17010125005

MOOT COURT EXERCISE AND INTERNSHIPS (CLINICAL COURSE IV) INTERNAL MOOT 1

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

IN THE MATTER PERTAINING TO

WRIT PETITION: 1/2022

MR. ROHAN.…………………………………………………………………. PETITIONER

VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ………………………………………RESPONDENT

UPON SUBMISSIONS TO THE HON’BLE JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE
HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

FACTS OF THE CASE
 ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE 1

WHETHER THERE LIMITATIONS ON MEDIA TRIAL WHEN CASE IS SUB JUDICE.

ISSUE 2

WHETHER SUO MOTO ACTIONS AND ACTIVISM BY A JUDGE IN THE PRESENT CASE ARE
AGAINST BASIC TENETS OF THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM AND THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CODE, 1973.

ISSUE 3

WHETHER THE JUDGMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF ARGUMENT ON EVIDENCES VALID.

 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THERE ARE LIMITATIONS ON MEDIA TRIAL WHEN CASE IS SUB
JUDICE.

1. It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble High Court that the freedom of the press is
covered under the fundamental right to speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)
(a) of the Constitution of India, 1949 (“Constitution”), as ruled by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in Bennett Coleman & Co. & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors 1. Since “Media
Trial” has been explained to be the report broadcasted by the KAB channel 2, for the purpose
of the current proceedings only such media coverage may be included.

2. The aforementioned “Media Trial” included a special report which heightened the issues,
pieces of evidence, problems in investigation, and pointed out the possibility of corruption by
the investigating officer.

3. The right to fair trial of the accused person has been protected and the report broadcasted by
KAB channel did not create any prejudice against the rights of the accused person. This shall
be proved in a two pronged manner: [1.1] The role of media does not create a bias or
prejudice against the accused person, and [1.2] The media did not obstruct the process of
administration of justice, thereby not violating the right to fair trial.

[1.1.]. THE ROLE OF MEDIA DOES NOT AMOUNT TO MEDIA TRIAL AS IT DID NOT CREATE

A BIAS OR ANY PREJUDICE AGAINST THE ACCUSED PERSON.

4. It is contended before this Hon’ble Court that unless there exists a prima facie case of malice
and bias, the actions of the media cannot be rendered as a Media Trial, which might infringe
the rights of the accused3. In the landmark judgment of R Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu4, it
was unequivocally held that if presumption of guilt or undue prejudice is created against the
accused persons, only then would it amount to obstruction of administration of justice. In the
given case, the report broadcasted only highlighted the issues, pieces of evidence, and the
possible lacunae in investigation5, which is not the same as creating any bias or prejudice
against the accused, but was merely a coverage of the case.
1
Bennett Coleman & Co. & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors, 1973 SCR (2) 757
2
Moot Court Problem No. 1, para 6
3
Review of The Press in India (2008 to 2012), Report submitted to The Press Council of India.
4
R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1995 AIR 264.
5
Moot Court Problem No. 1, para 2
5. In the case of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India6, it was stated, inter alia, when discussion or
advocacy in an investigation is limited to ensuring that a free, fair and transparent
investigation and trial occurs, discussion or coverage of a case by the media is acceptable. If
such discussion were to lead to incitement to conduct a parallel ‘unsupervised and
unregulated media trial’ then it is a fit case for being sanctioned under law. However, in the
present case, since only evidences and possible lacunae in investigation were covered, the
report broadcasted is acceptable, and cannot be sanctioned. Further, the “Media Trial” also
did not lead to any ‘unregulated and unsupervised trial’, as the fresh investigation which was
ordered for, by the court, was regulated under the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”).

6. It is also added that the actions of the media in the present matter were in tandem with the
essentials of media reporting on crime. The information reported to the public was honest,
authentic, objective and unbiased. The “Media Trial” did not report opinions, false
information or judgments, rather just reports on the issues, evidences and investigation, and
could not have prejudiced the opinion of the judiciary against the accused7.

