Impi

Impi is a Zulu word meaning war or combat and by association any body of men gathered for
war, for example impi ya masosha is a term denoting an army. Impi were formed from
regiments (amabutho) from amakhanda (large militarised homesteads). In English impi is
often used to refer to a Zulu regiment, which is called an ibutho in Zulu or the army.[2][3]

The impi was a military formation that transformed the face of southern Africa, on into east and central Africa. Its
highest development took place under Shaka, initiator of several important organizational, weapon and tactical
innovations.[1]
Its beginnings lie far back in historic local warfare customs, when groups of armed men
called impi battled. They were systematised radically by the Zulu king Shaka, who was then
only the exiled illegitimate son of king Senzangakhona kaJama, but already showing much
prowess as a general in the army (impi) of Mthethwa king Dingiswayo in the Ndwandwe–Zulu
War of 1817–1819.

Genesis of the impi

The Zulu impi is popularly identified with the ascent of Shaka, ruler of the relatively small Zulu
tribe before its explosion across the landscape of southern Africa, but its earliest shape as an
instrument of statecraft lies in the innovations of the Mthethwa chieftain Dingiswayo,
according to some historians (Morris 1965).[4] These innovations in turn drew upon existing
tribal customs, such as the iNtanga. This was an age grade tradition common among many
of the Bantu peoples of the continent's southern region. Young men were organised into age
groups, with each cohort responsible for certain duties and tribal ceremonies. Periodically,
the older age grades were summoned to the kraals of sub-chieftains, or inDunas, for
consultations, assignments, and an induction ceremony that marked their transition from
boys to full-fledged adults and warriors, the ukuButwa. Kraal or settlement elders generally
handled local disputes and issues.[5] Above them were the inDunas, and above the inDunas
stood the chief of a particular clan lineage or tribe. The inDunas handled administrative
matters for their chiefs – ranging from settlement of disputes, to the collection of taxes. In
time of war, the inDunas supervised the fighting men in their areas, forming leadership of the
military forces deployed for combat. The age grade iNtangas, under the guidance of the
inDunas, formed the basis for the systematic regimental organisation that would become
known worldwide as the impi.[6]

Limited nature of early tribal warfare

Warfare was of low intensity among the Bantu prior to the rise of Shaka, though it occurred
frequently. Objectives were typically limited to such matters as cattle raiding, avenging some
personal insult, or resolving disputes over segments of grazing land. Generally a loose mob,
called an impi participated in these melees. There were no campaigns of extermination
against the defeated. They simply moved on to other open spaces on the veldt, and
equilibrium was restored. The bow and arrow were known but seldom used. Warfare, like the
hunt, depended on skilled spearmen and trackers. The primary weapon was a thin 6-foot
throwing spear, the assegai. Several were carried into combat. Defensive weapons included a
small cowhide shield, which was later improved by King Shaka. Many battles were arranged,
with the clan warriors meeting at an agreed place and time, while women and children of the
clan watched the festivities from some distance away. Ritualized taunts, single combats and
tentative charges were the typical pattern. If the affair did not dissipate before, one side
might find enough courage to mount a sustained attack, driving off their enemies. Casualties
were usually light. The defeated clan might pay in lands or cattle and have captives to be
ransomed but extermination and mass casualties were rare. Tactics were rudimentary.
Outside the ritual battles, the quick raid was the most frequent combat action, marked by
burning kraals, seizure of captives, and the driving off of cattle. Pastoral herders and light
agriculturalists, the Bantu did not usually build permanent fortifications to fend off enemies.
A clan under threat simply packed their meager material possessions, rounded up their cattle
and fled until the marauders were gone. If the marauders did not stay to permanently
dispossess them of grazing areas, the fleeing clan might return to rebuild in a day or two. The
genesis of the Zulu impi thus lies in tribal structures existing long before the coming of
Europeans or the Shaka era.[6]

