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The genesis of a forgotten war:

Containment in Afghanistan
1947–1956
a
Douglas A. Borer
a
Department of Political Science , Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University , Blacksburg, VA, 24061–0130
Published online: 24 Sep 2007.

To cite this article: Douglas A. Borer (1992) The genesis of a forgotten war:
Containment in Afghanistan 1947–1956, Comparative Strategy, 11:3, 343-356, DOI:
10.1080/01495939208402880

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The Genesis of a Forgotten War:

Containment in Afghanistan
1947-1956

DOUGLAS A. BORER
Department of Political Science
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0130
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Abstract After a decade of steady U.S. military aid to the Mujahedin, the final
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was seen by many Western observers as a
concrete affirmation of the continued validity of containment as the primary doctrine
in U.S. foreign policy. The following essay challenges this positive conclusion by
investigating the roots of containment in South Asia in the first decade following
World War II. It is argued that containment was an inadequate policy guide for the
convoluted politics of South Asia and actually served to aggravate political tensions
between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. In doing so, the United States unwittingly
drove both Afghanistan and India into partnership with the USSR, thus creating the
exact scenarios that containment was intended to prevent.

Following a decade of civil war and foreign occupation beginning in December 1979,
Afghanistan was finally freed of Soviet military forces in February 1989. Once at the
heart of the cold war, the withdrawal of the last Soviet solder inaugurated a period of
increasing disinterest and apathy on the part of the Western world to the fate of the
Afghan people. Afghanistan once again became a remote, alien, and unimportant coun-
try, its civil war all but forgotten in the spring of the cold war and the recent destruction
of the Soviet Union. In part, the U.S. victory in the cold war has been ascribed to the
success of the United States' post-World War II strategy of containment. In harmony
with the basic axiom of containment (to stop communist expansion), the rebellion of the
Afghan people was supported by political and military aid by the United States following
the Soviet invasion. Therefore, the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan seems to be a ringing
endorsement of containment as an effective strategy.
This article takes issue with this positive appraisal of containment in Afghanistan. In
order to fully and accurately assess containment's success in Afghanistan, it is necessary
to review the early history of containment as it was originally applied to Afghanistan.
The primary goal of this essay is to explain why the United States and Afghanistan were
unable to reach a mutually acceptable political arrangement in the first decade following
World War II. This period ended with increased Soviet influence in Afghanistan from
1955 to the present. In addition to providing a general critique of containment as the
guiding doctrine of U.S. policy in South Asia, I will show that the United States failed to
implement its own stated principles of containment in Afghanistan. And in doing so, the

343
 344 D. A. Borer

United States handed the Soviet Union a preventable, de facto victory during the first
stage of the cold war.

Containment: Afghanistan and South Asia

From the outset of the postwar era, the United States was open to the idea of providing
aid to Afghanistan, albeit in a limited and conditional form. The concept of containment,
first publicly articulated by George Kennan in July 1947, was adopted by President
Truman as the cornerstone of postwar U.S. policy. Containment's possible role in Af-
ghanistan was clearly stated in Truman's declaration, "I believe that it must be the policy
of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by
armed minorities or by outside pressures."1 Truman's statement, which became known
as the Truman Doctrine, was based on the perception of international politics as a
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struggle for world domination, with the USSR as an amoral aggressive power bent on
conquering the world. U.S. policies toward Afghanistan were symptomatic of the practi-
cal limitations of insuring the lofty ideals of containment. Often these ideals directly
contradicted the opinions of strategic planners who viewed Afghanistan's importance as
a function of its geographic location bordering on the Soviet Union, Iran, and Pakistan.
Therefore, U.S. policies toward Afghanistan were contingent upon Washington's overall
political and military strategy in the region.
In 1945 Afghanistan, which had maintained neutrality during the war, faced im-
mense social and economic problems. The war had demonstrated how weak the political
independence of the landlocked country was when its economic lifelines to the outside
world (USSR, India) were all but cut off. Although Afghanistan had not suffered Allied
occupation as had its neighbor Iran, the transparent weakness of its position in the region
was obvious to the Afghan leadership. In order to lessen its economic and political
dependence on the Soviet Union and British India, Afghanistan returned to its historic
policy of cultivating relations with powerful states outside of the region. Two countries
which had been useful in the past, Germany and Japan, were, in 1945, no longer viable
alternatives in fulfilling the traditional balance of power role. Therefore, the United
States was seen as the most desirable country which could help to maintain Afghanistan's
political independence, and provide the economic means for modernization and develop-
ment.2
The first postwar Afghan overture toward the United States came in August 1946.
Prime Minister Shah Mohammed Khan stated that he was convinced that the United
States could ensure Afghanistan's security. "For the first time in our history we are free
of the threat of great powers using our mountain passes as pathways to empire,"3 This
statement was made in spite of the fact that the United States had earlier that year flatly
rejected Afghan economic development proposals as being too vague. The Afghan gov-
ernment decided to proceed with its own economic development plans through private
means. It signed a $17 million contract with the Morrison-Knudsen Company of Boise,
Idaho to build roads and repair irrigation canals in the Helmand River Valley in south-
west Afghanistan.4
In 1947, Afghanistan renewed its requests for American development funds in the
form of a $118 million loan that was justified both in economic and political terms.
Afghan officials presented the request to the U.S. delegation in Kabul by mentioning
Soviet offers to assist Afghanistan. The United States Export-Import Bank was uncon-
vinced that the Soviet Union was a serious factor in determining the validity of the
 Containment in Afghanistan 345

