The Politics of Persuasion

The Politics of Persuasion
i
The Politics of Persuasion
Economic Policy and Media Bias
in the Modern Era
Anthony R. DiMaggio
Published by State University of New York Press, Albany
© 2017 State University of New York
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever

without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval
system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic,
electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise
without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.
For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY

www.sunypress.edu
Production, Eileen Nizer

Marketing, Kate R. Seburyamo
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Dimaggio, Anthony R., 1980– author.

Title: The politics of persuasion : economic policy and media bias in the
modern era / Anthony R. DiMaggio.
Description: Albany : State University of New York Press, 2017. | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016020985 (print) | LCCN 2016045100 (ebook) | ISBN
9781438463452 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781438463469 (e-book)
Subjects: LCSH: United States—Economic policy—21st century. | Mass
media—Political aspects—United States—History—21st century. | Public
opinion—Political aspects—United States.
Classification: LCC HC106.84 .D56 2017 (print) | LCC HC106.84 (ebook) | DDC
070.4/49330973—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016020985
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
List of Illustrations vii

Acknowledgments xiii

Introduction: Political Officials, the News, and Public Opinion 1

1. The Research on Media Bias 19

2. Split Party Government and Reporting on the Minimum Wage,

1996 and 2007 39

3. Unified Republican Government: Debating Tax Cuts and

Social Security, 2001–2005 63

4. Unified Democratic Government: Debating the Stimulus and

Executive Pay, 2009 93

5. The Attack Dog Bias? Bad News and Economic Policy, 1996–2009 129

6. Media Effects on Public Opinion 153

7. Media Coverage and Its Effects: Expanded Case Studies,

1993–2014 197

8. Experimental Evidence of Media Effects on Public Opinion 231

Conclusion 257

vi Contents
Post-Script 271

Notes 273

Bibliography 351

Index 363

Illustrations
Tables
Table I.1. News Sources and Their Importance 14

Table 2.1 The Minimum Wage (1/1–8/31/1996): Competing

Frames in the News 46

Table 2.2 The Minimum Wage (1/1–5/31/2007): Competing

Frames in the News 49

Table 2.3 The Minimum Wage (1/1–8/31/1996): Political Actors

in the News 52

Table 2.4 The Minimum Wage (1/1–5/31/2007): Political Actors

in the News 55

Table 2.5 The Minimum Wage (1/1–8/31/1996): Mentions of

Parties and Party Leaders 56

Table 2.6 The Minimum Wage (1/1–5/31/2007): Mentions of

Parties and Party Leaders 57

Table 3.1 Tax Cuts (1/1–5/31/2001): Competing Frames in the

News 68

Table 3.2 Tax Cuts (1/1–5/31/2001): Political Actors in the News 72

Table 3.3 Tax Cuts (1/1–5/31/2001): Mentions of Parties and

Party Leaders 74

Table 3.4 Social Security (1/1–5/31/2005): Competing Frames

in the News 81

vii
viii Illustrations
Table 3.5 Social Security (1/1–5/31/2005): Political Actors in the

News 85

Table 3.6 Social Security (1/1–5/31/2005): Mentions of Parties

and Party Leaders 86

Table 4.1 The Stimulus (1/1–2/28/2009): Major Frames in

Print and Television Media 101

Table 4.2 The Stimulus (1/1–2/28/2009): Political Actors in

Print and Television News Stories 104

Table 4.3 The Stimulus (1/1–2/28/2009): Mentions of Parties


Table 4.4 Executive Pay (1/1–3/31/2009): Major Frames in

Print and Television News Stories
116
Table 4.5 Executive Pay (1/1–3/31/2009): Political Actors in

Print and Television News Stories 121

Table 4.6 Executive Pay (1/1–3/31/2009): Mentions of Parties


Table 5.1 Bad News and Partisan Conflict over Social Security:

A Sampling of Congressional Statements (January–
May 2005) 136

Table 5.2 Bad News and Partisan Conflict over the Stimulus:

A Sampling of Congressional Statements (January–
February 2009) 139

Table 5.3 Within Party Rejections of the President in Voting

‑
and the News 146

Table C.1 Presidential Priorities and the Tone of News Coverage:

A Nonrelationship 266

Table P.1 Pro-Government Media Bias in Non-Elite News Outlets,

10 Case Studies (1993–2014) 272

Figures
Figure I.1 Shifting Reporting on the Child Health Insurance

New York Times (2007–2009) 2

Published by State University of New York Press, Albany
© 2017 State University of New York
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever

without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval
system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic,
electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise
without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.
For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY

www.sunypress.edu
Production, Eileen Nizer

Marketing, Kate R. Seburyamo
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Dimaggio, Anthony R., 1980– author.

Title: The politics of persuasion : economic policy and media bias in the
modern era / Anthony R. DiMaggio.
Description: Albany : State University of New York Press, 2017. | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016020985 (print) | LCCN 2016045100 (ebook) | ISBN
9781438463452 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781438463469 (e-book)
Subjects: LCSH: United States—Economic policy—21st century. | Mass
media—Political aspects—United States—History—21st century. | Public
opinion—Political aspects—United States.
Classification: LCC HC106.84 .D56 2017 (print) | LCC HC106.84 (ebook) | DDC
070.4/49330973—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016020985
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
x Illustrations
Figure 6.12 Media Consumption and Opinions of Social Security

by Party (May 2005) 175

Figure 6.13 Public Opinion on the Stimulus (2/09–3/09) 181

Figure 6.14 Media Consumption and Opinions of the Stimulus

by Ideology (Jan. 2009) 182


by Party (Jan. 2009) 182

Figure 6.16 Public Perceptions of Media Negativity and Stimulus

Reporting (% Subscribing to Each Description) 185


by Party (Feb. 2009) 186


by Ideology (Feb. 2009) 186

Figure 6.19 Public Opinion on Executive Compensation

(2/2009–10/2009) 189

Figure 6.20 Effects of Attention to Media Coverage and Political

Discussions on Public Opinion of Wall Street

(Mar. 2009) 191

Figure 6.21 Media Consumption and Opinions of Executive Pay

by Party (Mar. 2009) 191

Figure 6.22 Media Consumption and Opinions of Executive Pay

by Party (Mar. 2009) 192

Figure 7.1 Reporting on Political Parties and Leaders During

Unified Government (New York Times) 203

Figure 7.2 Reporting on Political Parties and Leaders During

Divided Government (New York Times) 204

Figure 7.3 Attention to and Attitudes Toward Health Care

Reform (2009–2010) 208

Figure 7.4 Media Effects for Four Policy Disputes 211

Figure 7.5 Attentiveness and Opposition to Medicare Reform by

Age (12/2003) 217

Illustrations xi
Figure 7.6 Attention and Opposition to Medicare Privatization as

Related to Age (5/2011) 222

Figure 8.1 Survey Group’s Opinion on a Second Stimulus (2012) 236

Figure 8.2 Public Attitudes on a Second Stimulus (2012) 239

Figure 8.3 Survey Group’s Opinions of Making the Bush Tax

Cuts Permanent (2012) 241

Figure 8.4 Public Opinion on Taxes (2012) 245

Figure 8.5 Survey Group’s Opinion of Raising the Minimum

Wage (11/2014) 246

Figure 8.6 Public Opinion on Raising the Minimum Wage (2014) 249

Figure 8.7 Public Opinion on Lowering Student Loan Interest

Rates (11/2014) 250

Figure 8.8 Public Opinion on Student Loans (2014) 252

Acknowledgments
This book represents the culmination of a research agenda that occupied

countless hours, and began more than a decade ago when I was in graduate
school. There are many people I wish to thank for aiding me in my intellectual
journey. First, I want to thank my wife Mary and sons Frankie and Tommy
for their support and love during the long nights and weekends that went into
this project. Your love and company have kept me going all these years. Other
family I’d like to thank for their support include: Sam, Alissa, Marty, Jon,
Kristina, Mom, and Dad. I would also like to thank a number of intellectuals
who served as mentors, including: Carlos Parodi, Ali Riaz, Doris Graber,
Andy McFarland, Andy Rojecki, Jamal Nassar, and Manfred Steger. I am
particularly appreciative to Carlos Parodi, Ali Riaz, Stephen Caliendo, and
Andy McFarland for your support over the years as I searched for a permanent
academic position. Today’s academic job market is cutthroat, and without
your support I would never have made it. To my friends and colleagues who
were there for me over the years, I express thanks: Amentahru Wahlrab,
Jacob Van Laar, Erik Lisauskas, Erik Abderhalden, Kevin McGee, Grant
Smith, Rob Godsill, John Wilson, Paul Fasse, Tony Prudden, Wael Habboub,
Zach Gebhardt, Zach Wolfe, Chris McDonald, John Vinzant, Mark Roehrs,
John Roberts, Colin Suchland, David Reynolds, and Aaron Berkowitz. Fellow
intellectuals and progressives deserve tremendous thanks for helping in the
development of my intellectual thought: Mark Major, Michael Thompson, Paul
Street, Lauren Langman, Robert Hughes, Henry Giroux, Yahya Kamalipour,
Stephen Caliendo, Robert McChesney, Noam Chomsky, Edward Herman, and
Jeffrey St. Clair at Counterpunch. Finally, I’d like to thank all my students
over the years who committed themselves to achieving academic excellence
and civic literacy. Your development as intellectuals and committed citizens
made it all worthwhile.
xiii
Introduction
Political Officials, the News, and Public Opinion
This book begins with a case study—the partisan conflict over children’s health
insurance. This political dispute, although just one of many, tells us something
about how policy debates occur and how they are reported in the news. Par‑
tisan disagreement over federal spending for the State Child Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP) heated up dramatically in 2007. The main conflict was over
funding for the program, with President George W. Bush proposing to increase
spending by nearly $5 billion, amounting to nearly $30 billion over five years.
In contrast, Democrats sought to increase spending by $50 billion, for a total
of $75 billion over five years. After the Democrats’ reform proposal was passed
in the House of Representatives and Senate in late September, Bush vetoed the
legislation, although the president offered to compromise on future legislation
by agreeing to a greater amount than he had originally proposed. Democrats
twice sought to override Bush’s veto but failed.
SCHIP funding was revisited by President Obama and a Democratic
Congress in 2009. President Bush opposed the proposed Democratic expan‑
sion, worrying that it would lead to “government‑run health care for every
American.” In contrast, Obama signed a measure increasing funding, claiming
that it represented a first step in ensuring access to health insurance for all
Americans.1 These competing positions suggested significant philosophical
differences between the parties regarding federal assistance for those in need.
Media coverage of the SCHIP dispute changed significantly between
2007 and 2009. Coverage during the Bush years was far more sympathetic to
Republicans, but then became more favorable to Democrats in 2009. Examin‑
ing the number of mentions of prominent Democratic and Republican offi‑
cials and their parties, in addition to the number of times party members
were quoted, Figure I.1 suggests that the Democratic Party was disadvantaged
in 2007 when it came to news reports in the New York Times.
1
Figure I.1
2 Shi$ing Repor-ng on the ofChild

The Politics Health Insurance
Persuasion
New York Times
(2007-‐2009)
70 % of Men1ons
60 from Democrats
50 % of Quotes from

Democrats
40
% of Men1ons
30
from Republicans
20
% of Quotes from
10 Republicans
0
2007 2009
Figure I.1. Shifting reporting on the Child Health Insurance New York Times (2007–

2009).
Democratic quotes and mentions in the news constituted approximately

40 percent of all partisan sources, while Republicans received 60 percent
of mentions and quotes. This is contrasted with coverage in 2009, when
Democrats accounted for more than 60 percent of party mentions and quotes,
and Republicans less than 40 percent.2
What accounted for the shift in SCHIP coverage from 2007 to 2009?
While there are many theories of media bias, the most plausible explanation
for this shift in reporting was the change in partisan control of the federal
government. Shifting partisan control of government meant a change in which
party controlled the executive branch. In 2007, control of government was
split, with a Republican president, a Democratic House, and a Senate evenly
split between the two parties. In 2009, however, the federal government was
controlled by Democrats, which held control of the House, the Senate, and
the White House. The SCHIP case study provides some preliminary evidence
that a deciding factor driving news coverage is the partisan composition of
the government. Moving from split control of government between the par‑
ties to unified control resulted in Democrats being better able to dominate
the national discussion over SCHIP. In contrast, the Republican Party was far
more successful in influencing national discourse when Republicans shared
control of government with Democrats.
SCHIP is a relatively small issue in the grand picture of governing.
But government aid to children is still an important issue. It speaks to how
society treats its most vulnerable—those unable to meet basic needs such
Introduction 3
as food, shelter, and health care. The level of the government’s commitment
of tax revenues to those in need reveals much about America’s priorities.
Media coverage of important economic policy issues also has the potential to
influence how the public prioritizes issues and what kinds of policies Ameri‑
cans support. It is for this reason that the relationships between government,
media, and public opinion are the central concern of this book.
One common theory of media bias suggests that journalists are
pro‑government, tailoring their reporting of political issues to fit the views
expressed by administration officials. Academics refer to this phenomenon as
“indexing.” Reporters may “index” their coverage to the ever‑changing power
dynamics in Washington, covering Democratic and Republican perspectives
more or less prominently depending on which party holds control of gov‑
ernment. With SCHIP, “control of government” refers to which party was
in control of the executive and legislative branches. But are the patterns of
reporting observed in the SCHIP case study generalizable to other economic
policy issues? I examine this question in detail.
This book includes two central themes. First, I argue that a symbi‑
otic relationship exists between media and government. A symbiotic rela‑
tionship suggests a mutually reinforcing association between two individuals
or groups. This relationship is based upon cooperation between the two in
pursuit of each group’s objectives and goals. Political leaders seek to influ‑
ence public opinion, in large part through the use of rhetoric via speeches,
while also providing information to journalists, in an effort to “frame” news
stories in their favor.3 Journalists seek information from government officials
in order to produce news stories for public consumption. In a symbiotic
political union, journalists are thoroughly reliant on official sources, repeating
messages emanating from political elites and conveying them to the general
public. As a consequence, journalists limit the range of views in the news to
those voiced by the parties, providing a near‑monopoly on mass discourse.
Second, while political officials seek to build public support for their
policy positions, their effectiveness at doing so is inconsistent at best, and
depends on three factors: (1) the strength (or lack thereof) of a party’s mes‑
sage in the news; (2) preexisting public bias, with a public that is already
sympathetic to the party’s message more likely to accept that message; and
(3) the level of public familiarity with an issue, with increased familiarity
making it more difficult for officials to persuade the public, and less famil‑
iarity making persuasion easier. These three factors have been addressed in
previous studies, which have either speculated or provided some evidence
that they play a factor in influencing public opinion formation on public
policy issues.4
4 The Politics of Persuasion
Media Bias in Reporting the News
In my research, I examine five different theories of media bias concerning

reporting of domestic economic policy issues. These include: (1) the “index‑
ing” bias, which argues that media are biased in favor of government officials;
(2) the bad news bias, which claims that journalists are heavily negative in
their reporting, regularly challenging official views; (3) the pluralist theory,
which argues that reporters make consistent efforts to include the views of
many different societal groups, governmental and nongovernmental; (4) the
hegemonic theory, which claims that there are pro‑business biases in the
media; and (5) the “liberal media” theory, claiming that reporters are biased
in favor of Democrats and liberal views, and against Republicans and con‑
servative ones. After exploring these competing theories, I present evidence
in favor of the pro‑business and pro‑government theories, while questioning
the usefulness of the other theories.
Political parties play a dominant role in determining news coverage
on domestic policy. Journalists “index” the range of views expressed in the
media to the political party (or parties) that controls the government at any
given time. This means that political parties are tremendously important to
understanding how Americans engage with policy issues in the news. As
previous studies suggest, political parties set the agenda for what issues the
public will discuss. They also influence how people think about politics,
while representing diverse groups throughout society.5 Recognizing which
party controls government is key to understanding how journalists report
politics. When Democrats hold power over Congress and the White House,
coverage is biased in favor of Democrats; but news favors Republicans when
that party controls the White House and Congress. I refer to these periods
as “unified” party control of government. Finally, coverage is biased in favor
of neither party when control of the White House and Congress is shared by
both parties. I refer to these periods as “split” party government.
In a media landscape dominated by corporations, it is natural to expect
biases in favor of business interests. Media outlets are corporations, and their
primary objective is to pursue profits by promoting advertising and mass con‑
sumerism. But a pro‑business bias is also apparent in the news, not so much
by business leaders dominating the news, but more subtly through coverage
of policy debates that is dominated by corporate interests.
I argue that pro‑government bias in the news is inextricably tied to
a pro‑business bias. The business bias is plainly visible in the rightward,
pro‑business drift of political discourse over the last three to four decades.
This drift is acknowledged in a number of social science studies.6 While
Introduction 5
reporters “index” their coverage to official views, the views of the parties
themselves consistently favor business elites. This point is documented in
research showing the tendency of political officials to represent the views
of the affluent, at the expense of masses.7 The rightward drift of American
politics is evident in all the case studies I examine throughout this book,
so when one speaks of a pro‑government bias in the news, one is talking
about a pro‑business bias, due to both parties moving toward market‑based,
pro‑business policies. The market bias in the news manifests itself in report‑
ers’ failure to challenge political developments that negatively affect most
Americans—including growing economic inequality, stagnating‑to‑declining
incomes, increased work hours, growing personal and household debt, and
regular increases in the cost of living.
Media and the “Manufacture of Consent”
The title of this book, The Politics of Persuasion, refers to the influence of
media bias on public consciousness. If political leaders dominate the news,
do they also use media to build public support for their agendas? Some
scholarship argues that journalists consistently undermine public trust in
government by focusing on negative themes and challenging official agen‑
das.8 I argue that officials do dominate the news, although their ability to
“manufacture” public consent is less certain. Sometimes, media succeed in
building support for official agendas; but sometimes they help build opposi‑
tion to those agendas.
Political leaders’ concern with building public support is not new.
Walter Lippmann wrote about government efforts to “manufacture consent”
in favor of official views.9 Since Lippmann’s time, studies suggest that offi‑
cials have little interest in public opinion, and that attempts to manufacture
consent are a main staple of official behavior. Survey data from the 1960s
suggested that most legislators considered themselves “trustees,” feeling they
should retain autonomy to govern based on their personal preferences, rather
than looking to public preferences. Just 14 percent considered themselves
“delegates,” feeling they should look to public preferences first when mak‑
ing political decisions.10 More recently, one study finds that “politicians don’t
pander” to public opinion; rather, they formulate their own policies, while
seeking to mold public opinion around them.11 Another survey found that just
31 percent of members of Congress, and only 13 percent of political officials
in the executive branch agreed that “Americans know enough about issues
to form wise opinions about what should be done.”12 Case study research
uncovers numerous instances where political officials discount public opinion

in favor of their own preferences.13 These findings do not mean that govern‑
ment always ignores public opinion; officials are certainly susceptible to public
electoral pressures. This pressure can provide an incentive for officials to take
public opinion seriously, even if it is done reluctantly. As I show in chapter 5
on the issue of Social Security, officials are aware of public pressures in cases
when constituents contact their senators and representatives.
Past scholarship sought to examine how government may manufac‑
ture consent through the media.14 As I document in a number of case stud‑
ies, journalists share limited interest in exploring public opinion concerning
major policy issues. Little attention is devoted to nongovernmental sources,
as official sources are widely viewed as the real drivers of policy discourse.
This elitist, top‑down view of public policy is commonly accepted by reporters
and officials, but not shared by Americans, the vast majority of whom express
distrust of the government and media.15
An Independent Public?
How effective are official efforts to “manufacture” public consent? Many schol‑
ars answer this question with a simple “not very.” Some depict public opinion as
unstable and too “moody” to be taken seriously by political officials.16 Ameri‑
cans supposedly hold “non‑attitudes” because of their failure to pay attention to
politics. As the thinking goes, if some Americans possess meaningful political
opinions, it is because of messages they internalized from their political party.17
Public attitudes are supposedly irrelevant to the policy process, with officials
ignoring them because Americans are seen as incapable of comprehending
issues in a nuanced way.18 These conclusions are very pessimistic when it comes
to prospects for a democracy in which the public plays an active role.
I reject the notion that the public is irrelevant to the policy process,
or that its opinions are a function of randomness, ignorance, incapability, or
apathy. Many Americans surely fit these descriptions, but to speak in absolute
terms about a majority of citizens is unwarranted. Furthermore, officials may
try to manufacture public consent, but Americans resist official rhetoric when
it contradicts their own political interests. I see the public as neither totally
independent of political elites, nor totally dependent on them. Reality lies
somewhere in between these two poles. Large segments of the citizenry pay
fairly or very close attention to politics, and formulate opinions in mean‑
ingful ways. They display evidence of complex thinking, based not only on
socialization from elites, but from personal experiences. I am not the first
Introduction 7
to make these points, as previous research depicts the public as rational and
reasonable in its political attitudes.19
I refer to the public as semi‑independent in its political attitudes. Amer‑
icans at times display independence from political rhetoric, although at other
times they are strongly influenced by it. Political officials’ dominance of the
news provides them with an advantage when seeking to influence public
beliefs. Previous scholarship claimed that the media are influential only in
influencing what issues people think about or how they think about issues,
whereas I argue that media also influence public political beliefs and values.20
Research Design
This introduction provides basic information about the case studies I exam‑
ine, and how I analyze claims of media bias, as well as the supposed effects
of bias on public attitudes. Included in this section are: a brief description
of my case studies and the timelines analyzed for each, a discussion of the
media content analyzed, a description of my expectations regarding bias and
the effects of bias, and a discussion of the media sources and public opinion
surveys examined.
Measuring Media Bias
Media bias is observable in at least two instances: (1) when reporters distort
some aspect of reality and provide a false impression of what is happening
in the world; or (2) when reporters systematically favor one point of view
over another, be it governmental over nongovernmental actors, or one party
over another. Measuring bias is potentially difficult. For example, how do we
know coverage is distorted without some other measurement of reality with
which to compare news coverage that is allegedly biased?21 This concern can
be addressed in a number of ways. One way is to identify patterns in news
coverage, and demonstrate that they do not comport with reality in some
way, as has been done in previous research.22 A second means of measuring
bias is to ask reporters whether they favor some sources of information over
others, and to demonstrate that these preferences bias news content. This
book examines media bias through the second approach, documenting how
journalists favor government and business perspectives over those of citi‑
zens groups and other nongovernmental actors. I also identify cases in which
journalists favor one political party over another, devoting greater attention
and more favorable coverage to the party holding power in Washington at a
Illustrations ix
Figure I.2 Conditions for Successful Persuasion 13

Figure I.3

Conditions for Failed Persuasion 13

Figure 5.1 Media Attentiveness and Attitudes Toward Government 134

Figure 5.2 New York Times Coverage of Tax Cuts (January–

May 2001) 149

Figure 5.3 New York Times Reporting on Social Security Reform

(January–May 2005) 149

Figure 5.4 New York Times Reporting on the Stimulus

(January–February 2009) 150

Figure 5.5 New York Times Reporting on Executive Pay (January–

March 2009) 151

Figure 6.1 Attentiveness to and Knowledge of Social Security

(Feb. 2005) 161

Figure 6.2 Media Consumption on, and Political Awareness of

the Stimulus (Feb. 2009) 162

Figure 6.3 Alternative Spending Priorities for Budget Surplus

(% Preferring Each Option) 164

Figure 6.4 Media Consumption and Opinions of Tax Cuts by

Ideology (Feb. 2001) 165


Party (Feb. 2001) 165


Ideology (Feb. 2001) 166


Party (Feb. 2001) 166

Figure 6.8 Public Opinion on Social Security Reform (9/04–6/05) 170


by Ideology (Feb. 2005) 173


by Ideology (May 2005) 173


by Party (Feb. 2005) 174

Introduction 9
the initial establishment period, in which each news outlet began to pro‑
vide sustained coverage, with “sustained” defined as publishing more than
a dozen stories per month. The analyses end when issues receded from the
congressional agenda, after one of the parties succeeded or failed in passing
legislation.
For the 1996 minimum wage debate, my analysis spans from the
beginning of January, when debate over the wage increase became a regular
staple of coverage, through August 31, when President Bill Clinton signed
the increase into law. The 2007 analysis starts at the beginning of January,
after Democrats gained seats from the 2006 midterm congressional election
and made the minimum wage a policy priority. The analysis concluded in
late May, when a minimum wage increase passed into law. My review of the
2001 tax cuts started in early January, when discussion between the parties
emerged in advance of President Bush taking office. Analysis ended in May
2001, when a tax cut bill officially became law.
My review of the debate over privatizing Social Security began in Janu‑
ary 2005. In January Bush initiated his push for reform, following his 2004
reelection victory. Analysis ended in May 2005, at which time it was clear that
Bush had failed in pushing reform. During that month, Republican Represen‑
tative Roy Blunt listed the “priority legislation” to be pursued after Memorial
Day; Social Security was not on the list.
My analysis of the 2008–09 economic crisis included two issues: the
executive pay controversy and the stimulus. The executive pay controversy
became increasingly prominent from January through March 2009, follow‑
ing the October 2008 government bailout of Wall Street, and once it had
become clear that taxpayer money allocated to financial firms was being used
to pay out bonuses to Wall Street executives.24 Analysis culminated in March,
when President Obama announced new rules to regulate CEO and executive
compensation. Finally, my examination of the stimulus started in January
2009, when congressional Democrats began their discussion of a government
spending package in anticipation of Obama taking office. The analysis ended
in late February 2009, when the stimulus was passed into law.
Additional Cases
My research is expanded past the issues above, as I include ten additional case
studies in chapter 7. The findings from the first six cases are suggestive, but
concern remains about whether they are generalizable to a larger number of
policy issues. Introducing ten additional cases allows me to be more confident
in my results. These cases include:
1. The 1993–94 Clinton health care debate

2. The 2003 extension of Bush’s tax cuts

3. Bush’s 2003 expansion of Medicare prescription drug benefits

4. The 2008 economic bailout

5. The 2009–10 Obama health care debate

6. The 2011 debt ceiling crisis

7. The 2011 Medicare privatization debate

8. The 2013 government shutdown

9. The 2014 minimum wage debate

10. The 2014 Environmental Protection Agency limits on CO2

emissions from coal‑burning power plants
These sixteen case studies extend my analysis through two decades, includ‑
ing more than 1,300 news stories dealing with the first six cases, and more
than 9,500 stories for the additional case studies, for a total of nearly 11,000
stories overall. All of these issues are relevant either to government regula‑
tion of business or to citizens’ economic and welfare benefits. With a large
number of cases over a longer period of time, I am more confident that my
results are meaningful, rather than the result of chance.
Because of practical concerns with the large number of issues examined
in chapter 7, I limit my analysis to the “paper of record”—the New York
Times—since it is by far the most important news source in the country. Fur‑
thermore, the uniformity of results across all media I examine in my first six
case studies provides greater confidence that the findings from the New York
Times in my additional case studies are generalizable across the mass media.
Media Content
Throughout this work, I review many news media. I include television cable
outlets, local news and national wire services, national broadcast news, and
national newspapers. I analyze a number of different forms of media content.25
These include op‑eds (commentary), editorials, and news stories. These steps
were taken to increase the generalizability of my findings across different
types of content and sources of news. First, I examine news story headlines
and story leads, assessing how often each political party and its members,
other governmental officials, and different types of nongovernmental actors
Introduction 11
appeared.26 Story “leads” were defined as the first five sentences of a news
story. I also counted how often each political party and its members were
mentioned.27 Next, I examine how often members of each party, in addition
to other political actors (governmental and nongovernmental) were quoted
in news stories.28
Frames were also a subject of analysis. Frames play an important role
in influencing how news audiences interpret political issues.29 In this book,
a “frame” refers to a way in which an issue is reported, with each frame rep‑
resenting a specific message or narrative promoted by Democratic or Repub‑
lican officials. The frames I examine are based on my analysis of common
themes articulated by presidents and members of Congress, reflected in presi‑
dential speeches and congressional leaders’ statements on the floors of the
House and Senate.30 I use the Congressional Record database when examining
statements from Congress, and the American Presidency Project database for
presidential rhetoric.31 I describe the specific origins of each frame in later
chapters of this book. I measure the percentage of all news stories that a
frame appears in out of all stories analyzed, as well as how often each frame
appears as a percent of all frames that appear. Finally, I measure how often
news stories are characterized by some form of negativity. For each policy
debate, negativity was defined to include any story in which criticisms of a
policy proposal appeared (1) from within the party offering the proposal,
(2) from the competing party; (3) from the general public; or (4) from a
member of an interest group.
Expectations for Media Bias and Media Effects
For each theory of media bias, specific findings should be observed. For a
theory to be validated, it must be confirmed in a majority of case studies,
across most of the areas of media content analyzed.32 My expectations include
the following:
• If the media share a liberal bias, one should find consistent evi‑
dence that Democratic positions and political actors dominate
news stories, op‑eds, and editorials, appearing as more than 60
percent of all partisan political actors in stories, and in more
than 60 percent of all frames in the news.33
• In contrast, a pro‑business (hegemonic) bias will be evident in
its most blatant form if Republican sources appear as more than
60 percent of all political actors, and in more than 60 percent
of all news frames.34 Alternatively, a more subtle form of bias
will be evident if a pro‑business agenda is driving the types of

policy proposals discussed in the news.
• For media pluralism, one should observe the regular appearance
of not only governmental sources, but also nongovernmental
sources, the latter being at least one‑third of all sources quoted
or political actors appearing in story headlines and leads, and
one‑third of all authors of newspaper op‑eds.35
• A pro‑government bias would be apparent if government officials
dominate news content over nongovernmental actors, appear‑
ing as at least two‑thirds of all sources quoted or political actors
appearing in news stories. Additionally, a pro‑government bias

is apparent if a political party is more likely to dominate the
news than the opposing party when it holds unified control of
government, and if both parties receive approximately equal
coverage when control of government is split.36
• For the bad news bias, two types of content are examined: criti‑
cisms from one member of a political party against another
member of that party (“within‑party” attacks) and criticisms
from one party member toward the other party (“cross‑party”
attacks).37 For a negativity bias to be a common feature of
the news, it needs to appear in a majority of news stories for
each policy issue. I define negativity to include any reference
in stories to public, interest group, or cross and within‑party
criticisms of a policy proposal. Secondarily, if reporters over‑
emphasize within‑party fighting, comments from party mem‑
bers that indicate a fundamental rejection of a party’s proposal
should appear more often than within‑party voting against the
party’s proposed legislation.
This book also looks at public attention to national political discourse and
news on important policy issues.38 In measuring the potential effects of media
content on public opinion, I examine correlations in national public opinion
surveys between attentiveness to policy issues in the news and opinions of
those issues.39 I control for a variety of other potentially confounding factors,
including respondents’ sex, age, education, race, political party, political ideol‑
ogy, and income. In studying media effects, I expect a number of factors to
matter. First, if information in the media is one‑sided in favor of one party,
this should influence how Americans form their opinions. But an individual’s
familiarity (or lack thereof) with an issue should matter too, with those less
Introduction 13
familiar more likely to be influenced by one‑sided media content. Finally, a

person’s prior attitudes and ideology at the beginning of a national policy
debate should matter as well. Previous studies suggest that the effects of ideol‑
ogy and partisanship on Americans are strong, so it should be more difficult
to persuade someone whose ideology already disagrees with the views being
promoted in the news.40 Furthermore, public opinion is remarkably stable,
with most Americans holding their opinions relatively constant and changing
only incrementally over time, so prior attitudes should matter greatly when
it comes to public opinion of policy issues.41
My expectations for each case study are listed here. If a pro‑government
bias exists in the news, then greater attention to the news should be associated
with growing trust in, and support for government, rather than greater distrust
of and opposition to government—the latter of which is expected under the
“bad news” theory. Greater attention to the news on specific policy issues should
vary, however, depending on the strength of messages from the Democratic and
Republican parties, and depending on the level of prior public support for a
proposal, and on how familiar the public is with the issue. Specifically, in cases
when one party dominates the news, and Americans are already supportive of
a proposal, although not very familiar with the policy issue, increased attention
to the news should produce growing support for the party holding an advantage
in the news. Conversely, when a party is disadvantaged in the news (when
coverage is either biased against them or mixed, favoring neither party), and
when the public is already opposed to a party’s proposal and already familiar
with the policy issue, growing attention to the news should produce growing
opposition to the party holding a disadvantage in the news. These expectations
are represented in a visual format in Figures I.2 and I.3 below.
Figure I.2. Conditions for Successful Persuasion.

Increased Party Stronger Prior Lower Greater Support

Dominance + Public Support + Public Familiarity = for Party Stance

of the News for Party Stance with Issue Among Attentive

Americans

Figure I.3. Conditions for Failed Persuasion.

Party Inability Lower Prior Higher Greater Opposition

to Dominate + Public Support + Public Familiarity = to Party Stance

the News for Party Stance with Issue Among Attentive

Americans

As a secondary measure of the influence of prior public attitudes, I

expect that partisan Americans (Republicans or Democrats) who are already
predisposed to reject a policy proposal by the opposing party will be the
least affected by news coverage that is biased in favor of the opposing party.
Conversely, partisans who are already predisposed to support a proposal from
their own party will be the most affected by news coverage that is biased in
favor of their party. Alternatively, if my expectations are wrong and negativ‑
ity dominates the news, attention to the news on each policy issue should
produce increased opposition to the proposal in question.
Media Outlets
I include five media sources in this book: the New York Times, the Chicago
Sun Times, CBS News, Fox News cable, and MSNBC. News stories from these
organizations were analyzed through the Lexis Nexis database. The signifi‑
cance of each source is addressed in Table I.1. These media were chosen in
order to generalize about media coverage of public policy.
Thousands of stories, op‑eds, and editorials were examined in the six‑
teen case studies. The stories came from a mix of regional and national print
outlets, which typically appeal to more elite readers, and television news,
which either appeals to mass audiences or “narrowcasts” by appealing to
smaller conservative and liberal audiences. The New York Times was chosen
because it is the most prominent newspaper in the country. As the “paper of
Table I.1. News Sources and Their Importance
News Outlet Importance for this Study

New York Times Agenda‑setting national newspaper. Other news outlets

(TV and print) take cues from the “paper of record”
CBS News Broadcast news leader, mass appeal for “average” news

viewers
Fox News/MSNBC Privileged, relatively elite audiences (subscription‑based);

narrowcasting to partisan and ideological bases of both
parties
Chicago Sun Times Local newspaper audiences, wire service–based stories

representative of local news across the country
Introduction 15
record,” it is responsible for much of the original national reporting on public

policy, and is closely followed by other print, television, and online sources.
Studies demonstrate that the New York Times “sets the agenda” for what issues
are discussed in the news and for how they are covered.42
I selected the Chicago Sun Times because it represents local print news
across the country. As with other local papers, it pulls its stories on national
policy issues from newswire services such as Reuters and the Associated Press.
By selecting this outlet, I am able to generalize about stories produced by
other outlets relying on wire services across the country. Previous research
concludes that, even if some local newspapers report on local issues (the
actions of a local member of Congress or local presidential visits) differently
than other newspapers, the general tone of news content is similar across
local newspapers when they publish national news.43 This uniformity exists
because local newspapers do not produce original national reporting, instead
relying on newswire agencies.
CBS News was chosen because of its representation of a medium
(broadcast news) with mass appeal. CBS, ABC, and NBC news were viewed
by approximately 22 million Americans per day in 2012.44 Any generalization
about national reporting must take into account this medium when assessing
national coverage of economic policy issues.
In analyzing editorials and op‑eds, I expand my examination beyond
the New York Times and Chicago Sun Times. It is impossible to generalize
about national media commentary with such a small number of venues. I
also include articles from regional and national newspapers: the Wall Street
Journal, the New York Post, the Washington Times, and the Chicago Tribune.
All four have sizable readerships. Most importantly, these outlets hold repu‑
tations for being conservative in their editorializing, compared to the liberal
New York Times and Chicago Sun Times. Including liberal and conservative
newspapers is necessary for any study analyzing the full spectrum of U.S.
political commentary. I also analyze commentary from pundits who appear
on Fox News and MSNBC, including conservatives Bill O’Reilly, Glenn Beck,
and Sean Hannity (all on Fox), and liberals Rachel Maddow, Keith Olber‑
mann, and Ed Schultz (all on MSNBC).
Fox News and MSNBC represent a newer type of media that narrow‑
cast to partisan Americans, appealing to a combined primetime audience of
2.3 million in 2014.45 Including news outlets that narrowcast is important in
order to better generalize about the state of today’s news on economic policy.
Some claim that partisan “new media” represent a massive, even revolutionary
change from the previous “old media” system, which was based on “objec‑
tive” reporting.46 However, others claim the differences between old and new
media are not so large or significant, and that new media do little to chal‑
lenge traditional newsgathering or governmental dominance of the news.47
MSNBC and Fox must be examined to determine whether the new partisan
media represent a significant deviation from “objective” news organizations.
Other forms of new media, such as political blogs and content‑sharing
websites were not included in this study. Previous research questions whether
such sites even promote information that differs significantly from more con‑
ventional news, and available evidence suggests that such sources are followed
closely by only a small number of citizens.48
There is an additional justification for including both television and
print news. Television and print news sources contribute to citizen learning
about politics in different ways; audiences that are less interested in politics
learn more about politics from television, whereas those with more politi‑
cal interest learn more from newspapers.49 Different news audiences learn
differently from different types of media. Accounting for the various ways
in which economic policies are reported in television and print is necessary
for accurately gauging the effects of media consumption for different types
of audiences.
Public Opinion Data
I utilized public opinion surveys from the Pew Research Center and other
polling sources throughout this book. Pew’s surveys track public attention
to and opinions of countless issues in the news. Their surveys measured
public opinion for four of the six primary case studies I examined: the 2001
tax cuts, the 2005 Social Security debate, the 2009 stimulus, and the 2009
executive pay controversy, and five supplemental case studies: the 2009–10
health care debate, the 2003 tax cuts debate, the 2003 Medicare debate, the
2011 Medicare debate, and the 2011 debt talks. Survey data from other poll‑
ing firms were also used to supplement Pew data; these sources are discussed
throughout the book.
Structure of the Book
This book is divided into eight chapters. In chapter 1, I review the literature
covering competing theories of media bias. Readers eager to jump into the
findings of the book may choose to skip this chapter, although it provides
a detailed context for the limits of previous research, and for why this proj‑
ect was necessary. In chapter 2, four theories accounting for media content
Introduction 17
are explored—pro‑government bias, media pluralism, the liberal media, and

pro‑business bias (hegemony), and applied to the 1996 and 2007 minimum
wage case studies. In these two cases, neither Democrats nor Republicans
exercised an advantage in the news. In chapter 3, I review two case studies
under unified Republican government—the 2001 tax cuts and 2005 Social
Security debate. In these cases, I uncover evidence of a pro‑Republican bias
in the news. In chapter 4, I examine two conflicts during unified Demo‑
cratic government—the 2009 stimulus and 2009 executive pay controversy.
In contrast to chapter 3, I find a bias in favor of Democrats. Synthesizing the
findings from chapters 2, 3, and 4, each political party’s perspectives were
privileged or neglected depending on which party controlled government.
Chapters 5 and 6 address the “bad news” bias. In chapter 5, I review
media coverage in my primary case studies, comparing the “bad news” and
pro‑government theories. I find little evidence of a “bad news” bias in the
news. Chapter 6 tests the bad news theory by assessing the effects of media
coverage on public opinion. I find consistent evidence in chapters 5 and 6
that the pro‑government (or “indexing”) bias dominates news coverage, and
that it exerts a significant impact on public attitudes of policy issues. Offi‑
cial success in manufacturing consent, however, is inconsistent at best. But
the main problem with those claiming a bad news bias is that they frame
media as one‑dimensionally negative in opposition to government. I find
that coverage is far more fluid and variable, sometimes favoring one party
and sometimes favoring the other, but always favoring governmental over
nongovernmental sources.
Chapter 7 expands the book’s main findings on media bias and its
effects by reviewing ten additional case studies. The findings again suggest
a pro‑government bias in the news, but with inconsistent effects on public
opinion. Finally, chapter 8 utilizes experimental research methods to verify
the findings regarding the effects of the media on public opinion documented
in earlier chapters. Chapter 8 relies on experimental findings for four policy
areas: the minimum wage, student loans, tax cuts, and the stimulus.
Normative Implications for Constrained Media
A major implication of my findings centers on whether journalists promote

propaganda in media discourse. Previous studies criticize journalists for pro‑
moting government propaganda, at the expense of nonofficial views.50 This
book echoes that concern, considering the overwhelming reliance of reporters
on government sources at the expense of pluralistic reporting that emphasizes
nongovernmental voices. The neglect of nonofficial viewpoints is concerning

in a political era when the vast majority of Americans share distrust of gov‑
ernment. My concern with media propaganda in the United States is different
from traditional definitions of propaganda. Messages that are disseminated
via direct government control of the media content, as exercised by repres‑
sive governments in, for instance, Egypt, Iran, and Russia, are commonly
thought of as propaganda. Instead, I argue for a more subtle, alternative defi‑
nition, in which propaganda is voluntarily disseminated by journalists, who
are themselves elite actors in the policy process. Journalists are rarely told by
government which issues to report and which to ignore, but informally, U.S.
media still marginalize nonofficial voices. The outcome in the news, then, is
similar, whether one lives in a free society or an authoritarian one: govern‑
ments dominate news coverage. The difference between the United States and
other countries is that omission of critical views is voluntarily practiced by
private media corporations, whereas omission is promoted in authoritarian
countries by the government. Many previous studies shied away from dis‑
cussing the issue of media propaganda, likely due to the controversial and
negative responses this criticism will produce from the U.S. intellectual class.51
Getting beyond such conformity, however, is necessary in order to develop a
better understanding of how media operate within the U.S. political system.
In a vibrant democracy, journalists should be concerned with what the
public thinks on policy issues and regularly consult nongovernmental sources
when reporting the news. Democracy requires that the voice of the people
be heard in public policy debates, and media attention to public preferences
is necessary for the American people to establish a real voice in policy delib‑
erations. Journalistic neglect of public opinion is always a concern, but it
becomes an even larger impediment to democratic discourse when the public
is so distrusting of government. Public distrust has strongly defined American
politics in recent decades, so for journalists to cut the public out of national
policy deliberations suggests that they are performing poorly when it comes
to allowing the people a voice in political debates. The problem of journalists’
neglect of citizen voices is compounded with recent research demonstrating
that officials consistently overrepresent the political‑economic interests of
affluent Americans, while neglecting the wishes of the masses. These find‑
ings raise a vital question: If officials are mainly interested in representing
the affluent over the masses, and journalists marginalize public voices, then
who does speak for the people? Part of the concern over media propaganda
is mitigated by the finding that the public often questions official messages in
the news, but this reality does not eliminate concerns regarding how informa‑
tion is manipulated via official dominance of the media.
Acknowledgments
This book represents the culmination of a research agenda that occupied

countless hours, and began more than a decade ago when I was in graduate
school. There are many people I wish to thank for aiding me in my intellectual
journey. First, I want to thank my wife Mary and sons Frankie and Tommy
for their support and love during the long nights and weekends that went into
this project. Your love and company have kept me going all these years. Other
family I’d like to thank for their support include: Sam, Alissa, Marty, Jon,
Kristina, Mom, and Dad. I would also like to thank a number of intellectuals
who served as mentors, including: Carlos Parodi, Ali Riaz, Doris Graber,
Andy McFarland, Andy Rojecki, Jamal Nassar, and Manfred Steger. I am
particularly appreciative to Carlos Parodi, Ali Riaz, Stephen Caliendo, and
Andy McFarland for your support over the years as I searched for a permanent
academic position. Today’s academic job market is cutthroat, and without
your support I would never have made it. To my friends and colleagues who
were there for me over the years, I express thanks: Amentahru Wahlrab,
Jacob Van Laar, Erik Lisauskas, Erik Abderhalden, Kevin McGee, Grant
Smith, Rob Godsill, John Wilson, Paul Fasse, Tony Prudden, Wael Habboub,
Zach Gebhardt, Zach Wolfe, Chris McDonald, John Vinzant, Mark Roehrs,
John Roberts, Colin Suchland, David Reynolds, and Aaron Berkowitz. Fellow
intellectuals and progressives deserve tremendous thanks for helping in the
development of my intellectual thought: Mark Major, Michael Thompson, Paul
Street, Lauren Langman, Robert Hughes, Henry Giroux, Yahya Kamalipour,
Stephen Caliendo, Robert McChesney, Noam Chomsky, Edward Herman, and
Jeffrey St. Clair at Counterpunch. Finally, I’d like to thank all my students
over the years who committed themselves to achieving academic excellence
and civic literacy. Your development as intellectuals and committed citizens
made it all worthwhile.
xiii
compared to a high of 55 percent in 1985. Sixty‑seven percent said that news

stories “are often inaccurate,” compared to 34 percent in 1985. Seventy‑six
percent felt the media “favor one side” in reporting, up from 53 percent in
1985.1 Other surveys find similar levels of public distrust. A 2011 survey
from The Hill magazine found that 68 percent felt the media were biased,
with respondents twice as likely to feel journalists exhibited a liberal over a
conservative bias.2 Another 2011 survey by Gallup reported Americans were
more than three times as likely to claim the media share a liberal over a con‑
servative bias.3 These statistics suggest the issue of bias occupies a prominent
place in the public mind.
Media Bias: What It Is and Why It Matters
In Public Opinion, Walter Lippmann argued that biases in the informa‑

tion‑gathering process matter because they influence “the pictures” people
form “in our heads.” Lippmann argued that the world
is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct
acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety,
so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. And
although we have to act in that environment, we have to recon‑
struct it on a simpler model before we can manage it.4
Bias in the news is important because it speaks to the quality of the infor‑
mational environment in the United States, and whether Americans are able
to form coherent, meaningful opinions regarding the political system. If a
political party dominates the news, its adherents enjoy an advantage over
their partisan opponents in influencing what issues the media cover (known
as “agenda building”), what issues the public thinks about (known as “agenda
setting”), and influencing how the public thinks about political issues (known
as “priming”).5 Officials’ privileged position in the news does not guarantee
they will influence public attitudes, but it at least provides them with an
advantage in their efforts to persuade citizens.
Competing Theories of Bias
Many scholars have addressed media bias. They often disagree, however,
about precisely how media are biased. The sections below explore the topic
of bias in detail.
The Research on Media Bias 21
The Pro‑Government, Indexing Bias
The pro‑government bias theory portrays journalists as “indexing” their cov‑

erage to fit the range of views expressed by political officialdom.6 Much of
this literature is devoted to analyzing coverage of foreign policy issues. In his
study of the Vietnam War, Hallin found that coverage that was critical of the
war grew during times of government discord:
In situations where political consensus seems to prevail, journalists

tend to act as “responsible” members of the political establish‑
ment, upholding the dominant political perspective and passing
on more or less at face value the views of authorities assumed to
represent the nation as a whole. In situations of political conflict,
they become more detached or even adversarial, though they
normally will stay well within the bounds of the debate going on
within the political “establishment.”7
In Debating War and Peace, Mermin examines media coverage of eight U.S.
military interventions, finding that criticisms during each conflict appeared
only when criticisms had already been expressed by government officials.8
Another review of U.S. foreign policy from 2001 to 2014 concluded that
journalists typically restricted their reporting to those positions taken by
Democratic and Republican officials.9
Zaller and Chiu distinguish between different forms of pro‑government
bias.10 These forms include: “source indexing,” whereby “reporters simply
make the rounds among [official government] persons familiar with issues”
and write “stories that summarize what they have been told,” and “power
indexing,” in which “journalists may consider information newsworthy in
proportion to its capacity to foretell or affect future events.” For example,
Zaller and Chiu write that reporters “paid disproportionate attention to the
statements of Bush administration officials” during Senate hearings over the
1991 Gulf War “because, far more than other witnesses at the hearings, these
officials were in a position to determine whether the U.S. went to war or
not.”11
Bennett highlights the dangers of “politically managed” news that
“provides little solid basis for critical thinking” by media consumers.12 Ben‑
nett draws attention to “increasing limits on the content of news that stem
from the manufacture and sale of news as a commercial product . . . [news]
 
 
 
 
assignments are made increasingly with costs, efficiency, and viewer or reader
reactions run with fewer concerns about informing the public.”13 Bennett
expresses concern with the effects of corporate media monopolization on
There are two indispensable functions that journalism must serve

in a self‑governing society. First, the media system must provide
a rigorous accounting of people in power . . . in both the public
 
 
 
 
and private sector. This is known as the watchdog role. Second,
the media system must provide reliable information and a wide
range of informed opinions on the important social and political
issues of the day. No single medium can or should be expected
to provide all of this; but the media system as a whole should
provide easy access to this for all citizens.
“By these criteria,” McChesney argues, “the U.S. media system is an abject
failure.” He points to the emergence of “the modern commercial press system”
and “the severe contradiction between a privately held media system and
the needs of a democratic society.” Journalism, following the rise of media
“objectivity” in the twentieth century, has “three distinct biases built into it”:
the overreliance on official news sources “as the basis for legitimate news,”
the need for “a news hook or a news peg to justify a news story,” and the
“smuggling in” of “values conducive to the commercial aims of the owners
and advertisers.” McChesney contends that reporters are “oblivious to the
compromises with authority they routinely make,” one example being efforts
to equate the “spread of ‘free markets’ with democracy.”25
Corporate ownership creates pressure on news organizations to censor
news stories that criticize advertisers. Advertisers expect a regular stream
of news content for outlets they advertise with that refrains from ques‑
tioning their companies, products, or business practices. Investigative sto‑
ries that expose corporate malfeasance or corruption deter businesses from
future advertising with a news outlet. And the threat of censorship is not
idle. Previous surveys of news editors and reporters found that these pres‑
sures are ever‑present. Eighty percent of editors contacted in one survey said
that advertiser pressure on their organizations and reporters was common,
and 45 percent knew of instances when content was altered due to adver‑
tiser pressure.26 Three‑quarters of reporters surveyed knew of instances when
advertisers sought to influence news content, and 44 percent were aware
of instances when advertisers withdrew funding because of content they
deemed objectionable. Forty percent of reporters admitted their news outlet
succumbed to censorship due to advertiser pressures.27 Self‑censorship is also
an issue of concern. Approximately one‑third of journalists and news editors
admit that avoidance of views critical of advertisers happens “sometimes”
or is “commonplace,” while three‑quarters admit to self‑censoring stories to
satisfy advertisers.28
Aside from advertising pressure, scholars speak of “cultural hegemony”

as a prominent feature of the mass media. In Framing Class, Kendall discusses
media representations of social inequality, the working class, the poor, and
the homeless. She identifies a divergence between favorable images of afflu‑
ent groups, and less favorable images for the poor and less fortunate. The
wealthy are presented as “like everyone else,” “caring and generous people,”
“personify[ing] the American dream,” and playing the lead role in promot‑
ing the “gospel of materialism.”29 Conversely, entertainment programming’s
portrayals of the working class and poor are negative: workers and unions
are greedy and affiliated with organized crime, the poor are caricatured as
“white trash,” the working class is comprised of “buffoons, bigots, and slobs,”
and blue collar workers are “out of work or unhappy at work.”30
Kendall’s claims about class biases in the media are echoed by other
scholars. Rollings’s study of television during the 1980s found that enter‑
tainment programs emphasized service and professional occupations “at the
expense of the production sector.” Unions were “almost invisible on television”
programs and were depicted as “violent, degrading, and obstructive” when
they did receive attention.31 Additionally, Rollings found “the role that unions
continue to play in improving the quality of life and of working conditions
for workers is almost never illustrated.”32 This claim was repeated in Parenti’s
documentation of how Hollywood films convey images of unions as coercive,
criminal, and ineffective.33
Some research suggests antilabor, antiworker messages are common
in news reports covering laborers, strikes, and unions. Glenn claims that
negative portrayals of unions are common when workers organize against
corporate “free trade” agreements seen as detrimental to the working class.34
Kollmeyer maintains that “negative news about the economy [has] dispropor‑
tionately depicted events and problems affecting corporations and investors
instead of focusing on the general workforce.35 Kollmeyer found a pro‑inves‑
tor, pro‑corporate bias in his review of hundreds of stories in the Los Angeles
Times: “articles reporting problems threatening corporations and investors”
appeared in front‑page stories far more frequently than “problems threaten‑
ing workers,” while articles referring to corporate and investor reforms vastly
outnumbered stories on reforms “designed to help workers.” The average word
length of business stories was significantly longer than for worker‑oriented
stories.36
News representations of labor are described as negative‑to‑nonexistent.
Croteau and Hoynes examined the guest line up of Nightline and MacNeil‑

Lehrer News Hour, finding that only 5.7 percent of the guests on Nightline
were representatives of labor, public interest groups, or racial and ethnic
leaders.37 On Nightline programs covering the economy, 37 percent of guests

represented corporations, 17 percent were government officials, and only 5
percent represented labor. A similar pattern was found on MacNeil‑Lehrer
news programs.38 For coverage of labor strikes, reporters highlight the futility
strikes in general, framing them as harming consumers, as being potentially
violent, with strikers as too militant, and with union officials as inadequately
representing workers.39 Tracy argues that strikes are characterized by depic‑
tions of employers as “victimized” due to workers’ harmful behavior. Manage‑
ment is “sincere” in its negotiating tactics, while unions are “underhanded.”
Substantive grievances of the strikers are neglected, while government media‑
tors with labor and management are depicted as self‑sacrificing and optimistic
about settling strikes.40 Coverage of labor is also described as sensationalistic.
Puette, Erickson, and Mitchell suggest that although strikes occur in only a
miniscule number of cases in which unions negotiate contracts with employ‑
ers, they account for between one‑quarter to one‑third of all union coverage.41
Studies suggest that economic factors influence the news in other ways
as well. The size and relative profits of media markets influence reporting
quality. Larger media markets are more likely than smaller ones to produce
diverse media content to satisfy audience demands. As Althaus, Cizmar, and
Gimpel conclude: “Big‑city stations fly traffic helicopters and send large news
staffs to do live stand‑up reports from all around the market, while news‑
casts in the smallest markets are shoestring productions run by overburdened
reporters.”42 Vining and Marcin find that news outlets are more likely to
emphasize reporting with “lower production costs” and “qualities attractive
to audiences and advertisers”—two groups that are highly desired by media
corporations.43 Dunaway finds that corporate ownership of newspapers pro‑
duces less frequent coverage of politics, compared to privately owned newspa‑
pers.44 Schaffner and Sellers conclude that increased corporate consolidation
of media ownership leads to less extensive coverage of Congress.45
Profit considerations drive production of the news. In Market Driven
Journalism, McManus finds significant differences in midsized, large, and
very large television news stations concerning efforts to cut news produc‑
tion costs. Large stations (having the most resources) are more likely to rely
on outside fact checking “to ascertain newsworthiness,” and less likely to run
stories “from [outside] promoters or other media firms . . . without leaving
 
 
 
 
or phoning outside the typical newsroom.” Mid‑to‑smaller‑size stations are
less likely to do these things. McManus finds that inexpensive stories that are
easily generated by conventional sources are more likely to be produced over
expensive investigative pieces due to profit‑driven concerns with minimizing
operating costs.46
Finally, some scholars claim that journalists marginalize social move‑

ments that are critical of corporate power. Solomon criticizes newspaper
reporting of anticapitalist protests for oversimplifying protestors’ messages,
and for portraying them as “zealots” against international institutions such as
the World Bank and World Trade Organization.47 Giuffo criticizes reporters
covering anti–corporate globalization protests for failing to provide context
for demonstrators’ motivations.48 News stories are said to frame protests of
the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organiza‑
tion (WTO) as “against globalization,” rather than as against corporate glo‑
balization. Adler and Mittelman find that media rely on a single definition
of globalization as driven by business interests, as opposed to being driven
by transnational protests against corporate globalization.49
Goeddertz and Kraidy contend that media stress the “deviant” nature
of anti–corporate globalization protestors, while editorials and columns are
biased in favor of “free trade.”50 Analyzing the 1999 Seattle protest against
the WTO, Boykoff found that more than 60 percent of the reporting featured
a “violence frame,” covering skirmishes between police and demonstrators,
despite the protests being overwhelmingly nonviolent.51 Boykoff contends
that media portrayals of dissident movements, whether “starkly negative” or
critical “in much subtler ways,” are nonetheless “agreeable to the elite power
structure.”52
Do labor leaders and other nongovernmental actors appear regularly
in economic policy reporting? And are they able to compete for space with
business leaders and governmental officials? Are hegemonic messages domi‑
nant in reporting on public policy? I address all these questions in the next
few chapters.
The Rightward Drift of American Politics:

Its Impact on the News?
One way in which pro‑business biases may appear in the news is indirectly,
via the rightward drift in American politics. If the political process and the
actions of both political parties are increasingly defined by market policies
that benefit the affluent, and if journalists defer to political officials who
themselves defer to business interests, one may observe hegemonic biases
in the news. Numerous scholars discuss how the American political system
embraced hegemonic values from the 1970s through today. Hetherington
documents the decline of liberal government policies from the early 1970s
through the 2000s, arguing that the erosion of such policies produced great
public distrust of government, as officials became less concerned with pro‑

moting policies aimed at aiding the masses and disadvantaged.53 Hacker and
Pierson identify numerous changes in American politics favoring the afflu‑
ent. These include: the growing power of corporate lobbyists via the electoral
process, the embrace of “free market” ideology among political officials, the
erosion of earnings for working and middle‑class families, the growing cost
-
of living due to corporate interests in increasing profits from essential goods,
the decline of American labor due to deindustrialization and failure to enforce
labor law, and the targeting of tax cuts toward the affluent, at the expense of
other income groups. These policies, Hacker and Pierson argue, create pres‑
sure on the masses while producing record inequality.54 They also highlight
the concept of “drift,” defined as “the failure of government to respond to new
economic realities.”55 Drift refers to government failure to prioritize policies
that benefit nonelites. These policies include minimum wage increases at a
time when working poor’s wages are declining due to inflation, efforts to
protect and enforce labor laws against corporations assaulting unions and
unionizing workers, and efforts to regulate growing costs of vital goods such
as food, health care, and education.56
Journalistic Norms: Pro‑Government and Pro‑Business Biases
Scholars find that journalists operate according to standardized routines, val‑

ues, and norms in creating the news. Ryfe identifies journalistic practices that
drive production of news, including balance, detachment, and objectivity.57
Journalistic routines and norms may reinforce pro‑government and
pro‑business biases. Sparrow argues that journalists routinely rely on official
sources because of financial pressures to produce profits within the confines
of daily deadlines. Privileging of officials is seen as standard operating proce‑
dure among reporters, who view government as the agenda setter in political
reporting. Sparrow also cites market pressures as a major force on editors,
who are encouraged to prioritize advertiser interests.58 Bagdikian, Alger, and
others discuss how advertising pressures ensure that media outlets promote
mass consumerism as a dominant societal value.59
Many of the classic observational studies of reporters in the newsroom
frame journalists as biased in their reporting of political and economic issues.
Tuchman’s study found that reporters did not spend significant time searching
for nongovernmental sources, instead depending heavily on official sources.60
Gans stressed the prominence of “known” sources, including presidents and
presidential candidates, federal officials, state and local representatives, who
dominate political stories. Conversely, “unknowns” sometimes make it into
the news, but in cases of extravagant or sensational events, depicted as victims

of crimes or disasters, as voters, and sometimes as protestors. Reporters are
committed to capitalism as a virtuous economic institution, and report stories
within a continuum of expressible views that ranges from liberal to conserva‑
tive.61 Little space remains in the news, Gans argues, for those outside this
continuum of “legitimate” consensus and debate.
Gans claims that “[l]abor strikes are frequently judged negatively, espe‑
cially if they inconvenience ‘the public,’ contribute to inflation, or involve
violence.” Reporters share “an optimistic faith that in the good society, busi‑
nessmen and women will compete with each other in order to create pros‑
perity for all, but that they will refrain from unreasonable profits and gross
exploitation of workers or customers.” “Class groupings” and “class differences
are rarely reported,” and “notions of class conflict are outside the journalis‑
tic repertoire of concepts.”62 Fishman spotlights economic factors, such as
increased story quotas on journalists, for encouraging a turn “to report‑
ing pre‑formulated and prescheduled events in anticipation of a speed‑up
of their production line.” Fishman suggests, “the overall economic logic of
news reporting dictates the minimization of labor costs by understaffing the
newsroom.”63 Fishman, Tuchman, and Gans claim that journalists reinforce
dominant economic ideologies and this focus fits well with a pro‑business
bias in the news.
Objectivity may play a key role in promoting official dominance of
the news. Cook wrote of the “strategic ritual of objectivity,” with journalists
tailoring their reporting to official agendas.64 He argued:
In pursuing objectivity, reporters end up implicitly adding a par‑

ticular bias to the news—a structural bias toward concentration on
the events, ideas, preoccupations, strategies and politics of powerful
officials. The gravitation toward officialdom is what enables the
news media to be not merely political, but governmental.65
Mindich defines “objectivity” as including an “ethic of nonpartisanship” in

which “reporters must offer ‘both sides’ of each story.”66 “Both sides” of a
political issue are defined via official sources, which drive political reporting.
Journalists seek to “balance” their stories by reinforcing a “sphere of legiti‑
mate controversy,” which is limited to the ideologies expressed by political
officials.67 “Balance[d]” journalism “serves the status quo,” as journalists have
“embraced the idea that one can glean the truth by balancing quotes from
figures of authority.”68 Notions of journalistic “balance” and “objectivity”—
when dependent upon political officials to set the news agenda—suggest a
pro‑government bias in the news.
Agenda Building—Applied to Pro‑Government

and Pro‑Business Biases
Scholars express concern that media bias is difficult to measure and demon‑
strate. There is concern with how to demonstrate whether news reporting rep‑
resents “a fair representation of reality.”69 Groeling asks whether bias can be
adequately measured with regard to the process in which reporters focus on
certain stories over others. Measuring bias can be difficult since “a researcher
would have no idea” what potential stories a reporter was exposed to or not.
Could a reporter be selecting some stories over others, in accord with one
type of bias as opposed to some other bias? Fortunately, this problem is not as
intractable as it first seems. Direct interactions between researchers and report‑
ers have produced a number of studies suggesting that certain biases—such as
the pro‑government and pro‑business biases—affect the newsgathering process.
While I argue that pro‑government and pro‑business biases are apparent in
news content, evidence suggests that these biases also influence what types of
stories are marginalized or ignored. Journalists and editors admit to censoring
stories that criticize advertisers for fear of losing advertising profits. On another
level, I argue that market‑based ideas dominate public policy news. This means
that more progressive policy views do not receive much attention in the news,
since these positions are embraced by neither political party. They are filtered
out of policy discussions. These views may not be observed in the news—speak‑
ing to Groeling’s concerns—but their omission is evidence of pro‑business bias.
Evidence suggests that the pro‑government bias also influences how
policy issues are not reported. “Agenda building” refers to the process by
which some political issues are heavily emphasized in the news, while oth‑
ers are neglected, due to the priorities of political officials. Numerous studies
explore how the agenda‑building process influences news content.70 Some
studies document how human rights violations in countries allied with the
U.S. government rarely receive attention in the news, while violations in coun‑
tries designated enemies of the state receive sustained coverage.71 Research
also concludes that, on economic policy, journalists consult some sources far
more than others in deciding which stories to report and which to neglect
or ignore. One survey of reporters, for example, found that political offi‑
cials and business representatives were consulted most often when journal‑
ists decided what constituted legitimate economic news, while other political
actors—academics, labor union representatives, and members of public inter‑
est groups—were rarely consulted.72 In sum, there is little reason to suspect
that pro‑government and pro‑business biases do not influence journalists,
whether one is talking about how some stories are selected and reported, or
how others are marginalized or ignored.
“The Liberal Media”
Some scholars and pundits claim that media are biased against business and
Republican interests, while favoring liberal‑Democratic ones. Conservative
pundits attack journalists for slanting their reporting in a liberal direction
on domestic and foreign policy.73 Sutter challenges the claim that corporate
advertising pressures help censor stories that criticize business and conserva‑
tive interests, suggesting instead that such criticisms attract viewers—thereby
contributing to media corporations’ profits and bottom line.74 Many pundits’
attacks on “the liberal media” are derived from scholarship and watchdog
groups claiming to have uncovered evidence of bias.
The liberal media claim, while popular among pundits and the public,
is not without challenge. Numerous pundits and scholars question alleged lib‑
eral dominance of the media.75 One meta‑analysis of various studies of media
bias concluded that liberal media bias claims were not validated by available
research. Examining presidential election coverage, the meta‑analysis found
that positive and negative media coverage in television and print was evenly
split between Republican and Democratic candidates. The meta‑analysis found
that across numerous elections, “conservative elites’ claims of liberal media
bias appeared in campaign news coverage when the Republican candidate was
receiving relatively favorable coverage.”76 Other studies of media coverage also
find no evidence of liberal or conservative bias.77 Some research suggests a
conservative bias in the news, while others claim that bias varies depending on
the economic context.78 For example, Lee’s analysis of economic reporting from
1958–2004 concludes that ideological biases in the news varied depending on
factors such as inflation, unemployment, and which party was in government.79
Other scholarly research finds that coverage is biased against conserva‑
tives. In The Media Elite, Lichter, Lichter, and Rothman surveyed reporters
and editors from major news venues, comparing their ideology to that of
business leaders. Reporters and editors were characterized as liberal on social
issues, and conservative on economic issues, although less conservative on
economic issues than business leaders. Reporters and editors were also more
likely to describe themselves as liberal, and more likely to cite liberals as
reliable sources on welfare reform, liberal consumer groups as more reliable
on consumer protection issues, and environmental activists as more reliable
on pollution and environmental issues. Reporters were more likely to vote in
elections for Democratic candidates as well.80 Journalists’ Democratic leanings
were also reinforced in more recent surveys.81
Personal biases of reporters may translate into professional biases in
reporting. The Pew Research Center’s 2013 study of same‑sex marriage media
coverage concluded that while 63 percent of news stories were “mixed” in

their outlook on same‑sex marriage, 29 percent were supportive, and just
8 percent were opposed.82 Another Pew study from 2008 found that media
coverage of the presidential primary elections favored Democratic over
Republican candidates. 83 Other studies produce similar findings. Kuypers’s
review of 116 U.S. newspapers found that journalists marginalized far‑left,
moderate, and conservative views, in favor of “a narrow brand of liberal
bias.”84 Lowry concluded that reporting on economic issues was more positive
during President Clinton’s two terms than during President Bush’s terms.85
Schiffer’s analysis of newspaper coverage of Senate election campaigns during
the 1980s and 1990s concluded that news stories expressed a “slant” in favor
of Democratic candidates.86
Other research challenges claims that entertainment programs exhibit
a pro‑business bias. The conservative Media Institute examined two hundred
primetime programs on the three broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC),
concluding that “two of three businessmen are shown as foolish, greedy or
criminal, and that almost half of all work activities performed by business‑
men involve illegal acts.”87 Thomas and LeShay concurred with the Media
Institute’s findings, arguing that fictional programs on the major networks
“routinely” portray the “upper class” as “engaging in a greater amount of
negative behavior” than the “working class.” The authors qualified their study,
however, explaining that it is “wealth, not business leaders,” that “has consis‑
tently been portrayed negatively in popular media.”88
The highest‑profile recent study to allege a liberal media bias was
authored by political scientist Tim Groseclose. Groseclose argues that Ameri‑
can journalists lie far to the left of the public. His study measures news refer‑
ences to liberal and conservative think tanks, research groups, and activist
and advocacy organizations, comparing that reporting to Democratic and
Republican references to these groups in the Congressional Record database.
Measuring “political quotients” for both a wide variety of media outlets and
members of Congress, he found that reporters were more likely than members
of Congress to cite liberal groups in the news.89 Groseclose’s study, however,
was also contested by political scientists and media scholars regarding alleged
methodological flaws and unrealistic measurement expectations.90 By itself,
Groseclose’s study does not definitely “prove” liberal media bias, but it does
suggest that discussions of liberal bias remain highly relevant.
Distrust of “the liberal media” is related in significant part to the con‑
sistent efforts of conservative media pundits to convince cable and radio audi‑
ences that journalists are biased. Constant discussion of bias is correlated
with growing perceptions of bias, so conservative pundits’ fixation on this
issue seems to be fueling perceptions of bias.91 Furthermore, bias is often

in the eye of the beholder, with conservatives perceiving liberal media bias
more often than liberals. This trend appears to be due in large part to the
sustained conservative campaign to convince conservative Americans of such
a bias.92 Scholars should not ignore these trends in popular commentary and
in public thought, especially when powerful forces such as political officials
and pundits are responsible for driving them.
Pluralism and Citizen Empowerment in the News
The “pluralist” model of reporting claims that media include a diversity of

sources, governmental and nongovernmental, in the news. Variants of the
pluralism theory argue that the media empower citizens throughout the news
production process. Dahl stood at the forefront of the pluralist school of
American politics. In Who Governs? Dahl studied a single urban locale, New
Haven, Connecticut, in an attempt to understand the nature of power in the
city’s governing structure. He was concerned with whether “the way in which
political resources are distributed encourage oligarchy or pluralism?” Within
a pluralist democracy, Dahl claimed, “the relationship between leaders and
citizens . . . is frequently reciprocal: leaders influence the decisions of con‑
 
 
 
 
stituents, but the decisions of leaders are also determined in part by what
they think are, will be, or have been the preferences of their constituents.”93
While Dahl did not emphasize nongovernmental actors in the political
process, an emerging literature focuses on whether reporters allow for differ‑
ent interests, including labor groups, business interests, public interest groups,
and other nongovernmental actors, to gain meaningful access to the news.
News coverage of the anti–corporate globalization movement is described as
pluralistic because of the significant influence exercised by protest groups.
Rojecki sketches a picture of “a much more favorable media environment for
the anti‑globalization movement” than previously thought, tracing an “initial
focus on surface features [of the 1999 WTO protest]—costumes and stunts,”
that “quickly deepened to the underlying issues they symbolized.” Rojecki
highlighted reporters’ interest in attacks on the WTO as “undemocratic,”
“cloaked in secrecy,” “pandering to business interests,” and characterizations
of the organization as intent on global “domination,” “imperialist interven‑
tion,” and promoting “profits uber alles.”94 Other studies of anti–corporate
globalization protests presented evidence of favorable coverage for groups
challenging corporate power, even allowing protestors to overshadow govern‑
ment and business officials in some instances.95
Public interest groups’ success in receiving media attention appears to

be influenced by the strength of the groups in question. Thrall emphasizes
that interest groups’ success in gained media coverage is based on groups’ size
and economic resources. A group’s level of news coverage depends on factors
such as money, staff size, reputation, expertise, and name recognition.96 While
many interest groups are at a disadvantage due to difficulty in raising large
sums of money, many are able to compensate for this weakness by attracting
larger numbers of members—in the process securing greater media attention.
Recent examples of public interest group successes in gaining media attention
include: Occupy Wall Street, the 2011 Madison Wisconsin labor protestors,
the Tea Party, environmentalists, the gay and lesbian rights movement, and
protests in New York City and Ferguson, Missouri, over police brutality.
How successful are labor unions and their members and representatives
at gaining attention in the news? Labor union membership fell to historic
lows by the late twentieth to early twenty‑first century, but studies suggest
unions were at times successful in garnering sympathetic media coverage.
One example is the 1997 UPS strike. While the duration of strikes is his‑
torically a significant factor for unions when it comes to receiving increased
media coverage, public outreach efforts—as seen in the UPS strike—may
also matter.97 In his study of the 1997 UPS strike, Martin presented evidence
that “many mainstream news media dropped their typical consumer‑oriented
frames for telling stories about labor and instead presented a range of opin‑
ions about the status of part‑time workers in the economy [a major com‑
plaint of UPS workers was the shortage of full‑time jobs available from the
company], the years of downsizing at U.S. corporations, and the question
of fair wages.”98 As Martin found, however, labor victories (such as at UPS)
may be episodic, limited to specific events, and failing to challenge long‑term
hegemonic trends in the news.99 Nonetheless, Martin’s study suggested that
workers can successfully organize in order to receive more sympathetic news
coverage. Similarly, Ryan’s analysis of the UPS strike concluded that cover‑
age represented a collective victory for labor, exploring how workers came
together to exploit various “cracks” or “narrow opportunities” in news report‑
ing, promoting a positive image of labor as needing a raise and deserving
fairer working conditions.100
Kumar’s study of the UPS strikes adds more nuance and depth to previ‑
ous studies, yet still suggests there is room in the news for nongovernmental
actors. In the strike, Teamsters succeeded in “breaking through” to main‑
stream America, gaining sympathy from the public, although there was some
resistance from various media.101 Kumar found USA Today and NBC to be
the least sympathetic to the UPS strike, relying overwhelmingly on shallow

coverage that failed to examine strikers’ grievances. The Washington Post and
CBS were somewhere in between—not necessarily antagonistic to strikers but
not emphasizing worker grievances either. Finally, the New York Times and
ABC were the most open to workers’ interests, although hardly crusading for
their cause. The New York Times was more likely to quote Teamster sources,
for example, than USA Today and the Washington Post, while ABC was more
likely to stress the public’s sympathy with strikers. NBC was more likely to
emphasize sporadic picket line violence, in a sensationalistic manner.102
Beyond strike coverage, other pluralistic studies suggest significant
space in reporting for citizen groups. Berry presented evidence that interest
groups play an important role in influencing the news. He sampled television
newscasts in the mid 1990s from ABC, CBS, CNN, and NBC, finding that
-
interest groups were referenced 847 times in the 295 newscasts, or 2.9 times
per newscast.103 Citizens groups were included in newscasts even more often
than business groups or trade associations.104 Berry concluded that, based on
his results, there is an “enormous over‑representation of citizen groups” in
news coverage, despite the fact that “they are but a small part of the lobby‑
ing population.”105
Grossmann also presents evidence of a significant public interest group
presence in the news. He argues that “advocacy organizations and the media
rely on one another to set the political agenda and engage in debate over
major public issues.” Factors such as the “size of the political staff ” and “mem‑
bership” for interest groups, “the age of the organization,” and the “breadth
of its agenda,” are significant predictors of media attention.106 Berry’s and
Grossman’s findings reinforce the pluralist theory by suggesting that citizen
group activism results in greater attention to their messages in the news.
Finally, other research suggests news outlets fulfill a pluralistic func‑
tion by “giving the public what it wants” in political reporting. These schol‑
ars describe a “demand side” model of reporting, arguing that consumer
demand for news content drives the creation of content. Studies by Hamilton,
Gentzkow, and Shapiro suggest that news outlets tailor the alleged slants in
reporting to readers’ ideological preferences, while Hamilton suggests that the
decline of traditional “hard news” stories is the result of declining public inter‑
est in such stories.107 In The People’s News, Uscinski claims that public politi‑
cal preferences cause ideological biases in the news.108 Changes in American
partisanship (the percent of people identifying with one party or another)
produce a change in how often journalists report issues that are more likely
to be “owned” by one party or the other. Issue ownership refers to certain
issues that are seen as more credibly dealt with by one party. For example,
civil liberties and welfare issues are deemed the province of Democrats, and
national security and law and order issues are “owned” by Republicans. Uscin‑
ski’s findings suggest that journalists empower the public to influence the
types of issues appearing in the news and how they are reported.
The Bad News Bias
The final theory claims that a bad news bias pervades the news. This theory
contends that journalists are heavily critical of government, overemphasiz‑
ing negativity in political stories. Officials supposedly encounter difficulties
promoting their agendas in the news, due to the critical coverage produced
by reporters.
The bad news theory is supported by numerous scholars. Cohen
claims that coverage of presidents has become increasingly negative over the
decades.109 Patterson contends that reporting on elections from the 1960s
through the 1990s grew progressively more negative in covering candidates.
Increasing negativity produced an increase in voters’ skepticism of the can‑
didates.110 Studies of election advertisements and news coverage also docu‑
ment growing negativity.111 Other research links consumption of news with
increased negativity on the part of audiences. Hetherington finds evidence
of a “negative economic news bias dating at least to the Carter presidency.”
In the 1992 presidential election, he concludes, “the more news voters con‑
sumed and the closer they followed the campaign through the media, the
worse their retrospective assessments of the economy were.”112 Another study
finds that the frequency of negative reporting on the economy is linked to
the unemployment level, the rate of change of unemployment, and fluctua‑
tions in inflation.113
According to bad news scholars, journalists limit political leaders’ poli‑
cymaking powers. For example, media critics attack journalists for supposedly
undermining support for U.S. wars. The conservative Media Research Center
reviewed coverage of the Iraq war from the major broadcast networks, and
concluded that reporting was “overwhelmingly pessimistic,” with terrorist
attacks “the centerpiece of TV’s war news.”114 Another study by Baum and
Groeling depicted television news as overrepresenting within‑party criticisms
of the president, and underrepresenting across‑party praise for the president
during times of war. Overreporting of within‑party disagreements, they con‑
tend, turns members of the president’s party against the president, since these
partisans see within‑party attacks as novel and noteworthy, in contrast to
criticisms coming from the other party, which are seen as less interesting
“cheap talk.”115
Research on domestic policy reporting also claims a bad news bias.

