M.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

1. Salaries
2. Disqualifications
3. Staggering of Terms
 Republic v. Imperial, 96 Phil. 770
Parties REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE DOMINGO
IMPERIAL and HONORABLE RODRIGO D. PEREZ, Respondents.
Brief case This case concerns the interpretation of the provision of the Constitution
regarding the tenure of office of the members of the Commission on
Elections who are appointed to succeed those first appointed in case
they resign, retire, or die before the expiration of their term of office. The
majority holds that the appointees can hold office only for the unexpired
term even if their appointments run for a full term of nine years.
Facts  The first vacancy in COMELEC occurred when Commissioner Enage
retired before the expiration of his term. His successor, respondent
Rodrigo Perez, was named for a full nine-year term. However, on the
principles laid, term should only be served for the unexpired term.
 The second vacancy, COMELEC Chairman Jose Lopez Vito, died
more than two years before the expiration of his full term.
Commissioner Vicente de Vera was appointed in his place. However,
he also died before the expiration of his remaining term.
 Respondent Honorable Domingo Imperial was appointed Chairman
to succeed Honorable Vicente de Vera
 The SG held that the 2 respondents term already expired
Issue WON their term is expired already
Held the petition for quo warranto is hereby dismissed without costs.

a successor should only be allowed to serve for the unexpired portion of

each regular term

Article X

4. Reappointment
 Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, 35 Phil. 126

 Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358

Parties SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR-COMELEC commissioner., Petitioner, vs.
HAYDEE B. YORAC, in her capacity as ACTING CHAIRPERSON of the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
Brief case The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the
Philippines of Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting
Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario
B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding
commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d' etat attempt.
Facts  The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the

1
 Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be
resolved by the members themselves
 the Solicitor General argues that designation made by the President
of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of
"administrative expediency," to prevent disruption of the functions of
the COMELEC.
Issue WON a member of the COMELEC chairman may be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity by the President
Held WHEREFORE, the designation by the President of the Philippines of
respondent Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the respondent is hereby
ordered to desist from serving as such.

The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular

chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be
exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.

Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the

Constitutional Commissions as "independent." Although essentially
executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the
Philippines
Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the
applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own
discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on
Certiorari by the SC as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A,
Section 7.

 Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101

Parties THE NACIONALISTA PARTY, Petitioner, v. FELIX ANGELO BAUTISTA,
Solicitor General of the Philippines, Respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
Brief case petitioner respectfully prays that after due hearing a writ of prohibition
issue commanding the respondent Solicitor General to desist forever
from acting as acting member of the Commission on Elections under the
designation rendered to him by President Quirino unless he is legally
appointed as regular member of the said Commission on Elections
Facts  while the respondent held, as he still holds, the office of Solicitor
General of the Philippines, the President designated him as acting
member of the Commission on Elections
 It is contended that such designation is invalid, illegal, and
unconstitutional, because there was no vacancy in the Commission
on Elections and because a member of the Commission cannot at
the same time hold any other office
 The respondent contends that his designation is lawful and valid, not
only because the power to appoint vested in the President includes
2
 the power to designate, but also because it is expressly so provided
in Commonwealth Act No. 588; and that the offices held by him, one
permanent and the other temporary, are not incompatible.
Issue whether the designation of the respondent as Acting Member of the
Commission on Elections, in addition to his duties as Solicitor General,
pending the appointment of a permanent member is unconstitutional.
Held The petitioner is granted five days within which to amend its petition so
as to substitute the real parties in interest for it (the petitioner), or to show
that it is a juridical person entitled to institute these proceedings.

With these periods, it was the intention to have one position vacant every
three years, so that no President can appoint more than one
Commissioner, thereby preserving and safeguarding the independence
and impartiality of the Commission.

Exception is By death, resignation, retirement, or removal by

impeachment, a vacancy in the Commission is created. In these cases
the President may appoint a Commissioner for the unexpired term.

