Realism and International

Politics
KENNETI_I N. WALTZ
 First published 2008
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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Waltz, Ker-rneth Neal.
Rerlisnl and intcrnatiot-tal politics / Kenneth N' Waltz - Ist ed'
P.cm. 8-5
ISBN 978-0-415-95477-8 (hardbook : alk. paper) - ISBN 978-0-4 15-9 547
-
(paperbook : alk. papcr) I. International rclations Philosophy. 2. Realisrn.
J. Stut., Tl.re.4. Wortd politics. 5. War. i. Title'
12t307.w35 2008
327.10l-dc22 2007041766

ISBNI0: 0-41 5-95477-0 (hbk)

ISBNI0: 0-aI 5-95478-9 (Pbk)

ISBN t 3 : 97 8-0415-9 547 7 -8 (hbk)

 4
THE, ORIGINS OF WAR IN
NEOREALIST THEORY

Like most historians, rnany studcnts of inte rnrtional politics havc becn skepticirl
about thc possibiliq,of crcating a thcor).that rnight hclp onc to undcrstand and
cxplain thc intemational events that interest us. Thus Morgenthau, fbrcr.r-rost
among traditional rcalists, u,as fond olrepeating Blaise Pascal's remark that "the
histor,,, of the rvorld rvoulcl hlve been cliffbrent l'rird Cleopirtra's nose been a bit
shorter" trnd then irsking "Hou,cio you sl,stemize that)"1 His apprcciation of
the role of the accidental ar-rd the occurrcncc of thc unexpcctcd in politics
dampened his thcoretical anrbition.
The respclnse of ncorcalists is that, althougl-r difficultics abound, sor.nc of
the obstacles that seem most daunting lic in rnisapprcl-rcr.rsions irbont tl-rcor1,.
Tl'reory obviously cannot explain thc accidcr-rtal or account fbr nnexpectcc-l
e\rents; it deals in regularitics and rcpctitions and is possiblc or.rl1, if tl-rcsc can
be identifiecl. A firrtl-rer difficulq,is fbund in thc frrilr.rrc of rcalists to conceivc
of international politics as a distinct domain abor-rt u,hich tl-rcorics car-r bc f.rsl.r-
ioned. Morgenthlu, lbr exarnple , ir-rsistcd on "the autollomy of politics," but
hc fiilcd to appl)r the coucept to ilternational politics. A thcorl,is a depictiorr
of tl-re orgar-rizt.rtion of a dornair-r and of thc cor.rr.rcctiol'rs rntong its parts. A
theorl, indicatcs tl1i.1t some firctors arc r-norc ir-nportant than others and speci-
fies relatior-rs among then'r. In realih,, cvcrlrlfii1, is relatcd to everything clse,
and one don-rain cannot be separated from othcrs. 13ut the orl,isolates one reah-r'r
from ali others in order to dell u'ith it intcllcctualll,. S,1r 6[cfir]irrg the structllrc
of intcmational political svstcnls, r'reorealism cstablisl-rcs thc autonomv of
intcmtrtiontrl politics :rnc'l thus makes ir theorv about it possiblc.2
In developing a theorv olinternational politics, ncorcalism rctair-rs thc mr'Litr
tcrrcts of realpolitih, but me ans :urd encls arc viervcd diffcrcntl,v, as arc carlscs
ar-rd cffects. Morgcnthan, for example, thougl-rt of the "ratirxral" statesmln ls
ever striving to accurnnlate morc and morc po\\rer. IIe vieu,ed po\\'er irs lr-r cud
in itsclf. Altl-rough he:rcknorvledged that natiol-rs at timcs ilct or.rt of cor-rsidcr-
ations othcr than pou,cr, Morgcnthau ir-rsisted that, rvheu they do so, thcir
acti()l-rs arc not "ofla politicirl nature."3 In contrast, ncorcalism sccs po\\,cr as 11

possibly riscful means, \\.ith stites running rislis if thcy l.rave either too littlc or
too t-nuch of it. Excessivc u.cakncss r-r-rry invite an attack tlttt grerltcr strcrlgth
 l'Hl'l ()ll.ICllNS ()l- WAIt IN N]rOltt.,\LIS I 'f rILOltY