Groeling claims that journalists overreport criticisms occurring within the
president’s party on domestic policy. Criticisms from within the president’s
party account for most of the comments about the president in the news.116
Because of this negativity, Groeling claims that unified party control of gov‑
ernment is, paradoxically, detrimental to the president’s agenda.117 Attention
to the news, he finds, produces growing public cynicism toward the presi‑
dent’s party, undermining its ability to govern.118
Other studies implicate journalists in disseminating bad news. Lichter
and Noyes emphasize the dominance of “hate campaign journalism,” which
is aided by the “media’s persistent negativism.”119 Lichter and Noyes evaluate
the tone of television network economic coverage during the 1992 presidential
campaign, concluding that “negative assessments of the state of the economy
outweighed positive ones—in election and non‑election stories alike,” with
negative economic evaluations accounting for 87 percent of all economic
assessments.120 Kerbel claims that bad news overwhelmed good news in presi‑
dential campaigns from the 1980s onward, with television news becoming
more critical, more sound‑bite‑oriented, and increasingly scandal‑oriented.121
Farnsworth’s and Lichter’s analysis of presidential campaigns from 1988 to
2000 concluded that negative media assessments of candidates increased from
1988 to 2000, overshadowing positive assessments. News stories became less
issue‑oriented, with sound bites being increasingly critical of presidential
candidates.122
Another type of bad news research suggests that journalists fixate on
strategic angles in news stories, thereby fostering public cynicism. Cappella
and Jamieson argue that strategic news frames are increasingly common,
and that these frames prime audiences into accepting cynical assessments of
the political process. Strategic frames “draw the audiences’ attention to the
motivations of the people depicted . . . with the focus of strategic coverage
 
 
 
 
squarely on winning and losing and the self‑interest implied by this orienta‑
tion, the traits activated are likely to be negative ones indicative of artifice,
pandering, deceit, staging, and positioning for advantage—in general, mis‑
trustfulness.”123 In other words, strategic news frames foster increased pub‑
lic cynicism toward government.124 Such cynicism is thought to be a direct
product of the bad news bias.
Finally, some research in sociology and political science suggests that
a bad news bias is prominent in reporting of economic trends, crime and
anticrime policy, and in the war on terrorism. According to Lowry, news
stories on negative economic trends are significantly longer than stories on
positive economic developments.125 Research on reporting of crime finds that
journalists overestimate the frequency of crime in their stories. Their fixation

on crime coincided with official efforts to “get tough on crime” in the 1980s
and 1990s, despite evidence suggesting that violent crime rates were either
holding steady or declining. Entertainment programs also oversaturate audi‑
ences with violent images, and exaggerate the number of murders that occur
compared to the actual murder rate.126 “Cultivation” research concludes that
heavy media consumers—particularly heavy television viewers—are more
likely to be distrustful of others and to overestimate the crime rate, likely
because of programming saturated with violence.127
Regarding terrorism, numerous studies identify the prevalence of fear‑
ful rhetoric among political officials. These studies spotlight the influence of
fearful rhetoric in quieting public dissent against government and building
support for U.S. foreign policy.128 In summary, the above findings suggest that
a bad news bias, whether related to crime or terrorism, works to reinforce
official agendas.
Evaluating Alternative Theories of Bias
Each of the five theories of bias might account for media coverage of eco‑
nomic policy debates. Whether one (or a few) of the theories is more helpful
than others in predicting news coverage can only be determined by empirical
inquiry. I am aware of no systematic scholarly effort to assess all five theories
alongside each other, and with regard to economic policy issues. By looking
at more than twenty years of economic policy debates, I address this gap in
media research.
2
Split Party Government and

Reporting on the Minimum Wage, 1996 and 2007
I present three findings in this chapter. First, a symbiotic relationship exists

between journalists and officials. Reporters secure access to official sources
by privileging their voices in the news, while officials benefit from the oppor‑
tunity to sell their viewpoints to the public. Second, political parties are vital
to shaping the news. The years 1996 and 2007 were defined by split party
government, leading journalists to index their reporting to reflect the battle
for influence between Democrats and Republicans. Neither party fully domi‑
nated the news, although the partisan composition of government influenced
the biases evident in the news. Third, the minimum wage case studies suggest
an indirect business influence on the news. Reporters did not favor business
sources and Republicans over Democrats and organized labor, but discussions
of the minimum wage were defined by a rightward drift, evident in growing
business power over workers via the declining value of working‑class wages.
Journalists operate in a political‑economic environment that recognizes this
rightward drift as legitimate, since it has occurred under both Democratic
and Republican governments.
I conclude by addressing concerns about the quality of media delibera‑
tion in the United States. With the marginalization of public interest groups,
citizens, and other nongovernmental sources from the news, Americans are
left to hope that officials will do a sufficient job in representing the public
interest. By neglecting public voices, journalists artificially limit democratic
deliberation by truncating debates on political issues to restatements of the
views of a small number of political elites.
39
The Politics of the Minimum Wage
Democrats and Republicans disagree on the minimum wage. In 1996, Repub‑

lican House Majority Leader Dick Armey promised his chamber would “not
enact legislation that would kill jobs,” in reference to conservative claims that
the minimum wage negatively impacts employment.1 In contrast, President
Clinton’s secretary of labor Robert Reich reminded Americans that “11 million
workers earn less than $5.15 an hour, yet some Republicans still claim that they
don’t need a raise.”2 Republicans oppose raising the minimum wage without
accompanying tax cuts to offset the costs of a higher wage for small businesses.
They claim that minimum wage increases cause inflation and higher unem‑
ployment. Democrats frame wage increases as necessary for fighting poverty,
in light of the deteriorating purchasing power of the minimum wage that
results from inflation. Contrary to Armey’s claims, Democratic Representative
Jack Quinn stressed that “[p]eople who work a 40‑hour week ought to make
a wage they can live on. The minimum wage hasn’t been increased in seven
years. Even welfare pays much more. We must correct this so people are not
forced to choose between work and supporting their families.”3
While the parties disagree on the minimum wage, the role of journalists
in reporting this remains significant. Did reporters balance the views of both
parties on this issue? Or were they biased in favor of liberal or conservative
views? Alternatively, are media so diverse in their coverage that one cannot
generalize across the news venues in question?
Competing Perspectives Reviewed
Supporters of the minimum wage embrace raising the wage floor for the
working poor in an era of growing inequality.4 The minimum wage “redis‑
tributes” resources by requiring employers and business owners to increase
what they pay low‑income workers.5 Research suggests that states raising their
minimum wage in the 2000s saw the median income for food service workers
increase, in contrast to a decrease in wages in non–minimum wage–raising
states after inflation. These effects were not accompanied by any significant
decrease in employment.6 Increased incomes for food service workers sug‑
gest a redistributive effect of the minimum wage from business owners to
lower‑wage employees. Other studies found similar effects for the minimum
wage. The 1996–97 federal increase, for example, impacted 9.9 million work‑
ers.7 The 2007 wage increase affected nearly 15 million workers.8 Thus, the
Split Party Government 41
effects of wage increases on workers’ incomes are the main defense cited by
supporters when they speak of the need to raise the minimum wage.
Critics contend that the minimum wage inadvertently fails to redistrib‑
ute wealth from businesses to workers. Conceding that minimum wage raises
increase low‑income workers’ pay, Neumark finds that raises are also associ‑
ated with increased unemployment.9 What good is mandating higher pay,
critics claim, if it results in Americans losing jobs? According to opponents, as
wage increases are mandated by government, employers either lay off workers
or fail to hire new ones to replace outgoing workers, in order to offset the
costs of wage increases. Neumark’s findings are echoed by numerous econo‑
mists, and across many countries.10 Some economists describe markets as
influenced by the “elasticity” of demand for labor—with the “average estimate”
of a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage causing a 5 percent increase
in unemployment.11 A 2014 report by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
concluded that raising the national minimum wage from $7.25 to $10.10—
which was endorsed by President Barack Obama—will lift nearly one million
families from poverty and increase the incomes of 16.5 million workers, but
could cost the country 500,000 jobs. The CBO warned of uncertainty in the
estimate, however, since it concluded that job loss could range from a high
of one million jobs lost to a low of no job loss.12
Economists also maintain that increases in the minimum wage cause
inflation, since businesses offset the cost of wage increases by increasing the
cost of goods and services. This phenomenon relates to the Phillips curve,
which ties increased wages to increased prices for goods.13 What good is a
minimum wage increase, critics ask, if the growth in purchasing power is
offset by increased cost of living and growing prices for goods and services?
Claims made by minimum wage critics are also heavily contested.
Numerous studies question the allegedly harmful effects of the minimum
wage on workers. Card and Krueger’s study, Myth and Measurement, found
no negative employment effects in the fast food industry for states raising the
minimum wage compared to neighboring states that failed to raise their wages.
Subsequent studies reinforced Card and Krueger’s conclusion.14 Meta‑studies,
reviewing dozens of previous minimum wage studies, find either no negative
employment effects or minimal effects.15
Some also question the alleged connection between the minimum wage
and inflation. One study suggests that “the potential impact of minimum
wage hikes on the overall price level is simply too small to have any appre‑
ciable impact on inflation.”16 Furthermore, there appears to be no significant
relationship between the value of the minimum wage and the inflation rate
in the post–World War II era.17 These findings raise questions about whether
concerns with the minimum wage causing inflation are exaggerated.
Scholars also challenge the claims that the minimum wage hurts small
businesses and that it is ineffective in reducing poverty, due to the supposed
fact that young, part‑time workers are said to be the main beneficiaries. If
young part‑time workers without children disproportionately benefit, then
adults in need (lower‑income heads of household) will not benefit from a
wage increase. Numerous studies, however, find no significant relationship
between minimum wage increases and business failure rates in states that
raise wages.18 Available data also suggest that workers earning the minimum
wage are primarily adults working full‑time as the primary income sources
for themselves and their families, not teenagers seeking part‑time income.19
On the other hand, many economists continue producing studies suggesting
that minimum wage raises increase unemployment.20
The above data suggest that there is much disagreement on the alleged
effects of the minimum wage. The issue is somewhat complex, especially to
lay audiences and nonexperts, with regard to assessing the minimum wage’s
benefits and drawbacks. Ambiguity is evident in the scholarly community as
well. One survey of hundreds of members of the American Economic Asso‑
ciation (AEA) found that 46 percent agreed that “minimum wages increase
unemployment among young and unskilled workers,” whereas 27 percent did
not agree.21 A 2006 survey found that nearly 38 percent of AEA members sup‑
ported increasing the minimum wage; 14 percent preferred to keep it at the
2006 level, and 47 percent preferred to eliminate the minimum wage entirely.22
In other words, economists are split between those who favor the minimum
wage’s abolition, and those who favor maintaining or strengthening it.
Due to their lack of policy expertise, Americans rely heavily on the
media to inform them about major policy debates. Media outlets serve as
a forum for the discussion of the possible benefits or drawbacks of policy
proposals. Political leaders utilize media to communicate the promised ben‑
efits of their proposals to the public. The minimum wage is one such policy
topic that has the potential to reach large segments of the public. Whether
political leaders build public support for or opposition to the minimum wage
may depend on the tone of news reports.
The Political Debate, 1996 and 2007
The 1996 and 2007 minimum wage debates were marked by intense partisan
conflict. Story headlines conveyed the gravity of the disputes. Some examples
from 1996 include: “Republicans Seeking to Counter Democrats over the

Minimum Wage” (New York Times), “House Leaders Say They’ll Block Mini‑
mum Wage Increase; Suggest Tax Breaks for Business and Working Families
Instead” (CBS), “Democrats Refuse to Consider Gas Tax Repeal Without
Vote on Minimum Wage Hike” (CBS), “White House Rips Bid to Cut Gas
Tax” (Sun Times), and “GOP Blocks House Push for Minimum Wage Vote”
(Sun Times). Fighting was also evident in 2007, as this sample of headlines
suggests: “Effort to Move on Minimum Wage Bill in Senate Falters” (NYT),
“[Republican] Tax Measure Could be a Stumbling Block for Minimum Wage
Legislation” (NYT), “Republicans Decry Politics of Democratic Legislation”
(Fox News), and “Senate Debates Proposed Minimum Wage Increase” (CBS).
The conflict over the 1996 wage increase took place at a time when
the inflation‑adjusted value of the wage reached a forty‑year low.23 Demo‑
cratic president Bill Clinton pushed for a series of increases in the minimum
wage, despite the Democrats’ lack of majority control in Congress. Due to
split partisan control of government, reports spoke of an ongoing “gridlock,”
which eventually culminated with the 1996 federal government shutdown
over budgetary conflicts between Democrats and Republicans.24 Disagree‑
ments over a minimum wage raise produced antagonistic rhetoric from both
parties. Efforts by Democratic senators Tom Daschle and Edward Kennedy to
force a vote on the minimum wage were met with resistance by Republican
presidential candidate Bob Dole, among other Republicans, who sought to
block a final vote by including numerous add‑on bills to minimum wage
legislation that complicated a simple “yes‑no” vote. Interested in a compro‑
mise, Clinton supported a bill that included both the Democrats’ minimum
wage increase and Republican tax cuts for businesses and consumers. Clin‑
ton’s role as a mediator between the parties was limited, however, since he
denounced Republicans’ proposed add‑on legislation allowing employers to
avoid cooperating with union leaders regarding basic workplace activities.
Clinton denounced this bill, known as the “Team Act,” as a “poison pill”
aimed at “undermining workers’ rights,” and Democratic opposition ensured
that the legislation would not be seriously considered alongside any discus‑
sion of business tax cuts and a minimum wage increase.25
Partisan battles in Washington continued throughout the first half of
1996, receiving regular media coverage. Eventually, both parties came to a
compromise that included tax cuts and minimum wage increases for two
different years. The resulting bill, titled “The Small Business Job Protection
Act of 1996,” was signed into law on August 20, 1996, after a reconciliation
process between both the House of Representatives and Senate to iron out
differences between competing versions of the bill. The bill included, among
other tax cuts, “relief for small businesses,” intended to offset the costs of an
increased minimum wage. The bill included two increases in the minimum
wage, raising it from the previous $4.25 to $4.75 an hour by October 1,
1996, and to $5.15 by September 1, 1997. Although political debate over the
minimum wage was intense, both parties eventually reached a compromise
that promised benefits to both Democrats’ labor constituency and Republi‑
can‑supported businesses.
Minimum Wage Redux, 2007
The 2007 conflict over the minimum wage was similar in many respects to
the 1996 debate. Democrats supported an increase, and Republicans warned
that it would hurt workers and business. After narrowly capturing majority
control in the House and Senate following the 2006 midterm elections, Demo‑
crats introduced a “100 Hour Plan” in January 2007, proposing legislation on
the minimum wage, lobbying rules in Washington, deficit reduction, student
loans, and prescription drug prices.
Support for, and opposition to the minimum wage was defined accord‑
ing to the contours of 1996 debate. Republican opposition this time around
was less fierce than in 1996. Whereas only 8 percent of all House Republicans
vowed to support a minimum wage increase in 1996, approximately 40 per‑
cent supported a minimum wage bill in 2007.26 Such “support,” however, was
overstated. As in 1996, Senate Republicans refused to pass a minimum wage
bill without granting billions in tax cuts to businesses, ignoring Democrats’
calls for a “clean bill” containing only a wage increase.27 President Bush also
insisted that tax cuts be included in any minimum wage bill.28 As with the
1996 conflict, the 2007 fight over the minimum wage endured until midyear,
when Democrats attached a minimum wage increase accompanied by busi‑
ness tax cuts to a supplemental war funding bill. The final bill, titled “The
U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Account‑
ability Appropriations Act, 2007,” was passed on May 25, 2007. The legislation
increased the minimum wage from $5.15 to $5.85 an hour by July 2007, to
$6.55 by July 2008, and to $7.25 by July 2009.
In short, the 2007 minimum wage debate was remarkably similar to the
1996 debate in terms of the ideological parameters, regarding the substance
of legislation passed, and considering that both debates lingered for months
until passage. No two legislative debates are exactly the same, however. With
the 2007 debate, President Bush played a less antagonistic role (rhetorically
at least), compared to Bob Dole in 1996. Bush announced qualified sup‑
port for raising the minimum wage, if the increase were accompanied by tax
cuts. Furthermore, Bush was largely focused on other issues in 2007, includ‑
ing opposition to Democrats’ calls for withdrawal from Iraq. With Bush’s
abdication on the minimum wage, and considering the rapid nature of the
Democrats’ “100 Hour” initiative, one might expect to see a somewhat larger
advantage for Democrats, amid a general balancing of reports between both
parties due to split party government.
Competing Frames in Official Rhetoric
In examining the debates between political officials, I included frames

expressed by both parties. The frames were drawn from the arguments dis‑
cussed above, but expressed by prominent political leaders. These frames were
confirmed as relevant to political discourse primarily through an extensive
reading of presidential speeches and legislative statements in the Congressio-
nal Record, and secondarily by reviewing news stories covering the minimum
wage in both periods.
For those opposing the minimum wage, the main frames included:
(1) The “Unemployment Effects” frame, which contended that increasing the
minimum wage would cause a loss in employment among low‑pay workers.29
This narrative was articulated by officials such as Republican House Majority
Whip Tom Delay and House Republican Majority Leader Dick Armey, among
others;30 (2) The “Tax Cuts” frame, including discussions of business taxes
and the need to cut taxes to offset the cost of higher wages to businesses.31
This narrative was popular, for example, with Republican presidential can‑
didate and senator Bob Dole, who in 1996 proposed repealing the gas tax
to offset supposed negative economic effects of raising the minimum wage,
and President Bush and Congressional Republicans in 2007, who supported
cutting taxes on small businesses;32 (3) The “Labor Pandering” frame, which
included derogatory references to Democrats as under the control of workers
and unions.33 Examples included Republican representative Delay’s suggestion
that “big labor” pressured Democrats for a “sudden push for an increase in
the minimum wage,” and Dole’s accusation that President Clinton only raised
the minimum wage issue because of pressure from the A.F.L.‑C.I.O.34
For minimum wage supporters, major frames included claims related to
working‑class Americans, inflation and cost of living issues, and unemploy‑
ment concerns. More specifically, they included: (1) The “No Unemployment
Effects” frame, which challenged the notion that minimum wage increases
cause higher unemployment.35 This position was expressed by President Bill
Clinton, Labor Secretary Robert Reich, and the Department of Labor;36 (2)
The “Common Man” frame, which referred to families in need, workers, and
the persistence of poverty.37 References to working‑class mothers, fathers,
and children were common in the rhetoric of Democratic officials such as
President Clinton and Democratic House Representative and Education and
Labor Committee chairman George Miller, among others;38 and (3) The “Stag‑
nation‑Inflation” frame, referring to workers’ stagnating‑to‑declining wages
due to inflation.39 President Clinton articulated this point, stressing that the
minimum wage had reached a forty‑year low in inflation‑adjusted value by
the mid‑1990s, while other Democrats focused on the growing cost of living
amid declining wages.40
Framing the Minimum Wage
Assessing the frequency of these frames, one finds a bipartisan pro‑government

bias in the news. As Table 2.1 suggests, reporters consistently addressed both
Table 2.1. The Minimum Wage (1/1–8/31/1996): Competing Frames

in the News
NYT Sun Times CBS

(as % of

Pro Frames all frames)

No Unemployment Effects 4 3 6

Common Man 30 32 32

Stagnation‑Inflation 16 15 9

Total Democratic Frames 50 50 47

(as a % of all frames
appearing in the news)
Con Frames
Unemployment Effects 15 18 14

Labor Pandering 4 4 8

Taxes/Tax Cuts 31 28 31

Total Republican Frames 50 50 53


liberal and conservative partisan perspectives in nearly equal numbers of

stories in the New York Times, Chicago Sun Times, and CBS in 1996. Neither
Democratic nor Republican frames, in aggregate, monopolized reporting.
Neither liberal nor conservative frames appeared at least twenty percentage
points more often than the other. In total, Republican frames accounted for
50 percent, 50 percent, and 47 percent of all frames that appeared in the New
York Times, Chicago Sun Times, and CBS respectively. Democratic frames
comprised 50 percent, 50 percent, and 53 percent of all frames appearing in
the news. Journalists consulted “both sides” of the partisan debate over the
minimum wage raging in Washington.41
Reporters consistently sought to include both supporters and opponents
of the minimum wage increase in the news. Officials such as Republican
presidential candidate Bob Dole, and Clinton Labor Secretary Robert Reich
argued over whether minimum wage increases unemployment. Economists
also presented their own evidence cutting in both directions.42 While the New
York Times reported on “an inconclusive statistical battle over whether the
move [raising the minimum wage] will hurt more workers than it helps,”43
this statement was belied by the media outlets that examined reporting claims
that the minimum wage increases unemployment between 2 to 6 times more
often than challenges to that claim. This imbalance did not translate into an
overall privileging of Republican over Democratic frames, however, when
taking into account the frequency of all the competing frames in the news.
Democrats focused on American families and workers seeking higher
pay, and promised a higher minimum wage would reduce poverty. Report‑
ing that fit within this frame was evident in headlines such as: “Increase in
Minimum Wage Could Help 190,000 in Illinois,” (Chicago Sun Times), “Single
Working Moms Fight Outdated System” (Chicago Sun Times), “Workers Raise
Their Voices, Push for Minimum Wage Hike” (Chicago Sun Times), and “Clin‑
ton Urges Action on Bills to Create Jobs and Lift Incomes” (New York Times).
Reporters at times focused on workers and working‑class families. Demo‑
cratic officials highlighted the troubles “working men and women are having
[with] making ends meet,” and chastised Republicans for “lock[ing] out work‑
ing families” by opposing a higher minimum wage.44 Reporting emphasized
Democratic efforts to “ensure a sturdier sense of security for workers” at a
time when “job security may be a thing of the past.”45
Reporting also included Republican counterattacks on organized labor.
Republican condemnations of “labor bosses” appeared alongside attacks on
the Democrats for falling hostage to union interests.46 Republicans framed the
proposed wage raise as “nothing but a political act of appeasement” of “big
labor,” intended “to make the leaders of organized labor happy.”47 Such attacks
reached incendiary levels when National Republican Congressional Commit‑

tee spokesman Craig Veith warned that organized labor was embarking upon
“probably the biggest overt power grab in history.” The claim was inaccurate
historically, as labor union membership by the 1990s had reached its low‑
est level since World War II, and the value of the minimum wage was at its
lowest in decades. Nonetheless, Republican polemics were likely to mobilize
conservatives in the party.
The final set of frames pitted discussions of wage stagnation against a
focus on tax cuts for businesses. Democrats emphasized the historical decline
of workers’ earnings, with the Clinton administration emphasizing that “the
real value of the minimum wage” was moving “closer and closer to a 40‑year
low.”48 This approach was largely pragmatic—seen by a Clinton advisor as
one of many “pocketbook issues” relevant to workers.49 Journalists at times
consulted labor representatives who drew attention to “the stagnation of real
wages,” which were “frozen for many years” in light of government failure to
raise the minimum wage.50 Labor Secretary Robert Reich portrayed stagnating
wages through a class conflict lens: “The C.E.O.’s of America’s major corpo‑
rations got a 23 percent raise last year—an average compensation of nearly
$4.5 million each. . . . Why can’t we give 90 cents more an hour to millions
 
 
 
 
of our nation’s lowest paid workers?”51
Conversely, Republican discussions focused on taxes for business inter‑
ests and consumers. Dole stressed that a gas tax cut was “the most certain
way to give consumers relief,” while Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich
lambasted union organizers for pushing Democrats to support a wage raise
that would “hurt a lot of small businesses and you’re going to end up with
400,000 or more people out of work who would otherwise have a job.”52 Dole
promised a “pro‑growth tax agenda,” expounded upon by House leaders Dick
Armey and Newt Gingrich, which included “a combination of tax breaks for
business and working families.”53
2007 Minimum Wage Frames
Minimum wage reporting in 2007 balanced the ideological positions of both

parties, although the results were somewhat less even than coverage in 1996.
In most of the outlets examined in Table 2.2, Republican and Democrat‑
ic frames failed to dominate by more than twenty percentage points.54 In
only one news organization, MSNBC, did coverage lean toward Democratic
sources by more than 20 percentage points. In short, journalists tailored their
frames to both parties’ positions, rather than demonstrating a conservative
or liberal bias.

in the News
NYT Sun Times CBS Fox MSNBC

(as % of


No Unemployment Effects
9 0 11 0 0

Common Man 25 33 11 27 50

Stagnation Inflation 20 12 0 16 25
-

Total Democratic 54 45 22 43 75

Frames
(as a % of all
frames appearing
in the news)

Con Frames

Unemployment Effects 17 22 0 8 0

Labor Pandering 0 0 0 0 0

Taxes/Tax Cuts 29 33 78 49 25

Total Republican 46 55 78 57 25

Frames (as a % of
all frames appearing
in the news)

Number of news stories 14 3 21 45 16

analyzed
Analysis excludes op‑eds and editorials
Attention to the Republican “unemployment effects” frame, as in 1996,

outnumbered attention to the Democratic “no unemployment effects” frame,
suggesting that the “unemployment effects” frame was well established among
many journalists. This point was expressed by the New York Times, which
“revisit[ed]” the “minimum wage axiom” (emphasis added) that raising
the minimum wage causes job losses: “[E]conomists still maintain that the
axiom is true,” since “most economists believe that imposing a minimum
wage will generally increase joblessness at the bottom.”55 However, when
debates over whether the minimum wage increases unemployment were
reported, stories referenced prominent economists, including challengers to
the “unemployment effects” “axiom,” such as Alan Krueger and David Card,

and defenders such as David Neumark.56
As with 1996, the 2007 analysis finds that the “labor pandering” frame
was marginalized in reporting. In contrast, the “common man” frame was
fairly common. The Republican “tax cut” frame, however, received the most
attention of all frames for four of five media outlets. This prominence rein‑
forced President Bush’s and other Republicans’ emphasis on tax cuts being
included in wage legislation. In one example of the tax cut frame, House
Republican and ranking member of the Education and Labor Committee
Howard McKeon stated that “[t]he Democratic leadership’s unbalanced pro‑
posal may increase the minimum wage, but it leaves small businesses and
their workers to fend for themselves.” McKeon introduced a “competing mini‑
mum wage bill,” the New York Times reported, “that include[d] billions of
dollars in tax breaks” that “would allow faster depreciation for newly built
restaurants,” among other tax cuts.57 These cuts, Republicans promised, pro‑
vided “relief for small businesses that might face increased labor costs.” As
McKeon argued, “the small businessmen we are trying to help for the most
part are little guys.”58
While Republicans were focused on business profits, Democrats
emphasized the working poor. For example, the New York Times emphasized
the announcement by Democratic representative and chairman of the House
Education and Labor Committee George Miller that “it is a moral outrage
that millions of Americans who work full time still live in poverty.”59 The
Chicago Sun Times quoted Miller’s claim that “for 10 years the lowest‑paid
Americans have been frozen out” in light of their stagnating earnings and
the failure to raise the minimum wage.60 Cable news coverage, although often
characterized as catering to either liberal or conservative audiences, explored
both Republican and Democratic sides of the debate. Fox News, while devot‑
ing more time to Republican frames, still made a clear effort to discuss Dem‑
ocratic perspectives. MSNBC, in contrast, privileged Democratic positions,
which comprised 75 percent of all frames appearing in stories run by the
organization. MSNBC prioritized Democratic voices such as the “common
man” frame and discussions of working families. For example, Democratic
strategist Steve Harding was interviewed on the Tucker program, celebrating
the Democratic policies as “moving the American family forward, that give
opportunity to people, that give people hope again.”61 On Hardball with Chris
Matthews, the late Elizabeth Edwards (wife of Democratic vice presiden‑
tial candidate John Edwards) stressed the history of women who “work in
minimum wage jobs,” proposing a minimum wage increase to aid women in
“being able to support their families.”62 This personalization placed a human
interest angle into reporting, rather than portraying the working poor as a
faceless abstraction.
Sources in the News
The news frames examined suggest that journalists included both Republican
and Democratic views in the news. But was one side of the debate more privi‑
leged than the other? My frame analysis only measures whether Republican
and Democratic views appeared in a news story; it does not examine the
intensity of partisan voices within each news story. To measure the inten‑
sity of each party’s voice, I examined how often different partisan sources
appeared in the news. The data from this point forward provide comprehen‑
sive conclusions for competing theories of bias, regarding how often different
sources appear in the news.63 Table 2.3 provides the results for print cover‑
age of major actors in story headlines, leads, and for sources quoted in the
1996 minimum wage debate in both the New York Times and Chicago Sun
Times and in headlines for CBS News.64 One sees little evidence of plural‑
ism, since nongovernmental actors failed to account for at least one‑third
of all actors across headlines, leads, and quoted sources in both newspa‑
pers. Only the Chicago Sun Times came close to regularly including nonstate
actors, as 32 percent of all quoted sources. Reporting on the minimum wage
focused more on nongovernmental actors in 1996 than it did in 2007. The
long period of political debate over the minimum wage, taking place across
early to mid‑1996, included a somewhat more sustained, although still meager
emphasis on business leaders, labor leaders, workers, and general citizens.
A number of business interests were consulted by reporters. Examples
included the National Federation of Independent Business, small business
lobbyists, and business owners from the service sector in the areas of fast
food, retail, and supermarkets, which are heavily defined by low‑wage jobs.65
Reporting on labor leaders, workers, and union members included discus‑
sion of national unions such as the AFL‑CIO and the Service Employees
International Union (SEIU) and their representatives, such as John Sweeney
(AFL‑CIO) and Andy Stern (SEIU), in addition to “average” workers in the
service industry.66 Finally, economists who specialized in the study of public
policy and political economy were consulted from time to time.
Little evidence of liberal bias was found, or of a blatant pro‑business bias
in which business representatives and Republicans dominated stories. Table 2.3
demonstrates that neither Democratic nor Republican dominated headlines,
leads, or sources quoted in the New York Times, Chicago Sun Times, or CBS.
Table 2.3. The Minimum Wage (1/1–8/31/1996): Political Actors in the News

Headlines (% Democratic and Leads (% Democratic and Quoted Sources (%

Republican sources as Republican sources as Democratic and Republican

a % of all partisan a % of all partisan sources as a % of all

Actors sources appearing) sources appearing) partisan sources appearing)

NYT Sun Times CBS NYT Sun Times NYT Sun Times

Democrats 53 67 56 54 55 55 48

Republicans 47 33 44 46 45 45 52

Headlines (% of time each Leads (% of time each Quoted Sources (% of time

source appears as a % source appears as a % each source appears as a %

of all sources appearing) of all sources appearing) of all sources appearing)

NYT Sun Times CBS NYT Sun Times NYT Sun Times

Business Leaders 0 0 2 3 1 6 12

Labor Leaders 0 0 0 6 4 7 6

Workers and Unionists 0 0 0 0 6 4 4

Academics 0 0 0 1 4 6 6

Bureaucrats 0 0 2 0 4 0 3

Citizens 0 0 0 1 1 1 4

Executive 70 75 27 51 40 31 22

Legislative 30 25 69 38 40 45 43

Judiciary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Number of news stories 54 39 68 54 39 54 39

analyzed

Neither Democratic nor Republican actors appeared more than 20 percentage

points as often in any of the categories analyzed in 1996 except for one (the Chi-
cago Sun Times headlines). In other words, no single political party dominated
coverage. In contrast, the pro‑government bias is verified in every category
from Table 2.3. The theory predicts that Democratic and Republican actors
will fail to dominate headlines, leads, or sources quoted during times of split
party government, and in 1996 this prediction was validated. The pro‑govern‑
ment bias is also visible after examining governmental versus nongovernmen‑
tal actors. Governmental actors, including representatives from the executive
branch, Congress, and the national bureaucracy dominated coverage across all
three outlets in story headlines, leads, and sources quoted. Nongovernmental
actors constituted less than one‑third of actors across all categories examined.
Nongovernmental actors, however, appeared more often in 1996 stories on the
minimum wage relative to 2007 stories, as documented in Table 2.4.
The dominance of official sources across both case studies reveals who
reporters thought the real agenda setters were on the minimum wage. If
pluralism in the media requires regular consultation of governmental and
nongovernmental actors, this expectation was not met, although there was
modest space allotted for nongovernmental actors. Still, a more than 2:1
advantage for governmental over nongovernmental sources across each con‑
tent type suggests official dominance of the news. If media propaganda is
the product of governmental dominance of the news, the 1996 and 2007
minimum wage debates were defined by propagandistic coverage.
Findings for the major actors appearing in the 2007 minimum wage
debate were fairly similar to those from 1996. The year 2007 was defined by
split party government—as in 1996—and reporting over the minimum wage
devoted significant space to both parties, although coverage leaned toward the
Democrats. The Democratic advantage is likely explained, however, because
the minimum wage did not appear to be an important issue to President
Bush in 2007, although it had been to President Clinton in 1996. During the
1996 minimum wage debate (from January through August 1996), Clinton
addressed the minimum wage issue ninety‑eight times in speeches, statements,
or other official documents made available to the public, or an average of
more than twelve times per month. In contrast, President Bush issued just
one speech, statement, or other document during the minimum wage debate
(from January and May 2007), averaging .2 statements per month.67 Preoc‑
cupied as he was with the Iraq war, which deeply divided both parties, Bush’s
focus was rather limited when it came to debating Democrats on the minimum
wage. Furthermore, reporters appeared to recognize the larger presidential
uncovers numerous instances where political officials discount public opinion

in favor of their own preferences.13 These findings do not mean that govern‑
ment always ignores public opinion; officials are certainly susceptible to public
electoral pressures. This pressure can provide an incentive for officials to take
public opinion seriously, even if it is done reluctantly. As I show in chapter 5
on the issue of Social Security, officials are aware of public pressures in cases
when constituents contact their senators and representatives.
Past scholarship sought to examine how government may manufac‑
ture consent through the media.14 As I document in a number of case stud‑
ies, journalists share limited interest in exploring public opinion concerning
major policy issues. Little attention is devoted to nongovernmental sources,
as official sources are widely viewed as the real drivers of policy discourse.
This elitist, top‑down view of public policy is commonly accepted by reporters
and officials, but not shared by Americans, the vast majority of whom express
distrust of the government and media.15
An Independent Public?
How effective are official efforts to “manufacture” public consent? Many schol‑
ars answer this question with a simple “not very.” Some depict public opinion as
unstable and too “moody” to be taken seriously by political officials.16 Ameri‑
cans supposedly hold “non‑attitudes” because of their failure to pay attention to
politics. As the thinking goes, if some Americans possess meaningful political
opinions, it is because of messages they internalized from their political party.17
Public attitudes are supposedly irrelevant to the policy process, with officials
ignoring them because Americans are seen as incapable of comprehending
issues in a nuanced way.18 These conclusions are very pessimistic when it comes
to prospects for a democracy in which the public plays an active role.
I reject the notion that the public is irrelevant to the policy process,
or that its opinions are a function of randomness, ignorance, incapability, or
apathy. Many Americans surely fit these descriptions, but to speak in absolute
terms about a majority of citizens is unwarranted. Furthermore, officials may
try to manufacture public consent, but Americans resist official rhetoric when
it contradicts their own political interests. I see the public as neither totally
independent of political elites, nor totally dependent on them. Reality lies
somewhere in between these two poles. Large segments of the citizenry pay
fairly or very close attention to politics, and formulate opinions in mean‑
ingful ways. They display evidence of complex thinking, based not only on
socialization from elites, but from personal experiences. I am not the first
Table 2.4. The Minimum Wage (1/1–5/31/2007): Political Actors in the News



Actors
sources appearing) sources appearing) partisan sources appearing)

Sun

NYT Sun Times CBS NYT Times Fox MSNBC NYT Sun Times

Democrats 0 0 100 67 67 63 70 48 67

Republicans 0 0 0 33 33 38 30 52 33




Sun


Business Leaders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0

Labor Leaders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0

Workers/Unionists 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Academics 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0

Bureaucrats 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0

Citizens 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0

Executive 0 0 6 25 50 37 0 1 22

Legislative 0 0 94 75 50 61 90 71 78

Judiciary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Number of news stories 14 3 21 14 3 45 16 14 3

analyzed

A search for a blatant pro‑business bias does not bear fruit either. In
Table 2.4, Republican actors failed to outnumber Democratic ones in even one
category, and business sources were rarely consulted. This finding is tempered,
however, in the conclusion of this chapter, as I present evidence of a more
subtle form of pro‑business bias in reporting.
Partisan Mentions in the News
A final area of news content remains: references to parties and party lead‑
ers. The data suggest a pro‑government, rather than a liberal bias. Reporters
balanced references to both parties, as expected during periods of split party
government. Table 2.5 suggests that, in 1996, Republican Party and leadership
mentions outnumbered Democratic mentions by sixteen, eight, and four‑
teen percentage points in the New York Times, Chicago Sun Times, and CBS
respectively.70 None of these margins, however, was large enough to suggest
Republicans dominated reporting. Republican mentions failed to appear more
frequently than Democratic mentions by more than twenty percentage points
in any news outlet examined.
A review of party mentions in 2007 also suggests that neither party
dominated the news. Democrats were better represented in partisan mentions
for story headlines, leads, quoted sources, and frames. However, the privileg‑
ing of Democrats was not at overwhelming levels. Democratic mentions failed
to overshadow Republican ones by more than twenty percentage points in
three of the five news outlets seen in Table 2.6.71
It seems unwarranted to speak of a liberal bias with the above results.
Looking across news frames, story headlines, story leads, sources quoted, and
party mentions, Democratic sources or frames dominated over Republican
Table 2.5. The Minimum Wage (1/1–8/31/1996): Mentions of Parties and

Party Leaders
Democratic (as Republican (as Number of

% of all partisan % of all partisan news stories

News Outlet mentions) mentions) analyzed

New York Times 42 58 54

Sun Times 46 54 39

CBS 43 57 68

Analysis excludes op eds and editorials
-
Table 2.6. The Minimum Wage (1/1–5/31/2007): Mentions of Parties and

Party Leaders




Sun Times 60 40 3

CBS 63 37 21

MSNBC 71 29 45

Fox 60 40 16


ones in just nine of twenty categories examined in 1996 and 2007. In the
other eleven categories of content, Democrats and Democratic frames failed
to appear more than twenty percentage points as often as Republicans. When
I factor in the results from the next two chapters, I find even less evidence
of a liberal media bias.
Editorials, Op‑Eds, and Commentary
A review of editorials and op‑eds suggests that media were divided, promot‑
ing both liberal and conservative perspectives. The balancing of pro‑Demo‑
cratic and pro‑Republican positions is what one would expect if newspaper
editors seek to balance competing ideological perspectives of both parties. In
both 1996 and 2007, the New York Times and Chicago Sun Times were more
likely to print pro‑minimum wage viewpoints. MSNBC and Fox News were
not included in 1996 because Fox did not exist, and MSNBC was not yet
catering to Democratic audiences. In 2007, however, Fox News and MSNBC
were both seeking to cater to partisan audiences. CBS was not reviewed for
either period because its news programs, adhering to standards of objectivity,
refrained from explicitly taking a position on the minimum wage. Affirming
a more pluralistic approach (in media commentary at least), more than half
of all op‑ed newspaper writers addressing the minimum wage in 1996 and
2007 were nongovernmental actors.
In reviewing op‑eds and editorials, I counted the number of contribu‑
tors that expressed a position in support of, or opposition to, the minimum
wage. I also assessed whether the editors of each newspaper expressed a
position. Finally, I looked at the views of the hosts of nightly programs on

MSNBC and Fox News (for 2007).
Opinions in the New York Times in 1996 and 2007 generally supported
a minimum wage raise. In 1996, three op‑ed writers expressed support, with
just one writer opposing the minimum wage. Supportive op‑eds were written
by two economists and a labor lawyer, reflecting liberal themes discussed in
this chapter.72 In 2007, two New York Times op‑ed writers supported a wage
increase, and just one opposed it. Both supportive op‑eds were written by
regular columnists.73 Opponents of the minimum wage in 1996 and 2007
who wrote columns included a banking representative and economist, and a
business professor. These writers emphasized Republican themes appearing
in this chapter.74
Editorials from the New York Times supported a wage increase. A 1996
editorial advocated “raising the minimum wage by a modest amount” as part
of a national “anti‑poverty strategy.” Addressing Republican critics, the editors
promised the benefits from an increase would be “substantial”; “Will low‑paid
workers lose their jobs if employers must pay higher wages? Yes, but there
is widespread agreement among economic studies that the impact would be
very small.”75 Editorializing in 2007 also supported an increase, reluctantly
so if it was coupled with business tax cuts: “We would have preferred a
straightforward minimum wage increase. But the House bill [allowing mod‑
est tax cuts] is a reasonable response to the Senate’s refusal to move forward
without tax cuts.”76
Commentary in the Chicago Sun Times mirrored the New York Times.
As a regional newspaper with a liberal reputation, the Chicago Sun Times
consistently supported the minimum wage. In 1996, the paper printed op‑eds
by six different writers who supported a minimum wage increase and three
who opposed it. Coverage in 2007 was more meager, with just one op‑ed
writer in favor and one against. The 1996 op‑eds in favor of the minimum
wage were written by an economist, two regular columnists, and one of the
newspaper’s editors.77 The 2007 op‑ed was written by a civil rights activist
who was also a columnist.78
Stories that opposed a wage increase touched upon Republican
positions. The three op‑ed writers in 1996 who opposed raising the mini‑
mum wage included a business professor, a regular columnist, and a think
tank representative from the conservative Employment Policies Institute.79
The single 2007 op‑ed against the minimum wage was written by a regu‑
lar columnist. All the stories emphasized Republican points.80 In both 1996
and 2007, the editors of the Sun Times supported raising the minimum
wage.81
What about cable commentary? In 2007, cable commentary displayed

mixed evidence of bias. Comments from Fox News pundits leaned against
a wage increase, while MSNBC was mixed. Of its punditry‑based programs
(including those hosted by Tucker Carlson and Keith Olbermann), Olber‑
mann expressed support for raising wages, while Carlson was opposed.82
While the selection of cases here is limited, MSNBC’s pundits were split
in their opinions. This finding is less surprising considering the time that
this debate took place (2007), one year before MSNBC announced its lib‑
eral nighttime lineup. That lineup, including Olbermann, Rachel Maddow,
Ed Schultz, and Chris Matthews, was dominated by liberal pundits allying
with the Democratic Party.
Fox News was somewhat opposed to a minimum wage increase. Pundits
predicted a wage raise “would threaten business and business owners across
the country.”83 Republican officials were consulted, providing anti–minimum
wage perspectives and attacks on Democrats.84 Of Fox’s three nighttime pun‑
dit programs in 2007 (Hannity and Colmes, Your World with Neil Cavuto,
and The O’Reilly Factor), only Hannity’s programs included conflicted evalu‑
ations from hosts on the minimum wage. Hannity opposed a wage raise,
while Colmes failed to explicitly take a stance.85 Neither O’Reilly nor Cavuto
expressed any opinion on the minimum wage. In short, despite numerous
abstentions, what little evidence was available from nightly pundit programs
suggested a Republican bias.
In summary, the pluralistic theory received some confirmation in
an analysis of political commentary, since eight nongovernmental actors
appeared in op‑eds in 1997 and 2007, whereas no government officials did.
Nongovernmental actors constituted 75 percent and 33 percent of all op‑ed
writers in the New York Times for 1996 and 2007 respectively, and 43 percent
and zero percent of all op‑ed writers in the Chicago Sun Times for 1996 and
2007 respectively. This suggests that editors of major newspapers did consult
nongovernmental actors as op‑ed writers.
The mixed findings in op‑eds suggest that there was room for a variety
of liberal and conservative viewpoints in national commentary. Extending
my analysis to include articles from other newspapers including the Wall
Street Journal, Washington Times, Chicago Tribune, and New York Post, I find
that editorials consistently opposed a minimum wage increase in each outlet,
suggesting that opposition was common in some newspapers.86 My review
of U.S. commentary suggests that op‑ed and editorial pieces mirrored the
positions of the Democratic and Republican parties. This finding suggests a
pro‑government bias, although there is also evidence of pluralism in incor‑
porating nongovernmental voices.
Media Hegemony: A Second Look
Business groups did not overtly dominate the news, but business power was
felt in more subtle ways. Near‑monopolization of the news by government
officials translated in a roundabout way into a bias in favor of business inter‑
ests, in that journalists, op‑ed writers, editors, and pundits operated within a
political‑economic system that was increasingly hostile to organized labor and
minimum wage raises, even if raises do occasionally occur. A pro‑government
bias, then, translated into an implicit pro‑business bias in the national delib‑
eration over the minimum wage.
Because of government dominance of the news, some viewpoints were
largely excluded from discussion. On the issue of the minimum wage, dis‑
cussion of a “living wage” or livable wage permanently indexed to infla‑
tion was deemed out of bounds, apparently because it was not embraced by
either party. The distinction between a living wage and a minimum wage
is significant. Millions of Americans are classified as working poor, and are
often unable to pay for needs such as quality health care, healthy foods,
and the goods and services needed to pursue upward economic mobility
for themselves or their children. They receive a minimum wage, but not a
living wage that would guarantee their ability to cover their basic needs. The
rationale behind a living wage is that all workers earn enough to provide for
their basic needs. Studies suggest that if the minimum wage of the 1960s
had been raised to keep pace with growing labor productivity, the minimum
wage by 2013 would have been $21.72 an hour.87 This was far from the $7.25
minimum wage at the time.
The reluctance on the part of Democrats and Republicans alike to
embrace anything close to a living wage, or even to discuss the issue at
all, is a sign of the rightward, pro‑business drift in American political and
media discourse. Government has become less committed to maintaining
the purchasing power of wages for the poor and near‑poor. Every so often,
Democrats make a show of raising the minimum wage, while Republicans
oppose it, despite the overall historical context in which the minimum wage
consistently loses purchasing power over time. While the vast majority of
Americans support raising the minimum wage to something closer to a living
wage (to more than $10 an hour), discussions in the media are historically
dominated by two political parties responsible for a decline in the minimum
wage from a high of nearly $9.50 hour in 2013 purchasing power in 1968,
to $7.25 an hour by 2015.88
The decline in minimum wage purchasing power was not caused by
reporters, although they played a vital role in legitimizing a political system
that is responsible for devaluing the earnings of American workers over time.
When speaking of hegemonic bias in the news, business interests benefit
from a political system and media reporting that discuss the minimum wage
less and less often over time, and ensure that the purchasing power of that
wage consistently falls due to inflation, despite growing worker productivity.
Pro‑business bias in the media is not as blatant as it would be if Republicans
and business elites were the dominant sources appearing in news stories. But
business power persists in the form of an overarching political‑economic
system that values increased corporate profits and growing inequality over
redistribution from owners to workers.
Conclusions
Aggregate findings from this chapter suggest a pro‑government bias in the

news, after reviewing story frames, headlines, leads, sources quoted, and
party mentions. Journalists balanced Republican and Democratic sources,
as expected, during two periods of split party control of government. Of
the content analyzed, the pro‑government bias predicted media coverage for
most content analyzed in 1996 and 2007. The liberal media theory could be
used to account for a modest Democratic advantage in 2007, but on balance
there was no consistent evidence that such a bias existed for both 1996 and
2007. Combined with my findings from the next two chapters, there is even
less evidence of a liberal bias in the news. Finally, the pluralistic theory was
rejected with regard to news content, although there was some evidence of
incorporating nongovernmental actors in newspaper op‑eds.
A central theme of this book was validated in this chapter. Govern‑
ment and media maintained a symbiotic relationship, as evidenced by cover‑
age of the minimum wage in two different political time periods. Journalists
mainly looked to government when deciding how to frame the minimum
wage debate. Both parties helped set the terms for media discourse. In short,
journalists were not independent actors in the political process. If reporters
had sought to challenge government dominance of the news, they might have
risked future access to official sources. Journalists could have compensated
for reduced access to official sources by consulting nongovernmental sources
more frequently, but few journalists seemed to take this option seriously.
A second finding relates to the power of political parties in driving
the news. Simply put, parties are vital to political communication. They
allow political officials to affiliate with like‑minded people, and represent
constituents with similar ideological values. Parties also drive media policy
debates, although a pro‑business bias in the political process drives the par‑
ties themselves.
A final issue of importance is the prevalence of propaganda in the news.
Political leaders engage in propaganda by promoting certain viewpoints, while
systematically refusing to consider evidence that contradicts their preferred
policy positions. But reporters are also implicated in promoting propaganda
if they restrict viewpoints in the news to those deemed acceptable by politi‑
cal parties, government, and business elites. Public views are ritualistically
excluded from the news. Journalists appear to take an elitist view of the
public, assuming that political officials are the rightful leaders in the policy
process, with the public playing a passive to nonexistent role. This approach
fits comfortably with political leaders’ own contempt for public opinion, as
seen in public opinion surveys and in their preoccupation with representing
the affluent at the expense of the masses.
A main problem with journalists’ neglect of the public is that news
reports often fail to consider questions from Americans who are unhappy
with the political‑economic status quo. Many questions may be viewed by
news audiences as relevant to the policy process, but they are omitted from
the news when political officials deem them unacceptable. For example,
should a $10, $15, or even a $20 an hour minimum wage be the accepted
standard in the United States in light of growing labor productivity and cor‑
porate profits in recent decades? Is the growing power of businesses, exer‑
cised at the expense of organized labor and the working class, acceptable?
Should families tolerate a two‑party political system that endorses Americans
working significantly longer hours, at greater rates of productivity, for stag‑
nating‑to‑declining pay? Many Americans might want these questions raised
in political discourse. But to not even address them suggests that reporters
are restricting the news to a narrow range of opinion that excludes serious
criticisms of the political‑economic system. When media omit questions of
relevance to the mass public, concerns about propaganda are warranted.
3
Unified Republican Government

Debating Tax Cuts and Social Security, 2001–2005
In this chapter, I review media coverage of the 2001 tax cuts and Social Secu‑
rity reform in 2005. Both occurred during unified Republican government.
As with chapter 2, I discuss three main findings. First, coverage was defined
by a pro‑government bias. A symbiotic connection existed between reporters
and government, with official views driving the news.
Coverage privileged Republicans, as expected during periods of Repub‑
lican government. Additionally, nongovernmental voices were marginalized.
With little room for the perspectives of public interest groups and citizens,
Americans were left to hope that political officials would adequately represent
the public. While reporters could have taken nongovernmental actors more
seriously, they allowed the views of political officials to overshadow those of
the public. Social Security and taxation are two issues in which the public
shares direct experience, so it is not unrealistic to think that reporters might
have incorporated these voices into the news on a consistent basis. The pub‑
lic’s marginalization in favor of government voices speaks to a propaganda
function in the news media.
Second, political parties played a central role in shaping coverage of the
Bush tax cuts and Social Security reform. Republicans in Congress worked
with the president to sell both policies, while deterring potential challenges
in the news. The role of political parties in determining media coverage is
relevant when discussing how media play a propaganda function, largely lim‑
iting public discourse to views embraced within the two‑party system.
63
Finally, an indirect pro‑business bias pervaded the news. Business

officials were nowhere near a dominant actor in the news. However, in the
modern era, the U.S. political‑economic system has consistently shifted to
the right, and discussions about large tax cuts for the affluent and privatiza‑
tion of social welfare programs became the norm from the 2000s onward.
In previous decades, discussion of eliminating Social Security as a collective,
socialized program was not seriously entertained in public discourse.1 Tax
rates for businesses and the wealthy were much higher in previous decades,
and a collective notion existed within government and among the public that
corporations and the wealthy should pay a larger share of the nation’s taxes
than they have paid in recent years. The shift toward a pro‑business discourse
is reflected in media coverage, which simply covers debates about increas‑
ingly right‑wing policy proposals regarding tax reform and welfare programs.
Tax Cuts Enter the Public Agenda
In January 2001, Republicans proposed a comprehensive tax reform that pre‑

occupied Congress for the next half‑year. Arguments made for and against the
cuts centered on philosophical questions about the size of government, and
pragmatic questions about whether the cuts were affordable. The Congres‑
sional Budget Office (CBO) projected a $5.6 trillion federal budget surplus
from 2001 through the end of the decade. Of this estimated surplus, $2.4 tril‑
lion originated from excess Social Security payroll taxes, with the remaining
$3.122 trillion “up for grabs,” as the New York Times reported.
President Bush argued that the surplus was large enough to cover $1.6
trillion in tax cuts, and increased military, education, and health care spend‑
ing, without increasing the national debt. The CBO calculated that with the
projected surplus, and after the tax cuts, the federal government could lower
the national debt to $800 billion from a total of $3.4 trillion by the end of
the decade. Such optimistic projections were questioned during the 2000s
amid growing yearly deficits and swelling military budgets after September 11.
The 2008 economic collapse set the stage for even larger deficits because of
growing unemployment and a declining economy, both of which contributed
to declining tax revenues. The CBO’s estimate that the surplus could be used
for tax cuts and debt reduction proved inaccurate because it was based on the
assumption that the national economy would grow by 3 percent annually for
most of the decade. The economic collapse and a national debt of nearly $14.5
trillion by 2011 were beyond the CBO’s foresight when it made its estimate
Unified Republican Government 65
in the early 2000s. Consistent deficit spending, mixed with anemic economic
growth during the Bush years ensured that debt reduction was impossible.
Academics, researchers and think tanks debating the 2001 tax cuts were
somewhat limited in their analyses by the events and information of the day.
Conservatives embraced the projected $5.6 trillion federal surplus as evidence
that the government could afford large tax cuts. The Heritage Foundation
projected that the tax cuts and debt reduction were possible, and that the
national debt would fall to zero by 2010. This forecast looked extraordinarily
naive with $12.6 trillion in public government debt by 2014. A more than
$12 trillion discrepancy between the Heritage projection and reality was due
in large part to an unrealistic economic projection for the 2000s. Heritage
advocated for tax cuts by promising that cuts would increase income for a
family of four by $4,544 from 2001 through 2011. Heritage claimed that the
tax cuts would increase economic growth rates by two percentage points a
year for ten years; unemployment would supposedly fall to 4.7 percent within
the decade.2 Heritage’s far‑off projections did not prevent conservatives from
enthusiastically advocating large tax cuts.
Support for tax cuts was driven by “Supply Side” economics—a theory
framing economic growth as best achieved through reducing barriers to
profit for suppliers of goods and services.3 As the theory argues, lowering
taxes on businesses and the wealthy is the most effective way to promote
economic prosperity for businesses and working Americans. Liberals often
speak critically of supply side economics. They dismiss promises that corpo‑
rate profits “trickle down” to the public. Rather, corporations seek to retain
their profits, instead of sharing them with workers.4 Business tax cuts—crit‑
ics argue—accompany stagnating‑to‑declining wages and growing inequality.5
Supply side advocates, however, argue that tax cuts will increase tax revenues
because of strong economic growth resulting from tax cuts.6 This promise did
not come to fruition during the 1980s and 2000s, when large tax cuts for
businesses and the wealthy were followed by large deficits due to increased
military spending and declining tax revenues.
Critics of the Republican tax cuts were more reserved in their budget
estimates and economic projections. The Economic Policy Institute (EPI)
challenged the optimistic predictions of the CBO and conservative groups
due to the “uncertainty of 10‑year outcomes” for budget surpluses and eco‑
nomic growth. EPI argued that the tax cuts decrease government revenues:
“Budget projections are an art, not a science . . . the CBO projections are
 
 
 
 
problematic because they are just that—rough guesses of what will happen in
a hard‑to‑know future.” CBO estimates, EPI argued, “contain a large amount
of guesswork . . . while the consequences of the tax cuts, on the other hand,”
 
 
 
 
include “permanent reductions in government revenue.” Pushing for a large
tax cut in light of such uncertainty, EPI argued, was “bad policy.”7 EPI’s con‑
cern with the uncertainty of ten‑year estimates was eventually validated as the
economy declined precipitously during the late 2000s with growing unem‑
ployment, negative economic growth, and a large increase in annual deficits.
Background to the 2001 Tax Cuts
President Bush’s call for tax cuts originated in the 2000 campaign. He prom‑
ised to “reduce tax rates for everyone in every bracket.”8 Lawrence Lindsey,
Bush’s head electoral advisor, claimed the tax plan would “preserve a balanced
budget and allow a pay‑down of the national debt.”9 Following Bush’s electoral
victory, he began to lobby the public to make his case. Majority Republican
control in Congress increased likelihood of passing a tax cut. By February
2001, Bush sent his tax cut proposal to Congress, urging that a plan be passed
as soon as possible.10
Congressional debate over Bush’s tax cuts occurred along partisan lines.
Democrats complained that the cuts were too large and favored the wealthy,
offering instead their own plan with smaller cuts that were targeted at less
affluent constituents.11 While a few Republicans in Congress balked at Bush’s
plan, most supported him as the House of Representatives passed a bill in
March 2001 valued at nearly $1 trillion. In the Senate, the cuts that were
passed totaled $1.19 trillion, with fifteen Democrats breaking ranks to sup‑
port the bill, along with fifty Republican senators.12 Differences between the
House and Senate bills were worked out in conference committee, as a final
compromise bill included $1.35 trillion in cuts.13 Congress’s 2010 extension
of the tax cuts meant that the federal government lost approximately $2.5
trillion in revenues.14
On June 7, President Bush signed into law The Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Act of 2001, providing for reductions in income, gift, and estate
taxes that would remain in place until 2010. The vote occurred along partisan
lines: with 98 percent of both House and Senate Republicans voting in favor
of the cuts, and 93 percent and 76 percent of House and Senate Democrats
respectively voting against.15 The income tax portion of Bush’s legislation
reduced taxes for all income brackets, creating a maximum rate of 35 per‑
cent (down from 39.6 percent) for Americans in the top income category.
Those in lower brackets saw average cuts of 3 percent compared to the 4.6
percent reduction for the top income bracket. The legacy of the Bush tax cuts
remained for more than a decade, with Congress and President Obama agree‑
ing to temporarily extend them through 2012. The cuts eventually expired in
early 2013, to the chagrin of Republicans and approval of Democrats.
Reporting the Bush Tax Cuts
Journalists regularly highlighted the divide between Democrats and Repub‑

licans. A sample of headlines conveyed the partisan conflict: “Bush Faces
Group of Harsh Critics: House Democrats” (New York Times), “Suggesting
Smaller Cuts, Democrats Say Republican Tax Plan Is Too Risky” (New York
Times), and “Tug‑of‑War Over Taxes; Bush Sends $1.6 Trillion Plan to Con‑
gress; Dems Say It’s Skewed” (Chicago Sun Times).
Framing the Tax Cuts
For the tax cuts, I measured how often competing frames appeared in the
news. These frames were reflected in the positions taken by prominent
political officials in both parties. The frames were selected after reviewing
official rhetoric from presidential speeches and statements by senators and
representatives.
For those who supported tax cuts, the main news frames included: (1)
The “Economic Stability” frame, which envisioned cuts as promoting eco‑
nomic growth.16 This frame was widely embraced by President Bush and
congressional Republicans, who sold tax cuts as necessary in helping the
economy recover from the 2000 recession;17 (2) The tax “Relief ” frame, claim‑
ing cuts would benefit “average” Americans at a time of economic difficulty.18
The language of tax relief was a mantra for congressional Republicans and
President Bush;19 (3) The “Big Government” frame, encompassing references
to the projected budget surplus, or to warnings that government was exces‑
sively large.20 This frame was observed in President Bush’s rhetoric, as he
promoted tax cuts and “lean budgets” to demonstrate that Republicans were
“good stewards of the people’s money.” Other Republicans called for tax cuts
to minimize government, referring to the budget surplus as an example of
government “overcharge” of the public, and referring to federal revenues as
belonging to the taxpayers, not to government.21
For opponents of the tax cuts, the frames included: (1) The alternative
“Spending Priorities” frame, including discussions of alternative ways to use
the surplus, such as spending on ever‑growing Medicare and Social Security
costs.22 Congressional Democrats framed the government as needing to pro‑

mote the public welfare by using surplus revenues for popular programs;23
(2) The “Class War” frame, which depicted the Bush tax cuts as favoring the
wealthy.24 The class war frame became a rallying cry for Democrats framing
Bush’s tax cuts as a “Robin Hood in reverse” policy working against the mass‑
es;25 and (3) The “Cost” frame, which expressed concern that the cuts were
too expensive.26 These concerns were addressed by congressional Democrats
such as senators Ben Nelson and Byron Dorgan, who worried that spending
the budget surplus would lead to increased deficit spending and debt.27
While certain frames appeared more than others, these differences did
not lead to an overall privileging of one party’s frames. According to Table 3.1,
Table 3.1. Tax Cuts (1/1–5/31/2001): Competing Frames in the News
NYT as %

of all

Pro Frames frames) Sun Times CBS Fox MSNBC

Economic Stability 16 18 17 20 20

Relief 14 18 18 14 16

Big Government 17 14 18 16 14


Frames (as a % of
all frames
appearing in
the news)
Con Frames

Spending Priorities 12 11 9 16 13

Class War 20 20 18 15 17

Cost 21 19 20 19 20


Frames (as a % of
all frames
appearing in
the news)
Number of news 89 50 92 57 21

stories analyzed

journalists regularly incorporated both Democratic and Republican frames

into the news.28 These frames, however, provide only a general understanding
of reporting on tax cuts. My frame analysis does not analyze the intensity of
Republican and Democratic voices, as that task is left to my breakdown of
major actors and parties appearing in reporting. However, Table 3.1 indicates
a pro‑government bias in that journalists tailored their coverage to opinions
expressed on “both sides” of the partisan debate in Washington. In the five
media outlets examined, Republican and Democratic frames never accounted
for a total of less than 47 percent or more than 53 percent of total frames that
appeared, depending on the news outlet. In other words, both Democratic
and Republican positions were regularly represented.
On the Republican side, the “Economic Stability” frame stressed Repub‑
lican promises to reinvigorate the economy through tax cuts; on the Demo‑
cratic side, the “Spending Priorities” frame discussed how surplus funds could
be used for Medicare and Social Security, considering escalating costs due
to the “baby boomer” generation approaching retirement. Across the five
media outlets, the “Economic Stability” frame appeared often. In the New
York Times, for example, President Bush argued that “cutting marginal [tax]
rates for everybody who pays taxes is a good way to help ease the pain of
what may be an economic slowdown,” while Federal Reserve chairman Alan
Greenspan claimed that “having a tax cut in place may, in fact, do noticeable
good” in “avert[ing] recession” and “boost[ing the] economy.”29
In contrast, the “Spending Priorities” frame depicted the Bush tax cuts
as an unacceptable burden that would monopolize funds needed for other
programs. Examples included Democratic senator Tom Daschle’s claim in the
New York Times, that “only after financing for Medicare, Social Security, and
agriculture are secured can the nation spend on things like vacations and tax
cuts,” while House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt worried that “the plan was
so big it would complicate efforts to pay down the national debt and make it
more difficult to safeguard programs such as Medicare and Social Security.”30
For Republicans, the “Relief ” frame depicted tax cuts as a form of
public aid during a time of recession. President Bush argued on Fox News
that “my plan addresses the struggles of American families . . . it doesn’t tell
 
 
 
 
families how to spend their money . . . it’s tax relief for everybody who pays
 
 
 
 
taxes.”31 In opposition to the “Relief ” frame, reporters covered Democratic
characterizations of the tax cuts as skewed toward the rich. For example, in
one Fox News report, Democratic Representative Joe Hoeffel referred to the
tax cuts as “too big,” and as “giving too much benefit to the wealthy.”32 This
“Class War” frame appeared in between 15 to 20 percent of news stories,
depending on the media outlet.
The third set of frames addressed controversies regarding government

size and the cost of the tax cuts. With the “Big Government” frame, Republi‑
cans described the national government as bloated, too large, and inefficient.
Tax cuts were seen as necessary for returning to the public a revenue surplus
being unfairly kept from them. For example, in one CBS story, President Bush
pushed for reallocating the surplus: “Because our government has a surplus
does not mean that every American family has a surplus. We need to give
their own money back, to help families manage their own account, to pay
down their own personal debts.”33 Furthermore, Bush argued that “we must
resist the temptation” of “excessive federal spending.”34
On the Democratic side, the “Cost” frame portrayed the tax cuts as
threatening to increase deficits and debt. For example, Democratic senator
Robert Torricelli worried: “This tax cut will be followed by an increase in
military spending, unsustainable new programs, and an expanding debt.”
Democratic senator Kent Conrad warned that the cuts threatened to “put us
back into deficit.”35 Conrad articulated Democrats’ desire to “see less of a tax
cut . . . that would provide resources for additional pay down of debt. . . . I
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
think the people in the United States really want to see us get this long‑term
debt situation under hand, and the president’s proposal doesn’t do that.”36
Summarizing these findings, journalists mentioned competing Repub‑
lican and Democratic arguments to varying degrees, although both parties’
frames appeared frequently in the news. Demonstrating a pro‑government
bias, reporters made sure that both Republican and Democratic parties regu‑
larly appeared in stories. The extent to which either party dominated on tax
cuts, however, is best left to an analysis of sources appearing in the news.
Main Findings
Although Republican and Democratic frames appeared in the news, Repub‑

licans held an advantage in coverage. Pro‑Republican reporting was expected
when journalists “indexed” coverage to the views expressed by the party in
control of government. Table 3.2 includes the findings for political parties
and other political actors appearing in the news.37
Virtually no evidence is found of journalistic pluralism, as nongovern‑
mental sources maintained a weak presence in story headlines, leads, and
sources quoted.38 In none of the news outlets did nongovernmental actors
come close to representing one‑third of all sources. Nongovernmental voices,
to the extent that they appeared, included labor and business leaders, aca‑
demics, and general citizens. Business representatives cited in the New York
Times and Chicago Sun Times, for example, included those from General
Electric, the American Council for Capital Formation, General Mills, Bank
One, and Merrill Lynch. The relevance of these actors seems clear in light
of the targeting of many of Bush’s tax cuts toward businesses. Workers and
unionists appeared about as often as business representatives across different
media outlets, although labor leaders received nearly no attention. A variety
of workers were cited in stories, ranging from a homemaker and secretary to
a paramedic and an accountant. The reasoning for including these individuals
seemed obvious, considering that Bush’s tax cuts promised significant benefits
to rank‑and‑file workers.
Other nongovernmental actors appearing in tax cut stories included
representatives of citizen groups, and academics. Citizens’ groups included
the Club for Growth, Americans for Tax Reform, OMB Watch (a research
group on charities), and Citizens for Tax Justice. Reporters at times reviewed
the findings of various research organizations. Representatives were consulted
from a fairly wide spectrum of groups (ideologically speaking) such as the
Urban Institute, the Progressive Policy Institute, the Hudson Institute, and the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, and provided public policy analysis
of the different facets of the proposed legislation.
While different nongovernmental sources were consulted, their appear‑
ances were infrequent. Academics—those in a strong position to offer nuanced,
rigorous analysis of the likely effect of tax cuts—were almost invisible. The
warnings of groups such as the Economic Policy Institute about the uncer‑
tainty of ten‑year economic growth estimates seem prescient in retrospect.
Had reporters taken the work of these policy experts more seriously during
the tax cut debate, some of the most excessive euphoria accompanying the
tax cuts could have been tempered by more sober assessments.
Also neglected was attention to public spending priorities. As I explain
in chapter 6, while the public initially seemed supportive of tax cuts, that sup‑
port quickly dissipated when respondents were asked whether they preferred
tax cuts over spending for various government programs. A real inclusion
of public preferences could have benefited political discourse and the qual‑
ity of democratic representation. President Bush famously told Americans
when he sold the tax cuts that “[i]t’s your money. It’s not the government’s
money.”39 Were reporters interested in public opinion, they would have made
a concerted effort to consult Americans about what they wanted done with
their money.
What about other alleged biases in the news? Evidence for a pro‑busi‑
ness bias could be drawn from this case study, since Republicans were privi‑
leged in the news. However, such privilege dissipated in other case studies, as
Table 3.2. Tax Cuts (1/1–5/31/2001): Political Actors in the News




Partisan Political Actors sources appearing) sources appearing) partisan sources appearing)

Sun


Democrats 2 4 7 16 22 32 32 35 23

Republicans 98 96 93 84 78 68 68 65 77


All Other Political Actors source appears as a % source appears as a % each source appears as a %

(Nonpartisan) of all sources appearing) of all sources appearing) of all sources appearing)

Sun



Labor Leaders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 <1 0


Academics 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 5

Bureaucrats 0 0 5 6 0 5 4 3 0

Citizens 0 4 0 1 3 5 4 3 5

Executive 95 96 64 63 60 51 71 33 46

Legislative 5 0 30 28 30 39 17 50 37

Judiciary 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0


analyzed

seen in chapters 2 and 4. Indications of more subtle hegemonic biases, how‑

ever, are discussed at the end of this chapter. Evidence for a liberal bias was
nonexistent. Democratic actors were heavily outnumbered in print headlines,
leads, and sources quoted by more than twenty percentage points across all
nine categories in Table 3.2. Across news organizations, Democratic sources
ranged from a low of 2 percent to a high of 35 percent of all partisan sources,
while Republican sources ranged from 65 to 98 percent of partisan sources.
The idea of variable media coverage—in which parties are more or less
advantaged depending on which party controls government—is reinforced
here. One would have expected Republicans to dominate the news when
they exercised unified control of the executive and legislative branches. Also
reinforcing a pro‑government bias was governmental actors’ dominance over
nongovernmental actors, with the former never constituting less than an 80
percent of all sources appearing in headlines, leads, and sources quoted.
As Table 3.2 demonstrates, executive voices were the most commonly
appearing of political actors across eight of nine categories analyzed for story
headlines, leads, and quoted sources. Most prominent executive voices includ‑
ed figures such as President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney,
and Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill. Other common Republican sources cited
included leading members of Congress in finance and budget‑related com‑
mittees, among those holding other leadership positions. President Bush led a
sustained charge for tax cuts in the first half of 2001, referencing “tax relief ”
in his speeches, statements, and other documents released by the executive
ninety‑eight times, or an average of nearly twenty times per month, between
January and May. Reporters appeared to recognize the importance of tax cuts
to the president, in light of his dominance over Congress in the news. This
executive advantage in the news has been verified many times in previous
studies.40
Executive supremacy in the news suggested a tremendous influence
of the president in leading Congress. While the Constitution technically
provides power to Congress to write legislation and then propose it to the
president, this is not an accurate depiction of what typically happens in the
policy process. In reality, the president often takes the lead role, influencing
how Congress writes and revises legislation. Any displeasure on Bush’s part
with the details of Congress’s proposed tax reform could have been expressed
with a veto threat, to force legislators to consider presidential demands.41 The
president’s bargaining powers have long been known in academic scholarship,
although evidence here suggests that media outlets are vital venues through
which presidents seek to exercise dominance in this bargaining process.
Introduction 11
appeared.26 Story “leads” were defined as the first five sentences of a news
story. I also counted how often each political party and its members were
mentioned.27 Next, I examine how often members of each party, in addition
to other political actors (governmental and nongovernmental) were quoted
in news stories.28
Frames were also a subject of analysis. Frames play an important role
in influencing how news audiences interpret political issues.29 In this book,
a “frame” refers to a way in which an issue is reported, with each frame rep‑
resenting a specific message or narrative promoted by Democratic or Repub‑
lican officials. The frames I examine are based on my analysis of common
themes articulated by presidents and members of Congress, reflected in presi‑
dential speeches and congressional leaders’ statements on the floors of the
House and Senate.30 I use the Congressional Record database when examining
statements from Congress, and the American Presidency Project database for
presidential rhetoric.31 I describe the specific origins of each frame in later
chapters of this book. I measure the percentage of all news stories that a
frame appears in out of all stories analyzed, as well as how often each frame
appears as a percent of all frames that appear. Finally, I measure how often
news stories are characterized by some form of negativity. For each policy
debate, negativity was defined to include any story in which criticisms of a
policy proposal appeared (1) from within the party offering the proposal,
(2) from the competing party; (3) from the general public; or (4) from a
member of an interest group.
Expectations for Media Bias and Media Effects
For each theory of media bias, specific findings should be observed. For a
theory to be validated, it must be confirmed in a majority of case studies,
across most of the areas of media content analyzed.32 My expectations include
the following:
• If the media share a liberal bias, one should find consistent evi‑
dence that Democratic positions and political actors dominate
news stories, op‑eds, and editorials, appearing as more than 60
percent of all partisan political actors in stories, and in more
than 60 percent of all frames in the news.33
• In contrast, a pro‑business (hegemonic) bias will be evident in
its most blatant form if Republican sources appear as more than
60 percent of all political actors, and in more than 60 percent
of all news frames.34 Alternatively, a more subtle form of bias
cuts, but just two from those who favored it. Opponents of the tax cuts
included weekly op‑ed columnists, economists, former government officials,
and think tank representatives. These writers drew from the Democratic ideo‑
logical frames discussed in this chapter.45 Supporters of tax cuts at the New
York Times were limited to one economics professor and a representative
from a conservative citizens group. Growth‑related arguments were used to
justify the cuts.46
New York Times editorials criticized President Bush’s tax cut plan. They
highlighted the spending priorities that could be sacrificed with large tax cuts.
They called Bush’s plan a “bad fiscal idea”:
The White House projections assume that federal programs other

than Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid will not expand over
the next decade. That is unrealistic. Bush’s overly generous tax
cut plan would wipe out virtually the entire remaining surplus.
That would leave no money to help, as he promised, low‑income
families buy health insurance, which could cost $600 billion over
10 years—or to add prescription drugs to Medicare.47
In sum, the New York Times’ editorials and op eds were consistently pro‑Dem‑
-
ocratic, while heavily neglecting the positions of tax cut advocates.
A different pattern was evident in the Chicago Sun Times. The paper was
slightly biased in favor of tax cuts. It printed op‑eds from six writers support‑
ing the cuts, and five opposing them. Advocates included regular columnists
and a representative of a conservative think tank—the American Enterprise
Institute. Justifications for the cuts drew from familiar Republican themes
already discussed.48 Opponents of the tax cuts included regular columnists
and a Democratic Congressional Representative. These op‑eds emphasized
previously discussed Democratic themes.49
Editorially, the Chicago Sun Times sympathized with the Bush adminis‑
tration’s justifications for the tax cuts. The paper lauded Bush’s “broad‑based
approach” to the cuts, and his goal “of returning to the taxpayers some of their
hard‑earned dollars from the surplus.” The president’s strategy was “based
on principle: Bush believes in returning taxpayers’ money when a surplus
demonstrates that the government is taking too much. He believes in tax cuts
for all who pay income taxes.”50 A supplemental analysis of additional news
outlets, including the New York Post, Washington Times, Wall Street Journal,
and Chicago Tribune, finds that these organizations also supported tax cuts.51
In summary, this analysis of opinion‑based content finds considerable diver‑
sity in opinions on the tax cuts across media outlets. These findings mirror
those from the last chapter, in that the views taken were closely affiliated with
the positions articulated by Democrats and Republicans.
What about media pluralism? Nongovernmental actors appeared regu‑
larly in New York Times op‑eds, but not in the Chicago Sun Times. Of the
nineteen op‑ed writers in the New York Times, seven were regular colum‑
nists, eight were nongovernmental actors, and four were either government
or former government officials. Even excluding media employees, 67 percent
of actors, then, were nongovernmental, meeting pluralist expectations. Com‑
mentary in the Chicago Sun Times was split. Just one of the nine writers
in this paper was a nongovernmental actor, although just one writer was a
governmental official. The small number of cases here, however, makes it
difficult to generalize much regarding this content.
Concerning the Bush tax cuts, governmental dominance of the news
meant little space to address citizen concerns that might have contradicted
the tax cut agenda. Most Americans support the idea of balanced federal bud‑
gets. Citizens may ultimately prefer fewer taxes and fewer services, or greater
taxes and more services, but basic parity between tax revenues and spending
levels is needed for balanced budgets. Surveys suggest most Americans prefer
additional spending on programs such as Social Security, Medicare, Medic‑
aid, and education, among other social programs.52 But balancing the budget
and finding increased funding for popular programs is impossible with large
reductions in revenues. By helping Republicans sell tax cuts to the public,
journalists fostered a political discourse framing government as part of the
“problem.” Public opinion data in chapters 6 and 7 suggest that attention to
news on the tax cuts produced growing support for cuts. So reporters were
instrumental in encouraging a tension within public opinion: Americans,
paradoxically, supported tax cuts while also seeking greater federal spending
for social programs. This goal runs contrary to long‑term fiscal responsibility
in government, and suggests that coverage of the tax cuts ran contrary to the
public’s long‑term interests in seeking balanced budgets and greater funding
for social programs.
The Battle over Social Security
Reporting on Social Security reform was driven by competing viewpoints

from both parties. The Social Security debate was influenced by data from the
General Accounting Office (GAO), whose comptroller general David Walker
announced that the Social Security program would begin running deficits
by 2018, paying out more in benefits than it takes in through revenues, and
that it would be unable to pay out full benefits by 2042 if no changes to the
program were made.53
Social Security faces increased costs due to an aging population and
growing retirements in the “baby boom” generation. Walker argued that the
Social Security system is “not sustainable based upon the old method of
financing,” and predicted $3.7 trillion in unfunded liabilities would accrue by
2080. Testimony from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Con‑
gressional Budget Office (CBO), and Social Security Administration (SSA)
projected that revenues for Social Security via the payroll tax would raise
enough to cover 70 to 80 percent of benefits due after 2042.54 This shortfall
could be avoided with an increase in the payroll tax, if promised benefits
were cut, by raising the retirement age for eligibility, or if government bor‑
rowed additional funds to meet increased costs. Not included in Walker’s list
of solutions was Bush’s proposal to create individual savings accounts, which
Walker estimated would contribute to Social Security’s costs by introducing
new unfunded liabilities.55
Various claims were made by supporters and opponents of Bush’s pro‑
posed reform. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) criticized
Bush for promising that individual accounts are more efficient than the Social
Security trust fund because the former provide financial returns when invest‑
ed in the marketplace. Bush failed to acknowledge “increased risk associated
with stock market investments.” CBPP faulted Bush for neglecting transition
costs in funding his reforms, and ignoring the social benefits that accom‑
pany Social Security (as it currently exists) as a form of collectivized income
support, rather than one placing responsibility for retirement on individuals
alone.56 The organization criticized Bush for proposing reforms that CBPP
claimed could lead to reduced benefits for retirees because of volatile stock
market prices and cuts in benefits that would be made to offset the costs
of simultaneously paying for current retirees and establishing accounts for
future retirees.57
Bush’s supporters concentrated on the perceived shortcomings of the
Social Security program and the alleged superiority of market reform. The
Heritage Foundation warned that the government’s borrowing from the Social
Security surplus to pay for other programs would produce negative conse‑
quences: “The problem is that repaying Social Security will require trillions
of dollars in tax increases and/or unprecedented cuts elsewhere in the federal
budget—cuts likely to include defense, homeland security, education, and
health programs.”58 The CATO Institute cautioned that the payroll tax should
be increased to pay for future benefits, and that increased taxation imposes
“a terrible burden” on future generations.59 More popular among Republicans

were market‑based solutions with individual investment accounts. The Heri‑

tage Foundation celebrated this proposal, which they promised provides
greater financial returns to citizens.60 Finally, Social Security privatization
would supposedly empower citizens by putting investing decisions into their
hands, not those of an impersonal government bureaucracy. Market rhetoric
was obviously intended to appeal to the widespread distrust of government
in modern times.
The Reform that Failed
Bush’s push for Social Security reform ended in failure, due to Democratic
and public opposition. Shortly after Bush’s victory in the 2004 election, he
announced that he had earned “political capital” via reelection, which he
invested in the Social Security reform agenda.61 By early February 2005,
Bush made his first major announcement in the State of the Union address
promoting individual investment accounts.62 He promised to “give workers
more control over retirement savings and put Social Security on sound foot‑
ing . . . we will always keep the promise of Social Security for our older work‑
 
 
 
 
ers. . . . [W]e must strengthen Social Security by allowing younger workers to
 
 
 
 
save some of their taxes in a personal account—a nest egg you can call your
own, and government can never take away.” Privatization of Social Security,
Bush promised, offered retirees “more freedom and more control over your
own life.”63
Details concerning Bush’s proposal were hazy at first, but became clearer
over time. The privatization agenda traced back to his 2001 presidential com‑
mission report on Social Security reform, but Congress would ultimately need
to flesh out the details of a comprehensive proposal.64 The Bush plan allowed
for those under fifty‑five years old to put aside four percentage points of their
payroll taxes into a private account for investing in some mixture of stocks
and bonds. The plan required a high degree of government borrowing to pay
for benefits for current retirees and for investment accounts to future benefi‑
ciaries. Benefit cuts were floated by Republicans during early 2005 (referred
to as “progressive indexation”) to pay for the transition.65
Congressional Democrats mobilized against Bush’s privatization agen‑
da. The political risks associated with benefit cuts and with individuals losing
retirement savings because of market volatility were powerful motivators for
opposition. Democrats were concerned that the plan could cost them sup‑
port among elderly constituents and voters. They became unified in oppos‑
ing privatization, and began organizing town hall meetings to solidify public
opposition.66 They felt confident that privatization efforts would produce a

strong public backlash, with the program long known as the “third rail” of
American politics. Citizens groups such as Americans United to Protect Social
Security and the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) pressured
Democrats and Republicans to oppose privatization. American citizens also
responded negatively to Bush’s plan. Public opinion polling showed sup‑
port for Bush’s proposal was low for a president allegedly enjoying “political
capital.”67
Bush’s campaign to sell the country on transforming Social Security
failed to make inroads with the public.68 Republican divisions within the
party, coupled with public opposition and Democratic challenges to the presi‑
dent, assured privatization’s failure. While Bush’s proposal initially encoun‑
tered stiff Democratic resistance, Republican opposition solidified by April.69
By mid‑year, Bush’s dream of transforming Social Security was dead, as House
Majority Whip Roy Blunt provided a list of the “priority” legislation Repub‑
licans wanted to act upon by Memorial Day. Social Security reform was not
on the list.
Another Partisan Battle
Many Republicans did not agree on the details of reform. The New York Times
reported in early January 2005 that “President Bush [was] confronting a deep
split within his own party” between two “Republican camps” arguing over
“how big the accounts should be and whether the president should embrace
cuts in benefits” (emphasis added). These “divisions” were pragmatic, with
Republicans disagreeing about the details on how individual accounts should
move forward. But over time substantive opposition grew. As Beland and
Waddan recount: “Republicans struggled to agree on a detailed legislative
plan. . . . Over time, a growing number of Republicans distanced themselves
 
 
 
 
from the president because they found it increasingly difficult to answer the
many questions about potential benefit cuts asked by their constituents.”70
Throughout much of this conflict, however, the debate occurred according
to typical Republican‑Democratic divisions. Republicans were generally sup‑
portive of the president and lambasted Democrats for opposing Bush, while
Democrats opposed privatization. A brief review of news headlines suggests
strong partisan fighting on Social Security: “Kennedy Warns Democrats Not
to Be Republican Clones” (New York Times), “White House Looking for
Ways to Ease [Democratic] Opposition to Social Security Overhaul” (New
York Times), and “Bush, Dems Take Sides on Social Security Reform; And
Each Warns Other It Will Suffer in 2006 Elections Because of It” (Chicago
Sun Times).
Framing Social Security
The debate over Social Security was polarizing and contentious. Frames that
supported Bush’s reform efforts included: (1) The “Personalization” frame,
which discussed creation of “personal” accounts, referenced the impor‑
tance of a “free market” within which individuals could plan their retire‑
ment investing, and addressed Bush’s promise of an “ownership society” via
the creation of investment accounts.71 Bush and congressional Republicans
routinely employed the language of personalization.72 The above phrases
portrayed privatization as empowering individuals against “inefficient,” “big
government.” (2) The “Bankruptcy” frame, depicting Social Security as in
danger of being unable to pay for retiree benefits.73 This frame conveyed a
sense of urgency Republicans hoped would provoke Americans into support‑
ing reform. Bankruptcy was discussed regularly in Bush’s speeches.74 (3) The
“Future Generations” frame, which talked about preserving Social Security
for America’s children and grandchildren.75 Such phrasing regularly appeared
in President Bush’s speeches—portraying Social Security as unable to meet
future retirees’ needs.76
Democratic frames rejected Republican claims, framing Social Secu‑
rity as a success story. These frames included: (1) The “Privatization” frame,
contrary to the “personalization” frame, which described Bush as promot‑
ing “private” accounts and the “privatization” of Social Security.77 While the
difference between “private” and “personal” accounts might seem arbitrary,
polling demonstrated significant variations in support for reform, depending
on which word was used.78 References to “private” accounts were common
among congressional Democrats, including House Minority Leader Nancy
Pelosi and Senate Whip Dick Durbin, among others;79 (2) The “Manufac‑
tured Crisis” frame, which challenged claims that Social Security was going
bankrupt or in crisis.80 Democrats argued that if the program was not in dan‑
ger, why rush into a reform that was polarizing and unpopular with Ameri‑
cans? Democrats such as Representative Dennis Kucinich claimed that Social
Security would pay full benefits until 2041, while Senator Durbin explained
the program would remain fully solvent for nearly four decades, “making
every single promised payment.”81 (3) The “Cost” frame, which highlighted
the expenses incurred by establishing individual accounts and the borrowing
that privatization entailed.82 For example, senators Durbin and Mark Dayton
warned that borrowing for investment accounts could cost one to two trillion
dollars within a half‑decade.83 Democrats’ emphasis on the increased cost of
privatization sought to contradict Republican claims that individual accounts
were the solution to Social Security’s financial woes.
As with previous case studies, journalists echoed both Democratic and
Republican positions in the news. Table 3.4 suggests that, depending on the
media outlet, frames defending privatization accounted for as little as 44
percent, to as much as 57 percent of all frames that appeared.84 Similarly,
frames opposed to privatization constituted from 43 percent to 56 percent of
all frames. In short, frames from both parties regularly defined how Social
Security was reported.
Table 3.4. Social Security (1/1–5/31/2005): Competing Frames in the News

(as % of


Personalization 22 23 23 28 23

Bankruptcy 17 9 20 18 17

Future Generations 11 12 9 11 15


Frames (as a % of
in the news)

Con Frames

Privatization 29 37 31 25 22

Manufactured Crisis 10 14 11 10 14

Cost 11 5 6 8 9


Frames (as a % of
in the news)


analyzed
The “Privatization” and “Personalization” frames were regular staples

of reporting. Reporting conceded the importance of the “personalization‑

privatization” distinction. The New York Times, for example, highlighted CATO
Institute representative Michael Tanner’s acknowledgment that “Republicans
in Congress do not like the word ‘privatization’ because it does not poll
well.”85 President Bush, the paper reported, rejected the term “privatization,”
viewing it as a “trick word” that was “intended to scare people.” Republican
representative Jim McCrery, chairman of the Ways and Means Subcommittee,
discussed the importance of framing: “ ‘Private’ is exclusive, ‘private’ is limit‑

ing. ‘Private’ is something that’s not available to all. ‘Personal’ is encompass‑
ing. It’s individual. It’s ownership. In the end, you need the combination of
‘personal’ and ‘security.’ ”86

The second pair of rival frames addressed Social Security’s finances. The
“Bankruptcy” frame was captured by Bush’s warning to American youth: “If
you’re 20 years old, in your mid‑twenties, and you’re beginning to work, I
want you to think about a Social Security system that will be flat bust, bank‑
rupt, unless the United States Congress has got the willingness to act now.”87
Administration officials repeated this frame. Bush’s chief of staff Karl Rove,
for example, appeared on Fox News predicting that “we are facing a Social
Security system that is going to go bankrupt by the time our kids and grand‑
kids retire. And we’d better do something about it.”88 Many Congressional
Republicans claimed Social Security was in “crisis.”89
Democrats and other privatization opponents were more likely to
stress the “Manufactured Crisis” frame. Witold Skwierczynski, the president
of the Social Security Council of the American Federation of Government
Employees argued in the New York Times that “some of the information being
imparted” by Republicans was “not factual, not accurate. There is no immedi‑
ate crisis.”90 Journalists at times reported the estimate that the Social Security
surplus would not run out until 2042. This projection contradicted the claim
that Social Security was suffering from an immediate crisis.91 In total, the
“Bankruptcy” frame appeared more often than the “Manufactured Crisis”
frame in four of the five news organizations.
The third and final set of frames also addressed financial issues related
to Social Security. The “Future Generations” frame was an outgrowth of the
“Bankruptcy” frame, with Republicans predicting Social Security was unable
to meet future workers’ needs. The “Cost” frame suggested that the borrowing
required to create individual accounts was a burden on American taxpayers.
The “Future Generations” frame included figures such as Nicole Devinish,
an assistant to President Bush, who spoke on MSNBC of the need “to take
on the big issues and the ones that really allow us to leave the government
and this country in better shape for future generations. [President Bush]
poses the question, what can we do to improve the state of our children and
grandchildren’s union?” The Republican representative and chairman of the
House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security celebrated invest‑
ment accounts as “the only way we can take care of our kids in the future.”92
Proponents of the “Cost” frame estimated that individual accounts, as
news reporting suggested, “could add up to $2 trillion to the deficit over 10
years.”93 This frame depicted privatization as a threat to future generations.
Democratic senator and senior budget committee member Kent Conrad
criticized President Bush’s talk “about not wanting to pass burdens to future
generations. . . . But his budget does precisely that—passing on a crippling
 
 
 
 
and growing debt to our children and grandchildren. . . . I will not be part
 
 
 
 
of the unraveling the commitment of Social Security based on gutting the
benefits and hoping the stock market makes up the difference and funding
the transition with borrowing.”94
The above findings suggest that both Republican and Democratic posi‑
tions regularly appeared in the media. As with the other case studies, the
frames say nothing of the intensity of Republican versus Democratic voices. A
closer look at reporting on Social Security, however, suggests that Republicans
were strongly privileged over Democrats.
Main Findings
Findings regarding political actors in the news suggest a pro‑government bias,

with little evidence for the liberal media or pluralistic theories. Table 3.6 pro‑
vides no confirmation of a liberal media slant.95 Democrats were dwarfed by
Republicans in all nine categories covering story headlines, leads, and sources
quoted.96 Democratic marginalization coincided with Republican control of
government. The pro‑government bias predicts this pattern of coverage, since
journalists are expected to favor the party in power.
Political officials never constituted less than 75 percent of all sourc‑
es consulted in story headlines, leads, and sources quoted. At their most
extreme, as seen in headlines, political officials reached as high as 100 percent
of sources appearing in the news. Sources quoted were not so extreme in
terms of favoring officialdom, but even in that category government officials
constituted between 77 to 80 percent of all sources in the New York Times
and Chicago Sun Times.
A pro‑government bias was also observed via the privileging of the
executive branch. President Bush prioritized reform in his rhetoric and
actions, with the executive delivering seventy‑four public statements includ‑

ing speeches, press releases and interviews between January and May 2005,
or an average of nearly fifteen statements per month. Social Security reform
was the primary issue that defined the start of Bush’s second term in office.
Executive prioritization of reform coincided with a privileging of the execu‑
tive over Congress in all nine news categories from Table 3.5.
The media pluralism theory also lacks evidence. Nongovernmental
actors failed to comprise at least one‑third of all actors across all the catego‑
ries in Table 3.5. These voices received modest coverage as sources quoted
in New York Times and Chicago Sun Times stories, but attention was meager
throughout headlines and leads. Even in sources quoted, labor leaders, work‑
ers, and union members were barely mentioned. As such, reporting on a
“working‑class” perspective for how reforms would affect workers was largely
absent. The implications of these findings are significant: those most affected
by reform, and those with the most to lose if privatization failed, were barely
visible in the news.
Labor leaders appeared in almost none of the content categories from
Table 3.5. Their absence meant that working‑class interests had little voice in
media discourse. While workers would be pushed to invest their earnings in
the marketplace, they retained little ability to directly influence the debate on
privatization. Business leaders also received meager coverage.
“Average” citizens and academics received comparatively more atten‑
tion. Academics were sometimes consulted because of their expertise in ana‑
lyzing reform proposals. But academics retained a weak presence in headlines
and leads, although they appeared somewhat more often as quoted sources.
Academics consulted represented universities, businesses, and think tanks,
with journalists citing business professors, economists, and researchers from
groups such as the Economic Policy Institute and the CATO Institute.97 Citi‑
zens that did appear in the news represented citizens groups lobbying in
favor of or opposed to Bush’s reforms. Still, their appearance in stories was
relatively small, at less than 10 percent of sources quoted in both the New
York Times and Chicago Sun Times.
President Bush appropriated a “personalization” frame when selling
Social Security privatization. He articulated a concern with empowering
citizens to make their own decisions for retirement. Ironically, media cover‑
age limited public empowerment by failing to devote significant attention
to citizens and citizens groups in reporting. As a result, citizens had little
direct influence over media discourse. However, this does not mean that the
public was impotent in this debate. They were able to indirectly influence
Table 3.5. Social Security (1/1–5/31/2005): Political Actors in the News



Partisan Political Actors sources appearing) sources appearing) partisan sources appearing)

Sun


Democrats 4 12 14 14 12 27 33 26 20

Republicans 96 88 86 86 88 73 67 74 80


All Other Political Actors source appears as a % source appears as a % each source appears as a %

(Nonpartisan) of all sources appearing) of all sources appearing) of all sources appearing)