5. Other Perquisites
6. Proceedings
 Aratuc v. Comelec, 88 SCRA 251

 Cua v. Comelec, 156 SCRA 582

Parties JUNIE EVANGELISTA CUA v. COMELEC
Brief case
Facts  First Division of the COMELEC rendered a 2-1 decision favoring the
petitioner Cua but nevertheless suspended his proclamation as
winner in the lone congressional district of Quirino due to the lack of
the unanimous vote required by the procedural rules in COMELEC
Resolution
 Cua moved for his proclamation by the board of canvassers, which
reconvened and granted his motion.
 Cua took his oath the same day, but the next day Puzon filed with the
COMELEC an urgent motion to suspend Cua's proclamation
 COMELEC set the motion for hearing and three days later it issued a
restraining telegram enjoining Cua from assuming the office of
member of the House of Representatives.
 The petitioner then came to SC to enjoin the COMELEC from acting
on the said motion
Issue WON the vote of the first division is valid
Held ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the public respondent is
enjoined from further proceeding with the private respondent's motion
dated November 10, 1987. The restraining order issued by the COMELEC
on November 14, 1987, enjoining petitioner from assuming office as

3
 member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional
district of Quirino is LIFTED

Section 7 of the new Constitution, providing that "each Commission shall

decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought
before it."

Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1669 reads as follows:

"SEC. 5. Quorum; votes required; substitution. - Two members shall
constitute a quorum for the transaction of the official business of the
Division.

N. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

1. Composition and Qualifications
2. Scope of the Civil Service
 National Housing Corp. v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172

 National Service Corporation v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122

Parties NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO) AND ARTURO L. PEREZ,
petitioners,vs.
THE HONORABLE THIRD DIVISION, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MANILA AND
EUGENIA C. CREDO, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Brief case Consolidated special civil actions for certiorari seeking to review the
decision * of the Third Division, National Labor Relations Commission in
Case No. 11-4944-83 dated 28 November 1984 and its resolution dated
16 January 1985 denying motions for reconsideration of said decision.
Facts  Eugenia C. Credo was an employee of the National Service
Corporation (NASECO), a domestic corporation which provides
security guards as well as messengerial, janitorial and other similar
manpower services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its
agencies. She was first employed with NASECO as a lady guard on
18 July 1975. Through the years, she was promoted to Clerk Typist,
then Personnel Clerk until she became Chief of Property and Records
 Credo was administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, Manager of
Finance regarding certain entry procedures in the company's
Statement of Billings Adjustment
 Credo was called to meet Arturo L. Perez, then Acting General
Manager of NASECO, to explain her side before Perez and NASECO's
Committee on Personnel Affairs in connection with the
administrative charges filed against her.
 Credo filed a complaint before the NLRC against NASECO for placing
her on forced leave, without due process.
 She was later terminated

4
  the labor arbiter rendered a decision: 1) dismissing Credo's
complaint, and 2) directing NASECO to pay Credo separation pay
equivalent to one half month's pay for every year of service.
 Both parties appealed to respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) which 1) directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to
her former position
 petitioners challenge as grave abuse of discretion the dispositive
portion of the 28 November 1984 decision which ordered Credo's
reinstatement with backwages
Issue
Held the challenged decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED with modifications. 1)
reinstate Eugenia C. Credo to her former position at the time of her
termination, or if such reinstatement is not possible, to place her in a
substantially equivalent position, with three (3) years backwages, from 1
December 1983, without qualification or deduction, and without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges appertaining thereto, and 2) pay
Eugenia C. Credo P5,000.00 for moral damages and P5,000.00 for
attorney's fees.

1987 Constitution provides that:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter.

As guidelines for employers in the exercise of their power to dismiss

employees for just causes, the law provides that:

Section 2. Notice of dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a

worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or
omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal.

Section 5. Answer and Hearing. — The worker may answer the

allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a
reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford
the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative, if he so desires.

Section 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify

a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the
reasons therefor. 17

3. Appointments
(1) Exceptions
 De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289
Parties EDUARDO DE LOS SANTOS, petitioner,

5
 vs.
GIL R. MALLARE, LUIS P. TORRES, in his capacity as City Mayor,
PANTALEON PIMENTEL, in his capacity as City Treasurer and RAFAEL
USON, in his capacity as City Auditor, respondents.
TUASON, J.:
Brief case This is an original action of quo warranto questioning the legality of the
appointment of respondent Gil R. Mallare to the office of city engineer
for the City of Baguio which the petitioner occupied and claims to be still
occupying.
Facts  Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of
Baguio, by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments
 Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the
President to the same position, after which, the Undersecretary of the
Department of Public Works and Communications directed Santos to
report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos
refused to vacate the office
 The petitioner rests his case on Article XII of the Constitution, section
4 of which reads: "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."
Issue legality of the petitioner's removal from the same office which would be
the effect of Mallare's appointment if the same be allowed to stand.
Held We therefore hold that the petitioner is entitled to remain in office as City
Engineer of Baguio with all the emoluments, rights and privileges
appurtenant thereto, until he resigns or is removed for cause, and that
respondent Mallare's appointment is ineffective in so far as it may
adversely affect those emoluments, rights and privileges.

section 22 of Commonwealth Act No. 177 which expressly provides for

the first time (following the mandate of the Constitution),that "no officer
or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause as provided by law."

