Professional Documents
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Flight Operations Monitoring
Flight Operations Monitoring
Flight Operations Support & Services getting to grips with FOM Flight Operations Monitoring hanbook - Septembre 2007
AIRBUS S.A.S.
31707 BLAGNAC CEDEX, FRANCE
CONCEPT DESIGN GDCOS
PHOTOS BY AIRBUS
SEPTEMBER 2007
PRINTED IN FRANCE
REFERENCE A237/07
© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2007
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
AIRBUS, ITS LOGO, A300, A310, A318,
A319, A320, A321, A330, A340, A350, A380,
A400M ARE REGISTERED TRADEMARKS
Proprietary document.
FOM
involves a number of factors which could change
over time, affecting the true public representa-
tion. Airbus assumes no obligation to update any
information contained in this document or with
respect to the information described herein. The
statements made herein do not constitute an
offer or form part of any contract. They are based
on Airbus information and are expressed in good
faith but no warranty or representation is given
as to their accuracy. When additional information
Flight Operations Monitoring handbook
is required, Airbus S.A.S can be contacted to pro-
vide further details. Airbus S.A.S shall assume no
liability for any damage in connection with the Septemlbre 2007
use of this Brochure and the materials it con-
tains, even if Airbus S.A.S has been advised of
the likelihood of such damages. This licence is
governed by French law and exclusive jurisdic-
tion is given to the courts and tribunals of
Toulouse (France) without prejudice to the right of
Flight Operations Support & Services
Airbus to bring proceedings for infringement of
copyright or any other intellectual property right
Flight Operations Monitoring handbook
in any other court of competent jurisdiction.
Septembre 2003
Flight Operations Support & Services
Customer Services
1, rond-point Maurice Bellonte, BP 33
31707 BLAGNAC Cedex FRANCE
Telephone (+33) 5 61 93 33 33
PRELIMINARY NOTE
This brochure is a part of a package of guidance materials and software designed to help
AIRBUS operators to implement a Flight Operation Monitoring System. Its aim is to give you a
general understanding of Flight Operation Monitoring and its key benefits. Additional resources
are listed in the “Further information” section of this brochure.
This is not a regulatory approved document and its contents do not supersede any
requirements mandated by the State of Registry of the operator’s aircraft, nor does it
supersede nor amend AIRBUS’ type specific AFM, FCOM, MMEL documentation or any other
approved documentation.
You can contact AIRBUS Customer Support - Flight Operations Support and Services Department
and speak to a Flight Operation Monitoring Expert Pilot or specialist if you have any questions
about Flight Operation Monitoring.
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PRELIMINARY NOTE Getting to grips with FOM
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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Getting to grips with FOM DEFINITIONS
DEFINITIONS
Monitor: To check, supervise, observe and record the progress of an activity on a regular basis
in order to identify change by reference to defined standards.
Risk: The chance of something happening that will have an impact upon objectives. It is
measured in terms of consequences and likelihood.
Risk analysis: A systematic use of available information to determine how often specified
events may occur and the magnitude of their consequences.
Risk assessment: The process used to determine risk management priorities by comparing the
level of risk against predetermined standards, target risk levels or other criteria.
Risk identification: The process of determining what can happen, why and how.
Risk level: The level of risk calculated as a function of likelihood and consequence.
SMS: SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. An organized approach to managing safety, including the
necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures.
AMC: ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE. JAR AMC illustrate a means, or several alternative
means, but not necessarily the only possible means by which a requirement can be met.
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DEFINITIONS Getting to grips with FOM
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Getting to grips with FOM TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Getting to grips with FOM
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Getting to grips with FOM WHAT IS FOM ?
WHAT IS FOM ?
The Flight Operation Monitoring (FOM) concept presented below is a straightforward way of
managing the safety aspects of an airline’s flight operations. This it is an integral part of a
Safety Management System (SMS) as mandated by ICAO from 2009. It is easily adapted to suit
the differing State rules and operating environments around the world. It offers sufficient
flexibility so it can be applied by small operators, yet it is sufficiently rigorous to be the
foundation for flight operations departments operating complex international networks. The
proposed concept is based on best safety practices in world aviation.
GLOBAL CONCEPT
The goal of FOM is to monitor flight activities and warn of risks that threaten flight operations
so that safety can be managed as proactively as practicable.
A FOM system is an integrated set of practices and procedures for monitoring and improving
the safety of flight operations. As with all systems, a FOM system involves goal setting,
planning, documentation and the measuring of performance against goals.
In order to be effective, the FOM system must be purposeful and appropriate to the operation.
To determine the appropriate FOM level and focus, the nature and degree of safety
requirement has to be determined by assessing the risks to which the airline’s flight operations
are exposed. Then the ongoing Flight Operation Monitoring activities provide information to
continuously be ahead of risks by proactively tailoring procedures, training and the airline’s
structure in order to establish robust defenses to ensure that errors do not result in incidents
or accidents. In other words, FOM helps you identify, classify and manage safety risks of your
flight operations, and provides a framework on which to build a sound business.
Regardless of the size of the operation, all successful FOM systems will be founded on (but not
limited to) five key elements:
Airline Safety Policy defines the safety standards of the operation (flight, ground and
maintenance) and determines the safety culture; it is a high level statement of desired
airline’s safety performance that provides:
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WHAT IS FOM ? Getting to grips with FOM
The organizational size of the airline, the number of aircraft, and the complexity of the flight
operations guide the contents of the policy.
*(An agreement with flight crews for strict anonymity and confidentiality in use of the data,
and with all other personnel involved to ensure total cooperation in the project is an essential
point of safety policy).
A Flight Operations Risk Profile is a “living document” that must be periodically updated. A
good practice is to update the Flight Operations Risk Profile every three years, and each time
an operational change is introduced.
Airlines with higher risk profiles require more thorough safety management strategies than
those operating at lower risk levels. Even operations with a generally low risk profile
experience areas where FOM activity should focus.
The tools and activities described in the strategy must reflect the nature and level of risk
identified in the Flight Operations Risk Profile. The FOM strategy will be evaluated to ensure
that it is appropriate and that it is being applied.
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Getting to grips with FOM WHAT IS FOM ?
1. Systems for identifying all applicable laws, regulations and standards, including all
approvals, authorizations, exemptions and permitted deviations;
2. Documentation identifying and defining flight operations department personnel
responsibilities and accountabilities for safety, and for the performance or
management of all flight operations' activities;
3. Manuals or other documents addressing:
a. Aircraft operations and maintenance status;
b. Personnel training programs and competency certification in accordance with
State requirements; and
c. Aeronautical information.