request, and it rejected the loan as being economically nonviable. Eventually, after
intense lobbying, the bank would approve a mere $21 million of this loan to insure
Morrison-Knudsen's profits in the Helmand Valley project.5
Although 1947 was a fairly uneventful time in U.S./Afghan relations, it proved to
be a watershed year in twentieth century South Asian and superpower politics. The
British withdrawal from India and subsequent bloody partition of the country during the
creation of Pakistan changed the face of South Asian politics permanently. By 1947, the
fragile two-year period of postwar detente between the new superpowers was rapidly
eroding into the first stage of the cold war, and the first strategies of containment were
being formulated to block the advance of world communism.

Weapons for Afghanistan?

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Containment was a policy which sought global military, political, and economic alliances
that could achieve the U.S. goal of blocking Soviet expansion. However, the implemen-
tation of this policy proved to be less simplistic than the idealistic statements of the
Truman administration. In July 1948, a National Security Council position paper out-
lined the broad criteria for supplying arms to noncommunist nations:

Certain free nations the security of which is of critical importance to the

United States require strengthened military capabilities, if they are to present
effective political resistance to communist aggression now, and military re-
sistance later if necessary.
Therefore, the United States should assist in strengthening the military
capabilities of these nations to resist communist expansion provided they
make determined efforts to resist communist expansion and such assistance
contributes effectively towards that end.6

Afghan leaders realized that the withdrawal of Britain from the subcontinent tipped the
traditional balance of power in the region and placed Afghanistan in a vulnerable posi-
tion vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. In order to restore the balance, and encouraged by the
U.S. declared policy on aid to nations seeking to resist communism, the Afghans began
pursuing the economic and military aid from the United States.
Late in 1948, while continuing to pursue the $118 million loan proposal, the Afghan
representative, Abdul Majid Khan Zabuli, also requested U.S. arms for Afghanistan. He
presented his request in terms of both internal and external security requirements. Af-
ghan leaders had been perpetually confronted with tribal revolts, and were conscious of
the ever-present danger posed by their powerful northern neighbor dating back to the
czars. Zabuli stated that the reason for seeking U.S. weapons was to make a positive
contribution in the event of a war with the Soviets. When war came Afghanistan would
undoubtedly be overrun and occupied; however, Zabuli also informed State Department
officials that the Russians would be unable to pacify the country and the Afghans would
pursue guerrilla warfare for an indefinite period.7
Zabuli's prophetic analysis, later confirmed by the Mujahedin's tenacious war
against the Soviet forces, clearly states the realization on the part of Afghan officials of
the potential threat to Afghan sovereignty posed by Soviet expansion into South Asia.
Afghanistan's desire to remain independent of Soviet dominance necessitated an alliance
with the United States. Therefore, Afghanistan presented the United States with an ideal
 346 D. A. Borer

case for aiding a Third World nation seeking to defend itself from communist aggression
or internal rebellion. However, Afghanistan was frustrated in its attempts to solidify its
ties to the United States. The Truman administration paid little attention to Afghan
requests and focused its energies on other Middle Eastern affairs such as the newly
emerging Arab-Israeli struggle, the expanding rift between India and Pakistan, and the
consolidation of political control in Iran.8
The Afghans were determined to persist in their arms requests despite U.S. indiffer-
ence, and adopted a more politically charged approach. In 1949, after repeated requests
for arms were denied by the United States, Afghan officials suggested that they might
reassess Afghanistan's traditional position of neutrality in favor of whatever side agreed
to provide weapons. A cable from the U.S. embassy in Kabul reported that the Afghans
had indicated that "unless the US gave Afghan more assist Afghans might turn to the
USSR."9 However, despite this political gamesmanship the Afghans had also indicated
that they remained willing to align themselves more closely with the West. Some U.S.
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government officials voiced their support for the Afghan requests. Assistant Secretary of
State George McGhee observed that in the wake of the British withdrawal from India,
Afghanistan was prepared to abandon its traditional neutrality and associate openly with
the West. He recommended that "in view of these and other considerations, our failure
to extend some form of procurement assistance or token aid at this time would very
seriously jeopardize our effort over the past two years to orient these countries to the
West and away from Communism. . . ."10
McGhee's viewpoint at the State Department reflected the basic concepts of contain-
ment and the Truman Doctrine; however, his opinion, while concurring with publicly
stated U.S. policy objectives, conflicted with that of strategic planners. A study by the
Defense Department concluded that Afghanistan was of little or no strategic importance
to the United States. Its geographic location, coupled with the realization by Afghan
leaders of Soviet capabilities, presaged Soviet control of the country whenever the inter-
national situation so dictated. In fact, the military report stated that any overt Western-
sponsored military activities or aid might precipitate a Soviet move to take control of the
country."
The Defense Department report reveals one of the inherent problems of contain-
ment: the conflict between political goals and strategic reality. The ability of the U.S.
military to fulfill its designated role within poorly defined parameters of containment-
providing weapons and support to those states opposing communism—was challenged by
the logic in this report. Here it was argued that providing such military aid could actually
provoke a Soviet counterstroke. This analysis would suggest that, in certain instances,
the application of the military component of containment may in fact produce that which
it was meant to deter: Soviet expansion.
The internal debate between various political and military analysts in the State
Department and the Defense Department continued. The U.S. embassy in Kabul en-
dorsed the sale of arms in January 1950, hoping "to exclude Soviet influence, cement
Afghan-American friendship, maintain internal security, and promote settlement of dif-
ferences with Pakistan."12 However, the U.S. military again vetoed the recommendation.
The decision to to arm Afghanistan may have been based on Washington's fears of
further Soviet activity in Asia following the start of the Korean hostilities in June 1950.
A National Security Council report in August 1950 had concluded that