 Salazar v. Mathay, 73 SCRA 275

 Besa v. PNB, 33 SCRA 330
 Cadiente v. Santos, 142 SCRA 280
Parties MEDARDO AG. CADIENTE, petitioner,
vs.
LUIS T. SANTOS, City Mayor of Davao City, MAXIMINO ASISTIDO, City
Treasurer of Davao City, FELIX N. PEPITO, City Auditor of Davao City, and
ATTY. VICTOR CLAPANO, respondents.
ALAMPAY, J.:
Brief case Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Davao City, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 7571, entitle Ag.
Cadierte vs. Mayor Luis T. Santos, et al." promulgated on August 23,

6
 1972, which dismissed the petition for mandamus, quo warranto, with
preliminary injunction filed by herein petitioner.
Facts  petitioner Cadiente was appointed by then Mayor Elias B. Lopez as
City Legal Officer of Davao City. The appointment was duly attested
to and/or approved as "permanent" by the Civil Service Commission
 the new City Mayor Luis T. Santos, herein respondent, dispensed the
service of the petitioner on the ground that the position of City Legal
Officer was primarily confidential in nature
 Respondent City Mayor appointed respondent Atty. Victor Clapano as
City Legal Officer
 Petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission on January 7,
1982, which rendered its decision in its lst Indorsement dated March
2, 1972, therein holding that the termination, removal and/or
dismissal of petitioner is "without cause and without due process"
and that the position of City Legal Officer "is not included among
those positions enumerated in Sec. 5 of R.A. 2260 as belonging to
the non-competitive service."
 Despite this resolution public respondents still declined and refused
to recognize petitioner as the one entitled
 Petitioner thus filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao City,
Branch I, Civil Case No. 7571, for mandamus, quo warranto with
preliminary injunction against the herein respondents
Issue WON the position of city legal officer is confidential in nature
Held WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit

the position of a City Legal Officer is one requiring that utmost

confidence on the part of the mayor be extended to said officer

The positions of Municipal Attorney, Provincial Attorney and City Legal

Officer are by their very nature, primarily confidential, and therefore,
belong to the non-competetive service under paragraph 1, section 5,
Republic Act 2260, as amended, because the functions attached to the
offices require the highest trust and confidence of the appointing
authority on the appointee

The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon

loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as
confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves no
removal but an expiration of his term

4. Security of Tenure
 Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84
 Mendoza v. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108
Parties FRANCISCO L. MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.

7
 HON. LOURDES R. QUISUMBING as Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Brief case the petitioner questions the validity of letter-order of the then Secretary
of Education, Lourdes R. Quisumbing which terminated his employment
as Schools Division Superintendent of Surigao City.
Facts  Petitioner Mendoza was the Schools Division Superintendent of
Surigao City who, was reappointed by respondent Quisumbing as
such with a "PERMANENT" status
 Executive Order No. 117 was issued by the President reorganizing
the DECS , which then separated him from service
 public respondents maintain that due process was observed since
the petitioners were evaluated in accordance with the criteria
Issue WON the removal of employees due to reorganization is constitutional
Held former Lourdes R. Quisumbing as Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, is ordered to restore the petitioner to his position as Schools
Division Superintendent of Surigao City

Abolition should be exercised in good faith, should not be for personal or

political reasons, and cannot be implemented in a manner contrary to
law. "Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a
constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of each case.'

5. Partisan Political Activity

 Santos v. Yatco, 106 Phil. 745
Parties Alejo Santos is Secretary of National Defense and head of the
Department of National Defense
Honorable Nicasio Yatco, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
Brief case
Facts  Judge Yatco issued an order disallowing the Secretary of National
Defense from conducting a house-to-house campaign on behalf of
Gov. Tomas Martin candidate of the Nacionalista Party in the
Province of Bulacan .
 Thus, the Secretary-petitioner filed a complaint for prohibition of the
order, enjoining the enforcement thereof, claiming that he is not
covered by the 1935 constitutional prohibition stating that, “No
officer or employee in the Civil Service shall engage, directly or
indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.
Issue whether or not Cabinet Members can engage in partisan political
activity.
Held Officers and employees in civil service are prohibited from taking part in
partisan political activities. However, the Secretary of National Defense
is not embraced within the terms “officers and employees in the civil
service.”
Cabinet Members are not covered by the Constitutional prohibition

8
 against electioneering or partisan political activity because they hold
political offices. Cabinet Members serve at the behest and pleasure of
the President. As such, their positions are essentially political.