4. Systems for ensuring that all flight operations department personnel have the
necessary qualifications, skills, competencies, training, equipment and tools necessary
to enable them to exercise their responsibilities in a safe manner;
All airlines must have a Flight Operations Supervision and Management system that is
appropriate for the organizational size of the company, the number of aircraft, and the
complexity of the flight operations.
The safety actions tracking system is the mechanism to document, track, and evaluate the
effectiveness of safety measures. The design of the system will depend on the size of the flight
operations department and the nature of the operation. It should be integrated with all other
systems especially the quality system.
All operators require some type of hazard identification and safety actions tracking system. In
a flight operations department with only a few people operating in a low-risk environment, it
may be very rudimentary. Nevertheless, it should include a system to formally track identified
hazards, and to review the trends and evolution. Airlines of a significant size with complex
operational, technical, or human elements should have comprehensive hazard identification
and tracking program supervised by dedicated Safety committee.
Safety supervising body (such as a Safety Committee) should ensure that required actions are
assigned a priority appropriate to the level of risk indicated in the company Flight Operations
Risk Profile. For instance, concerns regarding weather conditions should be given high priority
if wind shear during landing and take-off has been identified as a safety critical area in the
company profile.
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WHAT IS FOM ? Getting to grips with FOM
A change management process normally involves some form of safety planning to demonstrate
that hazards associated with the change will be systematically identified and managed, and
that safety performance will be evaluated at an appropriate time and in an appropriate
manner after the change has been implemented.
Airlines that operate in stable low-risk environments need not maintain a change management
process. It is more appropriate for larger or complex operations, or those that frequently
experience significant change. The process should describe the types of changes requiring
examination, and document how the hazards and risk mitigation strategies will be developed,
documented and evaluated. Findings should be tracked in the hazard tracking system, and
when appropriate, used to update the Airline’s Flight Operations Risk Profile.
Operators in a low risk environment and those that have a record of effective management of
risks associated with the operation may only need an audit every three years. Those operating
in a high-risk environment or those without records of effective risk management (e.g.; new
operators) may need auditing annually. With demonstrated performance, the audit period can
be extended. Audits should also be considered after significant changes in a company’s
operational or management structure. Findings from the Safety Audit should be acted upon
with a priority that is appropriate to the degree of associated risk as documented in the
Airline’s Flight Operations Risk Profile, and tracked in the hazard tracking system.
Operational Reviews
An Operational Review is an internal examination of one or more parts of an airline’s flight
operation. The purpose of an Operational Review is to ensure that the critical aspects of the
flight operations are being effectively managed. Examples of issues that can be examined by
an Operational Review include company dispatch procedures, line maintenance practices,
operations from a particular site, and various operational practices and procedures. Findings
from an Operational Review are tracked in the hazard tracking system, and may be used to
update the airline’s Flight Operations Risk Profile and the FOM system.
In cases where there appears to be inappropriately high risk or ineffective risk management,
an operator should conduct an Operational Review. The findings should be addressed with a
priority appropriate to the degree of associated risk documented in the Airline’s Flight
Operations Risk Profile.
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Getting to grips with FOM WHAT IS FOM ?
Airline’s
Safety Policy
Flight Operations
Risk Profile
Standard Aircraft
Flight Profiles
FOM Feedback
Strategy
Safety Audits
Operational Reviews
FOM
Activities
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WHAT IS FOM ? Getting to grips with FOM
BENEFITS
A Flight Operations Monitoring system will assist you in meeting the following Safety related
goals:
• Meet your legal obligation with reference to flight operations' safety.
• Enhance the safety standards of your flight operations.
• Give you a preventative insight against the costs of incidents and accidents.
• Market the safety standards of your flight operation.
• Improve internal processes and communication.
Legal obligations
In the international air transport business, law places the responsibility for safety at senior
management level of an organization. Management can no longer remain distant from practices
and procedures established to identify safety deficiencies and reduce the potential for
accidents.
One proven way of increasing safety – and meeting legal obligations – is for an airline's
management to take a leadership role in building a Flight Operations Monitoring system
designed to proactively manage flight safety risks.
Failure to exercise these fundamentals still remains the prevalent factor in all accidents and
modern technology has done nothing to mitigate that fact.
A Flight Operations Monitoring system, which respects strict anonymity and confidentiality in
use of the data, is an essential point in enhancing the safety standards of your operation.
Economic aspects
Few organizations can come through the economic consequences of an accident or significant
incident without damage. The simplest way to reduce these costs is to proactively manage
flight safety risks by operating a FOM system.
Direct costs: Mostly relate to physical damage, and include replacing or compensating for
injuries, aircraft equipment and property damage.
Indirect costs: Are usually higher than direct costs, but are not as obvious and are often
delayed. Even a minor incident will incur indirect costs like: loss of business and damage to
reputation; legal and damages claims; increased insurance premiums; aircraft recovery and
clean up; loss of use of equipment.
Marketing advantages
A good safety reputation can contribute to profitability and business expansion. Improved
safety practices go hand-in-hand with good performance in a Safety audit.
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Getting to grips with FOM WHAT IS FOM ?
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Flight Data Monitoring
Flight-Data Recorders (FDRs) use can be traced back to wartime in the early 1940s, and were
legally required on civil airliners as "crash recorders" for accident investigation in the 1960s.
Early FDRs recorded the basic parameters required by the mandatory crash recorder: Airspeed,
Pressure Altitude, Magnetic Heading, Vertical Acceleration and Pitch Attitude.
These parameters were recorded at intervals between .2 and 1 second, on a metal wire that
was stored around a drum.
However the information gained by accident investigations using just this basic information,
such as for a UK aircraft accident at LHR in 1965, showed the great value of recorded flight
data. As a result, in 1966 it was suggested by the publication Flight International that more use
should be made of FDRs in normal service to “monitor pilot approach performance” and that
airline managements should be persuaded that “flight recorders aren’t just crash
recorders”…”they are pilot training aids”.
In the late 1960s the UK CAA sponsored the Civil Airworthiness Air Data Recording Programme
(CAADRP), where special recorders were fitted to the Comet, B707 and VC10 aircraft. This was
to obtain data on autopilot performance, and investigate the possible values of disturbances in
extreme weather conditions. Special events were triggered when specific parameters were
exceeded in turbulence, and the information was shared with NASA.
During this period, autoland was being developed, notably on the Caravelle and the Trident,
which required new FDRs, separate from the crash recorders, to record the large amounts of
data needed for certification of the autoland system for landings in low visibility. The Trident
FDR, for example, had data stored in a Quick Access Recorder on the flight deck, which crews
could remove after landing in order to be passed to engineering.