lvould hlvc dissuirclccl rtn '.rclvcrsarv fi'or-n l:iunching. Exccssivc stl'cugtll nriry
promPt othcr strttcs to incrcasc thcir rrrurs irncl pool their ctlirrts rrgrrinst tl'rc
dor-nirtltrt state. Bccilusc po\\'er is rr possibll,nscfirl r-ncrrns, scnsible st.lresurelr
try to hi-rvc an r-tppropritrtc i.lmount ol it. In crLlcitl siturrtions, hori.cvcr, the
ultimate coltcenr of stiltcs is not for pou'cr bLrt tor sccuritr,. fl-ris rcvision is.in
ir-nportattt itt-tc.
An cvct-t lnore inrpol'tiurt rcvisiou is fixrnd in a shitt of crrusal rclations. -fhc
infir-ritc mittcrials ol rn1, rerrlnr can bc organizecl in cndlcsslv clilfcrent u,avs.
Realisr-r-r thinks olcruscs ls r-r-rcx'ir-rg ir-r on11,onc clircction, fronr thc intcractior-rs
of inciivicluals iurd states to the outcorncs that their rrcts irncl intcrrrctir)ns pro-
duce. Nlorgcr-rthau recoqnize d that, n'hcn the rc is cor-npctition firl sc.rrcc goocls
and no one to servc ls ubitcr, a stmgglc for pon'cr u,ill cnsr.rc ilnrong the con'r-
petitors trnd that consc(llrenth,thc strLlgglc fbr;ros'cr ciur bc c-rplrrincc.l u,ithout
refercnce to thc cvil born in mcn. The strugglc tirr pou,el lrises sin-rplv because
men \\,alrt tl.rir.rgs, not bccallsc ol the er.il in tl.rcir clcsires. He labclccl r.nrrn's
desire fbr scrrrcc goocls as one of thc tu'o roots of conflict, but, cve n n,hilc
discussing it, hc secn-tccl to pull tou,ard the "other root of cor-rf]ict irncl con-
comitant s1,il"-(c1he attinttts dominandi, thc dcsirc for pou,er." Hc oficn
considercc-l tltilt trrtn's clrir.e tbr pori,er is rnore basic than the chrrncc conclitirtns
under r.vhich strugglcs fbr pou,er occur. 'fhis attitr-rc'le is sccn in his statcr.ncnt
that "in a u,orlcl t,hcrc pou,er collnts) r'rrr rrltion pursuinu il rational policv hrrs
a choice betu,eeu rcr-rour-rcing r'urcl $,rrntins po\\,er; and, if it could,tltc lust ttrr
pou'er fbr tl're inclividr.rirl's sake rvould still confi'ont us u,ith its lcss spectrrculirr
yet no le ss pressine r-noral deftcts."r
Stuclcnts of intcrnational politics have rvpicrrlll, infcrrccl ourcorncs fl.ollt
salient attributcs ol the rrctors proc-lucing thenr. 'l'hr.rs Marxists, li[<e libcrals,
have linkcd thc outbrerrk of u,ar or thc previrlcncc ol pcilcc t() the intcmal
qualitics olstiltes. Got'entmentirl tbrr-ns, economic systcms, socirrl institutior-rs,
political idcologics-thesc irrc but a ten,e-rrrn-rples olu'hcre the c:iuscs olu,ar
have bect-t tbund. Yet, rrltl'rouul-r ciluscs ilre specific.rlll'assignec-I, u.c knou'tlrat
states lvith u'iclel1, clivcrgcnt cconor-r-ric ir-rstitutions, social custonrs, enrl polit-
ical ideologics hrrvc all tinght u,ars. More srrikins still, mrrnv clilfcre nt sorts of
organizations fight u,ars, u'licthcl thosc r>rqanizations be triLres,
1'rcttv princi-
palities, cmpires, niltions, ()r strcct gangs. If :rn iclcntificc'l conclition sccrlls to
have causecl ir givcn \\,ilr) ()ltc n'rust u,onclcr s,h1, 11,.',r, occur rcpeiltcrllt, cvcr-r
though thcir cattscs vur,. Vrrriations in the cl'r:rrirctcristics of tl-re strltcs r-rrc not
linked directh, to thc olltc()nres tl-rirt thcir bchrrviors proclucc, nor lrc vlri
atior-rs in thcir pilttcrlts ol interaction. Miir-ri, historirrns, tirr
cx;rntplc, hrrvc
claimed that Wcrrld \Yar I rvrs cr-use cl bi, tl-rc ir-rtcr:iction of
fir,o o;-rposccl rrncl
closely balar.rced coalitior.rs.
llut tl-rcn ,rr,,,r1, l-r,-,,,. clainrccl th:rr lYrrrlcl War II u,as
caused b1'thc firilurc
of sonrc stirtes t() cor-nbine fi;rccs in irn cflbrr to right rrn
imbalar-rce of pou,cr
crcatccl by irn cxistinq alli.uce .

Neorealisn'r cot-rtcncis thirt iutcrnrrtior-rrrl politics c;rn bc unclcrstood only if

-
the effccts of strttcturc irre r-1c1,.-1cc1 to thc unit-lcr.cl
crplrrnr-rti<>ns of trlc'litionrrl
 THE,ORY