Hence, the Court set aside the injunction on Santos, holding that Cabinet
Members, being alter egos of the President, were in fact chosen
principally for their political influences. Thus, they were expected to exert
for the purpose of ensuring support for the administration.

Sec. 2. 1987 Constitution (Article IX-B)

"(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or
indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign."

Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292)

"Sec. 55. Political Activity. - No officer or employee in the civil service
including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or
indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election
except to vote nor shall he use his official authority or influence to
coerce the political activity of any other person or body. Nothing herein
provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee from
expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from
mentioning the names of candidates for public office whom he supports:
Provided, That public officers and employees holding political offices
may take part in political and electoral activities but it shall be unlawful
for them to solicit contributions from their subordinates prohibited in
the Election Code."

government officials holding political offices

1. The President of the Philippines;
2. The Vice President of the Philippines;
3. The Executive Secretary/Department Secretaries and other Members
of the Cabinet;
4. All other elective officials at all levels; and
5. Those in the personal and confidential staff of the above officials."

 Cailles v. Bonifacio, 65 Phil. 328

6. Self-organization
 Social Security System Employees Association v. CA, 175 SCRA 686
Parties CORTES, J:

Brief case
Facts  the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and
baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS for the reason that SSS failed to

9
 act on the union's demands (payment of accrued overtime pay, night
differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into
regular and permanent employees, etc.)
 SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike.
The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work;
that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages;
and that the strike be declared illegal.
 The SSS contends that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service
laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike.
Issue whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the
right to strike.
Held no reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals, the
instant petition for review is hereby DENIED and the decision of the
appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is
AFFIRMED. Petitioners' "Petition/Application for Preliminary and
Mandatory Injunction" dated December 13,1988 is DENIED.

Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are
denominated as “government employees” and that the SSS is one such
government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service
and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum
prohibiting strikes.

the right to form an organization does not carry with it the right to strike.

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human

Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers
to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law"
[Art. XIII, Sec. 31].- doesn’t state if govt employees are allowed or not.
Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to
strike they are prohibited from doing so.

 Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, 200 SCRA 323

Parties MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION v.
THE HON. PERFECTO LAGUIO JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila
NARVASA, J.:
Brief case
Facts  On September 17, 1990, around 800 public school teachers joined a
10
 mass action. The mass action carried the purpose of dramatizing
and highlighting the teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure
of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and
again been brought to the latter's attention.
 These grievances included, among other things, clothing allowances,
13th month pay for the year 1989, employment of new teachers to
ease overload work, reimbursement of real property taxes, increase
in salary, and other equally important demands.
Issue Whether or not public school teachers can go on a strike to redress their
grievances.
Held WHEREFORE, both petitioners are DISMISSED

Employees in the civil service, such as public school teachers, may not
engage strikes, walkouts and temporary work stoppages like workers in
the private sector. Employment in the government is governed by law.
Government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their
employers. The terms and conditions of employment are effected
through statutes and administrative rules and regulations, not through
collective bargaining agreements.

7. Temporary Employees
 Delector v. Ogayan, 123 SCRA 774
Parties JORGE DELECTOR, PEDRO LADRENA, ALEJANDRO ALDAS, ALEJANDRO
AGUADO, and MIGUEL AGNER, Petitioners-Appellants, v. ANTONIO M.
OGAYAN, in his capacity as Mayor of Palo
Brief case This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte dismissing the petition for quo warranto which
prayed for the ouster of respondents as policemen of Palo, Leyte, and
for the petitioners' reinstatement to the same positions.
Facts  Petitioners are patrolmen who did not possess any civil service
eligibility
 Respondent municipal mayor dismissed them from the police force
and appointed on the same date the other respondents as special
agents of his office force of Palo
 Petitioners contend that they cannot be replaced by non-eligibles as
this is prohibited by Section 23, Article VI of the Civil Service Law and
thus, as provisional appointees, their services cannot be terminated
at will by the appointing officer, except upon certification of
appropriate eligibles by the Civil Service Commission or by a
subsequent appointment of eligibles to the position.
Issue WON non-eligibles may be replaced at the will of the appointing body
Held WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit

Since petitioners did not possess any civil service eligibility, their

11
 appointments are considered temporary. It is a settled rule that
temporary appointees may be terminated at any time even without
cause. They have no fixed tenure.