Rise of Dingiswayo

In the early 19th century, a combination of factors began to change the customary pattern.
These included rising populations, the growth of white settlement and slaving that
dispossessed native peoples both at the Cape and in Portuguese Mozambique, and the rise
of ambitious "new men." One such man, a warrior called Dingiswayo (the Troubled One) of the
Mthethwa rose to prominence. Historians such as Donald Morris hold that his political genius
laid the basis for a relatively light hegemony. This was established through a combination of
diplomacy and conquest, using not extermination or slavery, but strategic reconciliation and
judicious force of arms. This hegemony reduced the frequent feuding and fighting among the
small clans in the Mthethwa's orbit, transferring their energies to more centralised forces.
Under Dingiswayo the age grades came to be regarded as military drafts, deployed more
frequently to maintain the new order. It was from these small clans, including among them
the eLangeni and the Zulu, that Shaka sprung.[6]

Ascent and innovations of Shaka

Shaka proved himself to be one of Dingiswayo's most able warriors after the military call up
of his age grade to serve in the Mthethwa forces. He fought with his iziCwe regiment
wherever he was assigned during this early period, but from the beginning, Shaka's approach
to battle did not fit the traditional mould. He began to implement his own individual methods
and style, designing the famous short stabbing spear the iKlwa, a larger, stronger shield, and
discarding the oxhide sandals that he felt slowed him down. These methods proved effective
on a small scale, but Shaka himself was restrained by his overlord. His conception of warfare
was far more extreme than the reconcilitory methods of Dingiswayo. He sought to bring
combat to a swift and bloody decision, as opposed to duels of individual champions,
scattered raids, or limited skirmishes where casualties were comparatively light. While his
mentor and overlord Dingiswayo lived, Shakan methods were reined in, but the removal of
this check gave the Zulu chieftain much broader scope. It was under his rule that a much
more rigorous mode of tribal warfare came into being. This newer, brutal focus demanded
changes in weapons, organisation and tactics.[6]

Weapons and shields

Zulu warrior armed with the iklwa stabbing spear (assegai) and iwisa club (knobkerrie). His kilt is of genet tails
"Ready for War"; "A Zulu"; "Zulu Policemen" - the man pictured to the right wears the head-ring (isicoco) denoting his
married status

Shaka is credited with introducing a new variant of the traditional weapon, demoting the long,
spindly throwing spear in favour of a heavy-bladed, short-shafted stabbing spear. He is also
said to have introduced a larger, heavier cowhide shield (isihlangu), and trained his forces to
thus close with the enemy in more effective hand-to-hand combat. The throwing spear was
not discarded, but standardised like the stabbing implement and carried as a missile weapon,
typically discharged at the foe, before close contact. These weapons changes integrated with
and facilitated an aggressive mobility and tactical organisation.[6]

As weapons, the Zulu warrior carried the iklwa stabbing spear (losing one could result in
execution) and a club or cudgel fashioned from dense hardwood known in Zulu as the iwisa,
usually called the knobkerrie or knobkerry English and knopkierie in Afrikaans, for beating an
enemy in the manner of a mace.[5] Zulu officers often carried the half-moon-shaped Zulu ax,
but this weapon was more of a symbol to show their rank. The iklwa – so named because of
the sucking sound it made when withdrawn from a human body – with its long 25
centimetres (9.8 in) and broad blade was an invention of Shaka that superseded the older
thrown ipapa (so named because of the "pa-pa" sound it made as it flew through the air). It
could theoretically be used both in melee and as a thrown weapon, but warriors were
forbidden in Shaka's day from throwing it, which would disarm them and give their opponents
something to throw back. Moreover, Shaka felt it discouraged warriors from closing into
hand-to-hand combat.

Shaka's brother, and successor, Dingane kaSenzangakhona reintroduced greater use of the
throwing spear, perhaps as a counter to Boer firearms.

As early as Shaka's reign small numbers of firearms, often obsolete muskets and rifles, were
obtained by the Zulus from Europeans by trade. In the aftermath of the defeat of the British at
the Battle of Isandlwana in 1879, many Martini–Henry rifles were captured by the Zulus
together with considerable amounts of ammunition. The advantage of this capture is
debatable due to the alleged tendency of Zulu warriors to close their eyes when firing such
weapons. The possession of firearms did little to change Zulu tactics, which continued to rely
on a swift approach to the enemy to bring him into close combat.