FDR data now contained sufficient parameters to be able to monitor flights effectively, and
the UK CAA sponsored the Special Events Search and Master Analysis (SESMA) programme for
the Flight Data Monitoring system to be developed by British Airways. British Airways has
continued to use this as its FDM programme with UK CAA involvement, and still keeps the name
SESMA.
By the early 1970s, all British Airways’ aircraft were monitored by an FDM programme. (FDR
data was used for Cat 2/3 autoland certification for the B747 in 1971-3, and for the
L1011/TriStar in 1974-77.)
Air France developed its own FDM programme in parallel, and in 1974 took the significant step
of obtaining a formal agreement between management and crew organizations to implement a
Flight Data Monitoring programme. See about AIR FRANCE in AIRLINES EXPERIENCE chapter.
Since the 1970s, both Air France and British Airways have had similar experience and benefits
from their FDM programs to those seen by the FAA FOQA 1995-2000 DEMOPROJ.
For example:
• Autoland certification - Safety improvement, regularity in low visibility.
• Reduced rushed approaches - Speed/altitude “gates” specified on approach.
• Engine life improvement - From improved autothrust usage, use of Reduced Climb
Thrust.
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WHAT IS FOM ? Getting to grips with FOM
The programs continue today in much the same form, but with modern computing and
communications technology the number of parameters monitored has increased from hundreds
to over 2,000. Increased sampling rates and decreased processing time means that many more
events can be encompassed. Whereas the complete analysis used to take some 5 weeks, now
most digitally recorded data can be analyzed within a day, and a crew member could then be
sent a file to display the flight, and events on his home PC.
Cockpit Observations
In line with the research work performed in the field of Human Factors, there was a need for
an operations observation system in order to try to identify areas of concern for safety, which,
by nature, were not covered by a FDM program.
Early in the 1980’s Pan American put in place observers in the cockpit. To feed its FOM
package Airbus developed LOAS (Line Operations Assessment System) on the basis of the TEM
(Threats and Errors Management) concept of LOSA (developed by University of Texas)
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Getting to grips with FOM REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
This chapter gives some indication about regulatory requirements concerning accident
prevention and flight safety programs. Like for all requirements, Authorities provide guidelines
for organization and for documentation of the activity. Airlines must choose how to implement
these guidelines and demonstrate to the authorities that the system put in place is in
accordance with the regulations.
You will notice that all these regulatory requirements stress the importance of Flight Data
Monitoring.
3.2.1 An operator shall establish and maintain an accident prevention and flight safety
programme.
Note.— Guidance on accident prevention is contained in the Accident Prevention Manual (Doc
9422) and in the Preparation of an Operations Manual (Doc 9376).
Note.— An operator may contract the operation of a flight data analysis programme to
another party while retaining overall responsibility for the maintenance of such a programme.
3.2.4 A flight data analysis programme shall be nonpunitive and contain adequate safeguards
to protect the source(s) of the data.
Note.— Guidance on flight data analysis programmes is contained in the Accident Prevention
Manual (Doc 9422).
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REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS Getting to grips with FOM
4.2.36 Some operators, who routinely examine FDR records for indications of hazards, or
deviations from standard operating procedures, have the findings reviewed by a committee
consisting of retired captains or flight crew. This group has the respect of both management
and pilots and thus avoids direct employer/employee contact. The fear of job loss or
punishment is thus avoided and the accident prevention insights are more readily obtained.
(b) Proposals for corrective action resulting from the accident prevention and flight safety
programme shall be the responsibility of the person accountable for managing the
programme.
(c) The effectiveness of changes resulting from proposals for corrective action identified by
the accident and flight safety programme shall be monitored by the Quality Manager.
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Getting to grips with FOM REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
the normal day to day procedures and ‘control’ systems and is not intended to duplicate
or supersede any of them. The scheme is a tool to identify those occasions where routine
procedures have failed. (Occurrences that have to be reported and responsibilities for
submitting reports are described in JAR-OPS 1.420.)
4. Occurrences should remain in the database when judged reportable by the person
submitting the report as the significance of such reports may only become obvious at a
later date.
[Amdt. 3, 01.12.01]
2. The manager of the accident prevention and flight safety programme, which includes the
FDM programme, is accountable for the discovery of issues and the transmission of these
to the relevant manager(s) responsible for the process(es) concerned. The latter are
accountable for taking appropriate and practicable safety action within a reasonable
period of time that reflects the severity of the issue.
Note: While an operator may contract the operation of a flight data analysis programme
to another party the overall responsibility remains with the operator’s accident
prevention and flight safety programme manager.
3.1 Identify areas of operational risk and quantify current safety margins.
3.2 Identify and quantify operational risks by highlighting when non-standard, unusual or
unsafe circumstances occur.
3.3 Use the FDM information on the frequency of occurrence, combined with an estimation of
the level of severity, to assess the safety risks and to determine which may become
unacceptable if the discovered trend continues.
3.4 Put in place appropriate procedures for remedial action once an unacceptable risk, either
actually present or predicted by trending, has been identified.
3.5 Confirm the effectiveness of any remedial action by continued monitoring.
4.1 Exceedence Detection: This looks for deviations from flight manual limits, and standard
operating procedures. A set of core events should be selected to cover the main areas of
interest to the operator. A sample list is in the Appendix. The event detection limits
should be continuously reviewed to reflect the operator’s current operating procedures.
4.2 All Flights Measurement: A system that defines what is normal practice. This may be
accomplished by retaining various snapshots of information from each flight.
4.3 Statistics: A series of measures collected to support the analysis process. These would be
expected to include the numbers of flights flown and analysed, aircraft and sector details
sufficient to generate rate and trend information.
5. Flight Data Monitoring Analysis, Assessment and Process Control Tools: The effective
assessment of information obtained from digital flight data is dependant on the provision
of appropriate information technology tool sets. A program suite may include: Annotated
data trace displays, engineering unit listings, visualisation for the most significant
incidents, access to interpretative material, links to other safety information, and
statistical presentations.
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REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS Getting to grips with FOM
highlighting examples in training and simulator exercises, periodic reports to industry and
the regulatory authority.
7. Accident and incident data requirements specified in JAR-OPS 1.160 take precedence over
the requirements of an FDM programme. In these cases the FDR data should be retained as
part of the investigation data and may fall outside the de-identification agreements.
8. Every crew member has a responsibility to report events described in JAR-OPS 1.085(b)
using the company occurrence reporting scheme detailed in JAR-OPS 1.037(a)(2).