The Civil Service Commission cannot even legally approve their

appointments as provisional as this act would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of the discretion of the appointing power.

provisional appointee is one with a civil service eligibility but different

from that which is appropriate for the position to which he was
appointed.

8. Objectives of the Civil Service

9. Oath
10. Disqualifications
 Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317
Parties CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.
Brief case This is a petition seeking the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino
Facts  The questioned EO allows member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department to hold other govt.position in addition to his primary
position, but not more than two positions, and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor
 Petitioners maintain that it runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits public respondents, as
members of the Cabinet, along with the other public officials from
holding any other office or employment during their tenure.
Issue WON member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or
other appointive officials of the Executive Department may hold more
than one position in the government
Held subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are GRANTED.
Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is
accordingly set aside.

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,

12
 including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct
of their office.

the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in

Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section
3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1),
Article VIII.

ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an

"authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred
upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position

11. Standardization of Compensation

12. Double Compensation
 Quimzon v. Ozaeta, 98 Phil. 705

O. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

1. Composition and Qualifications
2. Powers and Functions
(1) Enforcement of Election Laws

 Lacson v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-16261, Dec. 28, 1951

Parties
Brief case
Facts 
Issue
Held

 Aguam v. Comelec, 23 SCRA 883

 Abcede v. Imperial, G.R. No. L-13001, March 18, 1959

 Sanchez v. Comelec, 114 SCRA 454

Parties AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Brief case candidate Augusto S. Sanchez praying that COMELEC will conduct a
recount of the votes cast senatorial elections to determine the true
number of votes to be credited to him and prayed further for a
restraining order directing the Comelec to withhold the proclamation of
the last four (4) winning candidates on the ground that votes intended
for him were declared as astray votes because of the sameness of his
surname with that of disqualified candidate Gil Sanchez
Facts  Petition was opposed by the winning candidates Rasul and candidate
Juan Ponce Enrile
 the Comelec, by a vote of four to three, promulgated its decision

13
 dismissing petitioner Sanchez' petition for recount
 petitioner Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
 respondent Comelec, by a vote of five to two, announced its second
decision reversing its earlier decision and granting Sanchez' petition
for recount
 Enrile filed with the SC his petition to compel to annul the Comelec
decision granting Sanchez' petition
Issue WON the petition for recount is the jurisdiction of COMELEC or SET
Held decision of respondent Commission on Elections promulgated on July 30,
1987 granting Sanchez' petition for recount is hereby SET ASIDE. The
respondent Comelec is hereby ordered to proclaim petitioner Juan Ponce
Enrile as a duly elected senator

Senate Electoral Tribunal as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualification of the [Senate's] members." (Art. VI,
Sec. 17, Constitution)

the Court rules that Sanchez' petition for recount and/or re-appreciation
of the ballots cast in the senatorial elections does not present a proper
issue for a summary pre-proclamation controversy.

errors in the appreciation of ballots by the board of inspectors are proper

subject for election protest and not for recount or reappreciation of the
ballots.

In the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns
canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects (sec. 234), appear
to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (sec.
235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any
candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election (sec.
236), which are the only instances where a pre-proclamation recount
maybe resorted to, granted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot
box and its contents

 Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272

Parties PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., for and in behalf of 139 members,
represented by its President, Amado P. Macasaet and its Executive
Director Ermin F. Garcia, Jr., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
Brief case The Philippine Press Institute a non-stock, non-profit organization of
newspaper and magazine publishers assailed the constitutional validity
of Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent COMELEC
Facts  Resolution to procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2)
14
 page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every
province or city for use as "Comelec Space"
 "Comelec Space" shall also be used by the Commission for
dissemination of vital election information.
 "Comelec Space" shall also be available to all candidates
 PPI averred that it is unconstitutional and void on the ground that it
violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the
government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation, and is violative of
the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and
of expression
 Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Comelec from
enforcing and implementing Section 2 of the Resolution
Issue Whether the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain?
Held letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and
void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT.

The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public
use are the necessity for the taking and the legal authority to effect the
taking.
Comelec has not been granted the power of eminent domain either by
the Constitution or by the legislative authority

The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by
the Constitution, but not without payment of «just compensation»
(Article III, Section 9).

