 Makalintal v. Comelec, G.R. No.

157013, July 10, 2003

Parties ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official
capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management, respondents.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Brief Case Macalintal, a member of the bar challenged the Constitutionality of some
provisions of RA No. 9189 or The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003
Facts  that Section 5(d) violates Sec. 1, Art. V of the Constitution allowing the
registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other
countries by executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the
Philippines
 Section 18.5 empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates
for national offices including the President and the Vice-President violates the
constitutional mandate of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution;
Issue WON section 18.5 of RA9189 is unconstitutional for empowering the COMELEC
to proclaim winners for President and VP
Ruling WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED.
The constitutionality of Section 5(d) and 18.5 is UPHELD.

The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect
only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates
for the Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass
the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President
which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
Doctrine Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation
of the winning candidates for President and Vice President for the entire nation
must remain in the hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section 4 of
Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the
winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.

Ruy Elias Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163556, June 8, 2004
Parties Ruy Elias Lopez, Representative of the 3 rd Legislative District of Davao City
Vs
Senate
Brief Case Ruy Elias Lopez, Representative of the 3 rd Legislative District of Davao City,
filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus to ask the Court to declare
unconstitutional the Canvassing Rules
Facts  Lopez argued that the power and authority to open all certificates of canvass
of votes for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates are solely and
exclusively vested by the Constitution upon the Congress (senate pres)
 That it deprives him of his rights and prerogatives as a Member of Congress
 The OSG, the Senate and the House of Representatives argued that the
adoption of the Canvassing Rules is beyond the scope of judicial inquiry as it
is an internal matter of Congress
 They also argued that there has been no invalid delegation to the Joint
Committee of the duties of Congress.
Issue Whether the creation of the Joint Committee constituted an invalid delegation of
the constitutional duties of Congress in proclaiming the winners for P/VP.
Ruling Petition was dismissed
Doctrine No, the decisions and final report of the Joint Committee are still subject to the
approval of the joint session of both Houses of Congress, voting separately.

Since the Canvassing Rules subjects the acts of the Joint Committee to the
affirmation of Congress, the Committee’s report is preliminary and

1
 recommendatory in nature. The Rules leaves to both Houses, as an entire body,
the final act of determining the authenticity and due execution of the certificates
of canvass, and the proclamation of the President-elect and the Vice-President-
elect. There is no deprivation of the rights and prerogatives of the Members of
Congress.

 Brillantes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004

Parties SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner,
JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, DR.
JAIME Z. GALVEZ-TAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN,
NORBERTO M. GONZALES, HONESTO M. GUTIERREZ, ISLETA, AND
JOSE A. BERNAS, Petitioners-in-Intervention,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Brief Case petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed
by Atty. Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., a voter and taxpayer, seeking to nullify
Resolution No. 6712 approved by the Commission on Elections
Facts  automated election system (AES) was adopted by COMELEC for national
and local elections, which consisted of 3 phases (Php2.5B)-PMSI
 the first 2 phases were scrapped by COMELEC, apparently because they
encountered problems
 However, they ventured to implement Phase III of the AES through an
electronic transmission of advanced "unofficial" results of the 2004 elections
for national, provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as an
"unofficial quick count."
 Senate President Franklin Drilon had misgivings and misapprehensions
about the constitutionality of the proposed electronic transmission of results
for the positions of President and Vice-President
 the conduct of an advanced count by the COMELEC may affect the
credibility of the elections because it will differ from the results obtained
from canvassing
 The petitioners asserted that the assailed resolution effectively preempts
the sole and exclusive authority of Congress under Article VII, Section 4 of
the Constitution to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President
 The Comelec said that the project is "unofficial" in nature, that it cannot, be
considered as usurping the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the
votes for President and Vice-President.
Issue WON COMELEC had usurped the authority of Congress to conduct
canvassing of votes for P/VP thru the conduct of the unofficial quick count
Ruling WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. 6712
issued by the (COMELEC) En Banc is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
Doctrine SEC. 24. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for President and
Vice-President. -- The Senate and the House of Representatives, in joint public
session, shall compose the national board of canvassers for president and
vice-president. The returns of every election for president and vice-president
duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the president of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, the president of the Senate shall, not later
than thirty (30) days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public
session, and the Congress upon determination of the authenticity and the due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass all the results for
president and vice-president by consolidating the results contained in the data
storage devices submitted by the district, provincial and city boards of
canvassers and thereafter, proclaim the winning candidates for president and
vice-president.

2
 4. Term
5. The Vice-President
6. Presidential Succession
 Joseph Estrada v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001
Parties JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.

PUNO, J.:
Brief Case Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave
while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President
Facts  petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
 From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by
problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity
 It started when Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend
of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and
friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords under the name
Jose Velarde
 Some representatives moved to impeach the petitioner
 But he held on to his position. Until the EDSA Revolution II happened
 The petitioner fell from power, and VP Arroyo then took her oath as the P
 Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a
permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was
not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
Issue whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is
an Acting President.
Ruling the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are
DISMISSED.
Doctrine Art.VII,Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or
resignation of the President, the Vice President shall become the President to
serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of
the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice
President shall have been elected and qualified.

we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his
final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency and is
transmitting the seat to the VP

he also signed a letter, which was transmitted to the Senate, saying that he is
transmitting the position to the VP because he is unable to exercise the powers
and duties of the office of President

7. Oath of Office
8. Perquisites and Inhibitions
 Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317
Parties CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.

3
Brief Case Petitions seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No.
284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino
Facts  Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which allows members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions runs
counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
>a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his
primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and
government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation
Issue WON EO284 is violative of Sec.13 Art.VII of the Constitution
Ruling the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null
and void and is accordingly set aside
Doctrine Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in
any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in
the conduct of their office.
Exception
ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority
derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the
individual character, but rather annexed to the official position.

 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003

Parties REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and
ELIZABETH DIMAANO, Respondents

CARPIO, J.
Brief Case
Facts  Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA
Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No.
1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government
 Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of
alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q.
Ramas
 Aside from the military equipment the raiding team was also able to
confiscate money in the amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars
in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano, his lover
 She cannot claim that she owned it as she had no visible source of income
 PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379
Issue W/N petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance
with the RA 1379
Ruling the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No.
0037, remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such
appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax
liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
Doctrine RA 1379 raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully
acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly
disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public
officer who owns it.

4
 9. Presidential Immunity
 Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
Parties JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman

PUNO, J.
Brief Case
Facts  petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
 From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by
problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity
 It started when Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime
friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family
and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords under the name
Jose Velarde
 Some representatives moved to impeach the petitioner
 But he held on to his position. Until the EDSA Revolution II happened
 The petitioner fell from power, and VP Arroyo then took her oath as the P
 Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a
permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was
not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
 Estrada then filed quo warranto Alleging
(1) he did not resign from office,
(2) he is only on leave and Arroyo is only an Acting President,
(3) he is inhibited from resigning due to the pending impeachment trial
(4) the President enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, and
(5) Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation due
to public prejudice of guilt
 Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him
before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has
not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and
second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Issue Whether or not Estrada is immune from criminal prosecution?
Ruling The Supreme Court held that the President cannot use their resignation or
retirement to avoid prosecution. Even when impeachment proceedings have
become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and
civil cases may already be filed against the President. Thus, any prosecution
amounting from the preliminary investigation of the Ombudsman into the
alleged plunder, graft and corruption cases is valid.
Doctrine Presidential immunity from suit exists only during incumbency.
President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in
any civil or criminal case. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions

K. POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

 Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668
Parties FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS Secretary of
Foreign Affairs
Brief Case Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners on the resolution of the P
Facts  Former President FEM was deposed from the presidency via “people
power” revolution
 Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to

5
 die
 But President Corazon Aquino stood firmly on the decision to bar the return
of Marcos and his family
 Petitioner questioned Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country
such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due
process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives
them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the
constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
 That the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country
Issue Whether or not, in the exercise of executive power, the President may prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines
Ruling ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration
for lack of merit
Doctrine Executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines

President has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution
which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is
obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest

Residual power is that President can do anything which is not forbidden in the
Constitution

 Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797

Parties SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust

GUTIERREZ, JR., J
Brief Case two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives
and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square
meters of land at 306 Roppongi, Japan
Facts  4 properties in Japan were acquired by the Philippine government under the
Reparations Agreement done by the latter to the former during the war
 One of these is the Roppongi Property for the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy
 As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was
transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major repairs
 President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition of properties
in Japan
 Petitioner Laurel asserts that these lots were acquired as part of the
reparations from the Japanese government for diplomatic and consular use
by the Philippine government
 He states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by anyone can
attach to it, not even by the State.
Issue WON the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and
jurisdiction, to sell the property in Japan
Ruling the petitions are GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is issued enjoining the
respondents from proceeding with the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo,
Japan
Doctrine . As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of
man. It cannot be alienated.
A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such.

such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the

Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence

6
 The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:
ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks shores roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in
the preceding article, is patrimonial property.

 Domingo v. Zamora, G.R.No. 142283, February 6, 2003

Parties ROSA LIGAYA C. DOMINGO vs. HON. RONALDO D. ZAMORA, in his
capacity as the Executive Secretary
Brief Case petition for certiorari and prohibition1 with prayer for temporary restraining
order seeking to nullify Executive Order No. 81 and Memoranda Nos. 01592
and 01594.2 The assailed executive order transferred the sports development
programs and activities of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS for brevity) to the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC for brevity).
Facts  President Estrada issued EO 81 for the Transfer of the Sports Programs of
DECS to the Philippine Sports Commission
 Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Gonzales issued a
Memorandum which reassigned all remaining BPESS Staff to other
divisions of the DECS
 The petitioners were among the reassigned staff, and they argued that EO
81 is void and unconstitutional for being an undue legislation by President
Estrada and violated the principle of separation of powers. the EO violates
their right to security of tenure.
 However, while the case was pending, the congress enacted RA No. 915
which expressly abolished the BPESS and provides that BPESS personnel
not transferred to the PSC shall be retained by the DECS.
 The SC then dismissed the case for being moot and academic, but
explained that the assailed EO was valid.
Issue WON the President has authority to re-assign?
Ruling WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED
Doctrine Yes. Since EO 81 is based on the Presidents continuing authority is a valid
exercise of the Presidents delegated power to reorganize the Office of the
President.

the President’s power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the Presiden t
Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely transferr
ing functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or
Agencies, and vice versa.

the transfer of functions or agencies does not result in the employees cessatio
n in office because his office continues to exist although in another department,
agency or office.

1. The Appointing Power

 Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154

Parties RAMON P. BINAMIRA, petitioner,

vs.
PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR., respondent.

CRUZ, J
Brief Case petition for quo warranto, Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office
of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims

7
 to have been removed without just cause in violation of his security of tenure.
Facts  Petitioner Binamira, was designated General Manager (GM) of the Phil
Tourism Authority (PTA) by the then Minister of Tourism
 President Aquino, on noting that he was not designated by herself but
merely by said Minister contrary to that required by law, designated the new
Sec. of Tourism respondent Garrucho as the GM until such time she makes
an appointment thereto
 Binamira now seeks reinstatement, claiming he has been removed without
just cause in violation of his security of tenure
Issue WON the president can remove Binamira without just cause
Ruling WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.
Doctrine His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative,
he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the position in question. Even if it be
assumed that it could be and was authorized, the designation signified merely
a temporary or acting appointment that could be legally withdrawn at pleasure

Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is
that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced
at will by the appointing authority the designation is considered only an acting
or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure

Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority, provides as
follows:

SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. — The General Manager

shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of six (6)
years unless sooner removed for cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he
shall serve as such until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified.

 Javier v. Reyes, 170 SCRA 360

Parties ISIDRO M. JAVIER, Petitioner-Appellee, v. PURIFICACION C. REYES,
respondents-appellant
Brief Case
Facts  Petitioner allegedly was the duly appointed Chief of Police of Malolos,
Bulacan by the then Mayor Victorino B. Aldaba, took his oath and
discharged his duties
 pending approval and attestation of his appointment by the Civil Service
Commission, respondent,Reyes who had then assumed the office of
Municipal Mayor, recalled petitioner's appointment
 Civil Service Commission attested and approved the appointment of
petitioner as such Chief of Police.
 The mayor, on the other hand, quickly installed Bayani Bernardo as Chief of
Police of Malolos
 CSC pronounced the appointment of the replacement null and void and
directed respondent "that steps be taken immediately to install Mr. Javier as
Chief of Police
 Respondent refused to reinstate petitioner
Issue Between two appointees, the first complying with all the legal requirements to
hold office, and the second one made by the incumbent appointing power but
without assuming office or taking his oath of office, which one prevails
Ruling Respondent Mayor is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petitioner to office of
Chief of Police
Doctrine The first appointee which complies with all the legal requisites for appointment
prevails
8
 Bernardo never assumed office or took his oath. It cannot be said, then, that he
had accepted his appointment. Such an appointment being ineffective

Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment

 Soriano v. Lista, G.R. No. 153881, March 24, 2003

Parties ELPIDIO G. SORIANO III, Petitioner, vs. REUBEN S. LISTA

Ponente: Corona, J
Brief Case Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, of the permanent
appointments made by PGMA in the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)
Facts  Contended that their assumption of office is unconstitutional due to its lack of
confirmation from the Commission on Appointments (CA).
 He filed the petition as a member of the IBP and as a taxpayer
 the petitioner contends that the appointees should be prohibited from
discharging their duties and functions as such officers of PCG.
 after the aforesaid changes in the charter of the PCG, then President Fidel
V. Ramos, issued EO 475 transferring the PCG from the DND to the Office
of the President
 He later on again transferred the PCG from the OP to the DOTC
 Now that the PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine
Navy or the AFP, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of
the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that
matter, do not require confirmation by the CA.
Issue Whether or not the president’s appointments in the PCG, without confirmation
from the CA is valid
Ruling WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Doctrine Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution that only appointed officers from
the rank of colonel or naval captain in the armed forces require confirmation by
the CA.

(1) The Removal Power

 Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 231

Parties BRUNO O. APARRI, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and LAND AUTHORITY,

MAKASIAR, J.:
Brief Case petition for certiorari seeks to review the decision of the CA affirming the
decision of the CFI dismissal of the petition for mandamus
Facts  Respondents Board of Directors of the defunct National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration(NARRA) approved the appointment of Mr.
Bruno O. Aparri, as General Manager of the NARRA
 same Board of Directors approved the fixing of the term of office of the
incumbent General Manager, ending his term in 15 days.
 Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction with the
then Court of First Instance of Manila to annul the resolution of the NARRA
Board dated March 15, 1962 and to command the Board to allow petitioner
to continue in office as General Manager until he vacates said office in
accordance with law
Issue Whether Board Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) was a removal or dismissal
of petitioner without cause.
Ruling No, Resolution No. 24 was not a removal or dismissal of petitioner without
cause but an expiration of the term of office of the petitioner. The term of office
of the petitioner expired on March 31, 1962.

9
 Doctrine In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law. However, the power to
fix the term is vested in the Board of Directors subject to the recommendation
of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President of the
Philippines.

A careful perusal of the resolution points out the fact that the appointment is by
itself incomplete because of the lack of approval of the President of the
Philippines to such appointment
The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term.

Republic Act No. 1160

Section 2, Paragraph 2, Section 8 of Republic Act 1160 expressly gives to the
Board of Directors of the NARRA the power "to appoint and fix the term of
office of the general manager ... subject to the recommendation of Economic
Coordination and the approval of the President of the Philippines

2. The Control Power

 Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135

Parties HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,

petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM

CRUZ, J.
Brief Case
Facts  Secretary of Justice (Drilon) declared as null and void the Manila Revenue
Code for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of
tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and
public policy.
 The City of Manila filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
 lower court revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance
 declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional
because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control
over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring
on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local
governments
Issue Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is constitutional.
Ruling The challenged decision of the RTC, insofar, as it declared Section 187 of the
Local Government Code unconstitutional is reversed
Doctrine Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on
either or both of these grounds.
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace
it with his own version of what the Code should be

Control is defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set

aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

doctrine of qualified political agency – department secretaries are alter egos or

assistants of the President and their acts are presumed to be those of the latter
unless disapproved or reprobated by him.

 Gascon v. Arroyo, 178 SCRA 582

10
 Parties JOSE LUIS MARTIN C. GASCON vs.
The Hon. JOKER T. ARROYO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary

PADILLA, J.:
Brief Case petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, petitioners seek to annul
and set aside the "Agreement to Arbitrate" entered into by and between the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by Executive Secretary Joker T.
Arroyo, and ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, represented by its President,
Eugenio Lopez, Jr., dated 6 January 1987, to settle the claims of ABS-CBN for
the return of radio and television stations (TV Station Channel 4), and to enjoin
the Arbitration Committee created under the aforesaid agreement from
adjudicating the claims of ABS-CBN.
Facts  The Lopez family owned 2 television stations Channels 2 and 4 which they
have operated through the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation.
 When martial law was declared, the stations were seized.
 After the Marcos regime was toppled, the (PCGG) sequestered said
stations.
 Mr Lopez through counsel, ex-Senator Lorenzo Tanada requested
President Aquino the return of the stations. An agreement to arbitrate was
entered into regarding this matter.
 Acting upon the request, respondent Executive Secretary, by authority of
the President, entered into with the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,
represented by its President, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., an "Agreement to
Arbitrate
 Thereupon, petitioners as taxpayers sought to set aside the agreement to
arbitrate.
Issue WON the chief executive has the power to enter into arbitration
Ruling WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Doctrine Respondent Executive Secretary had, therefore, the power and authority to
enter into the "Agreement to Arbitrate" with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting
Corporation, as he acted for and in behalf of the President when he signed it;
hence, the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding upon the Republic of the
Philippines, as a party thereto.

Finally, neither the "convening of Congress" nor the "recent declaration of the
President that PTV-4 shall remain as the information arm of the government"
can render "ineffective and unenforceable" the "Agreement to Arbitrate"
because at the time of the signing of the said agreement, the President was
exercising both the legislative and executive powers of the Government, and
since the "Agreement to Arbitrate" is valid, it is "enforceable and irrevocable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law for the revocation of any contract."9

 De Leon v. Carpio, 178 SCRA 457

Parties CESAR R. DE LEON, petitioner,

vs.
J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, Director, National Bureau of Investigation,
respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
Brief Case two cases have been consolidated because they involve the same issue
against the respondent Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, who
has refused to reinstate the petitioners in defiance of the orders of the Civil
Service Commission as referred to him by the Secretary of Justice for
implementation.
Facts  Estavillo and de Leon are two NBI agents terminated by then Minister of
Justice Neptali Gonzales.

11
  Upon appeal to the Review Committee, the said body declined to act on
their petitions for reconsideration on the ground that it had lost its
jurisdiction with the ratification of the new Constitution.
 They were advised instead to seek relief from the Civil Service
Commission.
 The Merit Systems Protection Board of CSC held that their dismissals were
invalid and unconstitutional, having been done in violation of their security
of tenure under the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the Board ordered their
reinstatement.
 However, respondent Carpio, as Director of NBI, returned the orders issued
by the Secretary of Justice to CSC “without action,” claiming that they were
null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
 Unable to return to their respective positions, Estavillo and De Leon came
to this Court in separate petitions for mandamus
Issue Whether or not the Director of the NBI can disobey an explicit and direct order
issued to him by the Secretary of Justice
Ruling WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The respondent is hereby
ORDERED to immediately reinstate the petitioners as directed by the
Secretary of Justice
Doctrine No. In the case at bar, there is no question that when he directed the
respondent to reinstate the petitioners, Sec. Ordonez was acting in the regular
discharge of his functions as an alter ego of the President. His acts should
therefore have been respected by the respondent Director of the NBI, which is
in the Department of Justice under the direct control of its Secretary. As a
subordinate in this department, the respondent is bound to obey the
Secretary’s directives, which are presumptively the acts of the President of the
Philippines.

It is an elementary principle of our republican government, enshrined in the

Constitution and honored not in the breach but in the observance that all
executive departments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the
President of the Philippines.

The President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the members
of the Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other
offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. The
constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does
not require statutory implementation, nor may its be exercise be limited, much
less withdrawn, by the legislature.

3. The “Take-Care” Clause

4. The Military Power
(1) Command of the Armed Forces

 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81

Parties INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B.
AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Brief Case special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the
order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the
Philippine Marines (the "Marines") to join the Philippine National Police (the
"PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
Facts  Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to

12
 coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence.
 The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only,
until such time when the situation shall have improved.
 The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine
Marines null and void and unconstitutional for violation of civilian supremacy
over the military and the civilian character of the PNP
Issue Whether or not the The President did commit grave abuse of discretion in
calling out the Marines.
Ruling WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED
Doctrine The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading
the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is
not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also
tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears
on the horizon.

“Calling Out” Power;

While the Supreme Court gives considerable weight to the parties’ formulation of
the issues, the resolution of the controversy may warrant a creative approach that
goes beyond the narrow confines of the issues raised; Even as the parties are in
agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to call out the
armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power involved may be no more
than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the general welfare.

 SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, Feb. 3, 2004

Parties SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista vs

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRETARY ANGELO REYES
Brief Case
Facts  300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP, heavily armed stormed the
Oakwood Premiere in Makati demanding for the resignation of the President
Arroyo
 President declared a state of rebellion thru General Order No 4, directing the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police were
directed to suppress and quell the rebellion
 In the interim, several petitions were filed before the Court challenging the
validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4.
 Sanlakas contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not
require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces.
Because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient
factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an
indefinite period.
Issue WON the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President is usurpation of
legislative power
Ruling WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
Doctrine state of rebellion” or a declaration of a “state of lawless violence” or a “state of
invasion.” When any of these conditions exist, the President may call out the
armed forces to suppress the danger

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of

13
 the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

(2) Habeas Corpus

(3) Martial Law
 Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183

Parties IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO

S. AQUINO, JR vs.
HON JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
Brief Case petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained
by the military by virtue of the President's Proclamation No. 1081, dated
September 21, 1972.
Facts  The petitioners were arrested for being participants or for having given aid
and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the
country and to take over the Government by force
 Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos
issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno
Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some
others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile.
 Enrile answered that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’ declaration of
Martial Law.
Issue WON the President has power to declare Martial Law
Ruling JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED DISMISSING ALL THE PETITIONS
Doctrine The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or
imminent danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President
may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or
any part therein under Martial Law.

In the case at bar, the SC ruled that the state of rebellion plaguing the country has
not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the
state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the President’s order.

(4) Limitations of the Military Powers

5. The Pardoning Power
(1) Definitions
(2) Limitations
 People v. Casido, G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997
Parties PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM O. CASIDO

DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Brief Case
Facts  Casido and Alcorin were members of the CPP/NPA.
 In 1993, they were convicted of murder.
 In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, they applied
for pardon as well as for amnesty, both of which were granted during the
pendency of their appeal.
Issue Was the amnesty granted during the pendency of the appeal valid?
Ruling the Court hereby resolved that the release of accused-appellants William O.
Casido and Franklin A. Alcorin was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty
granted them
Doctrine Yes. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes
of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before
or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
The grant of amnesty, for which accused-appellants voluntarily applied under
Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both
Houses of Congress.

14
 (3) Kinds of Pardon
 Culanag v. Director of Prisons, 20 SCRA 1123

Parties IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

ANDRES S. CULANAG, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Brief Case appeal in a petition for habeas corpus filed by Andres Culanag, who is serving
sentence in our national penitentiary
Facts  Andres Culanag was accused of falsification of public document, in an
information filed in the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte
 falsely claiming to be one Ross V. Pangilinan, to be a graduate of the
College of Law of the University of the Visayas, to have passed the bar
examinations and to have been admitted to the practice of law.
 he was found guilty as charged and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
 Culanag was discharged from the penitentiary on parole. Among the conditions
of said release were to reside at Iligan City, not to change his residence without
the consent of the Board of Pardons and Parole, not to commit any crime, and
that should he violate any of the conditions, the remaining unexpired portion of
the maximum sentence imposed on him would again be in full force and effect
 Subsequently. another information for falsification of a public document was
filed against him in the Municipal Court of Mamburao, provincial capital of
Mindoro Occidental, also he claimed to be one Ross V. Pangilinan and filed
with the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro a
sworn petition for commission as notary public for and in the Province of
Occidental Mindoro, falsely stating that he is a law graduate of the University of
Visayas, had passed the bar examinations and been admitted to the practice of
law.
 violation of the condition of his parole, Culanag was ordered arrested to serve
the remaining portion of his prison term
Issue Whether or not the accused can be arrested while on parole for a different offense
committed.
Ruling Wherefore, the order appealed from, dismissing the petition for habeas corpus
for lack of merit, is affirmed.
Doctrine The power of the Chief Executive under Section 64(i) of the Rev. Administrative
Code to arrest and re-incarcerate any person who violates his parole condition,
stands even in the face of prosecution, conviction and service of sentence for
violation of conditional pardon

 Sumulong v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272

Parties WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG, petitioner,

vs.
HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS
AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
Brief Case petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner Wilfredo S. Torres,
presently confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa
Facts  petitioner was by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of
estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term
 These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals
 a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of the
Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the
penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be

15
 proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law.
 However, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") resolved to
recommend to the Pres ident the cancellation of the conditional pardon
granted to the petitioner due to long list of charges had been brought
against the petitioner during the last twenty years for a wide assortment of
crimes including estafa, other forms of swindling, grave threats, grave
coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives,
malicious mischief, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and violation of
Presidential Decree No. 772 (interfering with police functions)
 the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner.
 Petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence.

Ruling WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DISMISSED

Doctrine The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a
conditional pardon are purely executive acts

in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who
is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article
159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision
correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of
such pardon.

(4) Effects of Pardon

 Monsanto v. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190

Parties SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner,

vs.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
Brief Case
Facts  Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant
treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the complex crime
of estafa thru falsification of public documents
 Petitioner Monsanto then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said
motion was pending, President Marcos extended absolute pardon which
she accepted
 By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer
requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city
treasurer since the same was still vacant.
 Petitioner stressed that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the
crime which implies that her service in the government has never been
interrupted
Issue The principal question raised in this petition for review is whether or not a
public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a
new appointment.
Ruling WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED.

the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification

from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her
former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the

16
 usual procedure required for a new appointment. Her civil liability is not lost.
Doctrine Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted
with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is
bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.

The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon

implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the
conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness
and not forgetfulness.

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt
of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and
blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as
innocent as if he had never committed the offense. Pardon granted after
conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores him to all his civil rights.

(5) Distinctions
(6) Amnesty
 People v. Patriarca, G.R. No. 135457, Sept. 29, 2000
Parties PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOSE PATRIARCA,
JR., alias "KA DJANGO

BUENA, J.
Brief Case Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., appeals the decision of the Regional
Trial Court at Sorsogon convicting him of murder and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua.
Facts  the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, armed with guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO
from his residence and brought him to Sitio Abre, Mabini, Donsol,
Sorsogon, and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and
shoot ALFREDO AREVALO thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds,
which directly caused his death to the damage and prejudice of his legal
heirs.
 Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder for the
killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations
 accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to
the crimes charged.
 Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that Alfredo died in the hands of
Patriarca, who admitted that he is a member of the NPA
 a decision was rendered convicting the accused and imposing penalty
 Accused-appellant applied for amnesty and his application was favorably
granted by the National Amnesty Board
Issue WON the accused may be granted amnesty by the President
Ruling Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of
murder.
Doctrine Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense
itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that
the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he
had committed no offense.

Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons who shall apply therefor and who
have or may have committed crimes, on or before June 1, 1995, in pursuit of
their political beliefs, whether punishable under the Revised Penal Code or
special laws, including but not limited to the following: rebellion or insurrection;
coup d'etat; conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, insurrection, or coup
d'etat; disloyalty of public officers or employees; inciting to rebellion or

17
 insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to commit sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal
assembly; illegal association; direct assault; indirect assault; resistance and
disobedience to a person in authority or agents of such person; tumults and
other disturbances of public order; unlawful use of means of publication and
unlawful utterances; alarms and scandals; illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions, and explosives, committed in furtherance of, incident to, or in
connection with the crimes of rebellion and insurrection; and violations of
Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence without leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68
(failure to suppress mutiny or sedition), 94 (various crimes), 96 (conduct
unbecoming an officer and gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the Articles
of War; Provided, That the amnesty shall not cover crimes against chastity and
other crimes for personal ends."

DIFFERENCE OF PARDON AND AMNESTY

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which
must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take
no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with
the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take
judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is
granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political
offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender
from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does 'not work the
restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no case
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him
by the sentence' (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks
and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released
by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense."

6. The Borrowing Power

7. The Diplomatic Power
 Bayan v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 138570, October 10,
2000
Parties BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a JUNK VFA MOVEMENT vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA

BUENA, J.:
Brief Case certiorari and prohibition are issues relating to, and borne by, an agreement
forged in the turn of the last century between the Republic of the Philippines
and the United States of America -the Visiting Forces Agreement
Facts  Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases
Agreement
 To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines
and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty to respond to
any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels,
and aircraft.
 In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement,
both negotiated for a possible extention
 Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship
 Negotiations were still conducted by both panels on the VFA thereafter,
President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, ratified the VFA
 Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate

18
 for concurrence, which was concurred by 2/3 votes
 the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between
respondent Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Hubbard. (9)
Issue WON a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the chief Executive in ratifying
the VFA, and referring the same to the Senate has been committed
Ruling WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petitions are
hereby DISMISSED.
Doctrine As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the
Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of
at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the
negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are
exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his
vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the
fundamental law itself

As to the power to concur with treaties, the constitution lodges the same with
the Senate alone

8. The Budgetary Power

9. The Informing Power
10. Other Powers
 Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350,
December 2, 2002
Parties HON. RTC JUDGES MERCEDES G. DADOLE vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Brief Case petition for certiorari to annul the decision and resolution of the respondent
Commission on Audit (COA) affirming the notices of the Mandaue City Auditor
which diminished the monthly additional allowances received by the petitioner
judges of the (RTC) and (MTC) stationed in Mandaue City.
Facts  the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly
allowances of P1,260 which was again increased to 1,500 each
 (DBM) issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 stating that “such
additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates not exceeding
P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities may be
granted”
 Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of
disallowance to herein petitioners, reduced 1k each and to reimburse the
amount they received in excess of 1k
 The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest
against the notices of disallowance, but COA denied the motion
Issue whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of
the President
Ruling WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed decision
and resolution, dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively, of
the Commission on Audit are hereby set aside.

prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.

Doctrine Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments.

President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government
unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law

supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that

subordinate officers perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter

19
 11. Resumé

L. THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

1. Independence of the Judiciary
2. Judicial Power
 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81
Parties INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B.
AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Brief Case special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the
order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the
Philippine Marines (the "Marines") to join the Philippine National Police (the
"PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
Facts  Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence.
 The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only,
until such time when the situation shall have improved.
 The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine
Marines null and void and unconstitutional for violation of civilian supremacy
over the military and the civilian character of the PNP
Issue Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over
the military and the civilian character of the PNP.
Ruling WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED

the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian supremacy clause in

the Constitution is committed
Doctrine The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can

exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied
with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

20
  Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997
Parties WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, Senator vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, Senator
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Brief Case Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the
concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and
for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement.
Facts  Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal, as articulated
by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of
improving "Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products."
 Petitioners contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the
1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to
qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods”
 as (1) the WTO requires the Philippines “to place nationals and products of
member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products” and
(2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits and/or impairs” the constitutional powers
of both Congress and the Supreme Court.
 In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO
Agreement, petitioners are invoking this Court's constitutionally imposed
duty "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in
giving its concurrence therein via Senate Resolution
Issue Whether or not the Court has power in determining the constitutionality of the
agreement entered
Ruling WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Doctrine same

3. Jurisdiction
 Villavert v. Desierto, G.R. No. 133715, February 13, 2000
Parties DOUGLAS R. VILLAVERT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Brief Case petition for review on certiorari seeking the annulment of the Memorandum2 of
the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas which recommended the dismissal of
petitioner from the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), Cebu
Facts  Petitioner Douglas R. Villavert is a Sales & Promotion Supervisor of PCSO
Cebu Branch responsible for the sale and disposal of PCSO sweepstakes
tickets withdrawn by him, which are already considered sold
 As Villavert is not expected to sell all withdrawn tickets on his own, he is
allowed by the PCSO to consign tickets
 COA State Auditor III, wrote petitioner demanding the immediate settlement
of the latter's past due ticket accounts with PCSO in the total amount of
P997,373.60 with interest
 petitioner filed his counter-affidavit where he explained the circumstances
which led him to incur subject unpaid ticket accounts
 PCSO Board of Directors approved petitioner's proposed settlement
 Graft Investigation Officer II Edgemelo C. Rosales, after due consideration
of the evidence submitted by petitioner, rendered a resolution
recommending the dismissal of Adm. Case
 however, the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas, found petitioner "liable for
administrative sanction for Grave Misconduct and/or Dishonesty."
Consequently, petitioner was recommended for dismissal from the public
service

21
  Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
Issue WON the SC has jurisdiction on the petition for certiorari
Ruling ACCORDINGLY, let this case be REFERRED to the Court of Appeals as a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to be
disposed of in accordance with law.
Doctrine In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the
Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43

Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — . . . . In all administrative

disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
with Rules of Court.

No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

4. Appointments
(1) Qualifications
(2) The Judicial and Bar Council
5. Fiscal Autonomy
6. Composition of the Supreme Court
 In re Mateo A. Valenzuela and Placido B. Vallarte, 298 SCRA 408

Parties NARVASA, C.J.:
Brief Case In Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and
Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62,
Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabananatuan City, respectively.
Facts  Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the
President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City,
respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be
expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said
constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any
appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
Issue WON the president can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of
the ban in the interest of public service.
Ruling The Court further Resolved that (1) pending the foregoing proceedings and the
deliberation by the Court on the matter, and until further orders, no action be
taken on the appointments of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta which in the
meantime shall be held in abeyance and not given any effect and said
appointees shall refrain from taking their oath of office; and that (2) exercising
its power of supervision over the Judicial and Bar Council, said Council and its
ex officio and regular Members herein mentioned be INSTRUCTED, as they
are herby INSTRUCTED, to defer all action on the matter of nominations to fill
up the lone vacancy in the Supreme Court or any other vacancy until further
orders.
Doctrine Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his, term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public

22
 safety.

