Juan Barrameda Vs Percy M. Moir, 25 Phil 44, G.R. No.

7927, August 8, 1913

Facts:

Petitioner relates that the he was defendant in a suit brought before a justice of the peace to try title to
a parcel of land; that the case was decided adversely to him; that he appealed to the Court of First
Instance; and that the judge of that court, on motion of the appellee, dismissed the appeal with
directions to the justice of the peace to proceed with the enforcement of the judgment. At the request
of the petitioner, a preliminary injunction was issued by this court to stay the execution of the judgment,
and he now prays that the respondent judge be ordered to proceed with the case on appeal. The said
judge has demurred to the complaint on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. The basis of the demurrer is that Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131, conferring original
jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to try title to real state, are inconsistent with and repugnant to
the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902. By Act No. 2041, section 3, it was provided: Justices of the peace shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate question of title to real estate or any interest therein when the
value of the property in litigation does not exceed two hundred pesos, and where such value exceeds
two hundred pesos but is less than six hundred pesos the justice of the peace shall have jurisdiction
concurrent with the Court of First Instance.

Issue:

Whether or not Acts. Nos. 2041 and 2131 are unconstitutional.

Ruling:

Yes. In the case of Weigall Vs Shuster, it was held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Courts
of First Instance, as fixed by section 9 of the Philippine Bill, may be added but to not diminished by the
Philippine Legislature. Therefore, there will be sufficient reason for declaring the disputed provisions of
Acts. Nos. 2041 and 2131 repugnant to the Philippine Bill and, consequently void if they attempt
to curtail the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance where the title to realty is involved. The original
jurisdiction of those courts extends to "all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real
property, or of any interest therein". The concurrent jurisdiction in cases where the amount involved is
more than P200 but less thanP600, was meant only as supplemental and ancillary to the exclusive
jurisdiction over cases not exceeding P200. This concurrent jurisdiction must therefore be considered as
inseparable from and absolutely dependent upon the exercise of that exclusive jurisdiction which has
already been declared void. The concurrent jurisdiction must therefore be declared void also. Other
additional jurisdiction granted to justices of the peace by Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131 is not before the
court. Such other additional jurisdiction bears no relation whatever to those void provisions of the
statutes which provide for jurisdiction in real-estate actions; and applying the same rules to the rest
of the Act which the court has applied to the clause conferring concurrent jurisdictional in
real-estate actions between the amounts of P200 and P600, said is clearly of the opinion that the validity
of the remainder of the Act is not in any case dependent upon the said void provisions. In conclusion, it
seems advisable to state that the able brief of counsel for the respondent judge is based upon the a
priori assumption that original jurisdiction of Court of First Instance in real-estate actions is, by the
Organic Law, made exclusive. The judgment of the justice of the peace which it is desired to have the
respondent judge on this action review is an absolutely nullity. The respondent judge acquired
jurisdiction of the cause only for the purpose of dismissing the appeal, and in further directing the
justice of the peace to proceed with the execution of the void judgment, the respondent judge was in
error.