7. Furthermore, it is to be realized that reporting on crime and the on-going investigation does
not directly amount to a trial by media 8, the media has the right to report which is
complemented with the public’s right to know and be informed under Article 19 of the
Constitution9.

8. A bare perusal of the factual matrix also reveals that the media has not published interviews
or released any statement of either parties, or attempted to influence the opinion of the court
in favour of, or against either parties, rather only towards the issues in the trial.

[1.2] THE MEDIA DID NOT OBSTRUCT THE PROCESS OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

THEREBY, NOT VIOLATING THE RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL

9. It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that a fair trial refers to a trial in which bias
or prejudice against the witness, accused or the cause for which the trial is being conducted is
eliminated. Some of the essentials of a fair trial are just investigation, impartial judiciary,
presumption of innocence, protection against double jeopardy etc., under the CrPC.

6
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1
7
M. Jagannadha Rao, J. 200th Law Commission Report on “Trial by Media: Free speech and fair trial under
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973”, August 2006.
8
Secretary, Ministry of Information and Brodcasting v. Cricket Association of West Bengal 1995 2 SCC 161.
9
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, 1975 SCR (3) 333.
10. In the present case since the victim is the daughter of a well-known political leader, it falls
under the scope of a case concerning a leading popular figure as victim, which is a justifiable
ground for media attention being heightened, as established in the case of Indian Express
Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India10.

11. The process of administration is considered to be obstructed when there is undue interference
with the on-going investigation or procedure, which hampers smooth conduct of the trial 11. In
the infamous case of Hawala Transactions12, when the media aggressively reported on the
controversy and the question of media trial was raised, the Court had explicitly assured that
media publicity and reporting cannot lead to the Court compromising on the principles and
jurisprudence of a fair trial13.

12. Furthermore, it is contended before this Hon’ble Court that media reporting does not have the
potential to influence and prejudice the prudent minds of the judiciary, and the facets of fair
trial are undisputedly guarded by them. The media reports have nowhere attempted to create
a presumption of guilt against the accused person, but have ensured to uphold the
presumption of innocence by objectively reporting on the status of the investigation, the
issues framed and pointing out the possibility of corruption by the investigating officer.

13. It is submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the “Media Trial” in question does not amount
to a trial by media, and the right to fair trial guaranteed to the accused persons has been well
guarded. The accused has attempted to derail the proceedings, to shift the liability and the
onus of responsibility of his actions on to the media.

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE SUO MOTO ACTIONS AND ACTIVISM BY THE JUDGE IN THE

PRESENT CASE ARE AGAINST THE BASIC TENETS OF COMMON LAW SYSTEM AND THE

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973?

14. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the suo moto actions and the purported
‘activism’ by the Learned Judge in the present case are not against the basic tenets of the
common law regime or the CrPC. It is contended that the Learned Judge acted as a neutral
third party and did not display bias towards any party. This shall be proved in a three pronged
manner, as given: [2.1] Judges may rely on media reports, however they shall not be
admissible in the absence of corroborating evidence. [2.2] Sessions Judges are empowered to
10
Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 1986 AIR 515
11
R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1995 AIR 264.
12
Anukul Chandra Pradhan v. Union of India 1996 6 SCC 354.
13
Secretary, Ministry of Information and Brodcasting v. Cricket Association of West Bengal 1995 2 SCC 161.
 suo moto pass an order for a fresh investigation, request collection of specific evidence and
call for material witnesses. [2.3] Leaned Judge in the present case considered all the evidence
on record as lawfully required and passed the judgment based on cogent reasons.

[2.1]. JUDGES MAY RELY ON MEDIA REPORTS, HOWEVER THEY SHALL NOT BE

ADMISSIBLE IN THE ABSENCE OF CORROBORATING EVIDENCE.

15. It is humbly submitted that in respect of media reports, the admissibility of newspaper reports
was deemed to be secondary evidence in the nature of hearsay evidence under Section 63 of
Indian Evidence Act, 187214.