Section 4 (1) of Article VIII which states:

Sec. 4 (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. ** **. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof.

(1) En Banc cases

(2) Division cases
 Fortich v. Corona, 312 SCRA 751

Parties HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON vs.

HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

MARTINEZ, J.:
Brief Case The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some alleged farmer-
beneficiaries in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in
Quezon City on October 9, 1997 commanded nationwide attention that even
church leaders and some presidential candidates tried to intervene for the
strikers' "cause."
Facts  The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision of the Office of the
President (OP), which approved the conversion of a 144-hectare land from
agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the
President to issue the so-called "Win-Win" Resolution, substantially
modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become final and
executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land
conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of 44 hectares, and
ordered the remaining 100 hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-
beneficiaries.
 To support their request that their motions be referred to the Court en banc
Issue WON the court should decide on the motion en banc.
Ruling WHEREFORE, the separate motions for reconsideration of the April 24, 1998
Decision of this Court, filed by the respondents and the applicants for
intervention, are hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
Doctrine Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no
extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en banc

Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a

unaninous vote of all five (5) members of the Second Division is of the opinion
that the matters raised by movants are nothing new and do not deserve the
consideration of the Court en banc. Thus, the participation of the full Court in
the resolution of movants' motions for reconsideration would be inappropriate.

7. Requisites of a Judicial Inquiry

 Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392

Parties PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR.,

petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Brief Case Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed
by petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated,
seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from
implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for
being unconstitutional.
Facts  Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his

23
 certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming
elections
Disqualification questioned:
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of
the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been
6,5 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he
has retired
Issue WON there is actual controversy for the court to conduct judicial inquiry
Ruling section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid
Doctrine Neither one of them has been calle ed to have been adversely affected by the
operation of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional Theirs is a
generated grievance. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake.
In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking
judicial redress.

It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of

actual cases and controversies.

The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement"

(1) Actual Case

 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137

Parties
Brief Case
Facts 
Issue
Ruling
Doctrine

 PHILCONSA v. Villareal, 52 SCRA 477

Parties PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION vs.
HON. CORNELIO T. VILLAREAL, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives
FERNANDO, J.
Brief Case
Facts  Petitioners suing in their capacity as such as well as citizens and taxpayers
filed this mandamus proceeding praying that a writ be issued ordering
respondents Cornelio T. Villareal, in his capacity as Speaker of the then
House of Representatives, the Chief Accountant thereof, as well as its
Auditor, to inspect and examine the books, records, vouchers and other
supporting papers of the House of Representatives that have relevance to
the alleged transfer of P26.2 million from various executive offices to the
House of Representatives
Issue WON the court shall take cognizance of this case
Ruling WHEREFORE, the above petition is declared moot and academic.
Doctrine a suit of this character has become moot and academic with the effectivity of
the present Constitution

The records and books of accounts of the National Assembly shall be open to
the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the
Commission on Audit which shall publish annually the itemized expenditures
for each Member.'

(2) Proper Party

 Cuyegkeng v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-16263, July 26, 1960

24
 Parties DR. JOSE CUYEGKENG, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
DR. PEDRO M. CRUZ, as member of Board of Medical Examiners,
respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Brief Case
Facts  The petitioners are doctors whose alleged cause of action is predicated
upon the fact that their names appear in a list of qualified physicians,
approved and submitted, to the President for appointment as members of
the Board of Medical Examiners, and that respondent Dr. Pedro M. Cruz,
whom the President appointed to said board was not named in said list.
Issue WON the petitioners have legal standing to commence an action
Ruling Wherefore, the writ prayed for should be, as it is hereby, denied
Doctrine Thus, one who does not claim to be entitled to the office allegedly usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another cannot question his title thereto by quo
warranto. In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to entitled to the office
held by respondent herein. None of them has been appointed thereto and none
of them may, therefore, be placed in said office, regardless of the alleged flaws
in respondent's title thereto. They merely assert a right to be appointed to
said office. Hence, the petition for quo warranto has no leg to stand on.

When an individual may commence such an action. — A person claiming to be

entitled to a public office usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another
may bring an action therefor in his own name.

 Custodio v. Senate President, 42 O.G. 243

Parties WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of
Rizal, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL.,
respondents-appellees.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Brief Case Appeal, by petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, dismissing the above entitled case and dissolving the writ of
preliminary injunction therein
Facts  Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory
relief, with injunction, upon the ground that RA No. 920, which appropriates
funds for public works particularly for the construction and improvement of
Pasig feeder road terminals.
 Some of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the
tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and planned
subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision,
belonging to private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which
projected feeder roads do not connect any government property or any
important premises to the main highway.
 The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because people
living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of
the roads, and the government also gains from the donation of the land
supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to the
government.
Issue WON pascual has legal personality to commence an action
Ruling Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the records are

25
 remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
decision. Ruled in favor of petitioner
Doctrine As a taxpayer, Pascual had legal standing. The SC also ruled that the subject
appropriation was illegal because it appropriated public funds for the
improvement of private property. The right of the legislature to appropriate
funds is correlative with its right to tax, and under constitutional provisions
against taxation except for public purposes. Taxing power must be exercised
for public purposes only.

The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is
whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to
the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to
individuals might incidentally serve the public.

 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 235 SCRA 630

Parties KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED vs.
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Brief Case This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which seeks to prohibit
and restrain the implementation of the "Contract of Lease" executed by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on- line lottery
system, also known as "lotto."
Facts  Petitioners are suing in their capacities as members of the Board of
Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens.
 the PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of
increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds.
 KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Presidential Fidel V. Ramos strongly
opposing the setting up to the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious
moral and ethical considerations
 private respondent PGMC asserts that it is merely an independent
contractor for a piece of work and "petitioners do not appear to have the
legal standing or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the
reliefs sought.
Issue locus standi of the petitioners
Ruling The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 11 April 1994 is hereby MADE
PERMANENT.
Doctrine Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not
devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained,

The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement

"The protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest

and, conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no enforcement of
private rights. Private and public interests are, both in a substantive and
procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order." Moreover,
petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their
standing to sue has been amply demonstrated.

 Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623

Parties EDDIE GUAZON vs.
MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Brief Case This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military
and police officers represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal
Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila.

26
 Facts  The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bona fide
residents of Metr o Manila and taxpayers and leaders in their respective
communities.
 the "areal target zonings" or saturation drives" are in critical areas
pinpointed by the military and police as places where the subversives are
hiding
 petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of
human rights abuses.
 The public respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, oppose the
petition contending that petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition
for they are not the proper parties to institute the action.
 A particularly intriguing aspect of the Solicitor General's comments is the
statement that local and foreign co-respondents actually joined the
saturation drives and witnessed and recorded the events.
 Allegations of the petitioners are lies
Issue WON the petitioners have locus standi
Ruling WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Courts
of Manila, Malabon, and Pasay City where the petitioners may present
evidence supporting their allegations
Doctrine When an individual may commence such an action. — A person claiming to be
entitled to a public office usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another
may bring an action therefor in his own name.

(3) Earliest Opportunity

 People v. Munar, 53 SCRA 678
Parties THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
FELIZA CASUGA Y MUNAR, accused-appellant.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Brief Case
Facts  Accused-appellant was originally charged with grave slander in the
municipal court of San Fernando, La Union for having uttered defamatory
words in calling the offended party, Erlinda Munar, an unmarried woman
and a distant relative, the paramour of somebody
 The municipal court found her guilty merely of slight slander
 Accused-appellant filed an appeal directly to the La Union court of first
instance
 The trial court thereafter rendered its decision affirming the decision of MTC
 The accused filed a motion for reconsideration praying for acquittal and for
reduction of the civil liability to P100.00 but was denied
 The accused thereafter filed her notice of appeal directly to the Supreme
Court
 She asserted that the RTC’s conviction should be deemed null and void for
want of jurisdiction as her appeal should have been directly to the Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court
Issue WON the accused may question the jurisdiction of RTC to the SC, after it has
rendered its decision
Ruling ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto
Accused is guilty of slander
Doctrine this question is foreclosed by the doctrine of estoppel enunciated by the Court
that "after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision
on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of
the court

While the jurisdiction of a tribunal may be challenged at any time, sound public
policy bars the petitioners from so doing after their having procured that
jurisdiction themselves, speculating on the fortunes of litigation

27
 Sound public policy and the interests of a just, orderly, efficient and
inexpensive administration of justice, whereby justice and fairness are
accorded both to plaintiff and defendant, to the offended party as well as to the
accused, properly raise a barrier against a party who would speculate on the
fortunes of litigation and in the event of an adverse decision challenge the
jurisdiction of the very tribunal whose jurisdiction he or she has invoked and
procured at the expenditure of so much time, expense and effort on the part of
the litigants and of the State.

 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 33 SCRA 29, Summit Guaranty & Insurance

Parties SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY
DIZON, J.:
Brief Case
Facts  spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover a certain sum of money
 After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and executory, upon
motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of execution against the
defendants.
 Surety filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment
issued by the court hence became a quasi-party therein. it acquired certain
rights and assumed specific obligations in connection with the pending case
 Surety not only filed a written opposition thereto praying for its denial but
also asked for an additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of its
liability under the counter-bond
 Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an
answer or opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of such
answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned
heretofore
Issue WON the respondent in questioning the jurisdiction of the court has been
barred by laches
Ruling orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. In favor of petitioner.
Doctrine Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of
lack of jurisdiction for the first time after fifteen years after the action was
commenced in the Court of First Instance
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways
and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by
deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the
purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active
participation.

Laches "stale demands", in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an

unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.

Co. v. CA, G.R. No. 51535, Dec. 14, 1981

Parties
Brief Case
Facts 

28
 Issue
Ruling
Doctrine

(4) Necessity of Deciding Constitutional Question

 Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA, 181 SCRA 495
Parties CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
CORTES, J.:
Brief Case the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated July 15, 1987, which
created the (Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed on the primary
ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and
the creation of' the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the
approval of the act through a plebiscite.
Facts  Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the
Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong
Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall not undertake their
demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such
as political negotiations.
 A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such
agreement states that they are to:
 Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a
preparatory body that could perform policy-making and administrative
functions and undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft organic
act for the Cordilleras.
 Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group
of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order.
 Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of
the Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera
people. This was then signed into law by President Corazon Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative
Region [CAR], which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio.
 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground
that by issuing the said order, the President, in the exercise of her
legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated
task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras.
Issue Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional
Ruling E.O. 220 is constitutional. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Doctrine The Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that petition is unfounded.
E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the
Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the
enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In
short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict
with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions.

 Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797

Parties SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust

GUTIERREZ, JR., J
Brief Case two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives
and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square
meters of land at 306 Roppongi, Japan
Facts  4 properties in Japan were acquired by the Philippine government under the

29
 Reparations Agreement done by the latter to the former during the war
 One of these is the Roppongi Property for the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy
 As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was
transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major repairs
 President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition of properties
in Japan
 Petitioner Laurel asserts that these lots were acquired as part of the
reparations from the Japanese government for diplomatic and consular use
by the Philippine government
 He states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by anyone can
attach to it, not even by the State.
Issue WON the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and
jurisdiction, to sell the property in Japan
Ruling the petitions are GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is issued enjoining the
respondents from proceeding with the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo,
Japan
Doctrine . As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of
man. It cannot be alienated.
A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such.

such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the

Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence

The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:

ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks shores roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in
the preceding article, is patrimonial property.

 Zandueta v. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 115

Parties FRANCISCO ZANDUETA, petitioner,
vs.
SIXTO DE LA COSTA, respondent.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Brief Case This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco
Zandueta against the Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a
judgment declaring the respondent to be illegally occupying the office of Judge
of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila
Facts  petitioner, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta was discharging the office of
judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising solely the City of
Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First
Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the
President and confirmed by the CA
 the petitioner received from the President of the Commonwealth a new ad
interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth
Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance
of Manila and Palawan
 without its Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad interim
appointment, another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued
in favor of said petitioner

30
  the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved
the aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner,
 While the President has already appointed the herein respondent,
Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial
District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his
appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments
 Zandueta now prays to declare De la Costa to be illegally occupying the
office of judge of the 5th Branch of the CFI of Manila, and himself to be
entitled to continue occupying said office when his ad interim appointment
was disapproved.
Issue Is Zandueta entitled to repossess the office occupied by him under his former
appointment?
Ruling Wherefore, the petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the same is
dismissed
Doctrine Incompatible and Forbidden Offices-there is incompatibility between the two
appointments and, he is deemed to have abandoned the office he was
occupying by virtue of his former appointment.

The territory over which Zandueta could exercise and did exercise jurisdiction
by virtue of his latter appointment is wider than that over which he could
exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of his former appointment.
Hence, there is incompatibility between the two appointments. In accepting the
latter appointment and qualifying for the exercise of the functions of the office
conferred by it, by taking the necessary oath, and in discharging the same,
disposing of both judicial and administrative cases corresponding to the CFI of
Manila and of Palawan, Zandueta abandoned* his former appointment, and
ceased in the exercise of the functions of the office occupied by him by virtue
thereof.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official
voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by
law, — which new office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him
— , qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary
oath, and enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent
in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the corresponding
salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying
by virtue of his former appointment (46 Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he can
not question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last
appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121; id., 767, par. 123). He is
excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new appointment
may affect public interest or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of
legal exigencies (11 American Jurisprudence, 770, par. 124).

Gacho v. OSMEÑA
Parties PONCIANO GACHO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., ETC., ET AL., respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Brief Case (27) petitioners held position, under permanent appointment, as detectives in
the Police Department of the City of Cebu
Facts  Mayor of Cebu dismissed, among others, twenty (20) of herein petitioners,
who were, subsequently, in compliance with final judgment of courts,
declaring such dismissal illegal
 respondent City Mayor wrote to petitioners herein identical letters (Annexes
I and 1-1 to 1-24) advising them that their positions as detectives had been
abolished by said Ordinance No. 188 "effective immediately" and at the
same time enclosing therewith their appointments as patrolmen
 Petitioners refused to accept these appointments, in the belief that this was

31
 another scheme to effect their removal
 After forth the foregoing facts and alleging that their aforementioned
dismissal: is illegal and violative of their rights
 respondents alleged that the word "permanent" does not appear in the
appointments originally extended to petitioners, that the City of Cebu may
validly abolish old positions and create new ones, that petitioners were not
removed from office
Issue Have the positions held by petitioners herein, as members of the police
department of the City of Cebu, been abolished by Ordinance No. 188?
Ruling judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the positions held by petitioners
herein on and before May 15, 1956, were not abolished by Municipal
Ordinance No. 188; that petitioners were entitled to remain in office, after said
date; that they should be reinstated to their aforementioned positions and
allowed to continue holding the same, with all rights appurtenant thereto, in
accordance with law; and that they are entitled to collect the corresponding
compensation
Doctrine the enactment of an Ordinance is, and was, unnecessary, either to detail
temporarily, or to transfer Permanently, a member of the secret service,
division to the uniformed division of the Police Department of the City of Cebu

But where an ordinance purporting to abolish such an office is only a device for
the purpose of removing the incumbent while the office practically still remains
in existence, it is an evasion of the law, and void. (43 C.J. sec. 978, p. 600.)

But the right to abolish an unnecessary position cannot he used to conceal the
discharge of an employee in violation of the civil service law or circumvent the
effect of a decree of the court restraining the city from removing the incumbent.

the office must be abolished in good faith; and if immediately after the office is
created with substantially the same duties and a different individual is
appointed, or if it otherwise appears that the office was abolished for personal
or political reasons, the courts will interfere.

Effects of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality

 Manila Motors Co. v. Flores, 99 Phil. 738

Parties MANILA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANUEL T. FLORES, defendant-appellant.

BENGZON, J.:
Brief Case
Facts  In May 1954, Manila Motor Company filed in the Municipal Court of Manila
a complaint to recover from Manuel T. Flores the amount of P1,047.98 as
chattel mortgage installments which fell due in September 1941.
 Defendant pleaded prescription:
 The complaint was dismissed.
 On appeal, the Court of First Instance saw differently, sustaining Plaintiff’s
contention that the moratorium laws had interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period, and that deducting the time during which said laws were
in operation — three years and eight months 1 — the ten-year term had not
yet elapsed when complainant sued for collection in May 1954.
 Wherefore said court ordered the return of the case to the municipal judge
for trial on the merits.
 Defendant appealed. arguing principally that the moratorium laws did not
have the effect of suspending the period of limitations, because they were
unconstitutional
Issue Whether or not the moratorium laws did not have the effect of suspending the
period of limitations, because they were unconstitutional
32
 Ruling Judgment affirmed, without costs.- Moratorium law interrupted the running of period
Doctrine unconstitutional statute —"confers no right, create no office, affords no protection and
justifies no acts performed under it

there are several instances wherein courts, out of equity, have relaxed its operation or
qualified its effects "since the actual existence of a statute prior to such declaration is an
operative fact, and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored

(1) Partial Unconstitutionality

Flores v. Comelec
Parties ROQUE FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , NOBELITO RAPISORA, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Brief Case
Facts  Petitioner Roque Flores was proclaimed as punong barangay in Barangay
Poblacion, Tayum, Abra
 However, his election was protested by Nobelito Rapisora, herein private respondent,
who placed second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner
 Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, sustained Rapisora and installed him
as punong barangay
 The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, contending that the ballot in
question which only indicated “Flores” should be declared stray votes and
should not be divided equally to the other candidate who has the same
surname.
Petitioner further stated that in accordance with the Omnibus Election
Code, the 4 questioned votes should be counted in his favor by virtue of the
equity of incumbent rule, which states, in the event that there would be 2 or
more candidates having the same full name, if the ballot only states such
full name, the vote would be entitled to the incumbent.
Issue Whether or not he was entitled to the benefits of the equity-of-the-incumbent
rule
Ruling WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

 Declaring Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it provides

that barangay election contests decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial court shall
be appealable to the regional trial court;

2. Declaring valid Section 16(3) of Com. Res. No. 2022-A dated January 5, 1989;
Doctrine his certificate of candidacy was for kagawad and not for punong barangay
It then follows that the petitioner losses the title of being the incumbent
punong barangay on the election day making him not entitled to the benefits
of equity-of-the-incumbent rule. The result was that the 4 contested votes
were considered stray

Sec. 8.  Incumbent elective officials running for the same office shall not be
considered resigned upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.  They shall
continue to hold office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified.
Section 8 that all incumbent elected officials should not be considered resigned
upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy as long as they were running for
the same... position.
Under Rep. Act No. 6679, the person who wins the highest... number of votes as a
kagawad becomes by operation of law the punong barangay, or the executive of
the political unit.

(2) Appellate Jurisdiction

Calano v. Cruz
Parties PEDRO CALANO, petitioner-appellant,

33
 vs.
PEDRO CRUZ, respondent-appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Brief Case
Facts  respondent Pedro Cruz was proclaimed a councilor-elect in the municipality of Orion,
Bataan
 Petitioner Pedro Calano filed a complaint or petition for quo warranto contesting the
right of Cruz to the office on the ground that Cruz was not eligible for the office of
municipal councilor. Prayed that he be declared the councilor elected
 CFI of of Bataan dismissed on the ground that it was filed out of time, and also
because petitioner had no legal capacity to sue because his complaint does not allege
that he was duly elected councilor of the municipality of Orion, and, therefore, has
been deprived of his right to said position by virtue of the proclamation of the
respondent as duly elected councilor of said municipality
  On appeal to SC by petitioner from the order of dismissal, it was held that the petition
was filed within the period prescribed by law; and that although the petition might be
regarded as somewhat defective for failure to state a sufficient cause of action, said
question was not raised in the motion to dismiss because the ground relied upon,
namely, that petitioner had no legal capacity to sue, did not refer to the failure to state
a sufficient cause of action but rather to minority, insanity, coverture, lack of juridical
personality, or nay other disqualification of a party.
 As a result, the order of dismissal was reversed and the case was remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings.
Issue WON the SC may reverse the decision of the lower court on election contests
Ruling Reversing the order of dismissal, the case is hereby remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings
Doctrine section 178 of the Revised election code limiting appeals from decisions of Courts of First
Instance in election contests over the offices of Provincial Governor, members of the
Provincial Board, City Councilors and City Mayors, did not intend to prohibit or prevent the
appeal to the Supreme Court in protests involving purely questions of law, that is to say,
that protests involving other officers such as municipal councilor may be appealed
provided that only legal questions are involved in the appeal. Consequently, the appeal in
the present case involving as it does purely questions of law is proper.

Ruffy v. Chief of Staff

Parties RAMON RUFFY, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY, ET AL., respondents.
TUASON, J.:
Brief Case
Facts  The ground of the petition was that the petitioners were not subject to military law at
the time the offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed. In their
memorandum they have raised an additional question of law — that the 93d Article of
War is unconstitutional.
 During the Japanese occupation, herein petitioner, Ramon Ruffy, a
Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary, retreated in the
mountains instead of surrendering to the enemy.
 He organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as Bolo Combat Team which
has been recognized and placed under the operational control of the US
Army in the South Pacific.
 Sometime later, Col. Jurado effected a change of command in the Bolo
Area. Major Ruffy who was then acting as Commanding Officer for the Bolo
Area was relieved of his position. Later on or on October 19, 1944, Lieut.
Col Jurado was slain allegedly by the petitioners.
 It was this murder which gave rise to petitioner‘s trial.
 The trial court convicted petitioner and he now filed this instant petition with
the contention that he was not subject to military law at the time the offense
for which he had been placed on trial was committed.
 Petitioners contended that by the enemy occupation of the Philippines, the
National Defense Act and all laws and regulations creating and governing
the existence of the Philippine Army including the Articles of War, were
suspended and in abeyance during such belligerent occupation.

34
  He also assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of War which provides
that ―any person subject to military law who commits murder in the time of
war should suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the court martial may
direct.
 Petitioner argued that the said law was in violation of Article VII, section 2 of
the Constitution since 93d of Article of War fails to allow a review by the
Supreme Court of judgments of courts martial imposing death or life
imprisonment.
Issue Whether 93d of Articles of War was constitutional.
Ruling the petition has no merit and that it should be dismissed with costs. 
Doctrine ES, 93d of the Articles of War was constitutional. It does not violate Article VII,
section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that ―the National Assembly may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases
in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. Court Martial are
agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities ―for ordering of
courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of
the President as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation. Unlike
courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary.

x x x court martial are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power,

provided by Congress for the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in
properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and
utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives.

Espiritu v. Fugoso
Parties EMILIO ESPIRITU, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. VALERIANO
FUGOSO, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
PERFECTO, J.:  chanr

Brief Case Appellants instituted this quo warranto proceedings to seek reinstatement in

the positions of police officers they were occupying in the Manila Police
Department at the time the Pacific War broke out. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Facts  Pineda and Ealdama were denied reinstatement for they had been removed
from the service for cause.
 Later on the fiscal filed a petition to dismiss the case for they have already
been reinstated except that their salaries were have not been adjusted
because of lack of appropriation and that, on account of the willingness of
the administration to restore them to their previously held ranks
 Appellants alleged that the lower court erred in not declaring
unconstitutional Commonwealth Act No. 698.
 but now the question has become moot, because of the enactment on June
15, 1948 of Republic Act No. 271, expressly repealing Commonwealth Act
No. 698.
Issue WON the SC has the only power to declare a law unconstitutional
Ruling The case is dismissed without costs.
Doctrine The lower court, invoking the provision of section 10 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, expressed the opinion that the Constitution had lodged the power
to declare law unconstitutional exclusively upon the Supreme Court, and
consequently, refrained from passing upon the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 698. There is nothing in section 10 of Article VIII of the
Constitution from which it can be concluded that the power to declare a law
unconstitutional belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court. The section
provides only for the procedure that the Supreme Court should follow when
such a question is presented before it.chanroblesvirt

(4) Change of Venue or Place of Trial

People v. Pilotin
Parties THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CAMILO PILOTIN, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, ISIDRO PUGAL and ERNING

35
 ABANO, defendants-appellants.
AQUINO, J.:
Brief Case
Facts  Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion praying for the transfer to the
New Bilibid Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the
place of trial of Criminal Case No. 3949 of the municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
wherein he, as sole defendant, is charged with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions.
 he alleged that his life would be in jeopardy if he were to be confined in the Vigan
municipal jail during the trial because there are many political enemies of the Crisologo
family in that vicinity;
 Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur signified his conformity to the transfer of the venue of
the trial to the New Bilibid Prisons.
Issue WON the SC has the power to approve transfer of venue of criminal cases
Ruling the municipal court of Vigan is directed to transfer the record of Criminal Case No. 3949 to
the City Court of Quezon City where it should be re-docketed and raffled to any Judge
thereof. The case may be tried at Camp Crame. The usual precautions and security
measures should be adopted in bringing defendant Crisologo to Camp Crame on the
occasion of the hearing.
Doctrine Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution expressly empowers this Court to "order a
change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice". Here, what is involved
is not merely a miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of movant Crisologo, the
accused. It would be absurd to compel him to undergo trial in a place where his life would
be imperilled.

(5) Rule-making Power

 In re Edilon, 84 SCRA 554
Parties In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.
EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

CASTRO, C.J.:
Brief Case
Facts  he respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines.
 recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the
latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
 respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to
pay the corresponding dues
 The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from
the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable
cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an
administrative body."
Issue  WON the SC has the sole power to admit and discipline members of the bar
Ruling Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Doctrine Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397   authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules
5

of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see
fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is
to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases
regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
"Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of
law and the integration of the Bar 

P.E. Domingo & Co. v. Zari, 159 SCRA 171

Parties P.E. DOMINGO & CO., INC., PRIMITIVO E. DOMINGO, ROSARIO R. DOMINGO,

36
 LORETTA D. PANIS, AMADOR R. DOMINGO, ISIDORO M. DOMINGO, DANILO R.
DOMINGO and IRENEO R. DOMINGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI and THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(GSIS), respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Brief Case G.R. No. 76299 is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from a decision of the
Court of Appeals sustaining that right while G.R. No. 74211 is a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 questioning a decision of the trial court denying
such right
Facts  These cases arose from certain loans obtained by P.E. Domingo and Co. and several
other persons (hereafter referred to as Domingo) from the GSIS which were secured
with real estate mortgages and other collaterals
 Default in the payment of these obligations, the mortgages were foreclosed and the
mortgaged properties sold to the GSIS at public auction
 Domingo protested the foreclosure sale and filed complaints in the regional trial courts
for the annulment of the same.
 The motion was granted by the trial judge in Pasig but denied by Judge
Maximo Savellano in Manila 4 and Judge Remigio E. Zari in Quezon City.
Issue when the demand is made for the appointment of assessors in the form
prescribed by law, has the judge any discretion to deny it?
Ruling ACCORDINGLY, the petition in G.R. No. 76299 is DENIED and the petition in G.R. No.
74211 is GRANTED. Trial by assessors is hereby directed in Civil Case No. 84-24604 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila and Civil Case No. Q-41671 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City. The temporary restraining order dated June 4, 1986, in G.R. No. 74211 is
LIFTED.
Doctrine Act 190, provides that upon filing of such application, the judge shall direct
that the assessors be provided . . ." It would be difficult to draw a law in which
the terms could be made more mandatory: The Legislature said that the court
shall direct etc . . ., it did not intend that the judge might, could or should
appoint; the Legislature, considering the purpose of the law, meant exactly
what it said — that the judge upon proper application shall appoint.

Once the petition in writing has been filed by any of the parties, it is the duty
of the justice of the peace to grant it, and to proceed to the selection of the
assessors in the manner prescribed

Trial with assessors is available where questions of fact are involved as

assessors can help the judge in the determination of this kind of questions.
Concededly, they have nothing to do with the interpretation of legal questions.

As long as it is provided for in the Rules of Court, the right to trial with
assessors cannot be withheld except only for the most compelling justification.
Any right, whatever its source, be it the Constitution or only a statute or — in
this case — the Rules of Court, is protected by the due process clause and so
cannot be denied the person entitled thereto without good reason. 

Lim v. Zosa
Parties ANTONIO CHIAO BEN LIM, Petitioner, v. HON. MARIANO A. ZOSA, Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
Brief Case This is an appeal by certiorari from two Orders 1 of the respondent judge
dismissing a petition for the correction of an allegedly wrong entry in the birth
records of Kim Joseph describing him as a Chinese national instead of a Filipino
citizen.
Facts  The petitioner had offered to prove the error through several pieces of
evidence
 On opposition by the local civil registrar of Cebu, 3 however, the
respondent judge dismissed the petition and sustained the contention that
only clerical errors were allowed to be corrected in the summary
proceedings
Issue court’s role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in the civil registry
Ruling WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders are hereby set aside, and Special
Proceeding No. 3596-R of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch V, is

37
 reinstated for trial on the merits without delay
Doctrine Article 412 of the Civil Code simply provides: "No entry in the civil registry
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order." cralaw virtua1aw library

Where a change in the birth registry regarding citizenship is ordered, the Court
will not be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an
erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of
the Rule of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper
enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code
and so does not violate the Constitution.

"The court’s role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in the civil
registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts recorded therein

Tenure of Judges
 Ocampo v. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. L-7918, Jan. 18, 1955
Parties
Brief Case
Facts 
Issue
Ruling
Doctrine

De la Llana v. Alba, 82 SCRA 30

Parties GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of
Olongapo v vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget

FERNANDO, C.J.:
Brief Case
Facts  Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled, “An act reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes” was passed,
providing for the separation of Justices and judges of inferior courts from
the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts (except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax appeals).
 The honorable petitioner sought to prohibit the respondents from
implementing BP 129, alleging that the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
 Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa 129 which
in effect would cause the abolition of 1,663 judicial positions in the
inferior courts terminating the incumbency of Justices and Judges.
Issue Whether or not the “Security of Tenure” Provision of the Constitution is
impaired by BP 129
Ruling The Court ruled that the abolition of an office within the competence of a
legitimate body if done in good faith suffers no infirmity.

No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved.

The unconstitutionality of BP 129 not having been shown, the petition is
dismissed. No costs.
Doctrine Court similarly maintains that the passage of BP 129 was in good faith seeing
as its purpose was for the fulfillment of what was considered a great public
need by the legislative department, not intended to adversely affect the tenure
of judges or any particular judge

12. Decisions of the Court

38
 Nicos Industrial Corp. v. CA, 206 SCRA 127
Parties NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, JUAN COQUINCO and CARLOS
COQUINCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS

CRUZ, J.:
Brief Case
Facts  it was alleged that NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of P2,000,000.00
from private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank and to secure payment thereof
executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land located at Marilao, Bulacan.
 The mortgage was foreclosed for the supposed non-payment of the loan
 NICOS filed their action for "annulment of sheriff's sale, recovery of possession, and
damages, with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction."
 Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint presented witnesses and
submitted 21 exhibits.
 Respondents filed a 7page demurrer to the evidence to which the petitioners did not
oppose.
 Order was issued., plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed.
 Petitioners now assail the constitutionality of the Order, claiming that it does not
“clearly and distinctly” explain how it was reached as mandated by Art. VIII, Sec 14 of
the Constitution. They contend that there was not even analysis of their testimonial
evidence or of their 21 exhibits.
Issue Does the Order violate Art VIII Sec 14 of the Constitution?
Ruling the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of basis.
This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 10, for
revision, within 30 days from notice, of the Order of June 6, 1986, conformably
to the requirements of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution, subject to the
appeal thereof, if desired, in accordance with law.
Doctrine Yes. The Order is an oversimplification of the issues. It is a requirement of due
process that the parties to litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the
court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X
and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever
for its action. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark and is
especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the
possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.¹

Borromeo v. CA, 186 SCRA 1

Parties JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SAMSON LAO, respondents.
Brief Case
Facts  Borromeo charged the two court officials with usurpation of judicial functions, for
allegedly “maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake, baseless and
unconstitutional ‘Resolution’ and ‘Entry of Judgment’ in G.R. No. 82273.”
 However, this is not the first time that Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against
officials of the Court.
 In several letter complaints, he repeatedly claimed that he “suffered injustices”
because of the disposition of the four cases he separately appealed to this Court
which were resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly in violation of Sec 14, Art VIII of
the Constitution, among others.
 His invariable complaint is that the resolutions xxx do not bear the signatures of the
Justices who participated in the deliberations and resolutions xxx.
 He likewise complains that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and
that they did not state the facts and the law on which they were based and were
signed only by the Clerks of Court.
Issue Does the issuance of the minute resolution violate Art VIII, Sec 14 of the

39
 Constitution?
Ruling In this particular case, Judge Rafael R. Ybañez, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 18, is hereby ORDERED to QUASH the
summons issued and to DISMISS Civil Case No. CEB-8679. He is further
DIRECTED not to issue summons or otherwise entertain cases of similar
nature which may in the future be filed in the SC
Doctrine No. The Court is not “duty bound [by virtue of Art VIII, Sec 14]” to render signed
Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or
Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its
evaluation. This is the only way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it
and, accordingly, discharge its constitutional functions.¹

In the case at bar, the subject minute resolution is a 4-page resolution which
more than adequately complies with the constitutional requirements governing
resolutions refusing to give due course to petitions for review. The petition and
its incidents were discussed and deliberated upon by the Justices of the 3rd
Division.

Prudential Bank v. Castro

Parties PRUDENTIAL BANK complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO and ATTY. BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondents.
Brief Case
Facts  An administrative complaint was filed against respondent Atty. Grecia, and
a Decision to disbar him was subsequently rendered.
 He moved to reconsider but was denied in a Minute Resolution “for lack of
merit, the issues raised therein having been previously duly considered and
passed upon.”
 Grecia now prays that the Decision and the Resolution of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration be set aside.
 He challenges the Decision as violative of Art VIII, Sec 13 of the
Constitution due to lack of certification by the Chief Justice that the
conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to a member for writing of the opinion of the Court.
 He also avers that the Minute Resolution disregarded the constitutional
mandate in Art VIII, Sec 14.
Issue Did the denial of the motion for reconsideration by minute resolution violate Art
VIII, Sec 14 of the Constitution?
Ruling
Doctrine No. The Constitutional mandate that “no xxx motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be xxx denied without stating the legal basis
therefor” is inapplicable in administrative cases. And even if it were applicable,
said Resolution stated the legal basis for the denial, and therefore adhered
faithfully to the Constitutional requirement. “Lack of merit” which was one of the
grounds for denial, is a legal basis.