rcalism. lly err-rpl-rasizing horv strulcturcs aflbct actions and outcomcs, ncorcal-
isr-n rejects the assumption that lran's innate lust for pou,cr constitrltcs a slrf-
ficient causc olrvar in thc absence ofan1,61he1. It rcconccivcs thc causal link
bet*,een interacting units and intemational outcomcs. According to the logic
of internatiorul politics, one must belicvc that some causes of international
olltcomcs are the result of intcractions at the ultit level, irnd, sincc variations in
presumeci causcs do rlot correspond verlr closcly, to variations in observed
olrtcomesl onc mllst also assumc that othcrs are located at the structural lcvc1.
Causcs at the level of ur.rits intcract rvitl.r those at thc lcvcl of structure, and,
because they do so, explanation at the unit lcvcl alone is bound to be n-rislcad-
ing. If trr-r approach allou's thc consideratior.r of both unit-lcvcl and structural-
lcvel ci.ruses, then it can cope u,itl-r both thc changes ar-rd the continuities that
occur it-t x s1r51grr.
Structural realism prcsents a systemic portrait of intcmational politics
depictir-rg component units according to the rlanncr of their arrangement. For
the purposc o[dcrcloping a tl]eor),, statcs trc crst as unilrry Jctors \\'autiug
at least t() sllrvivc, and are taken to bc the systelr's corlstittrent units. Tl're
essential stmctural quility of thc systcrn is anarchy-thc absence of a central
monopoly of legitimirte forcc. Cl-ranges of structurc and hence of system occur
u,ith variations in the numbcr of gretrt powers. Thc range of expected out-
comcs is inferred fron-r thc assumecl motivation of the units and thc structure
of thc svstem in u,l-rich tl-rcy act.
A systems theory of intcrnational politics dcals u,ith forces at tl-rc inter-
national, and not xt the national, level. With both s)rstems-level and unit-level
forces in plalr, horv cau ol-lc constrrlct a theor,v of internirtior-rrrl politics rvithout
simriltancoush, constmcting a theory of forcign policyf An ir-rternational-
political thcorv does not imply or require a thcory of foreign policl, ar-r1.morc
than a r.r-rarkct theory implics or requires a thcory of the firm. Syste n-rs thcories,
rvhether political or economic, are theories thirt cxplain horv thc organization
of ir realrn acts its x constraining and clisposing fbrce on thc ir-rtcractir-rg Lrnits
withir-r it. Sucl-r theories tcll us about the fbrccs to r.vhich the units are sub-
jected. Fror-n them, wc can dralv some infcrcnccs about the expectcd behavior
ancl fatc of the units: tramch', horv the1, u'ill havc to compete u'ith ar-rd adjust
to onc anothcr if thcy arc to sun'ive and flor-rrish. To tl-re cxtcnt that thc
dynamics of a sl,sten-r lin.rit the freedom of its i.u-rits, their bchar,ior and the
outcor-llcs of their behavior bccome predictablc. FIou, do \\,e expcct firms to
respond to diffcrently structrlrcd markets, and statcs to differently strlrctrlrcd
iutern:rtior.ral political s),stemsf Thcsc tl.reoretical qucstions require us to take
firms t-rs firms, and states as states, rvithout paying attention to diflerences
alTr()llg thcr-n. The questiolts are then ausu,cred by reference t() thc placemcltt
of the r.rnits in thcir s)/stern ancl not bv rcference t() thc internal qualities of
the units. Sl,stems theories cxplirin ri,h1, di16..,-rt ur.rits behavc similarly ar.rcl,
despite tl-rcir varirtions, producc oLltcomes that fall rvitl-rin cxpected rar-rgcs.
Convcrscll,, theorics xt thc rutit leve I te ll us rvhy ciif flbre nt ur-rits bchavc
F
.THE OITIGINS OF WAR IN NE,OREALIS'T THEOI{Y

differently despite thcir sirnilar placement in a system. A tl-reory about foreigr.r

policy is a theory at the national lcvel. It leads to expectations abour thc
respollscs that dissimilar polities rvill make to external pressrlres. A theory
of international politics bears on thc foreign policies of nations although it
claims to explain ouly ccrtain aspects of thern. It can tell us u4rat intemational
conditions national policies have to copc u,ith.
From the vantage point ofncorealist theory, compctition and conflict among
srates stem directll, frorn the trvin facts of life urrder conditions of anarchy:
States in an anarchic order r.nust provide for thcir orvn security, and thrcats or
seeming threats to thcir security abound. Preoccupation u,ith idcnti\,ing dan-
gers and connteracting them bccorne a rvay 6f l16L'. Rclations remain tensc; thc
actors are usually suspicious ar-rd often hostilc even though by r-rature they may
not be givcn to suspicion and hostility. Individualll,, statcs may only be doing
what they can to bolster thcir security. Their ir-rdividual intentions aside, col-
lectively their actior-rs yield arms races and alliances. Tl're uneasy state of affairs
is exacerbated by the fhmiliar "securiLy dilemma," rvhcrein measures that
enhance one state's security rypically dirninish that of others.s In au anarchic
domain, the source of one's orvn comfort is the source of another's \\rorry.
Hence a state that is amassing instrumcnts of u,ar, even for its orvn defense,
is cast by others as a threat requiring response. The response itsclfthen serves
to confirm thc first state's beiief that it had reason to worry. Similarly an
alliance that in the interest of defcr-rsc rroves to increasc cohesion among its
members and add to its ranks ir-radvcrtently imperils an opposing alliance and
provokes colrntermeasures.
Some states may hunger for power for porver's sakc. Ncorealist theory, horv-
ever, shorvs that it is not necessar). to ass[lme an innatc lust fbr porver in order to
account for the sometimes fiercc competitior-r tl-rat marks the international
arena. In an anarchic dor-nain, a state ofrvar exists ifall partics lust for porver. But
so too will a state of rvar exist if all states seek only to cnsllre their ou,n s:lfety.
Although ncorealist theory does not explain why particular wars are fbught,
it does explain lvar's dismal recurrence through the millennia. Neorealists
point not to the ambitions or the intrigues that punctuate the outbreak of
individual conflicts but instead to the existir-rg structlrre rvithin r,r,hich evcr-rts,
whether by design or accidcnt, can precipitate opcrl clashes of arms. Thc ori-
gins of hot wars lic in cold tars, and the origins of cold wars are found in the
anarchic ordcring ofthe intcrnational arena.
The recurrence of war is explained by the structllrc of the international
system. Theorists explain lvhat l-ristorians knorv: War is normal. Any given war
ts explained not by looking at the strlrctlirc of the international-political
system
but by looking at thc particularitics rvithin it: thc situations, the characters,
and the interactions of srarcs. Although parriclllar expla,atior-rs arc found at
the_ unit level, general explanations
.iro necdcd. Wars vary in frequer-rcy,
"." for a structnral
and in other ways as u,ell. A central question thcory is this: Horv
do changes ofthe systcm affect the expectcd hcquency ofwarl
 'f i-I I'- o RY