All warriors carried a shield made of oxhide, which retained the hair, with a central stiffening
shaft of wood, the mgobo. Shields were the property of the king; they were stored in
specialised structures raised off the ground for protection from vermin when not issued to
the relevant regiment. The large isihlangu shield of Shaka's day was about five feet in length
and was later partially replaced by the smaller umbumbuluzo, a shield of identical
manufacture but around three and a half feet in length. Close combat relied on co-ordinated
use of the iklwa and shield. The warrior sought to get the edge of his shield behind the edge
of his enemy's, so that he could pull the enemy's shield to the side, thus opening him to a
thrust with the iklwa deep into the abdomen or chest.

Logistics

The fast-moving host, like all military formations, needed supplies. These were provided by
young boys, who were attached to a force and carried rations, cooking pots, sleeping mats,
extra weapons and other material. Cattle were sometimes driven on the hoof as a movable
larder. Again, such arrangements in the local context were probably nothing unusual. What
was different was the systematisation and organisation, a pattern yielding major benefits
when the Zulu were dispatched on raiding missions.

Age-grade regimental system

Age-grade groupings of various sorts were common in the Bantu tribal culture of the day, and
indeed are still important in much of Africa. Age grades were responsible for a variety of
activities, from guarding the camp, to cattle herding, to certain rituals and ceremonies. It was
customary in Zulu culture for young men to provide limited service to their local chiefs until
they were married and recognised as official householders. Shaka manipulated this system,
transferring the customary service period from the regional clan leaders to himself,
strengthening his personal hegemony. Such groupings on the basis of age, did not constitute
a permanent, paid military in the modern Western sense, nevertheless they did provide a
stable basis for sustained armed mobilisation, much more so than ad hoc tribal levies or war
parties.

Shaka organised the various age grades into regiments, and quartered them in special
military kraals, with each regiment having its own distinctive names and insignia. Some
historians argue that the large military establishment was a drain on the Zulu economy and
necessitated continual raiding and expansion. This may be true since large numbers of the
society's men were isolated from normal occupations, but whatever the resource impact, the
regimental system clearly built on existing tribal cultural elements that could be adapted and
shaped to fit an expansionist agenda.

After their 20th birthdays, young men would be sorted into formal ibutho (plural amabutho) or
regiments. They would build their i=handa (often referred to as a 'homestead', as it was
basically a stockaded group of huts surrounding a corral for cattle), their gathering place
when summoned for active service. Active service continued until a man married, a privilege
only the king bestowed. The amabutho were recruited on the basis of age rather than regional
or tribal origin. The reason for this was to enhance the centralised power of the Zulu king at
the expense of clan and tribal leaders. They swore loyalty to the king of the Zulu nation.

Mobility, training and insignia

Zulu warrior in full regimental regalia, carrying the large isihlangu war shield. c. 1860. The upper body is covered in
cow tails, the kilt is of spotted cat, genet or civet skin and the shins are decorated with cowtails. The elaborate
headdress consists of a browband and face-framing flaps of leopard skin with another band of otter skin above.
There are multiple ostrich feather plumes and a single upright crane's feather.
Shaka discarded sandals to enable his warriors to run faster. Initially the move was
unpopular, but those who objected were simply killed, a practice that quickly concentrated the
minds of remaining personnel. Zulu tradition indicates that Shaka hardened the feet of his
troops by having them stamp thorny tree and bush branches flat. Shaka drilled his troops
frequently, implementing forced marches covering more than eighty kilometres a day.[7] He
also drilled the troops to carry out encirclement tactics (see below). Such mobility gave the
Zulu a significant impact in their local region and beyond. Upkeep of the regimental system
and training seems to have continued after Shaka's death, although Zulu defeats by the
Boers, and growing encroachment by British colonists, sharply curtailed raiding operations
prior to the War of 1879. Morris (1965, 1982) records one such mission under King Mpande
to give green warriors of the uThulwana regiment experience: a raid into Swaziland, dubbed
"Fund' uThulwana" by the Zulu, or "Teach the uThulwana".

Impi warriors were trained as early as age six, joining the army as udibi porters at first, being
enrolled into same-age groups (intanga). Until they were buta'd, Zulu boys accompanied their
fathers and brothers on campaign as servants. Eventually, they would go to the nearest
ikhanda to kleza (literally, "to drink directly from the udder"), at which time the boys would
become inkwebane, cadets. They would spend their time training until they were formally
enlisted by the king. They would challenge each other to stick fights, which had to be
accepted on pain of dishonor.