Sun


Business Leaders 0 0 0 2 2 <1 2 3 1

Labor Leaders 0 0 0 <1 0 0 0 2 1


Academics 0 0 2 2 0 <1 0 8 12

Bureaucrats 2 0 9 1 2 6 0 3 1

Citizens 0 0 0 4 5 4 4 9 6

Executive 93 94 74 63 72 55 55 37 44

Legislative 4 6 15 26 18 33 32 36 35

Judiciary 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 <1 0

Number of news stories
analyzed 96 29 74 96 29 130 48 96 29

Excludes op‑eds and editorials
media discourse by appealing directly to political officials who were setting

the agenda in the news. A more detailed discussion of the public’s role is
included in chapter 6.
Party and Leadership Mentions
Republican unified government should have translated into Republican pre‑

eminence in the news. A review of references to the political parties and
their leaders suggests that Republicans greatly outnumbered Democrats, as
seen in Table 3.6.98
Republican actors outnumbered Democratic ones in all five news orga‑
nizations, although Republican mentions failed to exceed Democratic men‑
tions by more than twenty percentage points in two outlets—Fox News and
MSNBC. Stories commonly mentioned Republicans such as President Bush,
Vice President Dick Cheney, senator and chairman of the Finance Committee
Charles Grassley, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, House Majority Leader
Tom Delay, and House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas,
among others. These officials sat in influential leadership positions, so it is
not surprising that journalists regularly included them in reporting.
As with the tax cut debate, commentary on Social Security reform was not
characterized by a consistent liberal bias or pro‑business bias. There did, how‑
Table 3.6. Social Security (1/1–5/31/2005): Mentions of Parties and

Party Leaders




Sun Times 21 79 29

CBS 29 71 74

MSNBC 40 60 130

Fox 47 53 48


ever, appear to be evidence of pluralism and a pro‑government bias. Com‑

mentary and editorials were indexed to the views expressed by both parties. By
2005, MSNBC was only just beginning to appeal to liberal audiences. MSNBC’s
conservative Tucker program was not yet running until after the Social Security
debate had ended. However, another partisan program, Countdown with Keith
Olbermann, was aired at the time. Olbermann is a well‑known liberal, and his
position on Social Security was antithetical to Republicans’. Olbermann ques‑
tioned Bush’s depiction of Social Security as in crisis. He pointed to Bush’s past
warning (in 1978) that the program would be bankrupt by 1988 as evidence
that the president was fabricating a problem.99 In short, the little commentary
that did take place on MSNBC leaned in a liberal direction.
Fox News, unsurprisingly, leaned in a conservative direction. O’Reilly
and Hannity accepted Republican talking points that Social Security was in
crisis, that it needed to be saved for future generations, and that privatization
was necessary to promote freedom of choice and empowerment.100 Hannity
and Colmes straddled Republican and Democratic positions, with Colmes
distressed over the costs of privatization.101
The New York Times opposed privatization, running op‑eds from nine
writers criticizing Bush and from four writers supporting. Counted among
opponents were regular op‑ed writers, business representatives, professors,
former government officials, and think tank representatives. Reasons for
opposing privatization included conventional Democratic arguments explored
throughout this chapter.102 The New York Times did allot some space for reform
supporters. Supportive op‑ed pieces were penned by regular columnists and
a Brookings Institution representative. Support focused on claims that priva‑
tization would increase retirees’ savings, and aid in fighting poverty.103
New York Times editorials condemned Bush’s privatization campaign.
Aside from criticizing the cost of privatization, the editors charged the admin‑
istration with “manipulating information.”104 This referred to the administra‑
tion’s claim that government borrowing of $2 trillion to establish individual
accounts would help avoid $10 trillion in unfunded program liabilities in the
future. Countering Bush, the paper argued that the “$10 trillion is a highly
inflated figure, intended to overstate a problem that is reasonable estimated
at $3.7 trillion or even considerably less. Worse are the true dimensions of
the administration’s proposed ploy, which were made painfully clear in a[n
Executive] memo,” which estimated, counter to the administration’s public
claims, that even with $2 trillion in borrowing, a privatized system would
be unable to pay benefits without large cuts.105 This deception, the New York
Times editors lamented, ran counter to conservative promises that privatiza‑
tion would enhance, rather than reduce benefits.
The Chicago Sun Times leaned slightly against reform. The paper ran
op‑eds from six writers who opposed privatization, and from four in support.
Among the ranks of the opponents were regular columnists, a government
official, and a representative of the Center for Tax and Budget Accountabil‑
ity.106 Supporters were limited to regular columnists.107 Editorially, the Sun
Times pragmatically neither supported nor opposed privatization. On the one
hand, individual accounts were seen as “investment” in retirees’ futures. On
the other hand, the paper worried about the cost of privatization, and sus‑
pected the fiscal problems facing Social Security were exaggerated.108 In sum‑
mary, the Chicago Sun Times’s positions were fairly balanced, albeit slightly
pro‑Democratic. A review of the New York Post, Chicago Tribune, Washington
Times, and Wall Street Journal finds that Republican editorial positions char‑
acterized all the papers. Editorials supported privatization in principle, or
echoed Republican claims that Social Security was going bankrupt.109
National editorials and commentary expressed a range of views on
Social Security. These views, however, fell in line with the major parties’
positions. Commentaries did not adopt positions outside the boundaries of
“acceptable” political debate. Pieces never claimed that the government should
commit to additional funding to Social Security as a public program. Rather,
the debate was over whether to privatize Social Security or not.
The above analysis suggests evidence of both pluralism and a pro‑gov‑
ernment bias. Commentary straddled the positions of Democrats and Repub‑
licans, but a substantial presence for nongovernmental actors was evident in
the New York Times. Five of thirteen op‑ed writers were nongovernmental
actors. The number was significantly less for the Chicago Sun Times, in which
two of ten op‑ed writers were from nongovernmental sources. While citi‑
zens’ voices were included in both papers, views conformed to those of the
two‑party system.
Hegemony and the Pro‑Business Bias
The Social Security and tax cut debates were not dominated by business fig‑
ures, but hegemonic bias was apparent nonetheless. Coverage of the tax cuts
and Social Security debates heavily favored Republicans. The tax cuts were
historic—the largest in history, costing $2.6 trillion over ten years, and mainly
benefiting the wealthy.110 The terms of the tax cut debate favored right‑wing,
antitax views. This is not merely because Republicans dominated the debate.
More broadly, a pro‑business, hegemonic bias is evident in the growing popu‑
larity in American politics of tax cuts for businesses and the affluent as an
“end all, be all” solution to economic troubles in the United States. The rising
popularity of tax cuts in political discourse began in the 1980s with the Rea‑
gan cuts, continued in the 1990s with capital gains cuts for businesses under
Clinton, and culminated with massive cuts during the Bush years and beyond.
Prioritization of tax cuts means dramatic reduction of government revenues,
and the potential scaling back of government involvement in peoples’ lives.
Because of the rightward drift of American politics, tax cuts have become a
priority, rather than expanding government services through increased tax rev‑
enues and spending. This framework suggests that a hegemonic mindset, one
favoring lower taxes for the wealthy, is increasingly driving political discourse.
In contrast to the Bush tax cuts, Social Security reform was an abysmal
failure. On the one hand, the Republican Party so thoroughly dominated the
news, with Democrats heavily marginalized. On the other hand, coverage
was also somewhat mixed, due to extensive coverage of the strong divisions
within the Republican Party (explored in chapter 6). How, then, could this
coverage be characterized by hegemonic bias? In some ways, this bias was
certainly present. One element of pro‑business bias was evident in the debate
over privatization. This debate centered on one simple question: Should we
or should we not privatize Social Security? This context is representative of
a larger pro‑business mindset that has taken over political discourse. The
discussion was not primarily over whether to strengthen Social Security as
a collective, socialized program by raising additional tax revenues to but‑
tress and replenish the program’s trust fund. That discussion would have
been far more liberal, and less hegemonic than the discussion that actually
took place. While Social Security reform failed, it should still be situated
within a broader political‑economic framework that prioritizes discussion of
market‑based, pro‑business policies.
That President Bush could even raise the issue of privatization in public
discourse is a stark sign of how much the U.S. political system and politi‑
cal discourse has moved in favor of business interests. Such a debate was
not likely a half‑century earlier. As Republican president Dwight Eisenhower
acknowledged in 1954:
Should any political party attempt to abolish Social Security, unem‑

ployment insurance, and eliminate labor laws and farm programs,
you would not hear of that party again in our political history.
There is a tiny splinter group, of course, that believes you can do
these things. Among them are H. L. Hunt . . . a few other Texas
 
 
 
 
oil millionaires, and an occasional politician or business man from
other areas. Their number is negligible and they are stupid.111
Clearly, much has changed since Eisenhower’s time, for in less than fifty
years the most prominent official in the United States could not only make
the case for privatization publicly, but assume—albeit erroneously—that the
public was behind him.112
Conclusions
The results from this chapter’s investigations found little evidence of liberal
bias in reporting. Some evidence of pluralism was found, but only in newspa‑
per op‑eds. On the other hand, a pro‑government bias was present regarding
both the tax cuts and Social Security, with the views expressed in the news
“indexed” to those of political officials. For both the tax cuts and Social Secu‑
rity, the pro‑government bias accurately predicted news coverage with regard
to official dominance of story headlines, leads, sources quoted, news frames,
and mentions of parties and party leaders. Editorials and commentary were
also indexed to the opinions of political officials.
There are normative implications of a pro‑government bias in the
news. The two issues explored here were of extreme importance to “average”
Americans. For the tax cuts, the central questions are: (1) How are soci‑
ety’s economic resources distributed?; and (2) which groups of Americans
are privileged and marginalized in the process? Studies of the Bush tax cuts
estimated that they were heavily biased in favor of the wealthiest 1 to 20
percent of Americans.113 The top 1 percent captured 38 percent of the cuts,
compared to the poorest 60 percent, which received less than 20 percent.114
Simply stated, the Bush tax cuts were of tremendous importance
because they allocated trillions in tax revenues in a lopsided manner, ben‑
efiting wealthier Americans more than anyone else, and contributing to a
significant growth in inequality. They forced an increase in deficits and the
debt, which was later used (in the 2010s) by political officials to argue that the
United States was “broke” and that a massive cut in social welfare programs
was necessary. In such a significant policy debate, the American public played
little to no direct role.
Journalists fell in line with a mindset embraced by political officials that
the public should not generally be seen or heard from in public policy debates.
The public plays a participatory role in elections, but for policy deliberation
their input is deemed of minimal importance. This extremely limited concep‑
tion of “democracy”—if one could call it that—treats the public as a passive
force, to be guided by political elites. Due to the government’s dominance of
the news, to the near‑exclusion of citizen voices, it is difficult to talk about the
media without acknowledging a propaganda element at play. With the Bush

tax cuts, revenues could have been allocated in different ways, to pay down
national debt, or to strengthen the government’s commitment to other pro‑
grams that were growing in cost. The strengthening of welfare programs over
cutting taxes was preferred by the public, although citizens rarely expressed
this opinion (or any opinion for that matter) in the news.115
For Social Security reform, the near‑total absence of labor representa‑
tives, citizens groups, and citizens in general raises concerns about the qual‑
ity of deliberation. Journalists did not consider these actors to be important
to the policy process. For such a profound policy reform—one that would
affect hundreds of millions of Americans—the near‑invisibility of the public
is problematic from a democratic standpoint. The lack of public presence in
these stories becomes more concerning considering that privatized Social
Security accounts would have suffered tremendous losses following the 2008
economic collapse. While Americans would have suffered major hits to their
retirement savings, threatening their very ability to retire, journalists did little
to consult seniors about this possibility during the time of the 2005 debate.
An “instability” frame, discussing the fluctuations in the stock market and the
danger to retirement incomes, never appeared as a regular point of discus‑
sion in the news. It was neglected in Republican euphoria on privatization,
and failed to appear often in the news as a Democratic talking point. This
potential frame probably would have been a more common topic of discus‑
sion if senior citizens had appeared regularly in the news.
Reporters could have quoted experts on public opinion and “average”
Americans more frequently. As I discuss in chapter 5, however, the public did
benefit from an indirect presence in stories on Social Security. Reporters regu‑
larly referenced apprehension from Democratic and Republican officials toward
privatizing Social Security. This apprehension originated from a hostile pub‑
lic—particularly seniors and their advocacy groups—which exerted enormous
pressure on political officials not to endorse privatization. Despite the lack of
journalistic concern with the public, Americans still managed to force their way
into Social Security coverage, albeit indirectly by influencing the positions of
political officials. The public’s ability to indirectly influence the Social Security
debate suggests that Americans can at times play a powerful role in the policy
process. While the public had little impact on media discourse concerning tax
cuts, the vigilance of an active citizenry on Social Security meant the public
benefited from a direct pipeline into the halls of Washington.
If the public’s will was heard in the case of Social Security reform, it
certainly was not because of journalists. Political officials took public oppo‑
sition to privatization seriously because of a concern with electoral reprisal
Introduction 15
record,” it is responsible for much of the original national reporting on public

policy, and is closely followed by other print, television, and online sources.
Studies demonstrate that the New York Times “sets the agenda” for what issues
are discussed in the news and for how they are covered.42
I selected the Chicago Sun Times because it represents local print news
across the country. As with other local papers, it pulls its stories on national
policy issues from newswire services such as Reuters and the Associated Press.
By selecting this outlet, I am able to generalize about stories produced by
other outlets relying on wire services across the country. Previous research
concludes that, even if some local newspapers report on local issues (the
actions of a local member of Congress or local presidential visits) differently
than other newspapers, the general tone of news content is similar across
local newspapers when they publish national news.43 This uniformity exists
because local newspapers do not produce original national reporting, instead
relying on newswire agencies.
CBS News was chosen because of its representation of a medium
(broadcast news) with mass appeal. CBS, ABC, and NBC news were viewed
by approximately 22 million Americans per day in 2012.44 Any generalization
about national reporting must take into account this medium when assessing
national coverage of economic policy issues.
In analyzing editorials and op‑eds, I expand my examination beyond
the New York Times and Chicago Sun Times. It is impossible to generalize
about national media commentary with such a small number of venues. I
also include articles from regional and national newspapers: the Wall Street
Journal, the New York Post, the Washington Times, and the Chicago Tribune.
All four have sizable readerships. Most importantly, these outlets hold repu‑
tations for being conservative in their editorializing, compared to the liberal
New York Times and Chicago Sun Times. Including liberal and conservative
newspapers is necessary for any study analyzing the full spectrum of U.S.
political commentary. I also analyze commentary from pundits who appear
on Fox News and MSNBC, including conservatives Bill O’Reilly, Glenn Beck,
and Sean Hannity (all on Fox), and liberals Rachel Maddow, Keith Olber‑
mann, and Ed Schultz (all on MSNBC).
Fox News and MSNBC represent a newer type of media that narrow‑
cast to partisan Americans, appealing to a combined primetime audience of
2.3 million in 2014.45 Including news outlets that narrowcast is important in
order to better generalize about the state of today’s news on economic policy.
Some claim that partisan “new media” represent a massive, even revolutionary
change from the previous “old media” system, which was based on “objec‑
tive” reporting.46 However, others claim the differences between old and new
4
Unified Democratic Government

Debating the Stimulus and Executive Pay, 2009
In this chapter, I assess media coverage of the stimulus and executive pay
during a period of unified Democratic control of government. I find that, as
with reporting on the minimum wage, tax cuts, and Social Security, coverage
was best explained by pro‑government and pro‑business biases. Democratic
partisan control of government determined what the public was exposed to
in the news. Reporters embraced a symbiotic relationship with political elites,
echoing the messages of the Democratic and Republican parties. Little evi‑
dence was found of a liberal media bias. While news stories heavily privi‑
leged Democratic actors, as the liberal bias theory claims, this dominance
was likely due to Democratic control of government. No consistent pattern of
liberal bias was found in the other case studies, suggesting the theory holds
little explanatory power. During times of Republican control of government,
Republicans dominate the news. During periods of Democratic control, Dem‑
ocrats control news narratives. During split party government, journalists
balance the views of both parties. These findings suggest a pro‑government
bias, with journalists indexing coverage to the power dynamics that exist in
Washington.
These case studies provide little evidence of Republican domination of
reporting, or of an explicit bias in favor of business groups. However, the
framework through which the stimulus and executive pay were discussed
overlapped with the growth of business power in American politics. The stim‑
ulus and executive pay are linked to the larger issue of government deregula‑
tion of business. The stimulus was a direct consequence of deregulation, as
93
the government was forced to re‑stimulate the economy in order to clean

up the mess left behind after the 2008 economic collapse. That collapse was
a product of government deregulation of the banks, which spurred reckless
lending in housing‑related investments. For executive pay, the government
reacted to record spikes in executive compensation paid to those responsible
for creating the housing bubble. The central policy question was what govern‑
ment should do, if anything, to respond to the growing economic power of
corporate elites, who saw their incomes and wealth increase far more dramati‑
cally than “average” Americans in recent decades.
Finally, my analysis finds little pluralism in coverage in terms of seri‑
ous attention to public interest groups or the citizenry. What did Americans
think about using taxpayer bailout money for bonuses for those responsible
for the economic crisis? National reporting on the executive pay controversy
could have enriched the deliberation process if public sentiment covering
the bailout and its aftermath had been regularly consulted. Should the mon‑
ey have been allocated the way it was? Were the spending priorities in the
bill acceptable to Americans, or overlapping with public preferences? These
issues were never seriously addressed in reporting. Speaking to concerns
with propaganda, journalists displayed an extraordinarily narrow conception
of what constituted “acceptable” sources in the debate on these important
policy issues.
The 2008 Election and the Rise of Democratic Power
Following the sizable Republican losses in the 2008 election, early 2009 wit‑
nessed the rise of unified Democratic control of government. In a time of
economic crisis, Democrats made economic growth into a cornerstone of
their agenda. Partisan disagreement was strong, as Republicans sought to
obstruct Democratic initiatives they saw as anathema to Republican ideology.
National political debates over the stimulus and regulation of executive pay
dominated public discourse.
The Stimulus Debate and the Economic Crisis
The 2000s saw the collapse of one of the largest speculative bubbles in Wall
Street history. The $8 trillion housing bubble collapsed between 2007 and
2008, taking with it a number of national banks and investment firms.1 The
collapse threatened many more financial institutions, which were in danger
Unified Democratic Government 95
of declaring bankruptcy due to the massive losses incurred through housing

defaults and declining value of the mortgage‑related derivatives investments.
The economic collapse caused a decline in investor confidence and a decline
in trust in the banking sector. With the credit markets frozen by late 2008
due to increasing economic uncertainty, companies were unable to secure
loans to meet payroll obligations, or to continue or expand their business
operations. Significant layoffs ensued, as Americans suffered massive losses in
personal wealth (much of which was tied to their homes), and as unemploy‑
ment grew. The declining economy contributed to a decline in tax revenues
and a renewed emphasis on cutting government spending, which threatened
to further depress the economy. By 2009, the economy had reached its weak‑
est point yet, with negative economic growth and an unemployment rate of
nearly 10 percent.
The economic collapse and Wall Street bailout overlapped with the 2008
election, in which voters punished the Republican Party by voting for Demo‑
cratic majorities in the House and Senate, in addition to a Democratic presi‑
dent. The emergence of unified Democratic government was accompanied by
a discussion of what government could do to promote economic recovery. The
stimulus was an effort to jump‑start the economy again after an economic
collapse caused by deregulation. Deregulation had included the elimination of
rules governing commodities and “derivatives” investments covering the bun‑
dling of mortgages and home insurance contracts. It also included the removal
of previous banking ownership limits, tracing back to the Great Depression
and the Glass‑Steagall Act, which had mandated that separate corporations be
responsible for traditional commercial banking and riskier investment bank‑
ing. The repeal of Glass‑Steagall allowed for mergers between the two types of
banking interests, meaning that when banks failed due to the collapse of risky
housing investments, they would most certainly take the entire banking system
with them, unless they received a taxpayer‑funded bailout.
The debate over the economy centered on Keynesian and supply side
arguments regarding how to end the recession. Contrary to the supply side
approach, which historically stresses greater tax cuts for, and deregulation of
businesses, Keynesian economics is “demand side,” framing economic growth
as dependent on government’s attempts to stimulate consumer demand for
goods and services during periods of economic crisis. According to Keynes‑
ians, during times of economic decline, consumer demand is increased and
the economy stimulated by increased government spending on programs
such as public works and tax cuts for working and middle‑class Americans,
which are funded through deficit spending. As the father of demand side
theory, economist John Maynard Keynes advocated government intervention
following economic crashes via policies such as the reduction of loan interest
rates offered by the Federal Reserve and increased government investment
in infrastructure through public works spending, as a means of reducing
unemployment.2 Newly employed Americans would use their earnings on
consuming goods and services, thereby increasing economic growth. The
2009 stimulus was an example of Keynesian economics, because it included
substantial spending for public works and infrastructure, in addition to tax
cuts directed toward working and middle‑class Americans.
Competing Ideologies and the Stimulus
The stimulus was debated in a heated environment due to public anger over
growing unemployment, economic stagnation, and growing government debt.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that, by injecting close to
$1 trillion into the economy, the stimulus would increase economic growth
by between 1.2 to 3.6 percentage points in 2010. The CBO projected that
from 1.3 to 3.9 million jobs would be created within the same period, and
the unemployment rate would decline by between .7 to 2.1 percentage points.
However, the CBO also estimated that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would
decline by .1 to .3 percentage points by 2019, after factoring in the effects
of growing national debt from the stimulus.3 The CBO’s May 2011 estimate
concluded that the stimulus raised GDP by 1.1 to 3.1 percentage points,
decreased unemployment by .6 to 1.8 percentage points, and increased the
total number of employed by 1.2 to 3.3 million.4
Liberal policy analysts claimed the stimulus would stabilize and
strengthen the economy. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities argued
that the stimulus would aid in “significantly ameliorating the recession’s
impact on poverty,” with the bill’s inclusion of unemployment insurance,
working family tax credits, food stamps funding, and one‑time payments to
groups such as veterans, retirees, and to the disabled.5 The CBO estimated
that unemployment benefits created from seventy cents to $1.90 in economic
activity for every dollar spent.6 The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) estimated
that unemployment would have been two percentage points higher by the
end of 2009 if not for the stimulus.7 EPI supported the stimulus as a means
of improving American infrastructure, but criticized the bill for not going far
enough. They cited a report from the American Society of Civil Engineers,
which estimated that the stimulus funded just 8 percent of the amount needed
over five years for infrastructure development, with an additional $1.1 tril‑
lion needed.8
Conservative policy analysts dismissed the CBO’s and liberal groups’

claims about the positive economic benefits of the stimulus. They instead
focused on the debt associated with the bill, framing government interven‑
tion as an impediment to economic health. The Heritage Foundation lam‑
basted the stimulus as “the LARGEST SPENDING BILL EVER enacted
by Congress, making the New Deal look small, accounting for inflation.”
This calculation probably satisfied conservative critics, although comparing
a nearly decade‑long initiative (the New Deal) to a single year’s spending
bill was a stretch considering estimates suggesting that the stimulus was
significantly smaller than New Deal spending.9 Heritage calculated that the
stimulus spending would cost each family more than $10,000, and “would
be the equivalent to what they roughly spend on food, clothing, and health
care in an entire year.”10 The American Enterprise Institute worried that the
effect of Keynesian spending is “uncertain,” rejecting the entire premise that
government spending aids promoting economic growth.11 The Competitive
Enterprise Institute classified much of the stimulus as “boondoggles” and as
“wasteful union‑controlled” projects which would do little to promote infra‑
structure development.12
Much of conservative opposition originated from a philosophical
rejection of government spending directed toward poorer Americans. Curtis
Dubay of the Heritage Foundation criticized Obama for seeking to “spread
the wealth around” with the stimulus, and for engaging in “redistributionist
agenda” that benefited the poor by taking from the rich.13 Richard Epstein of
the CATO Institute argued that “as libertarians we know, each new extension
of government power should be examined under a presumption of error. By
that standard, the president’s stimulus package—indeed his entire legislative
program—should be scrapped.” As this last comment suggested, conservatives
rejected increased government spending as a matter of principle.14
The Political Battle
Opposition to the stimulus was significant, with House and Senate Repub‑
licans widely opposed to the Democrats’ proposal. Obama, however, wasted
no time with promoting the stimulus. He began making his case in early
January 2009, before he was even inaugurated president.15 Obama’s plan called
for $825 billion in spending to “jolt” the economy out of recession, while
Republicans appeared strongly hostile.16 Obama indicated by late January that
he was potentially open to a “compromise” on the stimulus, by increasing tax
cuts included in the bill to win Republican support.17
In late January 2009, House Democrats voted overwhelmingly in favor

of an $819 billion stimulus without a single Republican vote.18 In the Senate,
Republicans called for additional tax cuts in the package, and overwhelm‑
ingly opposed the bill.19 Despite opposition, Obama continued to support
the stimulus by speaking at town halls and other events.20 A bill eventually
emerged in the Senate in early February, estimated at more than $838 bil‑
lion, although the compromise between House and Senate versions was $789
billion.21 The Senate bill was passed with overwhelming Democratic support,
despite just three Republican Senators supporting it.
The stimulus bill became law on February 17, 2009, despite continued
battles between Republicans and Democrats.22 The law—titled the “American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009”—balanced competing spending pri‑
orities from the House and Senate. Public support for the stimulus and the
president remained high. This support was not surprising considering the bill
was passed during Obama’s “honeymoon” period, in which the public was
looking to him to address the economic crisis.23 Most supported the idea of a
stimulus to help stabilize the economy, with 52 percent embracing a spending
package of at least $800 billion.24
Partisan Conflict on the Stimulus
While Obama positioned himself as a facilitator between competing parties

in an effort to win Republican votes, his effort was unsuccessful in winning
significant cross‑party support. News stories conveyed the strength of parti‑
san conflict: “Republicans are Resistant to Obama’s Stimulus Plan (New York
Times),” “Democrats Set Sights on Republican Senators Who Oppose Plan”
(New York Times); and “Hopes for Bipartisanship Hit Political Reality as GOP
Votes Appear Scarce for Obama’s Stimulus (Chicago Sun Times).”
Framing the Stimulus
There were many conflicting arguments made in favor of, and against, the
stimulus by think tanks, policy researchers, and political leaders that appeared
in stories on the stimulus. Arguments in favor of the stimulus included: (1)
The “Infrastructure” frame, emphasizing the contents of the stimulus in
specific project areas such as education, energy, and construction projects
covering roads, bridges, and transit.25 Public opinion surveys found that
such spending was highly popular among Americans,26 so highlighting these
projects translated into positive framing for the stimulus. In his speeches
and interviews, for example, Obama stressed “infrastructure” spending that
would “put people to work rebuilding our crumbling roads and bridges,”27
(2) The “Economic Stability” frame, portraying the stimulus as necessary for
economic recovery.28 References included discussions of the stimulus related
to helping the economy stabilize and grow, and references to the stimulus
alongside discussion of the economic crisis or recession. Such content high‑
lighted the gravity of the economic downturn, while portraying the federal
government as leading stabilization efforts. Obama discussed the stimulus
as necessary for “get[ting] the economy moving again.” The stimulus was “a
necessary component to solving our economic problems, and in “sav[ing] or
creat[ing] over 3 million jobs” in the United States;29 (3) The “Main Street”
frame, emphasizing the suffering of “average” Americans in a time of cri‑
sis.30 This frame included references to low‑income individuals, to workers, to
“Main Street,” to poverty, to possible state and federal layoffs and service cuts,
to budget shortfalls or budget crisis, and references to unemployment. These
discussions created a positive image of the Democratic Party as concerned
with helping the disadvantaged. In one example, Obama stressed that the
stimulus would aid those relying on food stamps and unemployment benefits
by helping “ordinary families” “to survive, thrive, send their kids to college,
keep their homes, [and] keep their jobs.”31
Three frames were analyzed that depicted the stimulus in a negative
context. They included: (1) The “Taxes” frame, which addressed references to
taxes or proposed tax cuts.32 The Republican Party’s fixation on tax cuts as a
means of promoting economic growth has been known for decades. Demo‑
crats’ inclusion of tax cuts in the stimulus was a direct product of Republican
efforts to depict Democratic proposals as wasteful spending and as ineffec‑
tive in promoting economic growth. Democrats’ acceptance of the claim that
tax cuts are an effective way of promoting growth represented a victory for
Republicans, and in favor of a more conservatively oriented stimulus. Refer‑
ences to the need to stimulate the economy through tax cuts were routine
in congressional Republican speeches.33 (2) The “Borrowing” frame, stressing
stimulus effects on the national deficit and debt.34 Republicans attacked the
stimulus for harming future generations with unsustainable debt that would
eventually result in increased taxes. This attack fit comfortably within the
“Borrowing” frame, which included discussion of the cost of the stimulus,
to the borrowing entailed in the bill, and to government deficits and debt.
The “Borrowing” frame appeared numerous times in Republican speeches, for
example when Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell warned against put‑
ting “$1 trillion on the nation’s credit card,” and when House Minority Whip
Introduction 17
are explored—pro‑government bias, media pluralism, the liberal media, and

pro‑business bias (hegemony), and applied to the 1996 and 2007 minimum
wage case studies. In these two cases, neither Democrats nor Republicans
exercised an advantage in the news. In chapter 3, I review two case studies
under unified Republican government—the 2001 tax cuts and 2005 Social
Security debate. In these cases, I uncover evidence of a pro‑Republican bias
in the news. In chapter 4, I examine two conflicts during unified Demo‑
cratic government—the 2009 stimulus and 2009 executive pay controversy.
In contrast to chapter 3, I find a bias in favor of Democrats. Synthesizing the
findings from chapters 2, 3, and 4, each political party’s perspectives were
privileged or neglected depending on which party controlled government.
Chapters 5 and 6 address the “bad news” bias. In chapter 5, I review
media coverage in my primary case studies, comparing the “bad news” and
pro‑government theories. I find little evidence of a “bad news” bias in the
news. Chapter 6 tests the bad news theory by assessing the effects of media
coverage on public opinion. I find consistent evidence in chapters 5 and 6
that the pro‑government (or “indexing”) bias dominates news coverage, and
that it exerts a significant impact on public attitudes of policy issues. Offi‑
cial success in manufacturing consent, however, is inconsistent at best. But
the main problem with those claiming a bad news bias is that they frame
media as one‑dimensionally negative in opposition to government. I find
that coverage is far more fluid and variable, sometimes favoring one party
and sometimes favoring the other, but always favoring governmental over
nongovernmental sources.
Chapter 7 expands the book’s main findings on media bias and its
effects by reviewing ten additional case studies. The findings again suggest
a pro‑government bias in the news, but with inconsistent effects on public
opinion. Finally, chapter 8 utilizes experimental research methods to verify
the findings regarding the effects of the media on public opinion documented
in earlier chapters. Chapter 8 relies on experimental findings for four policy
areas: the minimum wage, student loans, tax cuts, and the stimulus.
Normative Implications for Constrained Media
A major implication of my findings centers on whether journalists promote

propaganda in media discourse. Previous studies criticize journalists for pro‑
moting government propaganda, at the expense of nonofficial views.50 This
book echoes that concern, considering the overwhelming reliance of reporters
on government sources at the expense of pluralistic reporting that emphasizes
Table 4.1. The Stimulus (1/1–2/28/2009): Major Frames in Print and

Television Media

(as % of


Infrastructure 16 20 10 15 15

Economic Stability 19 18 19 22 25

Main Street 17 20 18 12 17

Total Democratic Frames 52 58 47 49 57


Con Frames

Taxes 19 22 22 20 18

Borrowing 11 9 16 13 7

Big Government 18 11 15 18 18

Total Republican Frames 48 42 53 51 43



analyzed
increases in spending on education, aid to states for Medicaid costs, tempo‑

rary increases in jobless benefits, and a vast array of public works projects
to create jobs.”41 Democrats’ preferred narrative was seen in a comment from
Representative Dan Lipinski in the Chicago Sun Times, discussing stimulus
transit funding as “a great way to create jobs.”42 Discussion of infrastruc‑
ture—in light of its popularity with the public—served as a counterweight to
suggestions that “spending” was automatically “wasteful.” For example, while
Fox News reporter Bret Baier wondered whether the stimulus represented
“the biggest pork barrel spending bill in history,” he situated that discus‑
sion within another discussion of Obama’s “$825 billion wager that pumping
money into infrastructure and job growth will get the country’s economy
back on solid ground.”43
A second set of competing frames included conflicting claims regarding

stimulating the economy and government borrowing. References to the stim‑
ulus as vital to aiding the economy came in many forms. For example, Chris
Matthews, the host of the MSNBC program Hardball reported on Obama’s
“big bill aimed at pulling the American economy back from the abyss of
depression.”44 Similarly, the New York Times cited Treasury Secretary Timothy
Geithner’s claim that “the government would have to invest much more [in
a stimulus plan] before the economy revives: ‘In a crisis of this magnitude,
the most prudent course is the most forceful course.’ ”45

The “Borrowing” frame, in contrast, redirected Americans’ priorities
from a discussion of the economy to warnings about runaway spending.
Debt undertaken in the name of economic stimulus was seen as inherently
harmful. For example, Republican representative Mike Pence argued on CBS
that “the only thing it [the stimulus] will stimulate is more government and
more debt,”46 while Republican former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney
warned on Fox News that “a lot of us feel that we can’t continue to borrow
more money” in order to “extend jobless benefits” as part of government
spending.47
The final pair of competing frames in the debate emphasized “Big Gov‑
ernment” as compared to “Main Street.” On the “Big Government” side, CBS
reporter Bill Plante spoke of Republican attacks on Democratic Speaker of the
House Nancy Pelosi for including in the stimulus “pet projects that Democrats
have been trying to pass for years that have nothing to do with jump‑starting
our economy.”48 On Fox News, host Chris Wallace reported on the position
that “spending” was inherently negative, as seen in Representative Cantor’s
attacks on “a spending bill” that was “beyond anyone’s imagination,” and
Republican senator John McCain’s conclusion that the Democrats’ proposal
represented a “spending bill, not a stimulus bill.”49
In contrast, the “Main Street” frame refocused the agenda on what
government could do to help those in need. In the Chicago Sun Times, report‑
ing emphasized workers who were “battered by layoffs and dread of worse
to come,” and drew attention to “much of the new spending [that] would
be for victims of the recession, in the form of unemployment compensa‑
tion, health care and food stamps.”50 On Countdown, MSNBC host Keith
Olbermann addressed the more than 2.5 million Americans who joined the
ranks of the unemployed in 2008 and early 2009: “Republicans are betting
everything now, that the unemployed and millions more Americans who
worry they might soon be joining them on the unemployment lines would
prefer that Congress do nothing so that they are taxed less on paychecks that
they might not have for much longer.”51 As with previous chapters, the frames
analyzed here indicate little about the intensity of Republican versus Demo‑
cratic voices in the news. In order to understand which party dominated in
stimulus reporting, a closer examination is needed.
Main Findings
The findings herein suggest a strong pro‑government slant to the news. Cov‑
erage leaned heavily toward the Democrats, as predicted by those claiming
a liberal bias. Democratic sources dominated over Republican ones in every
category analyzed in Table 4.2. But this trend also corresponded with uni‑
fied Democratic control of government, as predicted by the pro‑government
bias theory.
Table 4.2 includes the findings for print coverage of political actors
appearing on television and in print.52 Virtually no evidence exists for media
pluralism. Nongovernmental actors simply did not get much attention in the
news.53 Nongovernmental actors reached a high of 17 percent of all actors for
sources quoted in the New York Times, but appeared far less often in the other
categories. Business sources were infrequent in their appearances. Examples
of business sources included the National Retail Federation, the Alliance
for American Manufacturing, the Caterpillar Corporation, and Google Inc.,
among others. Both reporters and the Obama administration consulted busi‑
ness coalitions and corporations on their opinions.54 Corporations such as
Caterpillar were included in the debate because of the impact of the stimulus
on construction projects.
As with other nongovernmental actors, academics were meager as
a source in stories. Among those consulted were representatives of liberal
and conservative groups such as the Center for American Progress and the
American Enterprise Institute, representatives of nonpartisan groups such as
the Tax Policy Center, and economists and analysts from the private sector.
These individuals were consulted to solicit their opinions of the effects of
the stimulus on “average” working Americans and on the business sector.55
Finally, workers and union members were consulted more than other
types of nongovernmental sources, but their presence did not even reach 10
percent of all sources in the New York Times and Chicago Sun Times. Examples
of those cited included: workers who were influenced by state and local service
cuts (and who might benefit from the stimulus), employees of corporations
who might be helped by construction projects, and private sector consultants
providing analyses for how the stimulus would affect the industries within
which they worked.56 One might suspect that workers’ perspectives would
Table 4.2. The Stimulus (1/1–2/28/2009): Political Actors in Print and Television News Stories




Sun


Democrats 94 100 62 78 87 64 76 63 79

Republicans 6 0 38 22 13 36 24 37 21




Sun



Labor Leaders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Workers/ Unionists 0 0 0 3 6 0 0 1 6

Academics 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 7 4

Bureaucrats 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0

Citizens 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 5 0

Executive 88 80 45 70 71 60 70 37 55

Legislative 12 20 55 24 24 34 27 42 33

Judiciary 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0


analyzed

be viewed as valuable for a stimulus that promised to get Americans back to

work, lower unemployment, and assist “Main Street” Americans. Such voices,
however, were seen as far less newsworthy compared to official sources.
Finally, general citizens appeared in some stories, but were concentrated
mostly in the sources quoted in the New York Times. The above findings
suggest that journalists were not interested in reporting a diversity of voices
outside of officialdom. Reporters indexed their coverage to fit the priorities
of Washington. Is this a problem for deliberation? From a citizen perspec‑
tive, there is reason to be concerned with the limited range of views that
drives political reporting. If democracy requires empowering the public to
influence the terms of political discourse, democratic deliberation was clearly
never achieved.
Party and leadership mentions in Table 4.3 suggest that Democratic actors
enjoyed a significant advantage over Republicans.57 Democratic mentions
outnumbered Republican mentions by more than twenty percentage points
in three of the five news organizations. Of the other two outlets, Republi‑
can mentions outnumbered Democratic on MSNBC, although Democrats
enjoyed a modest advantage on CBS News.
Reporting focused regularly on prominent party leaders. For the execu‑
tive branch, commonly mentioned representatives included President Obama,
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, and economic advisor Lawrence
Table 4.3. The Stimulus (1/1–2/28/2009): Mentions of Parties and Party

Leaders




Sun Times 73 27 14

CBS 54 46 57

MSNBC 47 53 37

Fox 63 37 101


Summers, among others. Regularly mentioned Democratic congressional

leaders included Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and House Majority
Leader Steny Hoyer, in addition to others holding financially related com‑
mittee positions. When Republicans did appear in reporting, party leaders
received regular attention. Commonly appearing officials included House
Minority Leader John Boehner and second ranking Senate Republican John
Kyl, in addition to leading budget and financially related committee members.
As with other case studies, opinions on the stimulus were indexed to the range
of views expressed in Washington. Some news outlets leaned in a pro‑Dem‑
ocratic direction, supporting the stimulus, while others aligned with Repub‑
lican positions. Whatever the bias of individual news organizations, there
was little evidence of a systematic liberal bias. Those outlets often thought of
as pro‑Democratic—including the New York Times, Chicago Sun Times, and
MSNBC—supported the stimulus. In contrast Fox News and other supple‑
mental sources adopted a more critical tone.
A review of New York Times content finds that nine op‑eds supported
the stimulus and five were opposed. The paper’s editors were supportive,
although they presented some criticisms of specific parts of the initiative. They
celebrated some sections of the law—such as its funding for food stamps, aid
to states, and aid to the unemployed, as “the most effective” way to promote
stimulus, since these programs “get money directly to low and middle‑income
Americans, who are likely to spend it quickly, boosting [consumer] demand.”
“Concern over swelling deficits” was seen as all the more reason “to get the
most from every dollar that is spent on the stimulus. That means spending
less money for tax cuts for business and high‑income Americans, and more
for government programs like, say, unemployment relief and aid to states.”58
In short, the paper supported the stimulus, although its editors wished it
allocated even more aid to the needy.
Commentary in the Chicago Sun Times also leaned in favor of the
Democrats. It printed columns from six writers who favored the initiative,
but just two who were opposed. Editorially, the paper criticized Republicans
for not having “proposed a better idea” for stimulating the economy, while
supporting President Obama for “slamming down the gate” against further
compromises. “A stimulus package heavy on spending and infrastructure
investments is the best way to pull this country out of the deepest recession
in a generation. That’s a nonnegotiable for the president, even at the risk of
undermining bipartisanship.”59 A sampling of supplemental sources—includ‑

ing the New York Post, Wall Street Journal, Washington Times, and Chicago
Tribune—finds all these newspapers taking Republican‑leaning, anti‑stimulus
positions in their editorials.60 In summary, editorial commentary in the U.S.
print media included a range of positions supported by both political parties.
Evidence of pluralism was apparent in both papers. In the Sun Times,
four of eight—or one‑half of the op‑ed writers—were nongovernmental figures,
while five of thirteen writers—or 38 percent—were nongovernmental in New
York Times op‑eds. The views expressed in both papers, however, mirrored the
ideologies of the major parties. Media pluralism in op‑eds might be seen as
reflective of some sort of commitment to diversity of views. But commentary
pages in newspapers are relegated to the back of the main section. While they
are important as a measurement of media content, a lack of diversity in actual
news stories cannot be made up for through the op‑ed page alone.
By 2009, partisan cable news was a growing venue. MSNBC and Fox
demonstrated that media providers were “narrowcasting” to Democratic
and Republican viewers. Coverage of the stimulus on both channels also
conformed to the range of viewpoints expressed within the political system.
Pundits at MSNBC and Fox expressed the typical ideological positions they
have come to be associated with, whether Democratic or Republican in
orientation.61
What lessons can be drawn from stimulus reporting? As I discuss
in chapter 5, the stimulus was a peculiar case. Democrats did not always
dominate the news. Overall, coverage in January was strongly favorable to
the party, although February reporting saw a significant decline in Demo‑
cratic dominance, as Republican criticisms received greater attention in the
news and as Democrats expressed internal divisions about what the stimulus
should look like. While attention to stimulus news was associated with grow‑
ing support for the president in January, attention actually produced grow‑
ing opposition by February. The Democrats, however, were generally effective
throughout the stimulus debate in setting the agenda for how the issue was
discussed in the news.
Regulating Executive Pay
The dispute over the use of taxpayer funds to pay bonuses to Wall Street
executives received extensive attention in the news in 2009. The 2008 eco‑
nomic crisis was followed by the passage of the “Troubled Assets Relief Pro‑
gram” (TARP). The initiative, commonly referred to as the “bailout,” was
supposed to provide financial liquidity to banks suffering massive investment

losses after the housing bubble collapse. Liquidity was necessary for banks and
investment firms to meet their debt obligations without declaring bankruptcy.
TARP was supposed to provide the funds needed to jump‑start bank lending
to other banks, businesses, and individuals during a frozen credit market.
The revelation that billions of dollars in taxpayer TARP money was allo‑
cated toward bonuses for executives at failing banks enraged many Americans.
In a time of economic instability and growing poverty and unemployment,
the bonuses were seen as an unacceptable appropriation of taxpayer dollars.
USA Today‑Gallup polling found that 80 percent of Americans were “dissatis‑
fied” with “the way AIG management” handled the granting of bonuses with
taxpayer funds.62 It seemed fundamentally unfair to many that the investment
banks responsible for the economic crisis were handing out bonuses at a time
when “Main Street” America was in serious economic trouble.
By 2009, scrutiny of Wall Street was increasing, as related to govern‑
ment‑funded bonuses. A study by the New York State Comptroller’s office
found that Wall Street executives allocated $18.4 billion in bonuses during
2008. That spending constituted the sixth largest spending for bonuses in Wall
Street history.63 A proposal put forward by congressional Democrats to regu‑
late executive pay at companies receiving TARP funds would have cost Wall
Street employees $10.9 billion over ten years, as estimated by the Congres‑
sional Budget Office.64 The curtailment of bonuses, then, represented a serious
concern for executives, who would see their salaries significantly limited.
Intense conflict transpired over the proposed regulation of executive
pay. Republicans and libertarian research organizations made strong appeals
against regulation. The CATO Institute argued that efforts to regulate pay
were based on the misperception that “the market for executives is not com‑
petitive and that pay levels do not reflect supply and demand for talent.”
CATO celebrated the alleged move on Wall Street toward “substantial pressure
on executive pay practices” as seen in “increasingly aggressive share‑holder
scrutiny” and fluctuations in year to year executive pay which “depend on
company performance.” Such factors, CATO argued, allowed Wall Street to
“self‑regulate over time.” Arguing against the regulation of executive pay,
CATO summarized their study of “low‑performing companies,” which found
“a 23 percent decline in their paid annual incentives” compared to “CEOs of
high performing companies [which] enjoyed a 22 percent increase.”65
The Heritage Foundation strongly supported executive compensation
practices prior to the 2009 push for new government regulations. It assumed
that risk of failure in the investment sector provided an incentive to rein in
reckless speculation and investments. Opposing regulation of pay and bail‑

outs, Heritage advocated a “free market” approach in which “government
meddling” in the private economy was seen as “hopelessly impractical” and
as an impediment to business freedom. Government regulations, Heritage
argued, “undermine incentives for performance and economic growth,” while
deterring “the best corporate talent” from working at companies covered by
pay regulation. In one attack, Heritage criticized a Treasury Department pro‑
posal to prohibit TARP recipients from distributing stock options to employ‑
ees, as these options were presented as “actually reduc[ing] risk rather than
increase[ing] it.”66
While many defenders of the “free market” felt that government regula‑
tion would ruin a “virtuous” economic system that already punishes business‑
es for engaging in risky investments, this claim was quite puzzling following
the 2008 economic bailout. Precisely the opposite lesson sprung from the
economic crisis. Even the most right‑wing of Republican Tea Partiers were
angry with the government bailout because they perceived it, correctly, as
a violation of the principle of “free markets,” in which companies assume
the risk of their investments, are rewarded for making sound investments,
and punished for pursuing reckless business decisions. It was rather ironic,
then to see many right‑wing defenders of Wall Street promoting bonuses at
a time when government bailout money was a prime source of funding for
those bonuses. Contrary to the free market rhetoric of the CATO Institute
and Heritage Foundation, the bonuses paid out from 2008 onward were
hardly a product of investments independent of government. The bailout
was unprecedented in that it removed the threat of risk for investors, since
firms learned they would be bailed out by government if they failed. Invest‑
ment firms poured massive sums of money into dubious mortgage‑based
Collateralized Debt Obligations, or CDOs (a type of “derivative” investment,
in which subprime mortgages were bundled together), under the under‑
standing that the full faith and financial backing of the federal government
was behind them. This confidence arose from the fact that government and
taxpayer‑subsidized mortgage institutions Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were
themselves bundling these subprime loans into CDOs and selling them to
investment firms.
Even if the subprime mortgages making up CDOs were unsustainable
as a form of investment (the loans were often given to applicants with bad
or no credit, no money to put down, or sporadic work histories), where was
the incentive to reject them as an investor when the government was granting
them its seal of approval and financial support? In an environment where
government actively promoted risky and bad investments, and especially

after the government bailed out companies that had invested in questionable
mortgages, a clear message was sent. Investors in the banking and finance
sector need not worry about making bad investments, because if they did, the

government would bail them out. At a time when only a few banking firms
control most of the money transactions in the country, due to deregulation of
banking ownership, the failure of even one or a few of these firms threatens
the stability of the entire banking system. Banks become “too big to fail,” and
are protected from failure by taxpayers. Without banking, the U.S. economy
cannot function. Understanding this basic point, many critics of Wall Street
called for breaking up the largest national banks, which seemingly no longer
need to worry about the risk associated with bad investing.
Despite the fallacies of the “free market” that were exposed by the
bailout, free market rhetoric continued to dominate the thinking of Wall
Street defenders. But growing critical attention directed toward the banks
also emerged after 2008. In one study by the Center for Economic and Pol‑
icy Research and the National Bureau of Economic Research, higher CEO
compensation levels for executives dealing in speculative investments was
associated with destructive business practices. As Bolton, Scheinkman, and
Xiong warned, “potentially overoptimistic investors,” aided by “optimal com‑
pensation contracts,” can “emphasize short term stock performance, at the
expense of long run fundamental value.” Fixation on short‑term profit gains,
they concluded, provided an incentive for executives to pursue dangerous
speculative investments.67
Liberal citizen groups criticized the bonuses. Common Cause published
a list of pay packages from Wall Street firms receiving TARP funds, spotlight‑
ing this practice for the group’s liberal constituents. Public Citizen favored
government regulation of “companies that exist only because of billions of
dollars of taxpayer supports” while “see[ing] fit to pay themselves obscene
salaries.” The group argued that executive bonuses “helped incentivize dan‑
gerous, short term betting” and “speculative gambling”—“making it ratio‑
nal to bet on the housing bubble to continue to inflate, even in the face of
certainty that it would eventually pop with devastating effects for financial
firms.” Implementing pay regulations, Public Citizen claimed, would impose
a “systemic mechanism of accountability” on “bailout firms” and help address
the issue of “hyper‑compensation.”68 The populist rhetoric of Public Citizen
corresponded with the anger on “Main Street” amid worsening economic
conditions in 2009. Accompanying that anger were Democratic officials’ calls
for government limits on executive pay.
Democratic Reforms and the Republican Response
The Obama administration’s response to taxpayer‑funded bonuses was swift.

Immediately upon taking office, Obama denounced the bonuses as “shameful”
and the “height of irresponsibility.” Framing himself as an opponent of excess,
rather than of Wall Street altogether, Obama announced: “There will be a time
for them to make profits, and there will be time for them to get bonuses.
Now is not that time. And that’s the message that I intend to send directly
to them.”69 That message was sent within the week of Obama’s comments, as
he announced plans to restrict incomes of senior executives at companies
receiving TARP funds to no more than $500,000 a year.70
Obama’s announcement, however, did not end to the debate over
bonuses. The issue lingered for months amid Congressional consideration
of new legislation on executive pay. The issue remained salient as General
Motors and Chrysler declared bankruptcy and appealed to the government
for bailout funds. The discussion of regulating executive pay again became
relevant with regard to executives at these firms. The issue remained salient
because of Democratic discussions of further actions that could be taken to
strengthen government regulation of executive pay. Such debates raged in the
media throughout early to mid‑2009, and provided Republicans and business
executives a chance to respond to Democratic arguments.
The Republican backlash against regulation began after Democrats
attempted to push stronger reforms beyond those initially announced by
Obama. Numerous bills were presented in Congress. One proposal from
Democratic representative Claire McCaskill required a pay cap for employees
of companies receiving TARP funds at $400,000 a year—$100,000 less than
the limit announced by Obama.71 Legislation passed in the House (by a vote
of 328–93) in March 2009 would have established a 90 percent tax on the
executive bonuses allocated to corporations that received more than $5 billion
in TARP money, and would have affected those executives earning more than
$250,000 a year. Another Democratic bill in the Senate sought to impose a 70
percent tax on bonuses, to be paid through an excise tax and a second tax on
executive bonuses.72 Most Republicans opposed the House bill to tax bonuses
at 90 percent, while Republican leaders derailed any vote on the Senate bill.73
Republican opposition to executive pay legislation was paradoxical,
however. The party rhetorically railed against the government‑funded bonus‑
es in the year after the 2008 bailout, yet it actively opposed government efforts
to recover bonuses. This left Republican Americans in a precarious position.
On the one hand, the party seemed to be opposed to granting bonuses with
taxpayer money. On the other hand, party leaders opposed efforts to recover
bonuses. In light of such schizophrenia (or double talk, as one might label it),
Republican Americans’ positions on executive pay did not overlap well with
those of Republican officials. In other words, citizens supported regulating
pay, while officials did not.
Throughout early 2009, the Obama administration gradually became
more involved in calling for stronger regulations of Wall Street pay. While
Obama did not support Congressional efforts to severely limit bonuses paid
out to Wall Street firms that received bailout funds, he did move toward sup‑
porting other pay regulations. Administration officials announced in March
2009 that they would seek new powers for the Federal Reserve to regulate
large financial firms and hedge funds, as related to executive pay. A propos‑
al being considered by Obama would introduce requirements for corporate
boards to link executive pay and compensation to the business’s performance.
The new rules favored by Obama were to be applied to all financial corpora‑
tions, rather than simply to those receiving bailout money.74
The Republican response to pay regulation emerged by February to
March 2009. Former Bush White House Press Secretary Dana Perino defend‑
ed companies such as AIG—which received TARP funds but granted billions
in bonuses—by speculating that “if they don’t get it [the bonuses] maybe they
won’t be motivated enough to try to help the company turn around.” Perino
ridiculed the “rhetoric in Washington” for unfairly “demonizing” executives.75
This approach was also pursued by congressional Republicans, who attacked
Obama while also appropriating a populist tone that criticized Wall Street
and the bailout. Such “populism” was limited however, in comparison to
that expressed by Democrats, since Republicans opposed any legislation to
regulate executive pay. The statements below place Republican criticisms of
regulation into better perspective:
• Republican representative John Kyl stated that “because of their

[Wall Street’s] excesses, very bad things begin to happen, like
the United States government telling a company what it can
pay its employees. That’s not a good thing in America.”
• Senate Republican Mel Martinez announced: “What execu‑
tives have done is troubling, but it’s equally troubling to have
government telling shareholders how much they can pay the
executives.”
• Senate Republican James Inhofe wondered about Obama’s pay
regulation, citing it as an example of “government running
business”: “Is this still America? Do we really tell people how

to run [a business], and who to pay and how much to pay?”
• Senate Republican Bob Bennett said that regulating pay was “a
leap, because the executive at the bank is a free agent who can
leave the bank and go to work someplace else. [With regula‑
tion] you run the risk of having a brain drain at the bank of
their top talent.”76
Wall Street firms vigorously fought back against regulation. AIG executives
cited “contractual obligations” and “talent retention” as the reasons for refus‑
ing to rescind bonuses.77 Such responses were not taken seriously by the pub‑
lic, however, considering that the “talented” executives Republicans spoke of
were responsible for crashing the economy. Surveys showed consistent public
support for regulating executive pay.78
Seeking to preempt Democratic legislation, almost all AIG employ‑
ees returned the bonuses that were paid for with TARP funds.79 This stalled
Democratic passage of compensation reforms aimed at taxing TARP‑funded
bonuses. Although discussion of pay regulations continued, Republicans
opposed further action.80 By the summer of 2009, a debate was taking shape
in the House of Representatives, where Republican members of the House
Finance Committee “expressed concern that the [Obama] administration was
using the financial crisis to extend its grasp over the private sector.” Senior
Republican committee member Spencer Bachus proclaimed: “I strongly
believe that it is neither the executive branch nor congress’s role to mandate
compensation policies.”81
The partisan conflict over executive compensation eventually ended in
the year following AIG’s return of taxpayer‑funded bonuses. By late July 2009,
the New York Times reported that a House panel voted overwhelmingly along
partisan lines to allow “shareholders the right to vote on pay and require
independent directors from outside of management [to] serve on compen‑
sation committees.”82 This stipulation was a far cry from earlier Democratic
statements, which sought power for the Federal Reserve to require corporate
boards to link executive pay and other compensation with businesses’ finan‑
cial performance. Final legislation regulating pay did not emerge until late
July 2010, via the Democratic Dodd‑Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act. The bill required corporations to provide a shareholder vote at
least once every three years on levels of executive compensation. Shareholders
were allowed through a nonbinding vote to reject “golden parachute” compen‑
sation for executives, and must also be informed of executive compensation
levels as a function of the corporation’s performance. This provision seemed

more symbolic than anything, considering the nonbinding nature of a share‑
holder’s “influence” over executive compensation. In a sign of the strength of
the partisan dispute, the bill passed without a single Republican vote in the
House, and with just four Republican votes in the Senate.83
Framing Executive Pay
The frames included in this analysis were drawn from the larger ideological
debate taking place between political leaders. Antagonistic frames portrayed
government regulation of pay as undesirable. The first, the “Wall Street–Free
Market” frame, included references to executive pay from the perspective of
business representatives and Republicans. The frame was defined by any dis‑
cussion of pay, compensation, or bonuses that occurred alongside mentions
of or statements by Republican officials, the Republican Party, and business
officials—those who formed a front in opposition to regulating bonuses. This
frame often included celebration of “free markets” as a desirable alternative
to government regulation, or rhetoric from officials who reflexively assumed
through the tone of their rhetoric that markets were superior to regulation.84
In contrast, the “Liberal‑Backlash” frame included discussions of pay, com‑
pensation, or bonuses that appeared alongside mentions of, or statements
from Democratic officials or the Democratic Party that were overwhelmingly
critical of taxpayer‑funded bonuses.85 Such discussions often displayed anger
at Wall Street for its role in the economic crisis and outrage at bonuses.
The next pair of frames explored executive compensation related to
influences arising from government and market forces. The “Regulatory‑Reli‑
ance” frame portrayed corporate executives who received TARP funds as
dependent upon taxpayers—hence, subject to government regulation. The
frame included any discussion of efforts to “claw back” or force a “payback”
or “repaying” of taxpayer dollars, or to regulate or impose limits on execu‑
tive pay.86 Democratic congresswomen such as Dina Titus and Jeanne Sha‑
heen reflected this position when they claimed that efforts to limit executive
bonuses were appropriate because those bonuses were taxpayer funded. In
one specific example, Titus argued Congress should “act quickly to recoup the
taxpayers’ money” that went “to irresponsible Wall Street executives.”87 In con‑
trast, the “Necessity” frame depicted corporate executives as legally required
to pay the benefits. The frame was comprised of discussions of legally binding
contracts, to government as dictating pay for the private sector, to the need
to recruit, retain, or reward talented executives via bonuses, to bonuses as a
The Pro‑Government, Indexing Bias
The pro‑government bias theory portrays journalists as “indexing” their cov‑

erage to fit the range of views expressed by political officialdom.6 Much of
this literature is devoted to analyzing coverage of foreign policy issues. In his
study of the Vietnam War, Hallin found that coverage that was critical of the
war grew during times of government discord:

normally will stay well within the bounds of the debate going on
within the political “establishment.”7
In Debating War and Peace, Mermin examines media coverage of eight U.S.
military interventions, finding that criticisms during each conflict appeared
only when criticisms had already been expressed by government officials.8
Another review of U.S. foreign policy from 2001 to 2014 concluded that
journalists typically restricted their reporting to those positions taken by
Democratic and Republican officials.9
Zaller and Chiu distinguish between different forms of pro‑government
bias.10 These forms include: “source indexing,” whereby “reporters simply
make the rounds among [official government] persons familiar with issues”
and write “stories that summarize what they have been told,” and “power
indexing,” in which “journalists may consider information newsworthy in
proportion to its capacity to foretell or affect future events.” For example,
Zaller and Chiu write that reporters “paid disproportionate attention to the
statements of Bush administration officials” during Senate hearings over the
1991 Gulf War “because, far more than other witnesses at the hearings, these
officials were in a position to determine whether the U.S. went to war or
not.”11
Bennett highlights the dangers of “politically managed” news that
“provides little solid basis for critical thinking” by media consumers.12 Ben‑
nett draws attention to “increasing limits on the content of news that stem
from the manufacture and sale of news as a commercial product . . . [news]
 
 
 
 
assignments are made increasingly with costs, efficiency, and viewer or reader
reactions run with fewer concerns about informing the public.”13 Bennett
expresses concern with the effects of corporate media monopolization on
Restrictions,” “Obama Lashes Out at Exorbitant Financial Sector Payouts,

Calls for Responsibility and Restraint,” “Take That, AIG: 90% Tax; House
Drops Hammer on Bonuses Given by Bailed‑Out Firms,” “Execs Return 9 of
Top 10 AIG Bonuses,” and “ ‘Outrage’ Bonuses; Firm Says It Was Contractu‑

ally Obliged to Make Payouts.”94
Competing Policy Frames
Journalists included both Republican and Democratic views in the news.

Reporters reflected the debates taking place in the nation’s capital. As seen
in Table 4.4, reporters consistently included both Republican and Demo‑
Table 4.4. Executive Pay (1/1–3/31/2009): Major Frames in Print and

Television News Stories

(as % of


Liberal‑Backlash 20 13 23 26 20

Regulatory Reliance 19 15 26 18 17
-

Populist 13 17 13 10 13

Total Democratic Frames 52 45 62 54 50


Con Frames

Street–Free Market 12 32 13 16 16

Necessity 17 13 10 21 19

Economic Instability 19 10 15 9 15

Total Republican Frames 48 55 38 46 50



analyzed
cratic frames in reporting on executive compensation reform.95 Democratic

frames ranged from a low of 45 percent to a high of 62 percent of all frames
in stories. Only on CBS did Democratic frames account for more than 60
percent of all frames. Democratic frames failed to appear as more than 60
percent of all frames in four of five news organizations. Republican frames
counted for as little as 38 percent to a high of 55 percent of all frames that
appeared. Only on CBS did Republican frames count for less than 40 percent
of all frames included in stories. In short, reporters made regular efforts to
include Democratic and Republican points of view, although this analysis says
nothing about the intensity of each party’s appearances within news stories.
The “Liberal‑Backlash” and “Republican–Wall Street” frames measured
the overarching state of the political debate on compensation, with regard to
whether supporters’ or opponents’ views appeared in stories. In one exam‑
ple of the “Liberal‑Backlash” frame, Democratic Congressman Barney Frank
commented: “I believe the structure of compensation is flawed. Namely, we
have had a system of compensation for top decision makers in which they
are very well rewarded if they take a risk that pays off but suffer no penalty if
they take a risk that costs the company money.”96 This statement demonstrated
discontent with how bonuses were allocated following the economic collapse.
In contrast, the “Republican–Wall Street” frame was defined by discus‑
sions from Republicans and business representatives—those opposing gov‑
ernment regulation of pay from a “free market,” “Wall Street knows best”
perspective. For example, one February 2009 story in the New York Times
reported that “banking executives worry that the government may intrude
further into their businesses as long as they are beholden to Washington.”
As Goldman Sachs Chief Financial Officer David Viniar explained, “We
just think that operating our business without the government capital would
be an easier thing to do.”97 This statement revealed a “free market” mentality,
with government intervention in regulating executive pay deemed an unnec‑
essary infringement on the freedom of corporations.
The second two competing frames both appeared regularly in reporting.
The “State Reliance” frame depicted corporate executives as subject to poten‑
tial pay regulation, due to their dependence on taxpayer funds. For example,
the New York Times reported on Democratic Senator Christopher Dodd’s
effort to use “ ‘every possible legal means’ to claw back [taxpayer] money.”98

Obama advisor Lawrence Summers promised that “every legal step possible
to limit those bonuses is being taken by Secretary [Timothy] Geithner and
by the Federal Reserve system.”99
In contrast, the “Necessity” frame included claims that executives were
entitled to bonuses, either because they had earned them, because they were
needed to retain talented employees, or because the payments were part of

legally enforceable contracts between the company and employees. The frame
was captured in the comments of AIG CEO Edward Liddy, who was quoted
on Fox News arguing: “These [bonuses] are legal, binding obligations of AIG.
There are serious legal as well as business consequences for not paying.”100
Liddy’s perspective was echoed by a New York Times story, titled “Few Ways to
Recover Bonuses to Bankers,” which consulted a compensation expert explain‑
ing that “unless actual wrongdoing is uncovered at the banks—and so far pros‑
ecutors have not disclosed any—the case for clawing back past pay is weak.”101
The final two frames—the “Populist” and “Economic Instability”
frames—appeared in numerous news stories. The “Populist” frame captured
the intense public anger following the 2008 collapse. The frame was captured
in a story from the Chicago Sun Times which explored public “outrage” at
AIG’s bonuses, while conceding that “the financial bailout program remains
politically unpopular and has been a drag on Barack Obama’s new presi‑
dency . . . the White House is well aware of the nation’s bailout fatigue and
 
 
 
 
anger that hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars have gone to prop up
financial institutions that made poor decisions, while many others who have
done no wrong pay the price.”102 In another example, MSNBC analyst Eugene
Robinson referred to TARP‑funded bonuses as “something that American
workers . . . can relate to and can understand and can get angry about.”103
 
 
 
 
Redirecting Americans’ attention to the country’s volatile economy, the
“Economic Instability” frame envisioned regulations as unacceptable due to
the burdens they imposed on businesses. The instability frame was appar‑
ent in one Fox News program, with guest Mort Kondracke warning against
government restrictions on Wall Street as firms sought to unload their “toxic
assets”:
So what they [investors] are going to do is they’ve got to rely on

this public‑private partnership [the TARP “bailout” and new pay
regulations] in order to get private investors to buy up the toxic
assets of the banks. The problem is that the private investors don’t
trust [Treasury Secretary] Tim Geithner. He once promised there
would not be limits on executive pay at banks. Boom, there are
suddenly limits on executive bank pay.104
Government plans to create a “bad bank” to help pay for “toxic assets” fol‑
lowing the 2008 crisis were tied directly to the issue of pay. As the New York
Times reported, many banks refused to participate in the “bad bank” initiative
if the federal government decided it “might later add restrictions on their
pay.”105 Not all stories made the connection between the weakened state of the
banks and pay regulation. However, investors’ decision to associate the two
issues in making their argument against pay restrictions provides a legitimate
justification for including stories discussing instability and uncertainty in the
context of regulating pay. These discussions fit within a larger antiregulatory
framework that was prominent in the news.
Main Findings
Reporters included competing partisan frames in stories, but Democrats held

a large advantage in other ways. Table 4.5 includes the findings for cover‑
age of major actors in story headlines, leads, and sources quoted for stories
on executive compensation.106 Democratic sources overwhelmed Republicans
in every category.107 Republican marginalization should have been expected,
since the compensation debate occurred during unified Democratic control
of government. With Democrats actively pushing regulation from a position
of strength, reporters conferred on them a dominant position in the news.
There is little evidence of media pluralism here. In just one of the nine
categories (New York Times sources quoted) was there evidence to suggest
a significant presence for nongovernmental actors. Nonofficial actors ranged
from a low of zero percent to a high of nearly 35 percent of all actors in
the news, never reaching one‑third of all the sources consulted except in the
New York Times’s sources quoted. In an unusual turn, business actors were
left to fill in the gap left by Republicans, the latter of whom were marginal‑
ized after an overwhelming Democratic victory in the 2008 elections. Busi‑
ness leaders seemingly received more regular attention in stories because
of their direct financial stake in the TARP funds. Examples of sources that
appeared in stories included executive compensation lawyers, consultants,
and other representatives of compensation firms, heads of hedge fund firms
that were involved in mortgages and derivatives, and major representatives
of banks and other investment firms.108 Labor leaders, “average” workers, and
union members, however, were rarely mentioned in news stories. These actors
might have been quoted in order to better understand their opinions of the
bonuses, or to explore their opinions of the growing divide between “aver‑
age” employee and CEO/executive pay. But such voices were in short supply.
Reporting that highlighted the opinions of “average” Americans would have
provided a glimpse into what “Main Street” thought—those who have seen
their net worth decline in the last decade, and who have been working longer
hours for less money while executive pay skyrocketed. Such human‑interest
angles were overwhelmingly ignored in stories. Rare references to workers

included, for example, a Chicago Sun Times story which interviewed gardener
Emeline Bravo‑Blackport, who “marveled at AIG executive[s]” and what she
saw as their extravagant lifestyles.109
General citizens sometimes appeared in news stories, although these
sources were a small fraction of sources in the news. Reporters sometimes
covered the views of academics, with stories including comments from rep‑
resentatives of liberal and conservative research groups, and economists at
major universities.110 Consultation of these sources was infrequent though.
Academics might have provided a historical context for the rapid growth
in executive pay, compared to the stagnating‑to‑declining pay of “average”
Americans. This angle was largely absent from reporting, as it did not con‑
form with the agenda of either party. General citizens appeared in just 3 to
5 percent of all sources consulted in different news organizations. Examples
of those consulted included newspaper and blog readers, a student, and a
truck driver.111
Democratic officials succeeded in nearly monopolizing the public dis‑
course. As displayed in Table 4.5, Democratic sources appeared more than 20
percentage points as often as Republicans in all nine categories of headlines,
story leads, and sources quoted. In short, government officials—not general
citizens, business executives, academics, or labor—drove the national debate
on compensation, setting the parameters and agenda for how the issue was
discussed.
The privileging of Democratic voices was also evident with party and lead‑
ership mentions. In every news outlet analyzed in Table 4.6, Democratic
mentions dwarfed Republican ones by more than 20 percentage points.112
Democrats exercised “issue ownership” over executive pay, with prominent
officials conferred high levels of attention. Examples of Democrats in the
executive and legislative branches that appeared regularly included President
Obama, White House economic counsel Lawrence Summers, Senator Chris‑
topher Dodd, and Representative Barney Frank, among others.
These officials played a major role in the conflict, likely due to the presi‑
dent’s prominent position in policy debates, and the relevance of economic
counselors such as Summers in providing advice to and coordinating with
the president on economic matters. Evidence of executive dominance—itself
an indication of a pro‑government bias—is seen in Table 4.5, with executive
Table 4.5. Executive Pay (1/1–3/31/2009): Political Actors in Print and Television News Stories




Sun


Democrats 100 100 100 89 93 68 67 90 97

Republicans 0 0 0 11 7 32 33 10 3




Sun



Labor Leaders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 <1 0

Workers/ Unionists 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 <1 2

Academics 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 6 0

Bureaucrats 0 0 0 5 5 0 3 6 0

Citizens 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 3 5

Executive 90 71 67 72 63 53 50 38 61

Legislative 10 29 17 12 16 34 32 21 10

Judiciary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Number of news stories
analyzed 60 17 14 60 17 12 29 60 17

Table 4.6. Executive Pay (1/1–3/31/2009): Mentions of Parties and

Party Leaders



NYT 81 19 60

Sun Times 88 12 17

CBS 78 22 14

Fox 68 32 12

MSNBC 75 25 29


voices outnumbering legislative ones across all nine news categories and all
five media venues.
As expected, Republicans were deeply marginalized, although party
leaders did at times receive attention. References to the Republican Party
and its leaders ranged from a low of 19 percent to a high of 32 percent of
all party mentions. When Republicans did appear in stories, they were often
individuals in prominent positions. Regularly mentioned figures included
House Minority Leader John Boehner, House Financial Services Committee
member Spencer Bachus, and Senate Majority Whip John Kyl. These officials
were likely consulted because of their roles as leaders of the minority party.
Little distinguishes the findings here from those of other case studies. Nation‑
al news outlets such as MSNBC, the New York Times and Chicago Sun Times
leaned strongly toward supporting regulation, while Fox News and other con‑
servative sources supported Republicans and opposed pay regulation.
In the New York Times, six op‑ed writers expressed support for regula‑
tion in early to mid 2009.113 Just two writers—one a regular columnist and
the other a business representative—opposed regulating compensation. 114
Editorially, the New York Times supported government action on executive
pay rules. The paper expressed sympathy for Obama’s plan to cap pay at
$500,000 a year for executives at firms receiving TARP funds, under the
assumption that taxpayer money should not be spent on rewarding failed
bankers. The New York Times reminded readers that “the banks can pay more
There are two indispensable functions that journalism must serve

in a self‑governing society. First, the media system must provide
a rigorous accounting of people in power . . . in both the public
 
 
 
 
and private sector. This is known as the watchdog role. Second,
the media system must provide reliable information and a wide
range of informed opinions on the important social and political
issues of the day. No single medium can or should be expected
to provide all of this; but the media system as a whole should
provide easy access to this for all citizens.
“By these criteria,” McChesney argues, “the U.S. media system is an abject
failure.” He points to the emergence of “the modern commercial press system”
and “the severe contradiction between a privately held media system and
the needs of a democratic society.” Journalism, following the rise of media
“objectivity” in the twentieth century, has “three distinct biases built into it”:
the overreliance on official news sources “as the basis for legitimate news,”
the need for “a news hook or a news peg to justify a news story,” and the
“smuggling in” of “values conducive to the commercial aims of the owners
and advertisers.” McChesney contends that reporters are “oblivious to the
compromises with authority they routinely make,” one example being efforts
to equate the “spread of ‘free markets’ with democracy.”25
Corporate ownership creates pressure on news organizations to censor
news stories that criticize advertisers. Advertisers expect a regular stream
of news content for outlets they advertise with that refrains from ques‑
tioning their companies, products, or business practices. Investigative sto‑
ries that expose corporate malfeasance or corruption deter businesses from
future advertising with a news outlet. And the threat of censorship is not
idle. Previous surveys of news editors and reporters found that these pres‑
sures are ever‑present. Eighty percent of editors contacted in one survey said
that advertiser pressure on their organizations and reporters was common,
and 45 percent knew of instances when content was altered due to adver‑
tiser pressure.26 Three‑quarters of reporters surveyed knew of instances when
advertisers sought to influence news content, and 44 percent were aware
of instances when advertisers withdrew funding because of content they
deemed objectionable. Forty percent of reporters admitted their news outlet
succumbed to censorship due to advertiser pressures.27 Self‑censorship is also
an issue of concern. Approximately one‑third of journalists and news editors
admit that avoidance of views critical of advertisers happens “sometimes”
or is “commonplace,” while three‑quarters admit to self‑censoring stories to
satisfy advertisers.28
closely dovetailed with a pro‑business framework that was visible to the close
observer. National discussions of executive pay and the stimulus should be
understood within a broader political and economic context of growing cor‑
porate power. Corporate executives’ wealth has grown dramatically in recent
decades, partly because executives appoint members of the board of directors,
who vote on CEO pay. While the majority of Americans have seen their pay
either stagnate or decline for years, business executives in major corpora‑
tions saw their incomes grow by leaps and bounds. For example, in 2012
the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) reported that “the growth of CEO and
executive compensation overall was a major factor driving the doubling of
the income shares of the top one percent and top .1 percent of households
from 1979 to 2007.” Probing more deeply into the growing chasm between
worker and executive pay, EPI added these findings:
• From 1978 to 2012, CEO compensation grew by 875 percent,

more than double the growth in value of the stock market. In
contrast, the average worker’s compensation grew by just 5.4
percent. If “free markets” reward Americans as the economy
improves and as corporations become more profitable, the gains
were incredibly uneven, with CEOs capturing twice the amount
of income gains that one would expect simply from looking at
stock market growth.
• The CEO to average worker pay gap grew dramatically
when measured as a ratio of earnings. In 1965, the average
CEO‑to‑worker compensation ratio stood at 20.1 to 1. By 1995,
the ratio stood at 122.6 to 1, and by 2012 it stood at 272.9 to
1.
• Measuring options granted in addition to base CEO pay, execu‑
tives earned 18.3 times more than the average worker in 1965.
By 1995 the ratio of CEO pay with options, compared to aver‑
age worker pay, was 136.8 times higher, and by 2012 it was
202.3 times greater.122
Government reluctance to regulate CEO pay meant that compensation rates

skyrocketed over the decades. Corporate executives found themselves in a
more advantageous position, not just economically, but electorally. With
greater amounts of money to devote to campaign contributions, they sought to
enhance their influence over politics. A steady decline in the pay of minimum
wage workers, followed by union decline in the United States, translated into
less opportunity for working Americans to influence elections via campaign

contributions and mobilizing laborers to vote. The discussion of executive
pay occurred within this broader context of growing corporate influence and
record income and wealth inequality. Democratic reforms aimed at executive
compensation rules were toothless, as seen in the Dodd‑Frank legislation,
which introduced “rules” that were not legally binding on businesses. The lack
of effort on the part of both parties to limit growing inequality between the
investor class and “Main Street” America was clear evidence of a pro‑business
bias that was underlying the larger political‑economic discussion of execu‑
tive pay. In other words, reporting on executive pay falls within this broader
systemic shift favoring Wall Street.
Regarding the stimulus, the underlying political‑economic context also
suggested a bias in favor of business interests. The stimulus and bailout were
unprecedented in history, representing more than $1.5 trillion in funds appro‑
priated in less than a year to clean up a mess caused by a decade of Wall
Street deregulation. The stimulus was sold by Democrats as a way of helping
improve the state of “Main Street” America. This position was difficult to
defend when the unemployment rate grew from 4.9 percent in 2008 to a high
of 10 percent in late 2009.123 Americans also saw their net worth decline by
35 percent from 2005 to 2010.124 In contrast, U.S. corporations declared record
profits from 2010 onward, year after year, while inequality grew to the high‑
est level seen in a century.125 Economically speaking, corporate America not
only recovered from the 2008 collapse, but was doing better than ever. “Main
Street” America, on the contrary, was doing far worse. By 2014, corporate
profits were at their highest in eighty‑five years, while worker compensation
was at its lowest point in sixty‑five years.126 The above data suggest that, while
the national banks and wealthy Americans came out in a stronger financial
position after the bailout, working Americans continued to suffer.
Journalists did not create the above economic trends. They did, however,
operate within a political‑economic system that increasingly favors the concen‑
tration of wealth among the few. As discussed in chapter 1, with government
pursuing policies that favor the wealthy and neglecting the masses, the political
system has taken sides in the conflict between competing economic classes.
Journalists reflexively and implicitly legitimized the rightward drift of politics
by restricting reporting to the viewpoints of the major political parties.
Other main themes running throughout this book are summarized
here. First is the issue of party influence in the news. Clearly, parties matter
greatly in driving coverage of policy debates. Each party’s level of control of
government (or lack of control) was the defining factor in these case stud‑
ies in determining how much attention reporters paid to parties and their
leaders. Parties matter because they set the political agenda for what issues
will be talked about in the news, and how they will be talked about. Those
party agendas, however, are also driven by a larger political‑economic system,
characterized by growing business power.
A second major theme concerns the role of propaganda in a symbiotic
politics‑media system. In the American press, journalists relegate the public
and public interest groups to a spectator role in political debates. Unable to
receive significant attention as a source in the news, the public has a difficult,
although not impossible time asserting itself. Officials typically (although not
always) treat the public as a passive entity. They seek to maintain preexist‑
ing support from their own partisans, and manufacture consent from the
undecided when it comes to public policy controversies. When speaking of
a media propaganda function in the United States, the main finding seems to
be the extraordinary lack of interest with which reporters treat the public, and
the fixation on political officials as the “legitimate” drivers of policy debates.
The six case studies documented thus far found a near complete lack
of media presence for a variety of nongovernmental actors, as executive and
legislative officials almost completely dominated policy reporting. In only
one of six case studies—the executive pay controversy—did nongovernmental
actors make up a significant percentage of all news sources. In that case, busi‑
ness executives were cited regularly regarding proposals for regulating pay for
corporations receiving federal assistance from the 2008 bailout. Never once,
however, did union members or other laborers, general citizens, or academics
and other specialists benefit from a consistent or sizable presence in the news.
While the public was dramatically affected by executive pay issues in an era
of growing income inequality between executives and workers, journalists did
little to make the public active participants in reporting.
Larger practical concerns abound regarding the pro‑government bias
in the news. In the case of the stimulus, the issue of public consent comes to
mind. With nearly a trillion dollars in spending of federal revenues, largely
financed through borrowing that has to be paid back by taxpayers, one might
ask: What did Americans think about specific programs covered in the stimu‑
lus? Were the law’s provisions seen as necessary and desirable by citizens?
Did Americans think spending priorities should have been rearranged in
favor of some items and away from others? Did they worry that the govern‑
ment spent such a large sum of money? Or was there public concern that
even more should have been spent to more effectively promote economic
recovery? Regarding executive pay, did Americans want officials to do more
to address growing economic inequality, amid record corporate profits and
declining worker pay? These types of questions were difficult to address in a
journalistic system that systematically neglects public voices. Concerns with

media propaganda appear warranted in light of journalists’ marginalizing of
the public. The privileging of the opinions of the few—government elites—
suggests that reporters are not interested in covering opinions falling outside
the two‑party spectrum of opinions.
Aggregate Results for the Six Case Studies
Tremendous uniformity was found across many media outlets in their cover‑
age of economic policy. Whether it was in an agenda‑setting paper such as
the New York Times, a regional, wire story–dependent source like the Chi‑
cago Sun Times, a mass‑appeal broadcast network like CBS, or increasingly
partisan outlets such as Fox News or MSNBC, coverage overwhelmingly
conformed to biases in favor of business and official interests. In chapters
2, 3, and 4, hundreds of news stories were examined, covering political
actors’ appearances (or failure to appear) in story headlines, story leads, in
news frames, sources quoted, partisan mentions, and in commentary, edi‑
torials, and op‑eds. Across the six case studies, and for all news categories
examined, a pro‑government bias was apparent 90 percent of the time. The
pro‑government bias predicted coverage with far more accuracy than other
theories. The liberal media theory was validated only 35 percent of the time.
The pluralist explanation for media coverage was by far the weakest of all,
accurately predicting news content just 2 percent of the time. The plural‑
ist explanation for media coverage helped account for patterns observed in
op‑eds from major newspapers, but little else. Finally, the pro‑business bias
rarely manifested itself in obvious ways in terms of privileging Republican
sources over Democratic ones. Pro‑business actors (Republicans, primarily)
successfully dominated coverage in just 34 percent of the news categories
reviewed. As already explained, however, pro‑business biases materialized in
more subtle ways, driving the debates occurring in the political‑economic
system, thereby indirectly influencing the types of policy proposals covered
by reporters. That Republican and Democratic sources each dominated cov‑
erage only about one‑third of the time is what one would expect if there
were a pro‑government media bias, since one‑third of case studies occurred
during Republican unified government, and another third during Demo‑
cratic unified government.
The findings from this chapter and the previous two also suggest that
claims that Fox News and MSNBC represent a new, substantively deviant
form of hyper‑partisan media may be exaggerated. There is no question
that nighttime cable programs were characterized by liberal and conserva‑

tive ideologies and biases, and daytime programs often exhibit signs of bias,
albeit more subtle forms than the nighttime lineups.127 Nighttime programs
were concerned with “mobilizing the troops” in the partisan battles related
to public policy. But a comprehensive analysis of media content that included
daytime programming and news‑oriented programs in addition to nighttime
pundits suggests that hyper‑partisanship was not systematically evident across
all Fox and MSNBC content. Fox News and MSNBC put their own parti‑
san spin on the news, no doubt, but overall they still reflect the spectrum
of views advocated by both the Democratic and Republican parties, even
if each does it in a different way than the “objective” reporters of the New
York Times, newswire agencies, and broadcast networks. Importantly, when
taken together, both Fox News and MSNBC indexed the views expressed in
their reporting and commentary to the spectrum of opinions expressed by
both parties, even if each outlet often leaned in a more liberal or conserva‑
tive direction. Both outlets also changed their coverage patterns in terms of
devoting more attention to one party or the other, depending on the party
composition of government. Perhaps most importantly, my findings suggest
that, even in partisan media, political officials set the agenda for what issues
are talked about, and how they are discussed.
Until this point, I have focused only on four competing accounts of
news coverage. I have yet to analyze bad news bias claims, which are the
focus of the next two chapters. I disagree with those who argue that coverage
of policy issues is biased against political elites. Some social scientists argue
that unified party control of government by either Democrats or Republicans
is accompanied by overreporting of negativity as directed against the party in
power, thereby limiting the ability of officials to set the national agenda and
build public support. These points are examined at length in chapters 5 and 6.
5
The Attack Dog Bias?