I(eeping wars cold: the structural level

In an anarchic rcalm,;reace is fiagilc. The prolongatiou of pelcc rcquires tlut
potctrtiall), dcstrbilizing dcvclopments clicit the intcrcst lrlc.l thc calcuhtccl
response c>f somc or trll of thc systcnl's prir-rcipal lctors' Itr the iruarchv of
states, the price of ilrattetttiot.t or r.t.tiscalctthtion is often paid in blood. An
import:rnt issue fbr a structural thcory to ircidress is u,l'rethcr dcstabilizing
cor-rditions rnd cvents ;rrc tnattitgcd bctte r in r-r-rultipol:rr or bipol:lr sYstcllls.
In :r sYstern of, sar,, five grcrrt po\\'cl's, the politics of po$'cr turlls on the
cliplon-r;rc1, b1,u,hich irlliances arc ntacle, t.ttaiutaitrecl, ar.rd disruptcd. Flexibilitl'
of alignn-rent means both tl'rirt tl-re cotlntr)'otte is u'ooit-tg n-ra1'prefer another
sr.ritor aud thrlt onc's presettt allirrnce pilrtlter rtt:l\/ dcfcct. Flcxibility oltrlign-
ment 1in-rits a state's opti()ns becattsc, iclealll,, its str.-rteg1' lnllst pleilsc Potclltial
allics and s;.rtis$' preser.rt partncrs. Allianccs lrc t.ttadc b)' statcs that havc somc
-fhc common intercst is orclinarily
but not all of thcir interests in cor-r-ur-ror-r. r-r

negativc one: fb;rr of other states. Divergcllce colllcs u'hcn positive interests
are at issuc. L-r alliar-rccs amoltg ne.lr equtls, strategies arc irl\\'il)Is thc prclduct
of cor-npron-rise since the ir-rtercsts of rrllies irr-rd thcir notiolls of hou' to scclrrc
tlrcrn are ncr cr idcrtticrrl.
If con-rpctir-rg blocs arc sccn to bc closcll' b;rlancccl, ar.rd if cornpctitiou turns
or-r important matters) thcn to let onc's side clou'n risks one's ou'n destrucriot-t.
In a momcr-rt of crisis thc u'caker or the m()re advcuturous party is likely tcr
dctcrmine its sidc's policy. Its plrtncrs crln aflbrd ncither to lct the u'eakcr
mcmber be dcfcated nor to adve rtise tl-rcir disunitl, b1, fiiling to back a ventllrc
o,cn rvhile deploring its risks.
The preludc to World War I plovidcs striking cxantples olsuch a situetiotr.
Thc approxir.r-rate equality of prrrtncrs in trotl.r thc Triple Allilncc and Triplc
Entente t.uadc tl-rem closclf interclepentlcnt. This intcrdcpendencc) combinccl
rvith tl-re kccr-r competition bctu'eeu thc tu'o calttPs, mcallt that) althor.rgh anv
colrntr), could commit its rrssoci;ttcs) no ()nc coLtlttr)r on eithcr side coulcl
cxcrcise control. If Austria-Huugarl' t.uarched, Gcruranl' l'rad to fbllou'; thc
dissolution of thc Austro-Hungarian Er-npirc u'oulcl have left Gcmranl' aloue
in the middlc of Europc. If Frar.rcc t-t.tarchecl, Russia l.rad to follou'; a Gcrtt.ti.ttt
victory ovcr ts-rance rvoulcl bc l clefcat fbr Russia. Ar-rd so the vicious circlc
continucd' Becattse thc clcfci.rt or thc defcctio' of a nrirjor alh' *'otllcl h;rvc
shaken thc bahnce, cach stilte \\/r1s constrilil]ecl to adjttst its stratcglr ancl t[-re
use of its fbrce s to thc air-ns iurcl ttirs of its plrtucrs.
In alliar-rccs among cqtials, the clcfcction olonc nrcmber thrcate ns the sccnr-
it1. of the othcrs. In alliirnccs among unecluals, tlre contribtttions olthc lesscr
r-nembers afc at once \\'ilntccl irnd of rclativcly' srlall ir-nportattcc. Itt alli;rrlccs
alnong uncqnlls, alliancc lcaders ncccl rvorrr, littlc iibottt tl-rc fiitl-rfirh'ress of
their follou,crs, u,ho nsuirlll'l-ravc little ch<>icc ltrvn'rt1'. Coutrast thc sitttatiou in
l9l4 s,itl-r tl-rat of thc Unitccl State s and Rritain urd Frrrncc in I956. The Unitccl
States coLrld clissociatc itself liom thc Sucz rrdventurc olits nvo prir-rcip;rl allics
p
1'HL, oITIGINS OF WAlT IN NEOREALIST THEOI{Y

xpd subject or-rc olthcr.n to heavr,finar-rcial prcssurc. Like Austria-Hungarl,in