the Kremlin might be prepared to accept in varying degrees the risk of a

general conflict by launching local armed attacks in order to attain objectives
 Containment in Afghanistan 347

regarded as of importance to the Soviet Union. . . . [T]he principle areas

where actual Soviet forces could be employed for a local purpose are Iran,
Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Finland. . . . In the
event of overt attack by organized USSR military forces against Finland or
Afghanistan: The United States should itself take no military action in these
to oppose the aggression. . . ."13

Again Afghanistan was found to have fallen outside the practical limitations faced by the
United States in attempting to apply to political ideals of containment in South Asia. It
would appear that as early as 1950, Afghanistan had been conceded to communist "ex-
pansion" without the bootprints of a single Red Army soldier having marked Afghan
soil.
The Afghans, however, were still reluctant to become a permanent fixture of the
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Soviet sphere of influence. In April 1951, Afghan Prime Minister Shah Mahmud
visited Washington. The State Department briefed President Truman that Afghan arms
requests were being ignored, rather than refused. The president was advised to tell the
prime minister that the United States, heavily strained in Korea, had limited means to
furnish arms and that the Afghans should rely on the collective security of the United
Nations.14
The Afghans went ahead with a formal arms request in August 1951. In an apparent
change of policy, the United States conditionally agreed to supply arms to Afghanistan if
the following terms were met: (1) the $25 million price tag would have to be paid in hard
currency; (2) the Afghan government would have to arrange its own transportation
through Pakistan; and (3) the sale would be made public. Apparently, the persistent
Afghans had finally won their battle to obtain weapons. However, this was not the case:
The Afghans considered the terms to be unacceptable and called the U.S. offer a "politi-
cal refusal."15 In order to understand the Afghans' reasoning for rejecting the U.S. arms
proposal, we must delve more deeply into the regional politics of South Asia. The
Afghan rejection of the terms of the proposed arms sale was interwoven with the intri-
cate and convoluted relationships existing between the United States, India, Pakistan,
and Afghanistan.

Regional Politics
In terms of national power, by far the most important nation in South Asia is India.
Following the withdrawal of Great Britain in 1947, India had the largest territory and
population, had inherited the largest army, had established democratic institutions, and
its leaders were admired in parts of the West. Therefore, in terms of realist concepts of
power, India was the logical and desired country for the United States to align itself with
in the struggle to contain Soviet expansion in the region. However, the choice was not
the Americans' to make. India's leaders considered Washington's analysis of the commu-
nist threat to be in error and felt that the policy of containment was likely to cause more
conflict than was necessary, and insisted on remaining neutral in the East-West strug-
gle.16
At this juncture, U.S. military planners made a major strategic blunder. Instead of
acknowledging India's crucial strategic importance in the region, they blindly turned to
Pakistan in order to obtain any sort of military foothold in South Asia. This erroneous
 348 D. A. Borer

decision would have dramatic, long-term repercussions on relations between the United
States and Afghanistan.
The Pentagon reasoned that, in spite of its conflict with India, Pakistan had some
very valuable strategic assets. Its geographic position commanded the second stage of
the classic invasion route from Central Asia onto the Indian plains, and its western
border reached the strategic oil region of the Persian Gulf. Washington perceived that,
unlike Afghanistan, a close working relationship with Pakistan could make a significant
contribution to securing these interests. Hence, Pakistan was seen as a worthwhile candi-
date for partnership in containment.17
The evolution of U.S.-Pakistan ties took place at a gradually accelerating pace from
the partition of India in 1947 to the signing of a Mutual Defense Agreement in 1950,
which was strengthened in 1954. The United States remained neutral over the Indo-Paki
dispute concerning the Kashmir Valley, and urged cooperation between India, Pakistan,
and Afghanistan to promote collective security in South Asia. However, by 1949, U.S.
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defense planners were beginning to view Pakistan with more interest:

From the military point of view, the countries of South Asia excepting
Pakistan have, under present and prospective conditions, little value to the
United States. . . . While the countries of South Asia, excepting Pakistan,
are of negligible positive strategic importance to us, encroachments by the
USSR would endanger our national policy of Communist containment.
18