Bad News and Economic Policy, 1996–2009
I develop a few main themes throughout this chapter. First, many of the
assumptions underlining claims of a negative, bad news bias appear to be
unrealistic, and as a result provide unreliable results. Second, despite claims
that journalists turn news audiences against political leaders due to negativ‑
ity in the news, I present contrary evidence that attention to the news is
associated with growing support for, and trust in, government. Third, after
examining the claims made by “bad news” scholars, I find little evidence of
such a bias in my case studies. To the contrary, some findings here suggest
that negativity, as expressed by Washington officials, might actually be under‑
estimated in major newspapers.
Journalists as Attack Dogs?
Some media critics argue that a bad news bias is endemic in reporting on
politics.1 Regarding journalistic practices in elections, Farnsworth and Lichter
argue in The Nightly News Nightmare that:
The television networks have behaved irresponsibly in their

reporting of recent presidential elections. Television networks’
coverage has become increasingly negative in tone over the past
several elections. This negativity, directed against nearly all viable
129
leaders.37 On Nightline programs covering the economy, 37 percent of guests

represented corporations, 17 percent were government officials, and only 5
percent represented labor. A similar pattern was found on MacNeil‑Lehrer
news programs.38 For coverage of labor strikes, reporters highlight the futility
strikes in general, framing them as harming consumers, as being potentially
violent, with strikers as too militant, and with union officials as inadequately
representing workers.39 Tracy argues that strikes are characterized by depic‑
tions of employers as “victimized” due to workers’ harmful behavior. Manage‑
ment is “sincere” in its negotiating tactics, while unions are “underhanded.”
Substantive grievances of the strikers are neglected, while government media‑
tors with labor and management are depicted as self‑sacrificing and optimistic
about settling strikes.40 Coverage of labor is also described as sensationalistic.
Puette, Erickson, and Mitchell suggest that although strikes occur in only a
miniscule number of cases in which unions negotiate contracts with employ‑
ers, they account for between one‑quarter to one‑third of all union coverage.41
Studies suggest that economic factors influence the news in other ways
as well. The size and relative profits of media markets influence reporting
quality. Larger media markets are more likely than smaller ones to produce
diverse media content to satisfy audience demands. As Althaus, Cizmar, and
Gimpel conclude: “Big‑city stations fly traffic helicopters and send large news
staffs to do live stand‑up reports from all around the market, while news‑
casts in the smallest markets are shoestring productions run by overburdened
reporters.”42 Vining and Marcin find that news outlets are more likely to
emphasize reporting with “lower production costs” and “qualities attractive
to audiences and advertisers”—two groups that are highly desired by media
corporations.43 Dunaway finds that corporate ownership of newspapers pro‑
duces less frequent coverage of politics, compared to privately owned newspa‑
pers.44 Schaffner and Sellers conclude that increased corporate consolidation
of media ownership leads to less extensive coverage of Congress.45
Profit considerations drive production of the news. In Market Driven
Journalism, McManus finds significant differences in midsized, large, and
very large television news stations concerning efforts to cut news produc‑
tion costs. Large stations (having the most resources) are more likely to rely
on outside fact checking “to ascertain newsworthiness,” and less likely to run
stories “from [outside] promoters or other media firms . . . without leaving
 
 
 
 
or phoning outside the typical newsroom.” Mid‑to‑smaller‑size stations are
less likely to do these things. McManus finds that inexpensive stories that are
easily generated by conventional sources are more likely to be produced over
expensive investigative pieces due to profit‑driven concerns with minimizing
operating costs.46
The Attack Dog Bias? 131
Baum present a picture of unified Democratic or Republican governments

as in near‑paralysis due to the tremendous power of journalists to impede
officials’ ability to govern. They reject claims of a pro‑government bias, and
the conclusion that “media are, at least most of the time, largely passive and
nonstrategic, like a conveyer belt faithfully transmitting what elites, especially
the most powerful elites, are saying.”4 Groeling and Baum argue, in contrast,
that “news coverage typically does not faithfully reflect the mix of elite rheto‑
ric in Washington,” and they speak of an alleged “consensus” that “negativity
dominates modern news coverage.”5
Similarly, Patterson argues that “journalistic and political values are at
odds with one another,” and claims reporters hold “a deeply cynical view of
politics and politicians.”6 Journalists fixate on “the unusual and the sensa‑
tional,” ensuring perverse coverage of the political process.7 Patterson docu‑
ments the growth of “unfavorable” news about electoral candidates in recent
decades, serving as evidence of a growing bad news bias.8 Farnsworth and
Lichter agree: “While scholars and politicians may argue over the existence
of ideological bias [in the news], there is much stronger evidence that the
television networks’ coverage [of elections] has become increasingly negative
in tone.”9
Journalists as Lapdogs
Many scholars do not agree with the claim that a bad news bias dominates
the news. Hallin claims that the degree of negativity in the news is dependent
upon how much negativity is expressed by political officials:

normally will stay well within of the debate going on within the
political “establishment,” and will continue to grant a privileged
hearing particularly to senior officials of the executive branch.10
Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston contend that journalists are not

interested in telling audiences about the realities of the world, but about
what officials say about reality:
What carries a story is not necessarily its truth or importance,

but whether it is driven by dominant officials within institutional
decision‑making arenas such as executive policy circles, or legisla‑
tive or judicial processes . . . the danger in the narrow scope of
 
 
 
 
Washington journalism is simple: information that may be crucial
for understanding and evaluating the stories in the headlines often
goes unreported or woefully underreported, because it simply is
not sanctioned by the powerful sources that drive the news.11
The above scholars subscribe to the “indexing” theory of bias, rejecting

the notion that the media serve as an independent force in politics. They see
journalists as dependent on the political system, and at best as “semi‑inde‑
pendent.”12 Historically, early communication research uncovered an official
source bias as playing a central role in reporting of politics.13 As documented
in chapter 1, many other studies reinforce a pro‑government bias in the news.
In short, journalists are not seen as attack dogs, but as lapdogs of the state.
Problems with the Bad News Bias
To this point, I have presented evidence of a pro‑government bias in the news,

as related to six policy debates. But the question remains: Is the bad news
bias a better way of characterizing news coverage of public policy? I argue
that the bad news bias is not presenting a full, or even necessarily an accu‑
rate picture of reporting. At first glance, the claim of a bad news bias seems
out of touch with the reality of dysfunctional national politics, as evidenced
by the extreme party polarization and incivility that has grown over the last
few decades. Congressional research, analyzing voting records of Democrats
and Republicans, reveals a record amount of partisan polarization in recent
decades, higher than at any other point in a century.14
Political polarization is apparent when reflecting on an event such as the
2013 government shutdown. Cross‑party fighting became such a problem that
the parties could not even agree on a federal budget to keep the government
running. This is the most basic task of political officials, and they failed to
accomplish it. The failure was due to the intensity of disagreement across the
parties over health care. Republicans insisted on tying the budget to repeal
of health care reform, and Democrats refused to entertain this demand. It
is difficult to understate the amount of dysfunction in Washington in light
of something as severe as a government shutdown, which emerged on the
heels of growing risk that the United States would default on its debt interest
payments due to the rapidly approaching “debt ceiling” a few weeks into the
shutdown. The shutdown is not the only example of negativity in government,
either. Evidence suggests that Republicans’ use of the filibuster to block votes
on Senate legislation reached record highs in recent years, with Republican
filibusters of presidential nominations also reaching historic highs.
One could add to congressional voting polarization an uncivil dis‑
course that has characterized national politics in recent years. This trend
also suggests growing government negativity and dysfunction. For example,
after the September 11 attacks, national discourse was often quite polarized,
with President Bush and conservative media warning government critics that
they were either “with us or against us” in the “War on Terrorism.”15 Such
polarized rhetoric created a political environment in which antiwar critics
were demonized for being anti‑American and undermining national security.
At the time of Obama’s election and afterward, there was no shortage
of polarized rhetoric. Republican officials attacked the president for being a
supposed socialist, because of his support for middle and working‑class tax
-
cuts, social welfare programs, and his health care reform. Conservative critics
condemned Obama for allegedly seeking to “ration” health care and establish
“death panels” that would deny life‑saving treatment to the sick and elderly.16
These conspiracy theories were echoed in the news and among right‑wing
pundits, and accepted by many conservatives despite a lack of evidence.
Journalists did not invent this hyper‑polarized political environment,
although right‑wing media pundits played a role in stoking anger at the
Obama administration by disseminating conspiracy theories. “Objective”
journalists played a role in promoting polarization by amplifying polemical
attacks voiced by political leaders. Much of the discussion regarding Obama’s
alleged socialism and “death panels,” for example, was promoted by political
officials (Sarah Palin, in the case of “death panels”), but heavily reported in
the news. In short, it makes little sense to refer to reporters as driving nega‑
tivity when it is already so abundant in official rhetoric.
Media Consumption and Its Effects:

Public Trust or Negativity?
If media are dominated by political officials, one would predict that increased
consumption of the news produces growing trust in government, not distrust.
To test this expectation, I examined public opinion data on media consump‑
tion and trust in government from the Pew Research Center, which conducted
a survey of Americans’ political values and news consumption habits. The
March 2011 poll surveyed Americans on (1) Whether government “is almost
always wasteful and inefficient,” or if it “does a better job than people give
it credit for”; (2) Whether “most elected officials care” or “don’t care what
people like me think”; and (3) Whether Americans “trust the government in
Washington to do what is right . . . just about always, most of the time, or
 
 
 
 
only some of the time.” In addition to surveying opinions on Washington poli‑
tics, Pew asked respondents whether they followed particular media outlets
“regularly,” “sometimes,” “hardly ever,” or “never.” I constructed a composite
measure of public attention to the news, including individuals’ consumption
of numerous venues, including ABC, NBC, and CBS Nightly News, the New
York Times, local newspapers, CNN, Fox News (cable), MSNBC, and National
Public Radio. Figure 5.1 below documents the relationship between media
consumption and government trust. Across all three questions, increased
consumption of the news was associated with increased trust in, and sup‑
port for government. These findings are what one would expect to find if a
pro‑government bias pervaded the news. The relationships in Figure 5.1 are
statistically significant, after controlling for respondents’ sex, age, education,
income, race, political party, and political ideology.17 Of course, these results
are not definitive by themselves since they represent just one period in time in
which media consumption and public trust were measured. However, numer‑
Figure 5.1.
Media A(en*veness and

60
A-tudes Toward Government
50
Low AEenCon
to the News
40
30
Moderate
AEenCon to
20 the News
10
Heavy
AEenCon to
0
the News
Americans don't give Elected officials care about I trust the federal
government enough credit what people like me think government to do what is
right most or all of the Cme
Source: Pew Research Center, March 2011 Political Typology Survey

Source: Pew Research Center, March 2011 Political Typology Survey
Figure 5.1. Media attentiveness and attitudes toward government.

ous studies find evidence that consumption of the news produces growing
trust in and support for government across many political issues.18
The data here, combined with those studies, provide grounds to ques‑
tion the claim that a pervasive negativity bias exists in the news and that it
turns people against government. Furthermore, evidence presented in chap‑
ters 6, 7, and 8 suggest that media consumption can produce different types
of effects by encouraging the public to become more or less supportive of
Republican or Democratic policy positions, depending on the specific issue
in question and how it is covered. These findings suggest that claims of a
one‑dimensional news bias against government are unwarranted.
How Common Is Negativity in Congressional Rhetoric?
Negativity between the parties is the norm in politics, not something exag‑
gerated by opportunistic journalists. Reporters have no shortage of negativity
to draw from when they write political stories. The continuous negativity in
politics is apparent when one analyzes the comments from both parties in
policy debates. Drawing from the Congressional Record database of official
statements and speeches, I reviewed legislative deliberation for two policy
debates—the 2005 Social Security reform and the 2009 stimulus. Table 5.1
provides many examples of the negativity that permeates Congressional rheto‑
ric, as seen in the statements from both Republicans and Democrats, on the
issue of Social Security reform.
During the Social Security debate, Democrats regularly attacked the
president’s privatization proposal. This is not surprising, but it does provide
evidence of strong negativity in this policy conflict. On any given week,
reporters could draw on critical speeches and statements delivered on the
House or Senate floor. Table 5.1 does not “prove” that the bad news theory
is wrong. It does, however, suggest that negativity is a common part of public
policy discourse among national officials in a time of record polarization.
Reporters did not need to invent fights between the parties. To the contrary,
such negativity was common in measures of official rhetoric.
But exactly how common was official negativity during the Social Secu‑
rity debate? To answer this question, I undertook a broad analysis of official
statements in the Congressional Record database.19 Analyzing 170 entries con‑
taining statements from members of Congress on Social Security, and over
200 speeches and comments made on the House and Senate floors, I looked
for evidence of Democratic and Republican criticisms of the other party, its
officials, and its position on Social Security. Negativity was the norm, with 75
Table 5.1. Bad News and Partisan Conflict over Social Security:
A Sampling of Congressional Statements (January–May 2005)
1/4/05; Criticized govt. borrowing from the Soc. 3/14/05; Congress promises IOUs it cannot

Rep. Paul (R) Security trust fund Rep. Price (R) deliver to future generations

1/6/05; Criticized privatization as a danger to Soc. 3/17/05; Constituents do not want privatization

Rep. Kucinich (D) Security Rep. Cuellar (D)

1/6/05; Worried about Republicans weakening 4/5/05; Bush has no credibility on fiscal issues

Rep. DeLauro (D) Soc. Security Rep. DeFazio (D) like Soc. Security after running up debt

1/20, 1/24/05 Privatization will cause benefit cuts to 4/5/05; Govt. gives IOUs it cannot cash for

Sen. Durbin (D) seniors Rep. Shaw (R) future generations

1/25/05; Republicans will gut Soc. Security 4/7/05; Privatization will increase the debt

Rep. Kaptur (D) Sen Reed (D)

1/31/05; Soc. Security is not in crisis; Bush has 4/14/05; Govt. IOUs to future generations are

Sen. Johnson (D) offered few details for reform Rep. Blackburn (R) unacceptable

2/1/05; Privatization is unfunded and will weaken 4/19/05; Privatization takes control away from

Sen. Durbin (D) Soc. Security Rep. Brown Waite (D) the public/gov. and puts it into private,

-

unaccountable hands

2/8/05; Soc. Security has a surplus, not funding 4/22/05; Democrats are “playing politics” on Soc.

Sen. Reid (D) problems Rep. Garrett (R) Security

2/16/05; Soc. Security is not going broke; is needed 4/26/05; Privatization hurts seniors in a stock

Sen. Dorgan (D) in current form Rep. Johnson (D) market “gambit”

2/17/05; Govt. should lift cap on Soc. Security 5/3/05; Soc. Security is not going bankrupt,

Rep. DeFazio (D) payroll tax, instead of privatizing the Rep. DeFazio (D) should not be privatized

program

3/1/05; More borrowing is needed for privatization; 5/5/05; Democrats use Soc. Security “as a

Rep. Jackson Lee (D) privatization is fiscally irresponsible
-
Rep. Gingrey (R) weapon” against Republicans instead of

seeking bipartisanship

3/3/05; Democrats are not proposing ways to fix 5/12/05; Privatization will force benefit cuts

Rep. Kingston (R) Soc. Security Rep. McDermott (D)

3/9/05; Complaint that Congress is issuing “IOUs” 5/17/05; Republicans will oppose Democratic

Rep. Burgess (R) and having to borrow on Soc. Security for Rep. Pence (R) efforts to pay for Soc. Security by

“future generations” raising taxes

percent of Congressional Record entries including some form of cross party
-
criticism. Fifty six percent of entries included a Democratic attack on Repub‑
-
licans, while another 19 percent included Republican attacks on Democrats.
Just 25 percent of entries contained no evidence of cross‑party negativity.20
This finding is relevant because it suggests that Congressional negativity
on Social Security was more common than negativity emphasized in the news
(see Figure 5.3 later in this chapter). For Social Security reporting, negativity
was emphasized in the news in less than 50 percent of all stories in four of
the five months analyzed in Figure 5.3, despite three‑quarters of Congressional
Record speech entries containing some form of negativity. If journalists were
fixated on negativity as a means of drawing in audiences, they should have
emphasized conflict more often than they did. Democrats made a concerted
effort to undermine Social Security reform, as seen in their rhetoric, but such
rhetoric was not emphasized as often in the news. Unified Republican con‑
trol of government in 2005 was accompanied by overwhelming Republican
dominance among the sources appearing in the news, thereby downplaying
negative Democratic messages. This finding raises a question about how com‑
mon negativity is in the news in comparison to official negativity.
Table 5.2 summarizes my review of the 2009 stimulus debate. In this
case, the negativity roles for the parties were reversed. Republicans, as the
minority party, led the way in criticizing President Obama. In Table 5.2, one
sees that negativity was common in 2009, this time with many Republican
attacks on the Democrats, Democratic positions, and Obama. Negative offi‑
cial rhetoric was the norm, as seen in my review of Congressional Record
statements.21 I reviewed ninety‑seven Congressional Record entries, containing
more than one hundred speeches or statements from House and Senate offi‑
cials. Eighty percent of entries included some form of cross‑party negativity
regarding the stimulus. Seventy five percent of entries included Republican
-
criticisms of Democrats, while another 20 percent included Democratic criti‑
cisms of Republicans. Just 20 percent of entries contained no evidence of
cross‑party negativity.22 Although negativity appeared in the vast majority
Congressional Record entries, it was less frequently emphasized in the news.
According to Figure 5.4, stories emphasizing negativity constituted less than
half of all media stories covering the stimulus in the reporting during January
and February 2009. Although Republicans systematically sought to under‑
mine the Democrats, their efforts were only infrequently emphasized in news
coverage. Despite Republicans’ fierce attacks, they were the minority party
in government, and news outlets—as documented in chapter 4—routinely
marginalized the party in stimulus reporting.
Table 5.2. Bad News and Partisan Conflict over the Stimulus: A Sampling
of Congressional Statements (January–February 2009)
1/8/2009; Representative Pence (R) Govt. cannot spend its way into econ.

recovery
1/13/2009; Rep. Wolf (R) Congress engages in too much wasteful

spending
1/21/2009; Rep. Hunter (R) Stimulus is “more spending in the wrong

places in the economy”
1/26/2009; Rep. Wilson (R) U.S. needs mainly “targeted” tax cuts for

“small business,” instead of “growing an
already massive government”
1/28/2009; Rep. Coffman (R) Stimulus will “recklessly plunge our

nation deeper and deeper into debt”
2/3/2009; Rep. Melancon (D) Republicans caused the fiscal spending

irresponsibility under Bush, the stimulus
is needed to recover from Bush
2/9/2009; Rep. McMorris‑Rodgers (R) Stimulus “does little to create jobs and

grow the economy”
2/12/2009; Senator Durbin (D) Republicans have a “do nothing”

approach on stimulating the economy
2/13/2009; Rep. DeFazio (D) Republicans have tried to “hijack” the

stimulus by making it about tax cuts
2/23/2009; Rep. Foxx (R) Stimulus will “only stimulate more

government and more debt”
2/26/2009; Rep. Cohen (D) Republican governors’ opposition to

taking stimulus money will mean
continued recession
The frequency of cross‑party negativity in the Congressional Record is

expected considering the record polarization and obstructionism in national
politics. What is perhaps more surprising is that journalists seemed to sup-
press much of that negativity. Journalists may simply view negativity from the
minority party as less worthy of coverage when the government is controlled
by the opposing party, and when the minority party is resorting to extreme
negativity to try and shut down the majority party’s agenda. This pattern is
certainly observed in the cases of Social Security reform and the stimulus.
But this pattern also undermines the claims of “bad news” scholars that uni‑
fied control of government harms the majority party because of excessive
negativity in the news.
Blaming journalists for negativity in government is convenient because
it implies only a partial dysfunction in American politics. If it is mainly
journalists who are guilty of negativity and undermining public confidence
in government, then the problems in American politics are not as severe as if
government itself were broken. If, on the other hand, negativity in the news is
merely a symptom of a larger problem—the breakdown of government—then
political scientists risk challenging the entire political system by highlighting
systemic dysfunction on the part of both the media and government. Criti‑
cizing the government for negativity and dysfunction may be controversial
for some scholars, but one should not shy away from a conclusion simply
because it is controversial or inconvenient for those holding political power.
Within‑Party Criticisms:
How Common Are They in the News?
While cross‑party criticisms and negativity are common in U.S. politics and
in the news, how often does dissent materialize from within each party? This
topic is of primary interest to some bad news scholars. Baum and Groeling
base much of their criticism of the media on the idea that journalists over‑
emphasize within‑party criticisms. Is this concern warranted? It is difficult to
know for sure whether reporters exaggerate within‑party negativity, although
the limited data available suggest that this is probably not the case.
Baum and Groeling examine reporting of congressional‑presidential
relations. Presidents are expected to be the leaders of their political parties.
Baum and Groeling focus on criticisms and praise of the president from both
parties to see how often presidents are framed positively and negatively in
the news. However, their research ignores other types of official rhetoric and
news content. They ignore congressional statements that do not relate to the
president, in addition to presidential and executive rhetoric, statements from
other officials, and statements from nonofficials. Within‑party and cross‑party
statements of praise and criticism toward the president comprise just some
types of statement from officials appearing in the news. Without taking into
account other types of statements, it is difficult to generalize about media
negativity. A comprehensive analysis of political discourse would need to
include presidential statements in the news, in addition to other types of

statements, in order to generalize about bias in news content.
A second problem also arises in efforts to measure a bad news bias.
Baum and Groeling focus on “criticism” of the president, but fail to distin‑
guish between types of criticism, which can be more or less severe. Two
types of criticism include: (1) substantive criticisms, which suggest a foun‑
dational rejection of presidential proposals, and (2) procedural criticisms,
which encompass any challenges to specific parts of a presidential or party
proposal, but do not necessarily suggest foundational rejection of the pro‑
posal. Procedural and pragmatic criticisms take issue more with the approach
of the president and the way he goes about pursuing policy, rather than the
policy itself. They do not necessarily suggest a total rejection of a policy pro‑
posal. These types of “criticisms” may suggest that a party member disputes
components of the proposal, while also revealing a willingness to work with
other party members to reach an accommodation or compromise. Arguably,
such “criticisms” may not be seen as criticisms at all, since disagreements
over the specific language and provisions in laws are a natural, inevitable
part of any legislative process. Just because a member of a party disagrees
on a provision of a piece of legislation does not necessarily mean they are
rejecting the entire proposal.
Procedural criticisms are quite different, conceptually, from substantive
criticisms. The latter suggest little to no willingness to work with other party
members on a legislative initiative. Substantive criticisms are detrimental to a
party’s agenda, while procedural criticisms are potentially, although not neces‑
sarily, harmful, depending on the statement in question. One problem with
measuring bias is that it is difficult to effectively identify procedural criticisms,
when it comes to demonstrating whether reporters overemphasize such com‑
ments. Substantive criticisms can be measured. One merely needs to identify
how often comments suggesting that a party member is going to vote against
his or her party’s proposal appear in the news, and then see if within‑party
opposition in the news appears more frequently than within‑party voting
against the party’s legislation.
Within‑party procedural criticisms may appear in the news because of
reporters who are made aware of internal party squabbling as it occurs. Such
fighting may be absent from final vote tallies on legislation. Rather, pragmatic
criticisms may be expressed during committee meetings when legislation is
being amended. Are journalists being biased by regularly covering such dis‑
agreements? Groeling examines the proportion of criticisms of the president
from within his own party, as reported in the news, comparing it to congres‑
sional voting against the president’s legislation. He finds that the frequency
of criticisms of the president in news stories is greater than the frequency of

partisans within the president’s party who vote against the president on his
preferred legislation. This is taken as evidence of journalists’ overrepresenta‑
tion of within‑party presidential criticisms.23 Congressional voting records
are an important measure of within‑party disagreement, but they are also a
limited, partial measure. The problem with using these votes to demonstrate
media bias is that legislators may, and do, change their positions during the
deliberation process on policy proposals. Furthermore, the policies supported
by the president may change over time, as the president negotiates with Con‑
gress over legislation. This process is often complex, and it is difficult to speak
authoritatively about negativity biases with such a fluid process.
Compromise is an inevitable part of the legislative process, ensuring
that many criticisms of a party’s proposals from within may be voiced during
Congressional deliberations, but not reflected in the final vote. Many points of
contention are already ironed out in committee, or through informal conver‑
sations between party leaders, committee members, and rank‑and‑file party
members before the final vote. Legislation may not even come up for a vote
if disagreements within a party are so strong as to threaten passage. None
of this conflict within the legislative process can be measured by looking at
congressional roll call votes. Legislators may also vote for a bill they do not
feel ideally suits their or their constituents’ needs, but contains enough worthy
provisions to justify a “Yes” vote. Or they may vote for legislation they are
not strongly supportive of due to pressure from party leaders.
A major problem with Baum and Groeling’s measure of bad news bias is
it seems to compare apples to oranges, rather than apples to apples. Substan‑
tive rejection of a party’s proposal, as seen in roll call votes, is fundamentally
different from procedural disagreements in the legislative process that do not
translate into a final “no” vote. One measure of disagreement looks at end
votes, after many within‑party disagreements may have already been worked
out. The other measure looks at the details of within‑party disagreements
during a legislative process that is working toward producing final legisla‑
tion. Presidential scholars understand that the development of legislation is
defined by a potentially complex back‑and‑forth between Congress and the
president, in which the president possesses “bargaining” powers based upon
his ability to veto final legislation.24 The writing of legislation, then, represents
a complicated dance between competing interests, in which disagreement,
compromise, and the staking out of potentially competing interests between
the president and legislators occurs. Reporters’ attention to these disagree‑
ments should not be considered out of the ordinary for news stories that
update audiences on political deliberations on legislation.
Agenda Building—Applied to Pro‑Government

and Pro‑Business Biases
Scholars express concern that media bias is difficult to measure and demon‑
strate. There is concern with how to demonstrate whether news reporting rep‑
resents “a fair representation of reality.”69 Groeling asks whether bias can be
adequately measured with regard to the process in which reporters focus on
certain stories over others. Measuring bias can be difficult since “a researcher
would have no idea” what potential stories a reporter was exposed to or not.
Could a reporter be selecting some stories over others, in accord with one
type of bias as opposed to some other bias? Fortunately, this problem is not as
intractable as it first seems. Direct interactions between researchers and report‑
ers have produced a number of studies suggesting that certain biases—such as
the pro‑government and pro‑business biases—affect the newsgathering process.
While I argue that pro‑government and pro‑business biases are apparent in
news content, evidence suggests that these biases also influence what types of
stories are marginalized or ignored. Journalists and editors admit to censoring
stories that criticize advertisers for fear of losing advertising profits. On another
level, I argue that market‑based ideas dominate public policy news. This means
that more progressive policy views do not receive much attention in the news,
since these positions are embraced by neither political party. They are filtered
out of policy discussions. These views may not be observed in the news—speak‑
ing to Groeling’s concerns—but their omission is evidence of pro‑business bias.
Evidence suggests that the pro‑government bias also influences how
policy issues are not reported. “Agenda building” refers to the process by
which some political issues are heavily emphasized in the news, while oth‑
ers are neglected, due to the priorities of political officials. Numerous studies
explore how the agenda‑building process influences news content.70 Some
studies document how human rights violations in countries allied with the
U.S. government rarely receive attention in the news, while violations in coun‑
tries designated enemies of the state receive sustained coverage.71 Research
also concludes that, on economic policy, journalists consult some sources far
more than others in deciding which stories to report and which to neglect
or ignore. One survey of reporters, for example, found that political offi‑
cials and business representatives were consulted most often when journal‑
ists decided what constituted legitimate economic news, while other political
actors—academics, labor union representatives, and members of public inter‑
est groups—were rarely consulted.72 In sum, there is little reason to suspect
that pro‑government and pro‑business biases do not influence journalists,
whether one is talking about how some stories are selected and reported, or
how others are marginalized or ignored.
morning interview programs really represent an “unfiltered format,” or an

independent measure of political rhetoric? Where is the evidence that the
messages in these programs are not significantly filtered by journalists as
a result of the editing process? What positions are left behind on the cut‑
ting room floor following interviews and roundtable discussions? How do
reporters’ edits of these programs and the questions they ask or do not ask
contribute to a presentation of content that is a more accurate characterization
of debates occurring among officials? Are these journalists editing programs
due to time constraints, and if so, how is a decision made about what con‑
tent is cut? It is difficult to answer these questions without speaking with, or
observing those who produce Sunday morning programs.
One is left to wonder whether the interview questions asked in Sunday
morning programs influence program content. If print reporters exaggerate
negativity in the news, why assume that those responsible for Sunday morning
programs are not manipulating formats to underrepresent negativity in politi‑
cal debates? Sunday morning journalists might be selecting their questions so
as to downplay within‑party conflicts, rather than focusing on questions that
would highlight disunity. They could be pressured by face‑to‑face contacts
with officials to avoid potentially embarrassing within‑party disputes. They
also might be inviting guests they feel will be less likely to present disagree‑
ments with other members of their party in order to avoid awkward conflicts.
Why assume that Sunday morning journalists are not downplaying cleavages
and disagreements within and across the parties as a courtesy to guests that
they must host for an extended period of time? Most importantly, what evi‑
dence is there that Sunday morning journalists are not also influencing media
content in ways that may distort the “true” levels of negativity in Washington?
Finally, where is the evidence that the guests interviewed on Sunday
morning programs present an unbiased sample of elite rhetoric, while report‑
ing from other news venues do not? Bad news scholars admit that “Sunday
morning political interview shows clearly do not account for the full universe
of potential commentary [from members of Congress] from which network
news producers might select. Nor are they necessarily a random sample of
elite rhetoric.”28 So why treat them as if they are representative of “real” official
discourse that is independent of media bias?
Expectations
To assess whether a bad news bias exists in the news, I analyze news con‑
tent in numerous ways. First, I undertake an apples‑to‑apples comparison,
measuring how often substantive within‑party dissent appears in the news,

and how often members of a party actually vote against the president’s pre‑
ferred policies. If reporters over‑cover within‑party disagreement, negativ‑
ity in the news should appear more often than votes against the president’s
agenda. Second, I employ a more general measurement of within‑party and
cross‑party criticisms, measuring the absolute levels of negativity in the news.
If negativity dominates the news, it should appear in most news stories for
the case studies examined here. My examination of media negativity and vot‑
ing records includes reporting on all the policy debates previously examined,
with the exceptions of Social Security reform and the 2007 minimum wage. I
exclude Social Security because there was never a final vote on Bush’s reform
proposal. The 2007 minimum wage debate was excluded because previous
studies of negativity examined reporting covering presidential proposals, and
the minimum wage represented a Democratic legislative item, not a presi‑
dential proposal.
Main Findings
In the spring of 2001, moderator Republican senators, including Olympia

Snowe, George Voinovich, and Arlen Specter, voiced opposition to President
Bush’s proposed tax cuts. Their concerns were in part due to worries that a
projected government surplus might not actually be as large as projections
claimed, and that large tax cuts might produce significant increases in the
deficit and debt.29 Critics within Bush’s party, however, were in the minority,
as the vast majority of Republicans voted for the 2001 tax cuts. How much
did journalists emphasize within‑party conflict on the tax cuts or on other
issues? My analysis of four policy disputes suggests that reporters do not exag‑
gerate within‑party disagreements. Very rarely does within‑party rejection of
the president appear in the news, and rarely do members of the president’s
party vote against his interests when it comes to roll call votes. These find‑
ings are explored in Table 5.3. The measures include within‑party criticisms
of the president in the New York Times and Chicago Sun Times, and final roll
call votes on legislation.30 I limit my analysis to these outlets, and in the next
chapter simply to the New York Times, due to space constraints and due to
evidence in chapters 2, 3, and 4 of overwhelming uniformity in news coverage
across news outlets examined. As the most important national news source,
the New York Times sets the agenda for other news sources throughout the
country. This agenda‑setting function explains the high level of overlap in
content across news outlets.
Table 5.3. Within‑Party Rejections of the President in Voting and the News
Minimum Wage (1/1–5/31/1996)

Number of stories: 54

The President’s Party: Rejection The President’s Party: Congressional

of the Policy Proposal
Opposition to Policy Proposal
(as a % of all Cong. Statements from (as a % of all Pres. Party Votes)

Pres. Party Members)

Legislative Opposition Congressional Opposition in

in the News Chamber Roll Call Votes

New York Times 1% House 6%

Sun Times 0% Senate 0%

Tax Cuts (1/1–5/31/2001)




Stimulus (1/1–2/28/2009)




Executive Pay (1/1–3/31/2009)


New York Times 9.4% House 13%


From Table 5.3, one sees that, for reporting on the 1996 minimum
wage, substantive criticisms within the president’s party rarely appeared in
the news, representing just 1 percent of the within‑party statements in the
New York Times, and none of the statements in the Chicago Sun Times.31 By
comparison, 6 percent of congressional Democrats did not vote with the

president on raising the minimum wage in the House, while all Democrats
in the Senate voted with the president. These numbers do not suggest a jour‑
nalistic negativity bias. For the Bush tax cuts, the same finding is evident.
Reporting of within‑party rejections of the president appeared in just 1 per‑
cent of Republican statements in the New York Times, and in none of the
statements in the Chicago Sun Times. Comparing this to voting on the tax
cuts, just 2 percent of House Republicans, and no Republican senators failed
to vote with the president on the tax cuts. To summarize, with tax cuts and
the minimum wage, within‑party dissent was less common in the news than
dissent in voting.
For the stimulus and executive pay, one sees mostly similar findings
to the other case studies. For the stimulus, within‑party opposition to the
president accounted for 9 percent and zero percent of Democratic statements
in the New York Times and Chicago Sun Times respectively. In comparison, 4
percent of House Democrats failed to support the president, while there was
no Senate opposition. Dissent in the news was higher than dissent in voting
in the Chicago Sun Times, but only slightly. For executive pay, reporting of
within‑party opposition in the New York Times (9.4 percent of the statements
from Democrats) fell within a normal range compared to actual disagreement
with the president in voting, as 13 percent of representatives and 7 percent of
senators failed to vote for legislation introducing restrictions on executive pay.
The Chicago Sun Times’ reporting on within‑party disagreement
exceeded actual within‑party disagreement in voting, although this devia‑
tion occurred in just one of the eight news categories analyzed in Table 5.3.
In summarizing the above findings, it seems that reporters provided an
accurate picture of within‑party disagreement for the case studies in ques‑
tion. The data here provide no evidence that reporters consistently over‑
reported within‑party conflicts. One would predict these findings based on
the pro‑government theory of bias. If reporters “index” within‑party dis‑
agreements to those expressed by officials, then the number of within‑party
disagreements in the news and in voting should roughly equal.
What about negativity in the news more generally? While I did not
measure negativity as a function of some sort of bias, it was possible to mea‑
sure it in absolute terms, to see whether it was emphasized in a majority or
minority of coverage for each policy. The measures below reflect the percent‑
age of stories that were classified as emphasizing negativity, specifically from
three sources—from within the president’s party, from the competing party,
and from members of the general public and public interest groups—during
the policy debate process.32 The overarching finding from this section is that
negativity is at times quite high, but that it fluctuates greatly over time. At
times it is frequently emphasized, and at other times infrequently. With regard

to the question: Do journalists emphasize negativity?—the answer seems to
be: sometimes more so and sometimes less.
For the 2001 Bush tax cuts, one sees that negativity waxes and wanes
in reporting over the months. In Figure 5.2, coverage was quite positive for
the Republican Party, as they consistently dominated over Democrats in the
areas of partisan sources quoted in the news and partisan mentions. Emphasis
on disagreements within and between parties ranged from a high of 60 to
80 percent of news stories in February and April, to a low of 20 percent of
stories in January and May. In short, reporting was generally positive, despite
ups and downs in coverage. As I document in Chapter Six, generally positive
coverage produced growing support for tax cuts.
Negativity was quite common in the news at times, and not all that
common at other times. This suggests a variable, rather than consistent, nega‑
tivity. The appearance of negativity in the news, however, is not surprising
considering how contentious the final vote was over the tax cuts. All Demo‑
cratic senators voted against, and opposition in the House included most
Democrats—196 of 197. Lacking enough support to pass the cuts through the
normal legislative process, Republicans were forced to resort to “reconcilia‑
tion.” Through reconciliation, items are voted on with limited debate (twenty
hours) to avoid a filibuster by a minority set on derailing the legislation, as
Senate Democrats were in 2001. This special rule is allowed in Senate voting
because of the importance of budget legislation, which must be passed every
year to keep the government running, making it immune from filibustering.
Figure 5.2 suggests that bad news was common in New York Times coverage
in some months, but not common in other months. But coverage did not
exhibit a consistent negativity in most stories across all five months examined.
With Social Security, negativity in the news grew over time, and was
sustained more consistently throughout the debate than with the Bush tax
cuts. As documented in Figure 5.3, Republicans generally dominated the news
in terms of sources quoted and party leaders mentioned. However, negativ‑
ity was emphasized in half of stories or more for four of five months ana‑
lyzed. Numerous sources of conflict appeared in the news, originating from
Democratic and Republican officials and the public. In stories emphasizing
conflict over Social Security, the vast majority of conflicts in reports—75
percent—originated from Republicans and Democrats (40 percent from
Democrats and 35 percent from Republicans). Just 25 percent of stories dis‑
cussed public opposition.
Because of multiple sources of opposition, news stories were not as
favorable to Republicans as they might have been. Overall, Social Security
Source: Lexis Nexis
Op-eds and editorials excluded
Figure 5.2. New York Times coverage of tax cuts (January–May 2001).

Source: Lexis Nexis
Figure 5.3. New York Times reporting on social security reform (January–May 2005).

reporting was characterized by sustained negativity, although the debate on

the House and Senate floors between both parties was also intense, as docu‑
mented earlier in this chapter.
As with tax cuts, negative reporting on the stimulus varied. As seen
in Figure 5.4, reporting in January was strongly sympathetic to the Demo‑
crats. More than 80 percent of sources quoted and mentions of partisan lead‑
ers were from Democrats, and less than 20 percent were from Republicans.
Similarly, negative stories emphasizing partisan and public disagreement on
the stimulus were infrequent, appearing in less than 20 percent of coverage.
By February, however, Democratic sources and party mentions had
shrunken by more than twenty percentage points, and negativity appeared
in more than 40 percent of stories. Overall, coverage ranged from positive
to increasingly negative, although emphasis on negativity never appeared in
more than half of stories per month.
Finally, for executive pay, negative news was rare. As Figure 5.5 sug‑
gests, in January 2009, Democrats dominated the news, with Republicans
making up between 20 percent to one‑third of all sources quoted and men‑
tions of party leaders. These numbers declined by February and March, with
Republicans ranging from a high from 20 percent to a low of none of sources
quoted and party mentions. Stories emphasizing negativity never appeared
Source: Lexis Nexis

Figure 5.4. New York Times reporting on the stimulus (January–February 2009).

Source: Lexis Nexis

Figure 5.5. New York Times reporting on executive pay (January–March 2009).

in more than 20 percent of news stories per month. Positive coverage aided
Democrats in their efforts to promote government regulation of executive
pay.
Conclusion
The case studies in this chapter suggest a number of findings, all of which
run contrary to the bad news bias theory. First, negativity is the norm among
political officials; it does not appear to be exaggerated by journalists. Historic
obstructionism and conflict in government makes it difficult to seriously talk
about journalists as the primary impediment to productivity in Washington.
My review of congressional rhetoric on Social Security and the stimulus sug‑
gest there was no shortage of negativity from political officials. Substantive
dissent from within the president’s party was rare in voting, and also in news
reports. For the four case studies, negativity was at times common in the
news, although it failed to appear in most stories from one month to the next.
Negativity was variable, fluctuating depending on the issue examined and
the month in question. This study should not be the final say on the matter,
but it does suggest that many of the previous claims about a negativity bias
may be exaggerated. In short, journalists do not seem to pose a significant
impediment to official dominance of the news.
6
Media Effects on Public Opinion
Three main points are covered in this chapter. First, I examine how media
shape public opinion. My findings suggest that political parties are often quite
effective in building public support through the media. In three of four cases
examined—the 2001 tax cuts, the 2009 stimulus, and the 2009 executive pay
controversy—the president’s party dominated the news and influenced public
opinion in favor of its preferred policies. Because parties often succeed in
manufacturing consent among the news‑following public, it makes little sense
to speak of “bad news” bias that consistently undermines official agendas.
A second topic I address is the extent to which the public is unaf‑
fected by official messages in the news. Americans often depend heavily on
officials to guide public opinion, but they also rely on their own previously
held attitudes and familiarity with (at least some) policy issues in order to
challenge official messages in the news. Looking across four case studies, it
is clear that political officials are often able to build public support, although
the public plays a more active role in challenging official agendas than many
scholars are willing to concede.
I develop an explanation for assessing how media influence public opin‑
ion. I provide evidence that three factors influence public opinion with regard
to news consumption: (1) the extent to which one party or another dominates
or fails to dominate the news; (2) the extent to which prior public support
for a party’s proposal exists among the general public and specific ideologi‑
cal and partisan groups within it; and (3) the extent to which the public is
already familiar with an issue addressed by officials.
Bad news scholars frame journalists as overly critical of govern‑
ment. This bias, they argue, produces disproportionately negative news and
153
increased distrust of government among the news‑viewing public. Others

portray journalists as dependent on officials to determine news content. Jour‑
nalists are seen as passive political actors, merely reflecting the debates occur‑
ring between the Democratic and Republican parties. As “indexing” scholars
argue, media socialize, or “indoctrinate,” those paying closest attention to
politics and the news in favor of political elites’ messages.1 By closely follow‑
ing politics in the news, the most attentive Americans are more likely to be
influenced by the political debates occurring in Washington that are reported
in the media. Parties exercise significant influence over public attitudes. Parti‑
san Americans “index” their political attitudes to fit those of their respective
parties. This pattern is evident in a number of the case studies examined here.
Public opinion scholars disagree about the role of the media in influ‑
encing public attitudes. The era of “minimal effects,” in which media were
thought to exercise little to no impact on public beliefs, is now rejected in
favor of a more expansive understanding of media effects.2 “Agenda setting”
and “priming” research suggest that media influence what issues people think
about and how they think about them.3 Additional questions are now being
asked with regard to media effects. Do media also shape individuals’ policy
attitudes? I address this question here, as I test competing theories of media
effects. I do not uncover evidence of a media effect that consistently encour‑
ages pro‑Democratic or pro‑Republican attitudes among viewers, but rather
a media effect that is variable and fluid. News stories are not consistently
biased in favor of one party or the other. Furthermore, attention to the news
does not produce consistent support for Democrats, as the “liberal media”
theory claims. Sometimes, attention to the news produces greater support for
Republicans. At other times, attention produces growing support for Demo‑
crats. The variability in media effects depends on which party is in control of
government, how unified they are in their discussion of a policy issue, and
on whether the public is susceptible to accepting a message in the first place.
Media Indoctrination and Public Opinion
In The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, Zaller examines “why and how
elite discourse affects mass opinion.”4 He found that political “considerations
that citizens use in evaluating presidential performance” are “formed from the
internalization of arguments from the mass media and elite discourse.”5 Zaller
describes a relationship between media and government in which officials
determine the range of views reported in political debates.6 News audiences
rely on reporters and political elites to form their own opinions. These find‑
Public interest groups’ success in receiving media attention appears to

be influenced by the strength of the groups in question. Thrall emphasizes
that interest groups’ success in gained media coverage is based on groups’ size
and economic resources. A group’s level of news coverage depends on factors
such as money, staff size, reputation, expertise, and name recognition.96 While
many interest groups are at a disadvantage due to difficulty in raising large
sums of money, many are able to compensate for this weakness by attracting
larger numbers of members—in the process securing greater media attention.
Recent examples of public interest group successes in gaining media attention
include: Occupy Wall Street, the 2011 Madison Wisconsin labor protestors,
the Tea Party, environmentalists, the gay and lesbian rights movement, and
protests in New York City and Ferguson, Missouri, over police brutality.
How successful are labor unions and their members and representatives
at gaining attention in the news? Labor union membership fell to historic
lows by the late twentieth to early twenty‑first century, but studies suggest
unions were at times successful in garnering sympathetic media coverage.
One example is the 1997 UPS strike. While the duration of strikes is his‑
torically a significant factor for unions when it comes to receiving increased
media coverage, public outreach efforts—as seen in the UPS strike—may
also matter.97 In his study of the 1997 UPS strike, Martin presented evidence
that “many mainstream news media dropped their typical consumer‑oriented
frames for telling stories about labor and instead presented a range of opin‑
ions about the status of part‑time workers in the economy [a major com‑
plaint of UPS workers was the shortage of full‑time jobs available from the
company], the years of downsizing at U.S. corporations, and the question
of fair wages.”98 As Martin found, however, labor victories (such as at UPS)
may be episodic, limited to specific events, and failing to challenge long‑term
hegemonic trends in the news.99 Nonetheless, Martin’s study suggested that
workers can successfully organize in order to receive more sympathetic news
coverage. Similarly, Ryan’s analysis of the UPS strike concluded that cover‑
age represented a collective victory for labor, exploring how workers came
together to exploit various “cracks” or “narrow opportunities” in news report‑
ing, promoting a positive image of labor as needing a raise and deserving
fairer working conditions.100
Kumar’s study of the UPS strikes adds more nuance and depth to previ‑
ous studies, yet still suggests there is room in the news for nongovernmental
actors. In the strike, Teamsters succeeded in “breaking through” to main‑
stream America, gaining sympathy from the public, although there was some
resistance from various media.101 Kumar found USA Today and NBC to be
Zaller maintains, was evidence of “elite domination of mass opinion by means

of the mass media.”16 The relationship between media content, elite messages,
and public opinion is documented elsewhere as well. Brody presents evidence
that “public approval of the way the president is handling the job stemmed
from the accumulation of media‑borne impressions that the president is suc‑
ceeding in achieving policy goals set by societal consensus or by his own poli‑
cy proposals.”17 Brody documents a relationship between increasingly negative
news coverage of the presidency in the late 1960s and early 1970s during the
Vietnam War and Watergate period, which was accompanied by growing
public disapproval of the president.18 Other studies document a relationship
between sympathetic reporting on the Bush administration’s antiterror mes‑
sages and Weapons of Mass Destruction–related messages in the news, and
increased public support for the president’s foreign policy.19
Finally, a number of other examinations of public opinion find that
political attitudes are indexed to political attentiveness. Nie, Verba, and Pet‑
rocik concluded that those with high interest in political campaigns were
more consistent in forming liberal and conservative attitudes, compared to
those less interested in political campaigns.20 Those with higher levels of edu‑
cation exhibited greater “levels of attitude consistency across both domestic
and foreign issues.”21 Berinsky concluded that politically attentive Americans
“take cues from elites,” with political attitudes changing as the balance of offi‑
cials’ messages fluctuate over time.22 Berinsky documents strong differences
between those who followed and did not follow politics, with highly attentive
liberals more likely to oppose the Iraq war from 2004 through 2006, compared
to highly attentive conservatives who were more supportive of the war effort.23
What all of the above studies have in common is they argue that public
opinion, like media coverage, is “indexed” to the views expressed in Washing‑
ton. This would certainly be possible if media coverage faithfully disseminated
the messages of political parties, rather than undermining them. Although
embraced by many scholars, public opinion “indexing” is questioned by oth‑
ers. Recent work by Baum and Groeling suggests that a bad news bias encour‑
ages increased public skepticism against officials, undermining government
authority. They reject the idea that journalists share a pro‑government bias
in reporting, and they reject the notion that “the public index their opinions
to the tenor of elite debate to which they are exposed.”24
Baum and Groeling speak of “the media’s independent effect” on public
deliberation and opinion, with journalists “over‑represent[ing] criticism of
the president [by members of Congress from the president’s party], while
under‑representing praise [from within the president’s party], especially dur‑
ing unified [party control of] government.”25 I presented evidence in chapter
Media Effects on Public Opinion 157
5, however, that the alleged “unyielding wave of negativity in media coverage

of elite discussion concerning the president and his policies” is strongly exag‑
gerated.26 A revisiting of the cases from chapter 5, analyzing media effects
on public opinion, should help uncover any alleged bad news effects (if they
exist) on public attitudes. A failure to find evidence of a pervasive bad news
effect would strengthen the case against claims of a journalistic negativity bias.
In measuring the alleged effects of bad news on public attitudes, Baum
and Groeling examine presidential public approval data and nighttime broad‑
cast television coverage of the president’s agenda.27 They argue that mem‑
bers of the president’s party, in addition to political independents, are drawn
to within‑party criticisms of the president. Such criticisms, they argue, are
rather novel, when compared to the more predictable within‑party praise or
cross‑party criticism of the president. Members of the party that opposes the
president should be swayed by rhetoric from their own party that praises the
president, since the source of praise (one’s own party) comes from a more
“credible” source. Baum and Groeling depict within‑party criticisms as harm‑
ing the party’s credibility with the public and cross‑party praise as reinforc‑
ing the presidential party’s agenda.28 Baum and Groeling produce evidence
that within‑party criticisms of the president in the news produce growing
disapproval of him among presidential partisans and political independents.29
Baum and Groeling also find that cross‑party praise for the president and
his party produces increasing approval of him among nonpresidential party
members and political independents.30
Expectations
Baum and Groeling’s study is rather nuanced in terms of examining how

media influence the beliefs of different groups of Americans. But they may
be unable to see the forest for the trees. There likely is much negativity in
the news, and it may well undermine presidents’ agendas when it occurs.
But to paint a picture of the media with such a broad brush, representing
media as one‑dimensionally negative, means ignoring case studies that docu‑
ment at length how journalists blatantly fail to question official messages
and propaganda.31 By looking only at congressional statements regarding the
president (just one part of all political statements in the news), one neglects
other components of official messages. One misses assessments of overall
levels of favorable and unfavorable coverage for each party for policy issues
in the news. This chapter examines not only legislative voices and how they
are received in the news, but all political voices in the news. It examines how
the public’s opinions on policy issues change as the overall tone of media
coverage changes. This more holistic analysis is necessary in order to speak
more authoritatively about media effects and an alleged bad news bias.
I would expect that greater attention by the media to reporting major
policy conflicts would produce mixed effects on public attitudes toward a
party’s proposals. Mixed effects are in part a function of fluid media coverage,
which switches between being more or less favorable to each party at differ‑
ent points in time. If media content varies, sometimes more favorable to the
president’s party and at other times less favorable, public opinion may vary
as well. News reports should not produce a one‑dimensional negativity bias
against government. Instead, media effects will be based on three primary
criteria, which vary over time and with each case study. First, media effects
will depend on the strength of each party, as seen in its ability or inability
to dominate the news. Positive coverage that favors one party should have its
strongest effects on partisans of that party, in addition to independents, and
the weakest effects (if any) on Americans in the opposition party. This expec‑
tation is derived from Zaller’s and others’ “selective exposure” research, which
finds varying media effects depending on the political affiliation and ideology
of the news viewer.32 Second, media effects will depend on the prior attitudes
of the public. The notion that prior public opinions matter when assessing
media effects on public opinion has some basis in previous research.33 Prior
public support, existing before the onset of major policy debates, will work
to either enhance or weaken the effects of official messages, depending on
how susceptible audiences are to the message in the first place. As audiences
become more aware of the basic details of a policy proposal, they will be bet‑
ter able to evaluate it, positively or negatively, based on their prior attitudes.
This sort of outcome suggests an informational effect of media coverage, as
the accurate reporting of party proposals provides citizens with a context
for evaluating those proposals. Prior attitudes, in this case, are measured by
collective preferences of the public as a whole, and by the opinions of vari‑
ous partisan and ideological groups. Third, the effects of media will depend
on how familiar the public is with a particular policy issue. On those issues
with which the public is more familiar, it will be more difficult for officials
to influence Americans’ policy attitudes.
Every case study examined here is unique, so each of the three factors
may be more or less important depending on the case. But there are good
reasons to assume that these factors will influence media effects. First, as dis‑
cussed above, a large body of research literature already suggests that media
biases influence public attitudes. When the president’s party dominates the
news, it is likely to produce greater support for his party among those paying
attention to the news. This outcome is likely assuming the president’s party
is unified in promoting its agenda. If the party is strongly divided, however,
media consumption might produce growing opposition because of all the
negativity being generated within the presidential party.
Second, with regard to cross‑party dissent, the opposition (non‑pres‑
idential) party’s growing influence over the news is also likely to influence
public attitudes. Growing effectiveness of the opposition party in getting its
positions out in the news is not likely to hurt the president’s party in terms
of the support it enjoys from its own partisans, as they are likely to reject
(for ideological reasons) the messages of the opposition. But negative cover‑
age directed toward the president’s party is likely to matter by mobilizing
opposition among independents, moderates, and members of the opposing
(non‑presidential) party. I anticipate these effects for independents and mod‑
erates because many of these individuals are potentially open to the mes‑
sages of both parties, but likely to increase their support for the party that
dominates the news.
Third, prior public opinion (as it existed before a party seeks to sell its
policy) will matter for two reasons. First, it is far easier to sell a policy to
the public when they already agree with it. In such cases, the party merely
needs to strengthen prior support among its own partisans, although some
convincing will need to take place among moderates and independents. On
the other hand, public opposition will be stoked when individuals’ interests
run counter to official proposals on a specific policy issue. Journalists’ report‑
ing of the details of a party’s proposal will strengthen opposition by some
Americans, as those whose interests lie contrary to the party’s proposal learn
more about the proposal in question. Such informational effects should be
expected in any media system that competently reports the basic contours
of a policy debate.
While previous research discusses the importance of prior public opin‑
ion in influencing the media effects on Americans’ attitudes, that research
suggests that information in the news must differ distinctly from Americans’
prior opinions for it to impact public attitudes.34 My findings suggest this is
not necessarily the case. Simply by revealing the details of a policy proposal,
media exert an informational effect on audiences that reinforces prior atti‑
tudes that were already either in favor of or opposed to the proposal. In other
words, media play a role in strengthening prior public opinions.
Fourth, public familiarity with an issue (or lack thereof) should signifi‑
cantly influence officials’ effectiveness in cultivating public support. It is natu‑
ral to expect those who are more familiar with an issue to be more confident
in their attitudes, and less likely to simply accept something someone else tells
them, especially if it contradicts their previous knowledge and experience.

Experience breeds confidence in and stability of opinions and beliefs. Fur‑
thermore, in an era of strong public distrust of government, it will be easier
for Americans to reject political rhetoric if it is seen as running contrary to
their experiences. Suspicion of government is at an all‑time high in modern
history, so those with reasons to question officials are likely to do so when
they feel that they are being misled.
Preliminary Results
Attempts to measure media effects are counterproductive if they fail to verify

that those who claim to closely follow the news actually do so. Individuals
may exaggerate their level of attention in public opinion surveys, as some
research suggests.35 Fortunately, the evidence here suggests that those who
claimed to be highly attentive better understood the basic details of policy
debates. This is likely because they were paying attention to reporting on
these issues. Data were only available for two of the policy issues in question,
however: the stimulus and Social Security.
Media play a vital role in setting the agenda for the policy issues the
public considers. For example, for the stimulus, increased stimulus coverage
was associated with growing public interest. Coverage of the stimulus com‑
prised 44 percent of all news reporting in early February, at a time when the
portion of the public who cited the story as their “most closely followed”
reached a similar 47 percent.36 The stimulus was the most covered issue in
the news, and as a result, the most followed story by the public. The ability
of media to influence interest in a story through sheer volume of coverage
is verified many times over in empirical studies.37
Those claiming to pay the greatest attention to reporting on Social Secu‑
rity and the stimulus were more likely to correctly answer that: (1) the Social
Security surplus was sufficient to be able to pay out full benefits for at least
thirty years (from 2005 onward); and (2) that Democrats and Republicans
were by and large not working together in producing a bipartisan stimulus
bill in early 2009. Figure 6.1 provides evidence that those who followed Social
Security reform “a lot” were more likely to assert that the surplus would not
run out before thirty years. This finding was consistent across liberal, conser‑
vative, and moderate respondents, and for all respondents more generally.38
The relationship between increased attentiveness and understanding of the
surplus’s insolvency date was statistically significant for all respondents in the
Pew survey, after controlling for respondents’ race, age, education, income,
Figure 6.1
A"en%veness to and Knowledge of
Social Security (Feb. 2005)
60
% All Respondents
50
Agreeing
Social 40
Conserva=ves
Security
30 Only
Will "Run
Short of 20
Moderates Only
Money" in 10
30 Years
or More 0 Liberals Only
Nothing A Li2le A Lot
A2en=on to Social Security Reform

(How Much Heard About This Issue)
Figure 6.1. Attentiveness to and knowledge of social security (Feb. 2005).

sex, partisanship, and ideology.39 Highly attentive conservatives were the least
likely to agree, when compared to other groups. This was likely a result of
the common conservative refrain repeated by Republican officials in the news
that Social Security was “going broke,” and that it was in danger of becoming
insolvent in the future.
A similar relationship was found between news attentiveness and aware‑
ness about the 2009 stimulus debate. Figure 6.2 suggests that those who paid
“a lot” of attention to the stimulus were consistently more likely to be aware
that no significant bipartisan effort was being made to pass legislation (just
three congressional Republicans supported stimulus legislation when the bill
came up for a vote). The relationship was observed for liberal, conservative,
and moderate respondents, and for all respondents more generally. The rela‑
tionship was highly statistically significant after controlling for other demo‑
graphic variables.40
Conservative Americans’ reluctance to accept the “thirty‑year surplus”
estimate suggests the importance of prior public attitudes, as this group was
more likely to resist information that conflicted with Republican officials’ dire
warnings that Social Security was going “broke.” Unlike the Social Security
civics question, the stimulus question was not susceptible to the same sorts of
partisan misperceptions by conservatives. There was no political advantage to
be gained by either party from falsely claiming that the parties were closely
working together on a stimulus package.
Figure 6.2
Media Consump.on on, and Poli.cal Awareness
of the S.mulus (Feb. 2009)
% Who
Disagree that 70 Conserva8ves
Democrats 60 Only
and
50 Moderates Only
Republicans
are "Working 40
Together" to 30
"S8mulate Liberals Only
20
the Economy
10
and Create
0 All Respondents
Jobs"
A Li-le A Lot
A-en8on to S8mulus Repor8ng & Debate
(How Much Heard About This Issue)
Figure 6.2. Media consumption on, and political awareness of the stimulus (Feb.

2009).
Republicans sought to rally public support by informing their support‑

ers how much they opposed Democrats on the stimulus, and that they rejected
“big government,” “wasteful,” “bloated” spending, and growth in the deficit
and national debt.
Main Findings
The four case studies reviewed here raise questions about the alleged bad news
bias, and suggest that media effects depend on the strength of each party’s
messages in the news, whether the public agrees in advance with a policy
proposal, and how familiar Americans are with a policy issue.
The 2001 Tax Cuts
The 2001 tax cuts debate occurred within a political environment that was
conducive to building support for President Bush’s proposal. As documented
in chapter 3, media coverage heavily favored Republicans. Furthermore, the
American public has historically been sympathetic to the idea of tax relief,
especially when they are told they will benefit from the cuts. Finally, tax law
is generally convoluted, so this was an issue with which the public was not
port for raising the minimum wage, if the increase were accompanied by tax
cuts. Furthermore, Bush was largely focused on other issues in 2007, includ‑
ing opposition to Democrats’ calls for withdrawal from Iraq. With Bush’s
abdication on the minimum wage, and considering the rapid nature of the
Democrats’ “100 Hour” initiative, one might expect to see a somewhat larger
advantage for Democrats, amid a general balancing of reports between both
parties due to split party government.
Competing Frames in Official Rhetoric
In examining the debates between political officials, I included frames

expressed by both parties. The frames were drawn from the arguments dis‑
cussed above, but expressed by prominent political leaders. These frames were
confirmed as relevant to political discourse primarily through an extensive
reading of presidential speeches and legislative statements in the Congressio-
nal Record, and secondarily by reviewing news stories covering the minimum
wage in both periods.
For those opposing the minimum wage, the main frames included:
(1) The “Unemployment Effects” frame, which contended that increasing the
minimum wage would cause a loss in employment among low‑pay workers.29
This narrative was articulated by officials such as Republican House Majority
Whip Tom Delay and House Republican Majority Leader Dick Armey, among
others;30 (2) The “Tax Cuts” frame, including discussions of business taxes
and the need to cut taxes to offset the cost of higher wages to businesses.31
This narrative was popular, for example, with Republican presidential can‑
didate and senator Bob Dole, who in 1996 proposed repealing the gas tax
to offset supposed negative economic effects of raising the minimum wage,
and President Bush and Congressional Republicans in 2007, who supported
cutting taxes on small businesses;32 (3) The “Labor Pandering” frame, which
included derogatory references to Democrats as under the control of workers
and unions.33 Examples included Republican representative Delay’s suggestion
that “big labor” pressured Democrats for a “sudden push for an increase in
the minimum wage,” and Dole’s accusation that President Clinton only raised
the minimum wage issue because of pressure from the A.F.L.‑C.I.O.34
For minimum wage supporters, major frames included claims related to
working‑class Americans, inflation and cost of living issues, and unemploy‑
ment concerns. More specifically, they included: (1) The “No Unemployment
Effects” frame, which challenged the notion that minimum wage increases
cause higher unemployment.35 This position was expressed by President Bill
Figure 6.3
Alterna(ve Spending
Priori(es for Budget Soc. Sec. and
Surplus (% Preferring Each Medicare (37%)
Op(on)
Domes5c
Programs (23%)
17%
37% Tax Cut (19%)
19%
Pay Off Na5onal
23% Debt (17%)
Figure 6.3. Alternative spending priorities for budget surplus (% preferring each

option).
appeared in the news. Still, the radical decline in support for tax cuts when
Americans were asked about competing spending priorities suggests that
framing plays an important role in influencing perceptions of public policy.
Attention to the news was associated with increasingly positive percep‑
tions of the Republican Party’s tax agenda among the news‑following public.
Drawn from a February survey from the Pew Research Center, Figures 6.4
and 6.5 measure public support for tax cuts, compared to other government
policies. Contrary to the bad news theory, increased attention to the political
and media discourse on the tax cuts was associated with increased support for
the president’s party. Those paying greater attention to the news on tax cuts
were more likely to favor the cuts over alternative spending priorities. Support
was greater among attentive Republicans, conservatives, independents, and
moderates, and much weaker for attentive Democrats and attentive liberals.46
Increased support for tax cuts was higher among those conservatives pay‑
ing closer attention to the news (a group most likely to already agree with
tax cuts), but marginal for liberals paying more attention to the news, while
highly attentive Democrats were even more likely to oppose the tax cuts. As
predicted, attention to the news had little effect on those already ideologically
predisposed to opposing tax cuts. By rejecting news coverage that favored
Republicans, Democrats and liberals demonstrated the role of prior public
attitudes in influencing public opinion formation.
Clinton, Labor Secretary Robert Reich, and the Department of Labor;36 (2)
The “Common Man” frame, which referred to families in need, workers, and
the persistence of poverty.37 References to working‑class mothers, fathers,
and children were common in the rhetoric of Democratic officials such as
President Clinton and Democratic House Representative and Education and
Labor Committee chairman George Miller, among others;38 and (3) The “Stag‑
nation‑Inflation” frame, referring to workers’ stagnating‑to‑declining wages
due to inflation.39 President Clinton articulated this point, stressing that the
minimum wage had reached a forty‑year low in inflation‑adjusted value by
the mid‑1990s, while other Democrats focused on the growing cost of living
amid declining wages.40
Framing the Minimum Wage
Assessing the frequency of these frames, one finds a bipartisan pro‑government

bias in the news. As Table 2.1 suggests, reporters consistently addressed both

in the News
NYT Sun Times CBS

(as % of


No Unemployment Effects 4 3 6

Common Man 30 32 32

Stagnation‑Inflation 16 15 9

Total Democratic Frames 50 50 47

Con Frames
Unemployment Effects 15 18 14

Labor Pandering 4 4 8

Taxes/Tax Cuts 31 28 31

Total Republican Frames 50 50 53


Consistent with the above findings, Figures 6.6 and 6.7 (also drawn
from the February Pew survey) find that attention to the news was correlated
with greater support for the notion that tax cuts would “be fair to everyone.”
The notion that tax cuts would disproportionately benefit the affluent over
other Americans was not as salient a concern for groups paying greater atten‑
tion to the news. Data from a March 2001 CBS survey found similar media
effects. 6.6
Figure Of those paying “a lot” of attention to the Bush tax cuts, 47 percent
thought the cuts would be “fair to everyone,” compared to just 33 percent
Media Consump.on & Opinions

of Tax Cuts by Ideology (Feb. 2001)
60 All
50 Respondents*
% Who
Agree That 40 Liberals Only
Bush's 30
Proposed
20 Moderates Only
Tax Cuts
Will "Be 10
Fair to 0 ConservaBves
Everyone" Not at All Not Too Fairly Very Close Only*
Close Close
Level of ADenBon to News on Tax Cuts
Figure 6.7 (Story Followed...)
Figure 6.6. Media consumption and opinions of tax cuts by ideology (Feb. 2001).

Media Consump.on and Opinions of
Tax Cuts by Party (Feb. 2001)
% Who All
Agree That 70
60 Respondents*
Bush's
Proposed 50
40 Republicans
Tax Cuts Only*
30
Will "Be 20
Fair to 10 Independents
Everyone" 0 Only
Not at All Not Too Fairly Close Very Close
Close Democrats
Only
Level of AHenIon to News on Tax Cuts
(How Close Followed News Story)

Figure 6.7. Media consumption and opinions of tax cuts by party (Feb. 2001).

of those paying “some” attention to this issue, and just 14 percent of those
paying “not much” attention.47
Media coverage, however, was instrumental in increasing support for
the tax cuts among moderates, independents, conservatives, and Republicans
paying attention to the news in the February and March surveys. Social sci‑
entists often speak of the “interaction” between different “independent vari‑
ables,” and their combined effects on a “dependent variable.” In the case of
tax cuts, political partisanship and media consumption (both independent
variables) played an interactive role in building support for the tax cuts (the
dependent variable). An interaction between media consumption and indi‑
vidual partisanship meant that both mattered in influencing public thought.
In other words, as Americans’ partisanship shifted from Democratic to inde‑
pendent and then Republican, increased consumption of the news was more
likely to produce growing support for the Bush tax cuts. The “interaction”
between partisanship and media attention—in terms of their effects on public
opinion—was statistically significant, after controlling for other demographic
factors of respondents.48
Media content was biased in favor of tax cuts, and attention to the
news was correlated with growing support for tax cuts, even after controlling
for factors such as respondents’ political party and ideology. Furthermore,
if increased media consumption produced growing support for cuts among
moderates and independents, this suggests a significant role for the media
in influencing public opinion in favor of the Republican Party. Regarding
prior attitudes, moderates and independents were not automatically more
likely to support tax cuts in early 2001, at the outset of the national debate.
While independents were slightly more likely (eight percentage points) to
support tax cuts than oppose them, moderates were evenly split in favor of
and against the cuts.49 If prior attitudes cannot explain growing support for
tax cuts among moderates, media bias can.
The findings for the tax cuts case study suggest that the bad news theory
failed to adequately predict media effects. If news coverage was consistently
negative against the president and his political party, why did increased atten‑
tion to that news increase support for Republicans in multiple months for
which public opinion data were available? Why were Republicans able to pass
the tax cuts, benefiting from significant public support from many groups
of Americans?
Scholars who lambaste the media for a bad news bias will be hard
pressed to explain growing public support for Bush among politically atten‑
tive Americans. The tax cuts case study suggests that Republicans benefitted
from favorable media coverage, and from a public that already supported
cuts and was unfamiliar with a tax policy that many might have opposed if
they knew it favored the wealthy. This case highlights the importance of the
news in informing the public about political issues with which they have
little direct experience.
Social Security Privatization: The Failed Reform
Unlike the 2001 tax cuts, Bush’s efforts to build public support for privatiz‑
ing Social Security did not succeed. As previously discussed, coverage of
Social Security reform in the first half of 2005 was mixed. While Republicans
dominated the news, disagreement within the party, coupled with Democratic
and public opposition, caused a large percentage of stories on reform to be
negative. The public was generally opposed to Bush’s proposal—especially
politically active seniors—and public familiarity with Social Security as a suc‑
cessful pay‑as‑you‑go program was high. As Americans learned more about
the details of a program that differed greatly from a status quo they already
favored and were familiar with, increased attention to the news produced
growing opposition to privatization.
If the conditions were ripe for selling the Bush tax cuts, they most
clearly were not in the case of Social Security. Political opposition from the
Democratic Party was generally weak in terms of their presence in the media
and their power in Congress to oppose reform. The party did not possess
enough votes in the House or Senate to block a vote, assuming that Repub‑
licans were unified in support of privatization. As documented in chapter
3, Democrats were sparingly quoted or mentioned in the news. However,
political opposition to privatization within the Republican Party was signifi‑
cant in 2005. This internal division on the privatization of Social Security
made reform difficult to impossible. Reports in the Wall Street Journal dur‑
ing the reform debate found that approximately thirty House Republicans
opposed privatization.50 Considering that Republicans only held 232 seats
in the House—a modest majority—and that 218 votes were needed to pass
legislation, within‑party opposition was sufficient to sink any reform effort,
especially when added to Democratic opposition. Many Republicans rebelled
against the president due to concern with angering their constituents. The
party was not able to present a unified front against the Democrats. Rather,
the party was conflicted in advocating privatization.
Prior public opinion cut against Republicans. Elderly constituents and
citizen groups such as the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)
opposed privatization. Furthermore, the general public seemed reluctant to
endorse Bush’s plan—even prior to his efforts to sell reform. According to a

Gallup poll in January 2005, before the president began his tour to sell priva‑
tization, 55 percent of Americans thought the creation of private accounts was
“a bad idea,” compared to just 40 percent who felt it was a “good idea.”51 A
January survey found a ten percentage point difference between Americans
cutting against privatization, with 50 percent opposing and 40 percent sup‑
porting.52 Some surveys prior to 2005 suggested public openness to investing
a small portion of workers’ earnings in private accounts as a supplement to
their guaranteed benefits, and some polls even found general support for
investing Social Security funds in the marketplace, but majority support dis‑
appeared once the details of President Bush’s proposal were posed to sur‑
vey respondents.53 A plurality of Americans wanted only “minor” changes
to Social Security, not the fundamental transformation Bush was selling.54
In light of these surveys, Americans were at best guarded about Bush’s pro‑
posal, to downright hostile at worst. Combining Democratic and Republican
congressional opposition with public hostility, Bush’s privatization effort had
little chance of success.
Many Americans—especially the elderly—were intimately familiar with
the Social Security program and its success in keeping millions of Americans
out of poverty in old age. They were unlikely to abandon a highly success‑
ful and popular program simply because a president told them they should.
Claims of an imminent “crisis” in the program’s funding ran directly contrary
to most elderly Americans’ experiences, as the program had remained finan‑
cially solvent and able to pay out full benefits for seventy years by 2005, and
remained a relatively healthy, stable, and solidly funded program years after
Bush’s claims of an imminent crisis. Furthermore, the allure of potentially
higher returns from private accounts was likely tempered by seniors’ previous
experiences with a guaranteed benefit, as opposed to the possibility of higher
or lower returns on private accounts.
Public familiarity with the Social Security program was evident in sur‑
veys. Questions asking citizens about taking a portion of their earnings and
investing them in the market saw small amounts of uncertainty, with just 3 to
5 percent of Americans saying they were “unsure” about such investments.55
Questions asking whether Social Security needed major changes or should
generally be kept the way it is saw “unsure” answers from just 3 to 4 percent
of respondents.56 Surveys asking basic questions about perceptions of Social
Security also saw low uncertainty. Just 4 percent of Americans were “unsure”
whether government has a responsibility to “provide a decent standard of liv‑
ing” to retirees, while just 6 percent were unsure when asked if the “benefits”
of Social Security are worth the “costs.”57 “Unsure” responses averaged less
than 4 percent of respondents across all the questions above. These low uncer‑
tainty rates suggest that most Americans hold established, stable opinions of
the Social Security program. In other words, Social Security is a program
that they feel familiar enough with to take a position one way or another.
Reports of disagreement among Republicans and Democrats echoed
societal conflicts over privatization. Figure 6.8 provides evidence of Republi‑
cans’ failure over time to cultivate public opinion in support of privatization.
The percentage of Americans who felt it was a “bad idea” to invest Social
Security funds in the stock market remained relatively constant, according
to CBS/New York Times surveys from early to mid‑2005, while ABC/Wash-
ington Post polling found that opposition increased by five percentage points
between December 2004 and June 2005.58 These findings do not suggest presi‑
dential success in increasing public support for reform.
Republicans attempted to positively frame privatization by referring to
“personal,” rather than “private” investment accounts in their rhetoric. This
strategy appears to have worked to only a limited extent. When Bush’s reform
proposal was referred to as creating “voluntary personal retirement accounts
as part of the Social Security system,” 41 percent of Americans supported a
change. In contrast, just 34 percent of Americans said they supported reform
when it was described as creating a system of “private” accounts. There were
clear limits to this “spin” game, however, as references to “personal” accounts
still failed to garner support for privatization from most Americans.59
Support for individual retirement accounts was anemic. The percent‑
Figure
age 6.8
of Americans worried about whether Social Security would eventually
Figure 6.8
Figure 6.8 Public Opinion on % Disapproving of Bush's Handling of
Social Security
Social Security
Public Opinion Reform
on % Disapproving of Bush's Handling of
Figure 6.8 Social (9/04-‐6/05) Social Security
Public Opinion on
S ecurity R eform % Disapproving of Bush's Handling of
70
Social (9/04-‐6/05)
Security Reform Social Security
% Feeling it is a "Bad Idea" to Invest
60
70 Public Opinion on % Disapproving of Bush's Handling of
Social Security Money "On Their Own"
Social (9/04-‐6/05)
% Feeling
Social it is a "Bad Idea" to Invest
Security
50
60 Security Reform Social Security Money "On Their Own"
70
40
50 (9/04-‐6/05) % Feeling it is a "Bad Idea" to Invest
60 Social Security Money "On Their Own"
70
30
40 % Disagreeing that "Social Security
50 % Feeling it is a "Bad Idea" to Invest
system will have the money available
60
20
30 % Disagreeing
Social Security tM hat "Social
oney "On STecurity
heir Own"
40 to provide the benefits you expect for
50 system will have the money available
10
20 your
% r eQrement"
30 to Dpisagreeing
rovide the tbhat "Social
enefits you Security
expect for
40 system
your will have the money available
0
10
20 % in Fravor
eQrement"
of "Private Accounts"
% Dpisagreeing
to rovide the tbhat "Social
enefits you Security
expect for
Apr-‐05
Oct-‐04
Jan-‐05
Mar-‐05
May-‐05
Jun-‐05
Sep-‐04
Nov-‐04
Feb-‐05
Dec-‐04
30
0
10 % in Fravor
system
your will ohf ave
eQrement" "Private
the mAoney
ccounts"
available
Apr-‐05
Oct-‐04
Jan-‐05
Mar-‐05
May-‐05
Jun-‐05
Sep-‐04
Nov-‐04
Feb-‐05
Dec-‐04
20 to provide the benefits you expect for

0 % in Fravor of "Private Accounts"
10 your eQrement"
Apr-‐05
Oct-‐04
Jan-‐05 Jan-‐05
Mar-‐05
May-‐05
Jun-‐05
Sep-‐04
Nov-‐04
Feb-‐05
Dec-‐04
0 % in Reform
Favor of "(9/04–6/05).
Private Accounts"
Figure 6.8. Public Opinion on Social Security
Apr-‐05
Oct-‐04
Mar-‐05
May-‐05
Jun-‐05
Sep-‐04
Nov-‐04
Feb-‐05
Dec-‐04
be able to pay out their retirement benefits failed to increase during early to
mid 2005, despite President Bush’s consistent claims that the program was
-
in imminent crisis.60 Social Security reform became ever more unpopular
whenever it was associated with President Bush. Pew Research Center polling
found that support for reform declined by eight percentage points when it was
described as “Bush’s proposal,” compared to descriptions without his name.61
Other indicators suggested that opposition to Bush’s reform plans was
steadily growing. ABC/Washington Post polling from the first half of 2005
found that disapproval of Bush’s “handling” of Social Security increased by
seven percentage points, while Pew surveys found that support for introduc‑
ing “private accounts” declined from 70 percent of Americans in September
2000, when Bush first campaigned on Social Security reform, to a low of 38
to 40 percent by February‑March, 2005.62 By June 2005, Bush’s privatization
plan was no longer being seriously discussed by Congress. Public opinion was
still divided, although notably skeptical, with ABC/Washington Post polling
finding a 48 to 49 percent support to opposition rating for efforts to invest
Social Security funds in the stock market. In the same poll, 63 percent of
Americans suggested that Bush’s proposal “would not improve the long‑term
financial stability of the Social Security system,” while just 32 percent agreed
it would.63
References to disagreement over Social Security reform were common
in the news, as these samples from the New York Times suggested: “G.O.P.
Divided as Bush Views Social Security”; “As White House Begins Social Secu‑
rity Push, Critics Claim Exaggeration”; “White House Looking for Ways to
Ease Opposition to Social Security Overhaul”; “6 Key Democratic Senators
Oppose Bush Plan on Benefits”; “Democrats Assail Bush Plan While Repub‑
licans Worry”; “Private Accounts are Risky, Many Young Workers Say”; “Cool
Reception on Capitol Hill to Social Security Plan”; “In Montana, Bush Faces
a Tough Sell on Social Security”; “Bush Pension Plan Faces a Brick Wall in
the Senate”; “Social Security Fight Begins, Over a Bill Still Nonexistent”; “2
Top G.O.P. Lawmakers Buck Bush on Social Security”; “Flare‑Ups in a Battle
to Push or Bury Bush Social Security Plan”; “Republicans Are Chastened
about Social Security Plan”; “Many Hurdles for Bush Plan”; “Bush Denies that
Private Accounts Are in Serious Trouble”; “In Partisan Haggling Over Private
Accounts, Even the Middle Ground Is Perilous”; “Senate Splits in Test Vote on
Social Security”; “Unions Protest Against Bush’s Social Security Proposal”; “At
Opening Social Security Hearing, Bush’s Fight Looks Largely Uphill”; “Presi‑
dent’s Big Social Security Gamble”; “House Social Security Hearing Opens
With Sharp Partisan Debate”; and “Bush’s Plan for Retirement Leaves G.O.P.
in a Quandary.”
The above stories suggest that different reasons contributed to opposi‑

tion to privatization. Among the public, there were concerns about the insta‑
bility of private accounts and whether they would provide enough security to
seniors, compared to the benefits guaranteed under the collective Social Secu‑
rity trust fund. Democratic officials and many Americans opposed a reform
proposal that would take Social Security out of the hands of the government
and public control, and put it into the private sector. Concerns about privati‑
zation revolved around a few issues: potential losses to retirement accounts,
imposing the responsibility on individuals (rather than on Americans col‑
lectively) to provide for retirement, and fear that privatization would lead to
benefit cuts for current beneficiaries, since payments would have to be made
to them in addition to new payments into individual retirement accounts.
Many Republican officials, on the other hand, were ideologically predisposed
to agree with the president, but expressed frustration at the strong public
opposition to the plan and the potential risk they would face come reelection
time with so many angry seniors and near‑seniors at the polls.
The combination of Republican Party, Democratic Party, and public oppo‑
sition to Social Security reform created a perfect storm for derailing privatiza‑
tion. The media stoked the growing tidal wave of opposition, as many Americans
were paying close attention to reporting on this issue, and increased attention
produced growing opposition. In February and May 2005, the Pew Research
Center found that 70 percent and 72 percent of Americans respectively reported
following the debate over Social Security in the news either “very closely” or
“fairly closely.”64 ABC/Washington Post polling from March 2005 found that
respondents acknowledged that increased attention to political discourse on
Social Security was correlated with greater opposition to reform. When asked,
“Would you say that the more you hear about Bush’s proposals on Social Secu‑
rity, the less you like them?” 58 percent agreed. Just 34 percent agreed that “the
more you hear about Bush’s proposals, the more you like them.”65
News coverage encouraged the growing opposition to privatization.
Despite Republican dominance of the news, much of the media coverage was
negative because it emphasized both Republican and Democratic resistance
to reform. According to survey data from Pew, increased attentiveness to
news about Social Security produced greater opposition to private retirement
accounts, and greater opposition to Bush’s “handling” of the reform issue,
as seen in Figures 6.9 and 6.10.66 This finding suggests significant impact of
news coverage on public attitudes, since the relationship between attention
to the news and opposition to Social Security reform remained statistically
significant, even after controlling for respondents’ partisanship, ideology, and
other factors. If a relationship between media attentiveness and opposition to
Figure 6.9

Media Consump.on & Opinions of
Social Security by Ideology (Feb. 2005)
90 All
80 Respondents*
% Opposing 70
Social 60
ConservaAves
Security 50
40 Only
Reform 30
Establishing 20 Moderates
10
Private 0 Only*
ReArement Not at All Not Too Fairly Very
Accounts Close Close Close Liberals Only*
APenAon to ReporAng on Social

Security Reform
Figure 6.10
Figure 6.9. Media consumption and opinions of social security by ideology (Feb.

2005).
Media Consump.on & Opinions of Social Security
by Ideology (May 2005)
100
90
% 80
70 All
Disapproving 60 Respondents*
of Bush's 50 ConservaAves
"Handling of 40 Only
Social 30
20 Moderates
Security" 10 Only
0
Not at All Not Too Fairly Very Close Liberals Only*
Close Close
ARenAon to News on Bush's Social

Security Plan
Figure 6.10. Media consumption and opinions of social security by ideology (May

2005).
reform remains after controlling for Americans’ ideologies and party identifi‑
cations, this suggests that opposition was not merely a function of preexisting
Democratic and liberal opposition, but that media also played a significant
role in their own right.
Conservatives were the least likely to be affected by attention to the

news, as their prior ideological predispositions meant they were likely to
side with the president in any case. The effects of media coverage, how‑
ever, were apparent over a period of multiple months, in both the February
and May 2005 Pew surveys. Liberals were the group most strongly influ‑
enced by reporting, which is unsurprising since their ideology already cut
against privatization. Moderates were also significantly impacted by coverage,
although not as strongly as liberals. The role of the media in contributing
to opposition to privatization can be seen among different partisan groups
as well. Figures 6.11 and 6.12 (also drawn from Pew) document the media’s
role regarding opposition to private accounts and disapproval of Bush among
independents and Democrats.
Attentive Democrats were the most opposed, with attentive indepen‑
dents also more likely to oppose. Majorities of moderates, liberals, and all
respondents who paid closer attention to the news disapproved of Bush and
opposed privatization, whereas opposition stood at less than half of respon‑
dents for those in these two groups who reported paying no attention to the
news. Greater growth in opposition to reform among attentive Democrats and
liberals speaks to the power of prior public attitudes in influencing public
opinion during policy debates, since these two groups were already predis‑
Figure 6.11
posed to oppose Bush on privatization. Republican and conservative Ameri‑
80
% Opposing 70 All
Social 60 Respondents*
Security 50
Reform Republicans
40 Only*
Establishing
Private 30
Independents
ReNrement 20 Only*
Accounts 10
Democrats
0
Not at All Not Too Fairly Very Close Only*
Close Close
Attention to Reporting on Social Security Reform

Figure 6.11. Media consumption and opinions of social security by party (Feb. 2005).