Dismissed due to lack of merit: It usually means that the charges that were
made, or the charge that was brought, is not substantiated/supported by the
evidence presented."

Buscayno v. Enrile, 102 SCRA 7

Parties IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS OF: BERNABE BUSCAYNO, Petitioner, vs. HON. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, Secretary of National Defense

FERNANDO, C. J.
Brief Case

40
 Facts  allegation that respondent Military Commission "lost on October 17, 1976,
the judicial power vested in it by the respondent Secretary, now Minister, of
the National Defense 2 to conduct the trial to persons charged with the
commission of crimes defined by the penal statutes of the land, when, on
said date, the Filipino people terminated the authoritarian regime, or military
dictatorship established by the Commander-in- Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, when they ratified the amendments to the Constitution"

Petitioner was arrested in Barrio Sto. Rosario, Mexico, Pampanga, as ranking
leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines and another for murder, both
pending with respondent Military Commission

Prior to his arrest, his trial before respondent Military Commission had started;
it continued thereafter after he was duly arraigned.

Then, on October 25, 1977, this petition was filed

Issue WON military commission has jurisdiction over the case
Ruling the petition is dismissed for lack of merit
Doctrine Court upheld that there is no violation of the constitution. Civilian supremacy is
not violated, also with the right of the accused to due process.
Court said that accussed may still be tried before the civil courts
notwithstanding the military commission.

 Ruiz v. Comelec, G.R. No. 105324, March 11, 1993

Parties
Brief Case
Facts 
Issue
Ruling
Doctrine

13. Salaries of Judges

Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Parties
Brief Case
Facts  Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC,
NCR, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the
Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries.
 They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation
as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries,
contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary
envisioned in and by said Constitution."
Issue Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.
Ruling WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.
Doctrine No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income
tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and
inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the
deliberations of the1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that
the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-diminution´ of
salaries of judicial officers. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose
income has been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject
to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.

The payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within

41
 the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their
continuance in office.

14. Periods for Decision

New Frontier Mines v. NLRC, 129 SCRA 502
Parties EW FRONTIER MINES, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and CRISANTO H. BRIONES, Respondents.
Brief Case
Facts  New Frontier Mines, Inc. seeks the nullification of the Labor Arbiter’s
decision, declaring illegal the dismissal of Crisanto H. Briones, its
managerial employee, and ordering his reinstatement with backwages
 He performed multifarious duties. His controversial performance in this job
during the six-month period of June to December, 1976 led to his removal.
 The project manager charged him with having incurred a cash shortage of
P8,000, having illicit relations with a female housekeeper at the project site,
drinking liquor every night and possible misappropriation of funds
 Briones filed his complaint for illegal dismissal
 The Labor Arbiter decided the case he found that Briones was a managerial
employee and he ordered his reinstatement with backwages.
 However, SC said that the order for reinstatement is devoid of justification.
And as a matter of compassionate justice, Briones may be given three
months’ separation pay for 1974, 1975 and 1976 at the rate of P1,200 a
month.
 The motion of Briones that the instant petition be dismissed because of the
expiration of 18 months from May 20, 1981, when the case was submitted
for decision, is not well-taken.
 What was really meant in the SCourt’s resolution of May 20, 1981, issued
after the memoranda had been submitted, is that this case would be
scheduled for deliberation to find out whether the necessary vote could be
had.
Issue WON the SC neglected to render decision on the case filed
Ruling WHEREFORE, the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the resolution of
Commissioners Atienza and Quadra are reversed and set aside. The petitioner
is ordered to pay three months’ separation pay to Crisanto H. Briones.
Doctrine Daily, SC is swamped with a great number of (1) appealed civil and criminal
cases, (2) petitions for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
habeas corpus, (3) disbarment cases and (4) administrative matters and cases
of judiciary personnel, aside from the cases undecided before the Constitution
took effect.

Q. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

1. Impeachment

 Romulo v. Yñiguez, 141 SCRA 263

Parties
Brief case
Facts  Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the
Batasan, filed with the Batasan calling for the impeachment of
President Marcos, then referred to the committee on justice
 The Committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and
substance to warrant its further consideration and dismissed all the
charges contained in the complaint 
 Ramon V. Mitra prayed for the recall from the archives of
disapproved Resolution No. 644 but was disapproved by the Batasan.
 The disapproval of the resolution was voted by majority of the

42
 members, hence it is impossible to obtain a two-thirds vote of all
members of the Batasan to support a judgment of conviction. 
Issue Can the SC order the Batasan to conduct a trial on the charges
contained in said resolution and complaint for impeachment?
Held SC cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed
for by petitioners.

Impeachment power belongs to the Batasan

>the Court cannot by mandamus compel the Batasan to give due course
to the impeachment complaint.

Under the Constitution, Batasan may initiate impeachment by a vote of

at least one-fifth of all its members and that no official shall be
convicted without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
members thereof

judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition for lack of merit

 In re: Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771

Parties IN RE FIRST INDORSEMET FROM HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ
DATED 16 MARCH 1988 REQUESTING HONORABLE JUSTICE MARCELO
B. FERNAN TO COMMENT ON AN ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT.
Brief case Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez, "Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor"

Facts  1st Indorsement: 1st attachment addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to
charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice Marcelo
B. Fernan and asking Mr. Gonzalez "to do something about this.
 The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco addressed to
Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed with
the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135, which, in the opinion of Mr.
Cuenco, made improper any "intervention" by Mr. Raul Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco,
nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to file responsive pleading Supreme Court en
banc to comply with Petition Concerned Employees Supreme Court asking
Tanodbayan's intervention.
 the Court Resolved to dismiss the charges made by complainant Cuenco against
Mr.Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit
Issue WON an SC member may be subject for disbarment case while in service
Held Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution Sec. 2 The President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed from office
on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, other high crimes, or graft and corruption."

A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine
Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only
by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public
officer. 

Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before
the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of
removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.

A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional
route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he

43
 may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment
proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate
proceedings.

 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224

Parties Nixon, the Chief Judge of a Federal District Court, US
Brief case
Facts  After petitioner Nixon, the Chief Judge of a Federal District Court,
was convicted of federal crimes and sentenced to prison, the
House of Representatives adopted articles of impeachment
against him and presented them to the Senate.
 Senate voted to convict Nixon, and the presiding officer entered
judgment removing him from his judgeship. 
 He then commenced the present suit for a declaratory judgment
and reinstatement of his judicial salary and privileges, arguing
that, because Senate Rule XI prohibits the whole Senate from
taking part in the evidentiary hearings, it violates the first
sentence of the Constitution's Impeachment Trial Clause, Art. I, §
3, cl. 6, which provides that the "Senate shall have the sole Power
to try all Impeachments."
Issue
Held Nixon's claim that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial
Clause is nonjusticiable.

 Francisco v. House Speaker, G.R. No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003

Parties
Brief case
Facts 
Issue whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question
Held ARTICLE XI

Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members
of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases
of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which
shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority
vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such

44
 referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once

within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting
for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines
is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall
be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose
of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Requisites of Judicial Review

 Locus standi

 Ripeness

 Justiciability

 Lis Mota

initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another
may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution.

the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph
5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review,

(1) Impeachable Officers

(2) Grounds for Impeachment
(3) Procedure
(4) Judgment

2. The Sandiganbayan
 Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433
Parties
Brief case
Facts  Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the
Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan
 He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public

45
 and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all
public officials, in several cases. 
 upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and
jurisdictional grounds.
Issue
Held WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. 

 Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 324

Parties
Brief case
Facts  FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, father and son, were convicted
by the Sandiganbayan of thirteen (13) counts of estafa through falsification of public
documents.   They now seek a review of their conviction as they insist on their
1

innocence.
 Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque,
while his son, his co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the
Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Municipality of Santa Cruz,
and concurrently a member of its Sangguniang Bayan (SB) representing the Federation
of Kabataang Barangays
 Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against
Mayor Francisco Lecaroz and Lenlie Lecaroz arising from the refusal of the two
officials to let him assume the position of KB sectoral representative. After
preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen
(13) Informations for estafa through falsification of public documents against
petitioners
Issue WON the petitioner is guilty of violating anti-graft and corrupt practices
Held petitioners FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ are ACQUITTED

If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person

committing the act, no malice or criminal intent can be rightfully imputed
to him. Was criminal intent then demonstrated to justify petitioners’
conviction? It does not so appear in the case at bar. Ordinarily, evil intent
must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to exist. Actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or mistake as to particular facts,
honest and real, will exempt the doer from felonious responsibility. The
exception of course is neglect in the discharge of a duty or indifference
to consequences, which is equivalent to a criminal intent, for in this
instance, the element of malicious intent is supplied by the element of
negligence and imprudence. In the instant case, there are clear
manifestations of good faith and lack of criminal intent on the part of
petitioners.

3. The Ombudsman
(1) Composition
(2) Qualifications and Appointment
(3) Term
(4) Powers and Functions
(5) Salary
4. The Special Prosecutor

46
  Jardiel v. Comelec, 124 SCRA 650
Parties
Brief case
Facts  A Petition for Certiorari to annul the Resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), (Second Division)
 petitioner Cesar Jardiel, a Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) candidate
for Mayor seeking re-election, prevailed over private respondent
Benjamin Aves, a Nacionalista Party (NP) candidate but COMELEC
suspended the effects of the proclamation due to alleged rampant
flying voters as reported by COMSAT9 thru telegram
 COMSAT 9- Comelec Special Action Team for Region 9 was the
COMELEC Special Action Team. It was "the deputy and implementing
arm of the Commission" (Resolution No. 1430) "to be sent on orders
of the Chairman of the Commission to areas where the holding of
free, orderly and honest elections is placed in jeopardy due to
terrorism, violence, frauds, votebuying and other analogous causes."
It was given "blanket authority" 
Issue The primary basis of the challenged resolution, a mere telegram from
COMSAT 9
Held the Writ of Certiorari is denied, and the Resolutions, dated December
10, 1980 and October 27, 1981, of the Commission on Elections
annulling the elections held in the Municipality of Penaranda, Nueva
Ecija, and ordering the holding of a special election thereat for the
positions of Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan,
are hereby upheld.

 Orap v. Sandiganbayan, 139 SCRA 252

Parties
Brief case
Facts  Three informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special
Prosecutor Rodolfo B. Aquino, charging petitioner Vicente S. Orap Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Court of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep.
Act No. 3019
 petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations on the ground that the officer who
signed the same had no authority to do so and that, corollarily, the Sandiganbayan did
not acquire jurisdiction over the offenses charged.
 It is the petitioner's position that the Tanodbayan has no power to conduct preliminary
investigations, file informations and prosecute criminal cases against judges and their
appurtenant judicial staff and that only administrative acts of agencies of the
government, whether or not criminal in character, are within the powers of said official.
Issue has the Tanodbayan the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of a complaint
charging a municipal judge and his clerk of court with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act
No. 3019 and, upon a finding of prima facie case, proceed to file the corresponding
information before the Sandiganbayan and prosecute the same?
Held As petitioner is charged with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which
are within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as defined under Section 4 of P.D.
1606,  the said court validly acquired jurisdiction over the informations in question.
3

Sections 17 and 19 of P.D. 1607

The Chief Special Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor and the Special
Prosecutors shall have the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all
cases cognizable, by the Sandiganbayan: to file informations therefor and to direct and
control the prosecution of said cases therein Provided, however that the Tanodbayan may
upon recommendation of the Chief Special Prosecutor, designate any fiscal, state

47
 prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as Special Prosecutor to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan who shall not
receive any additional compensation except such allowances, per diems and travelling
expenses as the Tanodbayan may determine in accordance with existing laws, rules and
regulations.

 Office of the Tanodbayan was purposely created to "give effect to the constitutional right
of the people to petition the government for redress of grievances and to promote higher
standards of integrity and efficiency in the government service." 1

 Inting v. Tanodbayan, 97 SCRA 494

Parties
Brief case
Facts  Petition for certiorari  and prohibition with preliminary injunction or
restraining order asking this Court: (1) to restrain and/or enjoin
respondent Tanodbayan from further interfering with the proceedings
in Criminal Cases
 petitioner endorsed to the City Fiscal of Davao complaints for perjury
against respondent Angelina S. Salcedo on the ground that in the
latter's sworn Personal Data Sheets she knowingly and falsely
indicated
 After conducting a preliminary investigation, the City Fiscal of Davao,
through Special Counsel Rodrigo R. Duterte, found a prima
facie case for perjury and resolved to file three (3) separate counts
of perjury
 Respondent City Fiscal of Davao City, Tanodbayan Vicente G. Ericta
reversed the resolution of the former in I. S. Nos. 36 and 131 finding
a prima facie case for perjury on three counts against Angelina S.
Salcedo and dismissing the cases of perjury
 Petitioner assailed that respondent Tanodbayan was without
jurisdiction to review and nullify the resolutions of the City Fiscal of
Davao
Issue WON tanodbayan has jurisdiction over the case
Held Presidential Decree No. 1630 provides that "tanodbayan may file and
prosecute civil and administrative cases involving graft and pt practices
and such other offenses committed by public offices and employees,
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations  in
relation to their office."

the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. chanro

 Zaldivar v. Gonzales, 160 SCRA 843

Parties
Brief case
Facts  Zaldivar was the governor of Antique and was charged
before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
 Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating
the case.
 Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority
of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the
48
 1987 Constitution. 
 The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease
and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to
temporarily restrain from investigating and
filing informations against Zaldivar.
 Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he
filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. 
Issue Does the Tanodbayan (Special Prosecuter) have the authority
to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing
of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan?
Held No. Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as distinguished from the
incumbent Tanodbayan) is charged with the duty to:

Under the present Constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere

subordinate of the Tanodbayan Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute
cases only upon the latter's authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot
initiate the prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same if instructed to do
so by the Ombudsman.

ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting

investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise
exercising the powers and function of the Ombudsman.

 BIR v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 115103, April 11, 2002

Parties
Brief case
Facts  (OMBUDSMAN, for brevity) received information from an "informer-for-reward"
regarding allegedly anomalous grant of tax refunds to Distillera Limtuaco & Co., Inc.
(Limtuaco, for brevity) and La Tondeña Distilleries, Inc. 
  Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum to Atty. Millard Mansequiao of the Legal
Department of BIR ordering him to appear before the Ombudsman and to bring the
complete original case dockets of the refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondeña.
 Assistant Commissioner asked that it be excused from complying with the
subpoena duces tecum because (a) the Limtuaco case was pending investigation by
Graft Investigation Officer II Napoleon S. Baldrias; and (b) the investigation thereof
and that of La Tondeña was mooted when the Sandiganbayan ruled in People v.
Larin that "the legal issue was no longer in question since the BIR had ruled that
4 

the ad valorem taxes were erroneously paid and could therefore be the proper subject
of a claim for tax credit
 The Ombudsman denied the Motion to Vacate the Subpoena Duces Tecum
10 

 The BIR averred it had the exclusive authority whether to grant a tax credit and that the
jurisdiction to review the same was lodged with the Court of Tax Appeals and not with
the Ombudsman.
Issue 1. Whether or not the actions of the Ombudsman are valid.
Held  Yes. In the 1987 Constitution enjoins that the “Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate case, notify the complainants of the action
taken and the result thereof.”
No requirement of a pending action before the Ombudsman could wield its
investigative power.  The Ombudsman could resort to its investigative prerogative on
its own or upon a complaint filed in any form or manner.  Even when the complaint is
verbal or written, unsigned or unverified, the Ombudsman could, on its own, initiate
the investigation.

49
 But ombudsman violated due process when he didn’t require to submit a written
answer within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof.

The respondent Office of the Ombudsman is prohibited and ordered to desist from
proceeding with Case

 Laurel v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002

Parties
Brief case
Facts  Petitioner Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the head of the National
Centennial Commission
 He was subsequently appointed as the Chairman of ExpoCorp., and was one of the nine
(9) incorporators.
 A controversy erupted on the alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts to some
entities and the petitioner was implicated.
 By virtue of an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, the petitioner
was indicted for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA
3019). The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the
Office of the Ombudsman, which was denied. He further filed a motion for
reconsideration which was also denied, hence this petition for certiorari.
 The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and contended that he is not a
public officer since ExpoCorp is a private corporation.
Issue WON ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case
Held Yes, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he is a public
officer. The NCC is an office performing executive functions since one of its mandate is to
implement national policies. Moreover, the said office was established by virtue of an
executive order. It is clear that the NCC performs sovereign functions, hence it is a public
office. Since petitioner is chair of the NCC, he is therefore a public officer. The fact that the
NCC was characterized by EO 128 as an 'ad-hoc body' make it less of a public office.
Finally, the fact that the petitioner did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of
no consequence since such is merely an incidence and forms no part of the office.

the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued in the Court’s Resolution
dated September 24, 2001 is hereby LIFTED.

5. Ill-gotten Wealth
6. Loans
7. Assets and Liabilities
8. Change of Citizenship

R. AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION

1. Kinds of Constitution
2. Permanence of the Constitution
3. Amendment and Revision
4. Procedure
(1) Proposal
 Imbong v. Comelec, 35 SCRA 28
Parties Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers and
interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention
Brief case
Facts  Petitioners filed separate petitions for declaratory relief, impugning
the constitutionality of RA 6132, claiming that it prejudices their
rights as candidates.

50
  On March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly
pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2
which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to
propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two
delegates from each representative district who shall have the same
qualifications as those of Congressmen.
 On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly,
passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of
March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall be composed
of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative
districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants:
Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two
delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required
of members of the House of Representatives."
 Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as
well as the particular provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and
par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the
constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132
practically on the same grounds advanced by petitioner Gonzales.
Issue W/N the Congress has the authority to call for a constitutional
convention?
W/N it has the power to enact the implementing rules while acting as
legislative body?
Held  Yes. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call
a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session
assembled but voting separately.

Yes. Implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of
its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or
by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of
legislative action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any specific
provision of the constitution, they are valid.

the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs. 2, 4, 5,
and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional. 

A. Position of the Constitutional Convention

 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1
Parties
Brief case petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional
resolution designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
ordinance thereto.
Facts  The 3 petitioner senators and 8 representatives have been
proclaimed by a majority vote of the Comelec as having been elected
senators and representatives in the elections held
 The 3 senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the

51
 opening of the first session of Congress due to alleged irregularities
in their election.
 The 8 representatives since their election had not been allowed to
sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the
Speaker,
 Consequently, the 3 senators and 8 representatives did not take part
in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their
membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary ¾
vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the
Constitution.
 If the petitioners had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of
the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary ¾
vote in either House of Congress.
 Respondents argue that the Court has jurisdiction, relying on the
conclusiveness on the courts of the enrolled bill/resolution.
Issue WON the Court can take cognizance of the issue. No
WON the resolution was duly enacted by Congress. Yes
Held No. Political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that
power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provisions.

Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by Congress.

The petition is dismissed without costs.

(2) Ratification
 Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774
Parties
Brief case
Facts  The Congress passed 3 resolutions simultaneously.
 The first, proposing amendments to the Constitution so as to
increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a
maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a
maximum of 180.
 The second, calling a convention to propose amendments to said
Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective
delegates from each representative district, to be elected in the
general elections.
 In addition, the third, proposing that the same Constitution be
amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of
Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned
constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in
Congress.
 Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the
President, became Republic Act No. 4913 providing that the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned

52
 resolutions be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general
elections.
 The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the said law contending
that the Congress cannot simultaneously propose amendments to
the Constitution and call for the holding of a constitutional
convention.
Issue Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional? YES
WON Congress can simultaneously propose amendments to the
Constitution and call for the holding of a constitutional convention? YES
Held The constituent power or the power to amend or revise the Constitution,
is different from the law-making power of Congress. Congress can
directly propose amendments to the Constitution and at the same time
call for a Constitutional Convention to propose amendments.

Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but
as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as
such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, for
their authority does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the
very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution
itself.

the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs
therein prayed for denied

 Occeña v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 755

Parties Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of
the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers.
Brief case two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang
Pambansa Resolutions 1 proposing constitutional amendments
Facts  The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the
validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing
constitutional amendments goes further than merely assailing their
alleged constitutional infirmity.
 The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that
the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law.
 The three Resolutions were:
 1) Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a
limited area of land for residential purposes
 2) Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister
and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly; and
 3) Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the

53
 Commission on Elections.
Issue Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is a fundamental law.
Whether or not the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to
propose amendments.
Held Yes, the Interim BatasangPambansa has the power and privilege to propose amendments.
On January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a
pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate
that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a
factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved.
The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law.

The existence of this power is indubitable as the applicable provision in the 1976
Amendments is quite explicit.The Interim BatasangPambansa, sitting as a constituent body,
can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an
indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a
legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which
amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional
convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim
BatasangPambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. Resolution No.
1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in
a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the
vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution
No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to
2 with 1 abstentionThe three resolutions were approved by the InterimBatasangPambansa
sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981, thus making them valid.

the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit

 Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702

Parties
Brief case
Facts  After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held
on November 10, 1970, the convention held its inaugural session on
June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to
amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering the voting
age to 18. "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V
OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO
18."
 On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the
Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with
the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971.
 Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main
thrust being that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the necessary
implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no force and
effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite
co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that the
calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a
power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may

54
 not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in
question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately
from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by
the Constitution.
Issue 1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case? Yes
2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional? No
Held 1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the
issue of whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent
assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one and thus subject
to judicial review. The jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to
the Convention but they are both subject to the Constitution.

2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single

amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of Article XV of
the Constitution which states that all amendments must be submitted to
the people in a single election or plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be
provided sufficient time and ample basis to assess the amendment in
relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not separately but
together.

the petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of
1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide
for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the
respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared
null and void. 

 Almario v. Alba, 127 SCRA 69

Parties
Brief case
Facts  As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate
will go to the polls on January 27, 1984 to either approve or reject
amendments to the Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos. 104,
105, 110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa.
 The proposed amendments are embodied in four (4) separate
questions to be answered by simple YES or NO answers. Petitioners
herein seek to enjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of
Question Nos. 3 (“grant” as an additional mode of acquiring lands
belonging to the public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the
government of a land reform program and a socialreform program),
which cover Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the people for
ratification or rejection on the ground that there has been no fair and
proper submission following the doctrine laid down in Tolentino v.
COMELEC.
 The petitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite

55
 but only ask for more time for the people to study the meaning and
implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature and
effect of the proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the
electorate.
Issue Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on a later
date.
Held The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed amendments
are beyond the power of the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or
not “grant” of public land and “urban land reform” are unwise or
improvident or whether or not theproposed amendments are
unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide. The
questions are presented for their determination. Assuming that a
member or some members of this Court may find undesirable any
additional mode of disposing of public land or an urban land reform
program, the remedy is to vote “NO” in the plebiscite but not to
substitute his or their aversion to the proposed amendments by denying
to the millions of voters an opportunity to express their own likes or
dislikes.

the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

5. Judicial Review of Amendments

 Tañada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil. 1101

Parties
Brief case
Facts 
Issue
Held

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents

Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not
been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina
Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes.

 Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333

Parties
Brief case
Facts  President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991
calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues
of martial law
 President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No.
1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by
declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for

56
 the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"
 Petitoners filed for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and
effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential
Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite
scheduled on October 16, 1976.
 Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there
is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent
power to propose amendments to the new Constitution asserting that the
poweris expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16,
Article XVII of the Constitution.

Issue WON President of the Philippines may propose amendments to the present Constitution in
the absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been convened.
Held Justiciability of question raised.

ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed.
This decision is immediately executory.

 Santiago v. Comelec, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

Parties
Brief case
Facts 
Issue
Held

 PIRMA v. Comelec, G.R. No. 129745, Sept. 23, 1997

Parties
Brief case
Facts 
Issue
Held

S. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
1. Elections
2. Existing Laws and Treaties
3. Reserved Executive Powers
 Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines v. Sec. of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343
Parties
Brief case
Facts 
Issue
Held

57
 4. Court and Judges
5. Constitutional Commissions
6. Career Civil Service
7. Priority Measures
8. Sequestration
 Cojuangco v. Roxas, G.R. No. 91925, April 16, 1991
Parties Petitioners are stockholders of record of SMC 

Brief case
Facts  annual meeting of shareholders of SMC was held. Among the matters taken up was the
election of fifteen (15) members of the board of directors for the ensuing year.
Petitioners were among the twenty four (24) nominees to the board
 On the date of the annual meeting, there were 140,849,970 shares outstanding, of
which 133,224,130 shares, or 94.58%, were present at the meeting, either in person or
by proxy. Because of PCGG's claim that the shares of stock were under sequestration,
PCGG was allowed to represent and vote the shares of stocks of "corporate shares"
 Representatives of the corporate shares present at the meeting claimed that the shares
are not under sequestration; or that if they are under sequestration, the PCGG had no
right to vote the same.  They were overruled.
 The PCGG claimed it represented 85,756,279 shares at the meeting including the
corporate shares which corresponded to 1,286,744,185 votes which in turn were
distributed equally among the fifteen (15) candidates who were declared elected.
 Petitioners allege that the 27,211,770 shares or a total of 408,176,550 votes
representing the corporate shares, were illegally cast by PCGG and should be counted
in favor of petitioners 
Issue whether or not the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) may vote the
sequestered shares of stock of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and elect its members of the
board of directors.
Held PCGG cannot exercise acts of dominion over property sequestered. It may not vote
sequestered shares of stock or elect the members of the board of directors of the corporation
concerned because PCGG cannot own
PCGG Has Only Powers of Administration

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. Private
respondents Adolfo Azcuna, Edison Coseteng and Patricio Pineda are hereby DIRECTED
to vacate their respective offices as members of the Board of Directors of the SMC as soon
as this decision is implemented. Contemporaneously with the installation of the safeguards
above-required to enable the PCGG to perform its statutory role as conservator of the
sequestered shares of stock or assets, the respondent SMC is hereby ORDERED to allow
the petitioners to vote their shares in person or by proxy and to be voted for as members of
the Board of Directors of the SMC and otherwise to enjoy the rights and privileges of
shareholders; and the PCGG is hereby ENJOINED from voting the sequestered shares of
stock except as otherwise authorized in the safeguards above-required. The questioned
order of the Sandiganbayan dated 16 November 1989 is hereby SET ASIDE; however, the
implementation of this decision shall be carried out under the supervision and control of the
Sandiganbayan.

9. Salaries

Parties
Brief case
Facts 
Held

58
 M. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
1. Salaries
2. Disqualifications
3. Staggering of Terms
 Republic v. Imperial, 96 Phil. 770
Parties REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE DOMINGO
IMPERIAL and HONORABLE RODRIGO D. PEREZ, Respondents.
Brief case This case concerns the interpretation of the provision of the Constitution
regarding the tenure of office of the members of the Commission on
Elections who are appointed to succeed those first appointed in case
they resign, retire, or die before the expiration of their term of office. The
majority holds that the appointees can hold office only for the unexpired
term even if their appointments run for a full term of nine years.
Facts  The first vacancy in COMELEC occurred when Commissioner Enage
retired before the expiration of his term. His successor, respondent
Rodrigo Perez, was named for a full nine-year term. However, on the
principles laid, term should only be served for the unexpired term.
 The second vacancy, COMELEC Chairman Jose Lopez Vito, died
more than two years before the expiration of his full term.
Commissioner Vicente de Vera was appointed in his place. However,
he also died before the expiration of his remaining term.
 Respondent Honorable Domingo Imperial was appointed Chairman
to succeed Honorable Vicente de Vera
 The SG held that the 2 respondents term already expired
Issue WON their term is expired already
Held the petition for quo warranto is hereby dismissed without costs.

a successor should only be allowed to serve for the unexpired portion of

each regular term

Article X

4. Reappointment
 Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, 35 Phil. 126

 Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358

Parties SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR-COMELEC commissioner., Petitioner, vs.
HAYDEE B. YORAC, in her capacity as ACTING CHAIRPERSON of the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
Brief case The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the
Philippines of Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting
Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario
B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding
commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d' etat attempt.

59
 Facts  The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be
resolved by the members themselves
 the Solicitor General argues that designation made by the President
of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of
"administrative expediency," to prevent disruption of the functions of
the COMELEC.
Issue WON a member of the COMELEC chairman may be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity by the President
Held WHEREFORE, the designation by the President of the Philippines of
respondent Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the respondent is hereby
ordered to desist from serving as such.

The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular

chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be
exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.

Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the

Constitutional Commissions as "independent." Although essentially
executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the
Philippines
Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the
applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own
discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on
Certiorari by the SC as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A,
Section 7.

 Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101

Parties THE NACIONALISTA PARTY, Petitioner, v. FELIX ANGELO BAUTISTA,
Solicitor General of the Philippines, Respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
Brief case petitioner respectfully prays that after due hearing a writ of prohibition
issue commanding the respondent Solicitor General to desist forever
from acting as acting member of the Commission on Elections under the
designation rendered to him by President Quirino unless he is legally
appointed as regular member of the said Commission on Elections
Facts  while the respondent held, as he still holds, the office of Solicitor
General of the Philippines, the President designated him as acting
member of the Commission on Elections
 It is contended that such designation is invalid, illegal, and
unconstitutional, because there was no vacancy in the Commission
on Elections and because a member of the Commission cannot at
the same time hold any other office

60
  The respondent contends that his designation is lawful and valid, not
only because the power to appoint vested in the President includes
the power to designate, but also because it is expressly so provided
in Commonwealth Act No. 588; and that the offices held by him, one
permanent and the other temporary, are not incompatible.
Issue whether the designation of the respondent as Acting Member of the
Commission on Elections, in addition to his duties as Solicitor General,
pending the appointment of a permanent member is unconstitutional.
Held The petitioner is granted five days within which to amend its petition so
as to substitute the real parties in interest for it (the petitioner), or to show
that it is a juridical person entitled to institute these proceedings.

With these periods, it was the intention to have one position vacant every
three years, so that no President can appoint more than one
Commissioner, thereby preserving and safeguarding the independence
and impartiality of the Commission.

Exception is By death, resignation, retirement, or removal by

impeachment, a vacancy in the Commission is created. In these cases
the President may appoint a Commissioner for the unexpired term.

5. Other Perquisites
6. Proceedings
 Aratuc v. Comelec, 88 SCRA 251

 Cua v. Comelec, 156 SCRA 582

Parties JUNIE EVANGELISTA CUA v. COMELEC
Brief case
Facts  First Division of the COMELEC rendered a 2-1 decision favoring the
petitioner Cua but nevertheless suspended his proclamation as
winner in the lone congressional district of Quirino due to the lack of
the unanimous vote required by the procedural rules in COMELEC
Resolution
 Cua moved for his proclamation by the board of canvassers, which
reconvened and granted his motion.
 Cua took his oath the same day, but the next day Puzon filed with the
COMELEC an urgent motion to suspend Cua's proclamation
 COMELEC set the motion for hearing and three days later it issued a
restraining telegram enjoining Cua from assuming the office of
member of the House of Representatives.
 The petitioner then came to SC to enjoin the COMELEC from acting
on the said motion
Issue WON the vote of the first division is valid
Held ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the public respondent is
enjoined from further proceeding with the private respondent's motion

61
 dated November 10, 1987. The restraining order issued by the COMELEC
on November 14, 1987, enjoining petitioner from assuming office as
member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional
district of Quirino is LIFTED

Section 7 of the new Constitution, providing that "each Commission shall

decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought
before it."

Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1669 reads as follows:

"SEC. 5. Quorum; votes required; substitution. - Two members shall
constitute a quorum for the transaction of the official business of the
Division.

N. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

1. Composition and Qualifications
2. Scope of the Civil Service
 National Housing Corp. v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172

 National Service Corporation v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122

Parties NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO) AND ARTURO L. PEREZ,
petitioners,vs.
THE HONORABLE THIRD DIVISION, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MANILA AND
EUGENIA C. CREDO, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Brief case Consolidated special civil actions for certiorari seeking to review the
decision * of the Third Division, National Labor Relations Commission in
Case No. 11-4944-83 dated 28 November 1984 and its resolution dated
16 January 1985 denying motions for reconsideration of said decision.
Facts  Eugenia C. Credo was an employee of the National Service
Corporation (NASECO), a domestic corporation which provides
security guards as well as messengerial, janitorial and other similar
manpower services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its
agencies. She was first employed with NASECO as a lady guard on
18 July 1975. Through the years, she was promoted to Clerk Typist,
then Personnel Clerk until she became Chief of Property and Records
 Credo was administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, Manager of
Finance regarding certain entry procedures in the company's
Statement of Billings Adjustment
 Credo was called to meet Arturo L. Perez, then Acting General
Manager of NASECO, to explain her side before Perez and NASECO's
Committee on Personnel Affairs in connection with the
administrative charges filed against her.
 Credo filed a complaint before the NLRC against NASECO for placing

62
 her on forced leave, without due process.
 She was later terminated
 the labor arbiter rendered a decision: 1) dismissing Credo's
complaint, and 2) directing NASECO to pay Credo separation pay
equivalent to one half month's pay for every year of service.
 Both parties appealed to respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) which 1) directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to
her former position
 petitioners challenge as grave abuse of discretion the dispositive
portion of the 28 November 1984 decision which ordered Credo's
reinstatement with backwages
Issue
Held the challenged decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED with modifications. 1)
reinstate Eugenia C. Credo to her former position at the time of her
termination, or if such reinstatement is not possible, to place her in a
substantially equivalent position, with three (3) years backwages, from 1
December 1983, without qualification or deduction, and without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges appertaining thereto, and 2) pay
Eugenia C. Credo P5,000.00 for moral damages and P5,000.00 for
attorney's fees.

1987 Constitution provides that:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter.

As guidelines for employers in the exercise of their power to dismiss

employees for just causes, the law provides that:

Section 2. Notice of dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a

worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or
omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal.

Section 5. Answer and Hearing. — The worker may answer the

allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a
reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford
the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative, if he so desires.