16. Further, Justice Dipak Mishra, in a judgment observed that “A Judge is not placed in the
high situation merely as a passive instrument of the parties. He has duty of his own,
independent of them and that duty is to investigate truth.” reemphasizing the duty of judges
towards investigation.15

17. Hence, it is submitted that Learned Judge did not act with any bias or prejudice, or against
the principles of fair trial by taking cognizance of the lacunae in the investigation and
ordering a fresh investigation.

[2.2]. SESSIONS JUDGES ARE EMPOWERED TO SUO MOTO PASS AN ORDER FOR A FRESH

INVESTIGATION, REQUEST COLLECTION OF SPECIFIC EVIDENCE AND CALL FOR MATERIAL

WITNESSES.

18. In the case of Vinay Tyagi vs. Irshad Ali & Ors16, the conditions for a reinvestigation were
set out, and it was stated that it is for the interest of the accused to render complete justice
and not have their case decided on incomplete evidence. It was also inter alia said to be the
responsibility of the courts to ensure a fair investigation.

19. In the Vinay Tyagi case it was also stated that the order for reinvestigation could specify the
manner in which the investigation must be carried out, which makes it valid for the Learned
Judge to call for specific evidence if his lordship believes to achieve the ends of justice.

20. The “Media Trial” also highlighted the lacunae in the investigation and the Sessions Court
took suo moto cognizance to order for reinvestigation, which it is empowered to do17.

14
S.P. Shenbagamoorthy vs Dr. Chenna Reddy, 1994 2 MLJ 23
15
Heeralal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1997 SCC OnLine MP 54
16
Vinay Tyagi vs. Irshad Ali & Ors. (2013 5 SCC 762)
17
MANU/ WB/ 0575/ 2012
21. Further, it is humbly submitted that explicit power has been granted under Sec 311 of CrPC,
for courts to call for any material witness even if they have not been called by either party.
The same principle has also been reiterated in Heeralal v. State of Madhya Pradesh18.

[2.2]. LEARNED JUDGE IN THE PRESENT CASE CONSIDERED ALL THE EVIDENCE ON

RECORD AS LAWFULLY REQUIRED AND PASSED THE JUDGMENT BASED ON COGENT

REASONS.

22. In the Vinay Tyagi case it was observed that unless specifically stated by way of an order that
the initial investigation report will not form a part of the material on record, the courts are
obliged to consider all the materials on record, including initial investigation reports, even if
a reinvestigation is ordered.

23. Hence, it is false to assume that Learned Judge only relied on evidence from reinvestigation,
especially considering that the Investigating agency could bring on record the old material to
be recorded again.

ISSUE 3: WHETHER JUDGEMENT PASSED IN ABSENCE OF ARGUMENT ON EVIDENCE IN

VALID

24. It is humbly contended that the judgment passed by the Session and District Court in the case
of State of Maharashtra v. Rohan that in the absence of argument on evidences is valid as in
the present case the judgment primarily relied upon the CCTV footage and the witness
statement. It is humbly contended that in this case [3.1] the electronic evidence relied upon is
admissible without argument, and [3.2] the witness statement relied upon is admissible
without argument.

[3.1]. THE ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE RELIED UPON IS ADMISSIBLE WITHOUT ARGUMENT

25. The CCTV footage that was relied upon the Sessions and District judge was electronic
evidence. The CCTV footage is considered as electronic record 19, and the Hon’ble Supreme
Court surmised that the Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is a complete code for
electronic record evidences20.

18
Heeralal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1997 SCC OnLine MP 54
19
Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP (2014) 10 SCC 473
20
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kishanrao Goratyal (2020) SCC OnLine SC 571; Anvar P.V. v. P.K.
Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473
26. The Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not necessitate the examination of
the electronic record by the parties. Section 59 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 also states
that electronic evidence does not require oral evidence to be proved.

27. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a CCTV footage is the best evidence
to determine the location of the accused with respect to the location of the crime, as per the
best evidence principle of criminal law21.

28. Hence, it is contended that in this present case the CCTV footage was procedurally
admissible and the relevant for the case law, making the reliance on the footage for the
judgement valid in the absence of arguments on the same.