Figure 6.12

Social Security by Party (May 2005)
100
90 All
% 80 Respondents*
Disapproving 70
of Bush's 60 Republicans
"Handling of 50 Only
Social 40
30
Security" 20 Independents
10 Only
0
Not at All Not Too Fairly Very Close Democrats
Close Close Only*
AQenRon to News on Bush's Social Security Plan

Figure 6.12. Media consumption and opinions of social security by party (May 2005).

cans were largely unaffected by negative media content, since they already
supported the president’s reform agenda.
As the above figures suggest, both partisanship and media consumption
were important in influencing public attitudes on Social Security. These two
variables appeared to play an interactive role. As survey respondents moved
from Republican in orientation to independent and Democratic, and as atten‑
tion to reporting increased, opposition to Social Security reform increased.
This relationship suggests an “if, then, when” relationship. If a respondent was
relatively more likely be sympathetic to the Democratic Party (self‑identified
independents and Democrats), when media consumption by these individu‑
als increased, then opposition to Bush on Social Security also increased. The
effect of the interaction between respondents’ political party and media con‑
sumption was statistically significant for both the February and May 2005
surveys, after controlling for respondents’ ideology, age, income, education,
sex, and race.67
In the end, Democratic and liberal Americans drew on information con‑
veyed in the news to bolster their opposition to a reform proposal that they
were already against. Moderates and independents, however, also increased
their opposition to privatization the more they paid attention to the news.
This suggests that media coverage exerted an impact on attitudes among two
groups that included many people who did not automatically reject privatiza‑
tion prior to learning about Bush’s proposal in the news. For example, inde‑
pendents were somewhat more likely to support privatization in surveys, and
yet increased attention to the news among independents appeared to produce

growing opposition to privatization. Independents were affected by bias in the
news that cut against the president, since this group was not predisposed to
opposing privatization during early 2005.68 Moderates and independents were
not consistently opposed to privatization at the outset of the policy debates.
In a December 2005 Pew survey, a plurality of moderates also supported
privatization.69 By later months, however, moderates and independents were
becoming increasingly opposed to privatization as they paid more attention
to the news, as documented in Pew monthly surveys; this finding suggests
that negative news content exerted a significant impact on public opinion.70
Since Social Security reform was such a heavily polled issue, other sur‑
veys conducted during the first half of 2005 produced identical results to
those already discussed. For example:
• In a February 2005 Pew survey, those who “heard” “a lot” about

Social Security reform were more likely to think Bush’s reforms
would decrease their investment returns, while those closely
following Social Security reform were more likely to disapprove
of Bush’s handling of Social Security, and more likely to support
limiting Social Security benefits for the wealthy as an alternative
to Bush’s privatization proposal.71
• In a March 2005 Pew survey, those who “heard” “a lot” about
Social Security reform were more likely to disapprove of Bush’s
plan, and those paying close attention to Bush’s proposal for
Social Security reform were more likely to disapprove of priva‑
tization, and to disapprove of Bush in general.72
• In a May 2005 Pew survey, those who paid close attention to
Social Security reform were more likely to disapprove of Bush’s
handling of Social Security, and more likely to oppose reform,
while those who “heard” “a lot” about Social Security reform
were also more likely to oppose reform.73
These findings also suggest a significant role for media in engendering oppo‑
sition to reform.
Increased attention to the news produced greater negativity toward
privatization, but the media were hardly alone in their negativity. Negativ‑
ity in the news appeared to be a reflection of growing opposition within
the political system, since journalists relied overwhelmingly on officials to
help frame their news stories. If officials in both parties were increasingly
suspicious of reform, that opposition was likely to be manifested in a news

system dominated by official voices. However, this is merely one case study.
Attention to the news does not always produce greater negativity among news
audiences. Media effects are variable in that they sometimes produce growing
opposition to a political party and at other times produce increased support.
Social Security and the Public:

Citizen Activism as Driving Media Coverage?
Public opinion played an indirect role in driving coverage that was critical of
privatization. It also played a minor role in directly inspiring negative cover‑
age. The public impacted news coverage by pressuring Republican officials to
oppose privatization. Republicans expressed their resistance to Social Security
reform, albeit grudgingly, in news stories, citing their concerns with a nega‑
tive backlash from citizens. Republican officials seemed optimistic about the
prospects for reform at the beginning of the year, prior to the public rebellion
against privatization, but news stories increasingly emphasized Democratic
and Republican resistance over time.
Much public opposition was concentrated among seniors, who drew
upon their own interests and experiences when opposing the president. A
major concern was the feeling that retirees would see lower benefits from
private accounts. Thirty‑seven percent of respondents in a CNN poll wor‑
ried that Americans “would get lower benefits if allowed to invest through
personal accounts,” compared to 30 percent who thought benefits would grow.
That same poll found that Americans thought that tweaking Social Security
would be preferable to radical restructuring. More than two‑thirds of respon‑
dents said that it was better to limit benefits to higher‑income earners to pay
for benefits to lower‑income beneficiaries.74 A second CNN poll found 53
percent of Americans preferred raising Social Security taxes over privatiza‑
tion. Similarly, 53 percent said that privatization would likely lead to benefit
cuts, compared to just 38 percent who said cuts would not occur. In short,
fear of lost benefits drove public opposition. Americans are generally familiar
with the Social Security system as is, structured under a collective trust fund,
with guaranteed benefits. With privatization, there would be no way to know
for certain what sort of benefits retirees would earn. Benefits could increase
or fall, depending on fluctuations in the stock market. Obviously, the public
was worried about benefit cuts, since most Americans understood the dangers
associated with falling stock market prices.75 Public familiarity with Social
Security mattered. It was far more difficult to convince Americans to support
come election season. But journalists did not serve in a watchdog role with
regard to holding political officials’ feet to the fire and ensuring that govern‑
ment represents the peoples’ interests. Concerns about media propaganda
seem well founded in light of this failure.
significant support from congressional Democrats. Such bottom‑up pressures

culminated in coverage of the public revolt against Bush and his proposed
reforms, suggesting that communication flows in the news are not always
top‑down, from political officials to the public. The public can influence
media coverage when it actively challenges official rhetoric, despite journal‑
istic norms and routines that discount the importance of citizens as political
actors in the news. As documented in chapter 5, one‑quarter of New York
Times stories emphasizing some form of disagreement on privatization made
reference to public opposition, suggesting at least a limited public role in
influencing the news. This occurrence does not represent a broader trend,
however, since a direct public role in influencing reporting was not observed
in any other case studies in this book.
The Stimulus and Mixed Public Support
The stimulus debate is indicative of how media biases can change over time,
while altering public beliefs in various ways. In January 2009, conditions were
conducive to building public support for the stimulus, because: (1) coverage
heavily favored Democrats; (2) surveys (at the onset of the debate) suggested
majority public support; and (3) the stimulus represented a complex set of
policy proposals with which the public was not very familiar, providing room
for Democrats to persuade the public. Under such conditions, increased atten‑
tion to the news would be expected to produce public support for the stimu‑
lus. However, by February 2009, political conditions were changing. Many
Americans were becoming relatively more familiar with the topic because of
extensive reporting. Although polls still found majority public support, the
Republican Party embarked upon a systematic campaign to undermine public
support for the stimulus, which culminated in increasingly negative news
coverage by February.82 Furthermore, there was some evidence of growing
within‑party dissent among Democrats, as documented in chapter 5. With
increasingly negative coverage and growing public familiarity with criticisms
of the stimulus, attention to the news should have produced growing opposi‑
tion to the Democratic agenda.
It was easier for Democrats to sell a stimulus proposal when the pub‑
lic was already supportive. Americans’ knowledge of stimulus spending was
modest at best in early 2009. The idea of the government spending money
to stimulate the economy was relatively simple, but the details of the stimu‑
lus were convoluted. The final legislation was a sizable 407 pages long. The
stimulus was comprised of many different components, including numerous
tax cuts, funding for roads, bridges, and other infrastructure, aid to states and
education funds, money for scientific research and development, among other
spending items. Relatively low familiarity with the stimulus meant a lower
likelihood that the public would oppose the president. Survey questions from
Gallup and Diageo in January 2009 found that uncertainty associated with
the stimulus was significant, although not as large as it had been for the Bush
tax cuts. Between 11 and 13 percent of survey respondents indicated that
they were “unsure” about the stimulus either way, likely because they were
not very familiar with the specifics of the program.83 These results suggest
modest unfamiliarity with the details of the stimulus program.
Despite some uncertainty associated with the stimulus, early public
opinion was supportive. A December 2008 CNN poll found that 56 percent
of Americans favored “a proposal to attempt to stimulate the economy by
increasing federal government spending or construction projects and eco‑
nomic assistance to some Americans.” In total, 67 percent felt the proposal
would do “a lot” or “some” to “help the economy,” compared to just 31 percent
who said a stimulus would help “not much” or “not at all.”84 Public opinion
on the stimulus was generally favorable in early 2009 as well. A January
CBS/New York Times survey found respondents were nearly 2.5 times more
likely to claim the stimulus was “about what is needed” or “does not go far
enough” than they were to claim that it “goes too far,” suggesting that most
Americans wanted a package that was either as strong as or stronger than
the legislation being discussed.85
ABC/Washington Post polling from mid‑February found that 64 percent
of Americans supported the stimulus when it was explained that it included
construction projects, tax cuts, and aid to states undertaken to promote eco‑
nomic recovery and growth.86 Figure 6.13 documents public support in detail.
Survey questions that focused on specific components of the stimulus found
strong majority support. USA Today/Gallup polling from late February found
that 83 percent of Americans supported “funding new government programs
to help create jobs”; 67 percent supported “giving aid to state governments in
serious financial trouble”; and 64 percent approved of “giving aid to home‑
owners who are in danger of losing their homes to foreclosure.”87
There was also potential for growing public opposition to the stimulus,
and public resistance began to materialize as Republicans countermobilized
against government spending. By mid‑March, CNN polling found that sup‑
port for the stimulus, when described in large part as a “government spend‑
ing” program, fell to 54 percent of Americans from 60 percent one month
earlier.88 In a March ABC/Washington Post poll, support for the stimulus fell
to below a majority (49 percent) when respondents were asked if they favored
Figure 6.13
% Who Favor "Funding new

Public Opinion on the S0mulus government programs to help
(2/09-‐3/09) create jobs"
90 % Who Favor "Giving aid to state
80 governments in serious financial
70 trouble"
60 % Who Favor "Giving aid to

50 homeowners who are in danger of
losing their homes to foreclosure"
40
30 % Support for SHmulus (as a
Composite of all Spending Projects
20
Described Above)
10
0 % Support for SHmulus when
Gallup Gall. Gall. ABC ABC framed as spending that increases
2/09 2/09 2/09 2/09 3/09 the deficit
Figure 6.13. Public opinion on the stimulus (2/09–3/09).

“increasing federal spending to try to improve the economy, even if it sharply
increases the federal budget deficit.” An April CBS/New York Times survey
also found that public support declined to less than half of respondents when
the stimulus was described as increasing the national debt.89 These findings
suggested that negative framing of the stimulus had the potential to increase
public opposition.90 In short, while the public supported the stimulus in early
2009, it was potentially open to challenges based upon concerns over “gov‑
ernment spending.”
Most Americans paid either “a lot” of attention (40 percent) or “some”
attention (40 percent) to reporting on the stimulus.91 Seventy‑eight percent
in February 2009 reported following stimulus reporting either “very closely”
or “fairly closely,” compared to just 22 percent following it “not too closely”
or “not at all closely.”92 Pew found in its February survey that the stimulus
debate was the most closely followed news story early in the month, with
nearly half of Americans expressing interest in the story. Interest was nearly
ten percentage points higher than interest in the next five most‑followed
stories combined.93 Preliminary evidence suggested that the media played a
positive role in encouraging support for the stimulus. When asked in a Janu‑
ary CBS/New York Times survey, “from what you have heard or read, do you
mostly agree or disagree that a large stimulus package is needed in order to

keep the economy from getting worse,” 66 percent of respondents agreed,
compared to just 24 percent who disagreed [emphasis added].94
In January, increased media attention produced greater support for
the stimulus. Positive effects are observable in Figures 6.14 and 6.15, based
on data drawn from Pew Research Center surveys.95 Increased attention to
Figure
the news 6.14produced growing support for the belief that the stimulus was a
“good idea.” Support was highest among highly attentive liberals and atten‑
tive moderates.96 Media Consump.on & Opinions
of the S.mulus by Ideology (Jan. 2009)

% 90
Conserva:ves
Following 80 Only
Story in the 70
News Who 60 Moderates
Feel Only*
50
S:mulus is Liberals Only
40
a "Good
30
Idea" All
20
Respondents*
10
0
A Li/le A Lot
Figure 6.15
Figure 6.14. Media consumption and opinions of the stimulus by ideology (Jan. 2009).

of the S.mulus by Party (Jan. 2009)
% 90
All
Following 80
Respondents*
Story in 70
the News 60 Republicans
Who Feel 50 Only*
SDmulus 40
is a "Good 30 Independents
Idea" 20 Only*
10
0 Democrats
A Li/le A Lot Only
A/enDon to SDmulus ReporDng & Debate

(How Much Heard About Story)

Figure 6.15. Media consumption and opinions of the stimulus by party (Jan. 2009).

Conservatives were unaffected by news coverage, and Republicans

were actually less supportive the more they paid attention to the news. An
interaction effect was apparent for Americans, between their prior attitudes,
as measured by their partisanship, and media consumption. As the parti‑
sanship of survey respondents moved from Republican to independent and
Democratic, and as media consumption increased, respondents were more
likely to support the stimulus.97 The interactive effect of political partisanship
and media consumption was statistically significant, even after controlling for
respondents’ ideology, age, income, education, race, and sex.
The varied effects of news consumption on different groups of Ameri‑
cans suggest that prior public opinions were important in driving both sup‑
port for and opposition to government spending. Liberals and Democrats
found reasons to support government spending in news coverage that already
favored Democrats, while Republicans and conservatives were largely unaf‑
fected by favorable coverage. But public opinion of the stimulus was not sim‑
ply a matter of people seeing what they wanted to see. Coverage that favored
Democrats was associated with growing support for the stimulus in January,
and the relationship between media consumption and attitudes remained,
even after controlling for factors such as respondents’ ideology and partisan‑
ship. This finding suggests a significant role for media content in influencing
public attitudes independent of partisanship and ideology.
Positive media effects in January were likely a function of Democratic
dominance of the news. Democrats accounted for between 80 to 90 percent
of all partisans mentioned and quoted in the news in January, compared to
Republicans, who accounted for just 10 to 20 percent. Negative coverage in
January—as reflected in coverage of disagreements within the Democratic
Party and criticisms from Republicans and the public—was at a minimum.
Negative coverage constituted just 20 percent of all news stories documented
in chapter 5. In summary, public opinion was seemingly “indexed” to the
prevailing messages disseminated in the media, with overwhelming posi‑
tive media coverage producing growing stimulus support for those following
the news.
Public support for the stimulus began to decline, however, between
January and February. Fifty seven percent of Americans supported the stimu‑
-
lus in January, but support fell to 51 percent a month later. Declining public
support appeared to be a function of increasingly critical news coverage.
In contrast to January, increased attention to the news was correlated with
growing opposition to the stimulus in February. While Republicans started
from a position of weakness in January, they moved to a position of rela‑
tively greater strength a month later. Growing negativity in the news was a
function of negative comments voiced by both Democrats and Republicans.
The overwhelming majority of Republican statements in the news—90 per‑

cent—were negative.98 But Democrats also expressed some internal divisions,
which were covered in news stories. A short sample of story headlines—all
of which included criticisms of the stimulus from Democrats, reveals the
growing frequency of within‑party disagreement: “Stimulus Plan Encounters
Stiff Resistance in the Senate”; “Bipartisan Push to Reduce Costs of Stimulus
Plan”; “Competing Bills on the Stimulus Divide Congress”; “Senate Agrees
to Dilute ‘Buy America’ Provisions”; “Internet Money in Fiscal Plan: Wise or
Waste?”; and “Democrats Indicate Areas of Compromise on Stimulus.” Some
examples of disagreements included the following:
• Some Congressional Democrats objected that there were not

enough infrastructure projects included in the draft stimulus.
• A small group of centrist Democrats pushed to reduce the costs
of the stimulus, with the New York Times reporting that “they
wanted to trim provisions that would not quickly create jobs or
encourage spending by consumers and businesses.” While these
Democrats comprised a small part of the party, they were able
to exercise disproportionate influence in light of the almost
unified Republican opposition to the stimulus and relatively
narrow Democratic majority in the Senate.
• Some Democratic Senators pushed to revise the stimulus
against Democratic priorities toward spending to place a great‑
er emphasis on tax cuts, in an effort to court Republican votes.99
Negative news became a reccurring theme in the news. As discussed in chapter

5, in the month of February 2009 a sizable 40 percent of New York Times stories
emphasized disagreement among Democrats or Republicans on the stimulus.
In the week‑and‑a‑half prior to the February Pew survey on the stimulus, a
poll that showed that media consumption produced increased opposition to
the stimulus, more than three‑quarters of stories included some reference to
disagreement among Democrats or between Democrats and Republicans.100
Negativity in the news also increased in February, as reflected in
increased reporting of Republican criticisms of the stimulus. As described in
chapter 5, mentions of and quotes by Republicans in the New York Times more
than doubled between January and February. On CBS News, the number of
stimulus stories referencing the Republican Party and its leaders increased by
28 percentage points from the first two weeks of January through the first
two weeks of February.101 Numerous studies also found that coverage was
increasingly negative on cable news programs, with Republicans and other
following economic crashes via policies such as the reduction of loan interest
rates offered by the Federal Reserve and increased government investment
in infrastructure through public works spending, as a means of reducing
unemployment.2 Newly employed Americans would use their earnings on
consuming goods and services, thereby increasing economic growth. The
2009 stimulus was an example of Keynesian economics, because it included
substantial spending for public works and infrastructure, in addition to tax
cuts directed toward working and middle‑class Americans.
Competing Ideologies and the Stimulus
The stimulus was debated in a heated environment due to public anger over
growing unemployment, economic stagnation, and growing government debt.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that, by injecting close to
$1 trillion into the economy, the stimulus would increase economic growth
by between 1.2 to 3.6 percentage points in 2010. The CBO projected that
from 1.3 to 3.9 million jobs would be created within the same period, and
the unemployment rate would decline by between .7 to 2.1 percentage points.
However, the CBO also estimated that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would
decline by .1 to .3 percentage points by 2019, after factoring in the effects
of growing national debt from the stimulus.3 The CBO’s May 2011 estimate
concluded that the stimulus raised GDP by 1.1 to 3.1 percentage points,
decreased unemployment by .6 to 1.8 percentage points, and increased the
total number of employed by 1.2 to 3.3 million.4
Liberal policy analysts claimed the stimulus would stabilize and
strengthen the economy. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities argued
that the stimulus would aid in “significantly ameliorating the recession’s
impact on poverty,” with the bill’s inclusion of unemployment insurance,
working family tax credits, food stamps funding, and one‑time payments to
groups such as veterans, retirees, and to the disabled.5 The CBO estimated
that unemployment benefits created from seventy cents to $1.90 in economic
activity for every dollar spent.6 The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) estimated
that unemployment would have been two percentage points higher by the
end of 2009 if not for the stimulus.7 EPI supported the stimulus as a means
of improving American infrastructure, but criticized the bill for not going far
enough. They cited a report from the American Society of Civil Engineers,
which estimated that the stimulus funded just 8 percent of the amount needed
over five years for infrastructure development, with an additional $1.1 tril‑
lion needed.8
The public’s negative impression of stimulus reporting was documented

in news content analyzed in chapter 5, but also evident in media effects dis‑
cussed in this chapter. Figures 6.17 and 6.18 document the role of the media
in fostering opposition to the stimulus among those paying attention to the
news, in Pew’s February survey.
Figure 6.17
Opposition to the stimulus was significantly higher among those paying
“a lot” of attention to the news, compared to those paying “a little” attention.
of the S.mulus by Party (Feb. 2009)

% 80
Following 70 All
Story in 60 Respondents*
the News 50
Who Feel Republicans
40 Only*
SKmulus is
a "Bad 30
20 Independents
Idea" Only*
10
0 Democrats
A Li.le A Lot Only
A.enKon to SKmulus ReporKng &

Figure 6.18 Debate (How Much Heard About Story)

Figure 6.17. Media consumption
Media Cand opinions of&the
onsump.on stimulus by
Opinions party (Feb. 2009).

of the S.mulus by Ideology (Feb. 2009)
70
% Following
Story in the 60 Conserva8ves
News Who Only*
50
Feel Moderates
40
S8mulus is Only
a "Bad 30 Liberals Only
Idea" 20
10 All
Respondents*
0
A Li-le A Lot
A-en8on to S8mulus Repor8ng & Debate
(How Much Heard About Story)
Figure 6.18. Media consumption and opinions of the stimulus by ideology (Feb. 2009).

Media effects were observed, after controlling for respondents’ party, ideology,
sex, age, education, income, and race, suggesting that negativity in the news
had real effects on public attitudes independent of respondents’ partisan and
ideological predispositions.105
An interaction effect was also observed between respondents’ partisan‑
ship and media consumption that worked against the Democrats. As individ‑
uals’ partisanship changed from Democratic to independent and Republican,
and as media consumption increased, respondents became more likely to
oppose the stimulus.106 Negative media effects were seen most dramatically
among attentive Republicans and conservatives—those already predisposed
to reject the stimulus. Analysis of a second survey from February, this time
by CBS, finds identical results. Those paying attention to stimulus reporting
were more likely to oppose the stimulus. And again, an interaction between
partisanship and media consumption was observed. Attentive Republicans
and independents were significantly more likely to oppose the stimulus than
attentive Democrats.107 The interaction effects in both the Pew and CBS sur‑
veys provide yet more evidence of the importance of prior public opinions
in influencing public thought. Republicans—those ideologically predisposed
to oppose the stimulus—were the most likely to be affected by the growing
In sum, the stimulus represented a case of mixed success for the Demo‑
cratic Party. Coverage, favored the party in January, and produced growing
support among those following the news. Public support fell in February,
however, as Republicans mobilized against the stimulus and Democrats
showed signs of internal divisions. By that point, attention to the news pro‑
duced growing opposition to the stimulus. These trends do not suggest con‑
sistent evidence of a negativity bias in the news, considering the favorable
media effects in January for Democrats, and considering their eventual suc‑
cess in passing the stimulus with majority public support. Increased negativity
in the news and among Americans appeared to be a function of negativity
that was already being expressed by political officials. Journalists restricted
their reporting overwhelmingly to the views of Democratic and Republican
officials, due to a pro‑government bias in the news. Public attitudes ran in
opposite directions in January and February because of a rapidly changing
informational environment in the media.
Regulating Executive Pay
The national controversy over executive pay speaks to the ability of officials
to build public support for regulating Wall Street. As documented in chapter
5, coverage of executive pay was overwhelmingly favorable to the Democratic

Party. Furthermore, after the 2008 economic crash, there was an obvious
growing public suspicion of corporate power following the controversial bank
bailout. In other words there was strong public support prior to the executive
pay debate for regulating Wall Street. Finally, the issue of bonuses paid for
with taxpayer funds was a relatively simple subject for Americans to grasp,
and most Americans reported that they had been following this issue either
“very closely” or “fairly closely” in early 2009, suggesting public familiarity
with this issue.108 In light of coverage that favored the Democrats, public
familiarity with the pay issue, and strong prior support for regulating bonuses,
increased attention to the news should have produced growing public support
for regulating Wall Street pay.
The national debate over executive pay restrictions was thoroughly con‑
trolled by Democratic actors and President Obama in early 2009. As discussed
in chapter 5, Democratic sources quoted in the news ranged between 80 to
100 percent of all partisan sources, while Democrats constituted between
more than 60 to as much as 100 percent of all party leaders mentioned in
stories. Furthermore, stories emphasizing disagreement within the Democrat‑
ic Party or criticisms from Republicans over regulating executive pay never
appeared in more than 20 percent of all news stories in any given month.
Public anger at Wall Street investors was evident before the discussion
of executive pay even took place. Unfortunately, few survey questions on regu‑
lating executive pay were available prior to the beginning of the debate on this
issue. However, it is clear that the American public was angry with the inves‑
tor class and sympathetic to greater regulation of Wall Street. According to an
October 2008 CBS poll, 52 percent of Americans disapproved of the economic
bailout, compared to just 36 percent that approved.109 Another October poll
from the Los Angeles Times found that a plurality of Americans—47 percent
felt there was “too little government regulation of business,” compared to 27
percent who said there was “too much” and 14 percent who said regulation
was “about right.” The same poll discovered that 73 percent agreed that “lack
of regulation is partly responsible for the current financial housing crisis.”110
At the beginning of the national debate over executive pay regulations in
early 2009, 56 percent said congressional approval of bailout funds for the
banks was a “bad idea.”111 An overwhelming 83 percent of Americans felt that
bonuses paid to executives after the collapse and government bailout “should
instead be paid out to the shareholders” of major companies, while 76 percent
rejected the idea that the bonuses were needed “in order to attract and retain
top talent” in executive positions.112
Once reporting on executive pay became increasingly common, polls

continued to show that Americans were sympathetic to government regula‑
tion of Wall Street bonuses. Figure 6.19 suggests that, according to ABC/
Washington Post polling from late March, nearly three‑quarters of Americans
described themselves as “angry” over the TARP‑funded bonuses.113
USA Today/Gallup polling found that most Americans wanted all the
TARP‑subsidized bonuses to be returned, while a CBS poll reported that an
even stronger majority wanted the government to “recover” the bonuses from
Wall Street employees.114 A Harris poll concluded that most Americans felt
bonuses should not be paid unless Wall Street companies were “doing well
and making good profits.”115 Majority support for regulation of executive pay
was still evident by October 2009.116 Clearly, the data in Figure 6.19 suggest
that Americans had strong feelings about the executive pay issue. Convincing
the public to embrace pay regulations was much easier when the public were
already sympathetic to this proposal.
Finally, Wall Street bonuses and excess were a familiar topic for Americans
by early 2009. Corporate executives’ practice of granting themselves bonuses in
the millions, while “Main Street” America was suffering from growing unem‑
ployment and economic stagnation, was a high‑profile issue. Many Americans
Figure
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compensation mergency ggovernment
overnment lloans"
(2/2009–10/2009). oans"

knew that their economic conditions were poor to even dire, and seeing gener‑
ous bonuses given to Wall Street executives, granted through taxpayer “bail‑
out” dollars, enraged many Americans. It is not difficult to envision Americans
becoming angrier at their lot in life at a time that they were working longer
hours than at any time in modern history simply to earn stagnating‑to‑declin‑
ing incomes, when they discovered that already‑wealthy Americans had been
granted bonuses paid with taxpayer money despite their responsibility for the
worst economic collapse since the Great Depression. In other words, the issue
of executive bonuses was one that Americans could easily understand, based
on their own personal experiences relative to the investor class.
When Americans were asked about executive bonuses, most felt familiar
enough with the topic to register their opinions. Three questions from Gallup,
CBS, and New York Times polls from early 2009 about whether the government
or Wall Street firms should have found ways to limit bonuses saw “unsure”
responses that ranged between 4 and 8 percent.117 When asked whether they
were “angry” or not about Wall Street bonuses, just 1 percent of Americans reg‑
istered “unsure” responses.118 Across these questions, “unsure” answers averaged
less than 5 percent of all responses. These results provide empirical evidence
of public familiarity with, and comfort in taking a stance on executive pay.
Initial evidence suggests that the media played a vital role in inform‑
ing the public about executive pay regulation. Large numbers of Americans
followed the executive pay dispute in the news. A CBS poll, for example,
found that as of late March 2009, 57 percent of Americans reported hearing
“a lot” about “the $165 million dollars in bonuses that insurance company
AIG . . . is paying to some of its executives.” Just 14 percent reported hear‑
 
 
 
 
ing “not much” or “nothing at all” about the controversy.119 Furthermore, the
news also appeared to influence public attitudes on pay. Drawing on a late
March Diageo survey, Figure 6.20 reveals that attention to executive pay in the
news and elsewhere was associated with greater hostility toward Wall Street.
The Diageo survey asked whether “what you have seen, read, or heard
about bonuses for employees and executives of financial services companies
made you more likely or less likely to support government programs to spend
money to financially help companies in other industries.” Increased attentive‑
ness was associated with declining support for providing further taxpayer
assistance to ailing companies.120 In other words, coverage that was increas‑
ingly critical of taxpayer‑funded bonuses appears to have produced increas‑
ingly negative views of Wall Street.
Other evidence also suggests that the media encouraged growing criti‑
cism of Wall Street. Drawing on March survey data from the Pew Research
Center, Figures 6.21 and 6.22 suggest that attention to the news increased
Figure 6.20
Effects of A+en-on to Media Coverage Percent of respondents

and Poli-cal Discussions on Public feeling that increased
Opinion of Wall Street poli>cal-‐media
(Mar. 2009) aAen>veness made them
more or less likely to
70 support further
60 government financial
assistance for ailing
50 companies
40 Percent of respondents
30 feeling that increased
poli>cal-‐media
20 aAen>veness made them
10 more or less likely to
support government
0 regula>on of Wall Street
More Likely Less Likely financial firms
Figure 6.20.
Figure 6.21 Effects of attention to media coverage and political discussions on public

opinion of Wall Street (Mar. 2009).
Execu.ve Pay by Party (Mar. 2009)
80
70 All
60 Respondents*
% Agreeing that
50
"Congress' Republicans
40
Response" to Only*
30
AIG Bonuses
was 20 Democrats
"Appropriate" 10 Only
0
Not Most Closely Most Closely Independents
Followed Story Followed Story Only
ANenOon to News on AIG

Bonuses (How Close News Story
Followed)
Figure 6.21. Media consumption and opinions of executive pay by party (Mar. 2009).

Figure 6.22
Execu.ve Pay by Party (Mar. 2009)
80
All
70 Respondents*
% Agreeing 60
that "Congress'
50 Republicans
Response" to
40 Only
AIG Bonuses
was 30
"Appropriate" Democrats
20
Only*
10
0 Independents
Not at All Not Too Fairly Very Only*
Close Close Close
Public AOenPon to News on AIG Bonuses (How
Close Followed News Story)
Figure 6.22. Media consumption and opinions of executive pay by party (Mar. 2009).

support for government regulation of executive pay.121 Growing support for
Democrats on regulating pay is the opposite of what one would predict if a
bad news bias was undermining the majority party’s proposals. The associa‑
tion between attention to the news and support for regulating executive pay
was statistically significant, after controlling for other factors such as respon‑
dents’ sex, age, education, race, income, political party, and ideology. Media
effects were also evident for CBS survey data from March 2009. An analysis
of the CBS survey finds that increased attention to news on executive pay pro‑
duced: (1) growing anger among news consumers about Wall Street bonuses,
(2) increased acceptance of the belief that bonuses were unacceptable, and (3)
growing support for the belief that Obama should have prevented companies
from paying bonuses with bailout funds.122 These relationships were also sta‑
tistically significant, after controlling for respondents’ partisanship, ideology,
and other factors already listed. The findings from the CBS and Pew surveys
suggest that the media played a significant role in influencing political atti‑
tudes, independent of respondent partisanship and ideology.
In the Pew March survey, media effects were observed for all subgroups
of Americans, including Republicans, Democrats, independents, conserva‑
tives, liberals, and moderates.123 Republicans and conservatives who paid
attention to the news were not more likely to oppose Democratic attacks on
corporations for paying out bonuses with bailout funds. The beliefs for both
groups ran contrary to those of Republican officials. Both Republicans and
Democrats were active on the House and Senate floors in March discussing
executive bonuses. A search of the Congressional Record finds that, for entries
in the record that focused on executive pay, 55 percent of officials who spoke
on the issue were Democrats, while 45 percent were Republican.124
Republican officials consistently voiced opposition to Democratic efforts
to regulate pay.125 And yet, Republican Americans did not follow the lead of
Republican officials. Instead, Republicans that more closely followed the news
were more likely to support Wall Street regulation. Such deviance from the
“party line” suggests considerable independence on the part of Republican
Americans for the executive pay issue. Since Republican Americans rejected
their own party’s position on executive pay, there was no significant interac‑
tive effect between partisanship and media consumption found in the March
Pew and CBS surveys. While Democrats who paid closer attention to news
on executive pay were more likely to support regulation across both the CBS
and Pew surveys, attentive Republicans and attentive independents were also
more likely to support regulation. In sum, media coverage exerted a signifi‑
cant impact across party lines, thereby undermining the Republican Party’s
antiregulation agenda.
Summarizing the findings from the executive pay controversy, one first
sees that a pro‑government bias was at work in the media. Government
officials, rather than nongovernmental actors, dominated the news, as was
the case in all the other case studies. In this case, Democrats enjoyed an
almost total domination of the news, and news coverage was “indexed” to
reinforce Democratic support for regulating executive pay. Public opinion
was “indexed” to favor the Democratic agenda, with those paying greater
attention to the news more likely to support new regulations on executive
pay. Prior public anger at Wall Street and familiarity with this controversy
likely helped in sustaining public support for regulation. Americans, regard‑
less of partisan affiliation or ideology, were angry about taxpayer‑funded
Wall Street bonuses. It was easier for Democrats to build public support
for regulating pay, since the public was well acquainted with the execu‑
tive pay issue by March 2009, and was already ideologically predisposed
to supporting this course of action.126 But media coverage also appears to
have impacted public opinion. As previously discussed, Americans who paid
attention to the executive pay issue were more likely to say that, based on
what they had heard, seen, and read in the news, they were more likely to
support government regulation.
Little about this case study reveals a bad news bias against the Dem‑
ocratic Party. The Democrats could not have asked for much more sym‑
pathetic coverage. There was little negativity against the party in the news
from January through March 2009, and Democratic sources enjoyed a large

advantage over Republican ones for months on end.
Conclusions
A brief review of the four case studies in this chapter finds no indication of
a consistent “bad news” effect on public opinion. Media effects were too vari‑
able, fluctuating greatly across case studies, to speak of an overarching bias
against the majority party during periods of unified government. In just one
case—Social Security reform—did attention to the news consistently produce
effects on public opinion that undermined presidential or majority party mes‑
sages. In one case—the stimulus—media consumption produced increased
support for and opposition to the president, depending on the month exam‑
ined. In two cases—the Bush tax cuts and executive pay—media consumption
produced growing support for the president and his party. These outcomes
suggest a range of possibilities for media effects, rather than a consistently
negative effect. Effects of news that favored the majority party—in the case of
three of the four case studies—suggest that public opinion is often “indexed”
to dominant messages in the news.
Political parties play a vital role in driving how the public processes
public policy debates. Unified party control of government provides the party
in power with a clear advantage when it comes to framing debates in the
media and getting out its preferred narratives and themes. In all four case
studies, I found evidence that Democratic Americans adopted and reinforced
the messages of their party’s officials. Republican Americans were more likely
to accept their party’s messages in three of the four case studies, with execu‑
tive pay the exception. Unified control of government does not guarantee a
party success, however, in cultivating public support. In the Social Security
example, within‑party divisions, cross‑party attacks, and a hostile public all
helped derail Republican privatization proposals. With the stimulus, with‑
in‑party division and cross‑party criticism threatened to obstruct Democratic
legislation. Despite these limitations, this chapter suggests a significant influ‑
ence of political parties in influencing public beliefs.
This chapter provided a second check for two theories of media bias—
the bad news theory and the pro‑government theory. The effects of media
coverage on public beliefs suggest that concerns about an overarching negativ‑
ity bias in the news are exaggerated. Certainly, negativity is a regular feature of
the news, but I have argued that this is because negativity is a common part
of American politics. Furthermore, coverage is far from consistently negative,
and majority parties seem quite effective in selling their political agendas to
the public through the news. This would be unlikely to happen if media cover‑
age were consistently negative against the party in power. Rather than creating
conflict where none existed, journalists usually reflect the power dynamics
(and political conflicts) that already exist in Washington. By reflecting power
imbalances in Washington in the news, journalists “index” public opinion to
the contours of debate among political officials.
The “indexing” phenomenon raises questions about the ability of the
public to remain independent of official messages and propaganda. If public
attitudes are manufactured through official messages and party socialization
from the top down, from party leaders to the public, this suggests that Ameri‑
cans often fail to independently formulate beliefs based on their own concerns
and interests. This does not mean that Americans themselves are ineffectual
in influencing the conditions under which their opinions are formed. Public
opinion is not simply a product of manufactured consent or managed dis‑
course driven by political elites. As the Social Security case study suggests—
and as other case studies in chapter 7 indicate—prior public attitudes at the
outset of policy debates matter a great deal, and can even undermine party
messages. On the Social Security issue, with which the public had much
familiarity, large numbers of Americans relied on their own interests and
preferences when forming opinions about privatization. Public opposition to
privatizing Social Security, and public support for regulating executive pay,
suggest that the public retains a significant independent streak when it comes
to questioning the Republican Party’s pro–Wall Street policies.
As I shall document in additional case studies in the next two chap‑
ters, the public’s prior beliefs and experiences with political issues suggest
that Americans are at times able to form opinions independently of par‑
ties. When policy proposals run counter to citizens’ own self‑interest, and
when the public is sufficiently familiar with an issue to be able to challenge
official messages, there is room for public independence from official mes‑
sages. Citizens are not merely “blank slates” to be impressed upon by political
officials. The biases and preferences they bring into policy debates—whether
they consider themselves conservative or liberal—are reinforced and even
enhanced by paying attention to elite discourse in the news. But when policy
proposals run counter to citizens’ own self‑interest, attention to the news
can produce significant opposition to official proposals. As the public learns
more about the details of unpopular reform proposals, they are receptive to
being mobilized against those reforms. In these cases, simply by reporting the
basic details of the policy debate in question, the media provide a crucial role
by helping the public understand what is at stake and how to respond. The
informational role of the media suggests that journalists provide an important
educational service to the public, despite concerns with government domi‑
nance of the news.
7
Media Coverage and Its Effects

Expanded Case Studies, 1993–2014
This chapter expands on the case studies from previous chapters, assessing
political parties’ effect on the news, and the effect of the news on public
opinion. First, I present more evidence that the structure of government influ‑
ences how journalists report policy issues. Second, I argue that three factors
determine how media influence public attitudes. These include: (1) the type of
bias in the news, and whether it favors one party more or the other; (2) the
level of prior public support for a proposal at the outset of a policy debate; and
(3) the extent to which Americans are already familiar with the policy issue.
Political Manipulation in Modern Democracies
President Barack Obama once argued that “the strongest democracies flour‑
ish from frequent and lively debate, but they endure when people of every
background and belief find a way to set aside smaller differences in service
of a greater purpose.”1 In contrast, President George W. Bush reflected that
“you can fool some of the people all of the time, and those are the ones
you need to concentrate on.”2 These statements suggest contrary mindsets
regarding how political discourse in the United States should work. Obama’s
comments suggest a desire to see citizens openly share their opinions in
search of a compromise between competing ideas. This goal, however, seems
increasingly difficult in an era of unprecedented polarization in Washington.
197
In contrast to Obama’s rhetoric, Bush’s comment speaks to a common

goal of American politicians, who seek to manufacture public consent in favor
of official messages. Political officials have long been interested in using per‑
suasion to build public support.3 In a free society, officials do not use violence
to build public support for government. But public support is needed none‑
theless for officials to exercise power. If nothing else, officials require public
support come reelection time, and worry about taking unpopular positions
if they think it will cost them votes.
Media Bias in Ten Additional Policy Conflicts
One potential limitation of earlier chapters is that they examined only six case
studies covering public policy conflicts. While the cases covered an extended
period of time (1996–2009) and involved issues that occurred during different
periods of party control of government, it is possible that these findings are
not representative of broader patterns in the media. To address this limitation,
I have expanded my case studies to another ten issues. By looking at more
than twenty years of the news, I am better able to generalize regarding my
findings. These issues include: the 1993–94 Clinton health care debate; the
2003 Bush tax cuts; the 2003 Medicare reform; the 2008 bank bailout; the
2009–10 Obama health care debate; the 2011 debt crisis and deficit reduction
talks; the 2011 Medicare reform debate; the 2013 government shutdown; the
2014 minimum wage debate; and Obama’s 2014 carbon emissions limit man‑
date. I chose these issues, not because they represented successes or failures in
selling party agendas, but because each represented a high‑profile issue that
was the subject to significant cross‑party conflict and regular media reporting.
The cases include policy successes and failures for both parties, so there is
little concern that I have predetermined my results regarding party success
and failure in building support from the public. By adding these conflicts
to my earlier case studies, I assess a total of eight policy conflicts occurring
during divided government, and eight conflicts during unified Republican or
Democratic government.
Reviewing the Case Studies
I provide an introduction to the ten policy issues here. Covering periods of

unified Democratic government, the 1993–94 and 2009–10 health care debates
centered on efforts to expand health insurance coverage to most Americans.4
Media Coverage and Its Effects 199
The 1993–94 health care debate was spearheaded by President Bill Clinton,
who promoted an employer‑based mandate to cover uninsured Americans,
although the details of actual legislation were left to Congress to develop.5
Republican opposition centered on the party’s support for an alternative to the
employer mandate, which instead favored an individual mandate. Clinton’s
effort at health care reform failed amid within‑party and cross‑party disagre‑
ments over the best path forward. The 2009–10 health care debate did not
suffer a similar fate. Democrats passed individual and employer mandates,
requiring all citizens to have health insurance. The federal government would
provide financial subsidies to individuals to purchase insurance on federally
and state regulated, privately run exchanges. The federal government also
mandated a Medicaid expansion to apply to individuals with incomes upward
of 133 percent of the official poverty rate.
Cross‑party fighting over “Obamacare” was commonplace. Republicans
tried fifty‑four times to repeal or alter the law between March 2010 and March
2014.6 The conflict culminated in the government shutdown from October
1 through November 16, 2013.7 Democrats and Republicans were unable to
agree on a fiscal year budget for 2014, as House Republicans demanded that
the budget be tied to a repeal of health care, while Senate Democrats refused
to consider a repeal attached to the budget. The standoff over health care
led to the government shutdown, and the problem was compounded by the
approaching debt ceiling, in which Congress risked exceeding the maximum
legal amount that it was allowed to borrow toward the national debt. The
government shutdown ended with a Republican defeat, as Americans opposed
the inclusion of health care repeal in the budget.8
President Bush pursued the 2003 tax cuts in the name of promoting
economic recovery from the recession following the 2000 “dot com” eco‑
nomic collapse.9 The “Jobs and Tax Relief Reconcilliation Act of 2003” was
passed despite Democratic congressional opposition. The legislation included
a cut in the Alternative Minimum Tax (a flat tax imposed on individuals
and businesses), in addition to lowering taxes on incomes earned from divi‑
dends and capital gains. These cuts largely benefited the wealthy, since affluent
Americans own the bulk of all stock‑based assets. The 2001 and 2003 tax
cuts represented landmark moments in defining America’s taxing priorities.10
Medicare reform was another controversial policy issue. Bush’s 2003
Medicare reform added prescription drug coverage to the traditional Medi‑
care program.11 Drug benefits were provided through a market approach, in
which the government was prohibited from offering drugs directly to ben‑
eficiaries, but instead relied on private companies. Seniors were prohibited
from receiving prescription benefits under their existing insurance plans. On
Table 4.2. The Stimulus (1/1–2/28/2009): Political Actors in Print and Television News Stories




Sun


Democrats 94 100 62 78 87 64 76 63 79

Republicans 6 0 38 22 13 36 24 37 21




Sun



Labor Leaders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Workers/ Unionists 0 0 0 3 6 0 0 1 6

Academics 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 7 4

Bureaucrats 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0

Citizens 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 5 0

Executive 88 80 45 70 71 60 70 37 55

Legislative 12 20 55 24 24 34 27 42 33

Judiciary 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0


analyzed

ments—led to major financial losses for Wall Street. These losses created
systemic insecurity in financial markets, leading to a credit crisis, in which
banks stopped lending to each other, businesses, and individuals due to a
lack of confidence in the economy.
The negative spiral set off by the credit freeze produced growing
unemployment and economic decline. Congress and President Bush were
concerned with the negative repercussions following a banking collapse.
Democrats and Republicans passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008 (the “bailout”), which created a Troubled Assets Relief Program
(TARP) to provide $700 billion in taxpayer funds to companies in danger of
declaring bankruptcy. The bailout was controversial among Americans.19 The
Congressional vote for the bill, however, was not divided along party lines.
The House initially rejected a bailout in late September, with 133 Republi‑
cans and 95 Democrats voting against it (67 percent and 40 percent of each
party’s votes respectively). A second vote in early October was successful,
however, with legislation supported by 73 percent and 46 percent of voting
House Democrats and Republicans respectively. Sixty seven percent and 83
-
percent of Senate Democrats and Republicans voted for passage, with support
from the president. TARP was successful in stabilizing the U.S. economy and
banking sector, although public anger at Wall Street was intense in the years
after the bailout.
A more recent conflict was the 2014 struggle over the minimum wage,20
which encompassed two major issues: (1) whether Congress should raise the
national minimum wage; and (2) Obama’s February 2014 executive order
mandating a $10.10 minimum wage for government contract employees.
Republicans opposed the executive order, contending that it would have
minimal impact overall on American workers.21 In contrast, Democrats intro‑
duced minimum wage legislation in the Senate, only to be filibustered. One
year earlier, in the House, Republicans had opposed efforts to raise wages.22
Obama sought to use his executive order as a rallying cry for Congress to
raise the minimum wage. In early 2013, Obama had also called for raising
the minimum wage to $9 an hour and indexing the wage to the inflation
rate. While raising the minimum wage is popular with the public, partisan
polarization in Congress ensured that an increase would not occur during
Obama’s presidency.
Finally, the Obama administration’s CO2 emissions mandate repre‑
sented another highly salient issue in American politics.23 In June 2014, the
president mandated, through executive order, new carbon pollution limits for
coal‑burning power plants. Obama’s rules were to be implemented through
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and called for a reduction in
fossil fuel emissions by coal plants of 30 percent by 2030, at an estimated cost

of $8.8 billion a year.24 Despite these costs, Obama maintained, the action
was necessary at a time when the vast majority of climate scientists agreed
that global warming was a worsening problem and that humans bore primary
responsibilty.25
Republicans claimed Obama was undertaking a “war on coal” and that
the regulations would kill jobs in the coal industry.26 In contrast, the EPA
cited the public health benefits of reducing CO2 pollution and supporters
warned that with the purported negative effects on the economy were heavily
exaggerated.27 Legal questions about Obama’s ability to issue new CO2 limits
without congressional legislation were allayed by the Supreme Court, which
ruled in both 2007 and 2014 that the EPA retained authority to set CO2 limits
under the Environmental Protection Act of 1970. The judges cited the threat
of global warming as a compelling reason for executive action.28
The ten policy issues addressed here represented fundamental con‑
flicts, relating to government regulation of business, protection of the public
health, and provision of social welfare services, and to government’s role in
promoting stability during crisis periods. These issues highlighted the grow‑
ing intensity of partisan polarization. The most blatantly suggestive of polar‑
ization were the minimum wage and CO2 emissions cases, which saw the
president forced to circumvent a hostile Congress entirely due to cross‑party
gridlock.
Media Findings
Due to space limitations, I did not examine a large number of media ven‑
ues here. I included just one source—the New York Times—and one news
category—partisan mentions. Considering that partisan mentions closely
tracked other measures of bias, this shorthand review should be sufficient
for the purposes of reviewing news coverage across case studies. Consid‑
ering the consistent uniformity in content across news sources that was
documented in previous chapters, the choice of the New York Times seems
appropriate.
Previous chapters found a pro‑government bias in the news. The data
here suggest that the pro‑government bias is still a powerful way to account
for coverage. From Figure 7.1, one sees that, during periods of unified con‑
trol of government, reporters “index” their coverage to benefit the party in
power.29 For Medicare reform (2003) and extending the Bush tax cuts (2003),
Figure 7.1

Repor&ng on Poli&cal Par&es & Leaders
During Unified Government (New York Times)

Health Care Reform 61%

(7/1/2009 -‐ 3/31/2010) 40%
% of stories
referencing
Health Care Reform 55% DemocraIc Party or
(9/1/1993 -‐ 8/31/1994) 28% DemocraIc leaders
Bush Tax Cuts (2/1 -‐ 54%

5/31/2003) 89% % of stories
referencing
Republican Party or
Republican leaders
46%
Medicare (6/20 -‐ 12/15/2003
72%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Number of stories: Health Care (2009–10): 3,796; Health Care (1993–94): 3,710; Tax Cuts (2003): 498;
Medicare (2003): 65
Number of stories: Health Care (2009–10): 3,796; Health Care (1993–94): 3,710;
Source: Lexis Nexis
Tax Cuts (2003): 498; Medicare (2003): 65

Figure 7.1. Reporting on political parties and leaders during unified government (New

York Times).
Source: Lexis Nexis
Republicans exercised unified control of Congress and the Executive and

Republican partisan mentions outnumbered Democratic by more than 20
percentage points. In the cases involving Obama’s health care reform (2009–
10) and the Clinton health care reform (1993–94), Democrats controlled
Congress and the Executive. In those cases, partisan mentions of Democrats
in the news appeared more than twenty percentage points more often than
Republican mentions. In addition to the four cases of unified government
examined above, another six issues were examined that occured during peri‑
ods of divided government. In previous chapters, there was no clear evidence
of media dominance by either party during periods of split‑party control of
government. That finding is reinforced in every case study here.
Figure 7.2 summarizes the results from these six case studies, finding
not a single example of either party being mentioned or referenced more
than twenty percentage points more often than the competing party.30 Clearly,
reporters made a consistent effort to reference and mention both parties on
a regular and nearly equal basis during periods of divided government.
Figure 7.2
Repor&ng on Poli&cal Par&es & Leaders During Divided
Government (New York Times)
EPA Emissions (5/15 -‐ 77%

6/30/2014) 63%
Minimum Wage (2/1 -‐ 45% % of stories referencing

2/28/2014) 32% DemocaOc Party or
DemocraOc leaders
Government Shutdown (9/20 -‐ 63%
10/17/2013) 62%
Debt Ceiling Crisis (6/1 -‐ 83%

7/31/2011) 82%
Medicare Reform (4/15 -‐ 72% % of stories referencing

4/30/2011) 74% Republican Party or
Republican leaders
Economic Bailout (9/29 -‐ 39%
10/7/2008 51%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Number of stories: EPA Emissions (2014): 35; Min. Wage (2014): 84; Govt. Shutdown (2013): 619; Debt
Ceiling (2011): 527; Medicare (2011): 61; Bailout (2008): 184
Number of stories: EPA Emissions (2014): 35; Min. Wage (2014): 84; Govt. Shutdown
Figure 7.2. Reporting on political parties and leaders during divided government
(2013): 619; Debt Ceiling (2011): 527; Medicare (2011): 61; Bailout (2008): 184

(New York Times).
Pro‑business Bias
Like the six cases discussed in previous chapters, the ten policy issues
addressed here speak to pro‑business (hegemonic) biases in the news. The
2003 and 2011 Medicare reforms were driven by efforts to introduce and
expand market control over this program. By requiring that private corpora‑
tions exclusively provide prescription drug benefits, and by requiring seniors
to purchase private insurance (instead of receiving it from the government),
Republicans promoted corporate profit interests. The health care debates cen‑
tered on efforts to expand the private health care industry. From 1993–94,
the goal was to require an employer health care mandate, while in 2009–10
the linchpin of reform was a mandate requiring individuals and employers
to purchase private health insurance. In both cases, no serious consideration
of a nonprofit, universal health care system was debated. Finally, for the
2013 government shutdown, the political debate was over whether to keep
a market‑based health care reform, or have no government intervention in
assisting tens of millions of uninsured Americans. Both of these perspectives

favored individual and market approaches to health care.
Hegemonic biases were apparent in other case studies. As with 2001,
the 2003 tax cuts were focused on directing taxpayer funds disproportionately
toward the wealthy and business interests. The 2008 bailout was an unprec‑
edented taxpayer allocation of funds toward the wealthy—strengthening
financial corporations responsible for creating the economic crisis. The 2011
debt talks were negotiated in a political environment in which the parties
debated whether deficit reduction would be funded entirely by spending cuts
(the Republican position) or just overwhelmingly by such cuts (the Demo‑
cratic position). Regardless of which party hoped to “win” this debate, the
outcome would have been biased against non‑affluent Americans. Spending
cuts for social programs disproprtionately fall on the masses of Americans,
who are then forced to make do with reduced government assistance. Efforts
to shield wealthier Americans from paying a greater share of the burden to
“balance the budget” send the signal to the masses about the government’s
policy priorities.
The last two issues cover the question of government regulation of
the private sector. For the minimum wage, the political‑economic context
was much the same as that discussed in 1996 and 2007. Declining wages
among the working poor continued from 2007 through 2014, amid increases
in worker productivity and growing corporate profits. Wealthy Americans
benefited from these trends, while inflation‑adjusted purchasing power for
the working poor declined. Officials debated whether or not to raise the
minimum wage amid a deterioration in worker pay, and the failure to agree
on a raise ensured the decline would continue for years to come. These
trends suggest a political‑economic climate that favors business. Similarly,
the EPA’s announcement of CO2 emission regulations for coal‑burning power
plants was undertaken via a business‑friendly, market‑based approach. The
EPA‑mandated cuts in fossil fuels were to be implemented through a “cap
and trade” policy, with businesses issued permits for maximum CO2 emis‑
sions. The permits can be traded between companies to allow those over the
cap to continue exceeding emission limits.31 Cap and trade is distinct from a
“carbon tax,” which is less favored by businesses because it imposes a tax on
each unit of carbon emitted, preventing some polluters from emitting above
their legal limits without paying a significantly higher price.32
What all of the above policy proposals have in common is that they
reflect the growing popularity and prominence of market‑based policy
approaches. There were alternatives to these proposals, but they would have
imposed greater costs on, and regulation of, corporate America. A living
wage, for example, costs employers far more than a minimum wage. Universal
health care is strongly opposed by health care corporations because of the
devastation it would impose on for‑profit health care. Opposing the Bush tax
cuts, and allocating surplus funds for social welfare programs such as Social
Security, Medicare, and Medicaid would have benefited the masses, but it
was opposed by the afluent, who stood to gain from tax cuts. Whatever one
thinks of pro‑market reforms, they represent a pro‑business shift in American
politics. Regardless of which party dominated the news for each policy debate,
the debates themselves were biased in favor of the affluent. Reporters did not
create this pro‑market drift, but they validated it by treating the major parties
as the only serious actors in policy debates.
Media Effects for Five Policy Conflicts
In addition to the analysis of media content above, I undertake five case stud‑
ies for which survey data was available concerning media effects on public
attitudes. The data were drawn from the Pew Research Center and other
polling firms, and cover: the 2003 Medicare prescription drug reform; the
2003 extension of the Bush tax cuts; the 2009–10 health care debate; the 2011
Medicare privatization debate; and the 2011 debt talks. The evidence suggests
there was no consistent negativity bias against the president’s party when
examining media effects.33 Rather, media effects were variable, and context
specific to the cases examined, with some cases cutting against the president’s
party and some cutting in favor. The cases are also notable in that they sug‑
gest significant public opposition to official messages, at least for a number
of policy issues.
Health Care Reform, 2009–10
Obama’s health care reform was fraught with difficulties. The coverage was
mixed to negative in tone, with measures of news content suggesting biases
in favor of and against Democratic reform efforts. The issue of health care
was one that the public was generally familiar with, at least in terms of
those citizens who were enrolled in and happy with their health care plans.
This familiarity was likely to make it more difficult to sell reform propos‑
als that represented a significant change from the status quo. Finally, prior
public opinion cut against the Democrats, with the public suspicious of dras‑
tic changes to heatlh care. Because of these three factors, one would have
expected growing attention to the news to produce growing opposition to

Democratic, market‑based health care reforms.
The health care debate produced mixed findings with regard to media
coverage. Data cited earlier in this chapter suggested some evidence of a
Democratic advantage in the news, with the party and its members refer‑
enced far more often than Republicans. Other research found that President
Obama was the dominant actor in the news over opposition sources.34 How‑
ever, numerous studies documented a pervasive negative tone in the news.
Conservative warnings about higher taxes, government “rationing” of health
care, and big government outnumbered liberal comments about promoting
competition in the health care industry, attacks on “greedy” health insurance
companies, and discussions of Democratic efforts to eliminate preexisting
condition denials for the insured.35 Discussions of “cost” and the “debt” arising
from the reform appeared more often in the news than discussions of Demo‑
cratic health care proposals. Warnings about government “socialism” and a
“government takeover” of health care were common.36 A growing negative
tone in the news was also documented regarding increased reporting of the
“death panels” controversy, in which conservatives claimed Democrats were
creating a government body to deny life‑saving care to the sick and elderly.37
The effects of media content cut against the Democratic Party. In four
national Pew surveys from 2009, for July, August, September, and October,
attention to health care in the news was associated with greater opposition
to reform.38 These negative media effects are to be expected, considering the
critical bent of news content. Media attention was signficant in stoking pub‑
lic opposition, after controlling for respondents’ ideology and partisanship.
This suggests an independent role of the media in influencing public beliefs,
outside of prior public opposition from Republicans and conservatives.
Coverage of the Tea Party—a group that placed health care opposition
at the forefront of its message—saturated the news in 2010, and research
suggests that news reports were consistently favorable in tone to the group.39
Tea Partiers envisioned themselves as part of a grassroots social movement
of “average” Americans, rebelling against alleged government overreach and
tyranny. Increased attention to the Tea Party rebellion in the news was associ‑
ated with growing opposition to Democratic health care reform.40 Increased
attention to the news on health care was also associated with growing opposi‑
tion to health care reform during the months when the Tea Party dominated
national news coverage in early 2010. Drawing on surveys conducted by Pew,
Kaiser, and CBS during the months of December 2009 and January, February,
and March 2010, I find that attention to news on health care produced grow‑
ing opposition to reform, after controlling for respondents’ political party,
ideology, income, age, education, race, and sex.41 These statistically significant
relationships, independent of respondents’ partisanship and ideology, suggest
that media coverage played a strong role in influencing public attitudes. Fig‑
ure 7.3 documents the relationship between public attentiveness and opposi‑
tion to health care reform, showing data for some of the surveys that were
conducted between late 2009 and early 2010.42
Media bias appeared to play a significant role in encouraging opposi‑
tion to reform. Independent and moderate Americans ranged between split to
supportive in their opinions of Democratic reforms. While independents were
more likely to oppose Obama on the issue of health care in general, they were
about evenly split when it came to supporting a government health care plan
designed to compete with private health plans. Moderates were more likely to
support Obama on health care, and on a government health care plan. Despite
these groups expressing mixed‑to‑supportive views of reform, attentiveness
to health care in the news was associated with growing opposition to reform
within these two groups. Moderates paying a lot of attention to the health
care debate were eleven percentage points more likely to oppose a government
health plan than moderates not paying attention, while attentive moderates
were seventeen percentage points more likely to oppose Obama on health
care reform
Figure 7.3 than inattentive moderates. Similarly, independents who paid a
lot of attention to health care were nineteen percentage points more likely to
A"en%on to & A*tudes Toward Health Care Reform
(2009-‐2010)
70
60
50 % Paying A Lot of A6en8on

to Health Care Who Oppose
40 Reform
30 % Paying Li6le to No

A6en8on to Health Care
20 Who Oppose Reform
10
0
Figure 7.3. Attention to and attitudes toward health care reform (2009–2010).

oppose a government health care plan than independents paying no attention,

while attentive independents were 33 percent more likely to oppose Obama on
health care than inattentive independents.43 It is difficult to explain these out‑
comes by claiming independents and moderates were predisposed to oppose
reform, considering that these groups were either undecided or supportive in
their opinions. Growing opposition among moderates and independents can
be explained, however, by coverage that was critical of the administration, and
which turned independents and moderates against Democratic reform efforts.
Responsdents’ political partisanship and attention to the news played an
interactive role in influencing public attitudes, with more attentive Republi‑
cans and independents being more likely to oppose health care than attentive
Democrats.44 These findings suggest that prior public attitudes were signifi‑
cant in influencing how Americans assessed health care reform. Republicans
were already predisposed to oppose reform, and became more opposed the
more they were exposed to news coverage. Democrats were more likely to
resist news coverage that was biased against their own party.
Other evidence also suggests that prior public attitudes, along with
strong public familiarity with the issue of health care, worked against the
Democrats. A Pew poll from July 2009, at the very beginning of the health
care reform controversy, found that less than half of Americans—42 per‑
cent—approved of “the way Barack Obama is handling health care policy.”45
Negative public attitudes were likely a product of satisfication with the health
care system the way it was, and fear of the unknown due to public confu‑
sion and uncertainty regarding Democratic reform proposals. Eighty percent
of Americans indicated in late 2009 that they were happy with the quality
of their health care, and 61 percent said they were happy with its cost. Just
1 percent indicated they were unsure about their opinions of their health
care plan’s quality and cost, suggesting that the vast majority of Americans
were familiar enough with this issue to take a stand one way or another.46
Presidential success in selling reform would be increasingly difficult because
of public opposition and happiness with the status quo.
Not knowing much about a health care reform proposal that was incred‑
ibly complex—weighing in at 906 pages—many Americans seemed to prefer
the familiarity of previous health care arrangements over the uncertainty
of reforms that could produce unintended, or even negative consequences.
Conservative scare stories about “death panels” played into Americans’ uncer‑
tainty about Obama’s proposals. Polling from late 2009 found that 41 percent
of Americans thought the “death panels” myth was real.47 Senior citizens were
more likely to feel that health care reform would “worsen” their own medical
care and worsen medical care in the United States. Seniors were also more
likely to say that reform would increase health care costs across the United
States, rather than reduce them.48 For seniors, an “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix
it” mentality was clearly driving their opposition. This feeling was shared by
many Americans, as a June 2009 survey found that 83 percent of Americans
were either “somewhat” or “very” satisfied with the health care they already
received, with 81 percent also satisfied with their health insurance. As Robert
Blendon, professor of health policy explained about the public’s mindset: “It’s
a huge barrier. These peole have something to lose. If they think reform is
going to actually make it worse for them, they get really scared.”49
News coverage did not allay public apprehension of market‑based
reforms. Americans remained comfortable and familiar with their insurance
plans, and uncertain about Democratic proposals. A CBS/New York Times sur‑
vey from September 2009 found that about two‑thirds of Americans said they
found the health care proposals considered by Congress to be “confusing.”50 Just
21 percent of Americans said the media did a “good” or “excellent” job cover‑
ing the “details of the proposals” being discussed in Congress, while 72 per‑
cent said journalists did an “only fair” or “poor” job.51 Lack of familiarity with
Democratic proposals was evident when Americans were asked about what
Congress should do regarding health care. Large numbers of citizens, between
24 to 29 percent in mid to late 2009, said that they had “no opinion” about
whether their members of Congress should “vote for or against” Democratic
health care proposals, with the rest of Americans nearly equally split for voting
for or against reform.52 These statistics suggest lack of familiarity with proposed
reforms. Coupled with strong public comfort with the status quo, uncertainty
about Obama’s proposals worked against the Democratic Party’s agenda.
The above findings suggest the importance of media coverage—among
other factors, in influencing the public response to health care reform. News
coverage of health care produced growing opposition in 2009 and 2010. Prior
public opposition and strong public familiarity with the health care status
quo made it more difficult for Obama to sell reform. With most Americans
already content with their health insurance, the market reforms proposed by
Obama represented an unknown for many. As the 2003 and 2011 Medicare
case studies will show, suspicion of the unknown is common when major
health care reform proposals are introduced.
Four Additional Case Studies
Four additional cases examined here suggest little evidence of a consistent

negativity bias in the news. Unlike the 2009–10 health care debacle, three of
reckless speculation and investments. Opposing regulation of pay and bail‑

outs, Heritage advocated a “free market” approach in which “government
meddling” in the private economy was seen as “hopelessly impractical” and
as an impediment to business freedom. Government regulations, Heritage
argued, “undermine incentives for performance and economic growth,” while
deterring “the best corporate talent” from working at companies covered by
pay regulation. In one attack, Heritage criticized a Treasury Department pro‑
posal to prohibit TARP recipients from distributing stock options to employ‑
ees, as these options were presented as “actually reduc[ing] risk rather than
increase[ing] it.”66
While many defenders of the “free market” felt that government regula‑
tion would ruin a “virtuous” economic system that already punishes business‑
es for engaging in risky investments, this claim was quite puzzling following
the 2008 economic bailout. Precisely the opposite lesson sprung from the
economic crisis. Even the most right‑wing of Republican Tea Partiers were
angry with the government bailout because they perceived it, correctly, as
a violation of the principle of “free markets,” in which companies assume
the risk of their investments, are rewarded for making sound investments,
and punished for pursuing reckless business decisions. It was rather ironic,
then to see many right‑wing defenders of Wall Street promoting bonuses at
a time when government bailout money was a prime source of funding for
those bonuses. Contrary to the free market rhetoric of the CATO Institute
and Heritage Foundation, the bonuses paid out from 2008 onward were
hardly a product of investments independent of government. The bailout
was unprecedented in that it removed the threat of risk for investors, since
firms learned they would be bailed out by government if they failed. Invest‑
ment firms poured massive sums of money into dubious mortgage‑based
Collateralized Debt Obligations, or CDOs (a type of “derivative” investment,
in which subprime mortgages were bundled together), under the under‑
standing that the full faith and financial backing of the federal government
was behind them. This confidence arose from the fact that government and
taxpayer‑subsidized mortgage institutions Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were
themselves bundling these subprime loans into CDOs and selling them to
investment firms.
Even if the subprime mortgages making up CDOs were unsustainable
as a form of investment (the loans were often given to applicants with bad
or no credit, no money to put down, or sporadic work histories), where was
the incentive to reject them as an investor when the government was granting
them its seal of approval and financial support? In an environment where
cuts would help the economy and the public. With these conditions in place,
one would expect that increased attention to news dominated by conserva‑
tive voices would have produced growing support for tax cuts that favored
business interests.
As in 2001, the Republican Party argued for tax cuts from a position of
strength, dominating the news during a period of unified control of govern‑
ment. Democratic opposition to the 2003 tax cut proposal—which called for
cuts in the Alternative Minimum Tax and for reduced taxes on income from
capital gains and dividends—was again largely muted in the news. Since this
was a tax cut initiative, and since tax law tends to be quite complicated, the
details of the proposed cuts likely eluded most Americans. Most Americans
were simply not very familiar with the Bush proposal, and had little founda‑
tion for independently challenging the Bush administration’s promises about
tax cuts producing economic and job growth. Lack of public familiarity with
the tax proposals was clear in surveys. The percent of Americans who held
“no opinion” about Bush’s 2003 economic plan (tax cuts were central to this
plan) reached as high as 10 to 21 percent of Americans by early 2003, while
14 percent of Americans were still unsure in 2003 whether the 2001 tax cuts
had helped the economy or not.54 Between 14 to 16 percent of Americans
said they were unsure about their opinions of various tax cut proposals from
Congress and President Bush, which ranged from $400 billion to $726 bil‑
lion.55 Overall, “unsure” or “no opinion” responses for the above questions
averaged 15 percent; such uncertainty was high relative to other policy issues
examined in this book.
While Americans were not strongly familiar with the Bush tax cut pro‑
posal, prior public support for the idea of a tax cut was sizable at the outset
of the national debate. Public opinion was split, but more favorable than
not. In mid‑January, 39 percent of Americans thought tax cuts would be
good for the economy, compared to 19 percent who thought they would be
bad.56 Fifty one percent of Americans supported the Bush tax plan, while 39
-
percent opposed it. Prior support meant that it was significantly easier for
the president’s party to convince Americans—especially independents and
Republicans—about the need for more tax cuts. Figure 7.4, based on Pew
survey data from May 2003, found that those paying attention to news on tax
cuts were nearly 20 percentage points more likely to say the cuts were fair to
all than those paying little or no attention. The relationship between attentive‑
ness and support for tax cuts was statistically significant, even after controlling
for respondents’ political party, ideology, sex, race, age, income, and educa‑
tion, suggesting a significant role for the media in influencing public thought.
Political partisanship and media consumption played an interactive role in
producing greater support for the cuts. As survey respondents moved from
Democratic to independent and Republican in their party orientation, and
as media attention increased, support for the tax cuts grew.57 This suggests
that prior public support among some groups was relevant in driving public
attitudes, with those already predisposed to supporting cuts becoming more
supportive the more they paid attention to news that favored Republicans.
While the above evidence suggests bare majority support for the tax
cuts, other measures indicated that support may have been stronger. A Janu‑
ary survey from Pew, for example, found that 78 percent of those paying
greater attention to news on tax cuts supported making cuts a policy prior‑
ity, as compared to 67 percent of those paying little to no attention.58 These
findings indicate that support for the tax cuts was fairly strong in general,
but that media coverage strengthened prior support. Bush sold the tax cuts
based on the promise that they would help promote economic growth in
the years after the 2000 economic recession. The public opinion survey data
from the first six months of 2003 suggests that Americans were sympathetic
to this argument.
In summarizing this case study, one sees more evidence that attention to
the news produced growing support for tax cuts that favored business inter‑
ests.59 Rather than being placed at a disadvantage, Republicans were firmly
in the driver’s seat in framing the national debate. If there was negativity
against the party in the news, it was marginalized by the diminished presence
of Democrats in the news. Increased support for tax cuts among attentive
Americans suggests that media effects were positive, rather than negative,
in favor of Bush’s pro‑business agenda. Media bias appears to have played a
significant role in cultivating support for tax cuts. Independents were evenly
split (37 percent to 37 percent) in terms of their feelings on whether the
Bush tax cuts would improve the economy or not.60 Independents also leaned
somewhat against the tax cuts, with 54 percent expressing opposition to the
Bush tax cuts, and 46 percent supporting. And yet, increased attention to the
news was associated with growing support for the notion that the tax cuts
would be fair to all. Growing support among attentive independents was likely
a product of media coverage that was biased in favor of Bush’s tax agenda.61
The 2003 Medicare Reform: The Public Asserts Itself
Unlike the 2003 tax cuts, the expansion of Medicare to cover prescription
drugs represented a stark example of public independence from conservative
official rhetoric and business interests. Although Republicans dominated news
coverage, the public was quite familiar with Medicare (as it had operated
up to that point), and prior support for changing the program was weak.
With Americans holding contrary interests to Republicans, increased atten‑
tion to the news should have been expected to increase public awareness of
a plan that cut against their interests, thereby increasing public opposition.
Americans rejected Republican efforts to build public consent for privatiza‑
tion, despite their dominance of the news. Private insurance corporations did
successfully benefit from the expansion of Medicare to include prescription
drug benefits, although it was not without resistance from Americans. Since
the rejection of Medicare reform was driven by prior public resistance to
market reform, it makes little sense to speak of a bad news bias as turning
the public against the president and his party.
The December congressional vote on reform played out mainly along
partisan lines, with Democrats opposing the bill and Republicans support‑
ing a market‑based approach to expanding care. Private insurers would be
responsible for providing prescription drugs—paid for by the federal govern‑
ment—to Medicare recipients. One might have expected that the public would
support the reform, since the Republican Party controlled the messages in the
news, amid little indication of within‑party division on the final prescription
package. Similarly, Democrats were weak in their resistance and suffered from
a significant disadvantage in media coverage, as they received far less atten‑
tion than Republicans (Figure 7.4). Their inability to block the passage of the
law revealed how weak the party was in its opposition efforts.
But the public seemed unaffected by Republican messages and claims
that “market reform” would make Medicare more efficient in providing for
seniors’ needs. Pro‑Republican coverage failed to build public support, as news
attentiveness was associated with growing opposition to reform. Increased
public opposition stemmed from Americans’ contrary preferences to those
of Republican officials. Seniors had extensive experience and familiarity with
Medicare, and feared changes that might make health care more expensive, or
would fail to adequately deal with growing costs of prescription drugs. Survey
questions in 2003 found that most Americans thought Medicare needed an
overhaul, but most were concerned that government would not go far enough
in trying to control costs, especially for drugs. Americans were particularly
suspicious of any “managed care” plan that forced seniors into private health
care plans. While the 2003 reform did not push seniors into private plans,
it did force them to purchase pharmaceutical drugs on the private market,
with little government effort to control or limit costs. Failure of government
to control costs and overreliance on “market‑based” approaches were primary
points of protest for the public.62 As with the 2010 Obama health care reform,
Medicare reform in 2003 brought with it the fear of the unknown, since
most Americans were concerned that the changes would fail to control drug
costs. As citizens gained more knowledge of the basic details of the Medicare
proposal, dissent grew among those paying attention to the news as they
discovered the reform did little to control prescription costs.
Surveys from early 2003 suggested that public opinion ran contrary to
Republican reforms. Gallup polling from January 2003 found that 30 percent
of Amerians felt Republicans “would do a better job of dealing with Medi‑
care” than Democrats, who 54 percent felt would deal with the issue more
effectively.63 Just 32 percent of Americans agreed in January 2003 that “in
order to provide drug coverage and control costs at the same time, the entire
Medicare program must be changed to work more like the private insurance
market.” In contrast, 59 percent agreed that “Medicare can add prescription
drug coverage while working mostly as it does now, because costs can be
controlled without having to change the entire program.”64 Later polling dur‑
ing the middle of the Congressional debate over Medicare (in mid to late
2003) found that the public remained skeptical. In one July 2003 survey, 51
percent of respondents worried that the prescription drug reform would “not
[go] far enough” in adequately covering seniors, while only 21 percent felt
the Republican proposal was “about right” in terms of meeting the needs of
seniors.65 These numbers only increased over time, and 61 percent felt in
December that the law did not go far enough, after the prescription drug
expansion was passed.66
Because the public was already familiar witih the Medicare program
and its benefits, selling any significant change to the program will be difficult
if that reform does not adequately address concerns over drug costs. One
could say in this case that “the devil you know” was apparently preferrable
to “the devil you don’t.” Americans were not thrilled with the status quo,
but they recognized that a market reform might exacerbate the problem of
growing drug costs. From 2001 through 2015, uncertainty regarding Medicare
has been low whenever polls have asked how “satisfied” the public was with
Medicare. “No opinion” responses ranged during this time from 4 to 7 per‑
cent of all survey responses. On average, “no opinion” responses comprised
5 percent across twelve Gallup questions from 2001 to 2015 surveying the
public about their level of satisfaction with Medicare.67 In short, many Ameri‑
cans felt they were familiar enough with Mediare to express an opinion on
it one way or another. In contrast, many Americans were uncertain about a
new prescription drug reform, which represented a relative unknown in late
2003. Survey questions from numerous polling organizations found that “no
opinion” responses comprised between 18 and 30 percent of all responses,
Democratic Reforms and the Republican Response
The Obama administration’s response to taxpayer‑funded bonuses was swift.

Immediately upon taking office, Obama denounced the bonuses as “shameful”
and the “height of irresponsibility.” Framing himself as an opponent of excess,
rather than of Wall Street altogether, Obama announced: “There will be a time
for them to make profits, and there will be time for them to get bonuses.
Now is not that time. And that’s the message that I intend to send directly
to them.”69 That message was sent within the week of Obama’s comments, as
he announced plans to restrict incomes of senior executives at companies
receiving TARP funds to no more than $500,000 a year.70
Obama’s announcement, however, did not end to the debate over
bonuses. The issue lingered for months amid Congressional consideration
of new legislation on executive pay. The issue remained salient as General
Motors and Chrysler declared bankruptcy and appealed to the government
for bailout funds. The discussion of regulating executive pay again became
relevant with regard to executives at these firms. The issue remained salient
because of Democratic discussions of further actions that could be taken to
strengthen government regulation of executive pay. Such debates raged in the
media throughout early to mid‑2009, and provided Republicans and business
executives a chance to respond to Democratic arguments.
The Republican backlash against regulation began after Democrats
attempted to push stronger reforms beyond those initially announced by
Obama. Numerous bills were presented in Congress. One proposal from
Democratic representative Claire McCaskill required a pay cap for employees
of companies receiving TARP funds at $400,000 a year—$100,000 less than
the limit announced by Obama.71 Legislation passed in the House (by a vote
of 328–93) in March 2009 would have established a 90 percent tax on the
executive bonuses allocated to corporations that received more than $5 billion
in TARP money, and would have affected those executives earning more than
$250,000 a year. Another Democratic bill in the Senate sought to impose a 70
percent tax on bonuses, to be paid through an excise tax and a second tax on
executive bonuses.72 Most Republicans opposed the House bill to tax bonuses
at 90 percent, while Republican leaders derailed any vote on the Senate bill.73
Republican opposition to executive pay legislation was paradoxical,
however. The party rhetorically railed against the government‑funded bonus‑
es in the year after the 2008 bailout, yet it actively opposed government efforts
to recover bonuses. This left Republican Americans in a precarious position.
On the one hand, the party seemed to be opposed to granting bonuses with
Figure 7.5
A"en%veness & Opposi%on to Medicare Reform
by Age (12/2003)
80 % paying very or
fairly close
60 a<en=on to news
on Medicare
40 reform
% disapproving or
20 strongly
disapproving of
0 Medicare reform
18-‐29 30-‐49 50-‐64 65 and over
Figure 7.5. Attentiveness and opposition to medicare reform by age (12/2003).

percent of those who closely followed the Medicare debate disapproved of the
legislation, while only 36 percent of those paying close attention approved.72
Seniors held many concerns about prescription reform, suggesting
independence among the elderly from Republican messages. What did those
concerns entail? The Gallup polling firm found that, while support for the
“general concept of a prescription drug benefit covered by Medicare” was
strong among seniors, the Bush plan suffered a “drop in support” among
those surveyed, which “probably reflects seniors’ concerns about some of
the specific provisions of this legislation,” as they expressed a “deeply held
feeling . . . that the legislation will not go far enough to help them pay for
 
 
 
 
prescription drugs.” Most did not agree that Medicare “needs a major over‑
haul, and there is pre‑existing sentiment that whatever changes might be
made to Medicare would do as much to harm the system as make it better.”
As Gallup reported, the law was “exceedingly complex: at 678 pages
long, involving a complicated mix of deductibles, exclusions, and amounts
above which and below which drug costs won’t be reimbursed. The new
law also makes numerous changes to Medicare, above and beyond the new
prescription drug benefit.” Confusion and uncertainty about change were
expressed among 49 percent of seniors, who were “very concerned” that the
law “will be too complicated for Medicare recipients to understand.” Having
paid close attention to reporting on Medicare, many seniors were likely aware
of the hole in prescription coverage and the uncertainties it would bring for
them regarding their ability to afford drug costs. Surveys conducted in late
2003 suggested as much. Gallup polling from December found that 84 percent
of seniors were “very” or “somewhat” concerned that the Medicare law would
“be too complicated for Medicare recipients to understand.” Furthermore, 85

percent worried the reform would “not go far enough to help seniors pay
for their prescriptions,” and 78 percent felt that the law would “benefit pre‑
scription drug companies too much.”73 These two concerns expressed seniors’
insights on reform, taking into account that the law did not fully fund pre‑
scription benefits and imposed no regulations on prescription prices.74
Details reported in the news suggested that seniors would likely face
difficulties fully funding prescription drugs because of holes in government
support and funding for the program. For example, a December 7 New
York Times story reported that the reform law prohibited the sale of private
insurance policies “that would help pay drug costs” not covered by Medi‑
care. Uncovered costs might become a significant concern and “surprise” for
seniors, the paper reported, “who will find big gaps in the [Medicare] drug
benefit and might want private insurers to plug the holes—just as they buy
insurance to supplement Medicare coverage of doctors’ services and hospital
care.” As the New York Times reported, Medicare would cover a $250 deduct‑
ible for drug benefits, after which it would only cover 25 percent of drug costs
for seniors from $251 through $2,250 per year, although all costs for the next
$2,850 would be covered. This gap became known as the Medicare “donut
hole,” and it occasioned serious criticism of the reform among many seniors,
the vast majority of whom lived on limited, fixed incomes, and therefore were
likely to have difficulty covering these costs.75
Public distrust and uncertainty regarding the reform did not end in
the months or years following its passage. By early 2004, only 33 percent of
Americans said they understood the Medicare law “somewhat” or “very” well.
Thirty‑eight pecent held an “unfavorable” view of reform, compared to 25 per‑
cent who had a “favorable” view.76 Confusion and apprehension about reform
continued through late 2005 and onward, as the prescription plan rollout
began in January 2006. By December 2005, 67 percent of seniors explained
that they did not plan to join the new prescription program. Thirty five per‑
-
cent indicated they understood the drug plan “somewhat” or “very well”—just
over one‑third of those supposedly benefiting from the program.77 In January
2006, 58 percent of seniors expressed the feeling that the prescription drug
program was “not working,” compared to a meager 20 percent claiming that
it was.78 These figures suggested a consistent senior opposition to Medicare
prescription program over time, although support did eventually grow in
later years.79 Sustained opposition suggested public independence over time
in questioning Republicans’ market‑based reform agenda.
In sum, Medicare reform was a bitter pill for many seniors to swallow,
but surveys also indicated that opposition persisted among the most attentive
Americans, even after controlling for respondents’ age. This suggests a wider
public opposition. Resistance to prescription drug expansion, then, was about
more than narrow self‑interest on the part of the elderly. Americans of dif‑
ferent ages did not like the Medicare reform. The evidence in this case study
suggests that growing public negativity toward Medicare reform was due to
prior public attitudes—which contradicted the Republican political agenda.
Political officials are not guaranteed success in their efforts to manufacture
public consent. On issues with which the public has extensive experience and
prior attitudes that run counter to official proposals, Americans can (and do)
embrace their own interests, rather than serving as vessels for official agendas.
An informed public can make use of information that is available in the media
in order to pursue its own interests, even when coverage is biased against
the public’s own preferences. In this case, any allegations of a bad news bias
against the president’s party seem misplaced. Coverage favored the presiden‑
tial party, but factors outside of media bias were decisive in influencing the
public’s final assessment of Medicare reform.
The 2011 Medicare Privatization:

More Evidence of Public Independence
Republican proposals for Medicare reform were no more popular in 2011

than in 2003. Public opposition, and strong public familiarity with a program
that most approved of (or approved of more than Republican alternatives),
made it unlikely that Republicans would be able to build support for privatiz‑
ing Medicare. As Americans became more aware of the details regarding the
Republican proposal that were reported in the news, it was to be expected
that they would become more opposed to privatization plans, which many
felt would benefit health insurance companies at the expense of Medicare
recipients.
Revisiting Medicare in 2011 worked in favor of President Obama, and
against Republicans. This was not due to a media bias in favor of Demo‑
crats, however. By mid‑2011, and as shown in data presented earlier in this
chapter, coverage of Medicare reform was directed at both political parties,
their officials, and their perspectives. Neither party argued from a position
of strength, given the split coverage of Medicare reform. When it came to
public opinion, however, Democrats held an advantage over Republicans. The
2011 controversy stemmed from a proposal by House Republican Paul Ryan
that seniors be required to purchase private health insurance through the
Medicare program (and receive a federal tax credit to do it), rather than
being provided their insurance directly by the government.80 The plan called
for a radical reform to the program after 2022, at which time seniors would
need to purchase health insurance through a government‑regulated exchange
providing various benefits to those covered under the plans.81
The Ryan plan benefited from nearly unanimous support among House
Republicans, who voted to implement it in their 2012 budget legislation. The
plan received sustained criticism, however, from policy critics and Demo‑
cratic officials because of concerns that it would hurt program beneficiaries.
A main concern was the plan to raise the age of Medicare beneficiaries over
time from sixty‑five to sixty‑nine between 2022 and 2086.82 Perhaps most cru‑
cially, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) concluded that the tax credit
subsidies to Medicare recipients under the plan would be inadequate to cover
the growing costs of private health insurance plans because the credit would
be indexed to inflation, and health care costs traditionally grow faster than
inflation. This change in the program meant, the CBO reported, that most
beneficiaries would pay more for their health care under the new privatization
rules.83 The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities estimated that seniors’
share of Medicare costs would increase by nearly 100 percent with the intro‑
duction of privately mandated health insurance for the “typical 65‑year old.”84
Public familiarity with the Medicare program, and lack of familiarity
with privatization plans, meant that it would be difficult for Republicans to
sell the public on major changes. As I argued with the 2003 Medicare case
study, Americans think that there are problems with the Medicare program as
is, but this does not mean they support the unknown of privatization, which
many fear will increase health care costs. Public familiarity with the Medicare
program was high in 2011. When asked whether they wanted Medicare to stay
as it was, versus being transformed via market‑based approaches, very few
Americans expressed uncertainty. Just 2 to 6 percent said they were “unsure”
when asked if Medicare should be changed so that seniors were forced to
buy health insurance in the private market, based on survey questions from
Quinnipiac, ABC, and the Washington Post.85 Similarly, 4 percent of Ameri‑
cans were unsure about the proposal to raise the age of Medicare eligibility.86
These low uncertainty rates suggest public familiarity with, and comfort con‑
cerning, taking a position on the Medicare program. In contrast, uncertainty
was high regarding proposals for privatization, which many Americans lacked
specifics on and found difficult to evaluate. For example, 23 percent said in
one Pew survey that they were “unsure” about a proposal to provide seniors
a voucher “credit toward purchasing private health insurance coverage.”87 In
short, public familiarity served as a roadblock for Republicans. Most Ameri‑
cans felt the program worked well enough to keep it as it was, and feared
potentially negative consequences of serious changes.
Prior public opposition was clearly important in reinforcing public

rejection of reform. Significant changes to Medicare are historically unpop‑
ular, as the 2003 case study demonstrated. Furthermore, Americans were
strongly opposed to change from the get‑go of the 2011 debate. A Kaiser
health care poll from February 2011—two months before Representative Ryan
introduced his privatization plan—found that 44 percent of Americans felt
that the Democratic Party could be trusted to do a better job handling Medi‑
care; 30 percent felt the same about Republicans.88 A March Bloomberg survey
reported that only 40 percent of Americans favored “replac[ing] Medicare
with a system in which government vouchers would help participants pay for
their own health insurance,” while 54 percent opposed this proposal.89 Most
did not believe that Medicare should be transformed into a market‑based
program. Fifty‑three percent in a March NBC/Wall Street Journal poll said
they either favored “minor modifications” to Medicare or that it was “pretty
much okay the way it is.” Just 44 percent felt that “major changes” or a “com‑
plete overhaul” were needed.90
Early reluctance regarding privatization was followed by strong opposi‑
tion to Ryan’s official proposal. An April 2011 Quinnipiac survey (the month
Ryan’s proposal was introduced) found that 60 percent of Americans said
that “Medicare should remain as it is . . . with a defined set of benefits for
 
 
 
 
seniors”; 34 percent felt that “Medicare should be changed so that seniors
who join Medicare in 2022 received a fixed amount of money from the gov‑
ernment each year that they can use to shop for their own private health
insurance policy.”91
As seen in Figure 7.4, those paying greater attention to the debate
over Medicare reform were more likely to oppose privatization. By convey‑
ing details of the privatization plan, the media appeared to exert an infor‑
mational effect that magnified prior public animosity toward changing this
popular program. The Republican failure to sell privatization represented a
victory for the Obama administration. In other words, this case study saw
little evidence of a negativity against the presidential party, although news
coverage helped undermine the Republican privatization agenda.
Unlike many other cases in this book, interactive effects were not evi‑
dent between partisanship and media consumption in the Medicare debate.
Highly attentive Republicans were not significantly more likely than attentive
Demorats or independents to support privatization of Medicare. These find‑
ings reveal substantial public independence—especially among Republican
Americans—in questioning Republican officials’ messages.
As seen in Figure 7.6, seniors were more likely to pay attention to news
on Medicare reform, and more likely to oppose privatization.92 This finding
suggests that seniors played a leading role in opposing reform. Opposition
Figure 7.6
A"en%on & Opposi%on to Medicare
Priva%za%on as Related to Age (5/2011)
% paying a lot
70 of a<en=on to
60 Medicare
50 reform
40 %
30 disapproving
20 of Ryan's
10 Medicare
reform plan
0
18-‐29 30-‐49 50-‐64 65 and over
Figure 7.6. Attention and opposition to medicare privatization as related to age

(5/2011).
to privatization, however, was evident among those paying close attention to

the news, even after controlling for respondents’ age. This means that there
were many non‑elderly Americans opposed to the reform. Expressing solidar‑
ity with the elderly, or perhaps simply worrying about how they will cover
their own Medicare costs when they retire, non‑elderly Americans joined
with seniors to oppose reform.
Americans felt the Ryan proposal was unlikely to help citizens when it
came to securing quality health insurance and care. Fifty‑six percent of those
surveyed in June 2011 thought privatization would be bad for the elderly; 74
percent of seniors agreed.93 Support and opposition fluctuated when the Ryan
plan was framed differently. For example, support rose from 46 percent to
54 percent when the Medicare voucher system was characterized as reducing
the deficit and empowering seniors to choose their own health care plans.
But opposition rose from 50 percent to 68 percent when respondents were
told that the voucher system would place private corporations in charge of
Medicare and cause seniors to pay higher costs or receive fewer benefits due
to an inability to cover rising health care premiums in the private market.94
These findings provide perspective about what drove opposition to reform.
Concerns with quality of care and cost of services in a private marketplace
were likely to be primary drivers of public opposition. Aside from these lead‑
ing questions, general opposition to reform was apparent in survey questions
that did not favor Democratic or Republican perspectives. Such opposition

suggests that resistance to privatization was real among the public.
Evidence in this case suggests that seniors, and Americans more gener‑
ally, formed their opinions independently of the Republican agenda, basing
their opposition to health care reform on the perception that they would be
significantly harmed by the privatization and growing costs imposed by insur‑
ance companies. Public independence was notable even among Republicans.
Survey data from Pew, drawn from the poll in Figure 7.4, show that majorities
among Republicans (52 percent), Democrats (61 percent), and independents
(53 percent) alike opposed Medicare reform. While opposition among inde‑
pendents and Democrats could be accounted for in part by the influence of
Democratic and presidential messages in the news, opposition among Repub‑
licans is harder to explain. That a majority of Republicans rejected their own
party’s plan, supported by the vast majority of Republican officials in the
House, suggests independence on the part of Republican voters.
The 2011 Debt Talks
The debt talks of 2011 were characterized by strong efforts from both parties
to enact specific cuts in government spending. Media coverage favored nei‑
ther party, but public opinion surveys prior to the debt talks suggested signifi‑
cant public opposition to Republican proposals. As Americans became better
aware through the news of the Republican proposals in the debt talks—which
sought trillions in budget cuts, with no tax increases on the wealthy—public
opposition was expected to grow, since the public opposed this approach to
dealing with the national debt.
During the 2011 debt ceiling crisis and debt reduction talks, both politi‑
cal parties engaged in sustained discussions about government spending pri‑
orities. The debt reduction talks began in the late spring to early summer, as
the federal government approached its “debt ceiling,” which represents the
limit placed on government under federal law regarding how much money
the Treasury Department is able to borrow. The debt ceiling was due to be
reached by August 2011, after which the government would face difficulty
(unless the ceiling was raised) meeting its spending obligations, particularly in
paying interest on the national debt. A U.S. default on debt interest payments
would produce a major crisis in the credit market, which many feared would
lead to an economic slowdown and recession. Republicans demanded that
Democrats negotiate over a package that called for cutting federal spending by
$2.4 trillion—equivalent to the amount of money by which they would agree

to increase the debt ceiling.95 The Republican push for cuts in government
spending to offset the debt ceiling increase prompted Democratic president
Barack Obama to push for a “grand bargain,” to be instituted over more than
a decade, that would cut government spending by trillions of dollars, even
more than the $2.4 trillion Republicans demanded.
The debt talks took place primarily between President Obama and
Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner. They ended in stalemate,
however, with both leaders unable to agree on a specific amount by which
to cut federal spending. President Obama initially called in April 2011 for a
total of $3 trillion in savings through spending cuts, with another $1 trillion
in savings achieved by overhauling the tax code and ending the Bush tax cuts
for families earning more than $250,000 a year.96 Republicans opposed the
president’s call for tax increases.97 They called for between $3 to $3.5 trillion
in cuts, and Republican Speaker Boehner reportedly agreed to no more than
$800 billion in revenue increases through overhauling the tax code to close
loopholes for businesses, while refusing to agree to an additional $300 billion
requested by the president.98
Obama and Boehner reportedly disagreed over the size of cuts to Medi‑
care, although the president also placed cuts to Social Security on the table.
Calls for cutting both programs angered fellow Democrats, inasmuch as cut‑
ting social programs would hurt the party’s constituents.99 Vocal opposition
to Obama’s plan was not expressed in public by the party’s leaders, however.
On the Republican side, Boehner’s agreement to limited tax increases was
not supported by other Republican officials, as was made clear by House
Republican Majority Leader Eric Cantor.100 Furthermore, while Boehner posi‑
tioned himself as willing to consider tax hikes in private talks with Obama,
he gave no indication to conservative Americans that he was ever close to
an agreement on raising taxes on the wealthy.101 In the end, the debt talks
revolved around a central commitment from both parties to reduce the debt
primarily through cutting government spending, rather than through raising
taxes. Republicans sought to reduce the debt through $3 trillion in spending
cuts, and Obama’s plan also leaned in favor of spending cuts over tax raises
by a ratio of three to one.
Despite the debt talks, neither side was able to agree on a “grand bar‑
gain” for spending cuts. Debt talks were called off by late July, as Republicans
and Democrats were deadlocked on a package for cutting spending and rais‑
ing tax revenues.102 Speaker Boehner claimed that Obama’s demand for $300
billion more in tax revenues was a “deal breaker.”103 Despite the failed debt
talks, Congress eventually came to an agreement on $1.2 trillion in spending
cuts in the August 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA). Labeled “the seques‑
ter,” the agreement called for automatic government spending cuts, sched‑
uled to be implemented from 2013 through 2021.104 The “across‑the‑board”
cuts applied to military spending (an 8 percent overall cut), in addition to
domestic discretionary programs (a 5 percent cut), although programs such
as Social Security and Medicare were exempted.105
It was difficult for Americans to understand the significance of the debt
talks at the very beginning of the negotiations. One Pew poll from May found
that 21 percent of Americans felt they did “not at all well” understand “what
would happen if the government doesn’t raise the debt limit.”106 When asked
whether they supported a congressional vote to raise the debt ceiling, a sizable
number of respondents—35 percent—said they did not “know enough” about
the issue to take a stance one way or the other.107 But Americans knew enough
about various programs the parties talked about cutting to take a stance on
funding for popuar social programs. One to 2 percent of Americans said they
were “unsure” about whether cuts to Medicaid, Medicare, or Social Security
were a good or bad idea.108 Similarly, 1 to 3 percent of those surveyed were
“unsure” about whether the government should cut government spending
to reduce the deficit, or maintain previous levels of spending, as seen in six
different surveys conducted between January and May 2011.109
While there may have been much uncertainty among the public about
the specifics of the closed‑door discussions on the debt, as details emerged
over time the public appeared to grow increasingly aware of, and hostile
toward the Republicans’ cut‑only, no‑increased‑taxes approach. Public famil‑
iarity with the talks increased over time. Although 8 to 13 percent of Ameri‑
cans said the debt negotiations were the issue they “most closely followed” in
the news in mid to late June, by mid to late July, between 31 to 40 percent
reported the debt talks were their “most closely follwed” issue, and that num‑
ber had reached 45 percent by early August. Opposition to the Republican
Party increased significantly during that time period.110 While approval of
“the way the Republicans in Congress are handling their job” stood at 30
percent in May, the rating fell to 22 percent by August.111 Most Americans
disapproved of the Republican approach to debt reduction, primarily because
major government programs were cut, without any assurances from Republi‑
can leaders that tax hikes were also being embraced by the party.
Public distrust was disproportionately directed at Republicans even
before the beginning of the debt talks. Many Americans felt that the party
had a poor track record on fiscal issues and spending. When asked in April
2011 who “is mostly to blame for most of the current federal budget deficit,”
41 percent said the Bush administration, compared to 14 percent who claimed
it was President Obama. These feelings were longstanding, as 39 percent had

felt the debt was primarily Bush’s fault in April 2010, compared to only 8
percent who blamed Obama.112 Such skepticism was not surprising in light of
debt expansion that occurred under Bush via the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, and
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the debt also increased significantly
under Obama, much of the increase was the result of a bad economy and
declining tax revenues amid constant spending obligations. Public opinion
clearly favored the Democrats over Republicans when it came to spending
issues. Fifty‑nine percent of Americans also indicated in April 2011 that they
supported a budget for the next year that included increases in taxes on those
making $250,000 or more a year—a central demand made by Obama dur‑
ing the debt talks.113 In contrast, 64 percent of Americans worried that “the
Republican plan for reducing the federal budget deficit” would “take away
needed protections for the poor and disadvantaged,” while an equal number
also worried that Republican deficit reduction plans would “protect the rich
at the expense of everyone else.”114 Public concerns were validated by Repub‑
lican efforts during the debt talks to cut programs that benefited the masses,
while attempting to shield wealthier Americans from shouldering part of the
burden for debt reduction.
Neither party was advantaged when it came to media coverage of the
2011 debt talks. Initial evidence suggests, however, that news coverage pro‑
voked opposition primarily to Republicans. Fifty‑two percent of Americans
believed that Obama “has acted responsibly” in the debt ceiling talks, based
on what they “read or heard about these disussions.” In contrast, 33 percent
said that what they “read or heard” suggested to them that Republicans “acted
responsibly,” with 63 percent feeling they had not.115 Other evidence also
suggests negative media effects for Republicans. As documented in Figure
7.2, references to the Democratic and Republican parties and their members
appeared in 80 percent and 75 percent of news stories respectively. And yet,
media coverage had the effect of disadvantaging the Republican Party and
Speaker John Boehner, as found in Figure 7.4. Those paying closer attention to
news on the debt talks were 17 percentage points more likely to say that they
had little to no trust in Speaker Boehner. Furthermore, Pew’s August 2011
monthly survey provides evidence that those paying attention to the news
on the debt talks were more likely to trust the Obama administration on this
issue.116 The advantage in favor of Obama was likely a function of prior public
attititudes that cut against the Republican Party. Since coverage did not favor
either party, the idea that bias was at work in prejudicing the public to favor
Obama seems unlikely. Rather, Americans opposed the Republican approach
to debt negotiations from the beginning, and attention to reporting on these
negotiations likely hardened preexisting public distrust when the public found
out what the Republican Party was demanding behind closed doors.
No evidence exists of an interactive effect between Americans’ partisan‑
ship and consumption of news on the debt talks. Highly attentive Republicans
and Democrats were neither more nor less likely to support President Obama
or oppose Republicans, compared to less attentive Republicans and Demo‑
crats. The failure of partisan rhetoric in influencing attentive news readers
likely stemmed in large part from the anger that members of both parties
expressed toward their political leaders. As I discuss later in this section,
neither party’s partisans were happy with how the debt negotiations pro‑
ceeded. Republicans felt that their leaders were unwilling to compromise,
and Democrats felt that President Obama was willing to compromise too
much. Whatever the reasons for their disapproval of the debt talks, the public
appeared to be unaffected by the political rhetoric that was disseminated by
both parties in the news.
Once the debt talks were in full swing, public opinion remained critical
of Republicans. Twenty‑eight percent of Americans said that the debt should
be reduced through “only spending cuts,” compared to 66 percent who felt
it should occur through a “combination” of “both tax increases and spend‑
ing cuts.”117 Another survey found that 63 percent agreed that “in order to
lower the nation’s budget deficit, taxes should be increased on households
earning $250,000 a year or more.” This sentiment contradicted the position
of congressional Republicans, who opposed income tax increases.118 Opposi‑
tion to Obama’s main demand—that increased tax revenues be part of any
deficit reduction deal—ensured that “compromise” would be all but impos‑
sible during negotiations. Republican opposition to tax increases contradicted
Boehner’s claims in meetings with Obama that such tax hikes were possible, as
was documented in an extensive analysis after the 2011 debt talks.119 Repub‑
lican officials’ demand that all federal savings come from spending cuts left
Republicans with little leverage in negotatiations, since they realistically had
little to offer to entice Democrats into a long‑term agreement for government
spending cuts. This “all‑or‑nothing” attempt at “negotiating” was bound to
fail, and ran contrary to what most Americans—Democrats and Republicans
alike—said they wanted, which was a compromise the included both tax hikes
and spending cuts.
The public made it clear that it wanted political officials to compromise
in order to achieve meaningful debt reduction. Most Americans—55 per‑
cent—said that it was more important for “lawmakers who share your views”
on the debt talks to be “willing to compromise, even if they [officials] pass
a budget you disagree with.” In contrast, 36 percent said that their parties’
lawmakers should “stand by their principles, even if it means the government

shuts down.”120 A majority of Americans, however, blamed the Republican
Party for being unwilling to compromise, due to the party’s opposition to
raising tax revenues. Only 17 percent of the public said that congressional
Republicans “did the most to put politics aside and worked for the good of the
country,” as compared to 31 percent who felt this way about Obama.121 Ameri‑
cans were ten percentage points more likely to say that Republicans, rather
than Obama, were primarily to blame for “the failure of the debt talks.”122
The public was also twenty‑two percentage points more likely to say they
supported how Obama had handled negotiations, compared to congressional
Republicans.123 Fifty percent of the public said that Republicans were “more
extreme in their positions” in the debt talks, compared to 35 percent who
said the same about Democrats.124 Forty nine percent said that Democrats
-
were “more willing to work with opposition leaders,” while 32 percent said
the same about Republicans.125
Opposition was apparent even within the ranks of the Republican Party,
as 58 percent of Republican Americans said by July 2011 that their leaders
were “not doing enough to strike a deal,” an increase from 42 percent in
March.126 Similarly, Democratic Americans expressed disapproval of President
Obama, as half worried that Obama would be “too willing” to compromise
with Republicans. This anxiety appeared to reflect a concern that the presi‑
dent might “give away too much” to Republican leadership in negotiation
over debt reduction. Concerns might have centered on Obama’s promise to
put Social Security cuts on the table, as this program is extremely popular
among Democratic and Republican constituents alike.127
In the end, Republicans appeared largely out of sync with the “average”
American on the question of how to reduce the deficit. By the end of the
debt talks in August, only 21 percent approved of “the way Republicans in
Congress have handled negotiations on the debt ceiling.” Similarly, 47 percent
blamed Republicans “more for the difficulties in reaching an agreement on
the debt ceiling,” while 29 percent blamed Obama.128 In light of the strong
disagreement between ordinary Americans and Republican officials on the
issues, it is not surprising to see growing opposition to the party among
those paying closer attention to reporting on the debt ceiling and deficit
reduction talks.
The 2011 debt talks provide evidence of public independence from gov‑
ernment rhetoric, as seen in opposition to Republican officials who sought
to shield the rich from contributing to debt reduction. First, a majority of
Americans expressed criticism of both the Democratic and Republican parties,
suggesting they were unhappy with partisan politics in Washington overall.
Second, a majority of Republicans expressed displeasure with their own party,

concluding that party officials were too dogmatic and unwilling to compromise
on raising taxes on the wealthy. The failure to compromise might be seen as a
“good” thing among hardcore Republican conservatives, but most Republicans
displayed considerable independence from the party by criticizing its leaders
for their inflexibility over the tax issue.
Conclusions
This chapter’s findings are relevant to a number of themes running through‑

out this work. The first relates to different theories of media bias. The evidence
in this chapter suggests a consistent pro‑government bias, in that news cover‑
age was “indexed” to the type of partisan government in place at any given
time. Second, there was little evidence of a bad news bias. In six of the nine
case studies examined in chapters 6 and 7, there was evidence that media
effects favored the presidential party. These included the 2001 tax cuts, the
2003 tax cuts, the 2009 stimulus, the 2009 executive pay controversy, the 2011
Medicare privatization, and the 2011 debt talks. In contrast, four of the nine
case studies found evidence of negative media effects against the presidential
party. These included the 2003 Medicare prescription reform, the 2005 Social
Security privatization, the 2009 stimulus, and the 2009 health care reform.
Six cases of media effects favoring the presidential party do not suggest mar‑
ginalization. While the number of observations here is relatively small, the
significance of these cases is not. They represent generation‑defining political
moments, covering major proposals for reforming government, and address‑
ing fundamental issues such as government regulation of business, promotion
of public health, and the providing of social welfare benefits.
This chapter also relates back to the idea that a pro‑business, hegemonic
bias exists in the news. A broader, overarching pro‑business framework was
evident in the news across all the case studies examined. Market‑based poli‑
cy proposals dominated political discussions over policy reforms, with these
approaches increasingly embraced by both political parties. Did a hegemonic
bias in the news mean that the public consistently fell victim to pro‑business
views and elite opinions, with mass consent simply being “manufactured”?
I see little evidence that this is the case. Certainly, at times the public is
indoctrinated into supporting pro‑business positions that favor the wealthy
over the masses. The 2001 and 2003 tax cuts are two examples. But at other
times an independent public appears in the policy process. In the cases of
Social Security reform, Medicare prescription reform, the attempted privatiza‑
tion of Medicare, the market‑friendly Obamacare, and debt talks that favored
the wealthy over the masses, the public opposed positions that reinforced
increased business power. With the 2009 executive pay debate, the 2011
Medicare privatization, and the 2011 debt talks, Republican voters displayed
independence from party officials, rejecting the party’s stand on recovering
taxpayer‑funded bonuses, criticizing the party for attacking a popular welfare
program, and rejecting the party for being too extreme in its unwillingness
to compromise over debt reduction.
The evidence in the last two chapters is mixed regarding public inde‑
pendence from official agendas. Some of it suggests public independence from
officials. But elite messages also exerted significant influence across the case
studies. Public attitudes were regularly indexed to the views expressed by
political elites. Democratic and Republican Americans who paid attention to
the news were consistently more likely to support their party officials than
partisans who paid little to no attention to the news. Americans could be
classified as semi‑independent of the partisan political system. At times, the
messages of political officials (in the news) exercised a significant impact on
public opinion. At other times, the public rejected those messages when they
did not match their own preferences and interests. The public’s rejection of
official agendas is more likely to occur regarding issues in which citizens
have significant prior knowledge and experience, as the examples of Social
Security and Medicare reform suggest.
Earlier in this book, I described a “symbiotic” relationship between
the media and government. A symbiotic bond suggests mutually reinforc‑
ing interests between journalists and political officials. On the one hand,
this entire book presents evidence that officials dominate the news on public
policy. But do media return the favor, strengthening the agendas of political
officials in the public mind? In a number of ways, this seems to be the case.
Journalists typically relegate the news‑consuming public to a passive position
in media debates, leaving citizens on their own to support one side or the
other (Democrat or Republican) in media debates that increasingly represent
pro‑business, hegemonic interests. Public attitudes are regularly “indexed”
to those of officials, as elite messages influence the positions of attentive
Democrats and Republicans among the news‑following public. On the other
hand, media cannot guarantee victories to political elites. The public retains
its own interests and often resists official agendas. While the media work to
reinforce official and pro‑business views, this process is far from universally
effective due to public resistance in many policy debates.
8
Experimental Evidence of
Media Effects on Public Opinion
With regard to media effects, my findings throughout this book have been
observational. I presented evidence from nine case studies suggesting that
three factors influence whether official messages—disseminated through the
media—are effective in cultivating public support. But questions remain
regarding cause‑and‑effect relationships. The case studies suggest that media
bias, prior public attitudes, and public familiarity (or lack thereof) with policy
issues all influence the opinions of those paying attention to the news. It
seems clear that both prior attitudes and the level of public familiarity with
policy issues influence public responses to official messages conveyed in the
media. In every one of the nine case studies examined in chapters 6 and 7,
prior attitudes and familiarity with a policy issue helped account for whether
the news‑attentive public accepted or rejected official messages. These results
suggest a remarkable stability in public opinion over time. However, I also
presented evidence in numerous case studies that biases in the news seemed
to contribute to both growing support for and opposition to official messages.
As social scientists have long known, correlations between two vari‑
ables—in this case media consumption and public opinion—do not necessar‑
ily demonstrate causation. One can infer causation from the case studies, but
one can always raise questions about whether correlations are due to actual
cause‑and‑effect relationships. To be more certain that media bias played a
role in influencing public attitudes, I undertake an experimental analysis in
this chapter. By analyzing experimental results regarding the effects of media
bias on public opinion, I add to my confidence in my initial case study find‑
ings. Through a series of experiments conducted in 2012 and 2014, I find
231
that the correlations previously documented between media bias and media
effects on public attitudes are not coincidental, and that bias exerts a very
real impact on beliefs. The main conclusions of this chapter mirror those in
chapters 6 and 7, as I document that bias in the news, prior public attitudes,
and public familiarity (or lack thereof) with political issues all influence the
public’s attitude formation process.
I review four different policy issues: the 2012 expiration of the Bush tax
cuts, the 2009 Obama stimulus, 2014 debates over raising the minimum wage,
and the lowering of student loan interest rates in 2014. All four issues rep‑
resented major policy disputes, receiving regular discussion in the news. My
experiments included more than two hundred participants from a Midwest‑
ern college. The 2012 experiment involved exposing students to policy infor‑
mation related to tax cuts and the stimulus. The 2014 experiment involved
the minimum wage and student loan interest rates. Obviously, the sample
of students is not generalizable to the entire country, which raises the ques‑
tion of how much “external validity” there is to the findings. This concern is
inevitable, however, with any experimental study that makes use of artificial
settings for gauging media effects on public opinion, and for studies that
include samples that are not representative of the entire U.S. public. Despite
these limitations, the findings are important in that experimental research is
an effective way of establishing cause‑and‑effect relationships between media
bias and public opinion. In conjunction with the findings from previous chap‑
ters, the experimental findings here add greater credibility and depth to my
overall conclusions regarding the factors that influence public opinion.
Throughout these experiments, students were surveyed through pre‑test
questions about their opinions of the various policy issues. A pre‑test, in
conjunction with a post‑test, was necessary in order to gauge how much of
an effect that exposure to biased messages had on public attitudes. A policy
introduction was provided in my 2012 experiment, since many participants
were unlikely to know what a “stimulus” was or know about the specifics of
the Bush tax cuts debate. This primer provided some very basic details about
both policy disputes. It informed participants about the 2009 stimulus, which
represented approximately $800 billion in spending on various programs, and
was intended to infuse money into the economy, so as to “stimulate” economic
growth and promote economic recovery from the 2008 economic collapse.
Regarding the Bush tax cuts, participants were introduced to the historical
debate, as they were informed that the cuts were originally passed in 2001 and
2003, in the name of promoting economic growth and recovery from the 2000
economic collapse and recession. Participants were also told that, by 2012, a
renewed debate between Democrats and Republicans had emerged regard‑
Experimental Evidence of Media Effects on Public Opinion 233
ing whether to extend the tax cuts permanently, since they were originally
set to expire by the end of the 2000s, and had been extended only through
2012. Students were not provided a basic primer for the minimum wage and
student loans in the 2014 experiment, since the vast majority of Americans
presumably know what a minimum wage is, and know about government
student loans. A number of policy‑related pre‑test questions were asked of
students in the experiments, including the following:
• Regarding the stimulus (2012), students were asked: “Would you

favor or oppose a proposal to attempt to stimulate the econo‑
my by increasing federal government spending on construction
projects and economic assistance to some Americans?” Options
included were: “strongly favor,” “somewhat favor,” “somewhat
oppose,” “strongly oppose,” and “unsure/no opinion.”
• Concerning higher education loan interest rates (2014), stu‑

dents were asked: “Do you support or oppose an effort on the
part of Congress to lower interest rates for students borrowing
money to pay for their college education?” Options provid‑
ed were: “strongly support,” “somewhat support,” “somewhat
oppose,” “strongly oppose,” and “unsure/no opinion.”
• On the issue of the expiration of the Bush tax cuts (2012),

students answered the following question: “Many of the tax
cuts passed in 2001 were temporary and are set to expire at
the end of 2012. Should those tax cuts be made permanent, or
should they be allowed to expire?” Options included: “strongly
agree they should be made permanent,” “somewhat agree they
should be made permanent,” “somewhat agree they should be
allowed to expire,” “strongly agree they should be allowed to
expire,” and “unsure/no opinion.”
• For the minimum wage (2014), students were asked: “As you
may know, the federal minimum wage [as of 2014] is currently
$7.25 an hour. Do you favor or oppose raising the minimum
wage to $10.10 an hour?” Options provided were: “strongly
favor,” “somewhat favor,” “somewhat oppose,” “strongly oppose,”
and “unsure/no opinion.”1
In the pre‑test survey, I also asked participants about a variety of personal

demographics, including their race, sex, age, political party, and ideology. By
controlling for these factors, one can be more confident that confounding
factors are not responsible for the effects of media content on public attitudes.
In conducting these studies, I informed participants in the 2012 experi‑
ment that “the goal of this exercise is to familiarize you with debates related to
various policy issues and to see how access to information influences people’s
attitudes and feelings on these issues.” Similarly, in the 2014 study, I explained
that “this exercise is designed to help you get acquainted with a few political
issues of significance to Americans, and as related to the political process. It
is also designed to see how information influences Americans’ assessments of
political issues.” Students were randomly assigned to either of two groups for
each experiment, one of which I will refer to here as the “liberal exposure”
group, and the other the “conservative exposure” group. Participants were
required to complete a pre‑test survey, prior to exposure to various newspaper
stories. After exposure to these stories, participants were asked to complete
a brief post‑test survey, measuring whether their policy attitudes changed
as a result of the stories read. The questions from the pre‑test and post‑test
surveys were identically worded. The short turnaround time between reading
the news articles and responding to the post‑test was intended to ensure that
no intervening factors such as exposure to other news content influenced
participants’ assessments and opinions of the issues, considering that these
issues were regularly covered in the news.
It is common for experiments to contain a third “control” group, in
addition to the two “exposure” groups. One compares the control group to
exposure groups, to estimate the effects of a treatment on participants. There
is no “control” group in this survey, as the pre‑test serves as the only thing
close to a control, in that it measures participants’ opinions before they are
exposed to information on various policy issues. I did not include a third
“balanced” information exposure group, which would have reported both
conservative and liberal viewpoints, because this would not technically be
a control group. Members of such a group would also be exposed to differ‑
ent points of view. Sniderman and Theriault find that exposure to “balanced
information” does not create more moderate political attitudes. Rather, those
exposed to such information choose the ideological side that matches their
preexisting political beliefs.2 Furthermore, my experiments were created in
order to measure the effects of one‑sided information flows, rather than the
effects of balanced information, on the public’s policy attitudes, so including
a “moderate” group is unnecessary. Finally, a simple experimental design with
multiple exposure groups and no control group has precedent in previous
studies of the effects of presidential rhetoric on public opinion.3
Exposure to Media Bias
Experiment participants were supplied with real news stories and opinion
pieces that leaned in favor of liberal and conservative positions on various
policy issues. The goal was to expose participants to the kinds of liberal or
conservative information they would see or read during the periods when
these policy issues were debated. I include here information on the various
biases to which readers were exposed, to provide a better context for evaluat‑
ing the effects of bias on each treatment group.
Expectations
I predict the following outcomes regarding the effects of bias on political

attitudes:
1. One sided information, in favor of liberal‑Democratic views

-
will result in participants becoming more liberal in their beliefs,
while exposure to one‑sided conservative‑Republican views will
make readers more likely to agree with conservative ideas.
2. Stronger media effects will be evident when a participant’s

prior attitudes cut in favor of the one‑sided information pre‑
sented, while media effects will be weaker when participants
are exposed to one‑sided information that cuts against their
prior attitudes.
3. Stronger media effects will be evident overall, for both liberal

and conservative effects, for issues with which the public is
less familiar, and weaker effects will be observed for issues
with which people are more familiar.
For each policy issue examined, I discuss the specific expectations regarding
the effects of media coverage on public attitudes.
Stimulus Spending
In early 2009, at the height of the national debate over the stimulus, a major‑
ity of Americans supported increased government efforts to promote recovery
from the 2008 economic collapse. As of February 2009, 59 percent of Ameri‑

cans supported an $800 billion stimulus package to be passed by Congress.4
In mid‑2012, at the time that I conducted my experiment on the stimulus,
a plurality of the participants supported a second effort at stimulating the
economy. The idea of a second stimulus had been discussed in the news, and
was supported by the Obama administration.5 As of 2012, the U.S. economy
remained weak, despite four years having passed since the economic collapse.
For participants in my experiment, 61 percent felt (in the pre‑test survey)
that the 2009 stimulus had had positive effects on the economy, while just 20
percent said it had had negative effects, and 20 percent were either unsure or
held no opinion on the stimulus. Support for a second stimulus was voiced by
a plurality of experiment participants. As seen in Figure 8.1, 45 percent favored
a second stimulus in the pre‑test survey, compared to 35 percent who opposed
it, and 20 percent who were unsure or who held no opinion on the issue.
Stimulus spending is a topic with which the public was moderately,
although not strongly familiar by the early 2010s. A sizable 20 percent of
those participating in my experiment said in the pre‑test survey that they
had “no opinion” or were unsure on the stimulus. I argued in chapter 6
that public familiarity with the stimulus was low in 2009, but after years
of exposure
Figure 8.1 to the issue (by 2012), uncertainty may have fallen somewhat.
Relative to other issues examined in this chapter, the stimulus appeared to be
Survey Group's Opinion on a Second

S3mulus (2012)
Support
20%
45% Oppose
35%
No Opinion/Unsure
Figure 8.1. Survey group’s opinion on a second stimulus (2012).

needed to retain talented employees, or because the payments were part of

legally enforceable contracts between the company and employees. The frame
was captured in the comments of AIG CEO Edward Liddy, who was quoted
on Fox News arguing: “These [bonuses] are legal, binding obligations of AIG.
There are serious legal as well as business consequences for not paying.”100
Liddy’s perspective was echoed by a New York Times story, titled “Few Ways to
Recover Bonuses to Bankers,” which consulted a compensation expert explain‑
ing that “unless actual wrongdoing is uncovered at the banks—and so far pros‑
ecutors have not disclosed any—the case for clawing back past pay is weak.”101
The final two frames—the “Populist” and “Economic Instability”
frames—appeared in numerous news stories. The “Populist” frame captured
the intense public anger following the 2008 collapse. The frame was captured
in a story from the Chicago Sun Times which explored public “outrage” at
AIG’s bonuses, while conceding that “the financial bailout program remains
politically unpopular and has been a drag on Barack Obama’s new presi‑
dency . . . the White House is well aware of the nation’s bailout fatigue and
 
 
 
 
anger that hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars have gone to prop up
financial institutions that made poor decisions, while many others who have
done no wrong pay the price.”102 In another example, MSNBC analyst Eugene
Robinson referred to TARP‑funded bonuses as “something that American
workers . . . can relate to and can understand and can get angry about.”103
 
 
 
 
Redirecting Americans’ attention to the country’s volatile economy, the
“Economic Instability” frame envisioned regulations as unacceptable due to
the burdens they imposed on businesses. The instability frame was appar‑
ent in one Fox News program, with guest Mort Kondracke warning against
government restrictions on Wall Street as firms sought to unload their “toxic
assets”:
So what they [investors] are going to do is they’ve got to rely on

this public‑private partnership [the TARP “bailout” and new pay
regulations] in order to get private investors to buy up the toxic
assets of the banks. The problem is that the private investors don’t
trust [Treasury Secretary] Tim Geithner. He once promised there
would not be limits on executive pay at banks. Boom, there are
suddenly limits on executive bank pay.104
Government plans to create a “bad bank” to help pay for “toxic assets” fol‑
lowing the 2008 crisis were tied directly to the issue of pay. As the New York
Times reported, many banks refused to participate in the “bad bank” initiative
if the federal government decided it “might later add restrictions on their
data regarding the effects of government spending on the economy, conclud‑

ing that such spending “has had zero effect on private sector job creation in
periods of economic sluggishness.”7 In a final attack on the stimulus, partici‑
pants read a 2012 article from U.S. News and World Report, which highlighted
the 12.8 million Americans who were unemployed that year, with “8.2 million
[who] cannot find enough work, and 1.1 million [who] have given up look‑
ing for work altogether.” Because of such high unemployment, the maga‑
zine criticized the president for a “failure of leadership” and for supporting
a “failed” stimulus effort that produced nothing more than “broken promises
and massive debt.”8 These conservative attacks were intended to undermine
the Obama administration and proposals for a second stimulus. Growing
unemployment from 2009 through 2012 was problematic for an administra‑
tion and its credibility at a time when the president had promised to help
Americans out of the economic crisis, despite the economy stagnating. If the
first stimulus was seen as ineffective, readers might wonder, why bother to
spend on another if all it will do is increase government spending and debt?
Contrary to the conservative views above, the “liberal exposure” group
focused on evidence suggesting the stimulus helped improve the economy, or
at least kept it from getting even worse. Experimental participants first read an
article from The Hill magazine, which discussed a CBO report estimating that
the Obama administration’s $800 billion in stimulus spending had increased
national gross domestic product by as much as 1.9 percent in late 2011, and
lowered unemployment by as much as 1.3 percent. Additionally, the article
reported that the CBO found that the stimulus had added nearly one million
jobs to the economy in 2009, 3.3 million in 2010, and 2.6 million in 2011.9
A second article assigned was a report by the Keystone Research Center,
which estimated that, without the stimulus spending, the U.S. economy would
have been even worse post‑2008. The report concluded that the stimulus had
stopped the further deterioration of the economy by injecting $800 billion of
economic activity that otherwise would not have existed, and that the unem‑
ployment rate might have reached as high as 16 percent nationally (compared
to the 10 percent level it reached in 2010), if it were not for stimulus spend‑
ing.10 Finally, participants read a USA Today report surveying economists
about the stimulus, finding that thirty‑two of forty‑three supported stimu‑
lus spending following the 2008 economic collapse. The story reported that
programs such as the extension of unemployment benefits, and increased
spending on food stamps, “would provide money that would likely be spent
immediately, funding job‑creating infrastructure projects; and giving home
buyers a tax credit to stop the slide in the housing market,” and would help
“soften the blow” of the weak economy.11 The above articles had the potential
to increase public support for government spending, since they suggested that
the 2009 stimulus had had positive economic effects, that had it prevented
the economy from further deterioration, and because such spending provided
important benefits to the needy during a time of economic crisis. Certainly,
many disadvantaged Americans were looking for increased assistance from
government during this time period, and promises of government help were
likely to appeal to those unhappy with the state of the economy.
Media Effects
When comparing pre‑test and post‑test answers, support for a second stimu‑
lus increased among those in the liberal exposure group, while opposition
increased for those in the conservative group. This was to be expected, and
the differences in the change in participant attitudes across both groups were
statistically significant at the 5 percent level, after controlling for respondents’
partisanship, ideology, age, sex, and race. Respondents, and the public in
general, were moderately familiar with the stimulus, so the overall effects of
exposure to biased content was expected to be smaller than those for issues
with which
Figure 8.2the public was less familiar (tax cuts), and not as large as those
for issues with which the public was more familiar (student loans). These
expectations are validated by Figure 8.2, which finds that the overall change
Public A)tudes on a Second
S2mulus (2012) Liberal Exposure
25 Group
Percent
Change in 20 Conserva8ve
ACtudes Exposure Group
on a 15
Second + = growing
Effort to 10 support for
S8mulate liberal posi8on
the 5
Economy -‐ = growing
0 support for
conserva8ve
-‐5 posi8on
Figure 8.2. Public attitudes on a second stimulus (2012).

in respondents’ attitudes amounted to twenty‑one percentage points. This

is equivalent to the change seen with the minimum wage (21 percent), less
than the change seen with the Bush tax cuts (28 percent), and more than the
change seen for student loans (8 percent).
Liberal change is signified in the figure with a “+” sign, while con‑
servative change is signified with a “–” sign. For the stimulus, the effects of
exposure to liberal information were far greater than for exposure to con‑
servative information, as is clear from Figure 8.2. This, again, was expected.
Experiment participants (and the general public) were more likely to support
the 2009 stimulus, in addition to supporting a second stimulus in later years.
The experimental findings here suggest it is easier to sell the public on policies
with which they are already sympathetic than it is to create an opinion from
nothing or change an antagonistic into a favorable opinion.
The Bush Tax Cuts
When asked simply about cutting taxes, most Americans seem to support any
proposals that promise to “get more money” into their pockets. The idea of
“less government,” as specifically manifested in ways that promise to increase
the economic returns of the “average” American, plays well with the public.
For example, in January 2001, prior to President Bush’s big push for a “tax
relief ” plan, 63 percent of Americans agreed that their taxes were too high,
compared to just 33 percent who believed their tax rate was about right.12
Fifty‑two percent supported the Bush tax cut plan, compared to just 33 per‑
cent who opposed it.13 However, Americans eventually became less enamored
with the tax cuts, and a Gallup survey from 2010 found that only 37 percent
of the public wanted an extension of the Bush tax cuts, compared to 44 per‑
cent who wanted an extension only for those making less than $250,000 a
year.14 Many Americans became disillusioned with the tax cuts (which were
promised to promote mass prosperity) in light of the growing inequality of
the 2000s, coupled with the massive economic decline from 2008 onward.
Despite the mixed findings noted above regarding public opinion, it
seems clear that the idea of tax cuts had become less popular in the early
2010s onward. For example, a CBS/New York Times survey in 2010 found that
53 percent agreed that the tax cuts only for those making over $250,000 a
year should expire, compared to 38 percent who disagreed.15 This finding is
significantly different from that nearly ten years earlier, when 52 percent of
Americans supported the Bush tax cuts. In my 2012 experimental study, and
as seen in Figure 8.3, pre‑test results found that 41 percent of participants
Figure 8.3
Survey Group's
Experimental Opinions
Evidence of MediaoEffects
f Making
on Publicthe
Opinion 241
Bush Tax Cuts Permanent (2012)
29%
30% Support
Oppose
41%
No Opinion/Unsure
Figure 8.3. Survey group’s opinions of making the bush tax cuts permanent (2012).

indicated that they opposed making the Bush tax cuts permanent, compared
to 29 percent who supported making them permanent and 30 percent who
had “no opinion” or were “unsure.”
Public uncertainty on the issue of tax cuts is typically quite high, com‑
pared to some of the other policy issues discussed in this chapter. Tax law in
the United States is one of the most complex, convoluted issues in politics.
The U.S. tax code is complicated, consisting of more than ten thousand pag‑
es according to one nonpartisan fact‑checking group.16 Tax laws themselves
are highly complex, with numerous components and specific tax loopholes
for various groups and individuals. The Bush tax cut legislation of 2001,
for example, was 150 pages long, including provisions related to individual
tax rates, the capital gains tax, retirement plan taxes, student loan interest
deductions, and estate and gift taxes. Citizens face difficulties interpreting tax
proposals, since political officials selling the proposals are notorious for pro‑
moting the alleged strengths of their legislation, while ignoring or downplay‑
ing criticisms. Public uncertainty was also evident in my 2012 experimental
study, with 30 percent of participants stating they were “unsure” or held “no
opinion” on the Bush tax cuts. This uncertainty rate is higher than for any
other issue examined here, with uncertainty on the stimulus reaching 20
percent of respondents, 15 percent uncertainty on the minimum wage, and
13 percent uncertainty for student loans.
With high uncertainty regarding tax cuts, coupled with prior public
support (in 2012) for allowing the Bush tax cuts to expire, I predict significant

media effects on political attitudes. The overall change in respondents’ atti‑

tudes for both liberal and conservative exposure groups should be stronger
in this case than for other issues in which there is less public uncertainty
(student loans, the stimulus, and the minimum wage). The liberally biased
content (supporting an end to the Bush tax cuts) should have greater effects
on respondents’ attitudes than the one‑sided conservative content (supporting
extending the Bush tax cuts), since prior public support among participants
in 2012 leaned in favor of ending the tax cuts.
Media Content
For the “conservative exposure” group, participants read news and policy
analysis pieces that made strong arguments for why the Bush tax cuts should
have been extended. The first article was a feature from CNN Money, which
reported on the results of a survey of national economists on tax cuts. As
CNN reported, 60 percent of economists contacted indicated their support
for the conclusion that “the [Bush] tax cuts should be renewed for every‑
one,” including those with incomes above and below $250,000 a year. These
economists agreed that extending the cuts represented “the most important
thing Congress can do to help the economy,” since “the [economic] recovery
[from the 2008 economic collapse] is still too fragile to allow taxes to go up”
for the vast majority of Americans.17 The news organization quoted Moody’s
Analytics economist Mark Zandi, who argued that a repeal of the tax cuts
could cause a “double‑dip recession,” while CNN reported that “higher taxes
are generally believed to be a drag on the economy since it leaves consumers
and businesses with less money to spend.” CNN warned that repeal could
hurt entrepreneurs, since “raising those tax rates would hit many small busi‑
nesses and could put a crimp in hiring.” The CNN piece was likely to incite
increased support for tax cuts, first because it carried the authoritative judg‑
ment of numerous economists, who are seen as experts on the effects of tax
policy on the economy, and second, because of references to the potential
negative effects of raising taxes on small businesses—with small businesses
typically seen in a very positive light by the public.
Experiment participants were also required to read articles from the
New York Times and New York Post. In the New York Times piece, CATO
Institute Senior Fellow and Harvard University professor Jeffrey Miron argued
that extending the Bush tax cuts was a “crucial step in restoring economic
growth,” since “raising tax rates would discourage” the “entrepreneurship” of
those on the “high end of the income distribution.”18 Similarly, in the New
York Post editorial, the paper claimed that additional tax cuts were necessary
for economic stimulus and job creation. The Post cited a Heritage Foundation
study, which estimated that Democrats’ proposal to raise taxes would reduce
jobs in the United States by 693,000 over ten years. Furthermore, the edito‑
rial maintained, the Bush tax cuts extension would “give business owners
confidence to hire new employees and keep the ones they’ve got . . . they let
 
 
 
 
wary investors know they’ll keep the money they make,” rather than losing it
via higher taxes.19 The Post and Times pieces spoke to issues that Americans
hold in high priority—job creation and economic growth. The addition of
specific estimates regarding potential job losses from increasing taxes was
likely to make at least some readers think twice about allowing the Bush tax
cuts to expire.
In contrast to the conservative group, the “liberal exposure” group read
a variety of arguments raising questions about how effective the Bush tax
cuts had been in promoting economic growth and prosperity. The first piece
participants read was from CBS News, which asked whether the Bush tax cuts
had really promoted widespread economic prosperity. The article cited a U.S.
Census Report, which found that the “median household income in 2007,
adjusted for inflation, was lower than in 2000,” despite the passage of the Bush
tax cuts. CBS cited data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics that indicated
that job growth during the 2000s had been quite weak, “with employment
and wage and salary growth . . . lower than in any previous post–World
 
 
 
 
War II expansion” following an economic collapse and recession. The report
included the conclusion of former Reagan administration economic advisor
Bruce Bartlett that “research by Federal Reserve economists has found little, if
any, impact on [economic] growth” from the Bush tax cuts.20 These findings,
when taken together, represented substantial statistical evidence challenging
the extension of tax cuts. The combined authority of the Congressional Bud‑
get Office, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Federal Reserve economists was
likely to carry much weight with those assessing the Bush tax cuts.
Next, the “liberal exposure” group included analysis from the Eco‑
nomic Policy Institute (EPI), which argued that the Bush tax cut went dis‑
proportionately to wealthy Americans, instead of the masses. EPI provided
data suggesting that during the 2000s, the tax cuts had produced “widening
income inequality,” since they were “heavily targeted toward the wealthy.”
EPI reported that in 2010, 38 percent of the total tax cut revenues went
to the top 1 percent of income earners, and that the poorest 60 percent of
Americans received less than 20 percent of the cuts. Overall, EPI concluded
that 65 percent of the Bush tax cuts had been directed toward the wealthiest
20 percent of Americans, while the remaining one‑third went to the other
80 percent.21 These figures were likely to foster opposition to the tax cuts,
because they contradicted Republican claims that the cuts benefited all and
promoted widespread prosperity. If the cuts went mainly to the wealthy few,
and produced increasing economic inequality, this raised questions about the
necessity of extending those cuts.
Finally, the liberal group read an article from Slate magazine, from
the progressive economist and former Clinton administration official Robert
Reich. Reich argued from a fiscal responsibility perspective that allowing the
tax cuts to expire would help reduce the national debt, and that the extension
of the cuts was unnecessary for promoting economic prosperity. Taking a
historical view, Reich argued that the top tax rate on wealthier Americans was
far higher during the 1950s through the 1980s (between 70 and 92 percent),
while economic growth averaged 3.7 percent. In contrast, from 1983 through
the late 2000s, the tax rates for the highest income brackets ranged between
35 and 39 percent, while economic growth averaged just 3 percent. Keeping
tax rates for the wealthy lower, Reich argued, would not necessarily guarantee
that greater income shares would go to “average” Americans. In the 1970s, the
wealthiest 1 percent captured 8 to 9 percent of all income nationwide, while
tax rates on this group were far higher than in later decades. In contrast,
when tax rates on the richest Americans were lower in the 2000s, the top
one percent captured 23.5 percent of all income nationally.22 By highlighting
these statistics, Reich challenged the narrative that increased tax cuts for the
affluent produce greater prosperity for the masses.
Media Effects
Support for extending the Bush tax cuts was significantly stronger for those
exposed to conservative news stories, while opposition to extending the cuts
increased among those exposed to liberal stories. However, as it concerned
an issue with which the public was not very familiar, media content had a
greater effect overall across both exposure groups than it did for other issues
examined. Based on Figure 8.4, the overall change in participant attitudes
from the pre‑test to post‑test was 28 percentage points. The overall change
in attitudes was higher than for the stimulus and minimum wage, subjects
with which participants had a moderate familiarity, and for student loans, a
topic in which participants had a strong familiarity.
As expected, the change in attitudes for the liberal group was stronger
than for the conservative group, since prior participant and public attitudes
leaned in favor of allowing the Bush tax cuts to expire. As argued throughout
this book, it is easier to strengthen the attitudes of those who already agree
with a position, as compared to creating new attitudes altogether or changing
FigureExperimental
8.4 Evidence of Media Effects on Public Opinion 245
Public Opinion on Taxes

Liberal
(2012) Exposure
Group
20
Percent Conserva8ve
Change in 15 Exposure
ACtudes Group
on 10
Allowing + = growing
the Bush 5 support for
Tax Cuts liberal posi8on
to Expire 0
-‐ = growing
-‐5
support for
conserva8ve
-‐10
posi8on
-‐15
Figure 8.4. Public opinion on taxes (2012).

prior attitudes that run in the opposite ideological direction. For Figure 8.4,
the difference between the liberal and conservative effects of media content
across both exposure groups was statistically significant at the 1 percent level,
after controlling for other respondent factors such as participant sex, age, race,
ideology, and political party.
The Minimum Wage
Americans are strongly supportive of raising the minimum wage. For exam‑
ple, a September 2014 CBS/New York Times survey found that 70 percent of
Americans supported raising the minimum wage from $7.25 an hour to $10.10
an hour.23 In my experiment, support for the minimum wage was not quite as
high, but a plurality of participants still supported it. As seen in Figure 8.5, 49
percent of participants in the pre‑test survey supported raising the national
minimum wage to $10.10 an hour, compared to 36 percent who opposed doing
so, and 15 percent who either had “no opinion” or were “unsure.”
The public is moderately familiar with the minimum wage as a policy
issue. Compared to stimulus spending and tax cuts, uncertainty regarding
the minimum wage was lower among the participants in my experimental
Table 4.6. Executive Pay (1/1–3/31/2009): Mentions of Parties and

Party Leaders



NYT 81 19 60

Sun Times 88 12 17

CBS 78 22 14

Fox 68 32 12

MSNBC 75 25 29


voices outnumbering legislative ones across all nine news categories and all
five media venues.
As expected, Republicans were deeply marginalized, although party
leaders did at times receive attention. References to the Republican Party
and its leaders ranged from a low of 19 percent to a high of 32 percent of
all party mentions. When Republicans did appear in stories, they were often
individuals in prominent positions. Regularly mentioned figures included
House Minority Leader John Boehner, House Financial Services Committee
member Spencer Bachus, and Senate Majority Whip John Kyl. These officials
were likely consulted because of their roles as leaders of the minority party.
Little distinguishes the findings here from those of other case studies. Nation‑
al news outlets such as MSNBC, the New York Times and Chicago Sun Times
leaned strongly toward supporting regulation, while Fox News and other con‑
servative sources supported Republicans and opposed pay regulation.
In the New York Times, six op‑ed writers expressed support for regula‑
tion in early to mid 2009.113 Just two writers—one a regular columnist and
the other a business representative—opposed regulating compensation. 114
Editorially, the New York Times supported government action on executive
pay rules. The paper expressed sympathy for Obama’s plan to cap pay at
$500,000 a year for executives at firms receiving TARP funds, under the
assumption that taxpayer money should not be spent on rewarding failed
bankers. The New York Times reminded readers that “the banks can pay more
with which the public is less aware, such as the Bush tax cuts. Furthermore,
the effects of liberal messages should be stronger than those for conserva‑
tive messages, since Americans are already more likely to support raising the
minimum wage than opposing such a raise.
Media Content
My second wave of experiments, conducted in 2014, exposed participants

to policy discourse covering the minimum wage and student loans. On the
minimum wage, there was no shortage of ideological disagreement to draw
on from both sides. The “conservative exposure” group included two articles
covering the supposed negative effects of raising the minimum wage. In
one article from The Hill magazine, Republican officials were featured, who
warned that a wage raise would “lead to higher unemployment as businesses
may seek to lay off employees to offset the cost of a higher wage.”24 A second
piece, by the New York Post, echoed the job loss concern, although this article
added a statistical angle by citing a report by the CBO suggesting that a wage
raise from $7.25 to $10.10 an hour could “wipe out about 500,000 jobs by
late 2016,” with worst‑case estimates suggesting as many as one million jobs
lost. The article quoted Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner’s
spokesman Brendan Buck, who argued that “mandating higher wages has real
costs, including fewer working people. With unemployment Americans’ top
concern, our focus should be creating—not destroying—jobs.”25 The warnings
about growing unemployment were likely to have a negative effect on public
support for the minimum wage. What is the point of supporting a minimum
wage raise if it harms workers?
Participants in the “liberal exposure” group did not read reports about
how the minimum wage would “kill” jobs. Supporters of the minimum wage
have long called into question the claim that raising wages is associated with
job loss. Instead, supporters cite the importance of wage raises to helping the
“average” American. Assigned articles focused on this theme. For example,
one piece from the New York Times discussed Obama’s efforts to promote
higher wages for Americans. The article referred to an Obama administration
executive order, which mandated that federal contractors receive a $10.10
minimum wage pay rate by 2015. The article cited Obama’s claims that the
economy could easily absorb a minimum wage increase with all the growth
that had occurred in 2014, with the U.S. adding ten million jobs over a 4.5
year period, and with the unemployment rate continuously falling. Obama
claimed a wage raise was “one of the best ways to give a boost to working fam‑
ilies.”26 In a second piece by the Economic Policy Institute, author Lawrence
Mishel emphasized the importance of a minimum wage increase in an era of

growing inequality and consistently declining value for the minimum wage,
after adjusting for inflation. Mishel pointed out that the inflation‑adjusted
value of the minimum wage had declined by nearly 20 percent from 1969
to 2011. He argued that “setting the minimum wage at an appropriate level
can help spur broad‑based wage growth and move us toward an economy
where workers benefit from [private sector] productivity growth.”27 The above
claims were important because they appealed to Americans’ sense of fair‑
ness, arguing that workers deserved raises in an era of economic recovery.
Such appeals to helping Main Street are generally quite popular in American
political discourse.
Media Effects
One‑sided news exerted the expected effects on experiment participants.

From the pre‑test to post‑test, those who read conservative messages became
less likely to support raising the minimum wage, while those who read liberal
messages became increasingly likely to support an increase in the wage to
$10.10 an hour. This is not surprising considering the prediction that biased
information produces a significant impact on public attitudes. The changes in
respondent attitudes were statistically significant at the 5 percent level, after
controlling for other respondent factors, including political party, ideology,
age, sex, and race. Respondents, and the public in general, were moderately
familiar with the minimum wage, so the overall effects of information expo‑
sure were expected to be smaller than the effects for exposure to tax cut
stories (an issue with which the public is less familiar), equal to the effects
of exposure to stimulus stories (an issue with which the public is moderately
familiar), and greater than the effects of exposure to student loans stories (an
issue with which the public is more familiar). These expectations are validated
by Figure 8.6, which finds that the overall change in public attitudes from
pre‑test to post‑test was 21 percent.
This is equivalent to the change seen with the minimum wage (21 per‑
cent), less than the change seen with the Bush tax cuts (28 percent) and
more than the change seen for student loans (8 percent). Finally, I expected
that the effects of one‑sided content for the liberal group would be greater
than for the conservative group because participants had been more likely to
support raising wages prior to the experiment. With a popular issue such as
the minimum wage, increasing public support was less difficult than foster‑
ing opposition.
Figure 8.6
Public Opinion on Raising the Liberal

Minimum Wage (2014) Exposure
Group
Percent 15 Conserva7ve
Change in Exposure
ABtudes Group
on Raising 10 + = growing
the support for
Minimum 5 liberal posi7on
Wage
0
-‐ = growing
support for
-‐5 conserva7ve
posi7on
-‐10
Figure 8.6. Public opinion on raising the minimum wage (2014).

Student Loans
Americans are strongly supportive of federal student loans, viewing them as

vital for making higher education more affordable and for aiding students
in improving their economic position in society. A 2013 survey by Public
Policy Polling found that 83 percent of Americans opposed increasing federal
student loan interest rates.28 In my experiment, and as seen in Figure 8.7, 84
percent of participants answered in the pre‑test survey that they supported
lowering student loan interest rates, compared to just 3 percent who opposed
lowering rates, and 13 percent who were either unsure or held no opinion
on changing interest rates.
Americans are generally quite familiar with the issue of federal student
loans. Tens of millions of Americans, including parents and young adults,
hold large amounts of student loan debt, with the average being more than
$30,000 per student in the United States.29 Furthermore, nearly 40 percent
of Americans had a college degree of some kind by 2014.30 The number
of Americans, then, who either hold a college degree, or have borrowed
Figure 8.7
250 Public Opinion

TheoPolitics
n Lowering Student
of Persuasion
Loan Interest Rates (11/2014)
13% Support
3%
Oppose
84%
No Opinion /
Unsure
Figure 8.7. Public opinion on lowering student loan interest rates (11/2014).

money to pay for one (for their children) is almost certainly more than half
of American adults. With the growing costs of higher education in recent
decades, this issue remains of great importance to the “average” American.
My experimental study suggests a low uncertainty rate when it comes to
this issue. Just 13 percent of participants said they were unsure or held “no
opinion” about student loans in the pre‑test survey, compared to 30 percent
being uncertain about tax cuts, 20 percent for the stimulus, and 15 percent
for the minimum wage.
Since Americans are familiar with the student loans issue, and since
they strongly support making higher education more affordable, exposure
to media content on this topic should produce weaker media effects. Hav‑
ing had significant independent experience with student loans, experiment
participants (all of whom were students) will be less likely to rely heavily on
the media when it comes to forming their beliefs. Since a massive number
of Americans already support lowering student loan rates, it is unlikely that
the number of supporters is going to grow that much as a result of media
coverage.
Media Content
For the student loans issue, a variety of perspectives were addressed, related to
the cost of higher education, students’ increasing debt burdens, and whether
these burdens are manageable. For the “conservative exposure” group, partici‑
pants read two pieces, one attacking students as a supposed special interest
in American politics, the other seeking to downplay the rising costs of a
college education. Two short articles from Inside Higher Ed and The Hill-
discussed Republican efforts in 2014 to block legislation that would reduce
student loan interest rates. The Inside Higher Ed article cited Republican
objections to the bill, specifically the claim that efforts to lower interest rates
by allowing students to refinance their loans amounted to “an unnecessary
subsidy to students that doesn’t address underlying problems with the rising
cost of college.”31 The Hill magazine article cited the comment from Senate
Republican Minority Leader Mitch McConnell that “the hard left is clearly in
the driver’s seat on the other [Democratic] side. That’s clear every time the
Democrat majority ignores the concerns of our [Republican] constituents to
turn to yet another one of their so‑called ‘messaging bills.’ ”32 A second piece

assigned to participants was from the New York Times, arguing that student
loan borrowing is not as dire a problem as many assume. The piece claimed
that “families and students consistently overestimate the cost of college” by
failing to account for the ‘net price’ (the official price after federal grant
subsidies), instead preferring to focus on the “sticker price” before grant aid.
The piece provided evidence that tuition rates were lower, on average, than
many thought, after taking into account federal grants, and that college was
often free for community college students because of federal subsidies.33 The
above pieces were clearly intended to downplay widely recognized financial
problems surrounding higher education, depicting students either as naive or
as undeserving special interests.
Stories in the “liberal exposure” group focused on growing economic
hardships of students in modern times. One story from U.S. News and World
Report reported on Obama’s efforts to “sidestep” congressional opposition and
expand the federal student loan repayment program to help indebted college
graduates. The piece explored Obama’s plan to cap student loan repayment
rates (regardless of the amount borrowed) at 10 percent of borrowers’ income,
a move that would have affected an estimated five million Americans by
2015. The article quoted the president, who sought to grant financial relief
to “many graduates” who are “feeling trapped” by student debt, and who
would benefit from government efforts “to lift that burden.” U.S. News and
World Report informed readers that average student loan debt in 2012 stood
at nearly $30,000, with total national student loan debt at $1.2 trillion. The
piece also cited a survey of college students that found that 94 percent of
college graduates with jobs since 2008 complained that their student loan
repayment rates were “not manageable” short of government efforts to reduce
their debt burdens.34 A second article was from Bloomberg News, which
provided a context for the historical growth in the costs of higher education

in recent decades. The story reported that college costs had “surged” by 500
percent between 1985 and the early 2010s, and warned that “the skyrocketing
increases exacerbate income inequality by depriving those of less [economic]
means of the schooling they need to advance” in life.35 These two pieces were
likely to increase readers’ sympathy for students, who were depicted as suf‑
fering under exorbitant student loan debt, unsustainable growth in the cost
of higher education, and diminished prospects for life success due to high
loan repayment rates.
Media Effects
For student loans, experimental effects were the weakest of all, compared
to other issues. As seen in Figure 8.8, the overall change in participant atti‑
tudes from the pre‑test to the post‑test was just eight percentage points, and
this change was not statistically significant. While the effects of conservative
information were greater than the effects of liberal information, neither find‑
ing appears all that meaningful considering that the overall changes (and the
Figure
changes 8.8
on each side) were so small. The lack of statistically significant effects
Figure 8.8
Figure
Figure 8.8
8.8
Public Opinion on Liberal
Public
Student
Public O pinion
Loans
O on
(2014)
pinion on Exposure
Liberal
Public O pinion on Liberal
Group
Liberal
Exposure
Percent 6 Student
Student LLoans
oans ((2014)
2014)
Student Loans (2014)
Exposure
Exposure
Conserva;ve
Group
Change
Percent in 5 Group
Group
Exposure
Percent 6 Conserva;ve
Percent
AFtudes
Change 6
6
in 4 Conserva;ve
Group
Conserva;ve
Change i n 5 Exposure
Change on i n 5 Exposure
Exposure
AFtudes 5 Group
AFtudes 4
3
AFtudes
Lowering
on 4
4 + = Group
Group
growing
on
on
Interest 3
Lowering 2
3
3
support
+ = growing for liberal
Lowering
Lowering 2 +
+ ==posi;on
ggrowing
rowing
Rates for 1
Interest 2 support for liberal
Interest
Interest 2 support
support ff or
or lliberal
iberal
Student
Rates for 1 0 posi;on
Rates
Rates f or 1
1
for -‐1 posi;on
-‐ =posi;on
growing
Loans
Student 0
Student
Student 0
0
Loans -‐2 -‐1 support
-‐ = growing for
Loans
Loans -‐1 -‐ = g
-‐ = growing rowing
-‐1 conserva;ve
support for
-‐2
-‐3 support
support ffor
or
-‐2
-‐2 posi;on
conserva;ve
-‐3
-‐4 conserva;ve
conserva;ve
-‐3
-‐3 posi;on
-‐4 posi;on
posi;on
-‐4
-‐4

Figure 8.8. Public opinion on student loans (2014).

for either group, however, was expected since participants (and the public in
general) were very familiar with the student loan issue and felt so strongly
about making higher education more affordable. Familiarity and prior sup‑
port for affordable education meant that conservative messages were unlikely
to have a large effect on participants’ beliefs.
The relatively greater effects of conservative information, although not
expected, are likely to have occurred because prior support for lower student
loan interest rates was so great (at 84 percent of participants) that there was
very little room for opinions to become more liberal. Since just 3 percent of
respondents were opposed to lowering student loan interest rates (see Figure
8.7), there was relatively greater room for opinions to move in a more con‑
servative direction from the beginning. Again, however, these changes are
not likely to be all that meaningful, in light of the very small, non–statisti‑
cally significant changes. Considering strong public familiarity with this issue
and the direct economic stake of so many parents and students in an era
of growing student loan debt, it was likely from the beginning that media
effects would be weak.
A Closer Look at the Findings
Participants in the 2012 and 2014 experiments were asked to write short
responses regarding what they learned from the exercise. These responses
were useful for better understanding the effects of biased information on par‑
ticipants. One thing that stuck out in these responses was that familiarity with
the issues varied greatly depending on the topic, and that greater familiarity
was often accompanied by increased respondent confidence in challenging
information that ran contrary (ideologically speaking) to their prior beliefs.
For example, it was clear from responses that participants had strong feelings
about student loans, and that many students had thought quite a bit about this
issue prior to the assignment. This is not surprising, considering that students
are strongly affected in a negative way by growing loan debt. On the other
side, many participants indicated that they had little grasp of the complexity
of U.S. tax law, and that the information they read—be it in the liberal or
conservative exposure group—was important in terms of influencing their
opinions of the Bush tax cuts and their proposed extension or elimination.
Clearly, familiarity with an issue (or lack of familiarity) played a role in the
opinion formation process.
Outside of the issue of familiarity, it was also clear that biased infor‑
mation produced significant effects on policy attitudes, if not for the student

loans issue then at least for the other three issues. Participants echoed major
conservative and liberal themes included in their readings, as would be
expected for those with moderate to limited familiarity with an issue, and
in light of the one‑sided nature of the content to which they were exposed.
For the Bush tax cuts, significant effects of biased information were evident
for both exposure groups. Participants in the liberal group cited common
themes covered in the readings, including the claim that there was “little
evidence that they improved the economy” or “promoted economic stimulus”
during the 2000s, and that the cuts had been “intended mainly for the rich,”
while “making them richer and ignoring the middle class.” One respondent
complained that the wealthy “should pay their fair share,” rather than being
granted preferential treatment in the tax code.
Those exposed to conservative information often embraced pro–tax cut
themes. Some expressed “concern” about hiring by both small and large busi‑
nesses, worrying that it might decline with a tax increase. Others said that
it appeared clear that the tax cuts were “a good thing” or “a positive plan”
for the economy. Some participants liked that the tax cuts “would apply to
all taxpayers,” and since they “worked extremely well” because they “low‑
ered the tax rates on people who have ordinary income,” rather than simply
“lowering the tax rates on the higher taxpayers.” These points echoed those
of national proponents of extending the tax cuts. Obviously, these themes
were very different than those focusing on the tax cuts as having a marginal
economic effect and as benefiting the few at the expense of the many. Notable
was the misperception among those in the conservative group that the cuts
would widely benefit all, despite the actual finding that most of the cuts had
been directed toward the wealthy and that inequality had actually grown
significantly during the 2000s. This false promise was a central theme among
proponents of the cuts who appeared in the news.
On the stimulus debate, effects were one‑sided, and mainly observed
for those exposed to liberal ideas. Reflecting on the messages they read across
various news stories, participants concluded that the stimulus significantly
“helped the economy” while “lowering unemployment.” The notion that the
stimulus prevented the economy from becoming worse was clearly evident,
with references to government spending as succeeding in ensuring that
“many other jobs were saved.” A common emphasis in terms of participant
opinions was the notion that stimulus spending was important for ensuring
“spending on infrastructure,” with some concerned with “crumbling roads”
and “collapsing bridges” and the dangers they posed. Support was voiced for
a second round of tax cuts focused toward working‑class and middle‑class
Americans, to stimulate an economy that was still relatively weak in 2012. In
contrast to the liberal group, those exposed to conservative news stories were
rarely swayed by the arguments being made. The lack of convincing criticisms
should not be surprising for participants who were already sympathetic to
the stimulus, and more likely to resist conservative criticisms.
With the minimum wage, respondents on both sides indicated that
the information they consumed influenced their perceptions. On the liberal
side, participants commonly focused on the perceived need to raise working
Americans’ wages as an issue of basic fairness. Comments included a focus
on “a lot of working students and single parents who are struggling to just
get by,” and the concern that “Americans are not making enough money to
meet their basic needs.” One respondent noted that “the change of $2.85 per
hour [from a $7.25 wage to a $10.10 wage] will make an incredible amount
of difference for people working at the minimum wage.” Another participant
stated that “it’s sad that Americans working some forty‑plus hours a week
can still struggle to stay afloat in this economy.” This point echoed Obama’s
and the Economic Policy Institute’s comments that were included in the lib‑
eral group’s readings. Exposure to conservative information produced grow‑
ing conservatism among news readers by stoking growing suspicion of the
minimum wage. Respondents worried that raising wages would “hurt small
businesses” and “young kids” working for the minimum wage, and that a
raise to $10.10 an hour was “too much, too fast,” in that it would likely “cause
the loss of too many jobs.” Such an increase would be “too difficult to get
passed” through Congress, and the supposed loss of jobs among Americans
would be “unfair.” The declining support for the minimum wage was notable
for those in the conservative group, considering that Americans are generally
supportive of raising the minimum wage, and since most Americans sup‑
ported a $10.10 raise in 2014.
Finally, media effects were marginal for those exposed to stories on the
cost of higher education. Numerous writers tried to make strong cases that
higher education either was or was not in a state of crisis. Most participants,
however, had relatively fixed opinions of this issue, in large part because they
were knowledgeable about the topic and drew on their own personal experi‑
ences. Almost all experimental participants—more than 90 percent—felt that
higher education was too costly when surveyed in the pre‑test. Similarly, 89
percent of Americans agreed in a 2012 Time poll that higher education had
entered a period of “crisis,” while 75 percent in a 2011 Pew poll said that
higher education costs were “too expensive for most Americans to afford.”36
Experiment participants complained that higher education had become “too
pricey” and “astonishingly” overpriced, and that colleges and universities
should be “more affordable” so that “people from lower social classes have
more of an opportunity to succeed in a career, or at least make a decent liv‑

ing.” One respondent went as far as to say that college education should be
free for all, because “if Europeans can do it, why not America?”
Republican rhetoric that attacked students as special interests who were
being pandered to by Democrats, and which framed higher education and
growing loan rates as constituting far from a crisis, were roundly rejected by
most participants. Increased government spending on education was strongly
supported by respondents. For example, one participant wrote that govern‑
ment “should prioritize lower interest rates for poor students” instead of
“giving the rich another tax break.” Another participant spoke of personal
experiences that contradicted the “education is not in crisis” narrative, as
she reflected on being denied the opportunity to attend her college of choice
since tuition and other costs were too expensive. A final participant acknowl‑
edged that being a student “allows me to realize much more easily how overly
expensive education at the college level is. If the interest on student loans were
lowered, it would make obtaining a college degree much easier.”
Main Lessons
This chapter has provided experimental confirmation of the findings uncov‑

ered in earlier chapters regarding the conditions under which official mes‑
sages in the news influence public opinion. The experiments found that
one‑sided information flows significantly impact political opinions, but not
equally in all settings. Prior public attitudes play a significant role in medi‑
ating the effects of media content, as does the public’s familiarity, or lack
thereof, with an issue. These findings suggest that Americans are not simply
passive recipients of official propaganda or biased media content. Rather,
they make use of their own opinions and experiences, while also being influ‑
enced by bias in the news. The findings here suggest that the media play an
important role in impacting not only what Americans think about, but their
policy beliefs and preferences. The public also retains some independence
from government agendas and official messages, depending on the specific
political context examined. In the end, making sense of the political process
and competing policy proposals is a complicated endeavor involving many
factors, although Americans do their best not to be simply manipulated by
government officials.
Conclusion
This book has sought to answer a number questions concerning: (1) media
coverage of public policy; (2) media effects on public opinion; and (3) the
extent to which the public is independent of official policy messages. With
regard to media content, I have documented the ways political parties play
a vital role in the policy process, reinforcing previous studies discussing how
they “set the agenda” for how public policy issues will be deliberated and
acted upon.1 Additionally, political parties are instrumental in ensuring that
public opinion—to a large extent—is “indexed,” or fitted to the spectrum of
views expressed by the major political parties.
The central findings in this study relate back to two questions. First,
what biases drive the media and influence how reporters cover policy issues?
Second, what factors influence the beliefs of the citizenry, specifically as relat‑
ed to the effects of media content on public attitudes? On the issue of the
media, some explanations of bias are more convincing than others. Little
evidence suggests an overarching liberal bias across political issues and case
studies examined here. Nor is there much evidence of a pluralistic media,
with reporters devoting regular attention to the views of the public, differ‑
ent citizens groups, academics, and other nongovernmental actors. Finally, I
find there is little evidence of a bad news bias. Bad news is a regular feature
of the news, but evidence that journalists exaggerate negativity in politics is
weak. Rather, negativity seems to be common in news reports because it is
a regular part of the political process, as seen currently in unprecedented
polarization and fighting between the parties. I find that the amount of bad
news in the media has been variable over time for my case studies, rather
than a consistent or even dominant staple of policy coverage. Contrary to
claims that the media turn the public against government, I have documented
how officials often sucessfully cultivate public support through the media, and
that increased consumption of the news is associated with growing trust in
and support for government.
257
A pro‑government bias regularly occurs in policy debates covered in the

news. Journalists look to whichever party is in control of government when
deciding which political leaders to cite more often. When either Democrats or
Republicans exercise unified control of government, they receive more atten‑
tion and usually benefit from more favorable news coverage. Split partisan
control, in contrast, is accompanied by nearly equal time devoted to each
party. Nongovernmental actors receive little attention, and find it difficult to
influence media content when political elites are treated as the “legitimate”
newsmakers. The overwhelming dominance by government officials is a cause
for concern when one speaks of the dangers of media propaganda. In an era
when the public and political officials express strong mutual distrust, and
when political officials systematically represent the affluent more consistently
than the masses, journalistic efforts to neglect the voice of the masses in the
news are deeply problematic. Democratic deliberation requires listening to
the voice of the people. If reporters systematically marginalize that voice, it
makes democratic representative government difficult.
I have also documented how a hegemonic, pro‑business bias manifests
itself in the news. First, heavy reliance on official sources can be seen itself as a
business strategy. By regularizing access to political officials, journalists ensure
a steady stream of news content, thereby guaranteeing regular profits from
advertisers seeking large consumer audiences.2 A second way that pro‑busi‑
ness bias permeates the news is through censorship of views that are critical
of advertisers. This form of bias is hard to pinpont because it involves omis‑
sion of controversial, critical view points, although the practice is commonly
acknowledged in surveys of journalists and editors. A third form of bias—the
most pervasive when it comes to public policy reporting—is observed in the
pro‑business tilt of specific policy debates covered in the news. In the last
few decades, public policy has been increasingly characterized by proposals
that are market‑oriented and friendly to business interests. It is not the case
that reporters bluntly privileged business elites and pro‑business Republi‑
cans in the cases I examined. Rather, the hegemonic process is more subtle.
If both parties embrace a political process that is increasingly dominated
by business interests over time, reporters become captive to these business
interests because they rely on political officials when it comes to reporting
policy‑related news. This is not a conspiratorial process. Rather, it stems from
journalistic norms and practices that stress the authoritative nature of official
sources at the expense of nongovernmental, nonofficial actors in the news.
Aside from providing a comprehensive explanation for understanding
how media bias works, I have also explored how public opinion fits within
the national policy‑deliberation process. I examined how effective the politi‑
Conclusion 259
cal messages of the president’s party and the opposition party were—as they
appeared in the news—in influencing public policy attitudes. The evidence
was mixed. Political officials do not simply manufacture consent. The public
is not a malleable, passive object, or an empty vessel to be utlilized instru‑
mentally by political and business elites. Rather, the public’s relationship with
the elite political and economic class is more complex. Americans might be
characterized as semi‑independent of political and pro‑business rhetoric. At
times, they are quite susceptible to official messages in the news; at other
times they are far less so.
By analyzing nine separate case studies involving public attention to the
media and media effects on public opinion, I arrived at some basic conclu‑
sions. Synthesizing those nine case studies here, I have identified three factors
that influence public opinion: (1) the extent to which the news is biased in
favor of the messages of one political party or the other; (2) the state of public
opinion itself at the onset of policy debates (prior to exposure to official mes‑
sages in the news), for the public as a whole, and for ideological and partisan
subgroups; and (3) the extent to which the public is familiar or unfamiliar
with an issue, with familiarity making it more difficult to change the public’s
opinions in a direction that is contrary to their preferences and beliefs.
The ability of a political party to influence the news is a function of
at least two factors: (1) the strength of the party in government, as seen in
its control (or lack thereof) of Congress and the executive branch; and (2)
the willingness of the party’s members to mount a visible public political
campaign in favor of its positions, and against the competing party. In some
cases, partisan control of government translated into more positive media
coverage and favorable media effects. These cases included: the 2001 tax cuts,
the 2003 tax cuts, the 2009 stimulus (excepting the month of February 2009),
and the 2009 executive pay controversy. But partisan control of government
has not always been enough to create favorable media effects. In at least two
cases, a determined minority party significantly influenced the news at times
because it was willing to mount a visible political campaign in opposition
to the majority party. In those cases, the minority party influenced public
attitudes in favor of its positions, including the 2009 stimulus (specifically
during the month of February), and the 2009 health care debate (for all
months examined). These cases, when taken as a whole, suggest that media
effects on public attitudes are variable, depending on which party controls
government and how actively the parties get their messages out.
Through a case study analysis, I have explored how various factors
appeared to play a significant role in influencing public opinion. In at least
one case, the role of a changing media environment and shifting media biases
over time seemed to exert a significant impact on public opinion. This pat‑
tern was observed in the case of the 2009 stimulus, as shifting biases from
month to month produced varied levels of support for, and opposition to the
presidential party. But the effects of media bias were observed in other ways
as well. For example, in numerous case studies, I documented how bias in the
news appeared to affect moderate and independent Americans, encouraging
them to embrace ideas that cut against or were different from their own prior
beliefs. These effects were observed across many case studies.
Prior public opinion at the beginning of major policy debates also
seemed to play a role in a number of case studies. The most obvious cases
were the 2003 Medicare reform, the 2005 Social Security reform, the 2011
Medicare privatization, and the 2011 deficit reduction talks. With Medicare
reform in 2003 and Social Security reform, public attention to the news was
associated with growing opposition to the president’s party. Republican con‑
trol of government translated into greater coverage of the party at the expense
of coverage of Democrats, although internal party divisions and Democratic
opposition to privatization also led to growing negativity in the news. Strong
public opposition prior to the reform debate seemed to contribute to later
public opposition to reform, as more Americans learned about the privatiza‑
tion plans. In 2011, attention to Republican attempts to privatize Medicare as
well as to the deficit‑reduction talks also produced growing opposition to the
Republican agenda. Media bias in favor of Democratic and liberal points of
view was unlikely to explain these trends, since Democrats did not dominate
the news in these cases. Rather, Americans shared interests and opinions that
cut against the Republican agenda from the very beginning of these debates.
As time wore on and Americans learned more about Republican positions
in the news, opposition increased among politically attentive citizens. In the
case of Medicare privatization, even a majority of the Republican Party’s base
opposed market reform. Similarly, in the debt reduction talks, a majority of
Americans expressed disapproval of both parties—although anger was more
commonly aimed at Republicans. These policy debates provide evidence of
significant public independence from the agendas of political parties. Such
independence is likely related to the unprecedented amount of public distrust
of government in recent years. In summary, the American public appears to
play a significant and at least semi‑independent role in influencing the terms
under which public policy debates influence attitude formation.
Finally, public familiarity (or lack thereof) with policy issues seemed to
influence how the public thought about policy controversies. When the pub‑
lic was less familiar with a policy issue, political officials were better able to
cultivate public support. For cases in which the public was more familiar (or
Conclusion 261
for cases where the public became more familiar with the topic over time), it
was more difficult for political officials to build public support. These findings
suggest that the public retains its own interests and experiences, which are
relevant in influencing how Americans think about domestic policy issues.
This suggests at least some evidence of public independence from official
messages in the news and governmental efforts to manufacture consent.
The experimental findings from chapter 8 provided consistent evidence
in a controlled setting that bias in the news, prior public opinion, and public
familiarity (or lack thereof) with policy issues all appear to be important in
influencing public opinion. These findings provided a second confirmation
of the conclusions uncovered in my case studies. These experimental find‑
ings allow for greater confidence in establishing cause‑and‑effect relationships
between the factors examined and public policy attitudes.
Identifying Cause‑and‑Effect Relationships
Throughout this book, I sought to identify cause‑and‑effect relationships

between composition of government and media content on the one hand,
and media coverage and its effects on public opinion on the other. A main
argument for causality, as related to how government influences media con‑
tent, is built into my case studies. Changing composition of government (due
to elections) between split government and unified government predates pat‑
terns in media coverage observed throughout the case studies. This ordering
makes it easier to argue for cause‑and‑effect relationships, especially if content
analyses show that official sources (compared to nonofficial sources) dominate
news stories in the case studies examined.
I have argued that biased media content influences Americans’ beliefs
on public policy. The opposite possibility, of course, is that the causality is
reversed, and that public support for or opposition to a policy proposal causes
increasingly positive or negative media coverage. I address this counterclaim
with numerous points below. Most importantly, I see little evidence in this
study that journalists are concerned with actively incorporating the public’s
views into news stories. Rather, the general public’s views do not seem to enter
into news stories very often, suggesting little journalistic concern that these
views should be driving the tone of news reporting. Rather, political officials
regularly dominate news coverage, and are setting the agenda for what the
public reads, sees, and hears.
With regard to my case studies, I see little evidence that prior public
attitudes (at the beginning of each policy debate) influenced media content.
Of all sixteen case studies examined in this book, nine were accompanied
by surveys designed to measure media effects on public opinion. In four of
those nine cases—the 2003 Medicare reform, the 2009 stimulus, the 2011
Medicare reform, the 2011 debt talks—prior public opinion did not correlate
well with the tone of media content. For Medicare reform in 2003, the public
was hostile toward reform, yet coverage appeared to favor Republicans. For
the 2009 stimulus, prior support overlapped with coverage that favored the
stimulus in January, but not with February coverage, which cut against the
Democrats. For the 2011 Medicare reform, prior public opinion was opposed
to Republican privatization efforts, but news content favored neither party.
Finally, for the 2011 debt talks, prior public opinion cut against Republicans
and in favor of Democrats, although news coverage favored neither party.
These findings raise questions about whether a consistent relationship even
exists between prior public attitudes and the tone of news coverage.
In his book The People’s News, Joseph E. Uscinski argues that the Ameri‑
can viewing public, rather than political officials and business elites, drives
political content in the news.3 As discussed in chapter 1, Uscinski presents evi‑
dence that growing public identification with the Democratic Party produces
greater media reporting of policy issues that are “owned” by the Democratic
Party. In contrast, growing public identification with the Republican Party is
said to produce greater media coverage of Republican‑“owned” issues. Simi‑
larly, Boydstun4 provides evidence that public concerns (as measured by the
“most important problem” people think faces the nation) can create pressure
for reporters to cover some issues more than others, depending on their per‑
ceived value to the public. How can these findings be reconciled with those
presented in this book that suggest the public has little role in the news pro‑
duction process? Regarding Uscinski’s findings, one simple way is to note that
Americans elect political leaders and that the public is ultimately responsible
for bringing different forms of government (Democratic unified, Republican
unified, split government) into being. Shifts in Americans’ party affiliations
are likely to produce changes in the party that controls government. Growing
dominance of government by one party, as I have documented, is linked with
media coverage that is increasingly favorable to the party in power. Regarding
Boydstun’s research, I would concede that the public may play some role in
influencing how often some stories are reported or not reported, but this has
little to do with how various issues are reported once they are on the media
agenda. Neither Uscinski’s nor Boydstun’s findings convincingly suggest that
the public is playing a direct role in influencing biases in news content. At
best, the role is indirect and seemingly quite limited compared to the more
active role played by political officials in shaping news content.
Conclusion 263
For a number of reasons, it is difficult to say that the public is empow‑

ered in terms of determining the biases apparent in the news. This study
found systematic evidence that journalists devote little time to consulting
nonofficial political actors such as interest groups, intellectuals, scholars, or
“ordinary” citizens. Some media indirectly cater to audience demands (parti‑
san media) in a general ideological way, but it is difficult to argue that citizens
play a direct, active role in influencing the content of specific political news
stories (as political leaders do). Even in partisan media such as Fox News and
MSNBC that supposedly cater to viewers’ opinions, nongovernmental actors
and citizens’ groups rarely appear in the news. Furthermore, my research
suggested that these venues are overwhelmingly dominated by official politi‑
cal actors, not the public.
Other research confirms the limited role of the public in determining
public policy news content. As one survey of journalists across the United
States concluded, political officials and business representatives are most com‑
monly consulted by journalists when the latter are writing their news stories
on economic policy issues, whereas nonpolitical actors such as union repre‑
sentatives, consumer advocates, and scholars are contacted at radically lower
rates.5 Furthermore, other forms of public opinion—such as national polls
revealing American policy preferences—appear only rarely in news stories
on major public policy issues. I uncovered few examples of stories that were
based on public opinion surveys in my studies of the policy issues covered in
the news, although such polls were discussed every now and then in stories.
These findings suggest that, while the public may indirectly play some role in
influencing the news, to say that the public is empowered to dictate political
news content seems like an exaggeration at best, and an outright distortion
at worst. Journalists generally spend little time considering what it is that the
public wants or believes regarding political issues.
Obviously, examples of public preferences influencing news content can
be found. Entertainment programs that are not watched by a large enough
audience fail to sell sufficient advertising time and are quickly replaced because
of their lack of popularity among viewers. Journalists increasingly cover tab‑
loid stories because they believe there is a market for this type of “news”
content among media consumers. Cable channels and radio stations produce
one‑sided partisan news content that they “narrowcast” to interested partisan
audiences. All of these are examples of citizens driving media content in
some way. However, a corporate media system is ultimately advertiser‑owned

and funded, and a system based on mass advertising is designed to create the
-
desire for products more than anything else. This bias involves a top‑down
process of creating consumer preference and selling products and services,
and resides at the heart of the corporate media’s business model. “Empower‑
ment” of the public is not the central goal of media corporations, regardless
of whether the product is a news or an entertainment program.
Furthermore, media outlets have actively socialized Americans into
desiring and consuming greater amounts of tabloid news and other forms of
entertainment content. They do no simply “empower” consumers by fulfilling
preexisting wants. As Markus Prior documents in his book Post‑Broadcast
Democracy, corporate media outlets were instrumental in shifting Ameri‑
cans away from demanding news content and have increasingly favored
the promotion of entertainment‑based programming in recent decades.6 By
fragmenting consumer choices between countless media outlets and venues,
media corporations have become increasingly successful at narrowcasting dif‑
ferent types of programs to very specific audiences. This strategy allows them
to market consumer products and services to narrowly defined audiences, on
a level that is far more effective than was possible in previous decades when
only a few media outlets existed. In short, the decline of public attention to the
news that Prior documents is very much a function of market forces, profit
motives, and media corporations seeking to create increased consumer desire
for nonpolitical news content. This process is all part of media corporations’
drive for greater advertising profits.
To argue that media are simply “giving the public what they want”
through partisan news programming is not entirely convincing. These outlets
are followed by a significant but relatively small minority of Americans. Talk
radio icons such as Rush Limbaugh are listened to by less than 5 percent of
American adults (Limbaugh has 14 million weekly listeners), and cable tele‑
vision channels like Fox News and MSNBC attract fewer than three million
primetime viewers per day.7 Cable news outlets are an important part of the
media landscape, but their importance should not be exaggerated. They play
at best a subsidiary role in the mass media and in reporting of political issues,
as the “narrowcasting” description of these programs suggests. Furthermore,
to claim that cable outlets simply “empower” consumers from the bottom up
fails to recognize that these channels are also socializing citizens from the
top down with content that is determined and driven by the political parties
and their own agendas. In short, it is unwarranted to claim that cable outlets
simply “give the public what they want” without acknowledging that “what
they want” and think is heavily driven by socialization from elite political
actors and corporate media elites.
In the end, one can certainly find examples of the American public
influencing media content in numerous ways. But it is far more accurate
to speak of political officials and business interests as driving news content
Conclusion 265
from the top down than it is to talk about the public dominating the news
from the bottom up. Media corporations are not democratic entities, and
they are not primarily concerned with fulfilling citizen wants independently
of creating those wants in the first place (as related to advertising and mass
consumerism). In the many ways discussed above, journalists and political
leaders are firmly in control of what types of messages Americans are exposed
to when it comes to news content. The public plays at best an indirect and
limited role in influencing political news, and is rarely consulted in the news
gathering and news production process.
Do Presidential Speeches Drive Bias in the News?
Previous research has found that the frequency of presidential speeches ref‑
erencing economic issues is associated with growing coverage of economic
issues in the news.8 In other words, presidents are effective at setting the
economic agenda based on their attention to this important issue. But does
this mean that there is a cause‑and‑effect relationship between presidential
rhetoric and the tone of media coverage? I have argued that changes in parti‑
san control of government produce changes in the tone of news coverage. But
an alternative hypothesis might suggest that presidential rhetoric influences
the types of bias in the news. For example, it may be the case that journalists
covered Republican officials so much more than Democrats during the 2005
Social Security debate because President Bush was very active in pursuing
speaking engagements across the country on this issue, thereby effectively set‑
ting the tone for how the media covered it. To gauge this alternative explana‑
tion, I reviewed twelve of the sixteen policy issues here—those in which the
president was clearly active in some capacity in speaking out related to the
policy in question. Table C.1 below documents the number of times that each
president addressed an issue, through statements, letters, interviews, speeches,
and other forms of communication, as made available through the American
Presidency Project database. The table also includes a summary of the tone of
media coverage for each policy issue and whether it benefited the president’s
party or not (positive, mixed, or negative tone), a summary of the overall level
of attention (higher or lower) paid to the issue in presidential communication,
and a description of what type of party control of government existed at the
time (unified Democratic, split, unified Republican).
Table C.1 suggests there is little relationship between presidential rheto‑
ric and the tone of the news. In only three of the twelve policy issues—health
care in 1993–94, the 2001 tax cuts, and the 2003 Medicare reform—positive
Table C.1. Presidential Priorities and the Tone of News Coverage: A Nonrelationship