Section 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify

a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the
reasons therefor. 17

3. Appointments
(1) Exceptions
63
  De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289
Parties EDUARDO DE LOS SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
GIL R. MALLARE, LUIS P. TORRES, in his capacity as City Mayor,
PANTALEON PIMENTEL, in his capacity as City Treasurer and RAFAEL
USON, in his capacity as City Auditor, respondents.
TUASON, J.:
Brief case This is an original action of quo warranto questioning the legality of the
appointment of respondent Gil R. Mallare to the office of city engineer
for the City of Baguio which the petitioner occupied and claims to be still
occupying.
Facts  Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of
Baguio, by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments
 Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the
President to the same position, after which, the Undersecretary of the
Department of Public Works and Communications directed Santos to
report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos
refused to vacate the office
 The petitioner rests his case on Article XII of the Constitution, section
4 of which reads: "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."
Issue legality of the petitioner's removal from the same office which would be
the effect of Mallare's appointment if the same be allowed to stand.
Held We therefore hold that the petitioner is entitled to remain in office as City
Engineer of Baguio with all the emoluments, rights and privileges
appurtenant thereto, until he resigns or is removed for cause, and that
respondent Mallare's appointment is ineffective in so far as it may
adversely affect those emoluments, rights and privileges.

section 22 of Commonwealth Act No. 177 which expressly provides for

the first time (following the mandate of the Constitution),that "no officer
or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause as provided by law."

 Salazar v. Mathay, 73 SCRA 275

 Besa v. PNB, 33 SCRA 330
 Cadiente v. Santos, 142 SCRA 280
Parties MEDARDO AG. CADIENTE, petitioner,
vs.
LUIS T. SANTOS, City Mayor of Davao City, MAXIMINO ASISTIDO, City
Treasurer of Davao City, FELIX N. PEPITO, City Auditor of Davao City, and
ATTY. VICTOR CLAPANO, respondents.
ALAMPAY, J.:
Brief case Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of First

64
 Instance of Davao City, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 7571, entitle Ag.
Cadierte vs. Mayor Luis T. Santos, et al." promulgated on August 23,
1972, which dismissed the petition for mandamus, quo warranto, with
preliminary injunction filed by herein petitioner.
Facts  petitioner Cadiente was appointed by then Mayor Elias B. Lopez as
City Legal Officer of Davao City. The appointment was duly attested
to and/or approved as "permanent" by the Civil Service Commission
 the new City Mayor Luis T. Santos, herein respondent, dispensed the
service of the petitioner on the ground that the position of City Legal
Officer was primarily confidential in nature
 Respondent City Mayor appointed respondent Atty. Victor Clapano as
City Legal Officer
 Petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission on January 7,
1982, which rendered its decision in its lst Indorsement dated March
2, 1972, therein holding that the termination, removal and/or
dismissal of petitioner is "without cause and without due process"
and that the position of City Legal Officer "is not included among
those positions enumerated in Sec. 5 of R.A. 2260 as belonging to
the non-competitive service."
 Despite this resolution public respondents still declined and refused
to recognize petitioner as the one entitled
 Petitioner thus filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao City,
Branch I, Civil Case No. 7571, for mandamus, quo warranto with
preliminary injunction against the herein respondents
Issue WON the position of city legal officer is confidential in nature
Held WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit

the position of a City Legal Officer is one requiring that utmost

confidence on the part of the mayor be extended to said officer

The positions of Municipal Attorney, Provincial Attorney and City Legal

Officer are by their very nature, primarily confidential, and therefore,
belong to the non-competetive service under paragraph 1, section 5,
Republic Act 2260, as amended, because the functions attached to the
offices require the highest trust and confidence of the appointing
authority on the appointee

The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon

loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as
confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves no
removal but an expiration of his term

4. Security of Tenure
 Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84
 Mendoza v. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108

65
 Parties FRANCISCO L. MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LOURDES R. QUISUMBING as Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Brief case the petitioner questions the validity of letter-order of the then Secretary
of Education, Lourdes R. Quisumbing which terminated his employment
as Schools Division Superintendent of Surigao City.
Facts  Petitioner Mendoza was the Schools Division Superintendent of
Surigao City who, was reappointed by respondent Quisumbing as
such with a "PERMANENT" status
 Executive Order No. 117 was issued by the President reorganizing
the DECS , which then separated him from service
 public respondents maintain that due process was observed since
the petitioners were evaluated in accordance with the criteria
Issue WON the removal of employees due to reorganization is constitutional
Held former Lourdes R. Quisumbing as Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, is ordered to restore the petitioner to his position as Schools
Division Superintendent of Surigao City

Abolition should be exercised in good faith, should not be for personal or

political reasons, and cannot be implemented in a manner contrary to
law. "Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a
constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of each case.'

5. Partisan Political Activity

 Santos v. Yatco, 106 Phil. 745
Parties Alejo Santos is Secretary of National Defense and head of the
Department of National Defense
Honorable Nicasio Yatco, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
Brief case
Facts  Judge Yatco issued an order disallowing the Secretary of National
Defense from conducting a house-to-house campaign on behalf of
Gov. Tomas Martin candidate of the Nacionalista Party in the
Province of Bulacan .
 Thus, the Secretary-petitioner filed a complaint for prohibition of the
order, enjoining the enforcement thereof, claiming that he is not
covered by the 1935 constitutional prohibition stating that, “No
officer or employee in the Civil Service shall engage, directly or
indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.
Issue whether or not Cabinet Members can engage in partisan political
activity.
Held Officers and employees in civil service are prohibited from taking part in
partisan political activities. However, the Secretary of National Defense
is not embraced within the terms “officers and employees in the civil

66
 service.”
Cabinet Members are not covered by the Constitutional prohibition
against electioneering or partisan political activity because they hold
political offices. Cabinet Members serve at the behest and pleasure of
the President. As such, their positions are essentially political.

Hence, the Court set aside the injunction on Santos, holding that Cabinet
Members, being alter egos of the President, were in fact chosen
principally for their political influences. Thus, they were expected to exert
for the purpose of ensuring support for the administration.

Sec. 2. 1987 Constitution (Article IX-B)

"(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or
indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign."

Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292)

"Sec. 55. Political Activity. - No officer or employee in the civil service
including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or
indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election
except to vote nor shall he use his official authority or influence to
coerce the political activity of any other person or body. Nothing herein
provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee from
expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from
mentioning the names of candidates for public office whom he supports:
Provided, That public officers and employees holding political offices
may take part in political and electoral activities but it shall be unlawful
for them to solicit contributions from their subordinates prohibited in
the Election Code."

government officials holding political offices

1. The President of the Philippines;
2. The Vice President of the Philippines;
3. The Executive Secretary/Department Secretaries and other Members
of the Cabinet;
4. All other elective officials at all levels; and
5. Those in the personal and confidential staff of the above officials."

 Cailles v. Bonifacio, 65 Phil. 328

6. Self-organization
 Social Security System Employees Association v. CA, 175 SCRA 686
Parties CORTES, J:

Brief case
Facts  the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and
baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking

67
 employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS for the reason that SSS failed to
act on the union's demands (payment of accrued overtime pay, night
differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into
regular and permanent employees, etc.)
 SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike.
The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work;
that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages;
and that the strike be declared illegal.
 The SSS contends that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service
laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike.
Issue whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the
right to strike.
Held no reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals, the
instant petition for review is hereby DENIED and the decision of the
appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is
AFFIRMED. Petitioners' "Petition/Application for Preliminary and
Mandatory Injunction" dated December 13,1988 is DENIED.

Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are
denominated as “government employees” and that the SSS is one such
government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service
and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum
prohibiting strikes.

the right to form an organization does not carry with it the right to strike.

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human

Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers
to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law"
[Art. XIII, Sec. 31].- doesn’t state if govt employees are allowed or not.
Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to
strike they are prohibited from doing so.

 Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, 200 SCRA 323

Parties MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION v.
THE HON. PERFECTO LAGUIO JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila

68
 NARVASA, J.:
Brief case
Facts  On September 17, 1990, around 800 public school teachers joined a
mass action. The mass action carried the purpose of dramatizing
and highlighting the teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure
of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and
again been brought to the latter's attention.
 These grievances included, among other things, clothing allowances,
13th month pay for the year 1989, employment of new teachers to
ease overload work, reimbursement of real property taxes, increase
in salary, and other equally important demands.
Issue Whether or not public school teachers can go on a strike to redress their
grievances.
Held WHEREFORE, both petitioners are DISMISSED

Employees in the civil service, such as public school teachers, may not
engage strikes, walkouts and temporary work stoppages like workers in
the private sector. Employment in the government is governed by law.
Government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their
employers. The terms and conditions of employment are effected
through statutes and administrative rules and regulations, not through
collective bargaining agreements.

7. Temporary Employees
 Delector v. Ogayan, 123 SCRA 774
Parties JORGE DELECTOR, PEDRO LADRENA, ALEJANDRO ALDAS, ALEJANDRO
AGUADO, and MIGUEL AGNER, Petitioners-Appellants, v. ANTONIO M.
OGAYAN, in his capacity as Mayor of Palo
Brief case This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte dismissing the petition for quo warranto which
prayed for the ouster of respondents as policemen of Palo, Leyte, and
for the petitioners' reinstatement to the same positions.
Facts  Petitioners are patrolmen who did not possess any civil service
eligibility
 Respondent municipal mayor dismissed them from the police force
and appointed on the same date the other respondents as special
agents of his office force of Palo
 Petitioners contend that they cannot be replaced by non-eligibles as
this is prohibited by Section 23, Article VI of the Civil Service Law and
thus, as provisional appointees, their services cannot be terminated
at will by the appointing officer, except upon certification of
appropriate eligibles by the Civil Service Commission or by a
subsequent appointment of eligibles to the position.
Issue WON non-eligibles may be replaced at the will of the appointing body

69
 Held WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit

Since petitioners did not possess any civil service eligibility, their
appointments are considered temporary. It is a settled rule that
temporary appointees may be terminated at any time even without
cause. They have no fixed tenure.

The Civil Service Commission cannot even legally approve their

appointments as provisional as this act would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of the discretion of the appointing power.

provisional appointee is one with a civil service eligibility but different

from that which is appropriate for the position to which he was
appointed.

8. Objectives of the Civil Service

9. Oath
10. Disqualifications
 Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317
Parties CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.
Brief case This is a petition seeking the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino
Facts  The questioned EO allows member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department to hold other govt.position in addition to his primary
position, but not more than two positions, and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor
 Petitioners maintain that it runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits public respondents, as
members of the Cabinet, along with the other public officials from
holding any other office or employment during their tenure.
Issue WON member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or
other appointive officials of the Executive Department may hold more
than one position in the government
Held subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are GRANTED.
Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is
accordingly set aside.

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other

70
 profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct
of their office.

the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in

Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section
3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1),
Article VIII.

ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an

"authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred
upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position

11. Standardization of Compensation

12. Double Compensation
 Quimzon v. Ozaeta, 98 Phil. 705

O. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

1. Composition and Qualifications
2. Powers and Functions
(1) Enforcement of Election Laws

 Lacson v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-16261, Dec. 28, 1951

Parties
Brief case
Facts 
Issue
Held

 Aguam v. Comelec, 23 SCRA 883

 Abcede v. Imperial, G.R. No. L-13001, March 18, 1959

 Sanchez v. Comelec, 114 SCRA 454

Parties AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Brief case candidate Augusto S. Sanchez praying that COMELEC will conduct a
recount of the votes cast senatorial elections to determine the true
number of votes to be credited to him and prayed further for a
restraining order directing the Comelec to withhold the proclamation of
the last four (4) winning candidates on the ground that votes intended
for him were declared as astray votes because of the sameness of his

71
 surname with that of disqualified candidate Gil Sanchez
Facts  Petition was opposed by the winning candidates Rasul and candidate
Juan Ponce Enrile
 the Comelec, by a vote of four to three, promulgated its decision
dismissing petitioner Sanchez' petition for recount
 petitioner Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
 respondent Comelec, by a vote of five to two, announced its second
decision reversing its earlier decision and granting Sanchez' petition
for recount
 Enrile filed with the SC his petition to compel to annul the Comelec
decision granting Sanchez' petition
Issue WON the petition for recount is the jurisdiction of COMELEC or SET
Held decision of respondent Commission on Elections promulgated on July 30,
1987 granting Sanchez' petition for recount is hereby SET ASIDE. The
respondent Comelec is hereby ordered to proclaim petitioner Juan Ponce
Enrile as a duly elected senator

Senate Electoral Tribunal as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualification of the [Senate's] members." (Art. VI,
Sec. 17, Constitution)

the Court rules that Sanchez' petition for recount and/or re-appreciation
of the ballots cast in the senatorial elections does not present a proper
issue for a summary pre-proclamation controversy.

errors in the appreciation of ballots by the board of inspectors are proper

subject for election protest and not for recount or reappreciation of the
ballots.

In the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns
canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects (sec. 234), appear
to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (sec.
235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any
candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election (sec.
236), which are the only instances where a pre-proclamation recount
maybe resorted to, granted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot
box and its contents

 Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272

Parties PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., for and in behalf of 139 members,
represented by its President, Amado P. Macasaet and its Executive
Director Ermin F. Garcia, Jr., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

72
 FELICIANO, J.:
Brief case The Philippine Press Institute a non-stock, non-profit organization of
newspaper and magazine publishers assailed the constitutional validity
of Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent COMELEC
Facts  Resolution to procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2)
page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every
province or city for use as "Comelec Space"
 "Comelec Space" shall also be used by the Commission for
dissemination of vital election information.
 "Comelec Space" shall also be available to all candidates
 PPI averred that it is unconstitutional and void on the ground that it
violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the
government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation, and is violative of
the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and
of expression
 Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Comelec from
enforcing and implementing Section 2 of the Resolution
Issue Whether the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain?
Held letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and
void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT.

The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public
use are the necessity for the taking and the legal authority to effect the
taking.
Comelec has not been granted the power of eminent domain either by
the Constitution or by the legislative authority

The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by
the Constitution, but not without payment of «just compensation»
(Article III, Section 9).

Article IX, Section 4

supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchise or permits for the
operation of — media of communication or information — [for the purpose of ensuring]
equal opportunity, time and space, and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefore, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection
with the objective of holding free, orderly honest, peaceful and credible elections

 De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760

(2) Decision of Election Contests

 Javier v. Comelec, 144 SCRA 194

Parties EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.

73
 THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR,
respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Brief case
Facts  The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique
for the Batasang Pambansa elections
 the eve of the elections several followers of the petitioner were
ambushed and killed allegedly by the respondent’s men
 the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the
canvass of the election returns.
 His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was
proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body
 The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the
proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by
the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution
Issue Was the Second Division of the COMELEC authorized to promulgate its
decision proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?
Held this case was rendered moot and academic due to dissolution of the
Batasang Pambansa. This petition would have been granted and the
decision of the COMELEC, set aside as violative of the Constitution.

Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.

Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:

(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all
member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.

Section 3 provides:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may
be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by
law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission
for decision.

 Flores v. Comelec, 184 SCRA 484

Parties ROQUE FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , NOBELITO RAPISORA, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Brief Case
Facts  Petitioner Roque Flores was proclaimed as punong barangay in Barangay Poblacion,
Tayum, Abra
 However, his election was protested by Nobelito Rapisora, herein private respondent, who
placed second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner
 Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong
barangay
 The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, contending that the ballot in question
which only indicated “Flores” should be declared stray votes and should not be
divided equally to the other candidate who has the same surname.
 Petitioner further stated that in accordance with the Omnibus Election Code, the 4
questioned votes should be counted in his favor by virtue of the equity of

74
 incumbent rule, which states, in the event that there would be 2 or more candidates
having the same surname, if the ballot only states such surname, the vote would be
entitled to the incumbent.
 The petitioner then went to the Commission on Elections, but his appeal was
dismissed on the ground that the public respondent had no power to review the
decision of the regional trial court.
 The Commission on Elections was obviously of the opinion that it could not
entertain the petitioner's appeal because of the provision in Rep. Act No. 6679 that
the decision of the regional trial court in a protest appealed to it from the municipal
trial court in barangay... elections "on questions of fact shall be final and non-
appealable."... punong barangay is an essentially executive officer
Issue Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay
election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
COMELEC
Ruling WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides
that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be
appealed to the RTC, must be declared unconstitutional.
Doctrine Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their
decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the decision
rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should have been appealed directly
to the COMELEC and not to the RTC.
Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the Commission on
Elections shall:
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials
decided... by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

(3) Decision of Administrative Questions

 Guevara v. Comelec, 104 Phil. 269
Parties JOSE L. GUEVARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Brief case Petitioner was ordered by the Commissioner on Elections to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt for having published in the
Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 an article entitled "Ballot Boxes
Contract Hit", and which article likewise tended to degrade, bring into
disrepute, and undermine it’s exclusive constitutional function
Facts  The COMELEC awarded to (NASSCO), (ACME), and (ASIATIC) the
contracts to manufacture and supply the Commission ballot boxes
 the Commission cancelled the award to the ACME for failure of the
latter to sign the contract within the designated time and awarded
instead to ASIATIC
 Then followed a series of petitions filed by the ACME for the
reconsideration of the resolution of the Commission
 The article signed by petitioner was published in the June 2, 1957
issue of the Sunday Times, a newspaper of nation-wide circulation.

75
 Issue WON COMELEC has the jurisdiction to punish as contempt the
publication of the alleged contemptuous article
Held petition is granted. Respondent Commission is hereby enjoined from
proceeding with the case set forth in its resolution- COMELEC no juris
The controversy between several dealers, merely refers to a ministerial
duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity
in relation to the conduct of elections. In proceeding on this matter, it
only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial
function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish
for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently
judicial in nature.

COMELEC shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be
conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all
administrative questions, affecting elections, including the determination of the number and
location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election
officials" (Section 2, Article X).

(4) Deputization of Law-Enforcement Agencies

(5) Registration of Political Parties
(6) Improvement of Elections
3. Election Period
 Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30
4. Party System
5. Funds

6. Judicial Review
 Aratuc v. Comelec, 88 SCRA 251

 Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferre, 135 SCRA 25

Parties FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JAIME N. FERRER
CUEVAS, J.:
Brief case Appeal by certiorari from the Order issued by the respondent Judge of
the then Court of First Instance of Manila, DISMISSING Civil Case
entitled, "Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. COMELEC, et al.",
and his subsequent Order DENYING petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Facts  respondent (COMELEC) issued an INVITATION TO BID CALL No.
calling for the submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture
and delivery of 1 1,000 units of voting booths
 Among the bidders were the herein petitioner, Filipinos Engineering
and Machine Shop, (Filipinas for short)
 COMELEC rejected ACME’s bid because the product is not rust
resistant," and that, "it is also heavy
 Committee instead recommended that Filipinas be awarded
 However, because ACME has the lowest bid, the commission

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 awarded the contract to ACME subject to the condition that it shall
improve its sample
 Filipinas filed an Injunction suit with the then Court of First Instance
 public respondents filed a motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the
lower court has no jurisdiction over the nature of suit
 Filipinas' motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
 Hence, the instant appeal.
Issue Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
suit involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of
contract arising from its invitation to bid
Held Petition was dismissed

COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not

issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident
of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections,
and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order"
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in
character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said
order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to the SC. Any
question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil
action before the trial courts.

The decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the
Supreme Court. (Section 2, Article X, 1935 Philippine Constitution

 People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715

Parties PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUALBERTO P. DELGADO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, Toledo City
GANCAYCO, J.:
Brief case The authority of the (RTC) to review the actions of the (COMELEC) in the
investigation and prosecution of election offenses filed in said court is
the center of controversy of this petition.
Facts  COMELEC received a report-complaint from Atty. Lauron E. Quilatan,
Election Registrar of Toledo City, against private respondents for
alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC
directed Atty. Manuel Oyson, Jr., Provincial Election Supervisor of
Cebu, to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case.
 After conducting such preliminary investigation, Oyson submitted a
report recommending the filing of an information against each of the
private respondents
 The COMELEC en banc in minute resolution resolved to file the
information against the private respondents
 Private respondents, through counsels, then filed motions for
reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest on the

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 ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted.
 RTC ordered the COMELEC to conduct a reinvestigation of said
cases
 COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and
opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is
only the Supreme Court that may review the decisions, orders, rulings
and resolutions of the COMELEC.
Issue WON RTC has the power to review on certiorari, decisions, orders,
resolutions or instructions of the Commission on Elections
Held WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code

"The regional trial courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any
criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the
offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in
other criminal cases."

Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and

administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the
purpose of securing free, orderly and honest elections

Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution

Functions of the COMELEC may be classified in this manner —
(1) Enforcement of election laws;  5

(2) Decision of election contests;  6

(3) Decision of administrative questions; 7

(4) Deputizing of law enforcement agencies;  8

(5) Registration of political parties;   and9

(6) Improvement of elections.  10

As provided in Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution, unless otherwise provided by law,

any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

P. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

1. Composition and Qualifications

2. Powers and Functions

 Riel v. Wright, 49 Phil. 195

Parties MAGDALENO RIEL, Petitioner, vs. BEN F. WRIGHT, Insular Auditor of the
Philippine Islands, Respondent.
JOHNS, J.:
Brief case
Facts  the petitioner alleges that on September 1, 1925, he was duly
appointed a "temporary clerk" in the office of the Secretary, Philippine
Senate, with an agreed compensation of P40 per month, as shown by
the letter of appointment from the Secretary of the Senate
 from February 1 to 14, 1926, there is due and owing him P20 for and

78
 on account of his services as such clerk, for which amount a warrant
was issued to and in his favor
 but the said respondent unjustly refused and still refuses to approve
said warrant
 petitioner does not have any plain, speedy or adequate remedy, and
prays for a writ of mandamus against the Insular Auditor
commanding him to sign the warrant.
 Respondent alleges that SC has no jurisdiction over his official acts
or any authority to compel him to sign the warrant, and claimed and
asserted that his powers and duties as Insular Auditor were in legal
effect identical with those of the U. S. Comptroller, and he then cited
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States to the effect that
the court do not have any control over, and do not review, the
decisions of the Comptroller.
Issue WON the Insular auditor may deny the compensation of temp employee
Held the writ is denied and the petition dismissed

the services in question were rendered eighty-two days after the final
adjourment of the Legislature. Hence, if the words "several days after a
session" cannot legally be construed to cover and apply to the period in
question, the petitioner was not legally employed, and is not entitled to
the compensation in question. "supplementary force," the words cannot
be construed to mean or apply to a period of eighty-two days, "after a
session."

Section 18 of Act No. 2935

The appropriation for "supplementary force" shall be understood to be
available for the payment of officers appointed in accordance with
section one hundred of the Administrative Code; of employees rendering
service before, during, and several days after a session, and employees
within and outside of the Philippine Islands . . .

 Matute v. Hernandez, 66 Phil. 68

 Guevara v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 813

Parties GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, as the Auditor General of the
Philippines and ISMAEL MATHAY, as the Auditor of the Central Bank,
respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Brief case This is an original action for mandamus to compel respondents, Pedro
M. Gimenez, as Auditor General of the Philippines, and Ismael Mathay,
as Auditor of the Central Bank of the Philippines to approve and pass in
audit two (2) bills of petitioner Guillermo B. Guevara for professional

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 services rendered by him to said Bank.
Facts  Miguel Cuaderno, the then Governor of the Central Bank of the
Philippines asked petitioner herein, as member of the Philippine bar
and practising lawyer, to cooperate with the legal counsel of the
Central Bank in defending the same and its Monetary Board in Civil
Case action for certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and damages in
the amount of P574,000, filed against them by one R. Marino Corpus.
 Auditor General express however, the belief that it is "excessive and
may be allowed in audit". Hence, the present action for mandamus
filed on July 6, 1960, to compel respondent to approve payment of
petitioner's retainer fee and per diem
Issue WON Auditor General has the power to disapprove payments due to
excessiveness
Held WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and respondents herein are
hereby ordered to pass in audit and approve the payment of the amounts
claimed by petitioner herein

Under our Constitution, the authority of the Auditor General, in

connection with expenditures of the Government is limited to the
auditing of expenditures of funds or property pertaining to, or held in
trust by the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof
Such function is limited to a determination of whether there is a law appropriating funds for
a given purpose; whether a contract, made by the proper officer, has been entered into in
conformity with said appropriation law; whether the goods or services covered by said
contract have been delivered or rendered in pursuance of the provisions thereof, as attested
to by the proper officer; and whether payment therefor has been authorized by the officials
of the corresponding department or bureau. If these requirements have been fulfilled, it is
the ministerial duty of the Auditor General to approve and pass in audit the voucher and
treasury warrant for said payment. He has no discretion or authority to disapprove said
payment upon the ground that the aforementioned contract was unwise or that the amount
stipulated thereon is unreasonable, "to bring to the attention of the proper administrative
officer expenditures of funds or Property which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary,
excessive or extravagant".

 Pacete v. Acting Chairman of the COA, 185 SCRA 1

Parties ELIAS V. PACETE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
THE HONORABLE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, MIGUEL
PEÑALOSA, JR., in his capacity as City Auditor and in his personal
capacity; and THE CITY TREASURER, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Brief case
Facts  petitioner Elias V. Pacete was appointed by the then Mayor Antonio
C. Acharon of General Santos City as City Attorney
 Mayor Acharon was charged with murder in the Court of First
Instance of General Santos City and was detained without bail.

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  Mayor Acharon ran for and was reelected as City Mayor of General
Santos City pending the criminal case against him and even while he
was in jail.
 Mayor Acharon issued Administrative Order No. 1 designating Vice
Mayor Erlindo R. Grafilo as Acting Mayor, but later revoked it
 Subsequently, Acharon filed two cases with the Supreme Court
challenging the authority of Acting Mayor Grafilo
 In the meantime, acting Mayor Erlindo Grafilo suspended petitioner
Elias V. Pacete as City Attorney for a period of ten (10) days
 notice was served on petitioner that he had been removed as the City
Attorney of General Santos City on the ground of loss of confidence.
 petitioner filed with the City Treasurer of General Santos City a claim
for the payment of his back salaries
 Petitioner's voucher was forwarded by respondent City Treasurer to
respondent City Auditor who in turn referred the same to the Auditor
General in an indorsement
 Commission on Audit, which by virtue of the 1973 Constitution took
over the powers and functions of the Auditor General, rendered a
decision disallowing petitioner's claim for backwages. Consequently,
respondent City Auditor Miguel Penalosa Jr. refused to pass in audit
petitioner's claim for backwages
Issue WON City auditor may refuse to pass in audit petitioner’s claim for
backwages pursuant to the lawful order of the Acting Commissioner of
COA
Held WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of
confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures;
and thus their cessation involves no removal 

Hence, the Court must rule that petitioner is not entitled to the backwages claimed.
Moreover, having determined the legality of petitioner's termination from service as City
Attorney, the Court must likewise hold that respondent City Auditor Miguel Peñalosa Jr.
cannot be held liable for damages since his refusal to pass in audit petitioner's claim for
backwages was pursuant to a lawful order made by the respondent Acting Commissioner
on Audit.

3. Prohibited Exemptions
4. Report

AMIGABLE Vs. CUENCA

GR. No. 26400, February 29, 1972
MAKALINTAL, J. :- private property exprop.w/o just compen

FACTS :
Victoria Amigable, the plaintiff-appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of Banilad Estate in Cebu City,
per Transfer Certificate Title No. (TCT) T-18060 (the certificate), issued to her by the Register of Deeds (RD) of Cebu
City on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right of interest in the property appears at
the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot,
with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
On February 6, 1959, Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and
Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways, and herein now referred to in this case as the

81
defendants/appellees, for the recovery of ownership and possession of the afore-cited subject property. She also
sought the payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral
damages, in the sum of P25,000, attorney’s fees in the sum of P5,000, and the cause of the suit.
The defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and interposed several
affirmative defenses against the plaintiff, pertinently alleging that those of the latter’s complaints, interalia, had no
legal basis as the government has not been given a consent to be sued; alleging further that, since the subject
property has been taken over by Cebu City government for public use, thus, plaintiff had no cause of action against
the defendants.
On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s cause of action
for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in question, on the ground that the government
cannot be sued without its consent, that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide
plaintiffs claim for the compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000, the same being money claim against the
government; and that the claim for moral damage had long prescribed, nor it did not have jurisdiction over said claim
because the government had not been given its consent to be sued. The complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure
a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently certified by the now Supreme
Court En Banc, there being no question of facts involved.
Thus, this appeal.
ISSUES :
Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case.
Whether or not the appellant could :
sustain ownership of the subject property;
institute her right of action to recover claims for damages and/or be entitled to a just compensation under the
constitutional provisions.
CITATIONS / HELD :
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, involving a claim for payment of the value of a portion of
land used for the widening of Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando,
held that where the government takes away property from a private land owner for public use without going through
the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. We there,
said :

… . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for public use were to be
respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of
governmental immunity suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the
government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by
it, and only upon payment of compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such
payment of the amount fixed, may it “have right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same
to the public use defined in the judgment. “If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not
be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what
the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just an important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to
legal norms on the part of officialdom, if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the
government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be
judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the
doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriated or invoked.

Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she
has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the
owner of the whole lot. As the registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of the
land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since the restoration
of possession of the said portion by the government is neither convenient nor it feasible this time because it is now
and could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the
value thereof at the time of taking.

As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land
from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition, the government
should pay for attorney’s fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.
WHEREFORE, the petition appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the
determination of compensation, including attorney’s fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No
pronouncements as to costs.

*Is there a prescriptive period for filing of action for payment of just compensation to the court?

Role of Judiciary:
ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION- candidate versus candidate

FACTS: The Electoral Commission was created pursuant to Art VI sec 4 of the 1935 Constitution (now sec 17) which
conferred to it the power to “be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly of tayabas.” The National Assembly (NA) passed a resolution confirming the
election of petitioner Angara as member of the NA on Dec 3, 1935.
Ynsua, a candidate vying for the Angara’s position, filed his election protest before the Electoral Commission on the
same date. Angara sought to prohibit the Electoral Commission from taking further cognizance of the Ynsua’s motion
Angara argues: the Constitution excludes from the Commission’s jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of
such election contests. Moreover, the Commission can regulate the proceedings of election protests only if the NA
has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings. Thus, According to Angara, the Supreme Court
therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

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ISSUE: WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative.

RULING: Yes, The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were,
conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the
government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. The court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as “the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.

Economy
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS (APCD)
vs.a
PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY(PCA)
G.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998
Mendoza J.

DOCTRINE:
Policy of Free Enterprise. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle the regulatory system that
has been set up by law. Any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the government.
FACTS:
7 coconut processing companies belonging to the APCD brought suit in the Regional Trial Court, Makati, to enjoin the
PCA from issuing permits to certain applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants.
Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative Order No. 02,
series of 1991, as the applicants were seeking permits to operate in areas considered "congested" under the
administrative order.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order and later a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the PCA from
processing and issuing licenses to the applicants.
While the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the Governing Board of the PCA issued Resolution No. 018-
93, providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product
processing industry. The PCA then proceeded to issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate
desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines
not to approve the resolution. Petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. The "certificates of
registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate. Hence this
petition.
ISSE:
Whether or not the Resolution No. 018-93 of the Philippine Coconut Authority in which it declares that it will no longer
require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a condition for engaging
in such business is valid.
HELD:
The Supreme Court declared PCA Resolution No. 018-93 null and void. The Court held that although the present
Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene
whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. However, any change in policy must be made by the
legislative department of the government. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the
power of an administrative agency to dismantle it.
The PCA in adopting the resolution abdicated its function of regulation and left the field to untrammeled competition
that is likely to resurrect the evils of cut-throat competition, underselling and overproduction which in 1982 required
the temporary closing of the field to new players in order to save the industry.
The PCA cannot rely on the memorandum of then President Aquino for authority to adopt the resolution in question.
As already stated, what President Aquino approved in 1988 was the establishment and operation of new DCN plants
subject to the guidelines to be drawn by the PCA. In the first place, she could not have intended to amend the several
laws already mentioned, which set up the regulatory system, by a mere memoranda to the PCA. In the second place,
even if that had been her intention, her act would be without effect considering that, when she issued the
memorandum in question on February 11, 1988, she was no longer vested with legislative authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution No. 018-93 and all certificates of registration issued
under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine
Coconut Authority to adopt or issue.

Dissenting Opinion:

Romero J.
PCA's authority to issue PCA-BR No. 018-93 is clearly provided in Section 3(a) of P.D. No. 232. Legislative
discretion, as to the substantive contents of a law, cannot be delegated. What may be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law is to be enforced, not what the law should be, a prerogative of the legislature which it can
neither abdicate nor surrender to the delegate. The principle is based on the separation and allocation of powers
among the three departments of government.
Thus, there are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power:
Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
Sufficient standard test - . there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of
the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running amiss.

We have accepted as sufficient standards "interest of law and order," "adequate and efficient instruction," "public
interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare," "simplicity, economy and efficiency,"
"standardization and regulation of medical education," and "fair and equitable employment practices."

83
 Consequently, the standard may be expressed or implied. In the former, the non delegation objection is easily met.
The standard though does not have to be spelled out but need only be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole. It may also be found in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged
legislation.
The PCA did not overstep the limits of its power in issuing the assailed resolution. We need not belabor the
point that one of the economic goals of our country is the increased productivity of goods and services
provided by the nation for the benefit of the people, since from a purely economic standpoint, the increase in
agricultural productivity is of fundamental importance.
The Constitution is cognizant of the realities of global interdependency, as it requires the pursuit of "a trade policy that
serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchanges on the basis of equality and
reciprocity."
In sum, the policy of deregulation must be determined by the circumstances prevailing in a certain situation. As we
have stressed in the past, this Court is only concerned with the question of authority, not the wisdom of the measure
involved which falls within the province of the Legislature.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition should be DISMISSED.