Article IX, Section 4

supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchise or permits for the
operation of — media of communication or information — [for the purpose of ensuring]
equal opportunity, time and space, and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefore, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection
with the objective of holding free, orderly honest, peaceful and credible elections

 De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760

(2) Decision of Election Contests

 Javier v. Comelec, 144 SCRA 194

Parties EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR,
respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Brief case
Facts  The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique

15
 for the Batasang Pambansa elections
 the eve of the elections several followers of the petitioner were
ambushed and killed allegedly by the respondent’s men
 the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the
canvass of the election returns.
 His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was
proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body
 The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the
proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by
the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution
Issue Was the Second Division of the COMELEC authorized to promulgate its
decision proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?
Held this case was rendered moot and academic due to dissolution of the
Batasang Pambansa. This petition would have been granted and the
decision of the COMELEC, set aside as violative of the Constitution.

Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.

Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:

(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of all member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and
city officials.

Section 3 provides:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election
cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving
members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en
banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within
ninety days from the date of their submission for decision.

 Flores v. Comelec, 184 SCRA 484

Parties ROQUE FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , NOBELITO RAPISORA, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Brief Case
Facts  Petitioner Roque Flores was proclaimed as punong barangay in Barangay
Poblacion, Tayum, Abra
 However, his election was protested by Nobelito Rapisora, herein private respondent,
who placed second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner
 Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, sustained Rapisora and installed him
as punong barangay
 The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, contending that the ballot in question
which only indicated “Flores” should be declared stray votes and should not be
divided equally to the other candidate who has the same surname.
 Petitioner further stated that in accordance with the Omnibus Election Code, the 4
questioned votes should be counted in his favor by virtue of the equity of
incumbent rule, which states, in the event that there would be 2 or more
candidates having the same surname, if the ballot only states such surname, the
vote would be entitled to the incumbent.
 The petitioner then went to the Commission on Elections, but his appeal was
dismissed on the ground that the public respondent had no power to review the
decision of the regional trial court.

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  The Commission on Elections was obviously of the opinion that it could not
entertain the petitioner's appeal because of the provision in Rep. Act No. 6679 that
the decision of the regional trial court in a protest appealed to it from the municipal
trial court in barangay... elections "on questions of fact shall be final and non-
appealable."... punong barangay is an essentially executive officer
Issue Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay
election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
COMELEC
Ruling WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it
provides that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election
case should be appealed to the RTC, must be declared unconstitutional.
Doctrine Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their
decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the decision
rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should have been appealed directly
to the COMELEC and not to the RTC.
Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the Commission on
Elections shall:
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials
decided... by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

(3) Decision of Administrative Questions

 Guevara v. Comelec, 104 Phil. 269
Parties JOSE L. GUEVARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Brief case Petitioner was ordered by the Commissioner on Elections to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt for having published in the
Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 an article entitled "Ballot Boxes
Contract Hit", and which article likewise tended to degrade, bring into
disrepute, and undermine it’s exclusive constitutional function
Facts  The COMELEC awarded to (NASSCO), (ACME), and (ASIATIC) the
contracts to manufacture and supply the Commission ballot boxes
 the Commission cancelled the award to the ACME for failure of the
latter to sign the contract within the designated time and awarded
instead to ASIATIC
 Then followed a series of petitions filed by the ACME for the
reconsideration of the resolution of the Commission
 The article signed by petitioner was published in the June 2, 1957
issue of the Sunday Times, a newspaper of nation-wide circulation.
Issue WON COMELEC has the jurisdiction to punish as contempt the
publication of the alleged contemptuous article
Held petition is granted. Respondent Commission is hereby enjoined from
proceeding with the case set forth in its resolution- COMELEC no juris
The controversy between several dealers, merely refers to a ministerial

17
 duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity
in relation to the conduct of elections. In proceeding on this matter, it
only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial
function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish
for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently
judicial in nature.

COMELEC shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be
conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all
administrative questions, affecting elections, including the determination of the number and
location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election
officials" (Section 2, Article X).

(4) Deputization of Law-Enforcement Agencies

(5) Registration of Political Parties
(6) Improvement of Elections
3. Election Period
 Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30
4. Party System
5. Funds

6. Judicial Review
 Aratuc v. Comelec, 88 SCRA 251

 Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferre, 135 SCRA 25

Parties FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JAIME N. FERRER
CUEVAS, J.:
Brief case Appeal by certiorari from the Order issued by the respondent Judge of
the then Court of First Instance of Manila, DISMISSING Civil Case
entitled, "Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. COMELEC, et al.",
and his subsequent Order DENYING petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Facts  respondent (COMELEC) issued an INVITATION TO BID CALL No.
calling for the submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture
and delivery of 1 1,000 units of voting booths
 Among the bidders were the herein petitioner, Filipinos Engineering
and Machine Shop, (Filipinas for short)
 COMELEC rejected ACME’s bid because the product is not rust
resistant," and that, "it is also heavy
 Committee instead recommended that Filipinas be awarded
 However, because ACME has the lowest bid, the commission
awarded the contract to ACME subject to the condition that it shall
improve its sample
 Filipinas filed an Injunction suit with the then Court of First Instance
 public respondents filed a motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the

