that present what is already relevant within it must also be noted that in pre flow of our purposeful action. However, are inmaking other possibilities relevant or evident senting or displaying and simultaneously excluded. This is precisely one of the central immediately common meanings or choosing). of the word screening today (as selecting are evident from the use of the word "screen" and its etymol These meanings nature of screens is ogy (Introna and Ilharco, 2000). This inclusion/exclusion also seen in the fact that screens have frames or edges that allows us to refer to that which is "on the screen" as opposed to "off the screen". Screening, as inclusion and exclusion, a framing process. is therefore also immediately - to For this screening - including and excluding sense there is the make of some previously on the basis of which necessity agreed ground something can be screened. This agreement for screening, as in including and excluding, is not about the content of this or that screen but rather an already agree ment about a particular way of living, or form of life, as we have suggested above. This way of living, that is the implied criteria of agreement, addresses even more the realm of truth. Truth here is fundamental, something namely not considered as correspondence of the content of the screen with the world but as an already agreement in our way of living that situates the screen as noted in his investigation of the already meaningful. Heidegger (1955/1977) Greek of truth, that the Greek word for truth, aletheia, meant the concept simultaneous of something. We might revealing and concealing suggest that as focal surfaces that grab and hold our attention, may indeed also screens, is before appear to us as "mirrors" of truth however, not reflecting that which of living already implied in their screening. As the of truth, screens condition that which can legitimately be asserted. This is an important conclusion ifwe consider the primacy of seeing in theWestern way of thinking and living, often expressed through the saying is believing." "seeing The screen is first andprimordially involved in seeing, watching, perceiving with the eyes. Seeing, according toHeidegger is "a peculiar (1927/1962:214), In our every way of letting the world be encountered by us in perception." dayness the human sense of sight performs a central role in our involvement them but reflecting context grounding a way

ON THE MEANING

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in-the-world is at stake in this supremacy of 1927/1962). What (Heidegger, so to speak, is not a characteristic or feature of humans, but an ontolog seeing, of being human in which cognition is conceived ical conception of as seeing. For us it seems that this ontological of seeing brings into focus the primacy of screens. Let us elaborate this claim some more. ontological significance notes that the early Greeks conceived (1927/1962:215) Heidegger cognition in terms of the "desire to see." Aristotle's (1998: 4, n. 980a) treatise Meta opens with the sentence "By nature, all men long to know." In order physics to capture what Aristotle wrote, with reference to ancient Greek, Heidegger that we must stay with the original meaning of the sentence, which suggests to man's Being" would then translate as: "The care for seeing is essential That such a reading is correct is supported by 1927/1962:215). (Heidegger the text of Aristotle that follows that sentence:

to [i.e., the care for seeing is essential By nature, all men long to know man's Being]. An indication is their delight in the senses. For these, quite and that through the apart from their utility, are intrinsically delightful, eyes more than the others. For it is not only with a view to action but also when we have no intention to do anything that we choose, so to speak, sight rather than all the others. And the reason for this is that sight is the sense that especially in us and reveals many distinguishing produces cognition 1998: 4, n. 980a) features of things. (Aristotle, Such an ontological of seeing is at the core of Western conception thought, and ever since. Saint Augustine also grounds many epistemological developments noted this priority of "seeing" - this correspondence between and cog seeing nition. In this regard Heidegger refers to Saint Augustine's (1927/1962:215) work from The Confessions: We even use this word 'seeing' for the other senses when we devote them ... We not to cognizing ..., but we even only say 'See how that shines' say 'See how that sounds, See how that is scented, See how that tastes, See how hard that is' ... Therefore the experience of the senses in general is as the 'lust of the eyes'; for when the issue is one of knowing designated the other senses, by a certain resemblance, take to themselves something, the function of seeing - a function in which the eyes have priority. (Saint quoted in Heidegger, Augustine 1927/1962:215-6) This priority of seeing, the primacy of the human sense of senses, is also a thesis defended (1962, by McLuhan claimed that the phonetic alphabet, invented more than 4000 the technology that brought about that primacy, introducing vision over the

other

He 1964/1994). was years ago, us into a world

dominated

and equilibriums. This priority patterns, modes by vision-based as seeing, and thus seeing as the is understood of seeing, in which cognition access to truth, gets revealed in a particular way in screens. In the phenomenon