It is unclear form this document why Afghanistan and India did not also interest the Joint
Chiefs of Staff as being of "positive strategic importance." However, the key phrase in
this document may in fact by "under present and prospective conditions." The rift
between Pakistan and India, and India's solid stance on remaining neutral, explains why
military planners were seeking alternative solutions to the problems of implementing
containment in South Asia. However it is unclear how an alliance with Pakistan would
strengthen the U.S. position in the region if such an alliance pushed India into the arms
of the Soviet Union. And the question remains as to why Afghanistan was not also seen
as possible lesser partner in containment.
The most important factor that blocked Afghanistan's involvement in the U.S. con-
tainment strategy in South Asia, and increased the U.S. reluctance to provide arms, was
the ongoing dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the area known as
Pushtunistan. The history of this issue reaches back to the days of British domination in
the region, and is worthy of some detailed consideration in light of the fact that this
dispute has never been resolved, and may cause future discord between Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and the United States.
The Pushtunistan problem can be traced to the establishment of the Durand Line as
the border between arms control and the northern territory of British India in 1893. The
border was drawn both for reasons of administrative convenience and strategic utility.
However, the Durand border survey failed to consider the ramifications of artificially
dividing the indigenous ethnic groups that populated the region. Subsequently, both the
Baluch and Pushtun tribes were split in half by the arbitrary decisions of British survey-
ors.19
The issue of Pushtunistan became one of the major planks in Afghanistan's postwar
foreign relations. Afghanistan's leadership circles, dominated by men of ethnic Pushtun
stock, began pushing for the formation of a separate state of Pushtunistan shortly before
 Containment in Afghanistan 349

the British withdrawal from India in 1947. The proposed state would extend form the
Wakhan corridor in the Northeast (bordering China) to the Arabian Sea in the South,
covering the two provinces of North-West Frontier and Baluchistan, as well as the free
tribal territory (an area not defined by the Durand Line), and part of Kashmir Valley. Its
population in 1950 would have been approximately 7 million (including 5.5 million
Pushtuns) and would have covered an area of 190,000 square miles.20
Pakistan adamantly refused to discuss any proposal which would have further
eroded its already weak position in relation to India. In 1951, the U.S. State Department
took the ambiguous position of encouraging Afghanistan to settle its border dispute with
Pakistan and promoted regional cooperation between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan in
order to counter "international communist gains."21 Simultaneously the United States
condemned Afghanistan's demands regarding Pushtunistan, yet conceded that negotia-
tions were necessary. Furthermore, the United States added to the confusion by never
publicly clarifying its position on Pushtunistan, even when requested to do so by the
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government of Pakistan.22 However, the United States indicated to Pakistani officials its
"unofficial" view that the Durand Line constituted the legal boundary between Afghani-
stan and Pakistan.23
While stating its desire for negotiations on the Pushtunistan dispute, the "unoffi-
cial" U.S. position removed any pressure on Pakistan to compromise with Afghanistan.
Realistically, it gave Pakistan no positive incentive to pursue sincere negotiations, and
even encouraged the termination of negotiations when it became clear that the United
States would support Pakistan's position if negotiations failed.
The United States was hoping in vain for peace between the Afghans and Pakistanis.
Diplomats were doubly hindered because the excessive rhetoric of containment had
served to paint the United States into a diplomatic corner. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan
were friendly toward the United States and hostile toward the Soviet Union, and when
the United States proposed on three occasions to help mediate the Pushtunistan dispute,
Afghanistan accepted the offer. Pakistan, which contended that he matter was an internal
one and not subject to mediation, rejected negotiations. The United States was unable to
pressure the Pakistanis over the issue of Pushtunistan because Pakistan, if pushed too
far, might follow India's policy of nonalignment, therefore threatening the military en-
circlement of the Soviet Union. In the end, Pakistan was simply viewed as a more
important ally than Afghanistan; therefore, the lofty ideals of containment were seen as
hollow rhetoric by the Afghans.
The Afghans were dismayed that the United States repeatedly refused to provide
them with arms, despite the fact that they met all of the publicly stated criteria and ideals
of containment. The United States believed that such assistance was more likely to be
used against Pakistan than against the USSR. Although the American analysis of this
possible use of the weapons may have been accurate, it is also clear that Afghanistan
could never have seriously threatened Pakistan with a small amount of U.S. arms.
Containment was revealed to be overly simplistic and totally inadequate as a functional
guidepost for strategic policy in the complex region. When intricate problems such as
Pushtunistan arose, the United States was forced to resort to classical balance-of-power
thinking, thus alienating Afghanistan, which saw U.S. policies as being hypocritical,
misleading, and contradictory.
It is now clear why the Afghan government rejected the terms of the 1951 arms sale,
as outlined by the United States, as being a political refusal. When Pakistan became
aware of the publicly announced sale, it would certainly not have allowed the arms to be
transported through its territory. An added indignity was that Afghanistan was required
 550 D. A. Borer

to pay cash for the weapons at a time in which most U.S. allies were receiving either
outright grants for arms or lenient repayment terms.
Louis Dupree, the leading Western scholar on Afghanistan, summarizes how the
Afghans viewed this situation:

The Afghans refused to participate in the Baghdad Pact, but asked the Amer-
icans once again for arms assistance to correct the upset "balance of power"
in the region. "Why should America arm Pakistan?" government officials
asked. "Who will the Pakistanis use the arms against?" Surely not the Rus-
sians, since Pakistan and the Soviet Union have no common boundary. India
had similar objections, and, in truth, Pakistan always considered India more
an enemy than either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China.24