Mandatory Occurrence Reporting is a requirement under JAR-OPS 1.420. Significant risk-
bearing incidents detected by FDM will therefore normally be the subject of mandatory
occurrence reporting by the crew. If this is not the case then they should submit a
retrospective report that will be included under the normal accident prevention and flight
safety process without prejudice.
9. The data recovery strategy should ensure a sufficiently representative capture of flight
information to maintain an overview of operations. Data analysis should be performed
sufficiently frequently to enable action to be taken on significant safety issues.
10. The data retention strategy should aim to provide the greatest safety benefits practicable
from the available data. A full data set should be retained until the action and review
processes are complete; thereafter, a reduced data set relating to closed issues can be
maintained for longer term trend analysis. Programme managers may wish to retain
samples of de-identified full-flight data for various safety purposes (detailed analysis,
training, benchmarking etc.).
11. Data Access and Security policy should restrict information access to authorised persons.
When data access is required for airworthiness and maintenance purposes, a procedure
should be in place to prevent disclosure of crew identity.
12. Procedure Document; this document signed by all parties (airline management, flight crew
member representatives nominated either by the union or the flight crew themselves)
will, as a minimum, define:
a) The aim of the FDM programme.
b) A data access and security policy that should restrict access to information to
specifically authorized persons identified by their position.
c) The method to obtain de-identified crew feedback on those occasions that require
specific flight follow-up for contextual information; where such crew contact is
required the authorised person(s) need not necessarily be the programme manager, or
safety manager, but could be a third party (broker) mutually acceptable to unions or
staff and management.
d) The data retention policy and accountability including the measures taken to ensure
the security of the data.
e) The conditions under which, on rare occasions, advisory briefing or remedial training
should take place; this should always be carried out in a constructive and non-punitive
manner.
f) The conditions under which the confidentiality may be withdrawn for reasons of gross
negligence or significant continuing safety concern.
g) The participation of flight crew member representative(s) in the assessment of the
data, the action and review process and the consideration of recommendations.
h) The policy for publishing the findings resulting from FDM.
13. Airborne systems and equipment used to obtain FDM data will range from an already
installed full Quick Access Recorder, in a modern aircraft with digital systems, to a basic
crash protected recorder in an older or less sophisticated aircraft. The analysis potential
of the reduced data set available in the latter case may reduce the safety benefits
obtainable. The operator shall ensure that FDM use does not adversely affect the
serviceability of equipment required for accident investigation.
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Getting to grips with FOM REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
The following table provides examples of FDM events that may be further developed using operator and
aeroplane specific limits. The table is considered illustrative and not exhaustive.
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REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS Getting to grips with FOM
[Amdt. 7, 01.09.04]
The Definition of Flight Data Monitoring: Systematic, pro-active and non-punitive use of digital
flight data from routine operations to improve aviation safety.
Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) programmes assist an operator to identify, quantify, assess and
address operational risks. Since the 1970’s the CAA’s Safety Regulation Group (SRG) has helped
develop and support such systems and used FDM information to support a range of
airworthiness and operational safety tasks. Through this co-operative development work many
farsighted operators have demonstrated the safety benefits of FDM such that the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) have recommended their use for all Air Transport operations
in aircraft of over 20 tonnes maximum weight. Since 1st January 2005 FDM has been a standard
for all operations over 27 tonnes and is enshrined in UK law. The UK, in continuing its policy of
applying ICAO standards, will make this a requirement under UK law and other European
regulators are also expected to comply.
The UK Air Navigation Order 2000 (ANO 2000) Article 34A requires the establishment and
maintenance of an Accident Prevention and Flight Safety Programme (AP&FSP) and includes
the requirement for FDM. The content of safety programmes, including FDM, will need to be
confirmed as acceptable by the CAA’s Flight Operations Inspectors.
It is recognised that there is a wide range of operators covered by these requirements and that
there is no “one size fits all” system. The size and age of aircraft may determine the
parameters available for analysis. The programme effectiveness and efficiency of a small fleet
or operation may be helped by pooling analysis within a group of similar operations. While
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Getting to grips with FOM REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
retaining responsibility for risk assessment and action, some operators may wish to contract
out the basic analysis due to lack of expertise or resources.
In a similar manner to the ICAO Accident Prevention Manual (Doc 9422), this document outlines
good practice and indicates what may constitute an operator’s FDM programme system that is
acceptable to the CAA. It is intended to be regularly reviewed and revised by CAA in
consultation with Industry as widespread FDM experience develops.
a. FOQA is a voluntary safety program that is designed to make commercial aviation safer
by allowing commercial airlines and pilots to share de-identified aggregate information
with the FAA so that the FAA can monitor national trends in aircraft operations and
target its resources to address operational risk issues (e.g., flight operations, air traffic
control (ATC), airports). The fundamental objective of this new FAA/pilot/carrier
partnership is to allow all three parties to identify and reduce or eliminate safety risks,
as well as minimize deviations from the regulations. To achieve this objective and
obtain valuable safety information, the airlines, pilots, and the FAA are voluntarily
agreeing to participate in this program so that all three organizations can achieve a
mutual goal of making air travel safer.
b. A cornerstone of this new program is the understanding that aggregate data that is
provided to the FAA will be kept confidential and the identity of reporting pilots or
airlines will remain anonymous as allowed by law. Information submitted to the FAA
pursuant to this program will be protected as “voluntarily submitted safety related
data” under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 193.
(1) In general, aggregate FOQA data provided to the FAA under 14 CFR part 13, section
13.401 should be stripped of information that could identify the submitting airline prior
to leaving the airline premises and, regardless of submission venue, should include the
following statement:
WARNING: This FOQA information is protected from disclosure under 49 U.S.C. 40123
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REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS Getting to grips with FOM
and part 193. It may be released only with the written permission of the Federal
Aviation Administration Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification.
(2) However, if an airline voluntarily elects to provide the FAA with aggregate FOQA
data that includes airline identifying information, then it should include an additional
statement that it is the proprietary and confidential property of [Airline Name].
c. As defined in this AC, operator FOQA programs include provisions for the identification
of safety issues and development and implementation of corrective actions. FOQA can
provide objective safety information that is not otherwise obtainable. No aircraft
operator is required to have a FOQA program. No operator that conducts a FOQA
program is required to obtain FAA approval of that program. However, an aircraft
operator that seeks the protection available in part 13, section 13.401 from the use by
the FAA of FOQA information for enforcement purposes must obtain FAA approval of its
program. For that purpose:
(1) The elements of a FOQA program are set forth by an aircraft operator in an
Implementation and Operations (I&O) Plan that is submitted to the FAA for review and
approval. Guidance on the appropriate content of a FOQA I&O Plan is provided in
appendix A of this AC.