18
 lower court has no jurisdiction over the nature of suit
 Filipinas' motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
 Hence, the instant appeal.
Issue Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
suit involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of
contract arising from its invitation to bid
Held Petition was dismissed

COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not

issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident
of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections,
and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order"
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in
character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said
order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to the SC. Any
question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil
action before the trial courts.

The decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the
Supreme Court. (Section 2, Article X, 1935 Philippine Constitution

 People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715

Parties PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUALBERTO P. DELGADO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, Toledo City
GANCAYCO, J.:
Brief case The authority of the (RTC) to review the actions of the (COMELEC) in the
investigation and prosecution of election offenses filed in said court is
the center of controversy of this petition.
Facts  COMELEC received a report-complaint from Atty. Lauron E. Quilatan,
Election Registrar of Toledo City, against private respondents for
alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC
directed Atty. Manuel Oyson, Jr., Provincial Election Supervisor of
Cebu, to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case.
 After conducting such preliminary investigation, Oyson submitted a
report recommending the filing of an information against each of the
private respondents
 The COMELEC en banc in minute resolution resolved to file the
information against the private respondents
 Private respondents, through counsels, then filed motions for
reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest on the
ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted.
 RTC ordered the COMELEC to conduct a reinvestigation of said
cases
 COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and

19
 opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is
only the Supreme Court that may review the decisions, orders, rulings
and resolutions of the COMELEC.
Issue WON RTC has the power to review on certiorari, decisions, orders,
resolutions or instructions of the Commission on Elections
Held WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code

"The regional trial courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any
criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the
offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in
other criminal cases."

Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and

administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the
purpose of securing free, orderly and honest elections

Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution

Functions of the COMELEC may be classified in this manner —
(1) Enforcement of election laws;  5

(2) Decision of election contests;  6

(3) Decision of administrative questions; 7

(4) Deputizing of law enforcement agencies;  8

(5) Registration of political parties;   and9

(6) Improvement of elections.  10

As provided in Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution, unless otherwise provided by law,

any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

P. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

1. Composition and Qualifications

2. Powers and Functions

 Riel v. Wright, 49 Phil. 195

Parties MAGDALENO RIEL, Petitioner, vs. BEN F. WRIGHT, Insular Auditor of the
Philippine Islands, Respondent.
JOHNS, J.:
Brief case
Facts  the petitioner alleges that on September 1, 1925, he was duly
appointed a "temporary clerk" in the office of the Secretary, Philippine
Senate, with an agreed compensation of P40 per month, as shown by
the letter of appointment from the Secretary of the Senate
 from February 1 to 14, 1926, there is due and owing him P20 for and
on account of his services as such clerk, for which amount a warrant
was issued to and in his favor
 but the said respondent unjustly refused and still refuses to approve
said warrant

20
  petitioner does not have any plain, speedy or adequate remedy, and
prays for a writ of mandamus against the Insular Auditor
commanding him to sign the warrant.
 Respondent alleges that SC has no jurisdiction over his official acts
or any authority to compel him to sign the warrant, and claimed and
asserted that his powers and duties as Insular Auditor were in legal
effect identical with those of the U. S. Comptroller, and he then cited
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States to the effect that
the court do not have any control over, and do not review, the
decisions of the Comptroller.
Issue WON the Insular auditor may deny the compensation of temp employee
Held the writ is denied and the petition dismissed

the services in question were rendered eighty-two days after the final
adjourment of the Legislature. Hence, if the words "several days after a
session" cannot legally be construed to cover and apply to the period in
question, the petitioner was not legally employed, and is not entitled to
the compensation in question. "supplementary force," the words cannot
be construed to mean or apply to a period of eighty-two days, "after a
session."

Section 18 of Act No. 2935

The appropriation for "supplementary force" shall be understood to be
available for the payment of officers appointed in accordance with
section one hundred of the Administrative Code; of employees rendering
service before, during, and several days after a session, and employees
within and outside of the Philippine Islands . . .