Ironically, the United States accused Afghanistan of the shameful practice of pursuing its
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own national objectives in Pushtunistan, while at the same time U.S. activities on the
world stage dwarfed the puny manipulations of the government in Kabul. While contin-
ually hoping that some sort of cooperation could be formulated among the nations of
South Asia, the United States blindly pursued its own military alliances with Pakistan, an
action which further alienated both Afghanistan and India, both of whom were more
concerned with their own national interests and regional security matters than with the
apparent U.S. fascination with a world communist threat.
United States policy toward Afghanistan in this period remained contingent upon
how Washington viewed the Soviet Union's ability to project power into Afghanistan.
Despite Afghanistan's apparent willingness to increase ties with the West even to the
point of abandoning neutrality, analysts in the United States decided that overt military
aid to Afghanistan would increase the likelihood of a Soviet response. In such an event,
the United States would not have been able to aid the Afghans, because of the immense
logistical problems posed by Afghanistan's isolated location. In 1952, during a minor
dispute between the USSR and Afghanistan over the presence of a United Nations oil
exploration team in northern Afghanistan, the U.S. ambassador in Kabul told Washing-
ton that, even if the United States were to offer arms, Afghanistan's borders could not be
guaranteed.25
In addition to its policy of denying weapons to the Afghan government, the United
States provided only a meager amount of nonlethal aid to Afghanistan from 1945 to
1955. Apart from partially financing Morrison-Knudsen's work on the problematic
Helmand Valley Project, the United States limited its aid to a small amount of technical
assistance and foodstuffs.26 In addition to its frustration over arms requests, Afghanistan
resented the amount and kinds of assistance it was receiving in comparison to Pakistan
and Iran. By 1954, Pakistan had received $97 million in grain and $37 million in
development assistance (fertilizers, mining and construction equipment, iron and steel
materials, industrial machinery, and railway equipment), while Afghanistan had received
only $2.1 million in technical assistance and $2.6 million in grain. Technical assistance
was concentrated in the provision of agricultural experts, foreign study for Afghans,
vocational education, and teacher training.27
In spite of Afghanistan's pronounced pro-American views and the continuation of
all cultural and business relations with the United States, Afghan leaders were angered
by the omission of their country in the emerging U.S.-South Asian strategy. In 1955, the
U.S. Congress authorized increased development assistance for the Third World, but
Afghanistan was again bypassed for political reasons regarding its border troubles with
 Containment in Afghanistan 351

Pakistan.28 After ten years of frustration, the Afghans had enough. By 1955 it was clear
that T\irkey, Iran, and Pakistan would constitute the only valued assets in America's
southern tier strategy to contain the Soviet Union. Afghanistan was considered to be
expendable.

Into the Soviet Fold

For a comprehensive analysis of containment in South Asia, it is necessary to review
briefly how U.S. policies toward Afghanistan were related to, and possibly refelcted in,
relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union It should be understood that Soviet-
Afghan relations before the period from 1945 to 1955 were not generally characterized
by hostility or conflict, and the various minor disputes which arose between the two
countries never led to a breach in relations. The two countries were able to maintain a
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fairly cordial relationship following Afghanistan's independence in 1919, a time that

coincided with the consolidation of Bolshevik rule during the Russian Civil War.
Soviet involvement in Afghanistan following World War II was directly related to
the East-West power struggle. From the Soviet viewpoint, the United States initiated
competition over Afghanistan by providing aid in 1945 for the construction of an exten-
sive water management system in the Helmand Valley Project.29 Peter Franck, director
of the National Planning Association's analysis of Afghanistan, describes the situation:

In the wake of Western involvement in Afghanistan through growing pro-

grams, normalcy in Afghan-Russian relations did not prevail long. To the
Soviet Union, economic commitments in Afghanistan and elsewhere had
political overtones as well. Certainly, in Soviet eyes, the rebuilding in 1947
by an American contractor of a modern high-speed road form the Pakistan
border to the second-most-important business center of its neighbors had
• • 30
strategic importance.

Franck's opinion of the motivation behind Soviet aid to Afghanistan was confirmed by
the major architect of postwar Soviet policies toward the Third World. In his memoirs,
Nikita Khrushchev describes the rationale underlying Soviet foreign policy goals in
Afghanistan:

In its desire to encircle us with military bases, America threw itself all over a
country life Afghanistan. . . . The Afghans asked us to help build several
hundred kilometers of road near the Iranian border. . . . However, because
Afghanistan didn't have railroads, such a highway would be a main artery,
carrying the economic lifeblood of the country. The road also had great
strategic significance because it would have allowed us to transport troops
and supplies in event of war with Pakistan or Iran. . . . The amount of
money we spent on gratuitous assistance to Afghanistan is a drop in the
ocean compared to the price we would have had to pay in order to counter
the threat of an American military base on Afghan territory.31