1914, Britain atrd Fraucc triecl to commit or at least in-rrnobilize thcir aliy by
presenting ir fiit rccor.r.rpli. Enjol.ing a position of predomir-rance, thc United
States cor,rld colltinLlc to fbcus its irttcntion on thc major adversary whilc dis-
ciplir-ring its nvo allics. Opposing Britain and France endar-rgered neithcr the
Unitcd Statcs nor thc alliirnce because thc securitv of Britain and Francc
dependccl much more l.reavilv or1 Lrs than orir securitl, depended on thcm.
The abilitl,of the Unitcd States, and the inabilitv of Germany, to pay a price
rneasurecl in intra-alliance terms is striking.
In balance-of-pou,er politics old style, flexibiliry of alignment led to rigidity
of strateg\,or the lin-ritation olfi'eedom of dccision. In balance-of-potvcr polit-
ics nel,sq4c, the obverse is truc: Rigidity of alignnrcnt in l nvo-pou'er world
results in rnore flexibili['ofstratcgl,;1nd greater fie cdorn of decision. I1 a nulti-
polar u,orld, ror.rgl.rl1, cquill parties cngagcd in cooperativc endcavors must
look lbr thc comlnon denominator olthcir policies. They risk finding the lorvest
one and casilr, end r-rp in thc u'orst of all possible rvorlds. In a bipolar \\,orld,
alliance leaders crrn design stratcgies primarily to advance their or,vn intcrcsts
and to cope u'itl.r thcir r.nain adr,ersary ar-rd lcss to satisfir their orvn allics.
Neither the Unitcd Strtes nor the So'n,ict Union has to seek thc approvtrl of
other states, but cach has to cope u,ith tl-rc other. In the great-por,vcr politics of
a multipolar u,orlc-I, u,ho is I danger to u,hom and rvho can bc cxpected to deal
with thrcats and problems rre mattcrs of uncertainty. In tl-rc grcat-porver polit-
ics of a bipolar u,orld, u,ho is a dangcr to ll,hom is never in doubt. Any event in
the world tlrat inr.olves the fortunes of cither of tl're great powcrs aLrtomaticaliy
elicits thc intcrcst of the otl'rer. Prcsidcr-rt Harry S. Trnman, at the time of the
Korean invasion, could not vcrlr \\.cll ccho Neville Chan-rbcrlain's rvords in the
Czechoslovakian crisis bv claimir.rg tl.rat the Arnericans kncrv nothing about
the I(oreans, a people living trar awa)r il1 the east ofAsia. Wc had to know about
them or qrrickll' fincl orrt.
In a trvo-pourcr competition, a loss fbr one is easily takcn to be a gain for the
other. As a rcsnlt, the pol e rs in a bipolar u,orld promptly rcspond to unsettling
events. L'r a multipohr uorld, dangers are diffused, respor-rsibilities unclear,
and definitions of vital interests casily obscured. Where a number of states are
in balance, thc skillful fbreign polio,of a fonvarcl pou.er is dcsigned ro gain an
advantagc tvitl.rout antagonizing othcr states and frighter-ring thcm into united
action. At tir.r-rcs in modern Enropc, thc bcr-rcfits of possible gains havc seemed
to ounvcigl-r tl-re risks ollikell, losses. Statcsmcn have hoped to push an issue to
the limit u,ithout causing i.rll of tl're potential opponerlts to Lulite. W-ren tl-rerc
are several possiblc cttcrnics, nnity of action among tl-rcm is difficult to achieve.
National lcadcrs could tl.rercforc tl.rir.rk-or desperately hopc, as did Theobald
von Bcthmann Hollrvcg and Adolf Hitler bcforc trvo u,orld wars-that a
united opi-rositior-r u,oulcl ltot fbrnt.
If intercsts irncl irrrbitior-rs conflict, thc absencc of crises is morc rvorrisome
than tl-reir prcsencc. criscs arc prodr-rced by the dctermination of a statc to
 f.HEORY

rcsist a chargc rhat anorhcr state tries to makc. As thc leadcrs ir-r a bipolar
systcm, tl-re United srates anc.l the Soviet Union are disposcd to clo
the rcsist_
ing, fbr in in.rporrant marters thc1, cannor hope that thcir allics rvill do
it fbr
them' Political action in the posnl,ar rvorlcl has reflectccl tl.ris colclitior.
comrnunist guerrillas operati.g i, Greece promptcd thc Trur.na, Doctrine.
Thc tightcni,g of soviet cortrol ovcr the srates oJ-Eastern Europc
led ro tire
Marshall Plar-r and the Atlantic l)efcr.rsc Treaq,, ar.rcl thcse ir-, t.r.,,
ga'e rise to
the cor-'ir.rtbrm and thc warsarv pact. Thc plar.r to crcate a welt
Ge.na.r
govcrnment produccd tl.re Berli, blockade. During the past
four decades, our
responses have bee, gcarcd to the Soviet union's actions,
and theirs to ours.
Miscalculatio, by some or arl of the great powcrs is a sourcc of
da.gcr i, a
multipolar r'r,orld; ovcrrcaction by either or both of tl-re great povucrs
is a solrrcc
of danger in t.r bipolar rvorld. Which is u,orsc: n.riscalculation or
overrcactio.f
Miscalculatio'r is the grearer e,il bccansc it is morc likely to permit
a, u.fold-
i,g of events that finall1'threatens thc status quo a,cr brings ihc powcrs
to \\rar.
o'erreaction is the lesscr c'il beca'sc ,t rr,.r.ri it costs only,roney
for unneces-
sary arms and possibly thc fighti,g of iimited rvars. The
clynarnics of a bipolar
system' morcover) provide a freasure of correction. L-r
a rvorlcl in r.vhich tg.o
states ,nited i, thcir m,tual antago,ism o'ershadou.
a,y others, thc be.efits
of a calculated rcsp.rsc stard out m.st crearly, ancl thc ,rrra,i.r,-r,
agai,st
irre sponsible behavior achicve their greatest force. Thus
two states, isolatio,ist
by traditio., unrurored in thc rvays of inter,ationar politics,
ar-rd fimed for
impulsivc behavior, havc shou,n themselves_not alrval,s
and cveryrvhere, but
alu'ilys in crucial cases-to be rvary, arert, cautious, flcxibre,
and forbcarir-rg.
Moreover, the cconomics of the great po\,vers in a bipolar rvorld
are ress
i,terdeper.rdent thirn those of the great pow..rs of a n-rultipolar
onc. The size of
grcat po$'ers tends to increasc as their numbers fhll, ancl
the largcr a state
is, thc grcirter the of its rcsources. states of continentar siic cro pro-
portior.rately less of'ariery
tl-reir busi'ess abroad than, for example, Britai., France,
and Germany dicl in thcir heydavs. Ncvcr befbre in modem
historl, have trre
grcat Powers dcpendcd so littlc on the outsicle u,orld,
and been so qlinvolr.ecl
in one a,other's economic affairs, as thc U'itcd States ar.rd the
So'ict Ur.rio,
havc bcen sincc thc rvtrr. Thc scparation of their intercsts
redtices the occasi.r-rs
for disp,te and pcrmits thcn'r, if thcy rvish, to lea'e cach other
alor-rc c'cr.r
thoueh each defi,cs its sccurity irtercsts rargely in terns ofthc
other.
of parties, diffusion or dangcrs, co,f,sio. of rcsponses:
-.Interdcpe'dcncc
These trre thc characteristics of great-powcr politi., ir.r
a multipolar rvorld.
Sclf:dcper-rdencc of parries, clarity of clangers, icrtirinry
about rvht has to facc
thcm: rhesc are the characteristics of great-po*,cr politics in
a bipolar,,vorld.

Keeping wars cold: the unit level

A major reason firr tl-re prolor-rgatio, of tl-re postwar peacc
is thc dcstructio. of
thc old n.rultipolar rvorld i. lvorrd wirr II and its ..;,1r..-",rt
b1,a bipolar or-rc.
 THF. ORI(;INS OF tVAII IN NI_.OI{IrAt.IST
T.HEORy

ll,1::' :l1l T l*,,lli,: liii:.. :::':::::'#,o;, ": ;I J. : :,1,,a c B u,,o

g c a b,

United Starcs ancl the Sor,iet Unior.r is c-lifficulr. ci,.r-,-i.,,1'i,.,.t,,

t"*'"".t
,h.
the distrust felt b1' both pirrties, ore ma\r casill, bclic'c ,r,*ll.,l ;::l:.:_':"t "f
the crises tl.rat thcy ha'c expericnced *,onld, ,, .".ii.. ,,,rr.: ;i:,,:'::]]:'tl'rer of
into rvar. For a fuller cxpl.,ratio, of *4^,that cliri ;;r-;;r:;r;,i:,::::[:11til
that othe r grcat fbrce tbr pc:rcc: r.rucle ar \\,eapons.
Statcs cc>,tir.ruc to coexist in a. anarchic ordcr. Seitrhe tp is thc
pr.ir.rciple of
action in such an order, and thc most irnportant u,ar. ir-r ri,hicl-r ,,.,.,
n.,,rr, t_r"tp
themscli,es is b1, pro'idir-rg for thcir ou,r.r sccurity,. fl.rerefbrc, in ,r,"iglrlrg
t1.,"
charccs olpeace, the first qucstions to ask are questio's abor-rt the-cnds
fbr
which states use tbrcc and trbout the strategies and u'eapo,s tl.rcr,cn.rplol,.
The
chanccs of peacc risc if states can;rchievc thcir most impor.rlnt c1.ls
ri.ithout
activell' using fbrcc. lVar bccorncs lcss likely as thc costs of u.lr rise i1 rclirtio,
to the possible gains. Realist theory, old and neu, alike, dra\\.s ilttcntiol t.
the
crucial role of rnilitary tcchnologv and strategl, among tl.rc fbrce s t[lt fix
thc
fate of statcs ar-rd thcir s).stems.
Nuclear wcapons dissi-rade states from going to rvar m*ch rnorc s.rel1, tha,
conventionirl \\/eapons do. In a conr.cntional u,orld, states can belicye bot]-r tl-rat
thcy ma1' u'in and rhat, should thc1, losc, the price of clcfbat rvill be bearable,
although World Wars I ar"rd II callcd thc latter belief into qsesriol ci.c1 bcfrrre
atomic bor.r-rbs rvere dropped. If tl-re Unitcd States and the Sor.ict Union s,erc
now armed only r,vith conventiontrl \\.capons, the lcssons of tl-rosc g,ars 1,ould
be clearh'rcmembercd, cspecialll. by the Soviet ur-rior-r. u,hich suflcred morc
i1
war than tl'rc United Statcs. H'.rd the atorn nevcr bcen split, those t\\,o nations
would still havc r.nucl.r to fi:ar fi'on-r cach othcr. Arrncd u,ith ir-rcreasingll,destrlrc-
tive co,r'e,tional *,capo,s, they u,o*ld bc co,strained to stri'c earnestll, t9
avoid rvar- Yet, in a convcntional u.orld, evcn sad and stror-rg lessons like
those
of the ni'<l u'rrld *.ars ha,c prclved cxcccdirgll, difficult ib. .t.t., ro lca,r.
Throughout modern l-ristory, o,c grcat po\\,er or arothcr l-ras lookccl as thor_rgh
it might bccomc dangerousll, strong: for examplc, Fra,cc ur.rdcr I-oris XIV
and Napoleon Bo,ap;rrtc, and Gcrmanv undcr wilhelni II ar-rcj Hitlcr.
Lr cach
casc, t1n opposi,g coalitio, tbrmcd a,d turned thc expansi'c state
back. The
lessons of histort, rvor-rld secm to bc crcar: In ir-rtcmationirl politics,
succcss
Ieads to fhilure . The cxccssivc accrurulation of pou.cr b1. onc
rirr" .r. colliti6l
of statcs clicits the opposition of othcrs. Thc leaclcrs ol expansior-rist statcs
ha'e ne,erthelcss beer.r able to persuirdc ther.nsclves that skillful cliplon-racy ar.rd
clcver strategl' *'o'ld e,able them to tra,sccncl thc no,nal irr,r..rr", ,rf
balancc-of:porver politics.
The cxpcricnce ofWorld War II, bipolarity, and rhc incrcrscc-l clcstlrctivcle
ss
of couve tltiot-tal u'capot-rs would n-rake W<rrlcl War III nrore
difficllt t() stiut thxll
earlier rvars rverc; and thc prescr-rcc of nuclcirr \\icapons clrar-nrrticrrlly,
ipcrcases
that difficulq.. Nnclcar \\,capons rcverse or ncgatc marv of thc co,r,cr.rtio,ll
causcs of rvar. wars ca. Lrc tbught i, tl-rc ficc of ,uclc:rr wci.lpo.s)
but trrc
 1'HEORY