ARNAULT Vs. BALAGTAS

G.R. No. L-6749,  July 30, 1955
LABRADOR, J. :
FACTS :
Petitioner-appelle, Jean A. Arnault, was an attorney in fact of Hernest H. Burt, with respect to the negotiation of the
purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines on October 21, 1949 for a
total price paid of P5,000,000, the disputable deal. On February 27, 1950, a Special Committee has been created by
the Senate of the Philippines (the Senate) in order to conduct investigation to determine the validity of the purchase
transactions and whether the price paid was fair and just and such any other facts the Committee may deem proper
in the circumstance. Upon said investigation, it was revealed that a cash amounting to P440,000 was disposed to an
unknown person/recipient.  The Petition-appellee was asked to whom the portion of purchase price of P440,000 was
delivered.  Petitioner-appellee refused to answer such inquiry despite persistent efforts of the Committee to convince
him to do so. Thereafter, on May 15, 1950, it was resolved to order that the Petitioner-appellee be committed under
the custody of Sergeant at Arms of the Philippine Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison in Rizal until such
time he shall reveal to the Senate of to the Special Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000,
and to answers questions pertinent thereto.
The herein Petitioner-appellee, filed a petition for habeas corpus under G. R. No. L-3820, July 18,1950, praying for
his release from said confinement, inte-ralia, questioning the validity of such confinement so ordered by the Senate
Committee. He contended that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of
the person to whom he delivered the P440,000, that Legislature lacks authority to punish him for contempt beyond
the term of legislative session, and that the question of the Senate which he refused to answer is incriminating
question which the appellee is not bound to answer. All of these contentions were adversely passed by the Court, so
his petition for release was denied. 
In the month of December 1951, the petitioner-appellee executed his affidavit and presented the same to the Senate
Committee and there he revealed that the P440,000 was given to a certain Jess D. Santos . Nevertheless, still, he
was not able to satisfy nor convince the Senate Committee of his disclosure / revelation, and instead, has ordered
him to remain in prison for coercive imprisonment until he should have purged himself of the aforesaid contempt to
the satisfaction of the latter, per Resolution No. 114, November 8, 1952.
In the petitioner-appellee’s petition for habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance (CIF), inter-alia, he alleges : that
he purged himself of the contempt charges upon disclosing Jess D. Santos as the recipient the P440,000, and
submitted evidence and corroboration, thereof;   that the Senate is not justified in finding that the he did not tell the
truth when he mentioned Jess D. Santos as the person to whom he gave the P440,000, based on the evidence
submitted; and, that the legislative purpose or intention for which the Senate ordered the confinement may be
considered as having been accomplished, and, therefore, there is no reason for said petitioner-appellee’s continued
confinement.

The court a quo, however, arrogating unto itself the power to review such finding, held that the “petitioner has
satisfactorily shown that the person of Jess D.  Santos actually and physically existed in the human flesh, that the
opinion or conclusion of the Senate abused its discretion   making its conclusion and that under these circumstances
the only thing that could in justice be done to petitioner is to order his release and have his case endorsed to the
prosecution as the circumstances warrant.
Therefore, this appeal
ISSUES :
1. Whether or not the Senate Committee’s Resolution order of continued confinement and detention of the
herein petitioner-appellee is valid.

2. Whether or not the petitioner-appellee may purge himself of contempt by disclosing the person in
question in the person of Jess D. Santos.

3. Whether or not the decision of the court a quo can be further sustained.

CITATIONS /DOCTRINES /HELD /PRINCIPLES AND RULINGS: 

1. Yes. A study of the text of resolution readily shows that the Senate found that the petitioner-appellee did not
disclose, by mere giving of the name Jess D. Santos, the identity of the person to whom the sum of
P440,000 was delivered, and in addition thereto that the petitioner withheld said identity arrogantly and
contumaciously in continued affront of the Senate’s authority and dignity.
In the previous case of this same petitioner decided by this Court G. R. 38201, Arnault vs. Nazareno, et al.
(46 Off. Gaz. No. 7, 3100), it was admitted and we had ruled that the Senate has the Authority to commit a witness if

84
he refuses to answer a question pertinent to a legislative inquiry, to compel him to give the information, i.e., by
reason of its coercive power, not its punitive power. It is how contented by petitioner that if he committed
an offense of contempt or perjury against the legislative body, because he refused to reveal the identity of the
person in accordance with the demands of the Senate Committee, the legislature may not punish him, for the
punishment for his refusal should be sought through the ordinary processes of the law, i. e., that is by institution
of a criminal action in court of justice.
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witness is founded
upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative
power, or necessary to effectuate power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on
which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and
information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution
adopted the principle of separation of powers, making its branch supreme within the realm of its respective
authority, it must have intended each department’s authority to be full and complete, independently of the
other’s authority and power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of
refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because if it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with
affronts committed against its authority or dignity.  The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with
by the legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished from the
judicial process by which offenders are brought to the courts of justice for the meeting of punishment which the
criminal law imposes upon them.  The former falls exclusively within the legislative authority, the latter within the 
domain of courts; because the former is necessary concomitant of the legislative process, while the latter has to do
with enforcement and application of criminal law.
2. No. The claim that the petitioner has purged himself of contempt, because he says he has already answered the
original question which he had previously been required to answer. In order that the petitioner may be
considered as having purged himself of contempt, it is necessary that he should testified truthfully, disclosing the
real identity of the person subject to the inquiry. No person guilty of contempt may purge himself by another lie or
falsehood; this would be repetition of the offense.  It is true that he gave the name Jess D. Santos, as that of the
person to whom the delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made. The Senate Committee refused to believe and
justify, that is the real name of the person whose identity is being the subject of the inquiry.  The Senate,
therefore held that the act of petitioner continued the original contempt, or reiterated it. Furthermore, the act
further interpreted as affront to its dignity.  It may be well taken as insult to the intelligence of the honorable
members of the body that conducted the investigation. The act of defiance and contempt could not have been
clearer and more evident.  Certainly, the Senate resolution declaring the petitioner in contempt may not be
claimed as an exertion of an arbitrary law.  

3. No. Besides the last resolution on November 8, 1952, is also of coercive in nature, in the sense that the Senate
Committee still demands and requires the disclosure of the fact which petitioner had obstinately refused to
divulge. While the Philippine Senate has not given up that the petitioner may ultimately disclose the record, it is
improper for the courts to declare that the continued confinement is an abuse of the legislative power and
thereby interfere in the exercise of the legislative discretion.  
The judgement appealed from should be, as is it hereby is, reversed, and the petition for writ habeas corpus is
denied. The order of the court allowing the petitioner to give bail is declared null and void.

Bermoy vs. Philippine Normal College

G.R. No. L8670, May 18, 1956
Reyes, A.J

Facts: On July 6, 1954, twenty employees of the Philippine Normal College, filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against the said Philippine Normal College and/or Philippine Normal School for the recovery of
salary differentials and overtime pay. The Solicitor General filed an answer on behalf of the defendants denying the
latter" s liability. But before the case was tried on the merits, the court ordered it dismissed on the ground that neither
one of the defendants was a corporation or a juridical entity with capacity to be sued.

Issue: Whether or not Philippine Normal College as a government can be sued?

Held: R.A. 416 took effect on July 1949, converted Philippine Normal School to Philippine Normal College, thus
created a Board of Trustees to administer the affairs as a corporation under Section 13 of the amended Act 1455
(Corporate Law), with the power to sue and be sued in ay court.

Section 6 of Republic Act No. 416 authorizes the College to be sued, where it is provided that "all
process against the Board of Trustees shall be served on the President or secretary thereof,"

Wherefore, the order appealed from is revoked and the case remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings.

SEPARATION OF POWERS (Justiciable and Political Questions)

DANTE O. CASIBANG VS. HONORABLE NARCISO A. AQUINO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch XIV, and REMEGIO P. YU
G.R. No. L-38025, August 20, 1979
FACTS:
Respondent Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local
elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably filed a protest against the
election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan; on the grounds of (1) anomalies and

85
irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3)
rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of
the 1971 Election Code.
In the meantime or on September 1972, the incumbent President issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire
country under Martial Law; and two months thereafter, more or less, on November 1972, the 1971 Constitutional
Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was ratified by the
sovereign people of the Philippines on January 1973; and on March 31, 1973, this Court declared that “there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect” (Javellana vs. Executive
Secretary).
Thereafter or on October 1973, the petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had rested
his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost
jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — principally) Section
9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has intervened in the case.
Respondent Yu contended that “… the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been
superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, local governments should adhere to the parliamentary form of
government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI.” Furthermore, he stated that local elective
officials have no more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power
embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII.
ISSUE:
Is the issue in the electoral protest a political question?
HELD:
No. The case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been
interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be
indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term “political
question” connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
That “the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons
who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly
construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of
an elective office, albeit under protest or contest” and that “subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section
9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new
fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the
time-frame prescribed in the Election Code, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a
judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect’s right to the contested office.”‘ We rationalize that “the Constitutional
Convention could not have intended, as in fact it did not intend, to shield or protect those who had been unduly
elected. To hold that the right of the herein private respondents to the respective offices which they are now holding,
may no longer be subject to question, would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could have been an
election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by
the Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the ballot.”
Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color. That section
merely allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local government code and any change in the
existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose.” It is apparent at once that such power committed by the New Constitution to the National Assembly
will not be usurped or preempted by whatever ruling or judgment the respondent Judge will render in the electoral
protest case. Whoever will prevail in that contest will enjoy the indefinite term of the disputed office of mayor of
Rosales, Pangasinan in the existing set-up of local government in this country; subject always to whatever change or
modification the National Assembly will introduce when it will enact the local government code.

D. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

Ministerio v. City of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464- ministerio filed a complaint against the city of cebu due to exprop land
used for road widening w/o paymemnt of just compen

Facts:
Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dated April 13, 1966, sought the
payment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square meters, alleging that in 1927 the
National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it
for the widening of the
Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either
written or verbal.
There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its
possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession.
The RTC ruled in favor of the government and dismissed the case

Issue: Whether or not the city of cebu is immune from suit

Ruling: Accordingly, the lower court decision is reversed so that the court may proceed with the complaint and
determine the compensation to which petitioners are entitled.
According to Article III, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the Constitution: "Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation."
"Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers
are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the
State from suit.

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Rearing of the Youth

People v. Larin, G.R. No. 128777, October 7, 1998- acts of lasciviousness to minor

Facts: That on or about April 17, 1996, inside the ladies' shower room located at the Baker's Hall, UP Los Baños,
Laguna, ERNESTO LARIN, who is a public employee of the U.P. Los Baños, took advantage of his
authority,influence and moral ascendancy as trainor/swimming instructor of 14 y.o. minor XXX YYY, and through
moral compulsion, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, commit lascivious conduct on the person of
said minor.
When arraigned on July 17, 1996,[5] the appellant, with the assistance of Counsel de Parte Cayetano T. Santos,
entered a plea of not guilty and thereafter waived the pretrial proceedings.

Issues: Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of a violation of Sec. 5 (b) of R.A.
No. 7610

Ruling: The appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, but the award of moral damages is
reduced to P50,000. Reclusion perpetua was imposed
Section 5, Article III[16] of RA 7610, states:
"SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -- Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or
any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,syndicate or grup, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

Republic Act No. 7610 penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuses. It was enacted in consonance with
the policy of the State to "provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse."

DELA LLANA v COMELEC (DISMISSED)

G.R. No. L-47245 December 9, 1977
Petitioners Respondents
GUALBERTO J. DELA THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE
LLANA SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE BUDGET COMMISSIONER
Facts of the Case
Petitioner, submitted to the people a referendum which reads, "Do you vote that President Ferdinand E. Marcos
continue in office as incumbent President and be Prime Minister after the organization of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa as provided for in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments to the Constitution?,". as ordered by the
Presidential Decree No. 1229. The COMELEC was the one authorized to promulgate the rules and regulations for
the proper of the said decree.

If the people vote “Yes”, Amendment No. 3 will merely be reaffirmed and reinforced. If the people vote “No”, then
the incumbent President, as he announced, will resign. It shows that he will be heeding the will of the people.

The petitioner, filed a “Petition for Prohibtion or Declaratory Relief” against the respondents holding the said
referendum.

Issues
WON the Petition for Prohibtion or Declaratory Relief would prosper?

Rationale/Analysis/Legal Basis
No. The subject matter is a political and non-justiciable question, involving as it does the wisdom, no more
and no less, of the decision to call for a referendum. The power to determine when a referendum should be called
and what matter is important for referral to the people, resides in the political branch of the Government, the
exercise of which involves consideration of a multitude of factors political, social, economic, etc. - normally outside
the periphery of competence of the courts. 

The dismissal of the instant petition is immediately executory.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION VS. SAN DIEGO

GR. No. 89572,  December 21, 1989
CRUZ, J. :
FACTS :
Respondent,  Roberto C. San Diego “or San Diego”, is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of
Bachelor of Science in Zoology. In pursuit of a medical degree, he took the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
three (3) times and flunked it several times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner, Department of Education,
has denied his application on the basis of the so called “three-flunk-rule” or the MECS Order No. 12 s. 1985, rule
stating : (h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a
student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.  
San Diego, then filed an original petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, invoking
his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. In an amended petition, he challenged the
constitutionality of the above-cited MECS rule, including grounds on due process and equal protection. The now
respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong (or the respondent judge), has rendered a decision on July 4, 1989,

87
declaring the challenged order invalid and granting petition. Con-currently, in the said decision, it was held that San
Diego had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of police power.
So this petition.

ISSUES : 
1. Whether or not the MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 Rule (h), or the “three-flunk-rule’ order is unconstitutional.

2. Whether or not the respondent judge’s decision alleging the now respondent San Diego had been deprived of his
right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of police power, can be sustained.

3. Whether or not the challenged rule shall constitute violation of due process and equal protection.

RULINGS : 
1. No. The right to quality education invoked by the respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides
that “every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable
and equitable admission and academic requirements.”
2. No. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power.  It is the right and
indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to
whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
3. There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State.  Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly
exercise if (a) the interest of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have the right to be a doctor. This is
true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer link, the longer the bridge to one’s
ambition.  The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not
dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in the manner that will best
promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.
3. The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well taken.  A law does
not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of
the Constitution.
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is
REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered. 

PARENS PATRIAE
MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant (G.R. No. L-25843
July 25, 1974)

Facts: The plaintiff-appelle Melchora Cabanas is the mother of Millian Pilapin, the beneficiary of the insurance of her
deceased father, Francisco Pilapil. Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint against herein defendant-appellant Francisco
Pilapil who, being appointed by his brother to act as the trustee during the minority of Millian, was then receiving the
proceeds of the insurance. Melchora sought the delivery of the insurance proceeds since her daughter is living with
her.

Issue: Whether or not herein herein defendant-appellant Francisco Pilapil should deliver the proceeds of the
insurance to Melchora Cabanas?

Ruling: Relying to Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code, the lower court ruled in favor herein plaintiff-appellee. The
decision was affimed by the Supreme Court in view of Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code and “in adherence to the
concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae (parent of the people), is called upon
whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his/her best interest.”

LOCAL AUTONOMY
HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ,
Petitioners, v. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONY CALVENTO, Respondents [G.R. No. 129093.
August 30, 2001.]

On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San
Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated
February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which was issued on September 18, 1995.

For declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, respondent Calvento went
to the RTC of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93. Said trial court rendered a decision enjoining petitioners from
implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and its
subsequent Order 2 dated April 21, 1997 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Consequently, herein petitioners went to the supreme court via a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal
of the decision dated February 10, 1997 of RTC of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93.

Issue: Whether or not Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of
a mayor’s permit based thereon are valid?

88
Ruling: In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and
resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel v. Virac, ordinances should not
contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress.

The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the
new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that
policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced
degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy.

Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to
local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization." It
does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."

FORMS OF CONSENT
EPG Construction v. Secretary Vigilar (G.R. No. 131544, March 16, 2001)

Facts: In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Ministry
of Public Works and Highways, where the latter undertook to develop the housing site and construct thereon 145
housing units. Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding therefor covered only around 2/3 of each
housing unit. Nevertheless, petitioners completed each housing unit as verbally requested by then DPWH
Undersecretary Aber Canlas who assured that additional funds would be available and forthcoming to pay the
P5,918,315 for the additional construction not covered by the contract.

On 14 November 1988, petitioners sent a demand letter to the DPWH Secretary and submitted that their claim for
payment was favorably recommended by DPWH Assistant Secretary for Legal Services Dominador Madamba, who
recognized the existence of implied contracts covering the additional constructions.

After DPWH Assistant Secretary Madamba opined that payment of petitioners money claims should be based on
quantm meruit and should be forwarded to the Commission on Audit (COA) for its due consideration and approval,
the money claims were referred to COA which returned the same to the DPWH Auditor for auditorial action. On the
basis of the Inspection Report of the Auditors Technical Staff, the DPWH Auditor interposed no objection to the
payment of the money claims subject to whatever action the COA may adopt.

In an Indorsement dated 27 December 1995, the COA referred anew the money claims to the DPWH pursuant to
COA Circular 95-006

In a letter dated 26 August 1996, respondent DPWH Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject money claims
prompting herein petitioners to file before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226, a Petition for
Mandamus praying that herein respondent be ordered:
1) To pay petitioners the total of P5,819,316;
2) To pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages in the amount to be fixed by the Court and sum of P500,000.00
as attorneys fees.

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226, in Civil Case No. Q-96-29243, dismissing the Petition for
Mandamus filed by the petitioners. Seeking to reverse the dismissal by the lower court, the petitioners went to the
Supreme Court via Petition for Certiorari.
Issue (in view of the given topic for this case): Under the circumstances, may the herein respondent invoke state
immunity?

Ruling: Respondents argument is misplaced inasmuch as the Principle of State Immunity finds no application in the
case before us.

Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently
hide under the States cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled
exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued
under any circumstance.

This Court as the staunch guardian of the citizens’ rights and welfare cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its
face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the States
cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that petitioners contractors be duly
compensated based on quantum meruit for construction done on the public works housing project.

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

HOLY SEE v ROSARIO (GRANTED)
G.R. No. December 1, 1994
101949 -holy see wanted to dispose of a land donated by archdio of manila. Since it cannot use the
land due to squatters.
Petitioners Respondents
THE HOLY THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
SEE Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.-real estate company
Facts of the Case
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters, Municipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were

89
 sold to Ramon Licup and later assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent starbright sales ent..
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the
parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties
was the 2nd sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).

The private respondent filed a complain for annulment of the sale with tropicana, and demanding specific
performance  and damages against petitioner, represented by Papal Nuncio and three (3) other defendants: Msgr.
Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
Issues
WON The Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding double selling a lot to 2 private
entities

Rationale/Analysis/Legal Basis
Yes. Generally, there are two accepted concepts of sovereignty: a) classical or absolute theory, wherein a
sovereign cannot be made as respondent to courts of another sovereign without its consent and; b) restrictive
theory, which puts conditions on when to recognize immunity.

Under the restrictive theory, sovereign immunity is only recognized with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii
(or those in pursuant to governmental functions). If the act is private or acts jure gestionis (those that are for profit),
then immunity cannot be invoked.

Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for
commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal
Nuncio.

The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for
the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations.

In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative
jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the
territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on beh
alf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all
the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.

ICHONG v HERNANDEZ (DENIED)

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
Petitioners Respondents
LAO H. ICHONG JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City
Treasurer of Manila
Facts of the Case
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents’ corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said
Act is unconstitutional. Petitioner contends among others, that the act denies equal protection of the laws and
violates international and treaty obligations.

Issues
WON RA 1180 violates the equal protection laws

Rationale/Analysis/Legal Basis
No. The law is a valid exercise of police power and no treaty or international obligations are infringed.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality.

The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law
clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege.

It cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been
entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner

In re: Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno

A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA
June 29, 1992
Summary
Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (CA), wrote a letter dated Nov. 14, 1990 addressed
to the Supreme Court about the correction of his seniority ranking in the CA. It appears from the records that
petitioner was first appointed as associate justice of the CA on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of office on Nov. 29,
1982. The CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." He was then
appointed as appellate justice and later accepted an appointment to be a deputy minister of Justice in the Ministry of

90
Justice. In Edsa Revolution in Feb. 1986 brought about reorganization of the entire government including the
judiciary. A Screening Committee was created. When Pres. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, as an
exercise of her legislative power, the Screening Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11 from being the
assoc. justice of the NEW CA. However, the petitioner's ranking changed from no. 11, he now ranked as no. 26. He
alleges that the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the provisions of issued order of Pres. Aquino.
The court en banc ranted Justice Puno's request. A motion for consideration was later filed by Campos and
Javelliano who were affected by the change of ranking. They contend that the petitioner cannot claim such
reappointment because the court he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last
appointment.

The Supreme Court ruled that the present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it
was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino
in the people power. A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any
country or state by those who were previously subject to it as as sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the
government or political system, usually effected with violence. A government as a result of people's revolution is
considered de jure if it is already accepted by the family of nations or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany,
Japan, and others. In the new government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct exercise of the Filipino
power. Therefore, it is the present CA that would negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.

Facts:
Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (“CA”), wrote a letter in Nov. 1990 to the Supreme
Court seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the CA.

Records show that Petitioner was first appointed as Associate Justice of the CA on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of
office on Nov. 29, 1982.

In 1983, CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (“IAC”) pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 (“BP 129”), "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary. Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes."

Thereafter, Petitioner was appointed Appellate Justice in the First Special Cases Division of the IAC and on
November 1984, petitioner accepted an appointment to be ceased to be a member of the Judiciary.

EDSA Revolution as a result, brought the reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary. To effect
the reorganization of the IAC and other lower courts, (1) a Screening Committee was created. President Corazon C.
Aquino, exercising legislative powers by virtue of the revolution, (2) issued Executive Order No. 33 to govern the
reorganization of the Judiciary.

The Screening Committee recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the New CA and assigned
him the rank of number 11 in the roster of appellate court justices. When the appointments were signed by the
President, petitioner’s seniority ranking changed, from number 11 to number 26.

Petitioner alleged that change in his seniority ranking could only be attributed to inadvertence for, otherwise, it would
run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33. He pointed the case of Justice Oscar Victoriano,
former Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals who was transferred from his position as Justice of the CA to the
Ministry of Justice as Comm. of Land Registration and in 1986 was reappointed to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
states that his (Victoriano’s) stint in the Commission of Land Registration did not adversely affect his seniority ranking
in the Court of Appeals

The court en banc granted Justice Puno's request, seniority rank of Petitioner was moved from number 12 to number
5. A motion for consideration was later filed by Associate Justices Campos and Javellana who were affected by the
change of ranking. They contend that the petitioner cannot claim such reappointment because the court he had
previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.

Issues: Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that would negate any
claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to EO No. 33.

Held: The present CA is a new court not merely a continuation of the CA and IAC. The Court holds that the Court of
Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33 were phased out as part of the
legal system abolished by the revolution and that the Court of Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 was
an entirely new court with appointments thereto having no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished courts.

Motion for Reconsideration was GRANTED and seniority rankings of members of the Court of Appeals, including that
of the petitioner, at the time the appointments were made by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.

Rationale/Analysis/Legal Basis
It is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was created in the wake of the massive
reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the people power. A revolution has
been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were
previously subject to it as sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually
effected with violence. In the new government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct exercise of the
Filipino power. Therefore, it is the present CA that would negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority
ranking.

Opinions:

Feliciano J.
I agree with the conclusion reached in the majority opinion written by my learned brother, Padilla, J. In particular, I
agree that the Court of Appeals established by Executive Order No. 33 is a new court, and was not merely the old
Intermediate Appellate Court with a new label. If one examines the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129, known as "The

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Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," relating to the old Intermediate Appellate Court, it is quite clear that the
previously existing Court of Appeals was abolished and a new court, denominated the Intermediate Appellate Court,
was created.

President Aquino was quite free, legally speaking to appoint to the new Court of Appeals whoever in her judgment
was fit and proper for membership in that new court in an order of precedence that she was just then
establishing.chanrobles law library

In my submission the situation of a member of the new Court of Appeals accepting appointment to some other
department or branch of government, outside the Judiciary, and who later receives an appointment once again to that
same Court of Appeals. But Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno was not in such a situation. The last preceding appointment
to the Judiciary of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno was to the then Intermediate Appellate Court newly created by B.P.
Blg. 129. In 1984, he left that court to become Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Justice. His next appointment to the
Judiciary was not to the old Intermediate Appellate Court, which by that time had passed on to history. His
appointment dated 28 July 1986, was, in my view, as already noted, to the new Court of Appeals established by
Executive Order No. 33. Thus, the last sentence of Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 129 (before re-enactment by Executive
Order No. 33) afforded no basis for a claim to the same numerical precedence in the new Court of Appeals that he
would have been entitled to had the old Intermediate Appellate Court not gone out of existence. It is difficult for me to
understand how a claim to a particular position in an order of precedence can be made where the court itself, to
which the new appointment is made, is a new and distinct court.

I vote to grant the Motion for Reconsideration.

Bellosillo , J.
The letter-appointment of President Corazon C. Aquino addressed to then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee dated
July 31, 1986, in fact categorically specifies the order of seniority of her appointees.

The above-quoted letter of President Aquino also brings to focus the ranking of Justice Oscar R. Victoriano who was
junior to Justices Nocon and Coquia in the old Court, as reflected in the letter of Presiding Justice Gancayco.
However, in the letter of the President, Justice Victoriano was ranked No. 3, while Justices Nocon and Coquia were
ranked No. 4 and No. 5, respectively. Hence, it is not accurate to say that Justice Victoriano was reinstated to his
former rank in the old Court, but was even given a rank higher than Justices Nocon and Coquia. This "possible
oversight" was also brought to the attention of Malacañang but, like the case of Justice Puno, no correction was
made.

All these clearly support the view of Mr. Justice Padilla in his ponencia, as well as of Mr. Justice Feliciano in his
concurring opinion, that the present Court of Appeals is an entirely different court, distinct from the old Intermediate
Appellate Court or the former Court of Appeals, with a new members although some were drawn from the now
defunct Intermediate Appellate Court,

This brings me to the final point which bothers me still further. If We sustain the claim that the present Court of
Appeals is merely a continuation of the old Intermediate Appellate Court, or of the old Court of Appeals, then We may
be swarmed with requests not only for re-ranking but also for reinstatement of those who were not reappointed on
July 31, 1986, but against whom no charges have been filed. For then, should they not be allowed to enjoy their
security of tenure as civil servants under the Constitution?

Gutierrez J.
When Secretary Arroyo states that the President had nothing to do with the order or sequence of seniority, it means
that she just followed the recommendations of her own Screening Committee, which recommendations had already
been reviewed by the Supreme Court. She did not select any recommendees her own. She never deviated from the
recommendations because everybody recommended was appointed. The change from No. 11 to No. 26 could not
have been a deliberate act of the President as she had nothing to do with the order of seniority of the Justices she
was appointing. The change could only have been an inadvertence because it was violative not only of the law but
also of the recommendations of her Screening Committee.

Cruz J.
Sec. 3 of BP 129 laid down the original precedence rule applicable to members of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
This was embodied in Sec. 2 of EO 33 without change except as to the name of the court. The first provision was not
repealed. As Mr. Justice Feliciano points out, it was merely "re-enacted." virtua1aw library

I do not think the re-enacted rule was intended to operate prospectively only. I believe it continues to be available to
the former members of the Intermediate Appellate Court no less than to the members of the Court of Appeals.

It is a well-known canon of construction that apparently conflicting provisions should be harmonized whenever
possible. The ponencia would instead revoke Sec. 3. of BP 129 even though Sec. 2 of EO 33 has not repealed but in
fact re-enacted it. I would reconcile the two provisions and give effect to both.

Significantly, Sec. 8 of EO 33 provides that "the term Intermediate Appellate Court shall hereafter mean Court of
Appeals."

Application of the doctrine

JAVELLANA vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY- prohibition on proposed constitution proc.1102 as null and void.
50 SCRA 33

FACTS:

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On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a prohibition case to restrain respondents from implementing any of the
provisions of the proposed constitution not found in the present constitution. Javellana maintained that the
respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing proposed constitution and that the
president is without power to proclaim the ratification of the constitution. Petitioners pray for the nullification of
Proclamation 1102 (Citizens Assemblies) and any order, decree, and proclamation which are similar in their
objectives.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a political question, and therefore non-
justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly
conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.

RULING:
Whether a constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to an existing constitution is a judicial
question as it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has been amended in the
manner required by the constitution. The Constitution proposed by the 1971 Convention was not validly ratified in
accordance with Article XV section 1 of the 1935 Constitution which provides only one way for ratification (election or
plebiscite held in accordance with law and only with qualified voters). Due to the environmental and social conditions
in the Philippines (i.e. martial law), the Court cannot honestly say that the people acquiesced to the proposed
Constitution. The majority ruled to dismiss the cases as the effectivity of the proposed Constitution is the basic issue
posed by the cases which considerations other than judicial are relevant and unavoidable. The new constitution is in
force as there are not enough votes to say otherwise.

Incorporation clause
KURODA vs JALANDONI- Kuroda was charged with war crimes. He then challenged cosntitu of EO68 and argued
PH us not a signaitry of hague and held that military commi has no jurisdiction.
42 OG 4282

FACTS:
-Shigenori Kuroda, a Lieutenant General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines, was tried for war crimes
under a complaint
-Kuroda challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 68 and argued that the Philippines was not a
signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he was charged
of “crimes not based on law, national and international.”
-The appellant also held that the Military Commission created under EO 68 had no jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is unconstitutional; and

2. Whether or not Kuroda may be charged with violation of Hague Convention’s rules and regulations in Philippine
Courts.

RULING:
Executive Order 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office is valid and constitutional. The rules and regulation of
Hague Convention, form part of the law of the Philippines regardless of whether or not it was a signatory to the same.
Thus, Kuroda may be charged for violation of its rules and regulations.
-The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the of the nation.

DISSENT Opinions
PERFECTO, J

CONCEPT OF THE STATE

DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
vs. EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA

Facts:
o On 1863, an Earthquake took place in the Philippines that devastated
lot of civilians. A central relief board was appointed to distribute the
money contributed by donors. After a thorough investigation and
consideration, the relief board allotted $365,703.50 to the various
sufferers. $30,299.65 was distributed, leaving a balance of $365.403.85 for
distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of Monte de
Piedad, the Philippine Government directed its treasurer to turn over
Monte de Piedad $80,000 of relief fund in its installment of $20,000 each.
The Monte declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only
the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands has the right to order
the reimbursement. On account of various petitions of the persons, the
Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General, bring suit against the
Monte de Piedad for recovery of the $80,000 together with interest, for
the benefit of those persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was
entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its
equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest and the
costs of the cause. Monte de Piedad then contended that the present

93
Philippine Government cannot file suit on the ground that the obligation
of the former was wiped out when there was a change of sovereignty
and that the suit could be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries
themselves or by their heirs.
Issue:
o Whether or not the government of the Philippine Islands has capacity to
file a suit against Monte de Piedad for the recovery of the said amount.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
o Yes, the Philippine Government is competent to institute action against
Monte de Piedad in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae.
Under this Principle, the Philippine Government being the guardian of
the “rights of the people” can represent the legitimate claimants of the
beneficiary and therefore has the capacity to file a suit against Monte

de Piedad. This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme

power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or
in the legislature. The Philippine Government is not merely a nominal
party that’s why it can bring and prosecute this action by exercising its
sovereign powers. The Supreme Court then held the right of the
Government to file the case. In this case, Philippine Government is not a
mere nominal party because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action,
is exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out
a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the
United States.

D. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

FORMS OF CONSENT

G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, THE

PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF
OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu,
P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL

CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

Facts:
 On 1961, a decision was rendered in a Special Proceedings in favor of
P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and Int’l Const. Corp., confirming
the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40. On 1969, Villasor,
issued an Order declaring the decision final and executory, directing the
Sheriffs of Rizal Province, QC & Manila to execute such. The
corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. The Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal served notices of garnishment with several banks, especially on the
"monies due the AFP in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the
amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution. The funds deposited
with PVB & PNB are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for
the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and
civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP. They
allege that Judge Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction in granting the
issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the AFP,
hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment are void.
In the answer filed by respondents, the facts set forth were admitted with
the only qualification being that the total award was in the amount of
P2,372,331.40.4
Issue:
 Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor was null
and void.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
 Yes. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the
dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of
constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the

state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its
consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. The State may
not be sued without its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logic and
sound sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the
object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had
been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Thus in the
recent case of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, such a
well-settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee:
"The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's
action 'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage
of execution' and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment
is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is
based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of

94
public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State
cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated
by law.

E. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

SUPREMACY OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITY
G.R. No. L-69401

RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR ALIH, EDRIS MUKSAN,
MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD RAMSID ASALI, BANDING USMAN, ANGGANG
HADANI, WARMIKHAN HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI, ALLAN TAN, MUJAHIRIN
MARAJUKI, KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA ALIH, MERLA ALIH, and NURAISA
ALIH VDA DE FEROLINO vs. MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, COLONEL
ERNESTO CALUPIG, MAJOR ARNOLD BLANCO AND 1ST LIEUTENANT DARWIN

GUERRA

Facts:
 On 1984, more than 200 Philippine marines and defense forces raided
the compound occupied by the petitioners at Zamboanga City, in
search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. The situation
resulted in a number of casualties. 16 male occupants were arrested, to
be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their
objection. The military also inventoried and confiscated rifles, rifle
grenades, rounds of ammunition.
 Petitioners came to the Court to recover the articles seized from them,
to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to
challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as
violative of their right against self-incrimination. The Court, referred such
for hearing at RTC. Petitioners demand the return of the arms and
ammunition on the ground that they were taken without a search
warrant as required by the Bill of Rights. The respondents, while admitting
the absence of the required such warrant, sought to justify their act on
the ground that they were acting under superior orders. There was also
the suggestion that the measure was necessary because of the
aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by the
assassination of Mayor Climaco.
Issue:
 Whether or not the acts done by the respondents are violative of the Bill
of Rights and thus the evidence obtained therein inadmissible in court

Held:
 Yes. Superior’s order cannot countermand the Constitution. The fact that
the petitioners were suspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse the
constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. Its obvious flaw lies in the
conclusion that the petitioners were unquestionably guilty on the
strength alone of unsubstantiated reports that they were stockpiling
weapons. The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted
criminals or fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zona," they were
merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been
investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and
not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military. The respondents
simply by-passed civil courts which had the authority to determine
whether or not there was probable cause to search the petitioners’
premises. It follows that as the search of the petitioners’ premises was
violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and the ammunition taken

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY (Basis)

KHOSROW MINUCHER VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND ARTHUR SCALZO

G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003

FACTS:
In May 1986, violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher following
a “buy-bust operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by private respondent Arthur
Scalzo in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was later
acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. In fact, that
his arrest as a heroin trafficker had been well publicized throughout the world, in various newspapers, particularly in
Australia, America, Central Asia and in the Philippines. He was identified in the papers as an international drug
trafficker.
Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the
Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United

95
States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying
that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.
HELD:
Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked
with immunity from suit as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.
The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.
The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries
Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy
Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation” conducted at the
residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo
These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but they give enough indication that the
Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent
Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having
ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and
then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher.
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

Social Justice
Ondoy vs. Ignacio et. al. 97 SCRA 252 G.R. No. L-47178 May 16, 1980
[Estrella B. Ondoy, petitioner vs. Virgilio Ignacio, Proprietor M/B Lady Estrellita and/or Imperial Fishing
Enterprises and/or the Secretary of Labor and/or The Compensation Appeals and Review Staff, Department
of Labor, Respondents]-mother of dead son seeks for compensation (social justice)

Facts:
The petitioner, Estrella Ondoy, is a mother of one Jose Ondoy, an employee who worked under Virgilio Ignacio.
According to the chief engineer and oiler, Jose Andoy was aboard the ship of the respondent’s enterprise as part of
the workforce. He was invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the ship and thereafter was found dead due to
drowning. Thus the petitioner asked for compensation, however, the testimonies by the chief engineer were
dismissed by the hearing officer due to lack of merit. Afterwards, a motion for reconsideration was also filed before
the Secretary of Labor, but was denied again due to lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether or not the compensation for Jose’s death is constitutional. Whether or not Social Justice has a role in this
case.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition, granting Estrella Ondoy 6,000 pesos as compensation for Jose’s death, 300
pesos for burial fees and 600 pesos as attorney’s fee with the costs against respondent, Ignacio.
Ratio:
The principle of social justice applied in this case is a matter of protection, and not equality. The Supreme
Court recognized the right of petitioner to claim a compensation from the respondent, as Jose did drown
while “in the actual performance of his duty.” To fortify this ruling, the SC cited cases wherein, with accordance to
the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor, Workmen’s Compensation Act, which dealt with the
right of workers for compensation for personal injury, was applied. Among them is a case where there was no
direct testimony attesting that the deceased drowned while in the performance of his duty, however, the
compensation was sustained. Lastly from another case, the SC quoted that “as between a laborer, usually poor
and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to
demand from the latter strict compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection.

Application of the Doctrine

Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863-osmena speech accusing the president of bribery.
Facts:
Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of
bribery against the President.
A special committee, composed of Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen, was
created by virtue of House Resolution No. 59, to investigate the truth of the charges against the President.

Osmeña failed to produce evidence in support of his remarks about the President. He was, by Resolution No. 175,
suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly behaviour.
Osmeña submitted to the SC a verified petition for “declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction” against the members of the special committee.
He asked for annulment of Resolution No. 59 on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity.
Several respondents challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, and defended the power of
Congress to discipline its members with suspension.

Issue:
Whether or not Cong. Osmeña be held liable for his speech?

Decision:
the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows
best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.

96
For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly
behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon
a coordinate branch of the Government.

Doctrine of State immunity (Basis):

PEDRO SYQUIA ET. AL. VS. LOPEZ, ET. AL
FACTS: The plaintiffs named Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, all surnamed Syquia, are the undivided joint owners of
three apartment buildings situated in the City of Manila known as the North Syquia Apartments, South Syquia
Apartments and Michel Apartments. In 1945, they executed three lease contracts for lease of the apartments to USA,
with the term being until the war has ended and six months after, or unless terminated sooner by USA, as the
buildings were used for billeting and quartering officers of the US armed forces stationed in the Manila Area. George
Moore, a Commanding General of the US Army, and Erland Tillman, Chief of the Real Estate Division to the US Army
in Manila who was under the command of Moore, was said to be in control of the apartment buildings and had
authority in the name of USA to assign officers of the army to the buildings or order them to vacuate the same. When
Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945, the lease would be terminated six months after. The petitioners
approached the predecessors of Moore and Tillman and requested the buildings to be returned to them, as per
contract agreement. However, they were advised that the US Army wanted to continue their occupancy of the
buildings and refused to execute new leases but advised that they will vacate the premises before February 1, 1947,
not the original terms of the contract agreement. Syquia et. al sued before the Municipal Court of Manila with the
demand to get the properties as their agreement supposedly expired, and furthermore asked for increased rentals
until the premises were vacated. Lopez et.al were part of the armed forces of the US moved to dismiss the suit for
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court. The Municipal Court of Manila granted the motion to dismiss the suit. The
case elevated to the Court of First Instance of Manila, and they affirmed the ruling of the lower court.

ISSUE: WON the court has jurisdiction over the defendants and over the subject matter of the action.

RULING: No, the court had no jurisdiction over the defendants and over the subject matter of the action, because the
real party in interest was the U.S. Government and not the individual defendants named in the complaint. Under the
well settled rule of International Law, a foreign government like the United States Government cannot be sued in the
courts of another state without its consent; that it was clear from the allegations of the complaint that although the
United States of America has not been named therein as defendant, it is nevertheless the real defendant in this case,
as the parties named as defendants are officers of the United States Army and were occupying the buildings in
question as such and pursuant to orders received from that Government. 2. Whether or not this is a suit against the
United States of America. The present action must be considered as one against the U. S. Government. It is clear
that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for
unlawful detainer. The U. S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit, which is essentially against
her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without
the latter's consent, but it is of citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said government's
consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country.

PVTA v CIR Digest

Facts:
This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for
the general welfare.
In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and the petitioner’s
failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA No. 444.
Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued
an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising
governmental functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444.
PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it
is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.

Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.

YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has become obsolete.
The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction between
constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: “The growing
complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete.”

The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration.
There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner can
rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case. The objection of private respondents with its
overtones of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v.
Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than
proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor
is the objection raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.

A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the differentiation that exists.
If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It
need not have required private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief
problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that
such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be
sustained.

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Waiver of Immunity

Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470-petition for certiorari and prohibiton fron the failure of judge Purisima to apply
the non suability doctrine regarding the case of money claim for a breach of contract, the yellow ball as plaintiff
against rice and corn admin.

Facts:
The jurisdictional issues raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding arose from the failure of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the
Court of First Instance of Manila to apply the well-known and of-reiterated doctrine of the non-suability of a State,
including its offices and agencies, from suit without its consent. It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by
defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a
money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract,
the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.

Issue: WON Can an agreement between the Rice and Corn Administration and Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.
operate as a waiver of the national government from suit?

Decision: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and the resolution of October 4, 1972 denying the
motion to dismiss filed by the Rice and Corn Administration nullified and set aside and the petition for prohibition is
likewise granted restraining respondent Judge from acting on Civil Case No. 79082 pending in his sala except for the
purpose of ordering its dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued on February 8, 1973
by this Court is made permanent except for the above-mentioned purpose of definitely terminating this case. Costs
against Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.

NO. The consent to be sued, to be effective must come from the State thru a statute, not through any agreement
made by counsel for the Rice and Corn Administration. Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the
contract between the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn Administration which,
according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract within the parties and the suits that may thereafter
arise. The consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed
out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had
no binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority.

Case Title: Romualdez-Yap v Civil Service Commission- separated from service due to reorganization of PNB
G.R. No. 104226 promulgation date: April 30, 2008
Petitioner: Conchita Romualdez-Yap
Respondent: Civil Service Commission
Ponente: Judge Padilla

Facts:

This case involved a request by the petitioner, Conchita Romualdez-Yap, for a certiorari of resolution No. 92-201 of
the respondent Civil Service Commission, which upheld the petitioner’s separation from the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) as a result of the abolition of the Fund Transfer Department. With the petition before the Supreme Court, the
petitioner raised the (1) existence of bad faith in the reorganization of the Philippine National resulting in the
separation from the service of petitioner (2) erroneous application of Dario v Mison doctrine vis-à-vis PNB’s
reorganization and (3) Erroneous application of the one-year prescriptive period for quo warranto proceedings in
petitioner’s case.

Issues:
Whether or not the civil service commission abused its power

Held:
According to the Supreme Court, “premises considered, the assailed CSC resolution is AFFIRMED. The position is
DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of said CSC in rendering the questioned
resolution.”
- a reorganization of the Bank and a reduction in force are hereby authorized to achieve greater efficiency and
economy in operations, including the adoption of a new staffing pattern to suit the reduced operations envisioned.
-showed lack of interest, she only insisted on reinstatement (2) years after her alleged unjustified separation

Santiago Vs Republic

FACTS:
On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his counsel filed an action for revocation of a Deed of Donation
executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the Donee, in the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga City. Mr. Santiago alleged that the Bureau, contrary to the terms of donation, failed to
install lighting facilities and water system on the property and to build an office building and parking lot thereon which
should have been constructed and ready for occupancy on before December7, 1974. Because of the circumstances,
Mr. Santiago concluded that he was exempt from compliance with an explicit constitutional command, as invoked in
the Santos v Santos case, a 1952 decision which is similar. The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in favor
of the respondent on the ground that the state cannot be sued without its consent, and Santos v Santos case is
discernible. The Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza affirmed the dismissal on grounds of constitutional mandate.
Ildefonso Santiago filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.

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RATIO:
The Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional provision shows a waiver. Where there is consent, a suit may be
filed. Consent need not be expressed. It can be implied. In this case it must be emphasized, goes no further than a
rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being a Donee, is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged
breach of the conditions of such donation. The writ of Certiorari prayed is granted and the order of dismissal of
October 20, 1977 is nullified, set aside and declared to be without force and effect. The Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga City, Branch II, is hereby directed to proceed with this case, observing the procedure set forth in the
rules of court. No cost.

The Incorporation Clause

Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2003-extradition of mark jimenez

Facts:
- The United States Government, on June 17, 1999, through Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No.
0522, requested the Philippine Government for the extradition of Mark Jimenez, herein private respondent, to the
United States. The request was forwarded the following day by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Department of
Justice (DOJ). Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the DOJ, private respondent requested for copies
of the official extradition request and all pertinent documents and the holding in abeyance of the proceedings. When
his request was denied for being premature, private respondent resorted to an action for mandamus, certiorari and
prohibition. The trial court issued an order maintaining and enjoining the DOJ from conducting further proceedings,
hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings
constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty

Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period of time within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence. In this case, there exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the Philippine Government to comply
with the provisions of the treaty and its equally significant role of protection of its citizens of its right of due process.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local
state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a
choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. The United
States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective
jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. In
fact, neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the rights of due process from a prospective
extradite.

Suability vs. Liability:

TORIO VS. FONTANILLA
FACTS: On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed 2 resolutions: one for
management of the town fiesta celebration and the other for the creation of the Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive
Committee. The Executive Committee, in turn, organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage with Jose
Macaraeg as Chairman. The council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the
"zarzuela" and another for the cancionan. While the zarzuela was being held, the stage collapsed. Vicente Fontanilla
was pinned underneath and died in the afternoon of the following day. Fontanilla’s heirs filed a complaint for damages
with the CFI of Manila. The defendants were the municipality, the municipal council, and the municipal council
members. In its Answer, defendant municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it
performs sovereign functions, and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from
which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. The defendant councilors, in turn,
maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for
the management of the town fiesta celebration and as such, they are likewise not liable for damages as the
undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the
municipal ordinance. CFI held that the municipal council exercised due diligence in selecting the person to construct
the stage and dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the decision and held all defendants solidarily liable for
damages.

ISSUES:
1. WON the municipality liable for the death of Fontanilla.
2. WON the municipal councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta committee liable for the death of
Fontanilla.

RULING:
Yes, the SC held that under doctrine of respondent superior, municipality is liable for damages for the death of
Vicente Fontanilla because the accident was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees,
or agents. It was found that the stage was not strong enough and the municipality and/or its agents had the
necessary means within its command to prevent such collapse. But they failed take the necessary steps to maintain
the safety of the stage, particularly, in preventing non-participants or spectators from mounting and accumulating on
the stage. Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the fact that it was Jose Macaraeg who constructed
the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-
committee on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an
agent of the Municipality.

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No, councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta committee are absolved from the liability. The
celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. The legal consequence
thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with the municipal
council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a personality, separate and
distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action
for damages for tort or negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless there is a
showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. The records do not show that municipal councilors
directly participated in the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted spectators
to go up the platform.

USA VS GUINTO
182 SCRA 644

FACTS:
These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of State Immunity. In GR No. 76607, the
private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding
conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base which was won by a certain Dizon. The
respondents wanted to cancel the award to the bid winner because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an
area not included in the invitation to bid, and subsequently, to conduct a rebidding. In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove
filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal as cook in
the US Air Force Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station Baguio City. It had been ascertained after
investigation, from the testimony of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock
used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager suspended him and
thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining agreement between the
Center and its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. Genove’s
reaction was to file his complaint against the individual petitioners. In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was
employed as a barracks boy in Cano O’Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust
operation conducted by the individual petitioners who are officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air
Force Office of Special Investigators. On the basis of the sworn statements made by them, information for violation of
R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista in the RTC of Tarlac. Said
officers testified against him at his trial. Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint
against the individual petitioners claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed. In GR No. 80258, a
complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the herein petitioners (except the US), for injuries
sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants. There is a conflict of factual allegations here.
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit
them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and claim that
plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest. In a
motion to dismiss the complaint, the US and the individually named defendants argued that the suit was in effect a
suit against the US, which had not given its consent to be sued.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the action was in effect a suit against United States of America.
2. Whether or not the defendants were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them
in the performance of their official duties.
RULING:
1. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be
bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this
doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized
state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society,
the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states. While the doctrine
appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against
officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit
must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into
a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign
immunity from suit with its implied consent.
2. US vs GUINTO (GR No 76607) The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US
government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United States
Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These
establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers. This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead
any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below. 2. Petitioners states they have
acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States. They are sought to be held
answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must
satisfy the judgment.
The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants, except for the paucity of the record in the
case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is not before the
Court. The respondent court will have to receive that evidence first, so it can later determine on the basis thereof if
the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek. Accordingly, this case must also be remanded to the court below for
further proceedings.
US vs RODRIGO (GR No 79470) The restaurant services offered at the John Hay Station operated for profit as a
commercial and not a government activity. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of self immunity to justify the
dismissal of the damage suit filed by Genove. Not even the US government can claim such immunity because by
entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested
itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. Still, the court holds that the complaint against petitioners in the lower court
be dismissed. There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, the petitioner acted
quite properly in terminating the private respondent’s employment for his unbelievably nauseating act of polluting the
soup stock with urine.

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US vs CEBALLOS (GR No 80018) It was clear that the individually-named petitioners were acting in the exercise of
their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against the complainant.
For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts immutable to
their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. The conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the
special counsel of Clark Air Base was a submission of the US government to its jurisdiction is rejected. Express
waiver cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government but must be effected through a duly-enacted statute.
Neither does it come under the implied form of consent. Thus, the petition is granted and the civil case filed in the
lower court dismissed.
US vs ALARCON VERGARA (GR No. 80258) The contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of
what actually happened. The records were too meagre to indicate that the defendants were really discharging their
official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred. Only after the lower court shall
have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting will the court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine
of state immunity is applicable.

FUNDAMENTALS PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES (Republicanism)

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO VS. JUSTO LUKBAN- city of manila mayor deported 170 women of ill reputr to davao
against their will, and of which they became laborers. Families of the victims thenfiled for writ of habeas corpus before
the SC.
G.R. No. L-14639, March 25, 1919

FACTS:
-The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, in the city of
Manila.
-The women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police.
-The police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila,
Justo Lukban descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates and deported them from Manila to Davao.
-These 170 women had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they
wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation.
-The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by
Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo.
-The relatives and friends of the said victims filed a case for issuance of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the writ of habeas corpus should be granted.

HELD:
The supreme court awarded the writ of habeas corpus to the women deported thereat, that directed Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the
province of Davao, and Feliciano Yňigo, an haciendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein
named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty.
According to the Supreme Court, there is no law that justifies the action of the respondent in deporting the
women of ill refute to Davao. In relation to constitutional right to liberty and travel of the prostitutes, the SC
explained that: these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels
but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens.

APPLICATION 

G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988

DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners,
vs.HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Zambales, Olongapo City, ANTHONY M.
ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents.

Facts: 
1. Dale Sanders and A.S. Moreau, Jr. were the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) and the
commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base in Olongapo City, respectively. 

2. Rossi and Wyer, American citizens with permanent residence in the Philippines, were both employed as gameroom
attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA, the former having been hired in 1971 and the latter in
1969. 

3. Rossi and Wyer’s employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time, thus they
protested the conversion and instituted grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of
the U.S. Department of Defense. The hearing officer who conducted the proceedings recommended for the
reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages, with the report on the
hearing containing an observation that "Special Services management practices an autocratic form of supervision." 

4. Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report and asked for the rejection of the abovestated recommendation
on the following grounds: 

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 a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;"
 b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to
supervise;" and 
c) "even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, they placed the records in public
places where others not involved in the case could hear."

5. Rossi and Wyers filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a for damages against Sanders and Moreau,
claiming that the letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed Rossi and Wyers to ridicule and caused
them mental anguish and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and
proprietary rights.

6. Rossi and Wyers made it clear that Sanders and Moreau were being sued in their private or personal capacity.
However, in a motion to dismiss filed under a special appearance,  Sanders and Moreau argued that the acts
complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had
no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.

7. The motion filed by Sanders and Moreau was denied on the main ground that they had not presented any evidence
that their acts were official in nature and not personal torts, and the allegation in the complaint that had acted
maliciously and in bad faith.

8. The petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction was thereafter filed before the Court, on the
contention that the above-narrated acts of the respondent court were tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: 
The basic question here is whether the petitioners were acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts
for which the private respondents have sued them for damages.

Held: 
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Cruz, stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government
functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public
officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not
suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of
his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person
sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.

It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by
them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly
had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments,
discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a reply to a request
from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the private respondents. Moreover, even in
the absence of such request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer's criticism—in effect a direct attack
against him—-that Special Services was practicing "an autocratic form of supervision."

As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of
the private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced. Disregarding the
question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and
directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA. In fact, the letter dealt
with the financial and budgetary problems of the department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the
re-designation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it.

The Court GRANTED the petition. The challenged orders were SET ASIDE. The respondent court was directed to DISMISS the
case. The Temporary restraining Order was made PERMANENT. No costs.

Separation of Church and State

Aglipay vs. Ruiz
 
GR No. L-45459- director of post ordered stamps on commerating int’l eucharistic congress.He was alleged to have
vilolated the sep of church anfd state
Facts:
The Director of Post announced that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration of
City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church pursuant to
Act No. 4052 for the purpose of appropriating funds for the making of new postage stamps.
It was alleged that Ruiz is in direct violation of the Constitution by issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative
of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. That such act was violative of Art. VI, Sec. 23 (3) of the Philippines, to
wit:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or
support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.

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Issue:Is the production and selling of the International Eucharistic Congress commemorative stamps violation of the
separation of Church and State and Art. VI, Sec. 23 (3)?
Ruling:
No, we are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete
separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the
Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our
political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the
Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection,
examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there
has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new
designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.”
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose. What it gives is the discretionary powers to determine when the
issuance of special postage stamps would be advantageous to the government.

D. The Doctrine of State Immunity

Application (Maricar Duncan) 

Garcia v Chief of Staff [16 SCRA 120]

Facts:
The plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, an action to collect a sum of money against the
above defendants. He suffered injuries while undergoing a 10-month military training at Camp Floridablanca,
Pampanga. He filed a claim under Commonwealth Act 400 and in April 1957 with the Adjutant General’s Office which
later disallow his claim for disability benefit. After further demands of the plaintiff, the same Adjutant General’s Office
denied the claim, alleging that the Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by RA 610 which took effect
January 1, 1950. That by the reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff, he was deprived of his sight or vision
rendering him permanently disabled; and by the reason of unjustified refusal of defendants on the claim, plaintiff was
deprived of his disability pension from July 1948 totalling no less than P4,000 at the rate of P20/mo and suffered
moral damages and attorney’s fees the amount of P2,000. The Philippine Veterans Administration and the Chief of
Staff of AFP file separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint; that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before coming to court;
that the complaint states no cause of action; and that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. Acting
on the said Motion, the Court of First Instance, on March 2, 1962, rendered an order dismissing the complaint on the
ground that action has prescribed. Motion for reconsideration of the said order having been denied, the plaintiff has
interposed this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court is right in dismissing the complaint.
Held:
The SC uphold the order of dismissal for the simple reason that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, it being a money claim against the government. It was already held in the case of New Manila Lumber
vs. Republic in L-14248, 4/28/60, that a claim for the recovery of money against the government should be filed with
the Auditor General, in line with the principle that the State can not be sued without its consent.
Commonwealth Act 327 provides:
Section 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the
Auditor General shall act and decide the same within 60 days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays after their
presentation....
Section 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim,
may within 30 days from receipt of decision, take an appeal in writing to (c) the Supreme Court, if the appellant is a
private person or entity.

 The well established rule that no recourse to court can be had until all administrative remedies had been exhausted
and that actions against administrative officers should not be entertained if superior administrative officer could grant
relief is applicable to this case. The order dismissing the complaint is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

E.Fundamental Principles and State Policies- Republicanism

La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. Vs Ramos Natural Resources and Environmental Laws- phil mining
act is said to have violated the principle of sovereignty over the natural resources because of its IRR on FTAA.
Because they allowed a foreign company to have control over the explot of our natural resources in prejud of filipino
citizens.
G.R. No. 127882; January 27, 2004

FACTS:
-This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995), its implementing rules and regulations and the Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated
March 30, 1995 by the government with Western Mining Corporation(Philippines)
Inc. (WMCP).
-Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is antithetical to the principle
of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural
resources, to the
prejudice of the Filipino nation.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to
exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service contract that permits fully foreign
owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the unconstitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its implementing rules and
regulations – insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements as well as the subject Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement. Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor,
provided that the State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and
actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is exercised by the board of directors of a
private corporation, the performance of managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other functions may be
delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the board retains full residual control of the
business.

 F. Separation of Powers

Justiciable and Political Questions

Tañada vs. Cuenco, 100 Phil. 1101- tanada lose to NP in SET

Pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) was an election protest filed by members of the Citizens Party
(CP) who lost to members of the Nacionalista Party (NP). The Senate was at the time composed of 23 members of
the NP and one of the CP — petitioner Sen. Tañada. When the SET was being organized, Sen. Tañada, in behalf of
the CP, nominated himself alone. Sen. Primicias, a member of the NP, then nominated “Sens. Delgado and
respondent Cuenco “to complete the membership of the Tribunal”. three upon nomination of the party having the
largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. xxx.” Over the
objection of Sen. Tañada, Sens. Delgado and Cuenco were chosen to sit in the SET. Sen. Tañada now contests
them in Court. Respondents aver, among others, that the SC has no jurisdiction on the matter as the issue is a
political question and not judicial.

Issue(s): Is the issue a political question beyond the ambit of judicial injury?
Whether or not the appointment of Senator Primicias of Cuenca and Delgado is valid

Held:
No,the issue at bar is not a political question and maybe settled in courts for the Senate is not clothed with “full
discretionary authority” in the choice of members of the SET. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the
proceedings in connection therewith. We have not only jurisdiction, but also the duty to consider and determine the
principal issue raised by the parties herein.
On the issue on whether the election of Sens. Delgado and Cuenco is valid, the Court ruled in the negative. It was
held that the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution in prescribing the manner for organizing the
Electoral Tribunals is to prevent the majority party from ever controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the
structure thereof be founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties with the Justices of
the SC to insure greater political justice in the determination of election contests.

PARENS PATRIAE

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant (G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974)

Facts: The plaintiff-appelle Melchora Cabanas is the mother of Millian Pilapin, the beneficiary of the insurance of her deceased
father, Francisco Pilapil. Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint against herein defendant-appellant Francisco Pilapil who, being
appointed by his brother to act as the trustee during the minority of Millian, was then receiving the proceeds of the insurance.
Melchora sought the delivery of the insurance proceeds since her daughter is living with her.

Issue: Whether or not herein herein defendant-appellant Francisco Pilapil should deliver the proceeds of the insurance to
Melchora Cabanas?

Ruling: Relying to Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code, the lower court ruled in favor herein plaintiff-appellee. The decision
was affimed by the Supreme Court in view of Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code and “in adherence to the concept that the
judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae (parent of the people), is called upon whenever a pending suit of
litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his/her best interest.”

LOCAL AUTONOMY

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, Petitioners, v. HON.
FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONY CALVENTO, Respondents [G.R. No. 129093. August 30, 2001.]- calvento as agent of
PCSO ,denied of permit

On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to
install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s
permit to open the lotto outlet, but was denied by on The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

104
For declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, respondent Calvento went to the
RTC of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93. Said trial court rendered a decision enjoining petitioners from implementing or enforcing
Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and its subsequent Order 2 dated April 21,
1997 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

Consequently, herein petitioners went to the supreme court via a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
decision dated February 10, 1997 of RTC of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93.

Issue: Whether or not Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayor’s
permit based thereon are valid?

Ruling: In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is
merely a delegated power coming from Congress however, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by
Congress. 

The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here
confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our
previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna enjoining
the petitioners from implementing or enforcing Resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna
is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

FORMS OF CONSENT

EPG Construction v. Secretary Vigilar (G.R. No. 131544, March 16, 2001)

Facts: In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Ministry of Public
Works and Highways, where the latter undertook to develop the housing site and construct thereon 145 housing units. Under
the contracts, the scope of construction and funding therefor covered only around 2/3 of each housing unit. Nevertheless,
petitioners completed each housing unit as verbally requested by then DPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas who assured that
additional funds would be available and forthcoming to pay the P5,918,315 for the additional construction not covered by the
contract.

On 14 November 1988, petitioners sent a demand letter to the DPWH Secretary and submitted that their claim for payment
was favorably recommended by DPWH Assistant Secretary for Legal Services Dominador Madamba, who recognized the
existence of implied contracts covering the additional constructions.

After DPWH Assistant Secretary Madamba opined that payment of petitioners money claims should be based on quantum
meruit and should be forwarded to the Commission on Audit (COA) for its due consideration and approval, the money claims
were referred to COA which returned the same to the DPWH Auditor for auditorial action. On the basis of the Inspection Report
of the Auditors Technical Staff, the DPWH Auditor interposed no objection to the payment of the money claims subject to
whatever action the COA may adopt.

In an Indorsement dated 27 December 1995, the COA referred anew the money claims to the DPWH pursuant to COA Circular
95-006

In a letter dated 26 August 1996, respondent DPWH Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject money claims prompting
herein petitioners to file before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226, a Petition for Mandamus praying that
herein respondent be ordered:
1) To pay petitioners the total of P5,819,316;
2) To pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages in the amount to be fixed by the Court and sum of P500,000.00
as attorneys fees.

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226, in Civil Case No. Q-96-29243, dismissing the Petition for Mandamus filed
by the petitioners. Seeking to reverse the dismissal by the lower court, the petitioners went to the Supreme Court via Petition
for Certiorari.
Issue (in view of the given topic for this case): Under the circumstances, may the herein respondent invoke state immunity?

Ruling: Respondents argument is misplaced inasmuch as the Principle of State Immunity finds no application in the case before
us.

Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under
the States cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the
rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance.

This Court as the staunch guardian of the citizens’ rights and welfare cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and
allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the States cloak of
invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that petitioners contractors be duly compensated based on
quantum meruit for construction done on the public works housing project.

105
 ICHONG v HERNANDEZ (DENIED)
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
Petitioners Respondents
LAO H. ICHONG JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila
Facts of the Case
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents’ corporations and partnerships adversely affected
by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional. Petitioner contends among others, that the act denies equal protection of the laws and violates
international and treaty obligations.

Issues
WON RA 1180 violates the equal protection laws

Rationale/Analysis/Legal Basis
No. The law is a valid exercise of police power and no treaty or international obligations are infringed.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality.

The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction
between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects
their privilege.

It cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on
the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner

In re: Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno

    A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA
   June 29, 1992
Summary 
Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (CA), wrote a letter dated Nov. 14, 1990
addressed to the Supreme Court about the correction of his seniority ranking in the CA. It appears from the records that
petitioner was first appointed as associate justice of the CA on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of office on Nov. 29, 1982.
The CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, "An
Act Reorganizing the Judiciary Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." He was then appointed as appellate
justice and later accepted an appointment to be a deputy minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. In Edsa Revolution in
Feb. 1986 brought about reorganization of the entire government including the judiciary. A Screening Committee was
created. When Pres. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, as an exercise of her legislative power, the Screening
Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11 from being the assoc. justice of the NEW CA. However, the petitioner's
ranking changed from no. 11, he now ranked as no. 26. He alleges that the change in his seniority ranking would be
contrary to the provisions of issued order of Pres. Aquino. The court en banc ranted Justice Puno's request. A motion for
consideration was later filed by Campos and Javelliano who were affected by the change of ranking. They contend that the
petitioner cannot claim such reappointment because the court he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date
of his last appointment.

        The Supreme Court ruled that the present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for
it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in
the people power. A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country
or state by those who were previously subject to it as as sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or
political system, usually effected with violence.  A government as a result of people's revolution is considered de jure if it
is already accepted by the family of nations or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others. In the new
government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct exercise of the Filipino power. Therefore, it is the present
CA that would negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.

Facts:
1. Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (“CA”), wrote a letter in Nov. 1990 to the Supreme
Court seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the CA. 

2. Records show that Petitioner was first appointed as Associate Justice of the CA on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of
office on Nov. 29, 1982. 

3. In 1983, CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (“IAC”) pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 (“BP 129”), "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary. Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." 

4. Thereafter, Petitioner was appointed Appellate Justice in the First Special Cases Division of the IAC and on November
1984, petitioner accepted an appointment to be ceased to be a member of the Judiciary.

106
 5. EDSA Revolution as a result, brought the reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary. To effect
the reorganization of the IAC and other lower courts, (1) a Screening Committee was created. President Corazon C.
Aquino, exercising legislative powers by virtue of the revolution, (2) issued Executive Order No. 33 to govern the
reorganization of the Judiciary.

6. The Screening Committee recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the New CA and assigned him
the rank of number 11 in the roster of appellate court justices. When the appointments were signed by the President,
petitioner’s seniority ranking changed, from number 11 to number 26. 

7. Petitioner alleged that change in his seniority ranking could only be attributed to inadvertence for, otherwise, it would
run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33. He pointed the case of Justice Oscar Victoriano,
former Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals who was transferred from his position as Justice of the CA to the
Ministry of Justice as Comm. of Land Registration and in 1986 was reappointed to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
states that his (Victoriano’s) stint in the Commission of Land Registration did not adversely affect his seniority ranking
in the Court of Appeals

8. The court en banc granted Justice Puno's request, seniority rank of Petitioner was moved from number 12 to number 5.
A motion for consideration was later filed by Associate Justices Campos and Javellana who were affected by the
change of ranking. They contend that the petitioner cannot claim such reappointment because the court he had
previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.

Issues: Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that would negate any claim to
seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to EO No. 33.

Held: The present CA is a new court not merely a continuation of the CA and IAC. The Court holds that the Court of Appeals
and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33 were phased out as part of the legal system abolished
by the revolution and that the Court of Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 was an entirely new court with
appointments thereto having no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished courts.

Motion for Reconsideration was GRANTED and seniority rankings of members of the Court of Appeals, including that of the
petitioner, at the time the appointments were made by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.

Rationale/Analysis/Legal Basis 
It is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was created in the wake of the massive
reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the people power. A revolution has been defined
as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it as
sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence. In the new
government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct exercise of the Filipino power. Therefore, it is the present CA that
would negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.

Opinions:

Feliciano J.
I agree with the conclusion reached in the majority opinion written by my learned brother, Padilla, J. In particular, I agree that the
Court of Appeals established by Executive Order No. 33 is a new court, and was not merely the old Intermediate Appellate Court
with a new label. If one examines the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129, known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," relating
to the old Intermediate Appellate Court, it is quite clear that the previously existing Court of Appeals was abolished and a new
court, denominated the Intermediate Appellate Court, was created. 

 President Aquino was quite free, legally speaking to appoint to the new Court of Appeals whoever in her judgment was fit and
proper for membership in that new court in an order of precedence that she was just then establishing. chanrobles law library

In my submission the situation of a member of the new Court of Appeals accepting appointment to some other department or
branch of government, outside the Judiciary, and who later receives an appointment once again to that same Court of Appeals.
But Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno was not in such a situation. The last preceding appointment to the Judiciary of Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno was to the then Intermediate Appellate Court newly created by B.P. Blg. 129. In 1984, he left that court to
become Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Justice. His next appointment to the Judiciary was not to the old Intermediate
Appellate Court, which by that time had passed on to history. His appointment dated 28 July 1986, was, in my view, as already
noted, to the new Court of Appeals established by Executive Order No. 33. Thus, the last sentence of Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 129
(before re-enactment by Executive Order No. 33) afforded no basis for a claim to the same numerical precedence in the new
Court of Appeals that he would have been entitled to had the old Intermediate Appellate Court not gone out of existence. It is
difficult for me to understand how a claim to a particular position in an order of precedence can be made where the court itself, to
which the new appointment is made, is a new and distinct court.

I vote to grant the Motion for Reconsideration.

Bellosillo , J.
The letter-appointment of President Corazon C. Aquino addressed to then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee dated July 31, 1986,
in fact categorically specifies the order of seniority of her appointees. 

The above-quoted letter of President Aquino also brings to focus the ranking of Justice Oscar R. Victoriano who was junior to
Justices Nocon and Coquia in the old Court, as reflected in the letter of Presiding Justice Gancayco. However, in the letter of the

107
President, Justice Victoriano was ranked No. 3, while Justices Nocon and Coquia were ranked No. 4 and No. 5, respectively.
Hence, it is not accurate to say that Justice Victoriano was reinstated to his former rank in the old Court, but was even given a
rank higher than Justices Nocon and Coquia. This "possible oversight" was also brought to the attention of Malacañang but, like
the case of Justice Puno, no correction was made.