In Shaka's day, warriors often wore elaborate plumes and cow tail regalia in battle, but by the
Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, many warriors wore only a loin cloth and a minimal form of
headdress. The later period Zulu soldier went into battle relatively simply dressed, painting
his upper body and face with chalk and red ochre, despite the popular conception of
elaborately panoplied warriors. Each ibutho had a singular arrangement of headdress and
other adornments, so that the Zulu army could be said to have had regimental uniforms;
latterly the 'full-dress' was only worn on festive occasions. The men of senior regiments
would wear, in addition to their other headdress, the head-ring (isicoco) denoting their
married state. A gradation of shield colour was found, junior regiments having largely dark
shields the more senior ones having shields with more light colouring; Shaka's personal
regiment Fasimba (The Haze) having white shields with only a small patch of darker colour.
This shield uniformity was facilitated by the custom of separating the king's cattle into herds
based on their coat colours.

Certain adornments were awarded to individual warriors for conspicuous courage in action;
these included a type of heavy brass arm-ring (ingxotha) and an intricate necklace composed
of interlocking wooden pegs (iziqu).
Tactics

The buffalo horns formation of the Zulu army. Parts 1–4 above: 1 "enemy", 2 "horns", 3 "chest", 4 "loins"

The Zulu typically took the offensive, deploying in the well known "buffalo horns" formation.
The attack layout was composed of four elements, each of which represented a grouping of
Zulu regiments:[8]

1. Left horn or flank

2. Right horn or flank

The "horns" or flanking elements were used to encircle and pin the enemy. Generally the
"horns" were made up of younger greener troops and could be maneuvered separately as
needed in an operation.
1. The "Chest" or central main force which delivered the coup de grace. The prime fighters
made up the composition of the main force.

2. The "Loins" or reserves used to exploit success or reinforce elsewhere. Often these
were older veterans, sometimes positioned with their backs to the battle so as not to get
unduly excited.

Encirclement tactics were not unique in the region and attempts to surround an enemy were
not unknown even in the ritualised battles. The use of separate manoeuvre elements to
support a stronger central group was also known in pre-mechanised tribal warfare, as is the
use of reserve echelons farther back. What was unique about the Zulu was the degree of
organisation, consistency with which they used these tactics, and the speed at which they
executed them. Developments and refinements may have taken place after Shaka's death, as
witnessed by the use of larger groupings of regiments by the Zulu against the British in 1879.
Missions, available manpower and enemies varied, but whether facing native spear, or
European bullet, the impis generally fought in and adhered to the classical buffalo horns
pattern.[9]

Organisation of the Zulu forces

Organization. The Zulu forces were generally grouped into 3 levels: regiments, corps of
several regiments, and "armies" or bigger formations, although the Zulu did not use these
terms in the modern sense. Size distinctions were taken account of, any grouping of men on
a mission could collectively be called an impi, whether a raiding party of 100 or horde of
10,000. Numbers were not uniform, but dependent on a variety of factors including
assignments by the king, or the manpower mustered by various clan chiefs or localities. A
regiment might be 400 or 4000 men. These were grouped into Corps that took their name
from the military kraals where they were mustered, or sometimes the dominant regiment of
that locality.[10] While the modest Zulu population could not turn out the hundreds of
thousand available to major world or continental powers like France, Britain, or Russia, the
Zulu "nation in arms" approach could mobilize substantial forces in local context for short
campaigns, and maneuver them in the Western equivalent of divisional strength. The victory
won by Zulu king Cetawasyo at Ndondakusuka, for example, two decades before the Anglo-
Zulu War of 1879, involved a battlefield deployment of 30,000 troops.[11]
At Isandhlawana, the Zulu impis scored their greatest victory against a foreign army, liquidating a significant part of
the British invasion force.[12]