[3.2]. THE WITNESS STATEMENT RELIED UPON IS ADMISSIBLE WITHOUT ARGUMENT

29. The primary contention regarding the admissibility of the witness in the present case is that
the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Natasha Singh v. CBI 22 held that the calling of
witness by the judge is valid as per Section 311 of CrPC which empowers any Court, at any
stage, to summon a witness if such person’s evidence is deemed essential by the judge. The
court is conferred with very wide discretionary powers under this section, and can summon
witnesses even without the application of the parties.

30. Furthermore, the second contention is regarding the cross-examination of the witness
presented during the trial. Wherever the opponent has declined to avail himself of the
opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination, it must follow that he
believed that the testimony given could not be disputed at all. It is wrong to think that this is
merely a technical rule of evidence. It is a rule of essential justice.23

31. Hence, it is contended that in the present case the parties by not scrutinizing the witness
present had put forth their admission of the testimony, hence making the reliability of the
judgement on this evidence as valid.

21
Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP (2014) 10 SCC 473
22
(2013) 5 SCC 741
23
Harish Loyalka and Anr. V. Dileep Nevatia and Ors. 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 68
PRAYER
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
 17010125005

MOOT COURT EXERCISE AND INTERNSHIPS (CLINICAL COURSE IV) INTERNAL MOOT 2

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

IN THE MATTER PERTAINING TO

WRIT PETITION: 1/2022

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION (EPHP)…………………. PETITIONER

VERSUS

ASPA PVT. LTD. ………………………………………RESPONDENT

UPON SUBMISSIONS TO THE HON’BLE JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE
HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

 FACTS OF THE CASE

1. ASPA, a French based Private Limited Company, established a manufacturing unit in the
outskirts of Ranangaon in 2012 after obtaining all environmental clearances, including
Consent for Establishment (CFE) and Consent for Operation (CFO) from Maharashtra
Pollution Control Board (MPCB). The clearances were valid until January, 2023 subject
to revision in 2019. ASPA established a manufacturing unit worth Rs. 500 crores in the
outskirts of Ranangaon.
2. In 2016, due to enormous growth of construction industry, ASPA was surrounded by
illegal construction of residential localities despite measures by Municipal Corporation of
Ranangaon to control it.
3. In 2020, the Central Pollution Control Board of India (CPCB) and IIT Kanpur (IITT)
released a report that indicated Ranangaon as one of the most polluted cities in India. The
municipal Corporation of Ranangaon, as a result of this report, established the Ranangaon
Pollution Control Board (RPCB) and empowered this Board to issue any orders to control
or decrease the pollution levels in the city.
4. RPCB, after finding ASPA to be one of the most polluting companies due to its activities
resulting in polluting groundwater issued notice to instal advanced machinery to reduce
its pollution which was complied with by ASPA and therefore, got the CFO till 2023.
5. RPCB issued order to ASPA to relocate on 09 January, 2020 while the Central and
Government of Maharashtra issued Government Order No. 333 that prohibited various
industrial developments around Ranangaon.
6. Environment and Public Health Protection (EPHP), a NGO, henceforth referred to as the
petitioner, filed the present PIL asking to shut down operations of ASPA as its causing
increase in level of pollution in residential areas. Following the petition, RPCB wrote to
the Chief Justice of Bombay High Court that the operations of ASPA are illegal since its
order on January 9, 2020.
7. The respondents, ASPA, contends that it was established only after acquiring all requisite
permissions and as an International Company, the order by RPCB is in conflict with the
country’s international obligations.
 ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE 1

WHETHER THE PETITION FILED BY THE ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH

PROTECTION IS MAINTAINABLE.

ISSUE 2

WHETHER THE RANANGAON POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD’S ORDER DATED 09.01.2020

IS IN CONFLICT WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS?