All these clearly support the view of Mr. Justice Padilla in his ponencia, as well as of Mr. Justice Feliciano in his concurring
opinion, that the present Court of Appeals is an entirely different court, distinct from the old Intermediate Appellate Court or the
former Court of Appeals, with a new members although some were drawn from the now defunct Intermediate Appellate Court,

This brings me to the final point which bothers me still further. If We sustain the claim that the present Court of Appeals is
merely a continuation of the old Intermediate Appellate Court, or of the old Court of Appeals, then We may be swarmed with
requests not only for re-ranking but also for reinstatement of those who were not reappointed on July 31, 1986, but against whom
no charges have been filed. For then, should they not be allowed to enjoy their security of tenure as civil servants under the
Constitution?

Gutierrez J.
When Secretary Arroyo states that the President had nothing to do with the order or sequence of seniority, it means that she just
followed the recommendations of her own Screening Committee, which recommendations had already been reviewed by the
Supreme Court. She did not select any recommendees her own. She never deviated from the recommendations because
everybody recommended was appointed. The change from No. 11 to No. 26 could not have been a deliberate act of the President
as she had nothing to do with the order of seniority of the Justices she was appointing. The change could only have been an
inadvertence because it was violative not only of the law but also of the recommendations of her Screening Committee.

Cruz J.
Sec. 3 of BP 129 laid down the original precedence rule applicable to members of the Intermediate Appellate Court. This was
embodied in Sec. 2 of EO 33 without change except as to the name of the court. The first provision was not repealed. As Mr.
Justice Feliciano points out, it was merely "re-enacted." virtua1aw library

I do not think the re-enacted rule was intended to operate prospectively only. I believe it continues to be available to the former
members of the Intermediate Appellate Court no less than to the members of the Court of Appeals.

It is a well-known canon of construction that apparently conflicting provisions should be harmonized whenever possible. The
ponencia would instead revoke Sec. 3. of BP 129 even though Sec. 2 of EO 33 has not repealed but in fact re-enacted it. I would
reconcile the two provisions and give effect to both.

Significantly, Sec. 8 of EO 33 provides that "the term Intermediate Appellate Court shall hereafter mean Court of Appeals."

KURODA vs JALANDONI
42 OG 4282

FACTS: 
Shigenori Kuroda, a Lieutenant General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines between 1943 and 1944,
was tried for war crimes under a complaint identical with the charge filed against General Tomoyuki Yamashita.
Kuroda challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 68 and argued that the Philippines was not a signatory
to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he was charged of “crimes
not based on law, national and international.” The appellant also held that the Military Commission created under EO
68 had no jurisdiction. 

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is unconstitutional; and

2. Whether or not Kuroda may be charged with violation of Hague Convention’s rules and regulations in Philippine
Courts.

RULING: 
Executive Order 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office is valid and constitutional. The president has acted in
conformity with the generally accepted policies of international law which are also part of the Constitution pursuant to
the incorporation clause stipulated in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution. The rules and regulation of Hague
Convention form part of and are wholly based on generally accepted principles of international law and were even
accepted by the United States and Japan for they are signatories to the said convention. Such rules and regulations,
therefore, form part of the law of the Philippines regardless of whether or not it was a signatory to the same. Thus,
Kuroda may be charged for violation of its rules and regulations.

CONCEPT OF THE STATE

DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
vs. EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA

Facts:
o On 1863, an Earthquake took place in the Philippines that devastated
lot of civilians. A central relief board was appointed to distribute the
money contributed by donors. After a thorough investigation and
consideration, the relief board allotted $365,703.50 to the various
sufferers. $30,299.65 was distributed, leaving a balance of $365.403.85 for

108
distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of Monte de
Piedad, the Philippine Government directed its treasurer to turn over
Monte de Piedad $80,000 of relief fund in its installment of $20,000 each.
The Monte declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only
the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands has the right to order
the reimbursement. On account of various petitions of the persons, the
Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General, bring suit against the
Monte de Piedad for recovery of the $80,000 together with interest, for
the benefit of those persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was
entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its
equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest and the
costs of the cause. Monte de Piedad then contended that the present
Philippine Government cannot file suit on the ground that the obligation
of the former was wiped out when there was a change of sovereignty
and that the suit could be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries
themselves or by their heirs.
Issue:
o Whether or not the government of the Philippine Islands has capacity to
file a suit against Monte de Piedad for the recovery of the said amount.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
o Yes, the Philippine Government is competent to institute action against
Monte de Piedad in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae.
Under this Principle, the Philippine Government being the guardian of
the “rights of the people” can represent the legitimate claimants of the
beneficiary and therefore has the capacity to file a suit against Monte

de Piedad. This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme

power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or
in the legislature. The Philippine Government is not merely a nominal
party that’s why it can bring and prosecute this action by exercising its
sovereign powers. The Supreme Court then held the right of the
Government to file the case. In this case, Philippine Government is not a
mere nominal party because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action,
is exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out
a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the
United States.

D. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

FORMS OF CONSENT

G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, THE

PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF
OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu,
P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL

CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

Facts:
 On 1961, a decision was rendered in a Special Proceedings in favor of
P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and Int’l Const. Corp., confirming
the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40. On 1969, Villasor,
issued an Order declaring the decision final and executory, directing the
Sheriffs of Rizal Province, QC & Manila to execute such. The
corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. The Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal served notices of garnishment with several banks, especially on the
"monies due the AFP in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the
amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution. The funds deposited
with PVB & PNB are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for
the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and
civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP. They
allege that Judge Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction in granting the
issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the AFP,
hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment are void.
In the answer filed by respondents, the facts set forth were admitted with
the only qualification being that the total award was in the amount of
P2,372,331.40.4
Issue:
 Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor was null
and void.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
 Yes. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the
dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of
constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the

state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its
consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. The State may
not be sued without its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logic and

109
sound sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the
object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had
been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Thus in the
recent case of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, such a
well-settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee:
"The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's
action 'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage
of execution' and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment
is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is
based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State
cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated
by law.

E. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

SUPREMACY OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITY

G.R. No. L-69401

RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR ALIH, EDRIS MUKSAN,
MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD RAMSID ASALI, BANDING USMAN, ANGGANG
HADANI, WARMIKHAN HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI, ALLAN TAN, MUJAHIRIN
MARAJUKI, KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA ALIH, MERLA ALIH, and NURAISA
ALIH VDA DE FEROLINO vs. MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, COLONEL
ERNESTO CALUPIG, MAJOR ARNOLD BLANCO AND 1ST LIEUTENANT DARWIN

GUERRA

Facts:
 On 1984, more than 200 Philippine marines and defense forces raided
the compound occupied by the petitioners at Zamboanga City, in
search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. The situation
resulted in a number of casualties. 16 male occupants were arrested, to
be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their
objection. The military also inventoried and confiscated rifles, rifle
grenades, rounds of ammunition.
 Petitioners came to the Court to recover the articles seized from them,
to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to
challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as
violative of their right against self-incrimination. The Court, referred such
for hearing at RTC. Petitioners demand the return of the arms and
ammunition on the ground that they were taken without a search
warrant as required by the Bill of Rights. The respondents, while admitting
the absence of the required such warrant, sought to justify their act on
the ground that they were acting under superior orders. There was also
the suggestion that the measure was necessary because of the
aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by the
assassination of Mayor Climaco.
Issue:
 Whether or not the acts done by the respondents are violative of the Bill
of Rights and thus the evidence obtained therein inadmissible in court

Held:
 Yes. Superior’s order cannot countermand the Constitution. The fact that
the petitioners were suspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse the
constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. Its obvious flaw lies in the
conclusion that the petitioners were unquestionably guilty on the
strength alone of unsubstantiated reports that they were stockpiling
weapons. The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted
criminals or fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zona," they were
merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been
investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and
not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military. The respondents
simply by-passed civil courts which had the authority to determine
whether or not there was probable cause to search the petitioners’
premises. It follows that as the search of the petitioners’ premises was
violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and the ammunition taken
from the raided compound are inadmissible as evidence in any of the
proceedings against the petitioners.

D. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY (Basis)

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KHOSROW MINUCHER VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND ARTHUR SCALZO
G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003

FACTS:
In May 1986, violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher following
a “buy-bust operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by private respondent Arthur
Scalzo in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was later
acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. In fact, that
his arrest as a heroin trafficker had been well publicized throughout the world, in various newspapers, particularly in
Australia, America, Central Asia and in the Philippines. He was identified in the papers as an international drug
trafficker. 
Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the
Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United
States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying
that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.
HELD:
Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked
with immunity from suit as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.
The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.
The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries
Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy
Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation” conducted at the
residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo
These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but they give enough indication that the
Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent
Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having
ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and
then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher.
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

Application of the Doctrine

Doctrine of State immunity (Basis):

1. PEDRO SYQUIA ET. AL. VS. LOPEZ, ET. AL

FACTS: The plaintiffs named Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, all surnamed Syquia, are the undivided joint
owners of three apartment buildings situated in the City of Manila known as the North Syquia
Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments. In 1945, they executed three lease
contracts for lease of the apartments to USA, with the term being until the war has ended and six months
after, or unless terminated sooner by USA, as the buildings were used for billeting and quartering officers
of the US armed forces stationed in the Manila Area. George Moore, a Commanding General of the US
Army, and Erland Tillman, Chief of the Real Estate Division to the US Army in Manila who was under the
command of Moore, was said to be in control of the apartment buildings and had authority in the name of
USA to assign officers of the army to the buildings or order them to vacuate the same. When Japan
surrendered on September 2, 1945, the lease would be terminated six months after. The petitioners
approached the predecessors of Moore and Tillman and requested the buildings to be returned to them,
as per contract agreement. However, they were advised that the US Army wanted to continue their
occupancy of the buildings and refused to execute new leases but advised that they will vacate the
premises before February 1, 1947, not the original terms of the contract agreement. Syquia et. al sued
before the Municipal Court of Manila with the demand to get the properties as their agreement
supposedly expired, and furthermore asked for increased rentals until the premises were vacated. Lopez
et.al were part of the armed forces of the US moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the court. The Municipal Court of Manila granted the motion to dismiss the suit. The case elevated to
the Court of First Instance of Manila, and they affirmed the ruling of the lower court. 

ISSUE: WON the court has jurisdiction over the defendants and over the subject matter of the action. 

RULING: No, the court had no jurisdiction over the defendants and over the subject matter of the action,
because the real party in interest was the U.S. Government and not the individual defendants named in
the complaint. Under the well settled rule of International Law, a foreign government like the United
States Government cannot be sued in the courts of another state without its consent; that it was clear
from the allegations of the complaint that although the United States of America has not been named
therein as defendant, it is nevertheless the real defendant in this case, as the parties named as
defendants are officers of the United States Army and were occupying the buildings in question as such
and pursuant to orders received from that Government. 2. Whether or not this is a suit against the United
States of America. The present action must be considered as one against the U. S. Government. It is clear
that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the

111
present case for unlawful detainer. The U. S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this
suit, which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen
filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent, but it is of citizen filing an action
against a foreign government without said government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of
jurisdiction of the courts of his country.

THE DEFENSE OF THE STATE

G.R. No. L-45892             July 13, 1938

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs.TRANQUILINO LAGMAN, defendant-appellant.- lagman and sosa
alleged to wilfully and unlawfully refused to register for military service. Hence the rtc sentence dem of 1 month and 1 day
imprison.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-45893             July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs.PRIMITIVO DE SOSA, defendant-appellant.

Facts: 
-In these two cases, the appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa were charged with a violation of Section 60 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It was alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and
having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to appear before the Acceptance Board and
register in the military service, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. 
-The appellants did not deny these facts, but they alleged in defense that they had not registered in the military service because
Primitivo de Sosa was fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also had a
father to support, had no military learnings, and did not wish to kill or be killed.
-Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of imprisonment.
-In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were sentenced, is impugned on the ground
that it is unconstitutional. 

Issue:  Is the National Defense Law valid?

Held: 
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Avanceña, ruled that the National Defense Law is valid on the ground that it is
constitutional.  Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines states that the defense of the state is a prime duty of
government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.

The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional
provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty
of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.

PVTA v CIR Digest

Facts:
This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased responsibility to
provide for the general welfare.
1.  In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and the
petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA No. 444. 
2. Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction.  Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari
on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from
Commonwealth Act No. 444. 
3. PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental
functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.
 
Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.
 
YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has become obsolete.
The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing
for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present
time: “The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of
government obsolete.” 
 
The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration.
There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner can
rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case.  The objection of private respondents with its
overtones of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v.
Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than
proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor
is the objection raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.
 

112
 A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the differentiation that exists.
If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It
need not have required private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief
problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that
such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be
sustained.

Waiver of Immunity

Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470

Facts:
The jurisdictional issues raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding arose from the failure of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the
Court of First Instance of Manila to apply the well-known and of-reiterated doctrine of the non-suability of a State,
including its offices and agencies, from suit without its consent. It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by
defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a
money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, 
the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.

Issue: 

Can an agreement between the Rice and Corn Administration and Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.  operate as a waiver
of the national government from suit?

Decision:

NO. The consent to be sued, to be effective must come from the State thru a statute, not through any agreement
made by counsel for the Rice and Corn Administration. Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the
contract between the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn Administration which,
according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract within the parties and the suits that may thereafter
arise. The consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed
out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had
no binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority.

  TOPIC: THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE: (4) SOVEREIGNITY

CITATION:  THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

v. 
G.R. No. L-36409 LORETA GOZO, defendant-appellant
October 26, 1973 -gozo bought a house and lot inside US naval base leased by US govt. in Olongapo city. demolished
house and built w/o securing permit from the lgu

I. THESIS STATEMENT: Appellant Loreta Gozo seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales, convicting her of a violation of Municipal ordinance and questions the validity of the
ordinance as it is not applicable to Military bases.

II. FACTS: Loreta Gozo  bought  a  house  and  lot  located  inside  the  United States  Naval  Reservation  in 
Olongapo,  a  territory  leased  to  the  US  by  the Military  Bases  Agreement.  She  demolished  the 
house  and  built  another without  securing  a  building  permit  from  the  Mayor.  Gozo  was  charged 
of violation  of  Municipal  Ordinance  No.  14.    

III. CONTENTION OF
PETITIONERS/ APPELLANT
IV. CONTENTION OF
RESPONDENTS/ APPELLEE
Gozo  avers that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed
forces. Thus the municipal  govt of Olongapo City has  no  jurisdiction  over  the  leased  territory. Thus,
the  Phil.  Govt  does  not  exercise  sovereignty  over  the  American  base.
Does  the  Phil  govt  exercise  sovereignty  over  the  American  base?

V. ISSUE The City Court of Olongapo City found her guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14,
Series of 1964. She was required to secure permit within 30 days of final decision, and failiure
to do so, she shall demislish the house at her expense
VI. RULING OF RTC Yes. 
People v. Acierto, 12 and Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.  "By the Agreement
the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in
certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency.
The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of
the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or
preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains
not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States

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 Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. 

VI. RULING OF CA Yes.  

this  case,  “by  the  Agreement,  the  Philippine  Govt  merely  consents  that  the US  exercise 
jurisdiction  in  certain  cases.    The  Philippine  Government  has not  abdicated  its  sovereignty 
over  the  bases  as  part  of  the  Philippine territory  or  divested  itself  completely  of  jurisdiction 
over  offenses committed  therein.
D.THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY: 7) Suability vs. Liability

CITATION:  LEONARDO PALAFOX, et. al., -palafox,an is the successor of a man who was hit by
  freight truck drove by totalba,chaufer of prov govt og ilpcps norte, thenheir filed case
G.R. No. L-10659 against the govt.for indemnity.
Jan. 31, 1958 Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Versus
PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE, THE DISTRICT ENGINEER AND THE PROVINCIAL 
TREASURER, 
Defendants and Appellees.
I. THESIS STATEMENT: Leonardo Palafox, et. Al appealed on the decision of The Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte which dismissed plaintiffs' 
claim against the PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE, THE DISTRICT ENGINEER AND
THE PROVINCIAL 
TREASURER  for damages arising from the death of their father Proceto Palafox.

II. FACTS: 1. Proceto Palafox, plaintiff’s father, who had been run over by a freight truck driven by
SabasTorralba onSeptember 30, 1948.
2. The Torralba was a chauffeur of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte detailed to
the office of the District Engineer who drove the motor vehicle along the National Highway
in compliance with his duties as such.
3. Prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence, Sabas Torralba pleaded guilty
and was accordingly sentenced.
4. The heirs subsequently began these proceedings against the employer the province,
the District Engineer, the Provincial Treasurer and Sabas Torralba.Upon a motion to
dismiss, the Hon. Fidel Villaneuva, Judge,quashed the case against the defendants,
except Sabas Torralba. Hence, this appeal.

III. CONTENTION OF Palafox insist that the basis of their demand for indemnity is not the above Art. 103, but
PETITIONERS/ Art. 1903 of the Civil Code.
APPELLANT “ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only
for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is
responsible. 

IV. CONTENTION OF There is no allegation that that said province and officers had been “engaged in some kind
RESPONDENTS/ of industry” as provided in Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, no cause of action exists
APPELLEE against them.

V. ISSUE Whether or not Torralba’s employer is liable for the damages arising from the death of
Palafox.

VI. RULING OF RTC The Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dismissed the heirs of Palafox claim against the
above PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE, THE DISTRICT ENGINEER AND THE
PROVINCIAL TREASURER for damages arising from the death of their father Proceto
Palafox.
VII. RULING OF NO.
SUPREME COURT Art. 103 of the RPC is not applicable since province and officers are not engaged in some kind of industry. 
-The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage has been
caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.”
-To attach liability to the State for the negligence of Sabas Torralba a declaration must be made that he was a
“special agent,”- and not one upon whom properly devolved the duty of driving the truck on that occasion. 
Hence, the government is not liable. The construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the
driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities. Wherefore, the death of
Palafox - tragic and deplorable though as it may be– imposed on the province no duty to pay monetary
compensation.

114
F. SEPARATION OF POWERS: 2) Blending of Powers
CITATION:  PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., petitioner,
 
G.R. No. 47065              THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
June 26, 1940
I. THESIS STATEMENT:
II. FACTS:
III. CONTENTION OF
PETITIONERS/ APPELLANT
IV. CONTENTION OF
RESPONDENTS/ APPELLEE
V. ISSUE
VI. RULING OF RTC
VI. RULING OF CA
VII. RULING OF SUPREME
COURT
vs.
a writ of certiorari was instituted to the high praying to render a decision declaring section 1
of Commonwealth Act No. 454 unconstitutional and void.
Pangasinan Transportation Co. Inc  (Pantranco) has been engaged for the past twenty
years in the business of transporting  passengers filed with the Public Service Commission
(PSC) an application to operate 10 additional buses.  PSC granted the application with 2
additional conditions on the ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and
conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight Hour
Labor Law. Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration with the Public Service
Commission but  was  denied by the PSC, hence their petition for certiorari in SC
That the legislative powers granted to the Public Service Commission by section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454, without limitation, guide or rule except the unfettered discretion
and judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total abdication by the
Legislature of its functions in the premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so far as those
powers are concerned, is unconstitutional and void.
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454
Under the first paragraph of section 15 of Act No. 146, as amended, no public service can
operate without a certificate of public convenience or certificate of convenience and public
necessity to the effect that the operation of said service and the authorization to do business
will "public interests in a proper and suitable manner.
Under the second paragraph, one of the conditions which the Public Service Commission
may prescribed the issuance of the certificate provided for in the first paragraph is that "the
service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumental
thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable depreciation
and "shall be valid only for a definite period of time.
It is likewise applicable to any extension or amendment of certificates actually force and to
those which may hereafter be issued, to permits to modify itineraries and time schedules of
public services and to authorization to renew and increase equipment and properties.
Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission: 
∙ is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation 
∙ constitutes undue delegation of powers 
 
The  provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional because it is a
proper delegation of legislative power under the principle of  Subordinate Legislation. It is
a valid  delegation because of the growing complexities of modern government, the
complexities or  multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased
difficulty of administering  the laws there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater powers by the legislature,
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the organic acts of the Public Service
Commission but are "a part of the charter of every utility company operating or seeking to
operate a franchise" in the Philippines.
115

VII.  RELEVANT DOCTRINE or
RATIONALE
The development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim
of delegatus non potest delegari or  delegata potestas non potest delegari. delegatus non
potest delegare- The rule that a person to whom a power, trust, or authority is given to
act on behalf, or for the benefit of, another, cannot delegate this obligation unless
expressly authorized to do so.

Doctrine: implied consent

G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN &
CO., INC., respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Manalo & Feliciano Law for petitioners.
Albert, Vergara, Benares, Perias & Dominguez Law Office for respondents.
-Eligio de guzman and company invited by the USA for bid but did not qualify for the award

Facts:

US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio de Guzman & Co.,
Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests based on the letters received from the
US.

In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the company did not qualify to
receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for
the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.

The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert
Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow
the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to
order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.

Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion.

The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail.
Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

Issue/s:
WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state
immunity

Held:
 WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case
No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

Ratio:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its
consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States.
However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because
the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
immunity

now extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts)

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions
of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the
United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized
for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

Correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of
the act.

DISSENT: MAKASIAR, J
The petition should be dismissed and the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M in the defunct CFI (now RTC) of Rizal be
allowed to continue therein.

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When the U.S. Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, confirmed the acceptance of a bid of a private
company for the repair of wharves or shoreline in the Subic Bay area, it is deemed to have entered into a contract
and thus waived the mantle of sovereign immunity from suit and descended to the level of the ordinary citizen. Its
consent to be sued, therefore, is implied from its act of entering into a contract. According to him, nonsuability shall
not be invoked  to penetrate and injustice.

(C.) Consent to be Sued

(3.) Incorporation of Government-owned or controlled corporation

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO- NHA expropriated the land of guivelondo,
however they didn’t agree on amount of compen so they file motion for recon b4 the court. Just compen has been
decided and final. Both mr was denied. During the judgment rendered by rtc, nha failed to appeal and court has
decided on the matter. Hence it fied for appeal to the SC. Petition denied coz nha has been estopped.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154411. June 19, 2003]
PONENTE: J. YNARES-SANTIAGO

FACTS:

On February 23, 1999, petitioner National Housing Authority filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
11, an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot and the Heirs
of Isidro Guivelondo for the purpose of the public use of Socialized housing.
On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo filed a Manifestation stating that they were waiving their
objections to NHA’s power to expropriate their properties. Thus an order of execution has been granted and the court
already appointed commissioners to determine the amount for just compensation
On April 17, 2000, the Commissioners submitted their report wherein they recommended that the just compensation
of the subject properties be fixed at P11,200.00 per square meter wherein a partial judgment has been rendered.

After the report on the just compensation has completed, both parties filed an MR on the amount for the just
compensation stating that it has no adequate basis and support. Both MR was denied by the court.
While the judgment has been rendered in the RTC and an entry of judgment and the motion for execution has been
issued, NHA filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the petition on the ground that the
Partial Judgment and Omnibus Order became final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal the same.
Wherefore, the Petitioner NHA filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

1) WON the state has consented itself from being sued

HELD:
The petition was denied and the judgment rendered by the lower court was affirmed.

RATIO:

On the first issue, the court held that, yes the state can be compelled and coerced by the court to continue
exercise its inherent power of eminent domain, since the NHA does not exercise its right to appeal in the
expropriation proceedings before the court has rendered the case final and executory. In the early case of City of
Manila v. Ruymann and Metropolitan Water District v. De Los Angeles, an expropriation proceeding was explained.

Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined that
its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be
paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three
commissioners.

On the second issue, the court held that a socialized housing is always for the public used and that the
public purpose of the socialized housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount of just
compensation that the court has fixed.

On the third issue, the court ruled that in this case the doctrine of state immunity cannot be applied to the NHA,
although it is “public in character”, it is only public in character since it is government-owned, having a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government, the funds of such government-owned and controlled
corporations and non-corporate agency, although considered public in character, are not exempt from garnishment.

The state has consented itself when it entered it filed for a petition before the court.

Notes:

Important Discussion in the case:

When does the Doctrine of State Immunity not applied in the government agencies?

1. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law
2. If the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled corporation which is clothed
with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the government, then its funds are not

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 exempt from garnishment. This is so because when the government enters into commercial business, it
abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.

GARNISMENT AS DEFINED BY BLACK LAW DICTIONARY:

Garnishment
- A judicial proceeding in which a creditor (or a potential creditor) asks the court to order a third party who is
indebted to or is bailee for the debtor to turn over to the creditor any of the debtor’s property (such as wages
or bank accounts) held by that third party.

- A person can initiate a garnishment action as means of either prejudgment seizure or post judgment
collection.

- In short, it only means whether the Heirs of Guivelendo can file a case to NHA to compel the latter to give to
them the amount of the just compensation as rendered by the court.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO

(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)
-legitimacy of government of aquino by direct exercise of people assisted by AFP

FACTS:
1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power.

2. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people are the judge.
The Court further held that:
1. The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;
2. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

Topic: Non-Suability of the State

Title: NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORP. Vs TEODORO-fees paid for landing and parking is paid by PAL
to the NAC.thise fees were said to be paid to capitol subdi inc whc owned the land.wt this CSI filed a n
action against PAL.
Reference: 91 Phil. 203

FACTS

-The National Airports Corporation was organized with the character of a corporation

-However it was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and the Civil Aeronautics Administration was
created for its replacement.

-But before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airports Corporation P65,
245 as fees for landing and parking on Bacolod Airport No. 2

-These fees are said to have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. which owned the
land used by the National Airports Corporation as airport. With this, the owner commenced an action
in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the Philippine Airlines, Inc.

-In order to recover the amount paid for landing and parking fee, The Philippine Airlines, Inc.
countered with a third-party complaint against the National Airports Corporation, which by that time
had been dissolved, and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration. 

-The third party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the fees claimed
by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. "on the belief and assumption that the third party defendant was the
lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and that the third party defendant and its predecessors in
interest were the operators and maintainers of said Bacolod Airport No. 2.

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-Consequently, after the Solicitor General answered the complaint of the third party, he filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third- party complaint,
because the National Airports Corporation "has lost its juridical personality," and, because agency of
the Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law,
is incapable of suing and being sued."

ISSUES

1. Whether or not government corporate agency may be sued?

2. Whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Administration can be sued?

RULINGS

1. As a general rule, state cannot be sued without its consent and there can be no legal
basis against the authority that formulate the law and which the law depends.

However, the exemptions are the unincorporated type of government who are doing
proprietary functions. Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune to
suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was
organized.

2. Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under section 3
of Executive Order No. 365, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and to grant
concession rights, and under section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation
gasoline, accessories and supplies, and rentals for. the use of any property under its management.
These provisions confer upon 'the Civil Aeronautics Administration the power to sue and be sued,
which is implied from the power to transact private business.

Wherefore, the petition is denied with costs against the Civil Aeronautics Administration.

Suability vs. Liability

E. MERRIT vs GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS-
FACTS:
- Merrit, riding on a motorcycle collided with an ambulance of the General Hospital which turned suddenly and unexpectedly
without having sounded any whistle or horn.
-By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was severely injured resulting to his inability to perform his job as a constructor
of wooden buildings.
- As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by the chauffeur who is an agent/employee of the Government
- By authority of the United States, the Philippine Legislature authorized merit to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands.

ISSUE:  Did the defendant simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff
HELD:
-By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff,
-It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.
“The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent but not when the damage should have been caused by the
official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be
applicable”
This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and
the regulations.
The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital is not considered as a special agent. For this reason, the Government
cannot be held accountable for the damages resulting from the said accident.

WOMEN
NATURE Special Civil Action: Certiorari
PETITIONERS Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company
RESPONDENTS NLRC and Grace de Guzman-
De guzman was dismissed from her job in phil telegraph for the reason that she was married.
SUMMARY. Respondent de Guzman was dismissed by Phil. Telegraph because she was
married, and Phil. Telegraph was ‘not accepting married women employees’. Phil. Telegraph
says, no, it was because she concealed her civil status. Court says, ‘how can she reveal her
civil status if it will get her dismissed? Besides, this prohibition against married women thing
is illegal, anyway.’ Court cites LC 136, which states that it is illegal for an employer to require
as a condition of employment that a woman shall not get married, among other statutes.

FACTS.
 Grace de Guzman was initially hired as a reliever – she had to work in place of women who went on maternity leave. Then, on
September 2, 1991, she was asked to be a probationary employee for 150 days.
 She indicated in the job application form that she was single, although she contracted marriage a few months earlier. She put
the same thing on her previous job applications, despite her marriage.

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 When petitioner Phil Telegraph found out about her marriage, they, through a memorandum from their branch supervisor,
asked her to explain, and reminded her that Phil Telegraph does not accept married women for employment (as verbally
instructed to de Guzman)
 De Guzman replied that she did not know about the policy and that she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status.
 Phil Telegraph was not convinced. They dismissed her.
 De Guzman filed for illegal dismissal. In the preliminary conference, de Guzman volunteered the information that she had
failed to remit P2380.75, and executed a promissory note to pay the same
 Labor Arbiter ruled for de Guzman, and mandated her reinstatement (she had gained regular status) with payment of back
wages and cost of living allowance. NLRC affirms, but suggests that de Guzman should be suspended for three months for her
dishonesty. Phil Telegraph takes it to the SC

ISSUES & RATIO.

1. WON Phil Telegraph’s policy of not accepting married women is valid – NO
All of the statutes, jurisprudence, good morals and public policy state that a company/corporation cannot dismiss a
woman because she is married.
 Sec. 14, Art II of the Constitution recognizes the role of women in nation building and commands the State t ensure the
fundamental equality before the law o women and men
 Sec. 14, Art XIII of the Constitution mandates that the State shall protect working women through provision for
opportunities that would enable them to reach the full potential
 LC 136-It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment
that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee
shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually employee merely by reason of marriage.

DECISION.
Petition dismissed, with double costs.

Social justice
CALALANG VS. WILLIAMS-calalng filed for writ of prohibition on the issued resolution by the national traffic
commission to prohibit animal drawn vehicles to pass along rosario st in dasam for a certain time
70 Phils. 726
FACTS
The petition for a writ of prohibition alleged that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940,
resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street,
from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at
Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the
adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned.
The Secretary of Public Works and communication approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal
Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period of
one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and
regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and
pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as
well. 

ISSUES
1. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.
HELD
1. No. Commonwealth Act No. 548 is not unconstitutional. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 law do not confer
legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The
authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of
is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or
the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest."
It aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public.
- Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

"the greatest good to the greatest number."

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Miscellaneous
REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004
TINGA, J.- rev.pamatong filed for presi candidacy but denied

Facts
Petitioner Rev. Elly Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President. Respondent COMELEC refused to give due
course to petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy, although such decision was not unanimous. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
but was declared along with others as nuisance candidates. Thus, a petition for writ of certiorari. Petitioner alleged that the
resolutions were issued in violation of his right to equal access to opportunities for public service under the Constitution.

Issue
Whether or not the resolution declaring petitioner as a nuisance candidate violates the Constitution

Ruling: The court has let the COMELEC decide if he is nuisance or not
No. Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public office"
is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency.
There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law.
Nuissance: Not supported by political party, no bona fide interntion to run for office, would cause a mockery or disrepute to the
election and those that will cause confuse to the voters

Miscellaneous
Oposa v. Factoran July 30, 1993 GR No. 101083 Davide J. Jonathan Torres Petitioners: Minors represented by their
parents Respondents: Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr (DENR SEC) Eriberto Rosario (Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati,
Branch 66) Doctrine: -oposa filed complaint to cancel timber license agrweement and CDO from process of licnese

Facts: 1. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of
the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical forests." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."
Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered: . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to — (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; (2) Cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
2. On 22 June 1990, Factoran, filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on 2 grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no
cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government.
6. Petitioners contend that the it has cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment. Petitioners maintain that TLAs are not contracts. Even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said
clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

Issue/s: 1. Does the petitioners have locus standi? 2. Does the Petitioners have Cause of Action? 3. Is the issue of cancelation of
TCA a political question? 4. Does canceling TCA, violate the non-impairment of contracts?

Ruling: 1. YES 2. YES 3. NO 4. NO Ratio: Does the petitioners have locus standi? The civil case is a class suit. The subject
matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. All the
requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said
civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
- That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein .

Peace and Order

Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004-chavez filed petition for prohibiton to enjoin imple of ban on carrying
firearms outside home

-In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP stressing the need for a
nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents.
-She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence
(PTCFOR),
- hence, a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence2 (Guidelines) issued by Hermogenes E.
Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP) was filed by Francisco Chavez.

ISSUE: whether the citizens right to bear arms is a constitutional right?

HELD: Petition was dismissed

The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation. The maintenance of peace and
order1 and the protection of the people against violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear
arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties

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 Justiciable and political question-petitioners filed for nullific of WTO agreement prohi its enforce and imple, on the
ground that it violates consti.
TANADA v. ANGARA G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
FACTS: 1. Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine
Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization and for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement.
They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and
to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods”
as (1) the WTO requires the Philippines “to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as
Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits and/or impairs” the constitutional powers of both
Congress and the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
HELD: 1. YES. Since the assailed act allegedly violates the Constitution, it becomes a jusiticiable controversy that the Court is
mandated to decidevert that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and
reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,”
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Philippine Bar vs COMELEC-PBA questioning validity of BP883. Its’ constitu

Petitioners filed a complaint questioning the validity of BP 883; calling for a special election for President and Vice
President on February 7, 1986.

The law was enacted following the letter of President Marcos to the BP that he was “irrevocably vacating the position
of President effective ONLY when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by
taking his oath of office ten days after his proclamation.

Petitioners question the validity of Marcos’ resignation as it did not create the vacancy needed for a special election
to be held and pray for prohibition to acts in relation to BP Blg 883.

Issues
Whether or not BP 883 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the Supreme Court should allow incumbent President Marcos to run on that said special election.

Ruling
Petitions dismissed. BP 883 is constitutional.