irigl-rer thc stalies ancl the closer a colrrltry comes to $'inning them, thc more
surely tl-rat colurrry invites rctaliation ar.rd risks its orvu destruction. The accu-
muitrtiorr ol significar-rt pou.cr through conqucst, even il only convcutional
\\,eapons arc uscd, is no lor.rger possiblc in thc tvorld of nuclcar porvers. Those
ir.rdividulls l,ho believc that the Soviet Union's lcaders .1re so bcllt otl rvorld
clot.uiuation that thcy nta)' bc u'illing to rlrn catastropl-ric risks for problenratic
gains firil to understand l-ron' govcrnmellts bchavc. Do tt'c cxpcct to losc one
ciq, or nvoi Ts,o cities or tcnf Wl.ren thcse are the pcrtinent qucstions, politi-
c;.rl lcadcrs stop tl-rir-rking lbout runuit'tg risks and start rvorrf ittg about ho\\' to
avoid thcm.
Deterrencc is more easily achieved than tt-tost militar.v strategists u'ould have
us bclicve. Lr tr convcntioual u'orld, A collntr\r can sensibly attack if it bclicvcs
that succcss is probablc. Itr a uuclcar u'orlc1, a couutrv callllot scnsibh' attack
unless it bclicvcs that succcss is assurecl. A natiot.r r.vill bc deterred liom attack-
ir-rg o'en if it bclicves that thcrc is onl1, a possibiliry that its adversary rvill
rettrliate. Uncertainq' of respousc, llot certainw, is reqr-rired fbr deterrencc
becausc, if retaliation occlrrs) one risks losing all. As Clauseu'itz wrote: If war
approtrchcs the absolutc, it becotnes imperative "not to take tl-rc first step
u,ithout tl.rir-rl<ir-rg u,hat ma1, be the last."u
Nuclear wcapons make thc inrplications cr,cn of victory too l-rorribie to con-
tcn-rplate. Thc problem that tl-rc t-tuclear pou,crs must soh'e is ho\\'to perPetuatc
pcace rvhen it is not possible to climinate :ril olthc causes oftvar. The structurc
of international politics has not been transfbnr-red; it remains anarchic in fbrm.
Nuclear stirtcs corltillue to compcte n-rilitarily. Witl"r each state striYing to ellsure
its ou,n securiw, u,ar remaius constrntl)r possible. In the anarchy of statcs,
impror.ir-rg thc means of defbrrsc and deterrencc rclative to the mcans of offerrsc
increascs thc chances of peacc. Wcapons and stratcgies that makc defbnse and
de terrcncc casicr, and offbr-rsivc strikcs l'rarder to moLlnt, decreasc the likelihood
of x.ar.7
Although the possibility of u'ar rcmains, the probability of a tvar involving
states u'ith nuclcar werpons has bcen drasticalll' rcduced. Over thc cettturics
great po\r'crs have fougl'rt ffrorc wafs than miuor states, alld the ficquencl' of
lvar has corrclatcd more closcll. u'ith tr structural characteristic-thcir inter-
national star-rdir-rg-thtrn u,ith unit-level attributes. Yet, becausc of a chauge
in militlrv tccllrology, a change at the unit lcvcl, r'vaging r,r'ar has increasingh'
becomc tl-rc privilege of poor aud u'e:rk statcs. Nuclear \\'eapons l-rave banisl-rcd
u.,ar fi-on-rthc ccnter of intcrr-ratiorul politics. A unit-level changc has dramatic-
r.rll1. rcduced a structural elfcct.
-fhc problbilitl, of mljor l'rrr xnrong states having nuclear \\'caPons
approachcs zcro. But the "rcal u'ar" trlay, as lirmes clain-red, lie in tl-rc prepar-
ations fbr u,agir.rg it. Thc logic of a dctcrrcnt strxtegv, il it is fbllou'cd, also
circurnscribes the ciruses of "rcal \\'alrs."3 In a couvetttional u'orld, the struc-
ture of internationll politics encouragcs statcs t() arm cot-npetitivcly. In a
nuclear u.orld, dcterrent stratcgies ofler the possibiliq. of dln'rpcr-rine thc
7
THI] ORIGINS OF WAR IN NEOITI.,AI,IS'I'1'HI.,ORY