ISSUE 3

WHETHER THE ORDER PASSED BY RPCB DATED 09.01.20 ORDERING ASPA TO SHUT
DOWN OR RELOCATE UNIT OF ASPA IS VALID AND LAWFUL.
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE PETITION FILED BY ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH

PROTECTION IS MAINTAINABLE.

1. It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble High Court that the petition
filed by the Environment and Public Health Protection under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, 1949 (“Constitution”) is maintainable.
2. The maintainability of the petition can be established in a two pronged
manner: [1.1] The NGO had locus standi to file the matter under Article
226 of the Constitution, and [1.2] Petition can be filed against ASPA under
Article 226 of the Constitution.

[1.1.]. THE NGO HAS LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226

3. It is contended before this Hon’ble Court that in the case of SP Gupta v.

Union of India24 it was established by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that a
member of the public or social action group acting in a bonafide manner
can invoke the Writ Jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of
the Constitution seeking redressal against violation of a legal or
constitutional rights of persons, who due to social, economic or any other
disability cannot approach the Court.
4. In the present case, the locus standi can be established in a two pronged
manner such as [1.1.1] Environment and Public Health Protection was
social group acting in bonafide manner, and [1.1.2] There was a violation
of the constitutional right of persons.

[1.1.1] ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION WAS SOCIAL GROUP ACTING IN
BONAFIDE MANNER

24
(1982) 2 S.C.R. 365
5. The Environment and Public Health Protection is an NGO created with the
bonafide intention of protection of environment and health of people of
Ranangaon.
6. Hence, in this case as a third-party Environment and Public Health
Protection is seeking intervention of Court wherein fundamental rights of
another party is impacted25.

[1.1.2] THERE WAS VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PERSONS.

7. It is recognized in the case of Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar26 that the

Right to Live is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution,
and it includes the right of enjoyment of pollution free water and air for
full enjoyment of life. If anything endangers or impairs that quality of life
in derogation with laws, a citizen has the right to have a recourse for
removing the pollution of water or air, which may be detrimental to their
quality of life.
8. Hence, in this particular case the report of IIT Tanpura along with Central
Pollution Control Board of India clearly showed that there was an
alarming level of air, water, and sound pollution, in and around
Rannagaon.
9. Furthermore, the expert committee appointed by the Ranangaon Pollution
Control Board (“RPCB”) clearly mentioned that ASPA was responsible
for it, and has also polluted the drinking ground water in its vicinity.
Hence, establishing that there was a violation of Right to Live under
Article 21 of the Constitution, of the residents of Rannagaon.

[1.2] PETITION CAN BE FILED AGAINST ASPA UNDER ARTICLE 226

10.It is humbly contended before the Hon’ble Court that Supreme Court of
India in the case of Federal Bank Lt. v. Sagar Thomas & Ors 27 provided an
25
People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India 1982 AIR 1473
26
Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar 1991 AIR 420
27
Federal Bank Lt. v. Sagar Thomas & Ors (2003) 10 SCC 733
 exception stating that a private body or a person may be amenable to writ
jurisdiction only where it may become necessary to compel such body or
association to enforce a statutory obligation or such obligations of public
nature. Furthermore, in case of People's Union for Democratic Rights vs.
Union of India28 it has been held that certain fundamental rights are
enforceable not only against the state but also against private individuals.
11.Hence, in the present case the writ petition can be filed against ASPA
despite being a private body.

ISSUE 2 – WHETHER THE RANANGAON POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD’S ORDER DATED

09.01.2020 IS IN CONFLICT WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS?

12.It is humbly contended that the Order dated 09.10.2020 passed by the
Ranangaon Pollution Control Board (“RPCB”) is not in conflict with any
international obligations or international law. This is because above-
mentioned action of RPCB, a government body, falls under the Right to
National Sovereignty and Right to Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources of the state of India.
13.It is further contended that on the other hand ASPA Pvt. Ltd. Acted against
various international standards regarding protection of environment
enshrined in various instruments.
14.The above stated argument is divided into 3 parts, as follows: [2.1] Right
to National Sovereignty [2.2] Right to Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resource [2.3] Violation of International Standards by ASPA Pvt.
Ltd.