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of screen, seeing is not merely being aware of a surface. The very watching the screen as screen implies an already present ontological about agreement the nature of the world; a world that is relevant (and true) to us who share it, in and through the screening of the screen. This is an important hint ifwe are to understand the power of screens in contemporary and society. organizations us now bring the strands of our analysis together. In screening, Let screens already attract and hold our attention. They continue to hold our attention as relevant in a particular ongoing way of doing. they present what is supposedly This ongoing an agreement, relevance has as its necessary condition not of content, but of a way of living and a way of doing. As such screens make our way of living evident - but also simultaneously and immediately exclude other ways of living and doing. As we face screens and continue to attend to them we behold not just content but also a certain already agreement on the "way we are" - a certain agreement about the possibilities of truth. Thus, as seeing, typical of western in the primacy of cognition thought, screens have ontological the mere content of their surfaces. In significance beyond we can say that the screen is a kind of Ge-stell, or Heidegger's terminology screening of screens is a kind of the possibilities for truth, our mostly that makes upon way of living and doing, is the background implicitly agreed relevance appear. In screening, the screen not only makes this way of living evident but simultaneously and immediately conceals other possible ways of indeed it even conceals its very own way of being. The frame at work being; screens to us in everyday also frames us in revealing life as mere represen "enframing" (Heidegger, 1955/1977). framework or frame at work, in which The tational depend locations
conduct

surfaces, thereby concealing on for their ongoing meaning. for the possibilities
ourselves towards screens.

the already agreement they imply and As such, screens function as powerful of truth. This is evident in the way we often

screens, are the context of contemporaneity. As Tony Fry ( 1993:13) puts it, television has arrived as the context. People who do not watch television, those who do not have television at home, especially seem to be out of context: "When you don't watch television for a long time, Screens, particularly television is not your way of thinking becomes different, your idea of what is interesting the same as what television people think should be interesting." (Tran, 2001:7) The media editor of The Guardian, commented with some irony that "the common factor to all 20th-century lunatics and serial killers, from Stalin to Lee Harvey Oswald, was this: they didn't watch enough telly" (Scott, 1999:17). In the aftermath of the September cinema 11th, theWhite House and Hollywood television into the Arab joined forces to extend the reach of Western companies world (CNN, 2001 ). What was at stake was precisely the context that television can establish, and indeed the traits of the already agreement that screens are. "Rushing essentially was world, Washington" to shift perceptions of the United States in the Islamic not looking to CNN but toMTV (CNN, 2001).

ON THE MEANING

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to reinforce what is presented just by the presenta The power of television in our daily lives. Yet this power does tion itself has important consequences not belong to television but rather to the screen in its screen-ness. This is con us at the bank, the doctor, the public firmed when we hear somebody serving office, and so forth saying: "that is not what is on my screen." In these situa tions the screen is often taken as more valid and trustworthy than ourselves as many of us have found out to our dismay.

4. Other How

Screens

and Some

Concluding

Comments

account of screens above relate to other does the phenomenological on screens? Obviously there is a large literature that talks directly or indirectly about the importance of screens. Due to the limits of space we will in Life on the Screen Sherry Turkle just refer to a few here. For example, that the screen has a certain plasticity that creates possibilities (1995) argues screens to become for being: "[w]e are using life on computer comfortable with new ways of thinking about evolution, sexuality, politics, relationships, work of She also claims: "In the real-time communities identity" (1995:26). we are dwellers on the threshold between the real and the virtual, cyberspace, unsure of our footing, inventing ourselves as we go on... [creating] an identity and and multiple that it strains the limits of the notion." (1995:10, 12). One could imagine that someone could treat a screen as a sort of theater for although this would mean an entirely different acting out their "other" selves to that which appears on the surface. Yet, this is not what she has relationship inmind: in of windows self that exists life practice is that of a decentered of this worlds and plays many roles at the same time. The experience many [life in the world and life on the screen] encourages treating parallelism on-screen lives with a surprising degree of equality... now and off-screen RL [real life] itself can be 'just one more window.' (Turkle, 1995:14) The that the significance of the screen suggests and funda Our phenomenology of the screen is not in the content on the screen as such mental meaning in an already implied and agreed way of being. The supposed but elsewhere, that Turkle suggests does not exist. Real life is not just another "parallelism" it is the only window, unless of course we treat the life on the screen window, as a game. As a game our comportment towards the surface we call the screen is entirely different. Without loose its the implied real life, the screen will Indeed computer game designers and fail to hold our attention. significance tomake games more compelling, know this. In their attempt they increasingly imbue them with our human way of being. Albert Borgmann (1999) argues of life on the screen put forward by Turkle that the "unparalleled opportunity" so fluid

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at a cost. To secure "the charm of virtual ambiguity excludes virtual must be dense

the veil of virtual such an enclosure

reality at itsmost glamorous, and thick. Inevitably, however,

price of sustaining such "fluid and multiple" of real consequences." Don Ihde (1990)

the the commanding presence of reality. Hence is triviality" (189). Indeed he argues, ambiguity identity is only feasible as long as it is "kept barren

analysis of hu through his phenomenological such as screens. that we embody technology relationships man/technology I do In wearing my eyeglasses He uses the example of wearing eyeglasses. "see through." In being that not only see through them; they also become into my own bodily sense as part of the which they are, they already withdraw suggests of screens way I experience my surrounding. Our phenomenology are also in a sense already that screens are not just embodied; they suggests enworlded. By this we mean they are not simply a way we look at the world of the world for example) but they already imply and draw (as representation into our sense like the eyeglasses, upon a way of living. Hence, they withdraw ordinary of what is relevant, or is not relevant, as part of our ongoing way of being. but also simultaneously hermeneutic In this sense screens are embodied (in I might fix my focus on the text or images on the Ihde's sense). Although and screen, what I actually see is not the screen itself but rather immediately simultaneously