compctition. Conventionirl ncapons are relativc. With convcutionl u,eirpotrs,

competing countrics rnltst constantll,cor-npare tl-rcir strcngths. Hou, scclrre a.
countr\r is depe ncls <tn hotv it cotlprtres to others in tl'rc quar.rtity ar-rd c1-ralitl, of
its rvcapoury, the sr,ritability of its stratcg)', the resilicncc of its socicty xnd
econoll\.) trnd the skill of its lcadcrs.
Nuclear \l,eapons arc not relative but absolutc u,eaporrs.' 'l'hc1, nakc it pos-
sible for a statc to lir.r.rit the size of its strategic fbrccs so long as othcr statcs arc
unable to rrchieve disarn.ring first-strike cirpirbilitics by, ir.r.rproving tl-reir fbrces.
If no statc can launch a disarming attack u.itl.r l.rigl'r confidencc, compirring thc
size of strategic fbrces bccomcs irrelevant. For deterrcnce, one asks hou, much
is enough, and cr-rough is defined as a sccond-strike capabiliq.. This interpret-
ation docs not imply that a dctcrrent force cirn dctcr cver\/thing, br.rt rathcr
that, bel,ond a ccrtait-t 1cvcl, additional tbrccs provic.le r.ro additional secr-rrit1,
for one parq, ar-rd pose no additional thrcat to others. f'he fii,o principll powe rs
in the systen.r have iong had sccond-strike forccs, u,ith ncither able to launch a
disarming strike agair-rst tl-rc otl.rer. That both ncvertheless continlrc to pile
weapon upon unnccded rveapon is a puzzlc rvhose solution cln be lbund only
within thc Unitcd States and the Sovict Union.

Wars, hot and cold

Wars, hot and cold, originate in the stmcture of the internatior-ral political
syste m. Most Ar.ncricans blar.ne the Soviet Union fbr cre atir-rg the Cold War, by
the actions that fbllorv ne cessarily fiorn thc naturc of its socieqv and govcrn-
ment. Revisionist historiar-rs, attacking thc dorninant vicu,, assign blirr-ne to tl-rc
United Strrtcs. Sonlc Anrericlrt crror, or siui\tcr intcrest. or farrltl assuurption
about Soviet airns, thcy ;rrgue, is rl4rat stirrtcd thc Cold War. Either \vay, thc
main point is lost. In ;,r bipolar u,orlcl, circh of tl-re two gretlt po\\rcrs is bor.rnd to
focus its fears on thc other, to distrust its motives, and to inlputc oflcr-rsive
intentions to detcnsivc trreasures. Thc propcr qucstion is rvhat, not rvho, startcd
the Cold War. Altl-rough its content and virulence \ra1r)/ as ur-rit-lcvcl fbrccs
change and interact, tl-re Cold War continucs. It is firml1, rooted in thc struc-
ture of postwar intcrnational politics, irr.rd n,ill last as long as that structLlrc
endures.
In any closcll, conrpctitiyc sYstenl, it ma1, 5cc111 that one is either paranoid or
a loser. Thc man1, An.rcricans rvho ascribc paranoia to the Soviet Union arc
saying little about its politictrl clite ancl much about thc intcmltional-political
system. Yet, in the prcseltce of nuclcar \\,c:1pons, the Cold War has not beconte
a hot one, x rilgiltg war illltoltg miljor statcs. Coltstraints r>r-r fighting big rvars
have bour-rcl thc major nuclear states into a s),stcm of uncals1, pcace. Hot u,ars
originate in thc strucrurc olinrernatior.ral politics. So docs thc Cold War, u,ith
its tempcraturc kept lou..by the prcscnce of nnclcar weapons.
 THEORY

Acknowledgment
Thc author thanks David Scl-rlcichcr, u'ho \\'i1s most hclpfirl in the cornplctior.r
of this article .

Notes
I Hans l.Morgcr-rthau, "Iuternation:rl Rclations: Quar-rtitative and Qualitatirc
Approacl-res," in Non-nan l). Pirln-rcr cd., A Dcsigtt for Internationnl Relatiorts
Research: Scope, Theory, Methods, and Relevnncr (Phitadclpl-ria,l970),p.78.
2 Morgerrthaq Politics among Nations (Ncu'York, 1973;Srh cd.), p. 11. Ludu'ig
Boltzmirn (trar-rs. Rudolf Weir-rgartncr), "Theories as Rcpre sentatious,"
cxcerpted ir.r Arthur Danto ancl Sidr.rey Morgcnbcsser eds.. Philonphy oJ'Science
(Cleveland, 1960), pp. 245-252. Ncorcalistn is sor.netitncs dubbcd strucftrrirl
realism. I usc thc tcrrns intcrchangcably, and, throughout this article, refbr tir
rrry o\\,n fbn-r-u-rlation ol neorealist tl-rcor1.. See Wirltz, Theory of Interno.tilnal
Politics (Rcadir-rg, MA, 1979); Robcrt I(eohrne ed., Neorenlistn and its Critics
(Nclr,York, 1986).
3 Morgenthau, Politics onxon! Nntions, y>. 27 .
4 Idem, Scientific Man vs. Pol,er Politics (Cl-ricago, l9a6), pp. I92, 200. Itrlics
trdclecl.
5 Sec lol-rn H. Herz, "Iclealist L-rtcrnationalisrr antl tl-rc Sccr-uiry Dllctnma," World
Politics, II (1950), pp. I57-180.
6 I(arl von Clauscu.itz, cd. Arratol Rap:rport; trans. J. l. Grirham, On War
(Hamn.rondsr'vorth, I 968 ), Y, p. 37 4.
7 Scc Malcolm !V. Hoag, "On Stability in l)eterrent Raccs," in Morton A. I(aplar.r
ed., The Revolu.tion in World Politics (Neu'York, 1962), pp. 388-410; Robcrt
)ervis, "Coopcration under the Securin,Dilcmma," World Politics,Xxx (I978),
pp.167-214.
8 William ]ames, "Thc Moral Equivirlent of !Var," iu Lcon Bramson and Gcorgc
W. Goetl.rals cds., Wnr: Studies frout Psl,chology, Sociology, and Antbropologl'
(Nov York, I9(r8; rer,. ed.), p. 23.
9 Cf'. Bernarcl Broclie, 'I'he Absohrtc Wrapltt: Atomic Pott,er nnd World Ot'der (Nctt'
York, 1946), pp.75-76.