It is interesting to note how Khrushchev's statement reveals that the motivations underly-
ing Soviet policies are a mirror image of those of the United States. The primary impetus
 352 D. A. Borer

behind both sides' foreign aid policies was to deny the other influence and control over
strategic nations of the Third World.
Soviet influence in Afghanistan increased in the 1950s partially because of support
for Afghanistan in regard to Pushtunistan. In 1950, when Pakistan denied Afghanistan
transit rights for goods entering and exiting the country, the USSR offered free transit
rights and started supplying the Afghans with essential items under embargo by Paki-
stan.32 The Soviet position was further enhanced by the U.S. rejection of Afghan arms
requests in 1948, 1951, and 1954.33 Another flare-up of the Pushtunistan problem in
1955 led to a closing of the Pakistan border. The Soviets again provided essential im-
ports such as gasoline and construction materials.
Even before the death of Stalin, and the advent of new policies toward the Third
World under Khrushchev, the Soviets and Afghans were moving ahead on economic
relations. In July 1950, they signed a four-year barter agreement under which the Af-
ghans agreed to exchange raw cotton and wool for Soviet petroleum, cloth, sugar, and
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other commodities. The Soviets also guaranteed a much higher rate of exchange than
any Western nation. The 1950 agreement was augmented by an offer to construct several
large gasoline storage tanks, and to take over oil explorations in northern Afghanistan
from a Swedish company. By 1952, Soviet-Afghan trade had doubled, and for the first
time the Afghans permitted the Soviets to establish a trade office in Kabul.34
In 1953, the Soviets advanced Afghanistan a $3.5 million credit for the construction
of two gain silos, a flour mill, and a bakery under generous terms bearing a 3% interest
rate.35 This effort was followed in July 1954 with a technical aid and credit agreement of
$1.2 million for construction of a gasoline pipeline across the Amu Darya River from
the USSR. Both of these projects had clear implications for Afghanistan's ability to
sustain itself (with Soviet assistance) in the event of future discord with Pakistan over
Pushtunistan. In August 1954, the Soviets increased their popularity among the Kabul
masses by agreeing to finance the paving of the city's streets. This project had previ-
ously been reject twice by the U.S. Import-Export Bank, and turned out to be a major,
low cost public-relations victory for the Soviets.36 In most instances, the Soviet Union
provided aid for various projects that the United States had earlier denied.
In December 1955, Soviet General Secretary Khrushchev and Premier Bulganin
stopped in Kabul on their tour of Asia. The Soviet leaders publicly supported Afghani-
stan for the first time. "We sympathize with Afghanistan's policy on the question of
Pushtunistan," said Bulganin. "The Soviet Union stands for an equitable solution of this
problem, which cannot be settled correctly without taking into account the vital interest
of the people inhabiting Pushtunistan."37 During this visit the two governments signed a
ten-year extension of a 1931 Afghan-Soviet Treaty of Nonaggression.38
In May 1956, six months after the Khrushchev/Bulganin visit, Soviet-Afghan rela-
tions entered a fundamentally new phase of increased diplomatic, economic, and mili-
tary relations. Afghanistan became one of the first Soviet targets of opportunity in the
East-West competition for Third World clients. The Soviets announced the gift of a 100-
bed hospital, an 11-14 transport plane for King Zahir, and a loan of $100 million, with
low interest and a 30-year repayment schedule. This loan (in its day an enormous sum)
produced one military and one civilian airport, two hydroelectric plants, a road mainte-
nance plant, a road over the Hindu Kush with a tunnel that would connect northern and
southern Afghanistan for the first time, and three irrigation projects. By 1956, there
were more than 460 Soviet technicians in the country.39
Following the final U.S. rejection of Afghan arms requests in December 1954,
Afghanistan finally turned to the Soviet Union in frustration. Military assistance from
 Containment in Afghanistan 353

the Eastern bloc, mainly in the form of arms transfers; advisory support and training
were begun in 1955, with an agreement between arms control and Czechoslovakia for $3
million in weapons. The first direct Soviet-Afghan arms agreement, signed in 1956,
provided for the sale of $25 million worth of military equipment including MiG-15 jets.
By 1965, the value of military equipment stood at approximately $275 million, under
repayment terms which required only 50% reimbursement by the Afghans. This military
equipment included 100 tanks and 100 airplanes. More than 200 Afghan military cadets
had been sent to the Soviet Union for training by 1962, and during the period 1953-1963
the Soviets had built or were building military airfields in Bagram, near Kabul; Mazar-i-
Sharif in Northern Afghanistan; and at Shindand in the central part of western Afghani-
stan.40

The U.S. Response

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The Soviet-Afghan weapons agreement in 1955 finally set in motion a greater level of
concern for what was happening in the region. In 1956 the National Security Council
agreed to "encourage Afghanistan to minimize its reliance upon the Communist bloc for
military training and equipment, and to look to the United States and other Free World
sources for military training and assistance."41 Henry Bradsher, a noted journalist and
author specializing in Soviet and Afghan affairs, provides a poignant critique of the U.S.
change of heart:

There was not detectable sense of irony in the secret NSC study, no refer-
ence to the repeated American spurning of Afghan military aid requests
before the Soviet deal, no recognition of the effects of America's arming
Pakistan, apparently no institutional memory of what had gone before.42

The United States also increased its economic development aid to Afghanistan in an
attempt to compete with the massive Soviet aid package presented by Khrushchev in
1955. However, belated aid programs could not compensate for the mismanagement and
neglect that U.S. relations with Afghanistan had suffered in the previous decade. The
Soviet Union had gained the upper hand in Afghanistan by 1956, and would slowly
increase its dominant position for the next 23 years. In 1979, the Soviets invaded Af-
ghanistan in order to prop up a faltering communist regime made up of political leaders
and officers in the Afghan military who had been trained and equipped by the Soviet
Union ever since 1955. Although the failure of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan in the
1950s can in no way be directly blamed for the illegal Soviet action in 1979, it is clear
that U.S. containment policy (or lack thereof) failed to restrain the growth of Soviet
influence and power in Afghanistan.