Higher command and unit leadership. An inDuna guided each regiment, and he in turn
answered to senior izinduna who controlled the corps grouping. Overall guidance of the host
was furnished by elder izinduna usually with many years of experience. One or more of these
elder chiefs might accompany a big force on an important mission. Coordination of tactical
movements was supplied by the indunas who used hand signals and messengers. Generally
before deploying for battle, the regiments were made to squat in a semicircle while these
commanders made final assignments and adjustments. Lower level regimental izinduna, like
the NCOs of today's armies, and yesterday's Roman centurions, were extremely important to
morale and discipline. Prior to the clash at Isandhlwana for example, they imposed order on
the frenzied rush of warriors eager to get at the British, and steadied those faltering under
withering enemy fire during the battle.[13] The widely-spaced maneuvers of an impi
sometimes could make control problematic once an attack was unleashed. Indeed, the Zulu
attacks on the British strongpoints at Rorke's Drift and at Kambula, (both bloody defeats)
seemed to have been carried out by over-enthusiastic leaders and warriors despite contrary
orders of the Zulu King, Cetshwayo. Such over-confidence or disobedience by thrusting
leaders or forces is not unusual in warfare. At the Battle of Trebia for example, the over-
confident Roman commander Sempronius was provoked into a hasty attack, that resulted in
a defeat for Roman arms.[14] Likewise, General George Custer disobeyed the orders of his
superior, General Terry, and rashly launched a disastrous charge against Indian forces at the
Battle of the Little Bighorn, resulting in the total destruction of his command.[15] Popular film
re-enactments display a grizzled izinduna directing the Zulu host from a promontory with
elegant sweeps of the hand, and the reserves still lay within top comanders' overall control.
Coordination after an army was set in motion however relied more on the initial pre-
positioning and assignments of the regiments before the advance, and the deep
understanding by Zulu officers of the general attack plan. These sub-commanders could thus
slow down or speed up their approach runs to maintain the general "buffalo horns" alignment
to match terrain and situation.[16]

Summary of the Shakan reforms

As noted above, Shaka was neither the originator of the impi, or the age grade structure, nor
the concept of a bigger grouping than the small clan system. His major innovations were to
blend these traditional elements in a new way, to systematise the approach to battle, and to
standardise organization, methods and weapons, particularly in his adoption of the ilkwa –
the Zulu thrusting spear, unique long-term regimental units, and the "buffalo horns"
formation. Dingswayo's approach was of a loose federation of allies under his hegemony,
combining to fight, each with their own contingents, under their own leaders. Shaka
dispensed with this, insisting instead on a standardised organisation and weapons package
that swept away and replaced old clan allegiances with loyalty to himself. This uniform
approach also encouraged the loyalty and identification of warriors with their own distinctive
military regiments. In time, these warriors, from many conquered tribes and clans came to
regard themselves as one nation- the Zulu. The Marian reforms of Rome in the military
sphere are referenced by some writers as similar. While other ancient powers such as the
Carthaginians maintained a patchwork of force types, and the legions retained such phalanx-
style holdovers like the triarii, Marius implemented one consistent standardised approach for
all the infantry. This enabled more disciplined formations and efficient execution of tactics
over time against a variety of enemies. As one military historian notes:

Combined with Shaka's "buffalo horns" attack formation for surrounding and annihilating
enemy forces, the Zulu combination of iklwa and shield—similar to the Roman legionaries'
use of gladius and scutum—was devastating. By the time of Shaka's assassination in 1828, it
had made the Zulu kingdom the greatest power in southern Africa and a force to be
reckoned with, even against Britain's modern army in 1879.[17]

The Impi in battle

To understand the full scope of the impi's performance in battle, military historians of the
Zulu typically look to its early operations against internal African enemies, not merely the
British interlude.[18] In terms of numbers, the operations of the impi would change- from the
Western equivalent of small company and battalion size forces, to manoeuvres in multi-
divisional strength of between 10,000 and 40,000 men. The victory won by Zulu king
Cetawasyo at Ndondakusuka, for example, two decades before the Anglo-Zulu War, involved
a deployment of 30,000 troops.[19] These were sizeable formations in regional context but
represented the bulk of prime Zulu fighting strength. Few impi-style formations were to
routinely achieve this level of mobilisation for a single battle. By comparison, at Cannae, the
Romans deployed 80,000 men, and generally could put tens of thousands more into smaller
combat actions.[20] The popular notion of countless attacking black spearmen is a distorted
one. Manpower supplies on the continent were often limited. In the words of one historian:
"The savage hordes of popular lore seldom materialized on African battlefields."[21] This
limited resource base would hurt the Zulu when they confronted technologically advanced
world powers such as Britain. The advent of new weapons like firearms would also have a
profound impact on the African battlefield, but as will be seen, the impi-style forces largely
eschewed firearms, or used them in a minor way. Whether facing native spear or European
bullet, impis largely fought as they had since the days of Shaka, from Zululand to Zimbabwe,
and from Mozambique to Tanzania.[22]