it already refers to, the activities, people, or things the world draw in the text and images on the screen. As we increasingly already implied on screens they withdraw to become for us immediately and already the world itself. However, these hermeneutic and withdrawal will only take possibilities if the screen is already a screen for us. It is this prior screenness that our place analysis brings to the fore. The work of Vivian Sobchack of the film of her work (1991, 1994, 1999) on the phenomenology is also very relevant for our discussion. The object to ours in as much as her focus is on the cinematic

experience is different that characterizes of experience the namely on the experiencing experience, event. She suggests that in the event of viewing there is a simulta cinematic neous embodiment of both the film and the viewer. She also and enworldment suggests that the cinematic experience happens when

the attitude of our consciousness towards the cinematic object simulta us as existential in relation to the screen and subjects neously positions status of what we see there in relation to what we have posits the existential and know of the life-world we inhabit. (1999:243) experienced our analysis to happen the ongoing suggests that for this cinematic experience, at all, those in front of it must comport themselves as a screen, else. This might rather than as something at first glance, however, it has important implications,

However,

screening, towards the screen seem quite obvious

ON THE MEANING

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73

as we hope

to have

ontological is, a grounding inserts itself in the moment prior to the cinematic event. Itmight be said to be a condition for the cinematic event to happen as such. It seems therefore that work would function as a meaningful of our analysis; Sobchack's extension this would be beyond the scope of this paper. however, as he used to call them McLuhan's investigations probes or explorations, can be said to bear some affinity with our work and with phenomenology more This is clear if one considers his aim to get at what ismost essential generally.

contours

has significant in this paper. Screen-in-the-world its grounding meaning is already agreement, that of the worlding of the world itself. In this sense our analysis because

shown

in a given phenomenon, and his considering of the constant interplay of ground is what it always and already is within a and figure, that is, of how something referential whole or background For McLuhan, soci 1927/1962). (Heidegger, eties have always been shaped more by the nature of the dominant technology of communication than by the content of the communication itself- hence his He con "the medium is the message" famous saying 1967/2001). (McLuhan, and technology, making sidered that media (he used broad notions of media almost equivalent) these expressions by extending human senses or capabil in us unique ratios of sense perception. ities, alter the environment, evoking as human extensions media change us and the way we perceive the world 1967/2001).

Thus,

(McLuhan McLuhan

to electronic according technologies, Contemporary are exten are so powerful because they 1967/2001), (1964/1994, sions of many of our senses, including of our own nervous system. For him are nothing less than revolutionary. He ar the effects of the new technologies that electronic media will replace the book as our dominant technology gued that is surrounding us "at the speed of New information of communication. light" cannot be read, only "surfed." One could argue that in today's terms, screens (the television screen, etc.) constitute screen, the personal computer as we indicated As such screens in the introduction. the dominant media,

an interplay among our senses, forcing us to partici encourage structurally we might and get involved. Thus, following McLuhan, suggest, that the pate 1964/1994: screen "engages You have to be with it" (McLuhan, 312; you. author's italics). In being "with it" the screen acts as a translator (McLuhan, that interprets by excluding. As such it is a form of knowledge 1964/1994). "does not ex the screen more generally) in doing this the television Yet, (or 1964/1994: cite, agitate or arouse" (McLuhan, 337) as the kind of interplay of is something senses it brings about is one of depth of involvement, which the a sense paralyzes us. Such aMcLuhanian that always in argument has many as the our phenomenological notion of already agreement with connections of screens. original meaning The central intention of this paper has been to enhance our understanding of that the phenomenological of screens in-the-world. We conclude meaning screen qua screen is an ontological agreement, which we express as already

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It is this already agreement that already calls for our attention and agreement. holds it.Our analysis only provides a preliminary outline of a full phenomenol to expose supposi of screens. It still requires further critical consideration ogy tions yet to be scrutinized. Indeed the work of others such as Sobchack (1991, in extending our analysis to include, 1994, 1999) might be taken up fruitfully screens. In addition our present anal for example, the experience of watching based screens. Some additional information-technology ysis tends to privilege to extend it even further. Furthermore, is necessary the Heideggerian analysis as well as the methodological of this investigation has ontology approach are possible, set its boundaries in non other orientations clearly especially Western we might have chosen other contexts. Even within phenomenology or the of Ihde (1990,1993,2002) such as the pragmatic phenomenology paths of Ingarden (1962/1989). Given the path we have ontological phenomenology taken we believe we have shown that the screen is an important phenomenon in contemporary life that merits further elaboration and analysis. This paper is a step towards such a rich and varied phenomenology of screens; as such new and meaningful it opens for the understanding of screens in possibilities our already screened world.

Acknowledgement We wish to acknowledge the important comments of the Editor and anony mous reviewers for the improvement of this paper. Their advice was funda mental in shaping this paper. For this we are very grateful.

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