[2.1.] RIGHT TO NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

15.It is submitted that since RPCB was established by the Municipal

Corporation of Ranangaon, it is a governmental body under the Indian

28
Democratic Rights vs. Union of India (1982) 3 SCC 235
 Government and enjoys the same rights as enjoyed by Indian Government
under Public International Law.
16.It is further submitted that the act of RPCB to issue the order dated
09.01.2020 is legal and well protected under the Right to National
Sovereignty of the Indian Government as per Public International Law.
The International Court of Justice in the case of Island of Palmas29 held
that National Sovereignty includes “…ability of States to be independent
and have autonomy and supreme control over their internal affairs subject
to limitations of public international law is known as state sovereignty…”.
It also held that the same also includes control over its airspace, territorial
sea, exclusive economic zones and the continental shelf for coastal States.
17.The right to national sovereignty is also one of the founding principles of
the United Nations Charted, as enshrined under Article 2 of the Charter.

[2.2.] RIGHT TO PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES

18.It is submitted that act of RPCB was legal and valid as it acted under its
Right to Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. RPCB acted to
revoke the permit of ASPA Pvt. Ltd. citing pressing environmental
concerns with its natural resources over which the Indian Government has
permanent sovereignty.
19.The Expert Committee formed by RPCB explicitly stated that ASPA Pvt.
Ltd. was one of the most polluting companies and its activities resulted in
the contamination of precious groundwater resources and air pollution.
Therefore, based on the same RPCB acted to revoke the permit of ASPA
Pvt. Ltd. to continue business in Ranangaon.
20.It is submitted that precious groundwater resources and air of Ranangaon
are natural resources which come under the sovereign control of the Indian

29
Island of Palmas case, 2 RIAA, pp. 829, 838 (1928).
 Government and its any action to protect the same is not against any
international obligations.
21.The right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources has been
recognised by the ICJ to be a part of International Customary Law in the
case of Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo30.
22.The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources by a resolution31 which
laid down various rights and duties of states regarding their and others’
natural resources. It explicitly provides that a State has power to take away
any such property on the grounds of public utility and national interest
from private actors in contravention of any contractual or legal
obligations.32
23.Therefore, the act of RPCB to issue the order dated 09.01.2020 revoking
the permit of ASPA Pvt. Ltd. from carrying on business based on
environmental concerns is legal and valid under Public International Law
and does not violate any international obligations.

[2.3.] VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS BY APSA

24.The actions of APSA Pvt. Ltd. from 2012 to 2020 caused enormous
amounts of pollution degrading the environment of India in Ranangaon,
Maharashtra. The same can be corroborated by the RPCB’s Expert
Committee Report and the Joint Research Report by Central Pollution
Control Board and IIT, Tanpur.
25.It is submitted that the above-mentioned act of ASPA Pvt. Ltd. is directly
against international standards set by various instruments regarding the
preservation of environment. These include United Nations Global
Compact33 which obliges business to take a precautionary approach
30
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 168, para 244.
31
United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 1803 (XVII).
32
Id para 4.
33
See <https:// www.unglobalcompact.org> accessed 14 March 2022.
 regarding the environment and the United Nations Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights34 which expects companies to avoid
infringing on human rights such as the right to a clean and safe
environment.

ISSUE 3: WHETHER ORDER PASSED BY RPCB DATED 09.01.20 ORDERING ASPA TO SHUT
DOWN OR RELOCATE UNIT OF ASPA IS VALID AND LAWFUL.