The Zulu had greater numbers than their opponents, but greater numbers massed together in
compact arrays simply presented easy targets in the age of modern firearms and artillery.
African tribes that fought in smaller guerrilla detachments typically held out against European
invaders for a much longer time, as witnessed by the 7-year resistance of the Lobi against the
French in West Africa,[23] or the operations of the Berbers in Algeria against the French.[24]

When the Zulu did acquire firearms, most notably captured stocks after the great victory at
Isandhlwana, they lacked training and used them ineffectively, consistently firing high to give
the bullets "strength." Southern Africa, including the areas near Natal, was teeming with
bands like the Griquas who had learned to use guns. Indeed, one such group not only
mastered the way of the gun, but became proficient horsemen as well, skills that helped build
the Basotho tribe, in what is now the nation of Lesotho. In addition, numerous European
renegades or adventurers (both Boer and non-Boer) skilled in firearms were known to the
Zulu. Some had even led detachments for the Zulu kings on military missions.

Throughout the 19th century they persisted in "human wave" attacks against well defended
European positions where massed firepower devastated their ranks. The ministrations of an
isAngoma (plural: izAngoma) Zulu diviner or "witch doctor", and the bravery of individual
regiments were ultimately of little use against the volleys of modern rifles, Gatling guns and
artillery at the Ineyzane River, Rorke's Drift, Kambula, Gingingdlovu and finally Ulindi.

Impi in popular culture

While the term "impi" has become synonymous with the Zulu nation in international popular
culture, it appears in various video games such as Civilization III, Civilization IV: Warlords,
Civilization: Revolution, Civilization V: Brave New World, and Civilization VI, where the Impi is
the unique unit for the Zulu faction with Shaka as their leader. 'Impi' is also the title of a very
famous South Africa song by Johnny Clegg and the band Juluka which has become
something of an unofficial national anthem, especially at major international sports events
and especially when the opponent is England.

Lyrics:

Impi! O nans'impi iyeza (Impi! Oh here comes impi)

Uban'obengathint'amabhubesi? (Who would have touched the lions?)

Before stage seven of the 2013 Tour de France, the Orica-GreenEDGE cycling team played
'Impi' on their team bus in honor of teammate Daryl Impey, the first South African Tour de
France leader.[25]

See also

African military systems to 1800

African military systems after 1900

Military history of Africa

Ashanti Empire

Military of the Ashanti Empire

Military history of Africa

Mali Empire

Military history of the Mali Empire

Kingdom of Ndongo

Kingdom of Matamba

Kingdom of Kongo

Nzinga of Ndongo and Matamba

Battle of Mbwila

Battle of Zama

Battle of Isandlwana

References

1. Donald Morris, 'The Washing of the Spears,' Touchstone, 1965.

2. Phil Tomaselli, The Zulu War 1879, Federation of Family History Societies (Publications) Limited,
2006, p.6

3. Paul Coquerel, L'Afrique du Sud des Afrikaners, Editions Complexe, 1992, p.40

4. Donald Morris, The Washing of the Spears. p. 32-67

5. Hanson, Victor Davis (18 December 2007). Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to
Western Power (https://books.google.com/books?id=XGr16-CxpH8C) . Knopf Doubleday
Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-307-42518-8.

6. Morris, 32–67

7. Morris, Washing of the Spears, p. 51.

 8. Donald Morris, The Washing of the Spears, pp. 43-56

9. Morris. Washing of the Spears 245-368; See also JD Omer-Cooper's The Zulu Aftermath, for the
spread of Zulu methods in south and southeast Africa.

10. Isandlwana 1879: The Great Zulu Victory, Ian Knight, Osprey: 2002, pp. 5–58

11. Donald Morris, 1962. The Washing of the Spears, pp. 195–196

12. Bruce Vandervort 1998. Wars of Imperial Conquest, pp. 20–78

13. Morris, pp. 361–367. An Undi Corps commander named Qetuka for example is mentioned in this
role.

14. Lazenby, John (1998). Hannibal's War: A Military History of the Second Punic War, pp. 55–56.

15. Brad Lookingbill. 2015. A Companion to Custer and the Little Bighorn Campaign - p 395

16. John Laband. 2014. Zulu Warriors: The Battle for the South African Frontier, 180-236.

17. Guttman, Jon. Military History, Jun2008, Vol. 24 Issue 4, p. 23-23.

18. Knight, Ian (1995) Anatomy of the Zulu Army, pp. 3–49.

19. Morris, pp. 195–196

20. Davis, Paul K. (2001), 100 Decisive Battles: From Ancient Times to the Present, pp. 14–126.

21. Bruce Vandervort, Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa: 1830–1914, Indiana University Press: 1998,
p. 39.