Summary: Afghanistan and the Problems of Containment

U.S. policy in Afghanistan serves to highlight a number of interconnected problems
manifest in containment as the foundation of U.S. policy in South Asia. Containment's
first problem lies in the fact that it was a concept based on the historic ideas of balance-
of-power politics, yet was articulated in the rudimentary ideological terminology of
anticommunist rhetoric. It could not account for the possibility that a nation may be
anticommunist, while at the same time pursue national objectives which were contrary to
 354 D. A. Borer

U.S. interests. This problem was graphically illustrated by Afghanistan's complete com-
patibility with the stated ideals of containment, while simultaneously being in discord
with U.S. interests because of its poor relations with Pakistan.
Containment's second major flaw, as revealed in U.S. policy toward Afghanistan,
was one of implementation. It was one thing for President Truman to state publicly the
U.S. intention to support those nations facing possible communist threats and internal
rebellion (two characteristics epitomized in Afghanistan); yet in practice, overt U.S.
support of Afghanistan was deemed inappropriate by military analysts who concluded
that U.S. aid would induce a Soviet response. Afghanistan's vulnerability to Soviet
encroachment could not be checked by the United States, even if the United States so
desired. The decision by the United States government not to provide significant mili-
tary, economic, and political support to Afghanistan, while simultaneously providing
such aid to its neighbors Iran and Pakistan, caused the Afghan leadership to question the
sincerity of the U.S. commitment to aiding their country. It is highly doubtful that a
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token quantity of U.S. military aid would have caused a severe Soviet reaction, yet it
would have indicated to the Afghans that the United States was ready to match words
with deeds.
Eventually the Afghans were sufficiently frustrated to turn to the Soviet Union for
support, thus producing the very scenario which U.S. policymakers hoped to prevent.
The debacle of implementing containment in Afghanistan is further magnified by the
United States renewed interest in Afghanistan beginning in 1956. Containment was
designed to prevent Soviet influence before it became unstoppable. The United States
began scrambling in 1956 to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan only after the
military and economic aid were introduced by the USSR on a large scale. The U.S.
reaction to Soviet involvement clearly indicates that the problems between Pakistan and
Afghanistan were secondary to the threat of greater Soviet influence in the region. The
decision by the United States not to include Afghanistan in its South Asian defense
strategy did not preclude the Soviet Union from pursuing its own objectives in Afghani-
stan, and the close U.S. relationship with Iran and Pakistan naturally caused the Soviet
Union to seek its own allies in the region.
The greatest flaw in using containment as a guide to regional policy in South Asia
was revealed by India's reaction to U.S. relations with Pakistan. The American military
alliance with Pakistan served to progressively alienate the neutral Indians. Eventually
this alliance, combined with India's view that China (also a supporter of Pakistan) was
the major threat to its security, led India to shift to an openly pro-Moscow position in the
1960s and 1970s. Thus, the inclusion of Pakistan in the U.S. containment partnership
both increased tensions between the nations of South Asia and enhanced Soviet opportu-
nities in India and Afghanistan. In a letter to Secretary of State Dulles, Chester Bowles,
U.S. ambassador to India during the Truman administration, criticized the Eisenhower
administration for emphasizing purely military goals while ignoring the more important
political, economic, and social forces at work in South Asia:

The proposed arms agreement with Pakistan, far from furthering our na-
tional objectives in the Middle East and South Asia, will add dangerously to
the grave instability that already exists there. I am convinced that the pro-
posed United States-Pakistan military agreement may indeed set in motion a
chain of events which in the next ten years can lead to political developments
in India and South Asia which will have grave implications for our future
relations in this area and indeed all of Asia.43
 Containment in Afghanistan 355

Bowles's letter was both perceptive and accurate. Containment policies in South Asia
would enhance U.S. security interests at best, to a marginal degree via Pakistan. The
negative cost, however, is extremely difficult if not impossible to justify. India, the most
powerful nation in South Asia, would align itself with the Soviet Union, India and
Pakistan would go to war, Pakistan would lose its East Pakistan provinces (which be-
came Bangladesh), and Afghanistan would become increasingly dependent on the Soviet
Union.
Strangely, the logic used to deny Afghanistan weapons in the 1950s—that it would
invoke a Soviet response—was lost on the same strategic planners who disregarded
India's reaction to the United States' alliance with Pakistan. In addition, following the
Korean War, China was viewed by Washington and Delhi as the greatest threat to Asia.
Instead of aggressively pursuing relations with India at this opportune time, Washington
further added to Delhi's fears by strengthening ties with Pakistan. Naturally India turned
to the Soviet Union as a source of support against both China and Pakistan.
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Containment was not conceived as a policy to be implemented only in post-hoc

fashion as a response to Soviet expansion. Rather, its primary emphasis was to preempt
the spread of communism by means of lending military, economic, and political support
to pro-Western regimes believed to be threatened by internal rebellion and communist
aggression. In Afghanistan, containment clearly was not applied in a manner to achieve
these goals. It was proved to be an inadequate policy guidepost in dealing with the
complicated political realities of South Asia.

Notes

1. "The Truman Doctrine," in Documents of American History, vol. 2, Henry S. Com-

manger, ed., (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), pp. 524-526.
2. Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modem Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Mod-
ernization 1880-1956 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1953), pp. 390-392.
3. New York Times, Aug. 9, 1946, p. 5.
4. Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, 2nd ed. (Durham: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 1985), p. 19.
5. Ibid., p. 18.
6. NSC/14/1, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Providing Military Assis-
tance to Nations of the Non-Soviet World," July 10, 1948 (extract) in Rajaendra K. Jain, ed. US-
South Asian Relations 1947-1982, vol. 2 (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1983), p. 11.
Hereafter cited as US-SA.
7. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948. Vol. 5: The Near
East, South Asia and Africa, Part I (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975),
pp. 491-493. Hereafter cited as FRUS.
8. Bradsher, Afghanistan, p. 19.
9. FRUS, 1949, Vol. 6, p. 777.
10. "Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State McGhee to Lloyd Berkner, Coordina-
tor for Foreign Military Assistance Programmes," Aug. 16, 1949 (extracts). Cited in FRUS, Vol.
6, pp. 45-47.
11. The Declassified Documents 1979 Collection (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1979), no. 33A. Cited in Bradsher, Afghanistan, p. 20.
12. Leon B. Poullada, "Afghanistan and the United States: The Crucial Years," The Middle
East Journal 35 (1981): 186.
13. "The Position and Actions of the United States with respect to Possible Further Soviet
Moves in Light of the Korean Situation," Report by the National Security Council, Aug. 25,
 356 D. A. Borer

1950. Cited in FRUS 1950, vol. 1: National Security Affairs: Foreign Economic Policy (Washing-
ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 376-387.
14. Bradsher, Afghanistan, p. 20.
15. Poullada, "Afghanistan and the United States," pp. 186-187.
16. W. Howard Wriggins, "U.S. Interests in South Asia and the Indian Ocean," in Lawrence
Ziring, ed., The Subcontinent in World Politics: India, Its Neighbors, and the Great Powers (New
York: Praeger, 1982), p. 208.
17. Ibid.
18. Memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 24, 1949. Cited in FRUS 1949, vol. 1,
pp. 30-31.
19. G. S. Bhargava. South Asian Security After Afghanistan (Lexington: Lexington Books,
1983), pp. 69-70.
20. Ibid., pp. 25-27.
21. Department of State Policy Statement with regard to Afghanistan, Feb. 21, 1951. Cited
in FRUS 1951, vol. 1, part 2, Asia and the Pacific (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Downloaded by [University of Glasgow] at 06:07 04 January 2015

Office, 1977), pp. 2008-2009.

22. Acheson's telegram to the embassy in Pakistan on Afghan-Pak differences, Nov. 28,
1950. Cited in FRUS 1950, vol. 5, p. 1455.
23. Ibid.
24. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 510.
25. Joseph J. Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study in the Use of Force in
Soviet Foreign Policy (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 19.
26. Technical cooperation was extended to Afghanistan under President Truman's Point Four
program. An agreement was signed between the two countries in Kabul on Feb. 7, 1951. See
Nake Kamrany, Peaceful Competition in Afghanistan: American and Soviet Models for Economic
Aid (Washington, DC: Communication Service Corp., 1963), pp. 24-25.
27. Peter Franck, Afghanistan Between East and West (Washington, DC: National Planning
Association, 1960), pp. 43-44.
28. Ibid., p. 44.
29. Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 482-485.
30. Franck, Afghanistan Between East and West, p. 9.
31. Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans, and ed. Stroke
Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), pp. 298-300.
32. Donald N. Wilber, Afghanistan (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1961), p. 184.
33. Bradsher, Afghanistan, pp. 19-20.
34. Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 493-494.
35. Franck, Afghanistan Between East and West, p. 37.
36. Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective, 2nd ed. (Stanford,
CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), p. 34.
37. N. A. Bulganin and N. S. Khrushchev, Speeches During Sojourn in Indian, Burma and
Afghanistan, November-December 1955 (New Delhi: 1956), p. 175, cited in Bradsher, Afghani-
stan, p. 25.
38. Wilber, Afghanistan, p. 185.
39. Collins, Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, p. 21.
40. Ibid., p. 23.
41. "Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on U.S. Policy South
Asia," Dec. 7, 1956, in Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog 5 (Jan./March 1979): no. 44B.
Cited in Bradsher, Afghanistan, p. 28.
42. Bradsher, Afghanistan, p. 28.
43. Letter of Chester Bowles, U.S. Ambassador in India, to Secretary of State Dulles and his
comment on the origin of the U.S. military aid programme to Pakistan, Dec, 23, 1953 (extracts).
Cited in US-SA, pp. 84-86.