7 Justices voted to dismiss the case, while 5 justices voted to declare the statute unconstitutional.

It turned out that the issue has become a political question. It can be only decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity at the scheduled election, fair, clean, and honest election.

The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent
president a new mandate or elect a new president.

Sovereignty
Laurel vs. Misa
77 Phil. 856
FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused
adhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his
allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of
sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the
Republic.

ISSUE:
1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese occupation?

HELD/RATIO: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to
his government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine
government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and
replaced. Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus,
there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there is no such change since the sovereign
– the Filipino people

G. DELEGATION OF POWERS

 Jaworski v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 144463, January 14, 2004

PARTIES SENATOR ROBERT S. JAWORSKI, petitioner, vs.

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION and SPORTS AND GAMES ENTERTAINMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
BRIEF The petition at bar seeks to nullify, via a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed directly before this Court, the "Grant
CASE of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming" by virtue of which SAGE was
vested by PAGCOR with the authority to operate on-line Internet gambling.
FACTS  PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE whereby the former grants the latter the authority to operate and

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 maintain sports betting stations and Internet gaming operations.
 Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its operations by conducting gambling on the
Internet on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza
outlets.
 Petitioner, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games,
Amusement and Sports, files the instant petition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE
be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet.
 Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any of the categories of the authorized
gambling activities enumerated under Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869

ISSUE WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT PAGCOR IS AUTHORIZED UNDER P.D. NO. 1869 TO OPERATE GAMBLING
ACTIVITIES ON THE INTERNET
RULING WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The "Grant of Authority and Agreement to
Operate Sports Betting and Internet Gaming" executed by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE is declared NULL and VOID.

A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which
cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the
government directly, or by public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on
them in the interest of the public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may
be made.

PAGCOR can not delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch
as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so.

Tariff Powers
 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219
PARTIES CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, (Second District of Bataan), Petitioner, v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, THE
TARIFF COMMISSION, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, and THE ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, Respondents.
BRIEF In the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, petitioner assails the validity of Executive Orders Nos.
CASE 475 and 478. He argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are violative of Section 24, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
FACTS  the President issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges
imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of five percent (5%) ad valorem
 Meantime, Executive Order No. 475 was issued by the President on 15 August 1991 reducing the rate of additional
duty on all imported articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad valorem, except in the cases of crude
oil and other oil products which continued to be subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem.
 Hence the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
ISSUE WON Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are violative of Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
RULING WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

it is clear that customs duties are levied and imposed entirely apart from whether or not there are any competing local
industries to protect.

Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other
bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department.
There is explicit constitutional permission (Section 28[2] of Article VI of the Constitution) to Congress to authorize the
President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff
rates . . . and other duties or imposts

Emergency Powers
 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368
PARTIES
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING

Delegation to the People

 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
PARTIES
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING

Delegation to Administrative Bodies

 Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. POEA, 243 SCRA 666

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PARTIES THE CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES, INC., ALSTER INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC.,
CREAMSHIP MANAGEMENT INC., EL GRANDE SHIPPING CORP., EASTGATE (INT'L.) MARITIME AGENCIES,
INC., FILIPINAS KALAYAAN OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORP., INTERWORLD SHIPPING CORP., JZEL COMPANY,
INC. , LAINE SHIPPING AGENCY CORP., MARINERS SERVICES, CORP., MARITIME SERVICES & MGT., INC.,
MID OCEAN (PHILS.) MARINE AGENCY, OCEAN EAST AGENCY CORP., PASIA-PHIL. GROUP, INC., PHIL.
MARINE CONSULTANT INC., SEASTAR MARINE SERVICES, INC., TSM SHIPPING (PHILS.) INC., TRANS-MED
(MANILA) CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, HON. NIEVES CONFESSOR AND THE HON.
FELICISIMO JOSON, respondent.
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING

Tests of Delegation
Emmanuel Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569
PARTIES
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING

The Completeness Test

 United States v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1
PARTIES
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING

The Sufficient Standard Test

 Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659
PARTIES RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE,
BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV,
ILOILO CITY, respondents.
BRIEF the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order
CASE
FACTS  The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they
were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1
 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing
of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.
 The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of
authority and also for its presumed validity.
 The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he
has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
 His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before
a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
ISSUE Is the confiscation by the police constitutes valid exercise of power?
RULING WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision
of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to
the petitioner. No costs.

There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare
Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence
thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required
immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to
have the force and effect of law.

The Party-list Representatives

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001
PARTIES
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS
ISSUE

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RULING

Qualifications
Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 119976, Sept. 18, 1995
PARTIES IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
BRIEF Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
CASE District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor
FACTS  private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for
candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration
and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and
canceling the certificate of candidacy.
 petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since
childhood but has been filed out of time but was denied
 a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
 respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in
different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila.
 the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that
she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections
 On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
 Hence the petition
ISSUE Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at
the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
RULING WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in
the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24,
May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places

Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a
right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate
that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as
her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner
sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make
them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention
clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.

"Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.

the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur:
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
(2) intention to remain there; and
(3) intention to abandon the old domicile.

Domino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999

PARTIES
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING

Bengzon v. Cruz, G.R. No. 14284, May 7, 2001

PARTIES ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
BRIEF The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no
CASE person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."1
FACTS  respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other,
"rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."
 respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran
for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
 Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.4
ISSUE whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-
born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
RULING WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

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 As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected
as member of the House of Representatives.

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation,
and (3) by direct act of Congress

 Coquilla v. Comelec, G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002

PARTIES
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING

. Election
 Codilla v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002
PARTIES
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING

Privilege from Arrest

 People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, Feb. 3, 2000
PARTIES PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
BRIEF The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national
CASE penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts1 is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted
in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
FACTS  He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their
representative in Congress. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from
pending criminal cases.
ISSUE Can the accused Congressman be granted immunity from arrest
RULING the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

A Senator of Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

It was never the intention of the framers of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions to shield a member of Congress from the
consequences of his wrongdoing. Thus, despite the widening of its scope to include criminal offenses, the privilege
from arrest is still circumscribed by the nature or the gravity of the offenses of which the accused is charged. Hence,
the commission of serious crimes, i.e., crimes punishable by afflictive penalties or with capital punishment, does not fall
within the scope of the constitutional privilege. A member of Congress could only invoke the immunity from arrest for
relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by correctional penalties.
Madame Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago in holding that accused-appellant's motion is bereft of
any legal merit.

Privilege of Speech and Debate

 Osmeña v. Pendatun, G.R. L-17144, Oct. 28, 1960
PARTIES
BRIEF About privilege speech
CASE

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FACTS
ISSUE
RULING

 Antonio v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-26526, May 27, 1974

PARTIES GAUDENCIO E. ANTONINO v. BRIGIDO R. VALENCIA
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS Lorenzo Sarmiento of the Liberal Party lost to Vicente Duterte of the Nacionalista Party in the election for governor in
Davao.

Subsequently, Senator Antonino issued a statement that the loss was caused by the support given by Valencia, the
Secretary of Public Works, to the independent LP candidate Maglana which caused a division in LP votes. Antonino
was quoted in various newspapers that had Valencia not “Sabotaged” and “double-crossed” them, the LP would have
won.

Antonino then proceeded to file requests to have Valencia investigated by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on
alleged anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and equipment.

Valencia retaliated by issuing a press release that he will also file charges with the Blue Ribbon Committee regarding
anomalous acts of the Senator. This release was published in newspapers

Antonino filed this case of damages. Valencia filed a counter-claim. Lower court ruled in favor of Antonino. Valencia
appealed. Antonino died and was substituted by Senator Antonino (Wife)
ISSUE W/N the Press Release is libelous
RULING

The statements issued were defamatory and libelous in nature as they imputed upon him certain corrupt practices.
Also, because the statement was not issued privately or officially, malice is presumed and such presumption was not
overcome as
Valencia did not prove the truth of his statements or that they were published with good intentions and with a justifiable
motive or that they were made in the exercise of the right of fair comment on the character, good faith, ability and
sincerity of public officials.

. Incompatible and Forbidden Offices

 Adaza v. Pacana, 135 SCRA 431
PARTIES HOMOBONO ADAZA, petitioner,vs.
FERNANDO PACANA, JR., respondent
BRIEF The issues posed for determination in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
CASE restraining order are: [1] whether or not a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas
Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the functions of both offices simultaneously; and [2] whether or not a vice-
governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost, can continue serving as vice-governor and
subsequently succeed to the office of governor if the said office is vacated.
FACTS  Petitioner Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental
 Elected vice-governor for said province in the same elections was respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., who likewise
qualified for and assumed said office
 respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections; petitioner
Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the
candidates, while respondent lost.
 Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has brought this petition to exclude
respondent therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be
the governor of the province until his term expires
 Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be considered to have abandoned or resigned from the
position of vice-governor when he lost in the Batas Pambansa elections, he could no longer continue to serve as
vice-governor, much less assume the office of governor.
ISSUE WON Adaza should still discharge his duties as governor despite his election as mambabatas
RULING WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

when respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after the Batas Pambansa elections, he was acting within
the law. His succession to the governorship was equally legal and valid, the same being in accordance with Section
204[2] [a] of the same Local Government Code,

Sec. 48. Permanent Vacancy in the Office of the Governor, City or Municipal Mayor — [1] In case a permanent
vacancy arises when a governor, city or municipal mayor refuses to assume office, fails to qualify; dies, or is removed
from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office, the
vice-governor, city or municipal vice-mayor, as the case may be, shall assume the office for the unexpired term of the
former.

Section 10 A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa shall not hold any other office or employment
in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled
corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet. ...

Inhibitions and Disqualifications

 Puyat v. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 33
PARTIES EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO,
RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners,

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 vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange Commission,
EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA,
JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
BRIEF This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order of respondent Associate
CASE Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez
leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
FACTS  After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held, one group, the
respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioning the election.
 Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as
counsel for respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no
Assemblyman could “appear as counsel before any administrative body,” and SEC was an administrative body.
 Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero. Assemblyman Fernandez had
purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero. Following the notarization of
Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he filed a motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI
shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation.
 The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’ ownership of the said 10 shares.
ISSUE Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec.
11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution
RULING WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC
Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby made
permanent.

SEC. 11. Contitution

No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction.

before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the
adverse party,

or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office,

or before any administrative body.

Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, during his term of office.

He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be called to act on account of his
office.

. Officers
 Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, Nov. 18, 1998
PARTIES SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA,
BRIEF Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule
CASE 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate
and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
FACTS During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to the position
of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate President.

Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the
minority, he was assuming position of minority leader.

He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for
him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.”

However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had chosen
Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.
ISSUE Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate minority
leader
RULING WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of
all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
“minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate
shall automatically become the minority leader.

Sec 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President, a President Pro Tempore, a Secretary,
and a Sergeant-at-Arms.

History would also show that the "majority" in either house of Congress has referred to the political party to which the
most number of lawmakers belonged, while the "minority" normally referred to a party with a lesser number of
members.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to determine the rules of its proceedings."

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 44 Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal affairs.

Quorum
 Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17
PARTIES JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
BRIEF Jose Avelino submitted a petition for quo warranto to the Supreme Court after Mariano Cuenco replaced him as Senate
CASE President after he abandoned his Chair and left the session hall on February 21, 1949.
FACTS During the session on February 21, 1949, Senator Tanada had been granted the right to speak in session to talk about
charges he drew up against Senate President Avelino.

Senate had reached quorum but the session did not start because Avelino had not yet opened the session. Before
opening it, he read the written resolution of Tanada and Senator Sanidad on his charges. When he finally did, he used
a lot of dilatory tactics to postpone Tanada’s speech.

Disorderly conduct happened so Senator David filed a motion for adjournment but it was opposed by Senator Sanidad.
Avelino banged his gavel and immediately left the session hall followed by Senator David, Senator Tirona, Senator
Francisco, Senator Torres, Senator Magalona, Senator Clarin.

Session continued with Senator Arranz as Senate President Pro-tempore.

Resolution 68 (ordering the investigation of charges filed against the Senate President, Jose Avelino) and 67 (declaring
vacant the Senate President chair and designating Mariano Cuenco as acting Senate President) were approved by the
remaining senators present.

Mariano Cuenco took an oath and was recognized by the president of the Philippines.
Jose Avelino filed for a petition to declare himself the rightful Senate President and to oust Mariano Cuenco.
ISSUE Whether or not resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
RULING the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. Without costs.

YES. The session was not adjourned validly and a there was majority of each House to constitute a quorum to do
business despite the number of senators who walked out of the session hall so resolutions were approved validly.

Each department has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.

Discipline of Members
 Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001
PARTIES MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S.
BALAJADIA AND MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for violation of Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago.

It was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions,
approved the application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens.

The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.
ISSUE WON, the Sandiganbayan has the authority to order a preventive suspension to Sen. Defensor-Santiago.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support

It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its
own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed sixty days.”

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 118364, Aug. 10, 1996

PARTIES ERLA A. SEGOVIA, REYNALDO C. SANTIAGO, and WINIFREDO SM. PANGILINAN, petitioners, vs.
The SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and the PRESIDENT of the NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, respondents.
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS Petitioner Paredes was formerly a Provincial Governor. While he was governor, charges of violations of RA 3019 (the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) were filed against him before the Sandiganbayan.

Subsequently, he was elected to Congress. During his second term in Congress, the Sandiganbayan imposed a
preventive suspension on him pursuant to the anti-graft law. Paredes challenged the authority of the Sandiganbayan to

129
 suspend a representative.

Paredes invokes Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution which deals with the power of each House of Congress to inter alia
“punish its Members for disorderly behavior” and “suspend or expel a Member” by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed 60 days.
ISSUE May the Sandiganbayan suspend Rep. Paredes?
RULING WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal
prosecution against him. This Court has repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is mandatory . . . , and there
are no "ifs" and "buts" about it.

Paredes’ invocation of Sec 16 (3), Art VI is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of
in Sec 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary preventive measure. Sec 13, RA 3019 is not being
imposed on Paredes for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.

Journals
Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268
PARTIES
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING

 Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703

PARTIES
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS RA 7354 entitled “An Act Creating the Phil Postal Corp, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing
for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith” provides in sec 35 thereof that all franking
privileges authorized by law are thereby repealed with some exceptions.

It thus withdrew the franking privilege of the SC, CA and trial courts of the Phils among other agencies. Petitioners
argue, among others, that said Sec 35 is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes contrary to
Art VI, Sec 26(1) of the Constitution.
They further argue that Sec 35 was not included in the original version of the Senate and House bill from which RA
7354 evolved.

As that appeared only in the Conference Committee Report after the last reading of the bill, its addition, they allege,
violates Art VI, Sec 26(2) of the Constitution.
ISSUE Was RA 7354 duly enacted in accordance to Art VI, Sec 26(2)?
RULING ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land
Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The
temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.

Aside from holding that the Conference Committee may deal generally with subject matter and not merely limited to
resolving differences between the two Houses, the Court declined to look into the charges that RA 7354 was not
enacted with the formalities mandated by the Constitution in Art VI Sec 26(2) holding that both the enrolled bill and
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted in accordance to said constitutional mandate. The Court
held that it is bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the govt, to which it owes, at the very
least, a becoming courtesy.

The Electoral Tribunals

Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139
PARTIES JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents.
BRIEF This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
CASE to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest
filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly
for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
FACTS  Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of
member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
 On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for
garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly
passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara.
 On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he
be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly.
 Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
 On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question
was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
 Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking

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 further cognizance of Ynsua's protest.
 He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards
the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear
the case.
ISSUE Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the
protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution
of the National Assembly?
RULING The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as
"the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution).
It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792

PARTIES DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner, vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or
any other representative who may be appointed vice representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.
BRIEFCASE

FACTS  In the 1987 elections, respondent Pineda of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was proclaimed winner over
rival petitioner Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) for the position of Representative for the 4th District of
Pampanga.
 Bondoc filed a protest with HRET and was proclaimed winner over Pineda after revision, reexamination and
reappreciation of the ballots. Among the members of the HRET who voted for proclamation of Bondoc was Rep.
Camasura of the LDP.
 Declaring Camasura to have committed a complete betrayal of loyalty to LDP, he was expelled from the party and,
upon the request of LDP, his election to the HRET was rescinded. The promulgation of Bondoc as winner was
then cancelled due to the consequent lack of the required concurrence of five members of the Tribunal.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE May the House of Representatives, at the request of a political party, change that party’s representation in the HRET?
RULING the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted.

The resolution... removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP,... is a
clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of... the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election
contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members.

The Commission on Appointments

 Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496
PARTIES REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner, vs.
REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent.
BRIE CASE
FACTS After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve
seats in the Commission on Appointments in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul
A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in
the House of Representatives. On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its
representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this
to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except
the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments
and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.
ISSUE Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission on Appointments
RULING WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The
Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is
entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as to
costs.

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission
shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also

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 subsequently thereto NOT the court.

Guingona v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971, Oct. 20, 1992

PARTIES TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., AND LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-NUCD),
petitioners, vs.
NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, respondents.
BRIEF In motions separately filed by respondent Senator Wigberto E. Tañada on October 27, 1992 and respondents Senate
CASE President Neptali A. Gonzales and Senator Alberto Romulo on October 30, 1992, said respondents moved for a
reconsideration of our decision
FACTS In the 1992 elections, the Senate was composed of 15 members from LDP, five from NPC, three from the LAKAS-
NUCD and one from the LP-PDPLABAN. In accordance with the rule of proportional representation in electing
members to the Commission on Appointments (CA), LDP was entitled to 7.5 seats, NPC to 2.5 seats, LAKAS-NUCD to
1.5 seats and LPPDP-LABAN 0.5 seat. In the approved composition of the CA, eight were from LDP and one from LP-
PDP-LABAN. Sen. Guingona now files this petition to prohibit Sen. Pres. Gonzales, as ex officio Chairman of the CA,
from recognizing the membership of the 8th representative from LDP and the lone member of the LP-PDP-LABAN on
the ground that it was violative of the rule of proportional representation.
ISSUE Was the constitutional rule on proportional representation in the CA violated when LDP rounded up its membership by
½ a seat?
RULING Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED with FINALITY.

In converting the fractional ½ membership into a whole, one other party’s fractional membership is made greater while
the other suffers diminution of its rightful membership.

The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada as members of the Commission on Appointments by the LDP
Majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Their nomination and
election by the LDP Majority by sheer force of superiority in numbers during the Senate organization meeting of August
27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with the command
of the Constitution, and by reason of numerical strength, knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said exercise
amounts to abuse of authority granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly found to exist.

Legislative Power in General

 Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230
PARTIES RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of Defense, PEDRO
GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR
MARINO, Secretary of Justice, respondents.
BRIEF This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction.
CASE
FACTS  Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources.
 Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or
amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency."
 Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by the President of the
Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice and
Corn administration and any other government agency from importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates
that only private parties may import rice under its provisions.
 They contended that the government has already constitute valid executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma,
that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail and the conflict be resolved under the
American jurisprudence.
ISSUE W/N the executive agreements entered is valid.
RULING WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had and has no power to
authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority; said importation is not
sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed
for must be and is, accordingly denied. It is so ordered.

Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. He may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not
defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an
executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

. Procedure
 Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999
Title of the Case Lacson v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No. 128096, January 1999

When January 20, 1999

promulgated
Panfilo M. Lacson, Petitioner

The Executive Secretary, The Sandiganbayan, Office Of The Special Prosecutor, The Department Of Justice,
Parties Myrna Abalora, Nenita Alap-Ap, Imelda Pancho Montero, And The People Of The Philippines, Respondent

Romeo M. Acop And Francisco G. Zubia, Jr., Petitioner-Intervenors

Brief In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
Background or reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila,
story where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence
Task Group (ABRITG)

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 Upon military investigation, the said incident was a legitimate police operation.1

A review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding
and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents

Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11)
information for murder2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division

Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information,3 the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action.4

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended
informations5 before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory

On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.
Claims of
people or
complaint
Claims of The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 — an act which further defines the jurisdiction of
accused the Sandiganbayan — is being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus

Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to
prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple
murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
Relevant Issue Whether, the sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case

Whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers
Ruling of Lower The Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the
Court Sandiganbayan. 
Ruling of CA The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained

The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is
hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said cases
Ruling of SC; -
acquit or convict
Reasoning While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder
"in relation to their public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by
the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise,
the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then
killed the latter while in their custody.
Relevant R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in
doctrine from order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.6
the case
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over
criminal cases committed by the public officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled
corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by law."

An offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with
the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.

 Farinas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003

PARTIES RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
BRIEF Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of
CASE Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
FACTS  Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Elections Practices, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring every law to have only one subject which should be in expressed in its title.
 The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.
The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and
the elimination of unfair election practices.
 Sec 67 of the OEC imposes a limitation of officials who run for office other than the one they are holding in a
permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The repeal of Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of
RA 9006.
ISSUE W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes
effective.
RULING WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the
Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. The purported dissimilarity of

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 Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of the RA 9006 does not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has
held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

Title of Bills
PHILCONSA v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479
PARTIES
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING

Approval of Bills
 Bolinao Electronics Corp. v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486
PARTIES
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING

Legislative Inquiries
 Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767
PARTIES JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR., LEONARDO
GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN
ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and through the CHAIRMAN, HON.
WIGBERTO TAÑADA, respondents, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, intervenor.
BRIEF This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injuective relief, to
CASE enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at
its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or
thirty-nine (39) corporations.
FACTS PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for engaging in devices, schemes and
stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and the Filipino people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over personal
privilege before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First Manila Management of
Companies or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the
case with regard to RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the SBRC continued its investigation of the
matter.

The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the SBRC in requiring
their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of the defendants of the civil case.
ISSUE Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose.
RULING WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts, including the circumtance that
petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues
intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondet Committee, the respondent Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it
and produce evidence at the said inquiry.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination
of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend
to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.

It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of
legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA
No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts
rather than of the legislature.

Senate Blue Ribbon v. Judge Majaducon, G.R. No. 136760, July 19, 2003
PARTIES THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, represented by its Chairman, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.,
Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE B. MAJADUCON, Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, and ATTY.
NILO J. FLAVIANO, Respondents.
BRIEF certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and preliminary injunction, assailing the resolution dated November 11, 1998 of
CASE Judge Jose S. Majaducon of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 23, which denied the Senate Blue

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 Ribbon Committee’s motion to dismiss the petition for prohibition, injunction with writ of preliminary injunction filed by
private respondent Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano; and (b) G.R. No. 138378, for review of the resolution dated April 15, 1999 of
respondent Judge Majaducon declaring petitioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. guilty of indirect contempt of court.
FACTS  This case had its aegis when the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an inquiry into the alleged
mismanagement of the funds and investment of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System
(AFP-RSBS).

 During the public hearings by the Blue Ribbon Committee, it appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot from
Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano worth P10,500 per square meter. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds
indicated that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000 per square meter.
 The Committee caused the service of a subpoena to Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before it.
 Respondent refused to appear and filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for
temporary restraining order with the RTC of General Santos City.
 The trial court issued a TRO directing the committee to cease and desist from proceeding with the inquiry.
 The Committee filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a valid cause of
action.
 The Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that Judge Majaducon
committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE Whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed the petition
for prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
RULING WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 136760 and 138378 are GRANTED. The
resolution of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 23, in Special Civil Case No. 496 dated
November 11, 1998, which denied the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee’s motion to dismiss, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the trial court on November 11, 1998 is DISSOLVED. The
resolution dated April 15, 1999, which declared Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. guilty of indirect contempt of court, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for indirect contempt is ordered DISMISSED.

This is clearly provided in Article 6, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution:

The Senate of the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.

On the other hand, there was in this case a clear legislative purpose, and this is to look into the reported misuse and
mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the intention of enacting appropriate legislation to protect the rights and
interests of the officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The Power of Appropriation

 Comelec v. Judge Quijano-Padilla and Photokina Marketing, G.R. No. 151992, Sept. 18, 2002
PARTIES
BRIEF Before us is a petition for certiorari alleging that respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla of the Regional Trial
CASE Court, Branch 215, Quezon City, committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the (a) Resolution1 dated December
19, 2001 granting private respondents application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction in Special Civil Action
No. Q-01-454052; and (b) Resolution3 dated February 7, 2002 denying petitioners Omnibus Motion to dismiss the
petition and their motion for reconsideration of the same Resolution and granting private respondent's application for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
FACTS  On September 9, 1999, the COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the supply and installations of
information technology equipment and ancillary services for its Voter’s Registration and Identification System
Project or VRIS Project.
 Private respondent Photokina Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA) pre-qualified and was allowed to participate
as one of the bidders. After the public bidding was conducted, PHOTOKINA’s bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion
Pesos garnered the highest total weighted score and was declared the winning bidder.
 Thus, on September 28, 2000, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3252 approving the Notice of Award to
PHOTOKINA, which, in turn, immediately accepted the same.
 The parties then proceeded to formalize the contract, with Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain and Atty. Rodrigo D.
Sta. Ana, acting as negotiators for the COMELEC and PHOTOKINA, respectively.
 However, under Republic Act No. 8760 ]the budget appropriated by Congress for the COMELECs modernization
project was only One (1) Billion Pesos and that the actual available funds under the Certificate of Availability of
Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief Accountant of the COMELEC was only P1.2 Billion Pesos.
 COMELEC Chairman Benipayo announced VRIS Project has been “scrapped, junked, or set aside.” Thus,
PHOTOKINA filed with QC RTC Branch 215 a petition to compel COMELEC to formalize the contract.
ISSUE Whether or not a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it notwithstanding that its
bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the project?
RULING WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 19, 2001 and February 7, 2002 issued by
respondent Judge Padilla are SET ASIDE. Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to formalize the contract. Since PHOTOKINA’s
bid is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is not binding upon the
COMELEC and is considered void.

Section 46 of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that “No contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall
be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor, the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is
sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure” while Section 47 states “no contract involving the expenditure of public
funds by any government agency shall be entered into or authorized unless the proper accounting official of the agency
concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the
purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current calendar year is available for
expenditure on account thereof, subject to verification by the auditor concerned” (not complete provision. Just the

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 pertinent parts)

Implied Limitations
 Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works and Communications, 110 Phil. 331
PARTIES WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of Rizal, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
BRIEF Appeal, by petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissing the above
CASE entitled case and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction
FACTS  Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground
that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for public works particularly for the construction and improvement of
Pasig feeder road terminals.
 Some of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the petition, were
nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging
to private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not connect any
government property or any important premises to the main highway.
 The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because people living in the subdivision will directly be
benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the government also gains from the donation of the land
supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to the government.
ISSUE Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of justifying an expenditure of the
government?
RULING Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the records are remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance against respondent Jose C. Zulueta. It is
so ordered. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Pascual.

As a taxpayer, Pascual had legal standing. The SC also ruled that the subject appropriation was illegal because it
appropriated public funds for the improvement of private property. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is
correlative with its right to tax, and under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes. Taxing
power must be exercised for public purposes only.

The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to
promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to
individuals might incidentally serve the public.

Constitutional Limitations
Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208
PARTIES
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS  Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977)
—as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general interest common to all people of
the Philippines, and as taxpayers—on the primary grounds that Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by
authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys, amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the
President to override the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.

 The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners and held that one
branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in its performance of duties within its
sphere of responsibility.
 It also alleged that the petition has become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under consideration was enacted
in pursuant thereof), which states that “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however,
the President…may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”
ISSUE W/N PD 1177 is constitutional
RULING Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.

Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by empowering the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the Executive Department to any program of any department
included in the General Appropriations Act, without any regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item. It not only disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an
undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.

Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds to naught. Such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

Appropriations for Sectarian Purposes

 Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201
PARTIES Petitioner: Gregorio Aglipay
Respondent: Juan Ruiz
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS The government had authorized a special stamp issue on the occasion of the observance in Manila of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress under the sponsorship of the Catholic Church. The petitioner, as head of the

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 Philippine Independent Church, assailed the measure, contending that it violated the Constitution because it benefited
a particular religion; thus he sought to prohibit the issuance and selling of the stamps commemorative of the event.
ISSUE Whether or not the authorized stamp issue be declared invalid for violating the principle of separation of Church and
State.
RULING The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.
Therefore, the stamp issue was held to be valid.

The issuance of the postage stamps in question was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The only purpose
was “to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country.” The stamps were not issue and sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The
officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance “to give publicity to the
Philippines and its people”.
Ponente: J. Laurel

Special Funds
 Osmeña v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993
PARTIES JOHN H. OSMEÑA vs. OSCAR ORBOS
BRIEF
CASE
FACTS  October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General Fund,
designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF).
 The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum
products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil.
Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account,". President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated
E. O. 137 expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost under recovery incurred as
a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products.
 The petitioner argues inter alia that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as amended, must be treated
as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a specific
purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the purpose
indicated, and not channeled to another government objective."
 Petitioner further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a
State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for
which it was created."
ISSUE Whether or Not the invalidity of the "TRUST ACCOUNT" in the books of account of the Ministry of "said creation of a
trust fund being contrary to Section 29 (3), Article VI of the Constitution.
RULING WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED insofar as it prays for the nullification of the reimbursement of financing
charges, paid pursuant to E.O. 137, and DISMISSED in all other respects.

It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police
power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137.
It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the
fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures
comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund."

. The Power of Taxation

 Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 14 SCRA 292
PARTIES REV. FR. CASIMIRO LLADOC, petitioner, vs.
The COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and The COURT of TAX APPEALS, respondents.
BRIEF CASE
FACTS  Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the
parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Lladoc, for the construction of a new
Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was spent for such purpose.
 On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of
Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest.
 Petitioner lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof. The protest and the motion
for reconsideration presented to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue were denied
 The petitioner appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals
ISSUE Whether the petitioner is liable for the assessed donee’s gift tax on the donated for the construction of the Victorias
Parish Church.
RULING The decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed insofar as tax liability is concerned; it is modified, in the
sense that petitioner herein is not personally liable for the said gift tax, and that the Head of the Diocese, herein
substitute petitioner, should pay, as he is presently ordered to pay, the said gift tax, without special, pronouncement
as to costs.

imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article VI of the Constitution contemplates exemption only
from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as Property taxes contra distinguished from Excise taxes The
imposition of the gift tax on the property used for religious purpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not
a property by way of gift inter vivos.

The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition of the donee's tax on
the property donated to the church for religious purpose.

. Referendum and Initiative

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  Garcia v. Comelec, G.R. No. 111230, Sept. 30, 1994
PARTIES ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MORONG, BATAAN, respondents.
BRIEF CASE
FACTS  On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong as part of the Subic Special
Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227.
 The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission; so, they resorted to
their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. They solicited the required number of
signatures to repeal the said resolution.
 However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding Office of the Sangguniang Bayan ng
Morong wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to deny the petition for local initiative and/or referendum.
 On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local initiative because its subject is “merely a resolution and
not an ordinance.”
ISSUE w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an initiative?
RULING The petition is granted and the decision of the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set aside.

it cannot be gained that petitioners were denied due process. They were not furnished a copy of the letter-petition of
Vice Mayor Edilberto M. de Leon to the respondent COMELEC praying for denial of their petition for a local initiative
on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. Worse, respondent COMELEC granted the petition without
affording petitioners any fair opportunity to oppose it. This procedural lapse is fatal for at stake is not an ordinary right
but the sanctity of the sovereignty of the people, their original power to legislate through the process of initiative. Ours
is the duty to listen and the obligation to obey the voice of the people. It could well be the only force that could foil the
mushrooming abuses in government.

The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people regarding legislation because of the event in February
1986. The new Constitution became “less trusting of public officials.”

Through initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution under Sec. 2 Art. 17 which provides
“amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
3% of the registered voter therein.”

The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
initiative and referendum.

PARTIES
BRIEF CASE
FACTS 
ISSUE
RULING

PARTIES
BRIEF CASE
FACTS 
ISSUE
RULING

CONSTI 1- Kathryn Mae T. Cuaresma Assignment

D. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

Ministerio v. City of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464

Facts:
Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
dated April 13, 1966, sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot,
containing an area of 1045 square meters, alleging that in 1927 the National
Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material
possession of it and used it for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road,
Cebu City, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written
or verbal.
There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its
possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General
refused to restore its possession.

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Issue: Whether or not the defendant is immune from suit

Ruling: Accordingly, the lower court decision is reversed so that the court may proceed
with the complaint and determine the compensation to which petitioners are entitled.
According to Article III, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the Constitution: "Private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."

E. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

People v. Larin, G.R. No. 128777, October 7, 1998
Facts: That on or about April 17, 1996, inside the ladies' shower room located at the
Baker's Hall, UP Los Baños, Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
ERNESTO LARIN, who is a public employee of the U.P. Los Baños, by taking
advantage of his authority, influence and moral ascendancy as trainor/swimming
instructor of 14 y.o. minor XXX YYY, and through moral compulsion, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, commit lascivious conduct on the person of said
minor.
When arraigned on July 17, 1996,[5] the appellant, with the assistance of Counsel de
Parte Cayetano T. Santos, entered a plea of not guilty and thereafter waived the pretrial
proceedings.

Issues: Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of a
violation of Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610

Ruling: The appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, but the
award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000. Costs against appellant. Thus, it
imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the
sum of P100,000 as moral damages.
Section 5, Article III[16] of RA 7610, states:
"SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -- Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
"The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
"(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x."(Italics supplied.)
The elements of the offense penalized under this provision are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

F. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Philippine Bar Association v. Comelec, G.R. No. 72915, Dec. 20, 1985
FACTS:
A number of petitions assail the validity of B.P Blg. 883 calling for a special election for
a President and Vice-president on February 7, 1986. Marcos gave a conditional
resignation where he shall vacate the position only when a winner has been proclaimed
and qualified by taking his oath 10 days after the proclamation. Petitioners question the
validity of Marcos’ resignation as it did not create the vacancy needed for a special
election to be held and pray for prohibition to acts in relation to B.P. Blg. 883

Issue: Is the B.P Blg. 883 unconstitutional?

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Ruling: The Court failed to have 10 votes to declare B.P. Blg. 883. Unconstitutional.
Whereas the original issue on B.P Blg. 883’s constitutionality, the issue has now
transformed into a political question where only the sovereign people can decide in a
fair, clean and honest election. As such, the Court dismissed the petitions and denied
their prayers of prohibition.

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