22. J.D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath.

23. Images d'Afrique et sciences sociales : les pays lobi, birifor et dagara (Burkina Faso, Côte-d'Ivoire et
Ghana) : actes du colloque de Ouagadougou, 10-15 décembre 1990. Fiéloux, Michèle., Lombard,
Jacques, 1926-, Kambou-Ferrand, Jeanne-Marie. Paris: Editions Karthala. 1993. ISBN 2865373975.
OCLC 28627875 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/28627875) .

24. Shepard, Todd, 1969- (2006). The invention of decolonization : the Algerian War and the remaking of
France. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. ISBN 0801443601. OCLC 61821802 (https://www.world
cat.org/oclc/61821802) .

25. Daryl Impey [@darylimpey] (5 July 2013). "Love this team - singing to "Impi" on the bus , legendary
moments" (https://twitter.com/darylimpey/status/353076722595405824) (Tweet) – via Twitter.

Bibliography

Colenso, Frances E. (1880). History of the Zulu War and Its Origin (https://archive.org/detail
s/historyofzuluwar00colerich) . Assisted by Edward Durnford. London: Chapman & Hall.

Knight, Ian. Brave Men's Blood, London, 1990. ISBN 1-84415-212-X.

Knight, Ian (2002). Isandlwana 1879: The Great Zulu Victory. Osprey. ISBN 1-84176-511-2.
 Knight, Ian. The Zulus.

Knight, Ian. Anatomy of the Zulu Army.

Morris, Donald R. (1998). The Washing of the Spears. Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-80866-8.

Further reading

Dutton, Roy (2010). Forgotten Heroes: Zulu & Basuto Wars including Complete Medal Roll.
Infodial. ISBN 978-0-9556554-4-9.

Barthorp, Michael (2002). The Zulu War: Isandhlwana to Ulundi. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
ISBN 0-304-36270-0.

Brookes, Edgar H; Webb, Colin de B. (1965). A History of Natal. Brooklyn: University of Natal
Press. ISBN 0-86980-579-7.

David, Saul (February 2009). "The Forgotten Battles of the Zulu War". BBC History
Magazine. Vol. 10, no. 2. pp. 26–33.

Gump, James O. (1996). The Dust Rose Like Smoke: The Subjugation of the Zulu and the
Sioux (https://archive.org/details/dustroselikesmok0000gump_x5e4) . Bison Books.
ISBN 0-8032-7059-3.

Knight, Ian (2003). The Anglo-Zulu War. Osprey. ISBN 1-84176-612-7.

Knight, Ian; Castle, Ian (2004). Zulu War. Osprey. ISBN 1-84176-858-8.

Laband, John; Knight, Ian (1996). The Anglo-Zulu War. Stroud: Sutton. ISBN 0-86985-829-7.

Lock, Ron; Peter Quantrill (2002). Zulu Victory: The Epic of Isandlwana and the Cover-up.
Johannesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers. ISBN 1-86842-214-3.

Martineau, John (1895). The Life and Correspondence of the Sir Bartle Frere. John Murray.

Raugh, Harold E. Jr. (2011). Anglo-Zulu War 1879: A Selected Bibliography. Scarecrow
PressPress. ISBN 978-0-8108-7227-1.

Spiers, Edward M. (2006). The Scottish Soldier and Empire, 1854–1902. Edinburgh
University Press. ISBN 978-0-7486-2354-9.

Thompson, Paul Singer (2006). Black Soldiers of the Queen: The Natal Native Contingent in
the Anglo-Zulu War. University of Alabama Press. ISBN 0-8173-5368-2.

Whybra, Julian. England's Sons, Billericay, (7th ed.), 2010.

External links
 Article about origin and weapons use of Zulu Impi (http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/w
eapons_zulu_impi.html)

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