 Matute v. Hernandez, 66 Phil. 68

 Guevara v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 813

Parties GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, as the Auditor General of the
Philippines and ISMAEL MATHAY, as the Auditor of the Central Bank,
respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Brief case This is an original action for mandamus to compel respondents, Pedro
M. Gimenez, as Auditor General of the Philippines, and Ismael Mathay,
as Auditor of the Central Bank of the Philippines to approve and pass in
audit two (2) bills of petitioner Guillermo B. Guevara for professional
services rendered by him to said Bank.
Facts  Miguel Cuaderno, the then Governor of the Central Bank of the
Philippines asked petitioner herein, as member of the Philippine bar
and practising lawyer, to cooperate with the legal counsel of the

21
 Central Bank in defending the same and its Monetary Board in Civil
Case action for certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and damages in
the amount of P574,000, filed against them by one R. Marino Corpus.
 Auditor General express however, the belief that it is "excessive and
may be allowed in audit". Hence, the present action for mandamus
filed on July 6, 1960, to compel respondent to approve payment of
petitioner's retainer fee and per diem
Issue WON Auditor General has the power to disapprove payments due to
excessiveness
Held WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and respondents herein are
hereby ordered to pass in audit and approve the payment of the amounts
claimed by petitioner herein

Under our Constitution, the authority of the Auditor General, in

connection with expenditures of the Government is limited to the
auditing of expenditures of funds or property pertaining to, or held in
trust by the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof
Such function is limited to a determination of whether there is a law appropriating funds for
a given purpose; whether a contract, made by the proper officer, has been entered into in
conformity with said appropriation law; whether the goods or services covered by said
contract have been delivered or rendered in pursuance of the provisions thereof, as attested
to by the proper officer; and whether payment therefor has been authorized by the officials
of the corresponding department or bureau. If these requirements have been fulfilled, it is
the ministerial duty of the Auditor General to approve and pass in audit the voucher and
treasury warrant for said payment. He has no discretion or authority to disapprove said
payment upon the ground that the aforementioned contract was unwise or that the amount
stipulated thereon is unreasonable, "to bring to the attention of the proper administrative
officer expenditures of funds or Property which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary,
excessive or extravagant".

 Pacete v. Acting Chairman of the COA, 185 SCRA 1

Parties ELIAS V. PACETE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
THE HONORABLE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, MIGUEL
PEÑALOSA, JR., in his capacity as City Auditor and in his personal
capacity; and THE CITY TREASURER, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Brief case
Facts  petitioner Elias V. Pacete was appointed by the then Mayor Antonio
C. Acharon of General Santos City as City Attorney
 Mayor Acharon was charged with murder in the Court of First
Instance of General Santos City and was detained without bail.
 Mayor Acharon ran for and was reelected as City Mayor of General
Santos City pending the criminal case against him and even while he
was in jail.
 Mayor Acharon issued Administrative Order No. 1 designating Vice

22
 Mayor Erlindo R. Grafilo as Acting Mayor, but later revoked it
 Subsequently, Acharon filed two cases with the Supreme Court
challenging the authority of Acting Mayor Grafilo
 In the meantime, acting Mayor Erlindo Grafilo suspended petitioner
Elias V. Pacete as City Attorney for a period of ten (10) days
 notice was served on petitioner that he had been removed as the City
Attorney of General Santos City on the ground of loss of confidence.
 petitioner filed with the City Treasurer of General Santos City a claim
for the payment of his back salaries
 Petitioner's voucher was forwarded by respondent City Treasurer to
respondent City Auditor who in turn referred the same to the Auditor
General in an indorsement
 Commission on Audit, which by virtue of the 1973 Constitution took
over the powers and functions of the Auditor General, rendered a
decision disallowing petitioner's claim for backwages. Consequently,
respondent City Auditor Miguel Penalosa Jr. refused to pass in audit
petitioner's claim for backwages
Issue WON City auditor may refuse to pass in audit petitioner’s claim for
backwages pursuant to the lawful order of the Acting Commissioner of
COA
Held WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of
confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them
endures; and thus their cessation involves no removal 

Hence, the Court must rule that petitioner is not entitled to the backwages claimed.
Moreover, having determined the legality of petitioner's termination from service as City
Attorney, the Court must likewise hold that respondent City Auditor Miguel Peñalosa Jr.
cannot be held liable for damages since his refusal to pass in audit petitioner's claim for
backwages was pursuant to a lawful order made by the respondent Acting Commissioner
on Audit.

3. Prohibited Exemptions
4. Report

23