(2) The guidelines contained herein are based on the extensive experience of the FAA
and the airline industry in developing FOQA programs and constitute a compilation of
best practices. The provisions of this AC neither add nor change regulatory
requirements or authorize deviations from regulatory requirements.
2. BACKGROUND. In recent years, the FAA and the air transportation industry have sought
additional means for addressing safety problems and identifying potential safety hazards.
Based on the experiences of foreign air carriers, the results of several FAA-sponsored
studies, and input received from government/industry safety forums, the FAA has
concluded that wide implementation of FOQA programs could have significant potential to
reduce air carrier accident rates below current levels. A reduction in the already low U.S.
airline accident rate is needed to preclude a projected growth in the number of accidents,
which is expected to occur due to increased future traffic volume. The value of FOQA
programs is the early identification of adverse safety trends that, if uncorrected, could
lead to accidents. A key element in FOQA is the application of corrective action and
follow-up to assure that unsafe conditions are effectively remediated.
3. SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY. The information contained in this AC applies primarily to air
carriers that operate under part 121 or 135, but may be applicable to operators under
other parts. The aircraft operator voluntarily enters into a FOQA program.
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Getting to grips with FOM REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
Operations (Chapter 4)
Article 23: Airlines must establish detailed and feasible flight quality monitoring procedures
and rules and regulations and submit them to the regional administration bureau and CAAC
Aviation Safety Office on file, respectively.
I. Title: Regarding the implementation with the directive of “The Flight Operation Quality
assurance (FOQA) Items Specifications on Boeing and Airbus Family Aircraft” .
II. Applicability: All the airlines and relevant enterprises and institutions that have been
required to perform flight operation quality assurance as per “The Administrative Regulations
on Flight Operation Quality assurance (FOQA)” in China Civil Aviation.
III. Purpose:
The directive aims to require the airlines to implement two latest industry standards into their
flight operation quality assurances operation, which have been recently published in China civil
aviation, i.e., “Flight Operation Quality Assurance Items Specifications Part 1: Airbus Family
Aircraft” (MH/T 2005.1—2007) and “Flight Operation quality assurance Items Specifications
Part 2: Boeing Family Aircraft” (MH/T 2005.2—2007). It aims to further implement “The
Administrative Regulations on Flight Operation Quality Assurance” in China Civil Aviation by
exercising these standards and to guide the airlines to properly revise their respective
assurance items and standards, to improve the control quality of flight crews and the
comprehensive administration level of technique administration divisions, to facilitate to
achieve with the general safe operation of airlines. Meanwhile, the above-mentioned two
industry standards also provide relevant basis for the safe administration of CAAC authority.
The Flight Operation Quality Assurance Items Specifications of Airbus Family Aircraft and
Boeing Family Aircraft has been based on the reference with ICAO standards,
recommendations, measures and relevant standards of aircraft manufacturer type manuals and
Chinese domestic airlines. CAAC has organized relevant divisions and the managerial
individuals and specialists who have undertaken flight operation quality assurance s for a long
term, in accordance with Chinese actual status, to jointly study and develop a unified
assurance items and standards for the same aircraft type. These standards have replenished
and matured the relevant assurance standards and requirements in “The Administrative
Regulations on Flight Operation Quality Assurance” in China Civil Aviation and have been
furnished with superior feasibility and operability.
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REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS Getting to grips with FOM
IV. Requirements:
Each airlines and relevant enterprises and institutions shall comply with these two industry
standards of “Flight Operation Quality Assurance Items Specifications Part 1: Airbus Family
Aircraft” (MH/T 2005.1—2007) and “Flight Operation quality assurance Items Specifications
Part 2: Boeing Family Aircraft” (MH/T 2005.2—2007) and base on the status quo of aircraft type
being operated in their own entity to properly organize their respective revisions and
implementations. The revised assurance items specifications on aircraft types shall not be less
restrictive than the industry standards.
Each CAAC Administration shall base on the requirements of The Administrative Regulations on
Flight Operation Quality Assurance and refer to the items or articles of these two standards to
periodically inspect and specify the airlines flight operation quality assurance, to continuously
summarize the actual experience of flight operation quality assurance, to improve
administration level and ensure with aviation operation safety.
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Getting to grips with FOM FOM OVERVIEW
FOM OVERVIEW
THE SYSTEM
The Flight Operations Monitoring System described here is centered on Flight Data Monitoring
(FDM) complemented by crew observation and reporting tools in order to cover as many safety
related elements as practically possible.
Flight Data Monitoring follows directly from the data recorded in the aircraft. It is currently
the most powerful monitoring tool, providing complete, accurate and objective flight safety
data that can cover all flights within an airline, with risk events being detected automatically.
However, FDM systems have their limitations: they cannot give information about event
environment like weather, ATC and communication difficulties, or passenger disruptions. FDM
systems cannot also detect certain events like navigational errors or assess the crews’ Human
Factors skills displayed on the flight deck.
These "environmental" conditions can only be assessed by in flight crew observation or through
the initiative of individuals to report events. Therefore, accurate and comprehensive Flight
Crew Reports are a fundamental part of any flight safety program. In addition to handling the
mandatory Air Safety Reports, that are legally required to be filed for an incident, Flight Crew
Reports should also include voluntary and confidential Human Factors Reports.
To be really meaningful, crew observations should be taken from as wide a source as possible.
Airline resources would not normally allow extra flight crews as observers on many routine
flights. However on routes where difficulties are known to exist, for example if significant FDM
events had been triggered, observer flights could be scheduled to establish the "environmental"
conditions of the problems.
A FOM system requires, as any system, dedicated personnel, with ad hoc tools and facilities to
perform specified tasks. These mandatory "components" act in conformity with process
defining activities, interactions with other departments and conditions of performance.
Human Resources
Depending on the airline structure a specific Flight Operations Monitoring department can be
created. Otherwise, the FOM team can be incorporated in the Flight Safety or Quality
Assurance Departments.
The size of the team involved in the FOM system will be defined in relation with the airline
operations' complexity (size and organization of the airline, the technology that will be
implemented to record and analyze information). In all cases, three functions have to be
manned: FOM Manager, Flight Operation Analyst and a System Engineer (to cover FDM aspects).
The FOM Manager is responsible for the overall management, administration, security, and
maintenance of the FOM program.
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FOM OVERVIEW Getting to grips with FOM
Note: It is essential that the post holder has the trust of both crew and managers with
respect to integrity and good judgment.
The Flight Operation Analyst is a pilot, type rated on the aircraft, and having extensive
knowledge of the airline's routes, aircraft characteristics, airline SOPs, safety requirements,
and various operational environments. He/She is responsible for the operational aspects of the
analysis.