26. It is humbly submitted that RPCB is a competent body set up by the

Municipal Corporation of Ranangaon to control and check pollution levels
in the city. The Municipal Corporation of Ranangaon empowered RPCB to
issue any order to control and decrease pollution levels in the city. This is
valid and lawful under an order by the Maharashtra Government dated
01/03/2013 which authorizes Municipal Councils to issue Consent of
Establishment and Consent to operate.
27. Further, it can be deduced from given facts that a highly authoritative
and reliable report by the Central Pollution Control Board of India along
with IIT Tanpur highlighted Ranangaon to be one of the most polluted
cities in India and therefore recommended moving industries outside a
radius of 6km. When further RPCB appointed expert committee, it was
found that ASPA was one of the most polluting companies, and found that
groundwater near the vicinity of ASPA was highly polluted.
28. It is humbly submitted that after necessary due diligence was
undertaken prior to RPCB passing its order dated 09.01.20, and in the
interest of the public good and to tackle the threat of increasing level of
pollution in the center of residential area, ASPA was ordered to shut down
or relocate.

34
Human Rights Council Report, A/HRC/17/31.
 29. The counsel would like to argue this in a twofold manner [3.1] By the
principle of Estoppel, RPCB is vested with the required authority [3.2]
Public equity has supervening power of consideration

[3.1] BY THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL, RPCB IS VESTED WITH THE REQUIRED

AUTHORITY

30. The principle of estoppel is humbly pleaded to justify the authority and
legality of RPCB since complied with the previous notices issued by
RPCB, it cannot now question the legitimacy of the RPCB and its powers.
31. In Gyarsi Bai vs. Dhansukh Lal, essentials of estoppel were - (a)
Representation by a person to another; (b) The other should have acted
upon the said representation; and (c) Such action should have been
detrimental to the interests of the person to whom such representations has
been made.
32. It is humbly argued that all three essentials are met since a notice was
sent to ASPA which was detrimental to them since they had to incur costs,
and they also acted upon it by installing advanced facilities.
33. Hence, it is submitted that order passed by RPCB was valid and lawful
since it is a competent body which is empowered to issue any order to
control and decrease pollution levels in the city.

[3.2] WHETHER INDUSTRY WITH ENORMOUS CAPITAL AND REQUIRED PERMITS CAN BE

ASKED TO SHUT DOWN IN FUTURE DUE TO SUPERVENING PUBLIC EQUITY

34. In M.P. Mathur v. DTC the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that
in the case there is a supervening public equity, the Government would be
allowed to change its stand and has the power to withdraw from
representation made by it which induced persons to take certain steps
which may have gone adverse to the interest of such persons on account of
such withdrawal. Merely because the resolution was announced for a
particular period, it did not mean that the Government could not amend
and change the policy under any circumstances. If the party claiming
application of the doctrine acted on the basis of a notification, it should
have known that such notification was liable to be amended or rescinded at
any point of time, if the Government felt that it was necessary to do so in
public interest.
35. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Sterlite Industries
(India) Ltd. v. Union of India also has explicitly held that in case a
situation arises post all environment clearances that the environment is
being polluted and rights under Article 21 are being violated a State
Pollution Control Board is well within its powers to order closure of such a
plant. This can be further justified on the myriad of cases where Right to
clean Environment has been held to be a Fundamental Right under Article
21 of our Constitution.
36. In Mc Mehta vs Union of India , although Kanour was the leading
place for tanneries in Uttar Pradesh and although it was in the top three
important industries of Uttar Pradesh, it was ruled that man’s development
cannot happen at the cost of the Environment and the Health of the general
Public. It was also noted that the term ‘Environment’ includes water, air
and land and the interrelationship which exists among and between water,
air and land and human beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-
organisms and property.
37. It is therefore humbly contended that based on the Right to clean
environment of the Public and larger public equity, it is justified for RCPB
to order the closure of ASPA irrespective of the costs of the project or the
issuance of permits at an earlier stage.
PRAYER
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
 17010125005

MOOT COURT EXERCISE AND INTERNSHIPS (CLINICAL COURSE IV) INTERNAL MOOT III

BEFORE THE HON’BLE INTERNAL COURT OF JUSTICE

WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

IN THE MATTER PERTAINING TO

WRIT PETITION: 1/2022

MR. ROHAN.…………………………………………………………………. PETITIONER

VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ………………………………………RESPONDENT

UPON SUBMISSIONS TO THE HON’BLE JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE
HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT