324 Pursuing relationships between behavior and culture: research strategies

of the sector in the figure. Second, it goes without saying that the categoriza-
tion of inferences is based on our judgments, and that the authors to whom we
refer might be inclined to argue, particularly about the examples at a high level
of inference where we are hesitant about the scope for empirical validation.

Absolutism, relativism, and universalism

The three sectors of fig. 12.1 show a fairly close correspondence with
the three general orientations in cross-cultural research proposed in ch. 1. Although
they have been named differently by various writers, we have identified them by
the terms relativism, absolutism, and universalism. Each of these has been men-
tioned numerous times in previous chapters, but here we attempt to define and

Table 12.1 Three orientations to cross-cultural psychology

Absolutist Universalist Relativist

1. General orientation
(a) Factors underlying Biological Biological Cultural
behavior and cultural
(b) Role of culture in Limited Substantial Substantial
behavior variation

2. Theoretical perspectives
(a) Similarities due to Species-wide Species-wide Generally
basic basic unexamined
processes processes
(b) Differences due Non-cultural Culture– Cultural
mainly to factors organism influences
interactions
(c) Emics and etics Imposed etic Derived etic Emic
(d) Context-free Directly Difficult to Usually
definition of available achieve impossible
concepts

3. Methodological perspectives
(a) Context-free Usually Often Impossible
measurement of possible impossible
concepts
(b) Assessment Standard Adapted Local
procedures instruments instruments instruments
(c) Comparisons Straight- Controlled, Usually
forward, frequent, avoided,
frequent, non-evaluative non-evaluative
evaluative
 Theoretical issues in cross-cultural psychology 325

elaborate them. To help our exploration of these orientations, table 12.1 outlines
a number of features of the three orientations under three headings: general ori-
entation, theoretical perspectives, and methodological perspectives.
As we noted in ch. 9, the relativist position (right-hand column of table 12.1)
was first identified in anthropology by Herskovits (1948), but was based on an
earlier set of ideas advanced by Boas (1911). This general orientation seeks to
avoid all traces of ethnocentrism by trying to understand people “in their own
terms,” without imposing any value judgments, or a priori judgments of any
kind. It thus seeks not just to avoid derogating other peoples (an evaluative act),
but it also seeks to avoid describing, categorizing, and understanding others from
an external cultural point of view (a cognitive act). “In their own terms” thus
means both “in their own categories” and “with their own values.” There is the
working assumption that explanations of psychological variations across the
world’s peoples are to be sought in terms of cultural variation, with little re-
course to other factors. Theoretically, relativists do not show much interest in
the existence of similarities across cultures, except to assume a general
egalitarian stance (e.g., “all people are equal”), and to explain any cultural dif-
ferences that they do observe as being due to cultural contexts that influence
individuals’ development. Differences are typically interpreted qualitatively: for
example, people differ in their form or style of intelligence, rather than in in-
tellectual competencies. Methodologically, comparative studies are avoided, be-
cause they are considered so problematic and ethnocentric as to render valid
comparison impossible. All psychological assessment should take place with
procedures (tests, etc.) developed within the local culture’s terms; these prac-
tices place relativists in the emic, indigenous, and cultural psychology approaches,
as discussed in ch. 11.
In sharp contrast, the position of absolutism seems little concerned with the
problems of ethnocentrism, or of seeing people “in their own terms.” Rather,
psychological phenomena are considered to be basically the same across
cultures: the essential character of, for example, “intelligence,” “honesty,” or
“depression” is assumed to be the same everywhere, and the possibility is ig-
nored that the researchers’ knowledge is rooted in their own cultural
conceptions of these phenomena. Methodologically, comparisons are considered
to create no essential problems, and are carried out easily and frequently, based
on the use of the same instruments (presumed to have the same psychological
meaning) in many cultures. These instruments are employed in a standard fash-
ion; at most, linguistic equivalence is checked, but this is often the only nod in
the direction of recognizing the possible role of cultural influences. Since instru-
ments are likely to be biased, both procedurally and conceptually, this approach
clearly leads to imposed etics as outlined in ch. 11. Theoretically, it is based on
the assumption that psychologically people everywhere are pretty much alike.
Where differences do occur, they are quantitative differences on the assumed un-
derlying common construct; different people are just “less intelligent,” “less hon-
est,” or “more depressed.”
326 Pursuing relationships between behavior and culture: research strategies

The position of universalism adopts the working assumptions that basic psycho-
logical processes are likely to be common features of human life everywhere, but
that their manifestations are likely to be influenced by culture. That is, variations are
due to culture “playing different variations on a common theme”; basic processes are
essentially the same, but they are expressed in different ways. Methodologically, com-
parisons are employed, but cautiously, heeding the safeguards described in ch. 11;
they should neither be avoided nor carried out at whim. Assessment procedures are
likely to require modification. While the starting point may be some extant theory or
test, one’s approach to their use should be informed by local cultural knowledge.
Universally applicable concepts will have to come about by reformulation of
existing concepts. Theoretically, interpretations of similarities and differences are
made starting from the belief that basic psychological processes are pan-human,
and that cultural factors influence their development (direction and extent), and
deployment (for what purposes, and how, they are used). Thus the major ques-
tions are to what extent and in what ways cultural variables influence behavior.
Quantitative interpretations can be validly made along dimensions that fall within
a domain in which the phenomena of interest are similar. For example, in cultures
that share the same conception, and encourage the same expression of depression,
differences on a test of depression may be interpreted quantitatively. At the same
time, in cultures that differ in conception and expression of depression, it may
be impossible to obtain equivalent measurements. Differences that are of a qual-
itative nature require theoretical analysis to define a common dimension on which
they can be captured as quantitative differences, before a comparison can be made.
In ch. 1 we sought to distinguish the universalist position from the absolutist
one, by claiming that universalism emphasizes the role of culture in bringing
about diversity, while there is virtually no role for culture in the absolutist view.
Another way of phrasing this distinction is to think of absolutism as implying
behavioral universalism. What we have called the universalist position places em-
phasis on the identity of shared basic psychological processes that are the legacy
of human phylogenetic history. Hence, one can also speak about psychological
universalism to describe this position (Poortinga, 1998; Poortinga et al., 1993).
Combining the outlook contained in fig. 12.1 and table 12.1 the following sum-
mary can be given. In the absolutist view a definition of psychological concepts
free of cultural context effects is judged to be within reach of the researcher. Such
context-free measurement requires the avoidance of pitfalls in the formulation of
items and careful translation, but there are no barriers that should prove to be in-
surmountable. Relativists believe that there can only be context-bound definition
of psychological concepts in such areas as personality, cognition, and social be-
havior. It follows that context-free psychological measurement should not even
be attempted. In the universalistic perspective, context-free definition of psy-
chological concepts is seen as a goal that can be approximated through the mod-
ification of culture-specific concepts. The expression of behavior in many re-
spects is culture bound, and context-free measurement of certain kinds of
variables may well be a goal that can never be fully reached.
 Theoretical issues in cross-cultural psychology 327

The three positions have implications for the theoretical definition of psycho-
logical concepts, as well as for the psychometric assessment of cross-cultural
similarities and differences. They also have implications for the operational de-
finition of universality. In general terms, a psychological concept, or a relation-
ship between concepts, qualifies as universal if it can be validly used to describe
the behavior of people in any culture. According to Triandis (1978, p. 1) it is “a
psychological process or relationship which occurs in all cultures.” This defini-
tion is rather imprecise and will apply to almost any concept. Jahoda (1981, p. 42)
suggests “invariance across both cultures and methods” as a requirement for uni-
versality. This is a description that would fit an absolutist orientation, but also
can be used by a relativist to indict the absolutist approach, because it imposes
conditions that rarely can be met.
The difficulties in identifying universals should not be taken to imply that they
do not exist. Arguments and findings to the contrary have been presented in a re-
view from a comparative anthropological perspctive by Munroe and Munroe
(1997). Another review is by Lonner (1980) who has noted considerable varia-
tion in approaches to universals in cross-cultural psychology. In one orientation,
derived from the psychometric tradition, Van de Vijver and Poortinga (1982) have
elaborated on this and argued that the universality of concepts can be defined at
several levels of psychometric accuracy and that more cross-cultural similarity
in behavior is implied as the definition becomes more precise. Their definitions
are given in terms of invariant properties of scales to qualitatively or quantita-
tively express cross-cultural differences. They distinguish four levels of concepts:
1 Conceptual universals are concepts at a high level of abstraction perhaps
without any reference to a measurement scale (e.g., modal personality, or adapt-
ability).
2 Weak universals are concepts for which measurement procedures have been
specified and for which validity has been demonstrated in each culture inves-
tigated (through evidence on structural equivalence, ch. 11). Generally, a claim
to this level of universality is implicitly held by most psychologists for virtu-
ally all current concepts in psychology even without a much-needed analysis
of their validity.
3 Strong universals are concepts that can be established with a scale that has the
same metric across cultures, but a different origin (i.e., meeting conditions for
metric equivalence, see ch. 11). Common patterns of findings provide relevant
evidence.
4 Strict universals show the same distribution of scores in all cultures. For such
universals instruments are needed that meet requirements for full score
equivalence.
The important point in these distinctions is that they do away with a dichotomy
between universal and culture-specific phenomena. Van de Vijver and Poortinga
(1982, p. 393) argue that it seems meaningful “to consider the degree of in-
variance of data across cultural groups as a function of the similarity in cultural
328 Pursuing relationships between behavior and culture: research strategies

patterns or background variables between them.” This argument fits with the
idea of universalism as an approach that sees invariance at various levels as a
potential outcome of cross-cultural inquiry.

Conceptualizations of behavior–culture relationships

Discussions on behavior and culture have a long history (Wandt, 1913; Ja-
hoda & Krewer, 1997). As we have seen in ch. 1, usually two or three main per-
spectives are distinguished in cross-cultural psychology. When a dichotomous cat-
egorization is made, it is between relativist orientations (cultural psychology) and
universalistic (culture-comparative) approaches. When three perspectives are
distinguished, the categories are cultural psychology, indigenous psychologies, and
culture-comparative research. Both culturalist and indigenous approaches tend to
share a relativist view, and this is the reason why they are sometimes taken together.
All three have been mentioned before in this book, particularly with reference to
the dichotomy between relativism and universalism. Indigenous approaches will be
discussed further in ch. 17. In the present section we specifically review views on
behavior–culture relationships.

Cultural psychology

Cultural psychology covers a range of approaches (Miller, 1997b). Perhaps the

main theoretical principle is that culture and behavior are essentially insepara-
ble, and thus cannot be studied apart from each other. “[C]ultural psychology is
the study of all the things members of different communities think (know, want,
feel, value) and do by virtue of being the kinds of beings who are the benficia-
ries, guardians and active perpetuators of a particular culture” [italics in original]
(Shweder et al., 1998, p. 867). As noted in ch. 9, a shift in cultural anthropology
from viewing culture as external context to “culture in the mind of the people”
(Geertz, 1973) formed an important precursor. The focus of research is on more
subjective aspects, such as the meaning that behavior has for the actor, rather
than on more objective aspects of behavior, as observed and rated by experts.
Three important features of cultural approaches include intentionality (or pur-
poseful action), historicity of behavior and developmental change, and the system-
like character of the behavior repertoire in a culture.
Shweder (1991, p. 97) argued that:
the life of the psyche is the life of intentional persons, responding to, and
directing their action at, their own mental objects or representations and under-
going transformation through participation in an evolving intentional world that
is the product of the mental representations that make it up.

Thus, “cultural psychology is the study of intentional worlds. It is the study of

personal functioning in particular intentional worlds” (Shweder, 1990, p. 3).