Note: The Flight Operation Analyst must be approved by the pilot community, as he acts as
a gatekeeper and ensures confidentiality of the data.
The System Engineer is in charge of flight data recorder serviceability and PC analysis
programs.
Once again, selecting personnel to staff the FOM program depends on the program’s scope, the
size and organization of the airline, and the technology that will be implemented to record and
analyze information. A typical program includes a FOM manager, one or more Flight Operation
Analysts, and one or more System Engineer. FOM team members should be technically
proficient and have excellent communication and problem-solving skills.
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Getting to grips with FOM FOM OVERVIEW
Tools
FOM system consists of onboard (in-flight data acquisition) and ground-based (data analysis)
elements.
The Flight Data Recording System (FDRS) is used to record aircraft mandatory parameters. The
FDRS consists of a Flight Data Interface Unit (FDIU) connected as shown below to a Solid State
Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR) and an optional Quick Access Recorder (QAR).
The Flight Data Interface Unit (FDIU) receives discrete and digital parameters and processes
them. The functions of the FDIU are: conversion, comparison and check. The FDIU converts the
input parameters into a recordable format for recorders:
• HARVARD BIPHASE for the Solid State Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR),
• BIPOLAR RZ for the optional Quick Access Recorder (QAR).
The FDIU compares the data that it sends with the data recorded by the SSFDR. The recorded
data is transmitted back to the FDIU through the playback data bus.
The FDIU checks the integrity of the mandatory parameters during the flight. After the flight,
engines shutdown, only the Linear Accelerometer signal check is done. The FDIU includes BITE
and monitoring functions.
The Solid State Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR) stores data which the FDIU has collected during
the last 25 hours. The data is recorded in data frames. Each frame contains data received
during one second. The SSFDR includes BITE functions. The SSFDR status signal is sent to the
Centralized Fault Display Interface Unit (CFDIU) through the FDIU and to the ECAM through the
System Data Acquisition Concentrators (SDACs). The SSFDR energization is controlled through
the power interlock circuit. The Underwater Locator Beacon (ULB) located on the front face of
the SSFDR enables the location of the recorder if the aircraft is immersed in water following an
accident. The ULB is equipped with a battery which is activated by both fresh and salt water.
The Quick Access Recorder (QAR) stores the same data as the SSFDR for on ground
performance, maintenance or condition monitoring tasks. The data frames stored in the QAR
are identical to the SSFDR data frames. The QAR status signals (QAR MEDIA LOW, QAR FAIL) are
sent to the lamps on its front face and to the CFDIU through the FDIU. The QAR power up is
controlled through the power interlock circuit. The QAR is not crash protected. This unit is
designed to provide quick and easy access to a removable medium, such as an optical disk or
PCMCIA card, on which flight information is recorded.
QARs have now been developed to record an expanded data-frame, sometimes supporting
2000+ parameters at much higher sample rates than the FDR. The expanded data-frame greatly
increases the resolution and accuracy of the ground analysis programs.
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FOM OVERVIEW Getting to grips with FOM
The Aircraft Integrated Data System (AIDS) is used to monitor various aircraft system
parameters in order to make maintenance easier and to allow formulating operational
recommendations. The AIDS consists of a Data Managements Unit (DMU) connected as shown
below. An optional Digital AIDS Recorder (DAR) may be installed.
The Data Management Unit (DMU) is basically equipped with 2 microprocessor boards:
• The first one (master) is in charge of the data input/output and the processing of
reports.
• The second one (slave) is in charge of the Digital AIDS Recorder (DAR) and Smart AIDS
Recorder (SAR) processings. The SAR memory is part of this board.
Digital AIDS Recorder (DAR) is designed to provide easy access to a removable medium, such as
an optical disk, cassette (50 hour magnetic tape), or PCMCIA card, on which parameters are
recorded.
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Getting to grips with FOM FOM OVERVIEW
Note: Compare to the basic DMU, the extended DMU is equipped with a slave
microprocessor board for customer programmable functions and interface to upload,
download and record data on PCMCIA card.
In certain airplanes the FDIU/AIDS architecture is regrouped in a one Flight Data Interface and
Management Unit (FDIMU), with integrated PCMCIA interface. FDIMU records mandatory
parameters complying with the applicable Airworthiness Requirements as well as engines, APU
and other systems' parameters for performance and operational analysis.
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FOM OVERVIEW Getting to grips with FOM
On ground
Ground-based elements of the FOM system are essentially dedicated to data processing,
analysis and storage.
For both FDM and Crew Observation or Pilot Self Reporting the trends of events are monitored
to highlight "areas of concern". If a critical deviation is identified the Gatekeeper is the first
means of identifying (by questions, or interview) any reasons that may exist for the deviation.
According to the response the matter finishes there, or is passed on to the Flight Safety
Manager for further action.
Facilities
The information generated by the FOM system is highly confidential so its protection is an
absolutely critical area that should be carefully organized by the management.
All FOM equipment and data must be secured and protected against unauthorized data
disclosure, alteration, misuse, or destruction. All systems, offices, equipment, workstations,
computers, and peripherals associated with the FOM have to be secure and with controlled
access. Additionally, secure storage areas have also be provided for of all FOM-related
materials, including paper, media, and backup devices.
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Getting to grips with FOM FOM OVERVIEW
In order to integrate a FOM system into your operation, the following 7 basic steps have to be
considered:
These elements will only be effective if they are integrated seamlessly into your flight
operation and organizational culture.
Senior management should consult widely with flight crews when preparing the FOM policy.
Consultation ensures that the policy is relevant to the staff and operation.
It should be signed by the senior person in the airline, usually the Chief Executive Officer or
Flight Operations Director. It is a tangible indication that senior management is committed to
the FOM program.
Your safety policy should be reviewed periodically to ensure that it remains coherent with your
safety objectives, and relevant to your operation.
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FOM OVERVIEW Getting to grips with FOM
The FOM objectives are outcome-based to meet the organization's safety policies. For
example, you may have an objective (for the ensuing six months) to monitor 95% of all your
flights. By communicating your target in advance you will foster a common goal for all persons
concerned with FOM to achieve.
Frequently time is the resource most difficult to allocate, particularly when starting the
implementation of the FOM program. Meetings will be required to establish roles and
responsibilities. Time must also be taken to communicate the intention of the program to all
flight crews.
The next important resource you need to devote to the operation of your FOM is expertise. You
will need to involve people from across your flight operations with the expertise to address
safety related issues.
All staff involved in the FOM program should be trained to understand the purpose of your FOM
program and to perform their role.
Once the FOM system is running and hazards start to be identified, senior management must be
prepared to commit resources to address those hazards. If hazards are not properly addressed,
enthusiasm for the FOM program will quickly wane.
The FOM Manager/Flight Safety Officer should have an open line of communication with all the
departments. This ensures that reports and recommendations are afforded the proper level of
attention, and that appropriate solutions are implemented in a timely manner. The FOM
Manager/Safety Officer must have the Chief Executive Officer’s assurance that any safety issue
can be raised without fear.
The FOM Manager/ Flight Safety Officer should be technically competent in the company's
flight operations. Regardless of technical expertise, if the job of FOM Manager/ Flight Safety
Officer is forced on someone who does not have a keen interest in safety, then it is unlikely
that others within the organization will buy in to FOM.
The FOM Manager's responsibilities are listed above in FOM System - Human Resources
Sub Chapter.
Note: The responsibilities and authority of the FOM Manager/ Flight Safety Officer must be
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Getting to grips with FOM FOM OVERVIEW
The size of the operation will determine the makeup and number of members in the Safety
Committee. The committee should include at least:
• A senior management representative who has the authority to approve
recommendations
• The FOM Manager/ Flight Safety Officer
• Flight operations representative (Chief Pilots for the respective fleets, Crew Rostering
Officer, etc.)
• Maintenance representative
• Training representative
A Flight Operations Risk Profile is a documented overview of the risks that are generally
experienced by the airlines flight operations. It is like a map that charts the “contours” of the
risk areas so that critical elements can be proactively identified and managed.
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FOM OVERVIEW Getting to grips with FOM
Safety actions tracking system is the mechanism to document, track, and evaluate the
effectiveness of safety measures. It should be integrated with all other systems especially the
quality system. An airline should ensure that required actions are assigned a priority
appropriate to the level of risk indicated in the company Flight Operations Risk Profile.
The FOM Manager and tools provider(s) should conduct induction training. It should be
customized to the airline organization and include information about the FOM system, Safety
Committee (or Safety Management Body) and the responsibilities of all employees in the team.
The training should cover new technology or equipment and changes in flight operations
induced by the program.
Keeping the FOM team informed and educated about current safety issues (through providing
relevant literature and sending them to FOM related courses and seminars) improves the safety
standard of your organization.
Now we will review an ongoing process in which the hazard identification is based on two
complementary channels: Flight Data Monitoring and Crew Observation.
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Getting to grips with FOM FOM OVERVIEW
Data Acquisition
In this substep, the data acquisition unit collects flight parameters from the aircraft systems
and sensors. Then, the data acquisition unit converts the data into digital format for output to
the flight data recorder (FDR) and also to second recorder. It is this second recorder, which
provides the data for the aircraft condition monitoring.
Analysis
The Analysis step of Flight Data Monitoring can be split into two substeps:
1. Events identification
2. Information Reporting
Events identification
The primary goal of the Analysis step is to identify any events or deviations from predefined
limits ("excedences") that may have occurred during flight. These limits are determined by the
combination of the aircraft limitations and the operator's flight operations procedures. Since
there can be over 150 such events that must be checked for every flight, computer analysis
software is used to scan for events where trigger values may have been exceeded. A the end of
this substep qualified Flight Operation Analysts and System Engineer eliminate flight or events
which are irrelevant (recorder or sensor problems, etc.) in order to not to populate the
database with illogical events. Events that have been identified are stored for further analysis,
in accordance with operator policy.
Information Reporting
In this substep the analysis software generates reports that yield statistical information, trend
analysis, and risk assessment on a routine, periodic basis. If a third party has done the analysis
and prepared reports these are sent electronically to the operator to assist them in
interpreting flight data. Turning data into information is where the real value resides.
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FOM OVERVIEW Getting to grips with FOM
Data Acquisition
Two means are utilised to gather information for the database. Either a qualified Observer
rides in the cockpit, or the flying pilots themselves report events that require active
management. Unobtrusively the observers record the threats and errors that affect the flight
as a series of "bullet points".
Data Recording
After the flight the Observer enters his data in dedicated software by means of specific
"keywords" for various aspects of the flight. If the pilots themselves have a report the data is
likewise entered into the database by trained personnel.
Analysis
During this step the data is processed with the dedicated software, which yield a series of
weighted scores in each operational category. Keywords are sorted to highlight areas of
operational concern. The frequency of the keywords indicates the magnitude of the CRM
and/or operational problems.
Statistical information and trend analysis can be traced by reference to the reports that are
programmed to be generated on demand.
A Safety Committee or group led by the FSO and comprising relevant flight personnel, analysts
and working parties (maintenance, ground operations, rostering, etc.), can now review key
issues and events, confirm their validity, and further investigate the circumstances surrounding
these events, should this prove desirable.
The involvement of the pilots of the aircraft at the time of the event greatly improves the
value of the information. The full participation of the pilots and any other personnel involved
in the operation of the flight is a requirement for good insight into events. There should be no
fear of recrimination so that an open and non-punitive investigation can ensue.
With the information gained from the Line Operations Assessment System , an operator now
has the means to provide meaningful feedback and make decisions that improve flight safety.
Critical safety areas within the airline such as flight operations, flight training, maintenance,
engineering, as well as functions outside the organization such as air traffic control, airports,
and manufacturers can be informed or updated. Corrective and preventative actions can be
implemented, and the effectiveness of these actions followed-up.
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Getting to grips with FOM AIRBUS FOM OFFERING
SERVICES
Airbus proposes a wide range of services designed to help the implementation of Flight
Operation Monitoring programs. Such services are tailored to the Operator’s needs and will
contribute to significantly reducing the Operator’s effort.
FOM assessment
Overview
FOM assessment gives a clear view of current airline operation, the organization, skills, methods and
tools already in place, or required.
It is a 5-days on-site service performed by an AIRBUS FOM engineer and by an AIRBUS pilot from
the FOM team.
It is a 4-day training provided in the Toulouse Training Center by Airbus FOM experts including
pilots and engineers.
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AIRBUS FOM OFFERING Getting to grips with FOM
FOM follow-up
This assistance is addressed to the airline pilots and analysts, who will participate in the FOM
program. After 3 months of data processing with AirFASE (at least 200 flights are required)
AIRBUS proposes the following:
• Detailed presentation of the flight profiles.
• Assistance for the first Flight Data Analysis - How to verify the events raised in AirFASE.
• Statistical reporting preparation and subsequent interpretation.
• Customization of key values and reporting with the engineer.
It is a 5-day on-site service performed by an AIRBUS FOM engineer and by an AIRBUS FOM pilot.
The objective is to support the first step of AirFASE data interpretation, and to optimize the
use of AirFASE applications to get accurate results and make pertinent risk assessment.
This service is highly recommended to the operators implementing AirFASE to alleviate any
implementation problems.
Assisted FDM
For Airlines who do not want to implement in-house Flight Data Monitoring software, Airbus
can propose the services of independent companies.
The selected company processes the flight data provided by the Airline, analyzes it, and
delivers regular reports to the Airline. For the purpose of operational analysis validation access
to the AIRFASE reporting and analysis module can be provided by the selected company with
appropriate security protection. The selected companies use the Airbus AirFASE tool and Airbus
FOM methodology.
The proposed services allow the Airline to implement the Airbus FOM concept with the support
of the company selected by the Airline.
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Getting to grips with FOM AIRBUS FOM OFFERING
SOFTWARE TOOLS
AirFASE
Overview
Jointly developed and supported by Teledyne Controls and Airbus,
AirFASE® (Flight Analysis and Safety Explorer) offers a
comprehensive measurement, analysis, and reporting tool that can
benefit all types of aircraft operators.
AirFASE® performs all the major functions of the flight data monitoring process, including data
processing, flight analysis and reporting, and flight data animation.
AirFASE® Transcription Program decodes the recorded data and translates the information
into engineering values.
To ensure data security, AirFASE® has the capability to de-identify flight data, leaving the de-
identified fields only viewable by authorized users.
AirFASE® supports a wide range of data recording devices and can virtually handle all types
of recording media available on the market today.
Key Functions
Data Processing
Transcription of raw flight data into engineering values.
Comparison between recorded flight data and flight profile
specifications (flight profiles are determined by combining engine
type, aircraft, and flight procedures characteristics).
Data De-identification.
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AIRBUS FOM OFFERING Getting to grips with FOM
Flight Analysis
Flight Data and Events Views: the events and flight parameters may
be viewed in a numerical or/and graphical format
VCR Type Replay , plus second-by-second manual Forward and Back. All functions are
synchronized to all graphs through cursors.
Reporting
- 40 -
Getting to grips with FOM AIRBUS FOM OFFERING
LOAS was conceived as a flight operations management system using a four-point scoring scale
for selected parameters.
The grading is complemented by the use of specific key words for each item graded.
Then, the total grades are processed with LOAS software, which yield a series of weighted
scores in each operational category.
Keywords are also sorted to highlight areas of operational concern. The frequency of the
keywords indicates the magnitude of the CRM and/or operational problems.
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AIRBUS FOM OFFERING Getting to grips with FOM
- 42 -
Getting to grips with FOM AIRBUS FOM OFFERING
The problem is that the pilots are not always aware of an event having been triggered during
their flight. And if they think it was the case, their understanding of the facts is most of the
time shady. It is due to the limitations inherent of the human brain. In many of the flight
situations where an exceedance occurs, and because the pilot brain capacity of processing
flight data (the cognitive process) is limited to less than 10 parameters (7 to 8 at best), it is
difficult for the pilots to report the actual values of numerous parameters which are necessary
for the understanding of the facts. This is even more difficult because of the dynamics of such
a situation, the pilot brain being often close to cognitive saturation.
In the standard FDM process, it takes much of time (often several weeks) before a crew can be
asked to give its contribution to the analysis of the flight. The memory of the facts is then
obviously downgraded. Even when a pilot is spontaneously reporting, the quality of his report is
also limited by the very nature of this cognitive process and its limitations.
After engines shutdown an on-board Airfase (Airbus FDM software) engine will process the raw
data and produce a file (called a “loms” file), transforming the raw data in engineering values,
identifying deviations and grading the severity of them (the highest severity is colour coded in
red).
The crew can then replay this file on the Onboard Information
Terminal (OIT) in a AirFASE flight replay type of interface.
Here will be displayed the red events of the flight (if any), and
he’ll be able to precisely locate the events during the flight,
reading the actual values of the parameters. For this he can use
the parameters window. The crew has the possibility of printing
the events, or to export the file to a debriefing room on the
ground.
The confidentiality is enforced by an auto erasure of the file after a countdown defaulted at
20’ (the pilot should not have to stay in the cockpit for too long a time after the flight), or by
erasure at any time on pilots’ decision.
Thus, pilots will be given critical information to better analyze the events: They will be able
clarify their own cognition of events, they will avoid misinterpretation, they will avoid
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AIRBUS FOM OFFERING Getting to grips with FOM
discrepancies in their analysis. Hence OFDM is helping to circumvent many of the above-
mentioned cognitive limitations. Using OFDM right after engines shutdown leaves the history of
the flight fresh in pilot’s memory.
Thanks to OFDM we may expect an enhanced reporting by pilots: It should be more systematic
(more frequent), and of a much better quality. Ultimately, it will improve the FDM analysis
process, significantly enhancing the understanding of the facts. With OFDM, Airbus is
pioneering in the field of proactive safety.
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Getting to grips with FOM FURTHER INFORMATION
FURTHER INFORMATION
- 45 -
FURTHER INFORMATION Getting to grips with FOM
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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Flight Operations Support & Services
Flight Operations Support & Services getting to grips with FOM Flight Operations Monitoring hanbook - Septembre 2007
AIRBUS S.A.S.
31707 BLAGNAC CEDEX, FRANCE
CONCEPT DESIGN GDCOS
PHOTOS BY AIRBUS
SEPTEMBER 2007
PRINTED IN FRANCE
REFERENCE A237/07
© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2007
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
AIRBUS, ITS LOGO, A300, A310, A318,
A319, A320, A321, A330, A340, A350, A380,
A400M ARE REGISTERED TRADEMARKS
Proprietary document.
FOM
involves a number of factors which could change
over time, affecting the true public representa-
tion. Airbus assumes no obligation to update any
information contained in this document or with
respect to the information described herein. The
statements made herein do not constitute an
offer or form part of any contract. They are based
on Airbus information and are expressed in good
faith but no warranty or representation is given
as to their accuracy. When additional information
Flight Operations Monitoring handbook
is required, Airbus S.A.S can be contacted to pro-
vide further details. Airbus S.A.S shall assume no
liability for any damage in connection with the Septemlbre 2007
use of this Brochure and the materials it con-
tains, even if Airbus S.A.S has been advised of
the likelihood of such damages. This licence is
governed by French law and exclusive jurisdic-
tion is given to the courts and tribunals of
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Flight Operations Support & Services
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copyright or any other intellectual property right
Flight Operations Monitoring handbook
in any other court of competent jurisdiction.
Septembre 2007