Number of times

Policy issue the president

(on which a president addressed the issue Tone of coverage (Favorable,

made a proposal or per month Amount of presidential Control of Negative, or Mixed toward

engaged in an action) (& ranking) attention (Higher, Lower) government the President and his Party)

Health Care 54.2 Higher Unified Democratic Favorable

(9/1/1993–8/31/1994) (2)

Minimum Wage 10.9 Higher Split Mixed

(1/1–8/31/1996) (8)

Tax Cuts 19.6 Higher Unified Republican Favorable

(1/1–5/31/2001) (3)

Tax Cuts 6.5 Lower Unified Republican Favorable

(2/1–5/31/2003) (10/11)

Medicare Reform 14.7 Higher Unified Republican Favorable

(6/1–12/31/2003) (7)

Social Security Reform 14.8 Higher Unified Republican Mixed to Negative

(1/1–5/31/2005) (6)

Executive Pay 5.3 Lower Unified Democratic Favorable

(1/1–3/31/2009) (12)

Stimulus 7.5 Lower Unified Democratic Mixed

(1/1–2/28/2009) (9)

Health Care 62.3 Higher Unified Democratic Mixed to Negative

(7/1/2009–3/31/2010) (1)

Debt Ceiling Negotiations 18 Higher Split Mixed

(6/1–7/31/2011) (4)

CO2 Emissions 6.5 Lower Split Mixed

Regulation (2014) (10/11)

Minimum wage (2014) 16 Higher Split Mixed

(5)

media coverage overlapped with a strong communication effort from the

president.
In this case, a “strong communication effort” was defined as any time
a president ranked in the top half of the twelve case studies for the number
of times that he addressed the issue per month. In a number of cases, the
president was quite active rhetorically, and news coverage was either mixed
or negative toward the president’s party. These case studies included the 1996
minimum wage, Social Security reform, the 2011 debt talks, and the 2014
minimum wage. In other cases, presidents were not very active rhetorically,
and yet coverage was favorable to the president’s party. These cases included
Medicare reform in 2003, the 2003 tax cuts, and executive pay in 2009. Finally,
in a few cases—including the 2009 stimulus and the 2014 CO2 emissions man‑
date, less presidential activity overlapped with mixed‑to‑negative coverage.
In sum, a high level of presidential activity and rhetoric was associated with
positive news coverage in three of twelve cases, or one‑quarter of the time.
In contrast, party control of government was an effective predictor of
the tone of news coverage for nine of the twelve cases. In these cases, one
sees one of the following outcomes: either unified Democratic or unified
Republican control was accompanied by coverage that favored the party in
power, or mixed control of government was associated with coverage that
was also mixed in tone. In just three cases—Social Security, the stimulus, and
health care (2009–10)—does one see a discrepancy between party control and
tone of coverage. In those cases, however, I have already documented how
rhetorical offensives from the minority party in government were associated
with a declining advantage in the news for the majority party. In these three
cases, journalists still followed political officials’ leads in determining the tone
of coverage, although the partisan composition of government was not the
main factor influencing news bias.
Concluding Points
This book began with a discussion of symbiotic politics. I argued that govern‑
ment officials and journalists are inseparably tied together when it comes to
reporting on public policy. Under current notions of objectivity, journalists
require regular access to official sources in order to be able to produce news
stories. Political officials, albeit to a lesser extent, rely on the mass media to
build public support. This is a messy process, however, as the many case stud‑
ies suggested. Simply put, American citizens are driven by their own inter‑
ests, experiences, and beliefs, in addition to being socialized by journalists
Conclusion 269
and political elites. Government dominance of the news never ensures policy
victories, or the manufacture of public consent. Acknowledging this point,
political leaders hardly operate on a level playing field compared to other
political actors such as citizens’ groups, academics and intellectuals, and the
“average” American. Media critics understandably worry about government
control over the news and the public mind. But in a free society, the public
may develop its own opinions and interests, and even act on them as well.
With regard to the public and democratic government, what is perhaps
most encouraging in my findings is the conclusion that the public at times is
quite independent of messages in the news that are driven by official sources
and pro‑business agendas. The ability of Americans to develop opinions, inde‑
pendently of partisan spin and business agendas, is an important element of
any pluralistic democracy. The public has demonstrated, through a combina‑
tion of their own ideological predispositions and experiences with various
policy issues, that they are able to form opinions without simply relying on
what political and economic elites tell them to think. While media content
may be far from empowering the public, citizens are often able to make use
of basic information provided in the news to form their own opinions on
important political matters.
Post-Script
In Chapter 7, I only addressed New York Times coverage when discussing

media reporting of the ten policy case studies. A more detailed presentation
of media content across multiple news sources for such a large number of
case studies proved unwieldly. However, for those concerned that my analysis
of only one media source is not enough to generalize about media content,
this post-script provides further confirmation that the findings from the New
York Times overlap strongly with other news outlets throughout the country.
I have included here media references to the Democratic and Republican
parties and to party leaders for four additional sources: CBS News, MSNBC,
Fox News, and the St. Louis Post Dispatch. Unfortunately, the Chicago Sun
Times was no longer available through Lexis Nexis when this analysis was
conducted, hence the replacement with the St. Louis Post Dispatch.
Recall that media coverage was evaluated as biased in favor of govern-
ment, and as “indexed” to the structure of government, first, if the percent
of all stories that each party and its leaders appeared in was at least 20 per-
centage points greater for the party holding power during periods of unified
control of government; and second, if neither party held an advantage of more
than 20 percentage points during periods of divided control of government.
Validating the “indexing” theory, the data from Table P.1 demonstrate that the
structure of government is an effective predictor of media content in 26 of 32
cases, or an overwhelming 81 percent of the time. During periods of unified
party government, the pro-government, “indexing” theory accurately predicts
news content outcomes in 9 of 14 cases, or 64 percent of the time, with the
party in power receiving more than 20 percentage points greater mentions
than the out of power party. During periods of divided party government,
neither party is able to dominate in the news—by receiving more than 20
percentage points greater mentions than the other party—in 17 of 18 cases,
or 94 percent of the time.
271
Baum present a picture of unified Democratic or Republican governments

as in near‑paralysis due to the tremendous power of journalists to impede
officials’ ability to govern. They reject claims of a pro‑government bias, and
the conclusion that “media are, at least most of the time, largely passive and
nonstrategic, like a conveyer belt faithfully transmitting what elites, especially
the most powerful elites, are saying.”4 Groeling and Baum argue, in contrast,
that “news coverage typically does not faithfully reflect the mix of elite rheto‑
ric in Washington,” and they speak of an alleged “consensus” that “negativity
dominates modern news coverage.”5
Similarly, Patterson argues that “journalistic and political values are at
odds with one another,” and claims reporters hold “a deeply cynical view of
politics and politicians.”6 Journalists fixate on “the unusual and the sensa‑
tional,” ensuring perverse coverage of the political process.7 Patterson docu‑
ments the growth of “unfavorable” news about electoral candidates in recent
decades, serving as evidence of a growing bad news bias.8 Farnsworth and
Lichter agree: “While scholars and politicians may argue over the existence
of ideological bias [in the news], there is much stronger evidence that the
television networks’ coverage [of elections] has become increasingly negative
in tone.”9
Journalists as Lapdogs
Many scholars do not agree with the claim that a bad news bias dominates
the news. Hallin claims that the degree of negativity in the news is dependent
upon how much negativity is expressed by political officials:

normally will stay well within of the debate going on within the
political “establishment,” and will continue to grant a privileged
hearing particularly to senior officials of the executive branch.10
Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston contend that journalists are not

interested in telling audiences about the realities of the world, but about
what officials say about reality:
Notes
Introduction
1. Robert Pear, “Obama Signs Children’s Health Insurance Bill,” New York Times,

February 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/us/politics/05health.html.
2. In examining reporting on SCHIP, I examined all stories that clearly ref‑

erenced/featured discussion of the issue in the headlines of New York Times stories,
between March and December 2007 (for a total of thirty‑three stories), and from
January to February 2009 (for a total of eight stories). A second coder was used to
document all partisan quoted sources, while major names of Democratic and Repub‑
lican officials were simply counted (without the need for a second coder). Inter‑coder
reliability for the 2007 and 2009 stories for quoted sources was high, averaging over
.9 for both periods.
3. Official efforts to communicate with the public through speeches and

attempts to cultivate the media have been addressed in numerous academic studies.
These include: Patrick Sellers, Cycles of Spin: Strategic Communication in the U.S.
Congress (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Matthew Eshbaugh‑Soha
and Jeffrey Peake, Breaking Through the Noise: Presidential Leadership, Public Opinion,
and the News Media (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2011); Gary Lee Malecha

and Daniel J. Reagan, The Public Congress: Congressional Deliberation in a New Media
Age (New York: Routledge, 2012); Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of
Presidential Leadership (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006); George C. Edwards III,
On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006);
Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of
Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: Free Press, 1991); Diane J. Heith,
The Presidential Road Show: Public Leadership in an Era of Party Polarization and
Media Fragmentation (New York: Routledge, 2015); Brandon Rottinghaus, The Provi‑
sional Pulpit: Modern Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (College Station: Texas
A&M University Press, 2010); B. Dan Wood, The Politics of Economic Leadership:
The Causes and Consequences of Presidential Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton Univer‑
sity Press, 2007); B. Dan Wood, The Myth of Presidential Representation (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009); Jeffrey E. Cohen, The Presidency in the Era of
273
274 Notes to Introduction
24‑Hour News (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Jeffrey E. Cohen, Going
Local: Presidential Leadership in the Post‑Broadcast Age (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni‑
versity Press, 2009); Jeffrey E. Cohen, Presidential Leadership in Public Opinion: Causes
and Consequences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Jeffrey Tulis, The
Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Mel Laracey, Presi‑
dents and the People: The Partisan Story of Going Public (College Station: Texas A&M
University Press, 2002); Mark Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan
Presidency (New York: Schocken Books, 1989); Brandice Canes‑Wrone, Who Leads
Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005);
James N. Druckman and Lawrence R. Jacobs, Who Governs? Presidents, Public Opin‑
ion, and Manipulation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Tim J. Groeling,

When Politicians Attack! Party Cohesion in the Media (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni‑
versity Press, 2010).
4. For a discussion of the potential impact of prior attitudes on individu‑

als’ attitude formation, see: Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon, 2002); Penny
S. Visser, George Y. Bizer, and Jon A. Krosnick, “Exploring the Latent Structure of
Strength‑Related Attitude Attributes,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,
ed. Mark P. Zanna and James M. Olson (New York: Academic Press, 2006), 1–67;
Charles S. Taber and Milton Lodge, “Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Politi‑
cal Beliefs,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3 (2006): 755–69; Mark Peffley
and Jon Hurwitz, “Persuasion and Resistance: Race and the Death Penalty in America,”
American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 4 (2007): 996–1012. With regard to official
messages and their effect on public opinion, see: Anthony R. DiMaggio, Selling War,
Selling Hope: Presidential Rhetoric, the News Media, and U.S. Foreign Policy Since 9/11
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015); Rottinghaus, The Provisional Pul‑
pit; and James N. Druckman and Lawrence R. Jacobs, Who Governs? Presidents, Public
Opinion, and Manipulation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
5. Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins, Setting the Agenda: Responsible

Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni‑
versity Press, 2005); John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of
Political Parties in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
6. Marc J. Hetherington, Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the

Demise of American Liberalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Jeffrey
M. Berry and Sarah Sobieraj, The Outrage Industry: Political Opinion Media and the
New Incivility (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Jacob S. Hacker and Paul
Pierson, Off Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American Democ‑
racy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson,
Winner‑Take‑All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—and Turned Its Back
on the Middle Class (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011); Taber and Lodge, “Moti‑
vated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs,” 2006.
7. Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political

Power in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Daniel M. Butler,
Notes to Introduction 275
Representing the Advantaged: How Politicians Reinforce Inequality (Cambridge: Cam‑

bridge University Press, 2014); Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, “Testing Theories
of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” April 9, 2014,
https://www.princeton.edu/~mgilens/Gilens%20homepage%20materials/Gilens%20
and%20Page/Gilens%20and%20Page%202014 Testing%20Theories%203 7 14.pdf.
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8. Thomas E. Patterson, Out of Order (New York: Vintage, 1994); Matthew

Baum and David Groeling, War Stories: The Causes and Consequences of Public Views of
War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Groeling, When Politicians Attack!
9. Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Free Press, 1997).

10. John C. Wahlke, Eulau Heinz, and William Buchanan, The Legislative Sys‑

tem: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1962).
11. Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, Politicians Don’t Pander: Politi‑

cal Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2000).
12. Pew Research Center, “Washington Leaders Wary of Public Opinion,”

Pew Research Center, April 17, 1998, http://www.people press.org/1998/04/17/
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washington leaders wary of public opinion/.
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13. For a review of political contempt of public opinion, see chapter 7 of Antho‑

ny R. DiMaggio, When Media Goes to War: Hegemonic Discourse, Public Opinion, and
the Limits of Dissent (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009).
14. Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Politi‑

cal Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon, 2002); DiMaggio, When Media
Goes to War; and DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope; Scott A. Bonn, Mass Deception:
Moral Panic and the U.S. War on Iraq (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2010);
Brigitte L. Nacos, Yaeli Bloch Elkon, and Robert Y. Shapiro, Selling Fear: Counterter‑
rorism, the Media, and Public Opinion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
15. Sarah Dutton, “Trust in Government Nears All‑Time Low,” CBS News,

February 16, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trust in government nears all time
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low/; Paul Steinhauser, “CNN Poll: Trust in Government at All‑Time Low,” CNN,
August 8, 2014, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2014/08/08/cnn poll trust in

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government at all time low 2/; Justin McCarthy, “Trust in Media Returns to All‑Time
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Low, Gallup, September 17, 2014, http://www.gallup.com/poll/176042/trust mass
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media returns time low.aspx.
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16. Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown,

1955).
17. Philip E. Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in

Ideology and Discontent, ed. David Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964), 206–61; Angus

Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The Ameri‑
can Voter: Unabridged Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); John R.
Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992).
18. Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York:

Praeger, 1962).
19. Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of

Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992);
Doris A. Graber, Processing Politics: Learning from Television in the Internet Age (Chi‑
cago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Samuel L. Popkin, The Reasoning Voter: Com‑
munication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1994); DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope.
20. Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton Uni‑

versity Press, 1963); Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, News That Matters: Tele‑
vision and American Opinion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Shanto
Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues (Chicago: Uni‑
versity of Chicago Press, 1994).
21. For example, see: Tim Groeling, “Media Bias by the Numbers: Challenges

and Opportunities in the Empirical Study of Partisan News,” Annual Review of Political
Science 16 (2013): 129–51. In this work, Groeling expressed concern that, since one
can never know the full population of issues that reporters are exposed to at any given
time, it is hard to know if stories are biased by journalists picking some stories over
others. In other words, without a point of comparison between a representation of
reality and reality itself, it becomes more difficult to talk about bias with confidence.
22. Books that take this approach include, to provide two examples: Bonn, Mass

Deception; and DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope.
23. For more on how changes in the political system impact news coverage, see:

James H. Kuklinski and Lee Sigelman, “When Objectivity Is Not Objective: Network
Television News Coverage of U.S. Senators and the ‘Paradox of Objectivity,’ ” Journal

of Politics 54, no. 3 (1992): 810–33. For a discussion of media bias and changes in
the political landscape, see: Groeling, “Media Bias by the Numbers.” Contrary to my
argument, Groeling claims that “changes in the political environment” that lead to
reporters favoring “one party over the other” do not necessarily constitute examples of
bias. For example, if a party receives increased attention or more favorable attention
in the news following an electoral victory that provides that party with control of
Congress and the White House, this would not necessarily be evidence of bias if the
choice to grant more favorable coverage is “proportionate to each party’s underlying
newsworthiness.” In other words, if journalists devote more attention to Republican
views during periods of Republican unified control of government, this does not
constitute bias, but evidence that the party had become inherently more newsworthy.
For a number of reasons, I reject this claim, as well as the premise that such favorit‑
ism in the news is not a form of bias. First of all, there is no rule of nature saying
that journalists are required to change their news coverage of political issues based
on changing government power structures. In fact, one would expect the opposite,
that journalists are free to make their own decisions on how to cover the news and
what sources to consult independent of the government. The First Amendment grants
tremendous legal freedom to journalists and editors to determine for themselves how
to report political matters. Second, there is no societal rule that says that political
leaders need to have a privileged position over other types of political actors, such
payments due to the rapidly approaching “debt ceiling” a few weeks into the
shutdown. The shutdown is not the only example of negativity in government,
either. Evidence suggests that Republicans’ use of the filibuster to block votes
on Senate legislation reached record highs in recent years, with Republican
filibusters of presidential nominations also reaching historic highs.
One could add to congressional voting polarization an uncivil dis‑
course that has characterized national politics in recent years. This trend
also suggests growing government negativity and dysfunction. For example,
after the September 11 attacks, national discourse was often quite polarized,
with President Bush and conservative media warning government critics that
they were either “with us or against us” in the “War on Terrorism.”15 Such
polarized rhetoric created a political environment in which antiwar critics
were demonized for being anti‑American and undermining national security.
At the time of Obama’s election and afterward, there was no shortage
of polarized rhetoric. Republican officials attacked the president for being a
supposed socialist, because of his support for middle and working‑class tax
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cuts, social welfare programs, and his health care reform. Conservative critics
condemned Obama for allegedly seeking to “ration” health care and establish
“death panels” that would deny life‑saving treatment to the sick and elderly.16
These conspiracy theories were echoed in the news and among right‑wing
pundits, and accepted by many conservatives despite a lack of evidence.
Journalists did not invent this hyper‑polarized political environment,
although right‑wing media pundits played a role in stoking anger at the
Obama administration by disseminating conspiracy theories. “Objective”
journalists played a role in promoting polarization by amplifying polemical
attacks voiced by political leaders. Much of the discussion regarding Obama’s
alleged socialism and “death panels,” for example, was promoted by political
officials (Sarah Palin, in the case of “death panels”), but heavily reported in
the news. In short, it makes little sense to refer to reporters as driving nega‑
tivity when it is already so abundant in official rhetoric.
Media Consumption and Its Effects:

Public Trust or Negativity?
If media are dominated by political officials, one would predict that increased
consumption of the news produces growing trust in government, not distrust.
To test this expectation, I examined public opinion data on media consump‑
tion and trust in government from the Pew Research Center, which conducted
a survey of Americans’ political values and news consumption habits. The
included the key words above, but if there were at least two references or more to the
key words in question throughout each news story. The rationale for this condition
for inclusion was that many stories (particularly on cable) may briefly mention an
issue I am concerned with, but the subject is not the main focus of the news piece. I
was only interested in stories in which the case study being examined was either the
main issue or a main issue.
27. In order to measure party and party member mentions, I looked for ref‑

erences in news stories to a “Democrat” or “Democrats,” or to the “Democratic”
Party, in addition to references in stories to a “Republican” or “Republicans” or to the
“Republican” Party. I also counted as part of party mentions any time I encountered
a reference to a specific party leader, when coding all news stories examined.
28. A source quote was coded as appearing if it included a statement, or mul‑

tiple statements made, no matter how long, that met two explicit conditions: (1) the
quoted source began with a quote and ended with another quote, and (2) the quoted
source ended with a period. Multiple quotes, if made within the same sentence, were
treated as one quote since they all were included before the final period of the sen‑
tence. If a source was quoted at the beginning of one sentence, and the quote ended
in another sentence, both sentences were counted as part of a single quote, since the
quote was not completed in the first sentence, but continued through the next.
29. Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Para‑

digm,” Journal of Communication 43, no. 4 (1993): 51–58; Robert M. Entman, Pro‑
jections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2003); Erving Goffman and Bennett Berger, Frame
Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Lebanon, NH: Northeastern
University Press, 1986); Karen S. Johnson‑Cartee, News Narratives and News Framing:
Constructing Political Reality (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004); Maria
Elizabeth Grabe and Erik Page Bucy, Image Bite Politics: News and Visual Framing of
Elections (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Pippa Norris, ed. Framing Terror‑
ism: The News Media, the Government, and the Public (New York: Routledge, 2003);
Diana Kendall, Framing Class: Media Representations of Wealth and Poverty in America
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011).
30. I discuss what information I included in each frame and how I went about

tabulating the prevalence of each frame in detail through each of chapters 2, 3, and
4. I describe the process in the specific endnotes related to each frame I discuss in
the text of those chapters.
31. The Congressional Record is based out of the Library of Congress “Thomas”

database, while the American Presidency Project database is based out of the Univer‑
sity of California, Santa Barbara.
32. For each area of news content analyzed, including partisan sources and other

political actors appearing in story headlines, story leads, sources quoted, mentions of
parties and party leaders, op‑eds, and editorials, coverage was deemed biased in favor
of a specific theory if a sizable majority (more than 60 percent) of stories for all cat‑
egories examined conformed to the theory’s expectations. For example, if more than 60
percent of story headlines, leads, sources quoted, and party leaders mentioned in stories
were biased in favor of Democrats over Republicans, that would suggest evidence of a
consistent liberal bias. The same thresholds were applied to other theories. For example,
if Republican sources appeared more than 60 percent of the time in news headlines,
leads, sources quoted, and party leaders mentioned in stories, this constituted evidence
of a pro‑business, hegemonic bias. For the pro‑government theory of bias, govern‑
mental sources needed to appear as more than 60 percent of sources compared to
nongovernmental sources in news headlines, leads, and sources quoted. Furthermore,
the pro‑government theory argues that journalists privilege one political party over the
other when that party holds political power. Based on this assumption, I expected that
partisan Democratic or Republican sources would appear as more than 60 percent of all
partisan sources mentioned in news stories during periods when either party controlled
both the White House and Congress, and that both parties would fail to exceed the 60
percent threshold during periods of divided government when neither party retained
political control. For the pluralism theory, it might be unrealistic to expect that more
than half of sources consulted or appearing in the news are nongovernmental actors.
As a result, a lower threshold is established of at least one‑third of all actors appearing
in news stories, compared to governmental sources.
33. I create a sixty‑forty threshold for a party to be dominant over another

party in terms of how often party members appear in story headlines, story leads,
quoted sources, party mentions, and news frames. This means that, for example, the
Republican Party would be seen as dominant in a case study if its members repre‑
sented more than 60 percent or more of all partisan officials in story headlines, leads,
quoted sources, party mentions, and news frames. This represents a more than 20
percentage point advantage over the other party, which is rather large, comparatively
speaking. When I look for coverage that is “approximately equal” between the parties
during periods of split government, I am talking about cases that fail to exceed the
sixty‑forty split. So, for example, if one party’s members appeared in 55 percent of
story headlines, leads, sources quoted, party mentions, and news frames, while the
other party appeared 45 percent of the time, this result fails to exceed the sixty‑forty
threshold, and coverage is deemed “approximately equal.”
34. The sixty‑forty threshold is employed in testing sources, frames, and politi‑

cal actors appearing in the news, as related to the pro‑business, pro‑government, and
liberal theories.
35. The one‑third threshold may at first seem arbitrary, but I chose it because,

if nongovernmental actors appear as less than one‑third of all sources quoted or
mentioned, it means that government officials exercise an overwhelming dominance
of the news, since they represent more than two‑thirds of all actors appearing.
36. The sixty‑forty threshold is employed in testing sources, frames, and politi‑

cal actors appearing in the news, as related to the pro‑business, pro‑government, and
liberal theories.
37. “Cross‑party” attacks refer to any time a member of one party criticiz‑

es either the other party in general, or specific members, or the party’s policies.
“Within‑party” attacks refer to any time that a member of the party criticizes mem‑

bers of his/her party or the party itself.
38. National survey firms ask many different questions meant to gauge public

attention to national political discourse and to the news regarding policy issues. Many
of the questions I include in this study explicitly ask the public about whether they are
following the news and other media content. Other questions imply that Americans
are paying attention to the news, by asking how much one has “heard” or “followed”
national debates on major policy issues. Citizens ultimately cannot become informed
about policy issues without following news coverage. Of course, many may mean that
they are simply talking to others around them when they say they have been “hearing”
about or “following” an issue, but those conversations are also ultimately not possible
without citizens also paying attention to the news. At the end of the day, citizens can‑
not have a discussion about what is happening in Washington without large numbers
of them following the news. I treat questions measuring how much the public has
“heard” about or “followed” unfolding events related to a policy issue as proxy mea‑
surements for attention to media content, since the vast majority of Americans say
in surveys included throughout this book that they are paying attention to news on
the policy issues examined.
39. Throughout this book, I use multiple regression analysis, specifically

employing binary logistic regression and ordered logistic regression to measure asso‑
ciations between media attentiveness and public opinion for various policy issues. I use
binary logistic regression for dependent variables that are dichotomous, and respon‑
dents answer a simple “yes” or “no,” or “support” or “oppose” for policy questions. I
use ordered logistic regression for survey questions where my dependent variable is
ordinal, for example, with choices between “strongly support,” “somewhat support,”
“somewhat oppose,” or “strongly oppose.” Control variables are included in my analysis
to account for other potentially confounding factors, including respondents’ sex, age,
race, income, education, political party, and political ideology.
40. Adam Berinsky, In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion

from World War II to Iraq (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Zaller, The
Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.
41. Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public.

42. James W. Dearing and Everett M. Rogers, Agenda‑Setting (Thousand Oaks,

Ca: Sage, 1996); Maxwell McCombs, Setting the Agenda: Mass Media and Public Opin‑
ion (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014).
43. DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope; R. Douglas Arnold, Congress, the Press,

and Political Accountability (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Andrew W.
Barrett and Jeffrey S. Peake, “When the President Comes to Town: Examining Local
Newspaper Coverage of Domestic Presidential Travel,” American Politics Research 35,
no. 1 (2007): 13–31.
44. State of the News Media 2013, “Network: By Numbers,” Project for Excel‑

lence in Journalism, 2013, http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2013/network news a year
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of change and challenge at nbc/network by the numbers/.
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45. Jesse Holcomb, “Cable News: Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center, April 29,

2015, http://www.journalism.org/2015/04/29/cable news fact sheet/.
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46. Kevin Arceneaux and Martin Johnson, Changing Minds or Changing Chan‑

nels? Partisan News in an Age of Choice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013);
Natalie J. Stroud, Niche News: The Politics of News Choice (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011); Matthew Levendusky, How Partisan Media Polarize America (Chica‑
go: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Matthew A. Baum and Tim Groeling, “New
Media and the Polarization of American Political Discourse,” Political Communication
25 (2008): 345–65; Heith, The Presidential Road Show; Kathleen Hall Jamieson and
Michael Cappella, Echo Chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the Conservative Media Estab‑
lishment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); David C. Barker, Rushed to Judg‑
ment: Talk Radio, Persuasion, and American Political Behavior (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2002).
47. Berry and Sobieraj, The Outrage Industry; DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling

Hope; Danny Hayes, “The News Anew? Political Coverage in a Transformed Media
Age,” in New Directions in Media and Politics, ed. Travis N. Ridout (New York: Rout‑
ledge, 2013), 193–209; Natalie Andrews, “Social Media Can Moderate Users’ Poli‑
tics,” Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/10/21/
study social media can moderate users politics/; Jennifer Stromer‑Galley, Presidential
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Campaigning in the Internet Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Aaron
Smith, “Civic Engagement in the Digital Age,” Pew Research Center, April 25, 2013,
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/04/25/civic engagement in the digital age/.
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48. Readers will notice that there is no analysis of social media political content

in this book. There are a number of reasons for this. One reason is because the study
of social media and politics is really in its infancy, and the question of how to secure
workable access to political content on social media is difficult to answer. Millions of
people in the U.S. use social media, and tracking the content of individual users may
ultimately be impossible. Analyzing traditional old and new media (such as newspa‑
pers, broadcast television, and cable news) is much more manageable, considering
easy access to an online news database such as Lexis Nexis. The reality of the matter
is that social media political content is extremely personal to the user in question,
and the ability to code or classify such content across the country defies what can be
accomplished by a single scholar, or even a team of researchers.
Methodologically, I do not examine social media in this book, in part because
these sources do not appear to represent a fundamental threat to the current infor‑
mational order—which is dominated by the corporate mass media. If consumers of
social media are to be believed, one can easily conclude that social media represent
no “revolution” in access to public information, contrary to the claims of some recent
scholarship (see Jason Gainous and Kevin M. Wagner, Tweeting to Power: The Social
Media Revolution in American Politics [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013]). I
argue that social media use, although significant to politics, does not represent a
fundamental challenge to the one‑way communications, from the top down, from
political officials to the public. I believe that outlets such as Twitter and Facebook
are an important, although relatively small part of modern political communication

in the United States. I explain the reasons for these conclusions immediately below.
In a number of ways, social media appear not to represent a fundamental
deviation from the status quo of political communication in the United States. One
reason is that political content on social media may not be all that significant in
terms of being biased either in favor of one party or another. For example, a recent
Pew Research Center survey of social media users finds that there were “no partisan
differences” and “no overall partisan tilt to one candidate or the other” in what users
heard regarding support for presidential candidates Mitt Romney and Barack Obama
in the 2012 election. While social media use allows for personalization of communica‑
tions across users, it does not appear that, politically speaking, information regarding
recent political issues (such as the 2012 elections) is systematically biased in favor of
one party or another. Secondly, the scholarly research is mixed regarding the effects of
social media use on public attitudes. Some research suggests that social media use has
moderating effects, encouraging consideration of different points of view among those
sharing information (see: Natalie Andrews, “Social Media Can Moderate Users’ Poli‑
tics,” Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/10/21/
study social media can moderate users politics/). These findings give one pause to
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wonder how exactly social media are promoting an alternative form of politics from
that which is already widely observed in the United States. Certainly, there is no
consensus in the research regarding whether social media polarize the public, as has
been conceded even by supporters of the polarization thesis (for a summary of this
research, see Stromer Galley, Presidential Campaigning in The Internet Age). Thirdly,
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other research suggests that political officials’ use of social media closely resembles
traditional news content, in that electoral candidates (like journalists) engage in a
top down, instrumental form of communication in which social media users are seen
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as passive recipients of information (see ibid.). If this depiction is accurate, discus‑
sion of social media as creating a “new path” for political expression in the United
States seem inaccurate. Finally, any suspicion that social media serve a primary, or
even central political function, seems unwarranted. A 2013 survey by Pew on “how
Americans discuss politics and public affairs with others” finds that only a very small
number of Americans regularly make use of social media for communicating political
content. The survey found that just 11 percent of Americans make use of social media
to share political information or communications at least once a month, and that the
same number use such forums for sharing political content on a weekly basis (see
Aaron Smith, “Civic Engagement in the Digital Age,” Pew Research Center, April 25,
2013, http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/04/25/civic engagement in the digital age/).
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Other surveys suggest the number of citizens regularly making use of social media
for political purposes may be even lower, at about 5 percent of Americans (see Gain‑
ous and Wagner, Tweeting to Power).
None of the above findings are meant to suggest that social media are insig‑
nificant when it comes to politics. If anything, the major significance of these media
sources is that they make it far easier for Americans to share information quickly
than was ever possible in the past. Certainly, some Americans are regularly making
use of social media to share information about politics, and some (an even smaller
number) may be using these venues to challenge political officials and their agendas.
But with such small numbers regularly making use of such outlets, it seems silly
to claim that such use is going to fundamentally undermine the information being
conveyed in the mass media. For social media to undermine traditional communica‑
tion networks, users would have to be basing their social media posts on informa‑
tion that is independent of the dominant narratives and discourses occurring in the
mass media—as seen in newspapers and television news. There is little evidence I
have seen to suggest that social media users are gathering informational sources in
such a way that they are building their own political communities, independent of
the information being collected and disseminated in major media outlets. While the
use of social media is not all that well understood today, and it certainly merits far
more attention, it appears unlikely at this juncture that such outlets will significantly
undermine the major narratives that drive national political discourse in the mass
media and in official political circles.
This research also does not examine prominent liberal and conservative blogs.
Right‑wing blogs such as Michellemalkin.com and Hotair.com and liberal blogs like
Huffington Post and Daily Kos play a somewhat significant role in American politi‑
cal discourse, although there is reason to wonder whether they pose any sort of
significant challenge to the “mainstream” corporate mass media. For one thing, much
of the content on these sites (such as Huffington Post) is simply a regurgitation of
reports written by corporate media outlets. In other, more editorially based sites such
as Michellemalkin.com and Hotair.com, much of the commentary appears to be quite
similar, ideologically speaking, to the kinds of content one would be exposed to on
channels like Fox News. In other words, these outlets do not appear to deviate all
that significantly from other media, in terms of their “reporting” or in terms of their
editorializing. By capturing the content on outlets like MSNBC and Fox News, I am
already measuring another form of “new media” with very similar content, ideologi‑
cally speaking. The choice not to include these blogs is not meant to suggest that
they are insignificant to the current political and media landscape, but merely to
suggest that their presence is not likely to question or reverse the broader media
trends uncovered in this study.
49. W. Russell Neuman, Mario R. Just, and Ann N. Crigler, Common Knowl‑

edge: News and the Construction of Political Meaning (Chicago: University of Chicago,
1992), 92.
50. Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent; DiMaggio, When Media

Goes to War; Anthony R. DiMaggio, Mass Media, Mass Propaganda: Examining Ameri‑
can News in the “War on Terror” (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008); Erin Steuter
and Deborah Wills, At War With Metaphor: Media, Propaganda, and Racism in the
War on Terror (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009).
51. In When Media Goes to War, I review in detail how most American scholar‑

ship ignores the idea that media in the U.S. practice propaganda.
284 Notes to Chapter 1
Chapter 1. The Research on Media Bias
1. Pew Research Center, “Amid Criticism, Support for Media’s ‘Watchdog’

Role Stands Out,” August 8, 2013, http://www.people press.org/2013/08/08/amid
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criticism support for medias watchdog role stands out/.
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2. Niall Stanage, “The Hill Poll: Most Voters See Media as Biased and

Unethical,” The Hill, July 25, 2011, http://thehill.com/polls/173173 the hill poll most
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voters see media as biased unethical and cozy.
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3. Lymari Morales, “Majority in U.S. Continues to Distrust the Media, Per‑

ceive Bias,” Gallup, September 22, 2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/149624/majority
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continue distrust media perceive bias.aspx.
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4. Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1922), 16.

5. For studies of media agenda setting, see: Dearing Rogers, Agenda Setting;

Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1993); John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and
Public Policies (New York: Longman, 2003); McCombs, Setting the Agenda; Iyengar
and Kinder, News That Matters. For studies of media priming, see: Iyengar, Is Anyone
Responsible?; Dietram A. Scheufele and David Tewksbury, “Framing, Agenda Setting,
and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models,” Journal of Communication
57, no. 1 (2007): 9–20; Frank D. Gilliam and Shanto Iyengar, “Prime Suspects: The
Influence of Local Television News on the Viewing Public,” American Journal of Politi‑
cal Science 44, no. 3 (2000): 560–73; David R. Roskos‑Ewoldsen, Mark R. Klinger, and
Beverly Roskos‑Ewoldsen, “Media Priming,” in Mass Media Effects Research: Advances
Through Meta‑Analysis, ed. Raymond W. Preiss, Barbara Mae Gayle, Nancy Burrell,
Mike Allen, and Jennings Bryant (Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2007), 53–80.
6. W. Lance Bennett, Steven Livingston, and Regina Lawrence, When the Press

Fails: Political Power and the News Media From Iraq to Katrina (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2007); Scott L. Althaus, Jill A. Edy, Robert M. Entman, and Patricia
Phalen, “Revising the Indexing Hypothesis: Officials, Media, and the Libya Crisis,”
Political Communication 13, no. 4 (1996): 407–21.
7. Daniel C. Hallin, The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam (New York:

Oxford, 1986), 10.
8. Jonathan Mermin, Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Interven‑

tion in the Post‑Vietnam Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 5, 12, 151.
9. DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope.

10. John Zaller and Dennis Chiu, “Government’s Little Helper: U.S. Press Cover‑

age of Foreign Policy Crises, 1945–1991,” Political Communication, 13 (1996): 385–405.
11. Zaller and Chiu, “Government’s Little Helper.”

12. W. Lance Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion (New York: Longman, 2006),

73, 22.
13. Ibid., 100.

14. For more on Bennett’s refusal to consider media as propagandistic, see Ben‑

nett, News: The Politics of Illusion, 3; Bennett, Livingston, and Lawrence, When the
Press Fails, 170.
Notes to Chapter 1 285
15. W. Lance Bennett and Steven Livingston, “A Semi‑Independent Press: Gov‑

ernment Control and Journalistic Autonomy in the Political Construction of News,”
16. Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Politi‑

cal Economy of the News Media (New York: Pantheon, 2002); Robert W. McChesney,
Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times (New York:
New Press, 1999).
17. Erik Boehlert, Lapdogs: How the Press Rolled Over for Bush (New York:

Free Press, 2006); DiMaggio, When Media Goes to War; DiMaggio, Mass Media, Mass
Propaganda; David Domke, God Willing: Political Fundamentalism in the White House,

the ‘War on Terror’ and the Echoing Press (Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2004); David
Dadge, The War in Iraq and Why the Media Failed Us (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006);
Mark Major, The Unilateral Presidency and the News Media: The Politics of Framing
Executive Power (New York: Palgrave, 2014); Danny Hayes and Matt Guardino, Influ‑
ence from Abroad: Foreign Voices, the Media, and U.S. Public Opinion (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013); Bonn, Mass Deception; Nacos, Bloch‑Elkon, and
Shapiro, Selling Fear; Steuter and Wills, At War with Metaphor.
18. David Forgacs, ed. The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916–

1935 (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 422–23.
19. Forgacs, The Antonio Gramsci Reader, 307.

20. Robin Mansell, “Political Economy, Power, and New Media,” New Media

and Society, 6, No. 1 (2004): 102.
21. Michael Parenti, Inventing Reality: The Politics of the News Media (New

York: St. Martin’s, 1992).
22. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality:

A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Anchor Books, 1967).
23. William A. Gamson, David Croteau, William Hoynes, and Theodore Sasson,

“Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality,” Annual Review of Sociology,
18 (1992): 381.
24. Robert W. McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics

in Dubious Times (New York: New Press, 1999); Robert W. McChesney, Communication
Revolution: Critical Junctures and the Future of Media (New York: New Press, 2007);
Robert W. McChesney, The Problem of Media: U.S. Communication Politics in the 21st
Century (New York: Monthly Review, 2004); Robert W. McChesney, The Political Econ‑
omy of Media: Enduring Issues, Emerging Dilemmas (New York: Monthly Review, 2008).
25. Robert W. McChesney, “Journalism, Democracy . . . and Class Struggle,”

 
 
 
 
Monthly Review 52, no. 6 (November 2000): 1–15.
26. Lawrence Soley, “The Power of the Press has a Price,” Fairness and

Accuracy in Reporting, 1 July 1997, http://fair.org/extra online articles/the power
-
-
-
-
of the press has a price/.
-
-
-
-
-
27. Ibid.

28. Columbia Journalism Review, “Self‑Censorship: How Often and Why?”

Pew Research Center, April 30, 2000, http://www.people press.org/2000/04/30/self
-
-
censorship how often and why/.
-
-
-
-
29. Diana Kendall, Framing Class: Media Representations of Wealth and Poverty

in America (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 30–51.
30. Ibid., 146–73.

31. Jerry Rollings, “Mass Communications and the American Worker,” in The

Critical Communications Review: Volume I: Labor, The Working Class, and the Media,
ed. Vincent Mosco and Janet Wasko (Stamford, CT: Ablex, 1983), 137.
32. Ibid., 140.

33. Michael Parenti, Make Believe Media: The Politics of Entertainment (New

York: St. Martins, 1992), 79–84.
34. David Glenn, “How Fast Track Was Derailed: Lessons for Labor’s Future,”

Dissent 45, no. 4 (1998): 47–52.
35. Christopher J. Kollmeyer, “Corporate Interests: How the News Media Por‑

trays the Economy,” Social Problems 51, no. 3 (August 2004): 432.
36. Ibid., 442, 445–46.

37. David Croteau and William Hoynes, By Invitation Only: How the Media

Limit Political Debate (Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1994), 72.
38. Ibid., 73, 113, 119.

39. Robert Goldman and Arvind Rajagopal, Mapping Hegemony: Television

News Coverage of Industrial Conflict (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1991), 89–109.
40. James F. Tracy, “The News about the Newsworkers: Press Coverage of the

1965 American Newspaper Guild Strike Against The New York Times,” Journalism
Studies 5, no. 4 (2004): 457–64.
41. William J. Puette, Through Jaundiced Eyes: How the Media View Organized

Labor (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 35; Christopher L. Erickson and Daniel
J. B. Mitchell, “Information on Strikes and Union Settlements: Patterns of Coverage
in a “Newspaper of Record,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 49, no. 3 (1996):
395–407.
42. Scott L. Althaus, Anne M. Cizmar, and James G. Gimpel, “Media Supply,

Audience Demand, and the Geography of News Consumption in the U.S.” Political
Communication 26, no. 3 (2009): 249–77.
43. Richard L. Vining Jr. and Phil Marcin, “An Economic Theory of Supreme

Court News,” Political Communication 31, no. 1 (2014): 94–111.
44. Johanna Dunaway, “Markets, Ownership, and the Quality of Campaign

News Coverage,” Journal of Politics 70, no. 4 (2008): 1193–1202.
45. Brian F. Schaffner and Patrick J. Sellers, “The Structural Determinants of

Local Congressional News Coverage,” Political Communication 20, no. 1 (2003): 41–57.
46. John H. McManus, Market Driven News: Let the Citizen Beware? (Thousand

Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994).
47. William Solomon, “More Form than Substance: Press Coverage of the

WTO Protests in Seattle,” Monthly Review 52, no. 1 (2000), http://www.monthly
review.org/500solo.htm.
48. John Giuffo, “Smoke Gets in Our Eyes: The Globalization Protests and the

Befuddled Press,” Columbia Journalism Review (Sept./Oct. 2001): 14–17.
49. Glenn Adler and James H. Mittelman, “Reconstituting ‘Common Sense’

Knowledge: Representations of Globalization Protests,” International Relations 18, no.
2 (2004): 189–211.
50. Tamara Goeddertz and Marwan M. Kraidy, “The ‘Battle in Seattle’: U.S.

Prestige Press Framing of Resistance to Globalization,” in The Globalization of Corpo‑
rate Media Hegemony, ed. Lee Artz and Yahya R. Kamalipour (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 2003), 83, 85.
51. Jules Boykoff, “Framing Dissent: Mass‑Media Coverage of the Global Justice

Movement,” New Political Science 28, no. 2 (2006): 201–28.
52. Jules Boykoff, The Suppression of Dissent: How the State and Mass Media

Squelch US American Social Movements (New York: Routledge, 2006), 25, 205, 211.
53. Hetherington, Why Trust Matters.

54. Hacker and Pierson, Winner‑Take‑All Politics; Hacker and Pierson, Off Center.

55. Hacker and Pierson, Winner‑Take‑All Politics, 83.

56. In light of growing polarization between the political parties in their voting

records, and the Republican shift to the right, McCarty emphasizes that such polar‑
ization makes it more difficult to pass initiatives such as increases in the minimum
wage. For more, see Nolan McCarty, “The Policy Effects of Political Polarization,” in
The Transformation of American Politics: Activist Government and the Rise of Conser‑
vatism, ed. Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2007), 223–55.
57. David Michael Ryfe, “Guest Editor’s Introduction: New Institutionalism and

the News,” Political Communication, 23, no. 2 (April–June 2006): 138.
58. Bartholomew H. Sparrow, “A Research Agenda for an Institutional Media,”

Political Communication 23, no. 2 (April–June 2006): 146; Bartholomew H. Sparrow,
Uncertain Guardians: The News Media as a Political Institution (Baltimore: John Hop‑
kins University Press, 1999), 76–80.
59. Ben H. Bagdikian, The New Media Monopoly (New York: Beacon, 2004);

Dean Alger, Megamedia: How Giant Corporations Dominate Mass Media, Distort
Competition, and Endanger Democracy (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998),
163–64.
60. Gaye Tuchman, Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality (New

York: Free Press, 1979), 5, 14, 21, 193, 46, 81.
61. Herbert J. Gans, Deciding What’s News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC

Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time (New York: Vintage, 1980), 10, 13, 30–31.
62. Ibid., 46, 24.

63. Mark Fishman, Manufacturing the News (Austin: University of Texas Press,

1980), 148, 150.
64. Cook, Governing with the News: The News Media as a Political Institution

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 6.
65. Ibid., 111.

66. David T. Mindich, Just the Facts: How “Objectivity” Came to Define American

Journalism (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 8.
67. Ibid., 134.

68. Ibid., 14, 135.

69. Groeling, “Media Bias by the Numbers,” 137.

70. Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, “The Politics of Agenda‑Building:

An Alternative Perspective for Modern Democratic Theory,” Journal of Politics 33,
no. 4 (1971): 892–915; Dan Berkowitz, “Who Sets the Media Agenda? The Ability of
Policymakers to Determine News Decisions,” in Public Opinion, the Press, and Public
Policy, ed. J. David Kennamer (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1992), 81–102.
71. Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent; DiMaggio, Selling War, Sell‑

ing Hope.
72. David Croteau, “Examining the ‘Liberal Media’ Claim,” Fairness and

Accuracy in Reporting, June 1, 1998, http://fair.org/press release/examining the
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-
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quotliberal mediaquot claim/.
-
-
73. Anne Coulter, Slander: Liberal Lies About the American Right (New York:

Crown, 2002), 60; Sean Hannity, Let Freedom Ring: Winning the War of Liberty Over
Liberalism (New York: Regan, 2002), 255–56, 260; Brent L. Bozell, Weapons of Mass
Distortion: The Coming Meltdown of the Liberal Media (New York: Crown, 2004), 57;
Bernard Goldberg, Arrogance: Rescuing America from the Media Elite (New York:
Warner, 2003), 66; Bernard Goldberg, Bias: A CBS Insider Exposes How the Media
Distort the News (New York: Perennial, 2003).
74. Daniel Sutter, “Advertising and Political Bias in the Media: The Market for

Criticism of the Market Economy,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 61,
no. 3 (2002), 725–45.
75. Eric Alterman, What Liberal Media? The Truth About Bias and the News

(New York: Basic, 2004); Edward Herman, The Myth of the Liberal Media: An Edward
Herman Reader (New York: Peter Lang, 1999); David Edwards and David Cromwell,
Guardians of Power: The Myth of the Liberal Media (London: Pluto, 2005); Robert W.
McChesney, The Problem of the Media: U.S. Communication Politics in the 21st Century
(New York: Monthly Review, 2004); Trudy Lieberman, Slanting the Story: The Forces
That Shape the News (New York: New Press, 2000); Brendan Nyhan, “Does the U.S.
Media Have a Liberal Bias?” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 3 (2012): 767–71; Paul
Waldman, “Tomorrow’s Bogus Liberal Bias Claims Today,” Prospect, 2011, http://pros‑
pect.org/article/tomorrows bogus liberal bias claim today.
-
-
-
-
-
76. David Domke, Mark D. Watts, Dhavan V. Shah, and David P. Fan, “The

Politics of Conservative Elites and the ‘Liberal Media’ Argument,” Journal of Com‑
munication 49, no. 4 (1999): 35–58.
77. David D’Alessio, Media Bias in Presidential Election Coverage 1948–2008

(Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2012); Tawnya J. Adkins Covert and Philo C. Wasburn,
Media Bias? A Comparative Study of Time, Newsweek, the National Review, and the
Progressive, 1975–2000 (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008); David Niven, “Objective Evi‑
dence on Media Bias: Newspaper Coverage of Congressional Party Switchers,” Journal‑
ism and Mass Communication Quarterly 80, no. 2 (2003): 311–26; David Niven, Tilt?
The Search for Media Bias (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002).
78. Daniel M. Butler and Emily Schofield, “Were Newspapers More Interested

in Pro‑Obama Letters to the Editor in 2008? Evidence from a Field Experiment,”
American Politics Research 38, no. 2 (2010): 356–71; Maria Elizabeth Grabe and Erik
Page Bucy, Image Bite Politics: News and the Visual Framing of Elections (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009).
79. Han Soo Lee, “Do National Economic and Political Conditions Affect Ideo‑

logical Media Slant?” Political Communication 30, no. 3 (2012): 395–418.
80. S. Robert Lichter, Stanley Rothman, and Linda S. Lichter, The Media Elite:

America’s New Powerbrokers (New York: Hastings, 1990), 21, 27, 57.
81. David H. Weaver and G. Cleveland Wilhoit, The American Journalist in

the 1990s: U.S. News People at the End of an Era (Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum,
1996), 18–19, 235; Derek Thompson, “Report: Journalists are Miserable, Liberal,
Over‑Educated, Under‑Paid, Middle‑Aged Men,” The Atlantic, May 9, 2014, http://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/05/report journalists are miserable over
-
-
-
-
-
educated under paid middle aged men mostly/361891/.
-
-
-
-
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-
82. Erik Wemple, “U.S. Media Cheers for Same‑Sex Marriage: Study,” Wash‑

ington Post, June 17, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik wemple/
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wp/2013/06/17/u s media cheers for same sex marriage study/.
-
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-
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-
-
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83. Journalism Project Staff, “The Invisible Primary: Invisible No Longer,”

Pew Research Center Journalism Project, October 29, 2007, http://www.journalism.
org/2007/10/29/the invisible primaryinvisible no longer/.
-
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-
84. Jim A. Kuypers, Press Bias and Politics: How the Media Frame Controversial

Issues (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); Robert B. Bluey, “Professor’s Study Shows Liberal
Bias in News Media,” CNSnews.com, July 7, 2008, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/
professors study shows liberal bias news media.
-
-
-
-
-
-
85. Dennis T. Lowry, “Network TV News Framing of Good vs Bad Economic

News under Democratic and Republican Presidents: A Lexical Analysis of Political
Bias,” Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 85, no. 3 (2008): 483–98.
86. Adam J. Schiffer, “Assessing Partisan Bias in Political News: The Case(s)

of Local Senate Election Coverage,” Political Communication 23, no. 1 (2006): 23–
39.
87. Leonard J. Theberge, “Crooks, Conmen, and Clowns,” Time, April 27, 1981,

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,924721,00.html.
88. Sari Thomas and Steven V. LeShay, “Bad Business? A Reexamination of

Television’s Portrayal of Businesspersons,” Journal of Communication 42, no. 1 (1992):
95–105.
89. Tim Groseclose, Left Turn: How Liberal Media Bias Distorts the American

Mind (New York: Harper Collins, 2011).
90. Andrew Gelman, “Thoughts on Groseclose Book on Media Bias,” Washing‑

ton Monthly, August 1, 2011, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ten miles square/
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-
2011/08/thoughts_on_groseclose_book_on031180.php?page=all&print=true; Brendan
Nyhan, “The Problems with the Groseclose/Milyo Study of Media Bias,”
Brendannyhan.com, December 22, 2005, http://www.brendan nyhan.com/blog/2005/
-
12/the_problems_wi.html; Brendan Nyhan, “Does the U.S. Media Have a Liberal

Bias?” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 3 (2012), 767–71.
91. Glen R. Smith, “Politicians and the News Media: How Elite Attacks Influ‑

ence Perceptions of Media Bias,” The International Journal of Press/Politics 15, no. 3
(2010): 319–43; Jonathan M. Ladd, Why Americans Hate the Media and How It Matters
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
92. Russell J. Dalton, Paul A. Beck, and Robert Huckfeldt, “Partisan Cues and

the Media: Information Flows in the 1992 Presidential Election,” American Political
Science Review 92, no. 1 (1998): 111–26; Anthony R. DiMaggio, “Bias in the Eye of
the Beholder,” Counterpunch Magazine, October 11, 2011, http://www.counterpunch.
org/2011/10/11/bias in the eye of the beholder/.
-
-
-
-
-
-
93. Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 7, 89–90.
94. Andrew Rojecki, “Modernism, State Sovereignty, and Dissent: Media and

the New Post–Cold War Movements,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 19,
no. 2 (2002): 152–71.
95. Kevin Michael DeLuca and Jennifer Peeples, “From Public Sphere to Public

Screen: Democracy, Activism, and the ‘Violence’ of Seattle,” Critical Studies in Media
Communication 19, no. 2 (2002): 125–51; Anthony R. DiMaggio, “From the Bottom
Up: Media Pluralism, Hegemony, and Citizen Opposition to Corporate Globalization,”
Unpublished Paper, completed in May 2008.
96. A. Trevor Thrall, “The Myth of the Outside Strategy: Mass Media News

Coverage Interest Groups,” Political Communication 23, no. 4 (2006): 407–20.
97. Erickson and. Mitchell, “Information on Strikes and Union Settlements.”

98. Christopher R. Martin, “The 1997 United Parcel Service Strike: Framing

the Story for Popular Consumption,” Journal of Communication Inquiry 27, no. 2
(2003): 190–210.
99. Christopher R. Martin, Framed! Labor and the Corporate Media (Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 2004), 1–20.
100. Charlotte Ryan, “It Takes a Movement to Raise an Issue: Media Lessons

from the 1997 UPS Strike,” Critical Sociology 30, no. 2 (2004): 483–511.
101. Deepa Kumar, Outside the Box: Corporate Media, Globalization, and the

UPS Strike (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007), 89–115.
102. Ibid., 93–112.

103. Jeffrey Berry, The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups

(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999), 121–22.
104. Ibid.

105. Ibid., 121.

106. Matt Grossmann, The Not So Special Interests: Interest Groups, Public Rep‑

resentation, and American Governance (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press,
2012).
107. James T. Hamilton, All the News That’s Fit to Sell: How the Market Trans‑

forms Information into News (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Matthew
Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro, “What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from U.S. Daily
Newspapers,” Econometrica 78, no. 1 (2010): 35–71.
108. Joseph E. Uscinski, The People’s News: Media, Politics, and the Demands of

Capitalism (New York: New York University Press, 2014).
109. Cohen, The Presidency in the Era of 24‑Hour News.

110. Thomas E. Patterson, Out of Order (New York: Vintage, 1994), 23.

111. For a single work on negativity in election advertisements, see Stephen

Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar Going Negative: How Political Advertisements Shrink
and Polarize the Electorate (New York: Free Press, 1997). For a volume of essays that
deal with negativity in election ads, see Richard G. Niemi, Herbert F. Weisberg, and
David Kimball, eds., Controversies in Voting Behavior (Washington, DC: CQ Press,
2010). For a study alleging negativity bias in news coverage of elections, see Johanna
Dunaway, “Media Ownership and Story Tone in Campaign News Coverage,” American
Politics Research 41, no. 1 (2013): 24–53.
112. Marc J. Hetherington, “The Media’s Role in Forming Voters’ National

Economic Evaluations in 1992,” American Journal of Political Science 40, no. 2 (May
1996): 388, 391.
113. Robert K. Goidel and Ronald E. Langley, “Media Coverage of the Economy

and Aggregate Economic Evaluations,” Political Research Quarterly 13, no. 2 (March
2005): 319–20, 325.
114. “TV’s Bad News Brigade: ABC, CBS, and NBC’s Defeatist Coverage of the

War in Iraq,” Media Research Center, October 13, 2005, http://www.mrc.org/Special‑
Reports/2005/sum/sum101405.asp.
115. Baum and Groeling, War Stories, 46–77.

116. Tim Groeling, When Politicians Attack! Party Cohesion in the Media (Cam‑

bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 7.
117. Ibid., 42.

118. Ibid. This theme is touched upon in every chapter, and represents the

main theme of the book.
119. S. Robert Lichter and Richard E. Noyes, Good Intentions Make Bad News:

Why Americans Hate Campaign Journalism (Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield,
1996), 271.
120. Ibid., 120.

121. Matthew Robert Kerbel, Remote and Controlled: Media Politics in a Cynical

Age (Boulder: Westview, 1999), 96, 84, 82.
122. Stephen J. Farnsworth and S. Robert Lichter, The Nightly News Nightmare:

Network Television’s Coverage of U.S. Presidential Elections, 1988–2000 (Lanham, MD.:
Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 107, 130, 148.
123. Joseph N. Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Spiral of Cynicism: The

Press and the Public Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 84.
124. Ibid., 158–59.

125. Lowry, “Network TV News Framing of Good vs Bad Economic News

under Democratic and Republican Presidents.”
126. Katherine A. Beckett and Theodore Sasson, The Politics of Injustice: Crime

and Punishment in America (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003).
127. James Shanahan and Michael Morgan, Television and Its Viewers: Cultiva‑

tion Theory and Research (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Beckett and
Sasson, The Politics of Injustice.
128. Nacos et al., Selling Fear; Bonn, Mass Deception; DiMaggio, Selling War,

Selling Hope; and Jennifer L. Morella and Elizabeth J. Zeichmeister, Democracy at Risk:
How Terror Threats Affect the Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
Chapter 2. Split Party Government and Reporting

on the Minimum Wage, 1996 and 2007
1. Associated Press, “A Call for Debate on Minimum Wage,” San Francisco

Chronicle, February 17, 1995, http://articles.sfgate.com/1995 02 17/news/17796509_1_
-
-
minimum wage wage increases dick armey r texas.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2. Ibid.

3. Adam Clymer, “Republicans Told to Brace for Vote on the Minimum Wage,”

New York Times, April 18,1996, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C00
E3DB1E39F93BA25757C0A960958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1.
4. Dennis L. Gilbert, The American Class Structure in an Age of Growing

Inequality (Newbury Park, CA.: Pine Forge Press, 2010).
5. David Neumark, “How Living Wage Laws Affect Low‑Wage Workers and

Low‑Income Families,” Public Policy Institute of California, 2002, http://www.ppic.
org/content/pubs/report/R_302DNR.pdf.
6. These calculations are based upon my own examination of states that raised

and failed to raise the minimum wage between 2001 and 2005. The information was
gathered from the Bureau of Labor Statistics information on food median service
workers’ earnings and employment levels state‑by‑state in the years before and after
state minimum wage raises.
7. Jared Bernstein, “Minimum Wage and Its Effects on Small Business,”

Economic Policy Institute, April 29, 2004, http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/
webfeatures_viewpoints_raising_minimum_wage_2004/.
8. Liana Fox, “Minimum Wage Trends: Understanding Past and Contemporary

Research,” Economic Policy Institute, November 8, 2006, https://www.policyarchive.
org/bitstream/handle/10207/8032/bp178.pdf?sequence=1.
9. David Neumark, “Minimum Wage Effects in the Post‑Welfare Era,” Econom‑

ic Policy Institute, January 2007, http://www.epionline.org/study_print.cfm?sid 103.
-
10. Fox, “Minimum Wage Trends”; Marvin H. Kosters, ed., The Effects of the

Minimum Wage on Employment (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute,
1996); Matthew B. Kibbe, “The Minimum Wage: Washington’s Perennial Myth,”
CATO Institute, May 23, 1988, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa106.html; Gerard F.
Adams, “Increasing the Minimum Wage: The Macroeconomic Impacts,” Economic
ous studies find evidence that consumption of the news produces growing
trust in and support for government across many political issues.18
The data here, combined with those studies, provide grounds to ques‑
tion the claim that a pervasive negativity bias exists in the news and that it
turns people against government. Furthermore, evidence presented in chap‑
ters 6, 7, and 8 suggest that media consumption can produce different types
of effects by encouraging the public to become more or less supportive of
Republican or Democratic policy positions, depending on the specific issue
in question and how it is covered. These findings suggest that claims of a
one‑dimensional news bias against government are unwarranted.
How Common Is Negativity in Congressional Rhetoric?
Negativity between the parties is the norm in politics, not something exag‑
gerated by opportunistic journalists. Reporters have no shortage of negativity
to draw from when they write political stories. The continuous negativity in
politics is apparent when one analyzes the comments from both parties in
policy debates. Drawing from the Congressional Record database of official
statements and speeches, I reviewed legislative deliberation for two policy
debates—the 2005 Social Security reform and the 2009 stimulus. Table 5.1
provides many examples of the negativity that permeates Congressional rheto‑
ric, as seen in the statements from both Republicans and Democrats, on the
issue of Social Security reform.
During the Social Security debate, Democrats regularly attacked the
president’s privatization proposal. This is not surprising, but it does provide
evidence of strong negativity in this policy conflict. On any given week,
reporters could draw on critical speeches and statements delivered on the
House or Senate floor. Table 5.1 does not “prove” that the bad news theory
is wrong. It does, however, suggest that negativity is a common part of public
policy discourse among national officials in a time of record polarization.
Reporters did not need to invent fights between the parties. To the contrary,
such negativity was common in measures of official rhetoric.
But exactly how common was official negativity during the Social Secu‑
rity debate? To answer this question, I undertook a broad analysis of official
statements in the Congressional Record database.19 Analyzing 170 entries con‑
taining statements from members of Congress on Social Security, and over
200 speeches and comments made on the House and Senate floors, I looked
for evidence of Democratic and Republican criticisms of the other party, its
officials, and its position on Social Security. Negativity was the norm, with 75
18. James Parrott, “State Minimum Wages and Employment in Small Business‑

es,” Fiscal Policy Institute, April 20, 2004, http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/press_040421.
stm; Jerold Waltman, Allan McBride, and Nicole Camhout, “Minimum Wage Increases
and the Business Failure Rate,” Journal of Economic Issues 32, no. 1 (1998): 219–23.
19. Liana Fox, “Minimum Wage Trends,” Economic Policy Institute, October

24, 2006, http://www.epi.org/publication/bp178/.
20. See “The Young and the Jobless,” Wall Street Journal, October 3, 2009, 12(A);

Walter J. Wessels, “The Effect of the Minimum Wages on the Labor Force Participa‑
tion Rates of Teenagers,” Employment Policy Institute, May 2001, http://epionline.
org/study_wessels_05 2001.pdf; Joseph J. Sabia, “The Effect of the Minimum Wage
-
Increases on Retail and Small Business Employment,” Employment Policy Institute,
May 2006, http://epionline.org/study_detail.cfm?sid=98; Nicole Coomer and Walter
J. Wessels, “The Erosion of the Entry‑Level Job Market: Minimum Wages and Their
Impact on Minimum Wage Workers,” Economic Policy Institute, August 2010, http://
epionline.org/study_detail.cfm?sid=129; William E. Even and David A. Macpherson,
“Unequal Harm: Racial Disparities in the Employment Consequences of Minimum
Wage Increases,” Employment Policy Institute, May 2011, http://epionline.org/study_
detail.cfm?sid=137.
21. Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New

Gilded Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 227.
22. Robert Whaples, “Do Economists Agree on Anything? Yes!” The Economists’

Voice 3, no. 9 (2006): 1–6.
23. John Schmitt and Jared Bernstein, “Out of Date on the Minimum Wage,”

Economic Policy Institute, June 5, 1996, http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/web
features_viewpoints_minwage96/.
24. Adam Clymer, “Clinton and Dole Clash on Delay of Wage and Gas Tax

-
Measures,” New York Times, May 9, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/09/us/
clinton and dole clash on delay of wage and gas tax measures.html.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
25. Ibid.

26. Michael Wines, “Republicans Seeking to Counter Democrats Over Mini‑

mum Wage,” New York Times, April 25, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/25/
us/republicans seeking to counter democrats over minimum wage.html; Christiane
-
-
-
-
-
-
-

Zappone, “House Passes Minimum Wage Hike Bill,” CNN.com, January 11, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/01/10/news/economy/minimum_wage/index.htm.
27. Jim Kuhnhenn, “Lawmakers Move Toward Deal on Minimum Wage Hike,”

Chicago Sun Times, February 17, 2007, 12; Chris Zappone, “Congress OKs Minimum
wage Boost,” CNN.com, May 24, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/05/24/news/econ‑
omy/minimum_wage/index.htm; Kate Zernike, “Senate Passes Wage Bill, but Obsta‑
cles Await,” New York Times, February 2, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/02/
washington/02wage.html.
28. Christiane Zappone, “Minimum Wage Hike Coming—but Maybe with

Strings,” CNN.com, January 4, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/01/04/pf/mininum_
wage/.
29. When reviewing the unemployment effects frame, coders looked for a

variety of key words that were common in articles, including: “free market,” “unem‑
ployment,” “employ,” “employment,” “work,” “worker,” and “job.” For the frame to be
coded as present, the article had to first contain one of the key words, and a specific
reference to the argument that the minimum wage causes higher unemployment, or
simply a reference to the argument that the minimum wage violates “free markets.”
30. Tom Delay, “More on the Minimum Wage,” Congressional Record, April

23, 1996; William Neikirk, “Clinton May Push for a Higher Minimum Wage,”
Chicago Tribune, January 7, 1995, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1995 01 07/
-
-
news/9501070150_1_clinton and congressional democrats higher minimum wage
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
amendment.
31. In searching for references to the tax cut frame, all cases where taxes were

referenced were included in the analysis. For this frame to be coded as present, an
article only needed to contain the word tax somewhere in the piece, since it was situ‑
ating a discussion of the minimum wage within a context of also discussing tax cuts.
32. Robert Dole, “Repeal the Gas Tax,” Congressional Record, April 30, 1996;

Jonathan Weisman, “House Passes Increase in Minimum Wage to $7.25,” Wash‑
ington Post, January 11, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp dyn/content/
-
article/2007/01/10/AR2007011001666.html; Steven Greenhouse, “Tax Cut Measure
Could be a Stumbling Block for Increase in Minimum Wage,” New York Times, Janu‑
ary 10, 2007, 18(A).
33. For the labor pandering frame, key words were used to search for attacks

on unions, including “labor” and “union.” For this frame to be coded as present, an
article had to contain an explicit reference to a Republican or business official’s attack
on the Democrats, not simply attacks on unions themselves, for pandering to, or being
unduly influenced by unions.
34. Adam Clymer, “Dole Blocks Vote on Raising the Minimum Wage,” New York

Times, March 27, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/27/us/dole blocks vote on
-
-
-
-
raising minimum wage.html; Tom Delay, “More on the Minimum Wage,” Congres‑
-
-
sional Record, April 23, 1996.
35. The no unemployment effects frame was coded as occurring based on

two criteria. First, a story had to include one of the following key words, including:
“unemployment,” “employment,” “employ,” “job[s],” “work,” or “worker.” Second, the
story had to contain an explicit challenge to the claim that the minimum wage caused
unemployment or job losses.
36. William J. Clinton, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State

of the Union,” The American Presidency Project, January 24, 1995, http://www.presi‑
dency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51634; Clymer, “Dole Blocks Vote on Raising the Minimum
Wage”; Office of the Chief Economist, “Making Work Pay: The Case for Raising the
Minimum Wage,” Department of Labor, March 1996, http://www.dol.gov/dol/about‑
dol/history/reich/reports/pay.htm.
37. For the “common man” frame to be coded as occurring, a story on the

minimum wage needed to include a reference to the American “families” or “chil‑
dren,” or to workers or to the Americans in poverty. All these subjects, in one way
or another, suggest identification with the working class, when discussed alongside
the issue of the minimum wage.
38. Greenhouse, “Tax Cut Measure Could be Stumbling Block for Increase in

Minimum Wage”; Clinton, “Address before a Joint Session of Congress on the State
of the Union.”
39. For the stagnation/inflation frame to be coded as occurring, an article had

to include a reference to American “wages” as stagnant, in decline, or to inflation
(eating away the value of the minimum wage). Any story that referenced political
officials discussing the low value of the minimum wage was also included. Finally,
references to a “living” wage, or discussion of higher pay that is needed because of a
cost of “living” increase were also included.
40. Clinton, “State of the Union Address”; William J. Clinton, “Address before

a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union,” The American Presidency
Project, January 23, 1996, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53091; Weisman,
“House Passes Increase in Minimum Wage to $7.25.”
41. For Table 3.3, inter‑coder reliability tests were undertaken for my coding

and that of the two supplemental coders—more specifically for individual measure‑
ments covering liberal and conservative story frames. For story frames, inter‑coder
reliability between my analysis and that of the two supplemental coders was 92 percent
and 88 percent for the New York Times; 93 percent and 91 percent for the Chicago
Sun Times, and 93 percent and 97 percent for CBS.
42. Adam Clymer, “Dole Blocks Vote on Raising Minimum Wage”; Robert G.

Hershey Jr., “An Increase in Wages May Hurt Some Teen‑Agers,” New York Times,
July 9, 1996, 1(D).
43. Hershey, “An Increase in Wages May Hurt Some Teen‑Agers”; Bob Ring‑

ham, “Battle of Minimum Wage Fought with Minimal Data,” Chicago Sun Times,
February 5, 1996, 45; Brian Tumulty, “Minimum‑Wage Flight Moves to Senate Floor,”
Chicago Sun Times, March 26, 1996, 40.
44. Adam Clymer, “Minimum Pay Bill Falls Short in Senate,” New York Times,

March 29, 1996, 10(B); Clymer, “Dole Blocks Vote on Raising Minimum Wage.”
45. John Frandsen, “President Woos the Worker; Economic ‘Floor of Decency’

Touted,” Chicago Sun Times, May 5, 1996, 30.
46. Adam Clymer, “Clinton and Dole Clash on Delay Of Wage and Gas‑Tax

Measures,” New York Times, May 9, 1996, 6(A); Clymer, “Dole Blocks Vote on Rais‑
ing Minimum Wage.”
47. Clymer, “Minimum Pay Bill Falls Short in Senate”; Peter T. Kilborn, “Repub‑

licans Are Up in Arms at Labor’s Political Rebirth,” New York Times, April 3, 1996,
3(A).
48. Katharine Q. Seelye, “Dole Concedes Wage Increase Will Win Vote,” New

York Times, April 22, 1996, 1(A).
49. Alison Mitchell, “Sharp Split Over Issues: Economics Or Values?,” New York

Times, January 27, 1996, 8(A).
50. David E. Sanger, “A Report Tries To Counteract Job‑Loss Fears,” New York

Times, April 23, 1996, 1(D).
51. Ibid.

52. Michael Wines, “Republicans Push for Gasoline Tax Repeal,” New York

Times, May 1, 1996, 16(A); Paula Zahn, “Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich Dis‑
cusses the Presidential Campaign and Current Political Issues,” CBS News, May 22,
1996, 7 a.m. ET.
53. Alison Mitchell, “Attack and Parry: Taxes Set Political Pace,” New York

Times, May 11, 1996, 9(A); Ed Bradley, “House Leaders Say They’ll Block Minimum
Wage Increase; Suggest Tax Breaks for Business and Working Families Instead,” CBS,
April 24, 1996, 6:30 p.m. ET.

reliability between my analysis and that of the two supplemental coders was 100
percent and 98 percent for the New York Times; 100 percent and 100 percent for
the Chicago Sun Times, and 97 percent and 100 percent for CBS, 93 percent and 98
percent for MSNBC, and 97 percent and 100 percent for Fox News.
55. Eduardo Porter, “Revisiting a Minimum Wage Axiom,” New York Times,

-
February 4, 2007, 4(C).
56. Ibid., http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/10/washington/10wage.html?gwh=

81A331936162A6FEA2AF4CC67437F7A9.
57. Greenhouse, “Tax Cut Measure Could Be a Stumbling Block for Increase

in Minimum Wage.”
58. Bloomberg, “Effort to Move on Minimum Wage Bill Falters in Senate,” New

York Times, January 25, 2007, 19(A); David Espo, “$7.25 Minimum Wage OK’d—
Changes to Come,” Chicago Sun Times, January 11, 2007, 22.
59. Greenhouse, “Tax Cut Measure Could Be a Stumbling Block for Increase

in Minimum Wage.”
60. Espo, “$7.25 Minimum Wage OK’d—Changes to Come.”

61. Tucker Carlson, “Tucker for January 3, 2007,” MSNBC, January 3, 2007,

6 p.m. EST.
62. Chris Matthews, Hardball, MSNBC, April 26, 2007, 5 p.m. EST.

63. Throughout this chapter, I provide a variety of inter‑coder reliability tests,

as measured by the percent agreement between coders. Some advocates of content
analysis might feel this measurement is too simple, so I include overall Kappa scores
as well for inter‑coder reliability. This measure is supposed to take into account the
level of agreement between coders that agrees simply by chance variation in coding
schemes. Kappa scores measure the level of agreement between coders from a scale
of zero to one, with zero suggesting no inter‑coder reliability of measures of media
content, and a one suggesting perfect correlation between coders. Scores over .7 to .8
suggest relatively high levels of reliability, while scores near .9 or higher suggest very
high levels of reliability. For the 1996 and 2007 minimum wage, I provide these tests
for 1996 minimum wage headlines across all media outlets examined, the Kappa reli‑
ability scores between my results and that of the first and second coders were 1 and
.83. For story leads, the Kappa reliability scores were .9 and .9. For quoted sources,
the Kappa scores were .81 and .85. For news frames, the scores were .91 and .9. For
the 2007 minimum wage, reliability scores were similarly high. For my results com‑
pared to those of the second and third coders, the Kappa reliability scores for story
headlines were .94 and .96. For story leads, the Kappa reliability scores were .96 and
1. For quoted sources, Kappa scores were .91 and .98. For news frames, the scores
were .94 and .84.
64. For the 1996 minimum wage, inter‑coder reliability tests were undertaken

for my coding and that of the two supplemental coders—more specifically for indi‑
vidual measurements covering headlines, story leads, and quoted sources. For head‑
lines, inter‑coder reliability between my analysis and that of the two supplemental
coders was: 97 percent and 100 percent for New York Times headlines; 97 percent and
99 percent for New York Times leads; and 93 percent and 93 percent for New York
Times quoted sources. For the Chicago Sun Times reliability tests were as follows: 100
percent and 99 percent for headlines; 96 percent and 94 percent for leads; and 94
percent and 91 percent for quoted sources. For CBS, reliability tests were as follows:
97 percent and 99 percent for headlines. No tests were included for MSNBC and Fox,
since those cable news outlets did not yet exist.
65. Eric Schmitt, “Senate Sees an Opportunity and Seizes It,” New York Times,

June 12, 1996; http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/12/us/senate sees an opportunity
-
-
-
-
and seizes it.html; Steven Greenhouse, “Minimum Pay Rise Could Have Vast Effects
-
-
-
on the Northeast,” New York Times, May 12, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/12/
nyregion/minimum pay rise could have vast effects on the northeast.html; Andre F.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Chung, “Restaurateurs to Spend $1 Million to Fight Minimum‑Wage Increase,” Chi‑
cago Sun Times, May 20, 1996, 57; Vicki Torres, “Small Business Split on Minimum
Wage; Industry and Ideology Lead to Differences,” Chicago Sun Times, April 30, 1996,
41.
66. Francine Knowles, “Fight for Wage Hike, SEIU Members Urged,” Chicago

Sun Times, April 23, 1996, 54; Andre F. Chung, “Restaurateurs to Spend $ 1 Million
To Fight Minimum‑Wage Increase,” Chicago Sun Times, May 20, 1996, 57.; Mary A.
Mitchell, “Single Working Moms Fight Outdated System,” Chicago Sun Times, May
12, 1996, 21.; Steven Greenhouse, “POLITICS: THE UNIONS,” Chicago Sun Times,
February 22, 1996, 6(B).; Steven Greenhouse, “Labor Leader Calls Buchanan Work‑
ers’ Enemy,” New York Times, February 22, 1996, 6(B); Steven Greenhouse, “Labor
Leader Plans Little Steps to Big Economic‑Political Goal,” New York Times, February
16, 1996, 18; Peter T. Kilborn, “Labor Movement Endorses the President,” New York
Times, March 26, 1996, 4(B); Brett Pulley, “State Knows a Thing or Two About the
Minimum Wage,” New York Times, April 28, 1996, 13(NJ).
67. My examination of presidential statements was conducted through the

American Presidency Project database. I searched for any times that the words “mini‑
mum wage” appeared in presidential statements, speeches, or other official docu‑
ments for each period in which the minimum wage was being reported in 1996 and
2007.
68. For the 2007 minimum wage, inter‑coder reliability tests were undertaken

for my coding and that of the two supplemental coders—more specifically for individ‑
ual measurements covering headlines, story leads, and quoted sources. For headlines,
inter‑coder reliability between my analysis and that of the two supplemental coders
was: 99 percent and 100 percent for New York Times headlines; 100 percent and 100
percent for New York Times leads; and 99 percent and 94 percent for New York Times
quoted sources. For the Chicago Sun Times reliability tests were 100 percent and 100
percent for headlines; 100 percent and 97 percent for leads; and 100 percent and 91
percent for quoted sources. For CBS, reliability tests were 100 percent and 100 percent
for headlines. For MSNBC tests of leads, reliability was 100 percent and 97 percent;
for Fox News tests, reliability was 96 percent and 99 percent.
69. Carl Hulse, “House, by a Wide Margin, Backs Minimum‑Wage Rise,” New

York Times, January 11, 2007, 28(A); Timothy Egan, “For $7.93 an Hour, It’s Worth
A Trip Across the State Line,” New York Times, January 11, 2007, 1(A).
70. Inter‑coder reliability tests were not needed for my examination of party

and party leader mentions. To undertake this analysis, I simply needed to collect a list
of all the major Republican and Democratic leaders in Congress and the executive.
Next, I searched for these key figures, in addition to any references to “Republicans,”
“Democrats,” and the “GOP” via the Lexis Nexis database. I simply summed up all
these mentions, which were found via computerized analysis by Lexis Nexis.
71. Inter coder reliability tests were not needed for my examination of party

-
and party leader mentions.
72. Mark Levinson, “The Buchanan Manifesto,” New York Times, January 25,

1996, 27(A); Thomas Geoghegan, “The State of the Worker,” New York Times, Febru‑
ary 5, 1996, 21(A); Bob Herbert, “In America; Sliding Pay Scale,” New York Times,
February 5, 1996, 15(A).
73. Paul Krugman, “On Being Partisan,” The New York Times, January 26, 2007,

21(A); Bob Herbert, “The Millions Left Out,” New York Times, May 12, 2007, 15(A).
74. Sarah Hamersma, “The Bare Minimum,” New York Times, March 8, 2007,

23(A); W. Michael Cox, “It’s Not a Wage Gap, But an Age Gap,” New York Times,
April 12, 1996, 15(A).
75. Editorial, “Boost the Minimum Wage,” New York Times, April 5, 1996, 26(A).

76. Editorial, “Minimum Wage, Minimum Tax Cuts,” New York Times, Febru‑

ary 15, 2007, 28(A).
77. Mark Weisbrot, “The 90‑Cent Question,” Chicago Sun Times, May 9, 1996,

34; Molly Ivins, “Armey Leads Charge Against Minimum Wage Hike,” Chicago Sun
Times, May 3, 1996, 37; Carl Rowan, “Tales From the Dark Side of Dole,” Chicago
Sun Times, April 23, 1996, 37; Michelle Stevens, “Fair Is Fair: Workers Deserve Living
Wage,” Chicago Sun Times, April 22, 1996, 35.
78. Jesse Jackson, “Time to Push New Congress to Revive U.S.,” Chicago Sun

Times, January 2, 2007, 21.
79. Richard B. Berman, “Illiterates Lose if Wage Is Hiked,” Chicago Sun Times,

April 6, 1996, 12; Hasken Benishay, “Minimum Wage Increase Is Tempting, But
Wrong,” Chicago Sun Times, June 30, 1996, 33; Robert Novak, “Retreat Is Complete
as House GOP Breaks Ranks,” Chicago Sun Times, May 30, 1996, 27.
80. George Will, “The Wage of Fools: Minimum is Bad Idea,” Chicago Sun

Times, January 4, 2007, 27.
81. Editorial, “GOP in Losing Battle Over Minimum Wage,” Chicago Sun Times,

April 29, 1996, 31.
82. Tucker Carlson, Tucker, MSNBC, January 5, 2007, 4 p.m. EST; Keith Olber‑

mann, Countdown, MSNBC, January 11, 2007, 8 p.m. EST.
83. Sean Hannity, “Interview with Adam Smith, Jack Kingston,” Fox News, Janu‑

ary 4, 2007, 9 p.m. EST.
84. Sean Hannity, “Interview with Mitch McConnell,” Fox News, January 4,

2007, 9 p.m. EST; Sean Hannity, “Pelosi Hypocrisy?,” Fox News, January 12, 2007,
9 p.m. EST.
85. Alan Colmes, Hannity and Colmes, Fox News, January 4, 2007, 9 p.m. EST;

Alan Colmes, Hannity and Colmes, Fox News, January 12, 2007, 9 p.m. EST.
86. Editorial, “Teen Jobs? Here’s a Way,” Chicago Tribune, March 23, 2010, http://

articles.chicagotribune.com/2010 03 23/news/ct edit editorial wages 20100323_1_min‑
-
-
-
-
-
-
imum wage teen jobs summer youth employment program; Editorial, “The Young
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
and the Jobless,” Wall Street Journal, October 3, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970203440104574402820278669840.html; Editorial, “Obama Eyes
Interns,” Washington Times, April 7, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2010/apr/7/obama eyes interns/; Editorial, “New York Living Wage Bill a Menace,”
-
-
New York Post, May 13, 2011, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/editorials/
living_wage_killing_jobs_Qsmw1FGjUczjJax3D3xgoI.
87. Caroline Fairchild, “Minimum Wage Would Be $21.72 if It Kept Pace with

Increases in Productivity: Study,” Huffington Post, February 13, 2013, http://www.huff‑
ingtonpost.com/2013/02/13/minimum wage productivity_n_2680639.html.
-
-
88. For public support for a $10 an hour minimum wage, see Eric Morath,

“Support for $10.10 Minimum Wage,” Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2013, http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303330204579250473005492880; For
a discussion of the decline in the purchasing power of the minimum wage, see: Sylvia
A. Allegretto and Steven C. Pitts, “The Unfinished March Toward a Decent Minimum
Wage,” Economic Policy Institute, August 26, 2013, http://www.epi.org/publication/
work dignity unfinished march decent minimum/.
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-
-
-
-
Chapter 3. Unified Republican Government
1. For example, in the 1950s, President Dwight Eisenhower explained: “Should

any political party attempt to abolish Social Security, unemployment insurance, and
eliminate labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of that party again in
our political history.” Harry Reid, “Social Security Privatization,” Congressional Record,
151, no. 87 (2005): S7402–S7405.
2. D. Wilson and William Beach, “The Economic Impact of President Bush’s

Tax Relief Plan,” Heritage Foundation, April 27, 2001, http://www.heritage.org/
research/reports/2001/04/the economic impact of president bushs tax relief plan.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3. Douglas Martin, “Jude Wanniski, 69, Journalist Who Coined the Term

‘Supply Side Economics,’ ” New York Times, August 31, 2005, http://www.nytimes.

com/2005/08/31/business/31wanniski.html?ex=1283140800&en=9b18b36a7ca3d605&
ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss; Gregory Fossedal, “Wanniski’s Last Word,”
United Press International, September 2, 2005, http://www.adti.net/upi/wanniski.html.
4. D. M. Giangreco and Kathryn Moore, Dear Harry: Truman’s Mailroom,

1945–1953 (Mechanicsburg, PA.: Stackpole Books, 1999).
5. Ethan Pollack, “Stagnant Wages, Rising Inequality,” Economic Policy Insti‑

tute, http://www.epipolicycenter.org/blm stagnant_wages_and_rising_inequality.pdf;
-
Annalyn Censky, “How the Middle Class Became the Underclass,” CNN Money,
February 16, 2011, http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/16/news/economy/middle_class/;
Andrew Fieldhouse, “Ten Years Later, the Bush Tax Cuts Remain Unfair, Ineffective,
and Expensive,” Economic Policy Institute, June 6, 2011, http://www.epi.org/publica‑
tion/ten_years_later_the_bush_tax_cuts_remain_unfair_ineffective_and_expensive/;
Common Dreams Staff, “65 Years of Tax Cuts for the Wealthy Created Record
‘Inequality’ Not ‘Prosperity,’ Says Report,” Common Dreams, September 17, 2012,
http://www.commondreams.org/news/2012/09/17/65 years tax cuts wealthy created
-
-
-
-
-
-
record inequality not prosperity says report.
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-
-
-
-
6. Bruce Bartlett, “How Supply‑Side Economics Trickled Down,” New York

Times, April 6, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/06/opinion/06bartlett.html.
7. Christian E. Weller, “Bush’s Fuzzy Surpluses—Tax Cuts Based on CBO’s

10‑Year Predictions are a Gamble the Economy Can’t Risk,” Economic Policy Institute,
March 1, 2001, http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/issuebriefs_ib154/.
8. David Hancock, “Bush’s 2000 Tax Cut Promises,” CBS News, February 11,

2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/08/30/eveningnews/main639550.shtml.
9. Richard W. Stevenson, “Bush Tax Plan: The Debate Takes Shape,” New York

Times, August 26, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/26/us/the 2000 campaign
-
-
-
the tax plan bush tax plan the debate takes shape.html.
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-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
10. Scott Lindlaw, “Bush Sends Tax‑Cut Plan to Congress, Urges Speed,” Chi‑

cago Sun Times, February 8, 2001, 3.
11. Alan Fram, “Bush Sends $1.6 Trillion Plan to Congress; Dems Say It’s

Skewed,” Chicago Sun Times, February 9, 2001, 1; Alan Fram, “Dems Say Their Pro‑
posal Has More Benefits; 2 GOP Senators Back Away From Bush Plan,” Chicago Sun
Times, February 16, 2001, 1; Marc Lacey, “Bush Faces Group of Harsh Critics: House
Democrats,” New York Times, February 5, 2001, 1(A); Alan Fram, “Dems Offer Smaller
Tax Cut,” Chicago Sun Times, February 16, 2001, 22.
12. David Espo, “House Panel Oks Bush Tax Cut Plan,” Chicago Sun Times,

March 2, 2001, 3; Chicago Sun Times, “House Passes Massive Tax Cut; Nearly $1
Trillion Package Is Bush’s First Major Victory,” Chicago Sun Times, March 9, 2001, 1;
Brian Tumult, “Senate Reduces Bush Tax Cut; Lobbying Couldn’t Save $1.6 Trillion
Plan,” Chicago Sun Times, April 8, 2001, 27.
13. Alan Fram, “Republicans Strike a Tentative Tax Deal; They Agree to Cam‑

paign for an 11‑Year, $1.35 Trillion Tax Cut,” Chicago Sun Times, May 1, 2001, 1.
14. Steve Wamhoff, “The Bush Tax Cuts Cost Two and a Half Times as Much

as the House Democrats’ Health Care Proposal,” Citizens for Tax Justice, September
9, 2009, http://www.ctj.org/pdf/bushtaxcutsvshealthcare.pdf.
15. Office of the Clerk, “Final Vote Results for Roll Call 118,” U.S. House of Rep‑

resentatives, May 16, 2001, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2001/roll118.xml; Gov Track,
“H.R. 1836 (107th): Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,”
Govtrack.us, May 23, 2001, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/107 2001/s165.
-
16. The “Economic Stability” frame, stories were coded as including the frame

if, in relation to discussion of the “economy” or “economic” issues in a story on tax
cuts, they also make reference to the importance of economic stability, health of the
economy, or to the economy “growing” or to economic “growth,” to creating “jobs,”
or specifically to the tax cuts as helping the stabilize, or prevent the economy from
getting worse. The frame also included any references to tax cuts as playing a “stimu‑
lus” role, to efforts to “stimulate” the economy, or to efforts to prevent a “recession”
or concern with a “recession.”
17. George W. Bush, “Remarks Prior to a Meeting with Bipartisan Congres‑

sional Leaders and an Exchange with Reporters,” The American Presidency Project,
January 24, 2001, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29770; Roscoe
Bartlett, “Tax Relief for Everyone,” Congressional Record, March 7, 2001; Cliff Stearns,
“President Bush’s Tax Relief Plan,” Congressional Record, March 13, 2001. Congres‑
sional Republicans who authored the Bush tax cuts named their bill the “Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,” speaking to the idea that it was
necessary to promoting economic growth.
18. The “Relief ” frame was coded as present in a story if it included one of a

number of references or discussions. Stories had to include references to tax cuts as
providing “relief ” to the average American, or to putting money back into citizens
pocket[s], to the importance of, or to assisting “small business[es],” or to the “death
tax”—a common Republican phrase used to depict taxes on wealthier Americans as
imposing an unnecessary burden on the population.
19. George W. Bush, “Remarks Following a Meeting with Republican Con‑

gressional Leadership and an Exchange with Reporters,” The American Presidency
Project, January 22, 2001, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29762;
Bush, “Remarks Prior to a Meeting with Bipartisan Congressional leaders and an
Exchange with Reporters,” 2001; Kay Bailey Hutchison, “Tax Relief,” Congressional
Record, February 6, 2001.
20. The “Big Government” frame was coded as appearing in stories if it included

one of a variety of key words. A story needed to reference the government “surplus”
of revenues, or discussions of government as bloated or too large or excessive in size,

or any other explicit references to government spending as too high or too large.
21. Mike Enzi, “Tax Cuts,” Congressional Record, February 6, 2001; Don Nickles,

“President Bush’s Tax Cut Proposal,” Congressional Record, February 28, 2001.
22. The “Spending Priorities” frame included references to the most commonly

discussed programs among Democrats that require significant public spending, but
benefit middle‑class and working‑class Americans in large numbers: Medicare and
Social Security. Any discussion of these two programs in a story about tax cuts auto‑
matically drove attention to alternative priorities outside of cutting taxes.
23. Byron Dorgan, “Tax Cuts,” Congressional Record, February 6, 2001; Stepha‑

nie Sandlin, “The President’s Tax Cut,” Congressional Record, March 7, 2001.
24. The “Class War” frame was coded as appearing in stories if it included one

of a variety of points in stories on tax cuts. Any stories were included if they included:
discussion of those at the top of the economic ladder or top/higher tax brackets, if
they referenced the “rich,” higher income, or “wealthy” or “wealthier”/”wealthiest”
Americans as related to the tax cuts. Furthermore, any stories that brought attention to
poor Americans, as related to the tax cuts and the wealthy were included, specifically
those that discussed “low” or “moderate” income Americans, the “poor” or those in
“poverty,” were included too. Finally, discussions of the “estate tax” were included in
this frame as well, since this tax (a focus of Republican efforts to cut taxes) applied
to wealthy Americans.
25. Paul Wellstone, “Tax Cuts,” Congressional Record, February 6, 2001; Richard

Durbin, “The President’s Proposed Tax Cut,” Congressional Record, February 13, 2001.
26. The “cost” frame included any one of a variety of different discussions.

Included are any references to the national “debt” or “deficit,” or the cost[s] of tax
cuts, or to concern with the budget being “balanced” or “balancing” budgets so as
to avoid deficit spending (which tax cuts could cause if spending stayed constant or
increased). Other references under this frame include: discussion of tax cuts being too
large or expensive, to the need to make the tax cuts smaller, or finally to the need for
fiscal “responsibility”/being fiscally “responsible” with regard to tax cuts and spending.
27. Dorgan, “Tax Cuts,” 2001; Ben Nelson, “The President’s Tax Cut Proposal

and the Budget,” Congressional Record, February 7, 2001.
28. For the tax cuts case study, inter‑coder reliability tests were undertaken

for my coding and that of the two supplemental coders—more specifically, for indi‑
vidual measurements covering liberal and conservative story frames. For story frames,
was 94 percent and 91 percent for the New York Times; 97 percent and 91 percent
for the Chicago Sun Times, and 100 percent and 94 percent for CBS, 97 percent and
100 percent for MSNBC, and 95percent and 100 percent for Fox News.
29. David E. Sanger and Alison Mitchell, “Bush, the Conciliator, Meets with

Democrats,” New York Times, February 3, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/03/
us/bush the conciliator meets with democrats.html; Chris Matthews, “Will Alan
-
-
-
-
-

Greenspan’s Testimony Boost President Bush’s Tax Cut Plan?” MSNBC, January 25,
2001, 5 p.m. EST; Dan Rather, “Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan Gives Green Light
to Tax Cut to Avert Recession,” CBS News, January 25, 2001, 6:30 p.m. EST; Charles
Osgood, “Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan Recommends Tax Cut to Boost
Economy,” CBS News, January 26, 2001.
30. Marc Lacey, “Bush Deploys Charm on Daschle in Pushing Tax Cut,” New

York Times, March 10, 2001, 7; David Espo, “Bush Hails House OK of Big Tax Cut;
But Plan Faces Uncertain Fate in Senate,” Chicago Sun Times, March 9, 2001, 27.
31. Paula Zahn, “Leading the Edge: President Bush’s Tax Cut Plan,” Fox News,

February 5, 2001, 10 p.m. EST.
32. John Kasich, The O’Reilly Factor, Fox News, February 9, 2001, “Impact Does

Bush’s Tax Cut Favor the Rich?” 10 p.m. EST.
33. Bryant Gumbel, “President Bush to Meet with Cabinet Members to Talk

Tax Cuts,” CBS News, January 31, 2001, 7 a.m. EST.
34. Frank Bruni, “Bush Defends Size of Surplus and Tax Cuts,” New York

Times, August 22, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/22/us/bush defends size
-
-
-
of surplus and tax cuts.html.
-
-
-
-
35. Richard W. Stevenson, “Bush Faces Fight on Plan to Limit or Cut Programs,”

New York Times, March 12, 2001, 1(A).
36. Bob Schieffer, Face the Nation, CBS News, March 11, 2011, 10:30 a.m. EST.

37. For the 2001 tax cuts case study, I provide tests for headlines across all

media outlets examined, and the Kappa reliability scores between my results and those
of the first and second coders were 1 and .93. For story leads, the Kappa reliability
scores were .97 and 1. For quoted sources, the Kappa scores were .87 and .85. For
news frames, the scores were .94 and .94.
38. For my tax cuts content analysis, inter‑coder reliability tests were under‑

taken for my coding and that of the two supplemental coders—more specifically for
individual measurements covering headlines, story leads, and quoted sources. For
headlines, inter‑coder reliability between my analysis and that of the two supplemental
Times quoted sources. For the Chicago Sun Times reliability tests were 100 percent
and 100 percent for headlines; 100 percent and 100 percent for leads; and 94 percent
and 91 percent for quoted sources. For CBS, reliability tests were 99 percent and 100
percent for headlines. For MSNBC tests of leads, reliability was 95 percent and 94
percent; for Fox News tests, reliability was 95 percent and 98 percent.
39. Bill Hemmer, “George W. Bush Holds Campaign Rally in Grand Rapids,

Michigan,” CNN, November 3, 2000, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/
0011/03/se.04.html.
40. Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee; Doris A. Graber and Johanna Dunaway,

Mass Media and American Politics (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2014); Martha Joynt
Kumar, Managing the President’s Message: The White House Communications Operation
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010); Michael Baruch Grossman and
Martha Joynt Kumar, Portraying the President: The White House and the News Media
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Major, The Unilateral Presidency
and the News Media; DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope; Frederic T. Smoller, The
Six O’Clock Presidency: A Theory of Presidential Press Relations in the Age of Television
(Westport: Praeger, 1990).
41. Charles M. Cameron, Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative

Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

and party leader mentions. For more on this, see my description of coding for party
and party leader mentions from chapter 2.
43. Bill O’Reilly, “Should Janet Reno Be Indicted?” Fox News, January 2, 2001,

10 p.m. EST; Sean Hannity, “Does America’s Economy Need a Boost?” Fox News,
January 11, 2001, 11 p.m. EST.
44. Sean Hannity and Alan Colmes, “Will Bush’s Tax Plan Survive Congress?”

Fox News, February 7, 2001, 11 p.m. EST.
45. Paul Krugman, “Reckonings; Getting Fiscal,” New York Times, January 10,

2001, 19(A); Alice M. Rivlin, “Why Fight the Surplus?” New York Times, January 30,
2001, 23(A); Richard Freeman and Eileen Appelbaum, “Instead of a Tax Cut, Send
Out Dividends,” New York Times, February 1, 2001, 23(A); Maureen Dowd, “Liber‑
ties; Taxing My Patience,” New York Times, February 7, 2001, 19(A); Robert E. Rubin,
“A Prosperity Easy to Destroy,” New York Times, February 11, 2001, 17(A); Anthony
Lewis, “Abroad at Home; Philosophy of the Worst,” New York Times, February 24,
2001, 13(A); Bob Herbert, “In America; Voodoo Redux,” New York Times, March 1,
2001, 25(A); Thomas L. Friedman, “Foreign Affairs; You’re Clear to Land,” New York
Times, March 13, 2001, 19(A); Paul Wellstone and Jonathan Kozol, “What Tests Can’t
Fix,” New York Times, March 13, 2001, 19(A); Gene Sperling, “The Reforms a Tax
Cut Ruins,” New York Times, 21 March 2001, 23(A); Robert H. Frank, “Traffic and
Tax Cuts,” New York Times, May 11, 2001, 35(A); James Carville and Paul Begala, “A
Battle Plan for the Democrats,” New York Times, May 27, 2001, 9(A).
46. Robert M. Dunn Jr., “Bush’s Tax Plan Just Needs Tweaking,” New York Times,

March 5, 2001, 17(A); Jack Kemp, “We Can Afford a Much Bigger Tax Cut,” New York
Times, February 21, 2001, 19(A).
47. Editorial, “The Surplus and the Tax Cut,” New York Times, January 2, 2001,

14(A).
48. Robert Novak, “A Political Lord of Money,” Chicago Sun Times, 8 January

2001, 21; Richard Brookhiser, “Intelligentsia Flustered by a Clever Rube,” Chicago Sun
Times, February 16, 2001, 37; George Will, “Surpluses Rightly Belong to the People,”
Chicago Sun Times, February 18, 2001, 49; Tom Roeser, “Securing the Blessings of
Liberty,” Chicago Sun Times, March 3, 2001, 17; James K. Glassman, “Bush’s Solid
Budget Is a Pleasant Non‑Surprise,” Chicago Sun Times, April 19, 2001, 29.
49. Michelle Stevens, “The Kindest Cut of All,” Chicago Sun Times, February 25,

2001, 39; Jan Schakowsky, “Public Not Buying Bush’s Snake Oil,” Chicago Sun Times,
March 10, 2001, 17; Mark Steyn, “Don’t Take What’s Not Yours,” Chicago Sun Times,
April 22, 2001, 39; William O’Rourke, “White House Has Wildcatter Culture Now;
President Bush Talks up Gloom‑and‑Doom Scenarios to Justify His Dubious Agenda,”
Chicago Sun Times, May 22, 2001, 29; Cindy Richards, “How Best to Squander $600?;
why Waste $1.35 Trillion on Social Programs When We Can All Fritter Away the Tax
Rebate on Our Own?” Chicago Sun Times, May 30, 2001, 37; Andrew Greeley, “U.S.
Should Try to Reduce Income Disparity,” Chicago Sun Times, February 18, 2001, 49.
50. Editorial, “Wishful Predictions Offered for 2001,” Chicago Sun Times, Janu‑

ary 1, 2001, 23; Editorial, “Bush’s Tax Plan Matter of Principle,” Chicago Sun Times,
February 26, 2001, 29; Editorial, “No Need to Panic Yet over Economy,” Chicago Sun
Times, January 7, 2001, 45; Editorial, “Taxpayers Finally Get a Friend in W,” Chicago
Sun Times, January 23, 2001, 23.
51. Editorial, “Extend the Tax Cuts,” Chicago Tribune, September 14, 2010,

http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010 09 14/news/ct edit taxes 20100914_1_tax
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-
-
-
-
-
cuts deficit commission taxaholics; Editorial, “Clinton and Obama for Bush: Two
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-
-
Democrats Stump for Tax Cuts,” Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2010, http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704457604576011940005049726.html; Editorial,
“What Tax Cut, Mr. Obama?” Washington Times, December 8, 2010, http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/8/what tax cut mr obama/; Editorial, “A Deal
-
-
-
-
on Taxes,” New York Post, http://m.nypost.com/;s=Y3K38ANBSfBwZC _IeWHT21/p/
-
news/opinion/editorials/deal_on_taxes_23Q5bEsmAsUftiqqHr2YMK.
52. Pew Research Center, “Public Wants Changes in Entitlements, Not

Changes in Benefits,” Pew Research Center, July 7, 2011, http://www.people press.
-
org/2011/07/07/public wants changes in entitlements not change in benefits/.
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-
-
-
-
-
-
-
53. Carolyn Lochhead, “Bush Social Security Proposal Takes a Hit/GAO Finds

Problems with Privatization,” San Francisco Chronicle, March 10, 2005, http://articles.
sfgate.com/2005 03 10/news/17362980_1_private accounts social security democrats.
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-
-
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-
-
54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Jason Furman, “President Misleads on Social Security Rate of Return,” Cen‑

ter on Budget and Policy Priorities, June 6, 2005, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.
cfm?fa=view&id=458.
57. Jason Furman, “How Would the President’s New Social Security Proposals

Affect Middle‑Class Workers and Social Security Solvency?” Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, April 29, 2005, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=234.
58. Brian Riedl, “When Social Security Problems Begin in 2018,” Heritage Foun‑

dation, February 17, 2005, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2005/02/
why social securitys problems begin in 2018.
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-
59. Michael D. Tanner, “Social Security: Follow the Math,” Cato Institute, Janu‑

ary 14, 2005, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3523.
60. Heritage Foundation, “Personal Social Security Accounts Would Allow

Indiana Workers to Fund Retirement Nest Egg,” Heritage Foundation, March 3,
2005, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2005/03/Personal Social Security

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-
-
Accounts Would Allow Indiana Workers to Fund Retirement Nest Eggs.
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61. Edwin Chen, “President Eager to Spend His New ‘Political Capital,’ ” Los

Angeles Times, November 5, 2004, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/nov/05/nation/
na bush5.
-
62. Richard W. Stevenson, “Social Security to be Focus of Much of Bush’s

Address,” New York Times, February 2, 2005, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.
html?res=9500E4DC133BF931A35751C0A9639C8B63.
63. Christine Dugas, “Bush Renews Call for Privatization of Social Security,”

USA Today, September 2, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/
nation/president/2004 09 02 bush social security_x.htm.
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-
64. George W. Bush, “The 2001 President’s Commission to Strengthen Social

Security,” Social Security Administration, May 2, 2001, http://www.ssa.gov/history/
reports/pcsss/potus.html.
65. Edmund Andrews, “Republicans Consider Slowing Benefits Growth for

Most,” New York Times, March 25, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/25/
politics/25social.html?_r=0.
66. Heidi Przybyla, “Democrats Use Bush Social Security Tactics Against

Republicans,” Bloomberg News, April 1, 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=newsarchive&sid=aowohrNKUPcw&refer=us.67. “Bush Still Lacks Broad Support

on Social Security, Poll Shows.” The Wall Street Journal, May 13 2005, http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB111591402193431846.html?mod=politics%255Fprimary%255Fhs.
68. David E. Rosenbaum, “Few See Gains From Social Security Tour,” New

York Times, April 3, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/03/politics/03social.
html; Robin Toner, “In Montana, Bush Faces a Tough Sell on Social Security,” New
York Times, February 6, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/06/politics/06baucus.
html.
69. Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Carl Hulse, “Cool Reception on Capitol Hill to Social

Security,” New York Times, February 4, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/04/
politics/04cong.html; Richard W. Stevenson, “Bush, On Road, Pushes Warning on
Retirement,” New York Times, February 4, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/04/
politics/04bush.html; Robin Toner, “Bush Pension Plan Faces a Brick Wall in the
Senate,” New York Times, February 15, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/15/
politics/15memo.html; Richard W. Stevenson and Robin Toner, “2 Top G.O.P. Law‑
makers Buck Bush on Social Security,” New York Times, February 18, 2005, http://www.
nytimes.com/2005/02/18/politics/18bush.html; David E. Rosenbaum and Robin Toner,
“At Opening Social Security Hearing, Bush’s Fight Looks Largely Uphill,” New York
Times, April 27, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/27/politics/27social.html.
70. Daniel Beland and Alex Waddan, The Politics of Policy Change: Welfare,

Medicare, and Social Security Reform in the United States (Washington, DC: George‑
town University Press, 2012), 156.
71. The personalization frame was coded as occurring in any story on Social

Security that referenced “personal” accounts or to “free market” approaches to reform‑
ing Social Security, or to promoting an “ownership society” through creating indi‑
vidual investment accounts.
72. George W. Bush, “Remarks in a Discussion on Strengthening Social Secu‑

rity in Tampa, Florida,” The American Presidency Project, February 4, 2005, http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=73704; Joe Wilson, “Providing Better
Retirement Choices to the American People,” Congressional Record, March 1, 2005;
Robin Toner, “It’s ‘Private’ vs. ‘Personal’ in Social Security Debate,” New York Times,
March 22, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/22/politics/its private vs personal
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-
in social security debate.html?_r=0.
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-
73. The “Bankruptcy” frame was coded as occurring in stories on Social Secu‑

rity that made reference to one of a number of key words, including: “problems” with
Social Security, a potential “shortfall” in the program, to a “bankrupt” program or
“bankruptcy,” to the program being “broke” or “broken,” to it being in “danger” or in
“crisis,” to the program being “short” of funds, to the program’s “financial,” “finance,”
or “financing” problems, to warnings that the program will “collapse” or is “collapsing,”
or is “unsustainable” or to its “unsustainability,” or to the program being “insolvent,”
or to “insolvency.”
74. George W. Bush, “Remarks in a Discussion on Social Security Reform,”

The American Presidency Project, January 11, 2005, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=63088; George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the State of the Union,” The American Presidency Project, February 2,
2005, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58746.
75. The “Future Generations” frame was coded as occurring in a story on Social

Security if it made reference to the program and “children” or “grandchildren” or to
“future generations” and their relevance to reform.
76. Bush, “Remarks in a Discussion on Social Security Reform,” 2005; George

W. Bush, “Remarks in a Discussion on Strengthening Social Security in Westfield, New
Jersey,” The American Presidency Project, March 4, 2005, http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/index.php?pid=62892.
77. The “Privatization” frame was coded as occurring in stories on Social Secu‑

rity if they made reference the program introducing “private” accounts or to “priva‑
tization” of the program.
78. Toner, “It’s ‘Private’ vs. ‘Personal’ in Social Security Debate.”

79. Ibid.; Richard Durbin, “Social Security,” Congressional Record, February 10,

2005; Nancy Pelosi, “Social Security and the Impact on Women,” Congressional Record,
February 3, 2005.
80. The “Manufactured Crisis” frame was coded as occurring if a story on Social

Security included references to a number of key words, as related to the program.
These included: if a story included a reference to a “surplus” in the Social Security

Trust Fund; if a story referenced reports that the program was not likely to run out of
its surplus funds before 2042 to 2060; if a story referenced the fact that the program
is running a “surplus” at any point; if a story described the Bush administration as
exaggerating the funding problems of the program; and references to conservative or
Republican “fear” or “fear mongering” with regard to Social Security going “broke”
or running out of money.
81. Dennis Kucinich, “Social Security,” Congressional Record, May 17, 2005;

Durbin, “Social Security.”
82. For the “Borrowing” frame to be coded as occurring, stories on Social Secu‑

rity needed to reference government efforts to “borrow” or to “borrowing” money to
pay for individual accounts, or to the government debt or deficits growing due to the
creation of individual accounts.
83. Durbin, “Social Security”; Mark Dayton, “Social Security Reform,” Congres‑

sional Record, February 17, 2005.
84. For the Social Security case study, inter‑coder reliability tests were under‑

individual measurements covering liberal and conservative story frames. For story
frames, inter‑coder reliability between my analysis and that of the two supplemental
coders was 97 percent and 95 percent for the New York Times; 100 percent and 97
percent for the Chicago Sun Times, and 99 percent and 93 percent for CBS, 95 percent
and 97 percent for MSNBC, and 94 percent and 96 percent for Fox News.
85. Robert Pear, “AARP Opposes Bush Plan to Replace Social Security

with Private Accounts,” New York Times, November 12, 2004, http://www.nytimes.
com/2004/11/12/politics/12benefit.html.
86. Toner, “It’s ‘Private’ vs. ‘Personal’ in Debate over Bush Plan.”

87. Michael A. Fletcher, “Bush Promotes Plan for Social Security,” Washington

Post, January 12, 2005, 4(A).
88. Neil Cavuto, “Interview Karl Rove,” Fox News, March 16, 2005, 4 p.m. EST.

89. Bob Schieffer, “Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, Discusses the

Senate Filibuster Rule and Judicial Nominations,” CBS News, April 10, 2005, 10:30
a.m. EST.
90. Robert Pear, “Social Security Enlisted to Push Its Own Revision,” New York

Times, January 16, 2005, 1(A).
91. Nedra Pickler, “Bush, Dems Take Sides on Social Security Reform; And

Each Warns Other It Will Suffer in 2006 Elections Because of It,” Chicago Sun Times,
January 12, 2005, 33.
92. Chris Matthews, Hardball, MSNBC, February 2, 2005, 9 p.m. EST; Robert

Pear, “AARP Opposes Bush Plan to Replace Social Security with Private Accounts,”
New York Times, November 12, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/12/politics/
12benefit.html.
93. Associated Press, “Democrats Assail Bush Budget, Deficit,” USA Today, March

5, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005 03 05 dem budget_x.htm.
-
-
-
-
94. David E. Rosenbaum and Richard W. Stevenson, “6 Key Democratic Sena‑

tors Oppose Bush Plan on Benefits,” New York Times, February 1, 2005, 14(A).
95. For Social Security, inter‑coder reliability tests were undertaken for my

coding and that of the two supplemental coders—more specifically for individual
measurements covering headlines, story leads, and quoted sources. For headlines,
was: 100 percent and 100 percent for New York Times headlines; 95 percent and 95
percent for New York Times leads; and 96 percent and 97 percent for New York Times
quoted sources. For the Chicago Sun Times, reliability tests were 100 percent and 100
percent for headlines; 100 percent and 100 percent for leads; and 100 percent and 95
percent for quoted sources. For CBS, reliability tests were 100 percent and 100 percent
96. For the 2005 Social Security case study, I provide tests for headlines across

all media outlets examined, and the Kappa reliability scores between my results and
that of the first and second coders were .98 and 9. For story leads, the Kappa reli‑
ability scores were .89 and .85. For quoted sources, the Kappa scores were .87 and .8.
For news frames, the scores were .89 and .86.
97. Edmund L. Andrews and Eduardo Porter, “Social Security: Help for the

Poor or Help for All,” New York Times, May 1, 2005, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9E0CE1D81E31F932A35756C0A9639C8B63&pagewanted=1; Leigh
Strope, “Social Security Change Revealed: Tentative Plan: Workers Put $1,000 Yearly
into Private Accounts,” Chicago Sun Times, January 5, 2005, 26.

and party leader mentions. For more on this, see note 58 from chapter 3.
99. Keith Olbermann, Countdown, MSNBC, February 3, 2005, 7 p.m. EST;

Keith Olbermann, Countdown, MSNBC, January 21, 2005, 7 p.m. EST.
100. Bill O’Reilly, The O’Reilly Factor, Fox News, February 3, 2005, 8 p.m. EST;

Bill O’Reilly, The O’Reilly Factor, Fox News, March 10, 2005, 8 p.m. EST; Sean Hannity
and Alan Colmes, “Discussion with House Majority Leader Tom DeLay,” Fox News,
February 2, 2005, 11 p.m. EST.
101. Hannity and Colmes, “Discussion with House Majority Leader Tom

DeLay.”
102. Paul Krugman, “Stopping the Bum’s Rush,” New York Times, January 4,

2005, 19(A); Gene Sperling, “No Pain, No Savings,” New York Times, January 5, 2005,
23(A); Barry Schwartz, “Choose and Lose,” New York Times, January 5, 2005, 23(A);
Michael C. Laracy, “Women and Children First,” New York Times, January 8, 2005,
15(A); Paul O’Neill, “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?” New York Times, January 16,
2005, 11(D); Jeff Shesol, “Let’s Put This Speech to Bed,” New York Times, February
2, 2005, 21(A); Maureen Dowd, “Inherit the Windbags,” New York Times, February
3, 2005, 27(A); Bob Herbert, “The Era of Exploitation,” New York Times, March 25,
2005, 17(A); Robert E. Rubin, “Attention: Deficit Disorder,” New York Times, May 13,
2005, 23(A).
103. Nicholas D. Kristof, “Social Security Poker: It’s Time for Liberals to Ante

Up,” New York Times, February 5, 2005, 17(A); John Tierney, “Bush as Robin Hood,”
New York Times, April 30, 2005, 13(A); Martin Mayer, “Private Accounts, Public
Accountability,” New York Times, 22 April 2005, 23(A); John Tierney, “The Proof ’s in
the Pension,” New York Times, April 26, 2005, 19(A); David Brooks, “Calling Demo‑
crat’s Bluff,” New York Times, May 8, 2005, 13(A).
104. Editorial, “For the Record on Social Security,” New York Times, January 10,

2005, 18(A); Editorial, “Read the Fine Print,” New York Times, February 6, 2005, 12(D).
105. Editorial, “For the Record on Social Security,” 2005.

106. Jesse Jackson, “U.S. Policy Abandons King’s Dream; King Realized the

Freedom Symphony had Many Movements,” Chicago Sun Times, January 18, 2005,
35; William O’Rourke, “Social Security Plan an Ideological Crusade; Privatizers Don’t
Want a Solution, They Want a Victory,” Chicago Sun Times, February 13, 2005, 46;
William O’Rourke, “Reporting Isn’t What It Used to be; Dan Rather Has Come a
Long Way From His Early Days of Actual Reporting,” Chicago Sun Times, January
23, 2005, 37; Cindy Richards, “Deficits Matter Because the National Debt Matters,”
Chicago Sun Times, February, 16, 2005, 51; Andrew Greeley, “How Long Can Bush Get
Away with Lies? As Long as Karl Rove and His Team of Spinners Provide Persuasive
Rationalizations,” Chicago Sun Times, February 25, 2005, 57; Ralph Martire, “It Would
Worsen the Nation’s Debt and Cost Significantly More than Current Policy,” Chicago
Sun Times, March 26, 2005, 23; Rahm Emanuel, “Low Savings Rate is Real Retirement
Crisis; Day‑to‑day Living Expenses Continue to Rob the Middle Class of its Ability
to Save for Retirement,” Chicago Sun Times, April 22, 2005, 49.
107. Michael Barone, “Social Security Reform Can Pass Despite Clinton Failure;

The Bush Plan Is Much Better Policy and More Salable. The Clinton Health Care Plan
Took on Too Much,” Chicago Sun Times, January 4, 2005, 35; George Will, “Social
Security Should Be Reformed not Because There Is a Crisis but Because There Is
an Opportunity,” Chicago Sun Times, January 20, 2005, 43; Betsy Hart, “Bush Must
Stand Firm on Social Security Private Accounts; Bush has Laid out a Bold Agenda,
Now He Must Fight for It, Even Against Members of his Own Party,” Chicago Sun
Times, February 13, 2005, 46; Robert Novak, “GOP Catches Heat on Bush Plan; For
Many, the Social Security Bill Is Looking Like a Bridge Too Far,” Chicago Sun Times,
March 3, 2005, 29.
108. Editorial, “Is Bush’s Social Security Shift as Necessary as Reagan’s?” Chicago

Sun Times, February 3, 2005, 27.
109. Editorial, “A System Doomed,” New York Post, February 6, 2005, 26;

Editorial, “The Solvency Trap,” Wall Street Journal, May 2, 2005, 18(A); Edito‑
rial, “A Forceful Address to the World,” Washington Times, February 4, 2005,
18(A); Editorial, “Third Rail Politics,” Chicago Tribune, September 27, 2010,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010 09 27/news/ct edit tenth 20100927_1_dold
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-
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and seals private accounts social security.
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-
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110. William Ahern, “Comparing the Kennedy, Reagan, and Bush Tax Cuts,”

The Tax Foundation, August 24, 2004, http://taxfoundation.org/article/comparing
-
kennedy reagan and bush tax cuts; Andrew Fieldhouse and Ethan Pollack, “Tenth
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-
-
-
-
Anniversary of the Bush‑era Tax Cuts,” Economic Policy Institute, June 1, 2011, http://
www.epi.org/publication/tenth_anniversary_of_the_bush era_tax_cuts/.
-
111. Mark S. Mizruchi, The Fracturing of the American Corporate Elite (Cam‑

bridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 293.
negativity to try and shut down the majority party’s agenda. This pattern is
certainly observed in the cases of Social Security reform and the stimulus.
But this pattern also undermines the claims of “bad news” scholars that uni‑
fied control of government harms the majority party because of excessive
Blaming journalists for negativity in government is convenient because
it implies only a partial dysfunction in American politics. If it is mainly
journalists who are guilty of negativity and undermining public confidence
in government, then the problems in American politics are not as severe as if
government itself were broken. If, on the other hand, negativity in the news is
merely a symptom of a larger problem—the breakdown of government—then
political scientists risk challenging the entire political system by highlighting
systemic dysfunction on the part of both the media and government. Criti‑
cizing the government for negativity and dysfunction may be controversial
for some scholars, but one should not shy away from a conclusion simply
because it is controversial or inconvenient for those holding political power.
Within‑Party Criticisms:
How Common Are They in the News?
While cross‑party criticisms and negativity are common in U.S. politics and
in the news, how often does dissent materialize from within each party? This
topic is of primary interest to some bad news scholars. Baum and Groeling
base much of their criticism of the media on the idea that journalists over‑
emphasize within‑party criticisms. Is this concern warranted? It is difficult to
know for sure whether reporters exaggerate within‑party negativity, although
the limited data available suggest that this is probably not the case.
Baum and Groeling examine reporting of congressional‑presidential
relations. Presidents are expected to be the leaders of their political parties.
Baum and Groeling focus on criticisms and praise of the president from both
parties to see how often presidents are framed positively and negatively in
the news. However, their research ignores other types of official rhetoric and
news content. They ignore congressional statements that do not relate to the
president, in addition to presidential and executive rhetoric, statements from
other officials, and statements from nonofficials. Within‑party and cross‑party
statements of praise and criticism toward the president comprise just some
types of statement from officials appearing in the news. Without taking into
account other types of statements, it is difficult to generalize about media
negativity. A comprehensive analysis of political discourse would need to
8. Ethan Pollack, “Recovery Package Falls Short of Infrastructure Needs,” Eco‑

nomic Policy Institute, February 4, 2009, http://www.epi.org/economic_snapshots/
entry/snapshots_20090204/.
9. Reuters, “Factbox: How U.S. Stimulus Plan Ranks against Other Programs,”

February 13, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/02/13/us usa stimulus rank
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-
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-
sb idUSTRE51C5LG20090213.
-
10. Rory Cooper, “Stimulus 101: The Pelosi‑Reid‑Obama Debt Plan,” Heritage

Foundation, January 27, 2009, http://blog.heritage.org/2009/01/27/stimulus 101 the
-
-
-
pelosi reid obama debt plan/.
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-
-
-
11. Kevin A. Hassett, “Why Fiscal Stimulus is Unlikely to Work,” American

Enterprise Institute, March 3, 2009, http://www.aei.org/docLib/Why%20Fiscal%20
Stimulus%20is%20Unlikely.pdf.
12. Hans Bader, “Obama Proposes $50 Billion More in Wasteful Deficit Spend‑

ing,” Competitive Enterprise Institute, September 8, 2010, http://www.openmarket.
org/2010/09/08/obama proposes 50 billion more in wasteful deficit spending/.
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13. Curtis S. Dubay, “Obama’s Stimulus has ‘Spread the Wealth Around’: Are Tax

Hikes Next?” Heritage Foundation, March 23, 2009, http://www.heritage.org/research/
reports/2009/03/obamas stimulus has spread the wealth around are tax hikes next.
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14. Richard A. Epstein, “Why the Obama Stimulus Plan Must Fail,” CATO

Institute, July 21, 2009, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why obama
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-
stimulus plan must fail.
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-
-
15. Jackie Calmes and Carl Hulse, “Obama Considers Major Expansion in Aid

to Jobless,” New York Times, January 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/us/
politics/04stimulus.html.
16. Jackie Calmes and David M. Herszenhorn, “Obama Pressing for a Quick

Jolt to the Economy,” New York Times, January 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/01/24/us/politics/24stimulus.html; Peter Baker, “Obama, in Effort to Build
Support, Lays Out Details of $825 Billion Stimulus Plan,” New York Times, January
25, 2009, 20(A); Sharon Otterman, “Republicans are Resistant to Obama’s Stimulus
Plan,” New York Times, January 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/26/us/
politics/26talkshow.html.
17. Jackie Calmes and Carl Hulse, “Obama, Visiting G.O.P. Lawmakers, Is Open

to Some Compromise on Stimulus,” New York Times, January 28, 2009, 17(A).
18. Jackie Calmes, “House Approves $819 Billion Plan for Economic Aid,” New

York Times, January 29, 2009, 1(A).
19. David M. Herszenhorn, “Stimulus Plan Encounters Stiff Resistance in Sen‑

ate,” New York Times, January 31, 2009, 14(A); Jackie Calmes and David M. Herszen‑
horn, “Democrats Set Sights on Republican Senators,” New York Times, January 29,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30repubs.html?ref=politics.
20. Peter Baker, “At Town Hall Rally, Obama Pushes Stimulus Plan,” New York

Times, February 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/us/politics/10obama
-
web.html; Abdon M. Pallasch, “Obama Hears Stimulus Cat‑Calls; President Greeted
Warmly at Peoria Plant While Pushing $789 Billion Recovery Package,” Chicago Sun
Times, February 13, 2009, 16; Lynn Sweet, “Selling the Stimulus; Obama Tries Web,
Phone Bank, Even Visit to Elkhart,” Chicago Sun Times, February 9, 2009, 22.
21. David M. Herszenhorn, “Senate Clears Path for Vote on $838 Billion

Stimulus,” New York Times, February 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/
washington/10stimulus web.html; David M. Herzenhorn and Carl Hulse, “House and
-
Senate in Deal for $789 Billion Stimulus,” New York Times, February 12, 2009, 1(A).
22. Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Adam Nagourney, “As Recovery Measure Becomes

Law, the Partisan Fight Over it Endures,” New York Times, February 18, 2009, 17(A).
23. Jeff Zeleny and Megan Thee‑Brenan, “Survey Reveals Broad Support for

President,” New York Times, February 24, 2009, 1(A).
24. Lydia Saad, “Public Support for Stimulus Package Unchanged at 52%,” Gal‑

lup Economy, February 5, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/114184/public support
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-
stimulus package unchanged.aspx.
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25. The “Infrastructure” frame was coded as present in news stories on the

stimulus if they included references to “education” spending or references to schools,
colleges, universities, and/or higher education, to “renewable” energy projects or to
energy spending in general, to public works spending and construction projects, in
addition to references to specific infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and mass transit.
26. Associated Press, “AP GfK Poll, February 12–17, 2009,” Pollingreport.

-
com, http://www.pollingreport.com/budget6.htm; McClatchy Newspapers, “Ipsos/
McClatchy Poll, January 15–18, 2009, http://www.pollingreport.com/budget6.htm.
27. Barack H. Obama, “Interview with Columnists of the Washington Post,”

The American Presidency Project, February 13, 2009, http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/index.php?pid=85746&st=&st1=; Barack H. Obama, “Remarks at the House
Democratic Caucus Issues Conference in Williamsburg, Virginia,” The American
Presidency Project, February 5, 2009, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.
php?pid=85739&st=&st1=.
28. The “Economic Necessity” frame was coded as appearing in news stories on

the stimulus if it included one of a number of different types of content. These include:
references to the economy as in “recession,” references to economic growth and efforts
to stabilize the economy, references to the economic “crisis” or to the housing “cri‑
sis.” All of these references, if appearing in the context of stimulus stories, suggest
economic immediacy and danger that could be addressed by the U.S. government.
29. Obama, “Interview with Columnists of the Washington Post”; Obama,

“Remarks at the House Democratic Caucus Issues Conference in Williamsburg,
Virginia.”
30. The “Main Street” frame was coded as appearing in news stories based on a

few criteria. Stories that referenced the “poor” or “poverty,” that discussed American
workers, or those with low incomes who might benefit from a stimulus, or refer‑
ences to “Main Street” Americans were included. Other things included in this frame
included references to potential service cuts from government without a stimulus, in
addition to the threat of growing layoffs and increasing unemployment in the private
economy without a stimulus. References to “working‑class” and “middle‑class” groups
as potentially benefitting from a stimulus were included too. Finally, any references to
a budget crisis within states, or to budget shortfalls for states if they did not receive
stimulus funds were included as well.
31. Barack H. Obama, “Interview with Brian Williams of NBC News,” February

3, 2009, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.
php?pid=85748&st=&st1=; Obama, “Interview with Columnists of the Washington
Post.”
32. The “Tax” frame was very straightforward, as it simply was coded as appear‑

ing for any story in which the stimulus was talked about alongside tax‑related issues
or tax cuts.
33. Marsha Blackburn, “Speech of Hon. Marsha Blackburn of Tennessee in the

House of Representatives,” Congressional Record, February 13, 2009; Mitch McConnell,
“American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,” Congressional Record, February
3, 2009.
34. The “Borrowing” frame was coded as existing in a news story if it made

reference to the stimulus, alongside discussions of “debt” or “deficit” concerns with
regard to stimulus spending. References to borrowing funds to pay for the stimulus
were also included in this frame.
35. Mitch McConnell, “Stimulus Package,” Congressional Record, February 6,

2009; Eric Cantor, “Legislative Program,” Congressional Record, January 22, 2009.
36. The “Big Government” frame was coded as appearing in news stories if it

included references to the stimulus, alongside discussions of “special interest” legis‑
lation, “pork barrel” politics, or other forms of wasteful spending, pet projects, or
reckless/irresponsible spending.
37. Mitch McConnell, “Stimulus Package”; John Boehner, “Economic Stimulus,”

Congressional Record, February 3, 2009.

reliability between my analysis and that of the two supplemental coders was 100
percent and 95 percent for the New York Times; 97 percent and 88 percent for the
Chicago Sun Times, and 95 percent and 95 percent for CBS, 90 percent and 95 percent
for MSNBC, and 90 percent and 90 perent for Fox News.
39. Julie Chen, The Early Show, CBS News, January 29, 2009, 7 a.m. EST.

40. David M. Herszenhorn and Carl Hulse, “Deal Reached in Congress on

$789 Billion Stimulus Plan,” New York Times, February 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/02/12/us/politics/12stimulus.html?_r=0.
41. David M. Herszenhorn, “Senate Releases Second Portion of Bailout Fund,”

New York Times, January 16, 2009, 1(A).
42. Mary Wisniewski, “Lipinski Seeks $10 Billion for Transit in Stimulus,” Chi‑

cago Sun Times, January 28, 2001, 15.
43. Brit Hume, Fox Special Report with Brit Hume, Fox News, January 16, 2009,

6 p.m. EST.
44. Chris Matthews, HARDBALL, MSNBC, January 28, 2009, 5 p.m. EST.

45. Jackie Calmes and David M. Herszenhorn, “Geithner Grilled over Tax

Issue,” New York Times, January 21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/busi‑
ness/economy/22treasury.html.
46. Katie Couric, “Obama at Capitol to Talk to Republicans about Stimulus

Package,” CBS News, January 27, 2009, 6:30 p.m. EST.
47. Neil Cavuto, Your World with Neil Cavuto, Fox News, March 3, 2010, 4

p.m. EST.
48. Julie Chen, “Obama’s Economic Stimulus Package Passes House; House

Speaker Nancy Pelosi Discusses Issue,” CBS News, January 29, 2009, 7:30 a.m. EST.
49. Jackie Calmes, “House Passes Stimulus Plan with No G.O.P. Votes,” New York

Times, January 28, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/29/us/politics/29obama.
html; Fox News, “McCain: It’s a Spending Bill, Not a Stimulus,” Foxnews.com, May 4, 2011,
http://video.foxbusiness.com/v/3882715/mccain its a spending bill not a stimulus/.
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50. Jeannine Aversa, “Economy Takes Worst Tumble in Quarter Century; Lay‑

offs, Debt, and Dread Combine to Drag Nation’s Fiscal Health Down to End ’08,”
Chicago Sun Times, January 31, 2009, 2; David Espo, “Done Deal; After a Day of
Backroom Dealmaking by Rahm Emanuel and Harry Reid, President Obama’s Com‑
promise $780 Billion Stimulus Package Seems Poised to Pass the Senate,” Chicago Sun
Times, February 7, 2009, 2.
51. Keith Olbermann, Countdown, MSNBC, January 28, 2009, 8 p.m. EST.

52. For the 2009 stimulus case study, I provide tests for headlines across all

media outlets examined, and the Kappa reliability scores between my results and that
of the first and second coders were 1 and 9. For story leads, the Kappa reliability
scores were .96 and .92. For quoted sources, the Kappa scores were .86 and .85. For
53. For the stimulus case study, inter‑coder reliability tests were undertaken for

my coding and that of the two supplemental coders—more specifically for individual
measurements covering headlines, story leads, and quoted sources. For headlines,
was: 100 percent and 100 percent for New York Times headlines; 100 percent and
100percent for New York Times leads; and 94 percent and 91 percent for New York
Times quoted sources. For the Chicago Sun Times reliability tests were 100 percent
and 100 percent for headlines; 98 percent and 99 percent for leads; and 88 percent
and 96 percent for quoted sources. For CBS reliability tests were 100 percent and 100
percent for headlines. For MSNBC tests of leads, reliability was 95 percent and 92
percent; for Fox News tests, reliability was 95 percent and 95 percent.
54. Neil Cavuto, Your World with Neil Cavuto, Fox News, January 28, 2009, 4

p.m. EST.
55. Jackie Calmes, “For Obama, Rare Chance for Bold Start on Big Task,” New

York Times, January 19, 2009, 12(A); Calmes and Herszenhorn, “Obama Pressing for
Quick Jolt to the Economy”; Sam Dillon, “Stimulus Plan Offers Road to Retooling
Social Policy,” New York Times, January 28, 2009, 1(A); Jeannine Aversa, “Economy
Takes Worst Tumble in Quarter Century; Layoffs, Debt and Dread Combine to Drag
Nation’s Fiscal Health Down to End ’08,” Chicago Sun Times, January 31, 2009, 2.
56. David M. Merszenhorn, “Internet Money in Fiscal Plan: Wise or Waste?”

New York Times, February 3, 2009, 1(A); Michael Cooper, “Rider Paradox: Surge in
Mass, Drop in Transit,” New York Times, February 4, 2009, 1(A).

58. Editorial, “The Stimulus Advances,” New York Times, January 29, 2009,

26(A); Editorial, “The Stimulus Debate,” New York Times, January 11, 2009, 9(A).
59. Editorial, “Obama’s No. 1 Job Is Boosting Economy,” Chicago Sun Times,

February 11, 2009, 21.
60. Editorial, “Job’s Snow‑Job,” New York Post, July 15, 2010, http://www.nypost.

com/p/news/opinion/editorials/jobs_snow_job_B7JdKD5Q9bW5gHMit1H8MP; Edi‑
torial, “Buses to Nowhere, Stimulus for Nothing,” Washington Times, December 23, 2010,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/23/buses to nowhere stimulus for
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-
-
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nothing/; Editorial, “The Stimulus Time Machine,” Wall Street Journal, January 26, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123292987008414041.html; Editorial, “Stimulating

Waste,” Chicago Tribune, July 19, 2010, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010 07 19/
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news/ct edit signs 20100719_1_federal stimulus funds signs rod blagojevich.
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61. Rachel Maddow, The Rachel Maddow Show, MSNBC, January 6, 2009, 9

p.m EST; Keith Olbermann, Countdown, MSNBC, January 28, 2009, 8 p.m. EST; Ed
Schultz, The Ed Show, MSNBC, April 8, 2009, 6 p.m. EST; Ed Schultz, The Ed Show,
MSNBC, April 13, 2009, 6 p.m. EST; Bill O’Reilly, The O’Reilly Factor, Fox News,
January 28, 2009, 8 p.m. EST; Glenn Beck, Glenn Beck, Fox News, January 26, 2009,
5 p.m. EST; Sean Hannity and Alan Colmes, Hannity and Colmes, Fox News, January
5, 2009, 9 p.m. EST; Sean Hannity and Alan Colmes, Hannity and Colmes, Fox News,
January 6, 2009, 9 p.m. EST; Sean Hannity and Alan Colmes, Hannity and Colmes,
Fox News, January 12, 2009, 9 p.m. EST; Alan Colmes, Hannity and Colmes, Fox
News, January 9, 2009, 9 p.m EST.
62. Polling Report, “USA Today/Gallup Poll, March 21–22, 2009,” Pollingreport.

com, http://www.pollingreport.com/business2.htm.
63. ABC News Blogs, “Obama Calls Wall Street Bonuses ‘Shameful’ and the

‘Height of Irresponsibility,’ ” ABC News, January 29, 2009, http://blogs.abcnews.com/

politicalpunch/2009/01/obama calls wal.html.
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64. Congressional Budget Office, “Summary of the Estimated Cost of H.R. 1,

the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,” Congressional Budget Office,
February 2009, http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9981/ReidAmendment.pdf.
65. Ira T. Kay and Steven Van Putten, “Executive Pay: Regulation vs. Market

Competition,” Cato Institute, September 10, 2008, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.
php?pub_id=9621.
66. Dave Mason, “Why Government Control of Bank Salaries Will Hurt, Not

Help, the Economy,” Heritage Foundation, November 4, 2009, http://www.heritage.org/
research/reports/2009/11/why government control of bank salaries will hurt not
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help the economy; Andrew M. Grossman, “Unintended Consequences on Executive

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Pay I: Golden Parachutes,” Heritage Foundation, February 4, 2009, http://blog.heritage.
org/2009/02/04/unintended consequences on executive pay i golden parachutes/;
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Dave Mason, “House Executive Pay Legislation Puts Pay Czar’s Boot in the Door,”
Heritage Foundation, July 30, 2009, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/07/
house executive pay legislation puts pay czars boot in the door.
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67. Patrick Bolton, Jose S. Scheinkman, and Wei Xiong, “Executive Pay

and Short‑Termist Behavior in Speculative Markets,” Columbia Business School/
Princeton University, November 2005, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=858284.
68. Public Citizen, “Obama Pay Cuts a Good Start, But More is Needed,”

October 22, 2009, http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=2982;
Robert Weissman, “Statement of Robert Weissman, President, Public Citizen,” Pub‑
lic Citizen, October 15, 2009, http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.
cfm?ID=2978.
69. ABC News Blogs, “Obama Calls Wall Street Bonuses ‘Shameful’ and the

‘Height of Irresponsibility’ ”; Ben Feller, “$18 billion in Wall St. Bonuses Is ‘Shameful’;

Obama Lashes out at Exorbitant Financial Sector Payouts, Calls for Responsibility and
Restraint,” Chicago Sun Times, January 30, 2009, 34.
70. Stephen Labaton, “Obama Plans Fast Action To Tighten Financial Rules,”

New York Times, January 25, 2009, 1; Steve Liesman, “TARP Executive Compensation
Limits Set at $500,000,” CNBC, February 4, 2009, http://www.cnbc.com/id/29003965/
TARP_Executive_Compensation_Limits_Set_at_500_000; Associated Press, “Wall St.,
Not Haul St.; Obama Limits Exec Pay to $500,000,” Chicago Sun Times, February 5,
2009, 10; Edmund L. Andrews, “U.S. Plans to Curb Executive Pay for Bailout Recipi‑
ents,” New York Times, February 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/busi‑
ness/worldbusiness/04iht 04pay.19912202.html.
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71. Sam Stein, “Claire McCaskill Lays Down Law on CEO Compensation,”

Huffington Post, January 30, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/30/
mccaskill lays down law o_n_162662.html.
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72. Tom Raum, “Take That, AIG: 90% Tax; House Drops Hammer on

Bonuses Given by Bailed‑Out Firms,” Chicago Sun Times, March 20, 2009,
34; Heidi N. Moore, “Bonuses: Senate Bill Makes the House Looks Gener‑
ous,” Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/03/20/
bonuses senate bill makes the house look generous/.
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73. Greg Hitt and Aaron Lucchetti, “House Passes Bonus Tax Bill,” Wall Street

Journal, March 20, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123745823318182841;
Associated Press, “Senate Republicans Brake Rush to Tax AIG Bonuses,” USA Today,
March 20, 2009, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009 03 20 aig
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bonuses_N.htm.
74. Stephen Labaton, “Administration Seeks Increase in Oversight of Execu‑

tive Pay,” New York Times, March 22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/22/us/
politics/22regulate.html?hp
75. Ben Armbruster, “Perino Defends AIG Bonuses,” Think Progress, March 17,

2009, http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2009/03/17/36843/perino defends aig/.
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76. Ryan Grim, “GOP Opposes Pay Limits on Bailed Out Bankers,” Huffington

Post, February 6, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/02/06/gop opposes pay
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limits on_n_164544.html.
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77. Martin Crustinger, “AIG Execs Get $165M in Bonuses; U.S. Unable to Bar

Payments Despite $170 Bil. Bailout of Troubled Insurer,” Chicago Sun Times, March
15, 2009, 20; Lynn Sweet, “ ‘Outrageous’ Bonuses; Firm Says It Was Contractually

Obliged to Make Payouts,” Chicago Sun Times, March 16, 2009, 33.
78. These surveys are discussed at length in chapter 6.

79. Bloomberg News, “Execs Return 9 of Top 10 AIG Bonuses,” Chicago Sun

Times, March 24, 2009, 37.
80. Jeanne Sahadi, “War over AIG Bonuses Dies Down,” CNN Money, March 24,

2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/24/news/economy/bonus_tax_onsecondthought/
index.htm?source=yahoo_quote.
81. Cyrus Sanati, “House Panel Clashes Over Pay Restrictions,” New York Times,

June 12, 2009, 4(B).
82. Stephen Labaton, “In Victory for Obama, House Panel Approves Restraints

on Executive Pay,” New York Times, July 29, 2009, 4(B); Stephen Labaton, “House
Panel Approves Executive Pay Restraints,” New York Times, July 28, 2009, http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/07/29/business/29pay.html.
83. Helene Cooper, “Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System,” New York

Times, July 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/22regulate.html.
84. The Republican/Wall Street antiregulation frame included any sentences

referencing executive pay or bonuses which situated that discussion from the point
of view of Republicans and business executives. These stories often included generic
claims that regulation of executive pay was undesirable in a “free market” and that
government was not suited to make such decisions.
85. The “Liberal Backlash” frame included any discussions of executive pay and

bonuses accompanied by discussions from Democratic officials of efforts to regulate
Wall Street bonuses. Democratic statements regularly assumed that regulation of pay
and bonuses was necessary in light of the perceived incompetence of Wall Street fol‑
lowing the 2008 economic collapse.
86. The “Regulatory Reliance” frame was coded as appearing in stories on the

issue of executive pay and bonuses, alongside references to attempts to “claw back”
bonuses through imposing a tax on executive bonus salaries for those corporations
that received bailout funds and paid out bonuses to employees. The frame also includ‑
ed any discussions of efforts to “limit” executive pay, force employees to “repay” or
“pay back” bonuses, or efforts to regulate pay in some other way.
87. Dina Titus, “AIG Outrage,” Congressional Record, March 19, 2009; Jeanne

Shaheen, “AIG Bonuses,” Congressional Record, March 19, 2009.
88. The “Necessity” frame was coded as present in stories if one of a number of

conditions was met. Stories would have to include references to the “legal” nature of
such pay agreements, to “contracts” or “contractual” legal agreements that needed to

be bound by corporations, to claims that these contracts were needed to “recruit” or
“retain” skilled/”talented” employees, and to the need to attract employees to compa‑
nies with extra financial incentives. The frame included claims that these employees
had “earned” their benefits, and that government should not “dictate” pay limits, and
condemnations of government for allegedly moving toward “socialism,” “Marxism,”
or “communism” if regulations on pay were to be passed into law.
89. Jeff Sessions, “AIG Bonuses,” Congressional Record, March 16, 2009; Jon Kyl,

“AIG Bonuses,” Congressional Record, March 23, 2009.
90. The “Populism” frame sought to capture public anger at Wall Street for

paying out bonuses in a time of crisis from taxpayer funds. This frame was coded
as appearing in stories if it discussed pay or bonuses, alongside discussions of public
anger, outrage, fury, or distrust.
91. Jeanne Shaheen, “AIG Bonuses,” Congressional Record, March 19, 2009;

Brad Sherman, “TARP and the AIG‑Wall Street Axis,” Congressional Record, March
18, 2009; Barack H. Obama, “The President’s Weekly Address,” The American Presi‑
dency Project, January 31, 2009, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=
85712&st=&st1=.
92. Key ideas included in the “Economic Instability” frame were references to

efforts to regulate pay or bonuses, tempered by discussions of the “toxic” assets on
Wall Street, or references to the proposed “bad bank” under the Treasury Department
that was supposed to buy up toxic Wall Street assets so these investment firms could
wipe them from their records. The frame also included any discussion of the weak
economy or an economy in crisis, or references to “stress tests” for the big banks,
alongside discussions of efforts to regulate executive pay and bonuses.
93. Sessions, “AIG Bonuses,” 2009; Paul Broun, “The AIG Bonus Bill is a Leg‑

islative Cover‑up,” Congressional Record, March 19, 2009.
94. A sufficient sample of headlines addressing the executive pay battle was not

available for CBS, Fox News, or MSNBC, as the titles of the stories largely failed to
directly address the events in Congress surrounding reform.

reliability between my analysis and that of the two supplemental coders was 94 percent
and 95 percent for the New York Times; 97 percent and 87 percent for the Chicago
Sun Times, and 87 percent and 93 percent for CBS, 93 percent and 90 percent for
MSNBC, and 80 percent and 87 percent for Fox News.
96. Cyrus Sanati, “House Panel Clashes over Pay Restrictions,” New York Times,

June 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/us/politics/12pay.html.
97. Louis Story, “Some Banks Want to Give Government Money Back,” New

York Times, February 11, 2009, 3B.
98. Dash and Bajaj, “Few Ways to Recover Bonuses to Bankers.”

99. Edmund L. Andrews and Peter Baker, “Bonus Money at Troubled AIG

Draws Heavy Criticism,” New York Times, March 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/03/16/business/16aig.html.
100. Bret Baier, Fox Special Report with Bret Baier, Fox News, March 16, 2009,

6:40 p.m. EST.
101. Dash and Bajaj, “Few Ways to Recover Bonuses to Bankers.”

102. Laurie Kellman, “AIG Told: Give It Back; Dems Say They’ll Get $165 Mil.

Back One Way or Another,” Chicago Sun Times, March 18, 2009, 39.
103. Keith Olbermann, Countdown, MSNBC, January 30, 2009, 8 p.m. EST.

104. Bret Baier, Fox News All‑Stars, Fox News, April 21, 2009, 6:30 p.m. EST.

105. Carl Hulse and David M. Herszenhorn, “A.I.G. and Wall St. Confront

Upsurge of Populist Fury,” New York Times, March 20, 2009, 1(A).
106. For the executive pay case study, I provide tests for headlines across all

media outlets examined, and the Kappa reliability scores between my results and that
of the first and second coders were .83 and 1. For story leads, the Kappa reliability
scores were .9 and .8. For quoted sources, the Kappa scores were .87 and .81. For
107. For the executive pay controversy, inter‑coder reliability tests were under‑

individual measurements covering headlines, story leads, and quoted sources. For
headlines, inter‑coder reliability between my analysis and that of the two supplemental
Times quoted sources. For the Chicago Sun Times reliability tests were 100 percent and
99 percent for headlines; 95 percent and 99 percent for leads; and 92 percent and 93
percent for quoted sources. For CBS reliability tests were 100 percent and 100 percent
108. Dash and Bajaj, “Few Ways to Recover Bonuses to Bankers”; Vikas Bajaj

and Stephen Labaton, “Risks are Vast in Revaluation of Bad Assets,” New York Times,
February 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/02/business/economy/02value.
html; Andrews, “U.S. Plans to Curb Executive Pay for Bailout Recipients”; Associ‑
ated Press, “Wall St., Not Haul St.; But Many Will Likely Find Loopholes”; Martin
Krutsinger, “AIG Execs Get $165 Million in Bonuses; U.S. Unable to Bar Payments

Despite $170 Billion Bailout of Troubled Insurer,” Chicago Sun Times, March 15, 2009,
20.
109. Jon Kristofferson, “AIG Uproar Complicates Obama’s Bank Bailout Plan,”

Chicago Sun Times, March 22, 2009, 22.
110. Steve Lohr, “Wall St. Pay Moves in Cycles. (Guess Where We Are Now),”

New York Times, February 5, 2009, 1(B); David Barstow and Mike McIntire, “Calls
for Clarity in New Bailout for U.S. Banks,” New York Times, February 9, 2009, http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/business/economy/10bank.html.
111. Dinesh Ramde, “Bailed‑Out Bank Backs Off; Cancels Puerto Rican Vaca‑

tions for Workers After Public Rage,” Chicago Sun Times, February 13, 2009, 32; Sweet,
“ ‘Outrageous’ Bonuses”; Greta Van Susteren, “Barney Frank Argues with Harvard Law

Student,” Fox News, April 7, 2009, 10 p.m. EST.

113. Robert H. Frank, “Should Congress Limit Executive Pay,” New York Times,

January 4, 2009; Paul Krugman, “Bailout for Bunglers,” New York Times, February 2,
2009, 21(A); Nicholas D. Kristof, “Escaping the Bust Bowl,” New York Times, February
12, 2009, 35(A); Charles M. Blow, “Anger Mismanagement,” New York Times, March
21, 2009, 21(A); Carl Icahn, “We’re Not the Boss of A.I.G.,” New York Times, March
29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/opinion/29Icahn.html?pagewanted=all;
Maureen Dowd, “Toxic R Us,” New York Times, March 22, 2009, 9(A).
114. Reed Hastings, “Please Raid My Taxes,” New York Times, February 6, 2009,

27(A); David Brooks, “Greed and Stupidity,” New York Times, April 3, 2009, 29(A).
115. Editorial, “It’s Not Their Money,” New York Times, January 23, 2009, 26(A);

Editorial, “Still Nice Work if You Can Get It,” New York Times, February 5, 2009,
30(A).
116. Editorial, “Courting Catastrophe,” New York Post, March 19, 2009, http://

www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/editorials/item_ion4fUG2wh5DJZSbcuzBJO; Edito‑
rial, “AIG and Our Embarrassing Congress,” Chicago Tribune, March 22, 2009, http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/2009 03 22/news/0903210311_1_aig bonuses white
-
-
-
-
-
house; Editorial, “Today, It’s AIG . . .” Washington Times, March 25, 2009, http://
 
 
 
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/mar/25/today its aig and tomorrow congress
-
-
-
-
-
-
may be coming /; Editorial, “A Smoot‑Hawley Moment,” Wall Street Journal, March
-
-
-
23, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123776465612908965.html.
117. Roger Simon, “Using Madoff ’s Playbook, AIG Scored Big,” Chicago Sun

Times, March 19, 2009, 18; Roger Simon, “Wall Street Wolves are the Real Toxic
Assets,” Chicago Sun Times, March 26, 2009, 20; Jesse Jackson, “Invest in Education,
Forgive College Loans,” Chicago Sun Times, March 17, 2009, 25.
118. Editorial, “Can’t Stop Bonuses? What are Lawyers for?” Chicago Sun Times,

March 17, 2009, 24.
119. Rachel Maddow, Rachel Maddow Show, MSNBC, February 2, 2009, 9 p.m.

EST; Keith Olbermann, Countdown, MSNBC, January 30, 2009, 8 p.m. EST; Keith
Olbermann, Countdown, MSNBC, March 16, 2009, 8 p.m. EST; Ed Schultz, Ed Schultz
Show, MSNBC, March 18, 2009, 6 p.m. EST.
120. Sean Hannity, Hannity, Fox News, January 30, 2009, 9 p.m. EST; Sean

Hannity, Hannity, Fox News, January 28, 2009, 9 p.m. EST; Glenn Beck, Glenn Beck,
Fox News, March 26, 2009, 5 p.m. EST.
121. Bill O’Reilly, The O’Reilly Factor, Fox News, January 21, 2009, 8 p.m. EST.

122. Lawrence Mishel and Natalie Sabadish, “CEO Pay in 2012 Was Extraordi‑

narily High Relative to Typical Workers and Other High Earners,” Economic Policy Insti‑
tute, June 26, 2013, http://www.epi.org/publication/ceo pay 2012 extraordinarily high/.
-
-
-
-
123. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Labor Force Statistics from the Current

Population Survey,” U.S. Department of Labor, 2014, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/
LNS14000000.
124. Susanna Kim, “Median Household Net Worth Down 35 Percent,” ABC

News, June 18, 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2012/06/median house‑
-
hold net worth down 35 percent/; Catherine Rampell, “Corporate Profits were the
-
-
-
-
-
Highest on Record Last Quarter,” New York Times, November 23, 2010, http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/11/24/business/economy/24econ.html?_r=0.
125. Rampell, “Corporate Profits were the Highest on Record Last Quarter,”

2010; Yepoka Yeebo, “Corporate Profits at All‑Time High as Recovery Stumbles,”
Huffington Post, March 25, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/25/corpo‑
rate profits 2011 all time high_n_840538.html; Alexander Eichler, “Fortune 500 Com‑
-
-
-
-
-
panies Made Record $824 Billion Profit in 2011,” Huffington Post, May 7, 2012, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/07/fortune 500 company earnings_n_1497593. -
-
-
html; Robert Lenzner, “Corporate Profits are at An All Time Record Peak and
-
Expected to Grow in 2014,” Forbes, November 30, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
robertlenzner/2013/11/30/there are far fewer bears on the stock market today than
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
at the peaks in 2000 or 2007/.
-
-
-
-
-
-
126. Floyd Norris, “Corporate Profits Grow and Wages Slide,” New York Times,

April 4, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/05/business/economy/corporate prof‑
-
its grow ever larger as slice of economy as wages slide.html.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
127. David Brock, The Fox Effect: How Roger Ailes Turned a Network into a

Propaganda Machine (New York: Anchor, 2012).
Chapter 5. The Attack Dog Bias?
1. Groeling, When Politicians Attack!, 50; also see: Farnsworth and Lichter, The

Nightly News Nightmare; Cappella and Jamieson, Spiral of Cynicism; Thomas E. Pat‑
terson, Out of Order (New York: Vintage Press, 1994); Larry J. Sabato, Feeding Frenzy:
Attack Journalism and American Politics (Baltimore: Lanahan, 2000).
2. Farnsworth and Lichter, The Nightly News Nightmare, 14, 177–78. 166.

3. Groeling, When Politicians Attack!, 186, 8, 10.

4. Baum and Groeling, War Stories, 4.

5. Baum and Groeling, War Stories, 4; Groeling, When Politicians Attack!, 51.

6. Patterson, Out of Order, 36, 17.

7. Ibid., 37.

8. Ibid., 20.

9. Farnsworth and Lichter, The Nightly News Nightmare, 40.

10. Hallin, The “Uncensored War,” 10.

11. Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston, When the Press Fails, 7, 29.

12. Hallin, The “Uncensored War”; Mermin, Debating War and Peace; Bennett et

al., When the Press Fails; W. Lance Bennett, “A Semi‑Independent Press: Government
Control and Journalistic Autonomy in the Political Construction of News,” Political

13. Leon V. Sigal, Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of News‑

making (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1973).
14. Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America:

The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008).
15. Paul Krugman, “Taken for a Ride,” New York Times, March 19, 2004, http://

www.nytimes.com/2004/03/19/opinion/taken for a ride.html; Christopher Hitchens,
-
-
-
“Fear Factor: How Did we Survive Ari Fleischer’s Reign of Terror?” Slate, September
11, 2006, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2006/09/
fear_factor.html.
16. Michael Cooper, “ ‘Spreading the Wealth’ as Both Accusation and Prescrip‑

tion,” New York Times, October 19, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/20/us/
politics/20mccain.html?_r=0; Politifact, “Sarah Palin Falsely Claims Barack Obama
Runs a ‘Death Panel,’ ” Politifact, August 7, 2009, http://www.politifact.com/truth o

-
-
meter/statements/2009/aug/10/sarah palin/sarah palin barack obama death panel/;
-
-
-
-
-
-
Associated Press, “Steele Calls Obama Health Plan ‘Socialism,’ ” CBS News, July 20,

2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/steele calls obama health plan socialism/.
-
-
-
-
-
17. All three survey questions on government trust and support for government

from Figure 5.1 are statistically significant at the .01 percent level, after controlling
for respondents’ demographic variables including sex, age, education, race, income,
political party, and political ideology.
18. DiMaggio, When Media Goes to War; DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope;

Bonn, Mass Deception; Nacos, Bloch‑Elkon, Shapiro; Selling Fear; Zaller, The Nature
and Origins of Mass Opinion; Kimberly Gross, Sean Aday, and Paul R. Brewer, “A
Panel Study of Media Effects on Political and Social Trust after September 11,” The
International Journal of Press/Politics 9, no. 4 (2004): 449–73.
19. I searched the Congressional Record between January 1 and May 31, 2005,

using the search words “Social Security” to create a list of entries covering statements
from senators and representatives. From this list, I selected entries where it was clear
(based on the titles of entries) that the primary focus was Social Security.
20. I employed a second coder for my analysis of Social Security and the Con‑

gressional Record. The coder analyzed a randomly drawn sample of 20 percent of the
entries I analyzed. The inter‑coder reliability rate between my coding results and those
of the second coder was .91, or 91 percent.
21. I searched the Congressional Record between January 1 and February 28,

2009, using the search word “stimulus” to create a list of entries covering statements
from senators and representatives. In creating this list, I selected any entries (based on
their titles) that were clearly related to the stimulus, or that referenced the “American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,” so as to make sure that the main topic of
discussion was in fact the stimulus.
22. As with the Social Security analysis, I employed a second coder to analyze

Congressional Record statements of negativity related to the stimulus. The second
News audiences are not merely interested in the final results of policy
deliberations, as seen in congressional roll call votes. They want to know
about how policies are shaping up throughout the lawmaking process. Interest
groups and citizens seek to influence congressional deliberation and voting
by contacting their member of Congress, and they cannot do this if they
only see the final product of legislation, without following the deliberative
process that produces final legislation. Through the “beat” process, journal‑
ists establish stable relationships with member of Congress and their staffs
by focusing their reporting on central locations, including Capitol Hill and
the White House. Legislators share their positions with reporters, and these
positions make their way into news reports. Without some direct observation
of these conversations, or without asking journalists directly, it is difficult to
know whether they are overreporting within‑party conflicts.
A final problem with demonstrating bad news bias relates to attempts
to use media coverage as a measurement of media bias itself. This method
for “demonstrating” negativity in the news was used in previous research.25
For example, one study reviewed Sunday morning television interview pro‑
grams with political leaders, and compared program content to reporting of
political issues in television broadcasts.26 The former (interview) programs
were assumed to represent an unbiased sample of elite rhetoric, whereas the
latter (news programs) were assumed to oversample within‑party disagree‑
ments—thereby distorting reporting of political debates.
A number of problems are evident with this approach to identifying
bias. For one, it is simply wrong to claim that comparing one form of poten‑
tially biased content (Sunday morning media programs) to another potential
form of potentially biased content (broadcast news reports) provides evidence
of media bias. Do differences in the conveyance of within‑party disagree‑
ments between Sunday shows and print stories suggest that the latter are
misrepresenting official views? These two measurements are both forms of
media content. Comparing one representation of reality to another repre‑
sentation of reality—the entire time assuming that one of those measures
is a more “objective” measure—is questionable. To claim that the guests of
Sunday morning interview programs “enjoy an extended open mic forum
in which they are free to say whatever they like, with minimal editing and
at most limited interjection from the interviewers” cannot be authoritatively
demonstrated without observing the entire process whereby Sunday morning
programs and broadcast news stories are produced.27 No tangible evidence
is currently available demonstrating why one form of news (interview pro‑
grams) is inherently superior to another form (broadcast news) in terms
of measuring the “real” state of official rhetoric in Washington. Do Sunday
Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues (Chicago: University

of Chicago Press, 1994); James W. Dearing and Everett M. Rogers, Agenda Setting
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996); Maxwell McCombs, Setting the Agenda: The Mass
Media and Public Opinion (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).
4. Zaller, Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, 16.

5. Ibid., 86, 81.

6. John Zaller and Dennis Chui, “Government’s Little Helper: U.S. Press Cov‑

erage of Foreign Crises, 1945–1999,” December 1999, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/
polisci/faculty/zaller/Gov’s%20Little%20Helper/GovHelper. PDF.
7. Zaller, Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, 58.

8. Ibid., 21.

9. Ibid., 18.

10. Ibid., 65.

11. Ibid., 85.

12. Ibid., 52.

13. Ibid., 103.

14. Ibid., 104.

15. Ibid., 201–202.

16. Ibid., 311.

17. Ibid., 145.

18. Richard Brody, Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public

Support (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1992), 138, 142.
19. Nacos, Block‑Elkon, and Shapiro, Selling Fear; Bonn, Mass Deception.

20. Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, The Changing Ameri‑

can Voter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 153–54.
21. Ibid., 149.

22. Berinsky, In Time of War, 62.

23. Ibid., 102–108.

24. Baum and Groeling, War Stories, 3–4.

25. Ibid., 75.

26. Ibid., 76.

27. Ibid., 66.

28. Ibid., 114–48.

29. Ibid., 70, 137–38, 142–45, 133.

30. Ibid., 137, 145.

31. As examples, there have been numerous case studies examining those

instances in which journalists failed to ask critical questions regarding the conflicts
in Afghanistan and Iraq and other foreign policy issues. Some examples of these
studies include: DiMaggio, When Media Goes to War; DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling
Hope; Bonn, Mass Deception; Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston, When the Press Fails;
Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent; Mermin, Debating War and Peace; and
Hayes and Guardino, Influence from Abroad.
32. Zaller, Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion; The idea that media influence

public opinion in favor of reinforcing already existing biases from news audiences
is referred to in scholarship as part of “selective exposure theory.” For a review of
this literature, see: Sivia Knolbloch‑Westerwick, Choice and Preference in Media Use:
Advances in Selective Exposure Theory and Research (New York: Routledge, 2014).
33. See: Groeling, When Politicians Attack!, and Larry M. Bartels, “Messages

Received: The Political Impact of Media Exposure,” American Political Science Review
87, no. 2 (1993): 267–85. Bartels argues that “media exposure is most likely to be
consequential (in the sense of producing large observable opinion changes) when
prior opinions are weak, most notably for ‘new’ candidates or issues.” In the context
of my research, it is not so much how “new” an issue is in politics, as how familiar
individuals are with the basic details of a policy proposal or government program
associated with that issue. Individuals who are more familiar with policy proposals
and programs will be more likely to exert their independence from political rhetoric
than those who are less familiar.
34. Bartels, “Messages Received,” 274.

35. Markus Prior, “Improving Media Effects Research through Better Measure‑

ment of News Exposure,” Journal of Politics 71, no. 3 (2009): 893–908.
36. Pew Research Center, “Stimulus News Seen as More Negative than

Positive,” February 11, 2009, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1118/economic stimulus
-
-
news seen as negative.
-
-
-
37. See: Dearing and Rogers, Agenda Setting; McCombs, Setting the Agenda; Iyen‑

gar and Kinder, News That Matters; Pew Research Center, “Press Coverage and Public
Interest: Matches and Mismatches,” Pew Research Center, January 11, 2011, http://people
-
press.org/2011/01/11/press coverage and public interest matches and mismatches/.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
38. “All respondents” refers to liberals, conservatives, moderates, Democrats,

Republicans, independents, and any other groups included in the survey.
39. The relationship between increased attention to the political/media debate

on Social Security and feelings that the program would not run short of its surplus
for at least thirty years is positive and statistically significant at below the 5 percent
level, after controlling for partisanship, ideology, age, income, education, sex, and race.
40. After factoring in control variables, the relationship between increased

attention to the political/media debate on the stimulus and awareness that the par‑
ties were not working together is positive and highly statistically significant at the
.01 percent level.
41. Wendy W. Simmons, “Public Has Mixed Feelings about Tax Cuts,” Gallup,

January 24, 2001, http://www.gallup.com/poll/2077/public has mixed feelings about
-
-
-
-
-
tax cuts.aspx.
-
42. Polling Report, “Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll,” Pollingreport.com,

March 28–29, 2001, http://www.pollingreport.com/budget.htm; Polling Report,
“CNN/Time Poll,” Pollingreport.com, March 21–22, 2001, http://www.pollingreport.
com/budget.htm; Simmons, “Public Has Mixed Feelings About Tax Cuts”; Wendy W.
Simmons, “Majority of Americans Continue to Support Bush’s Tax Cut Plan,” Gallup,
March 9, 2001, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1924/majority americans continue sup‑
-
-
-
port bushs tax cut plan.aspx; Polling Report, “Pew Research Center for the People
-
-
-
-
and the Press Survey,” Pollingreport.com, February 14–19, 2001, http://www.pollin‑
greport.com/budget.htm.
43. Polling Report, “Reuters/Zogby Poll,” Pollingreport.com, February 27–28,

2001, http://www.pollingreport.com/budget.htm; Polling Report, “Fox News/Opinion
Dynamics Poll,” Pollingreport.com, March 28–29, 2001, http://www.pollingreport.
com/budget7.htm.
44. Polling Report, “CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll,” Pollingreport.com, March

9–11, 2011, http://www.pollingreport.com/budget.htm.
45. Polling Report, “Pew Research Center Survey,” Pollingreport.com, February

14–19, 2001, http://www.pollingreport.com/budget.htm.
46. For the Pew Research Center data for February 2001, the relationship

between increased attentiveness and support for the tax cuts over alternative priorities
is statistically significant for all respondents at the 1 percent level. For conservatives,
the relationship is significant at the .1 percent level; for moderates, the relationship
is significant at the 10 percent level; for liberals, there is no significant relationship.
For Republicans, the relationship between attentiveness and support for tax cuts over
alternative priorities is statistically significant for all respondents at the 5 percent level;
for independents, the relationship is significant at the 10 percent level; for Democrats,
there is no significant relationship.
47. Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research, “CBS/New

-
York Times Monthly Poll, March 2001,” University of Michigan, https://www.icpsr.
umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/3278?q=icpsr+3278&searchSource=icpsr
-
landing; The relationship between attention to the news and support for the idea
that the tax cuts were fair was significant at the .01 percent level, after controlling for
respondents’ sex, age, race, education, income, party, and ideology.
48. The interactive relationship between attention to the news and partisanship,

as related to increased support for tax cuts, is significant at the .01 percent level, after
controlling for other respondent factors such as ideology, income, age, race, and sex.
49. The February 2001 Pew survey on tax cuts asked Americans whether they

approved or disapproved of the Bush tax cuts. I tabulated independent and moderate
support and opposition levels based on this survey question.
50. Beland and Waddan, The Politics of Policy Change, 150.

51. Frank Newport, “Public Opinion on Privatizing Social Security Still Fluid,”

Gallup, January 26, 2005, http://www.gallup.com/poll/14737/public opinion privatiz‑
-
-
ing social security still fluid.aspx#2.
-
-
-
-
52. Alec Gallup and Frank Newport, The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 2005 (Lan‑

ham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 36.
53. For public support for privatization in general, see Polling Report, “CNN/

USA Today/Gallup Poll,” Pollingreport.com, October 24–26, 2003, http://www.poll‑
ingreport.com/social.htm and Polling Report, “ABC/Washington Post Poll,” Polling
report.com, December 16–19 2004, http://www.pollingreport.com/social.htm; for polls

showing public support for investing a small part of Social Security funds, as a supple‑
ment to guaranteed benefits, see Polling Report, “Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll,”
Pollingreport.com, December 14–15, 2004, http://www.pollingreport.com/social3.htm;
regarding the disappearance of majority support when the public was exposed to the
details of Bush’s reform proposal, see Polling Report, “ABC News/Washington Post Poll,”
Pollingreport.com, January 12–16, 2005, http://www.pollingreport.com/social3.htm.
54. Polling Report, “Pew Research Center Poll,” Pollingreport.com, January 5–9,

2015, http://www.pollingreport.com/social3.htm.
55. Polling Report, “ABC/Washington Post Poll,” Pollingreport.com, March

10–13, 2005, http://www.pollingreport.com/social.htm; Polling Report, “CBS/New
York Times Poll,” Pollingreport.com, June 10–15, 2005, http://www.pollingreport.com/
social.htm.
56. Polling Report, “Pew Research Center for the People and the Press Survey,”

Pollingreport.com, January 5–9, 2005, http://www.pollingreport.com/social.htm; Poll‑
ing Report, “NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll,” Pollingreport.com, February 10–14,
2005, http://www.pollingreport.com/social.htm.
57. Polling Report, “CBS/New York Times Poll,” Pollingreport.com, June 10–15,

2005, http://www.pollingreport.com/social.htm; Polling Report, “CBS Poll,” Pollingre‑
port.com, January 17–21, 2014, http://www.pollingreport.com/social.htm.
58. Polling Report, “CBS/New York Times Poll,” Pollingreport.com, June 10–15,

2011, http://www.pollingreport.com/social2.htm; Polling Report, “ABC News/Wash‑
ington Post Poll,” Pollingreport.com, June 2–5, 2005, http://www.pollingreport.com/
social2.htm.
59. Toner, “It’s Personal vs Private in Social Security Debate.”

60. Polling Report, “CBS News/New York Times Poll,” Pollingreport.com, June

10–15, 2005, http://www.pollingreport.com/social2.htm.
61. Pew Research Center, “Economy, Iraq Weighing Down Bush’s Popu‑

larity,” Pew Research Center, May 19, 2005, http://people press.org/2005/05/19/
-
economy iraq weighing down bush popularity/.
-
-
-
-
-
62. Polling Report, “ABC News/Washington Post Poll,” Pollingreport.com, June

2–5, 2005, http://www.pollingreport.com/social2.htm; Pew Research Center, “Bush
Failing in Social Security Push,” Pew Research Center, March 2, 2005, http://peo‑
ple press.org/2005/03/02/bush failing in social security push/; Polling Report, “Pew
-
-
-
-
-
-
Research Center Survey,” Pollingreport.com, March 17–21, 2005, http://www.pollin‑
greport.com/social2.htm.
63. Polling Report, “ABC News/Washington Post Poll,” Pollingreport.com, June

2–5, 2005, http://www.pollingreport.com/social2.htm.
64. These survey questions were found through the Pew Research Center’s

national question search database, and were polled as part of the February and May
2005 “News Interest Index” polls.
65. Inter‑University Consortium for Political and Social Research, “ABC News/

Washington Post Poll,” University of Michigan, March 2005.
66. As related to my tests of Pew Research Center data for February 2005,

the relationship between increased attentiveness for all respondents and opposition
Republican Social Security reform is significant at the 5 percent level. For partisan
and ideological subgroups, results are as follows: for conservatives, the relationship
between increased attentiveness and opinions of Republican Security reform is not
statistically significant; for moderates, the relationship is significant at the 5 percent
level; for liberals, the relationship is significant at the 10 percent level; for Republicans,
the relationship is significant at the 10 percent level; for moderates, the relationship
is significant at the 5 percent level; for Democrats, the relationship is significant at
the 10 percent level. As related to the tests of Pew Research Center data for May
2005, the relationship between increased attentiveness and increased disapproval of
Bush’s handling of reform is significant at the 10 percent level. For conservatives and
moderates, there is no statistically significant relationship between attentiveness and
opposition to Bush’s handling of Social Security; for Republicans and independents,
there is no statistically significant relationship; for liberals, the relationship is signifi‑
cant at the .1 percent level.
67. In measuring public attitudes about Social Security, I created an interaction

variable between media attention and partisanship for the February and May 2005
Pew surveys. This variable was highly statistically significant for both February and
May at the .1 percent level, after controlling for respondents’ ideology, income, age,
education, race, and sex.
68. Pew Research Center, “Bush Failing in Social Security Push,”

Pew Research Center, March 2, 2005, http://www.people press.org/2005/03/02/bush
-
-
failing in social security push/.
-
-
-
-
69. Ibid.

70. To see declining support among moderates and independents over time,

see the documentation from the Pew Research Center survey: “Bush Failing in Social
Security Push,” from March 2005.
71. For the February Pew survey and for all respondents: the correlation

between having “heard” “a lot” about Social Security reform and concluding reform
would produce decreased investment returns is statistically significant at the 5 percent
level; the relationship is not statistically significant for conservatives or moderates, but
is significant for liberals at the 1 percent level. The relationship is not significant for
Republicans; for independents, the relationship is significant at the 5 percent level;
for Democrats, the relationship is significant at the 10 percent level. The correlation
between closely following reporting on Bush and Social Security reform and disap‑
proving of Bush’s handling of reform is statistically significant for all respondents at
the 1 percent level. The relationship is not significant for Republicans. For moderates,
the relationship is significant at the 1 percent level; for liberals, the relationship is
significant at the 5 percent level; for independents, the relationship is significant at the
.1 percent level; for Democrats, the relationship is significant at the 5 percent level.
72. For the March Pew survey: the correlation between having “heard” “a lot”

about Social Security reform and disapproving of Bush’s reform plan is statistically
significant at the .1 percent level for all respondents. For conservatives, there is no
significant relationship between attentiveness and opinions of reform; for liberals, the
relationship is significant at the .1 percent level; for moderates, the relationship is
significant at the .1 percent level; for Republicans, the relationship is significant at the
10 percent level; for independents, the relationship is significant at the 1 percent level;
for Democrats, the relationship is significant at the .1 percent level. The relationship
between increased attention to Social Security news stories and disapproval of Bush’s
plan is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for all respondents. For conserva‑
tives, liberals, independents, and Republicans, the relationship between attentiveness
and presidential approval is not statistically significant; for moderates and Democrats,
the relationship is significant at the .1 percent level.
73. For the May Pew survey, the relationship between attentiveness to Bush’s

proposal for Social Security reform and opinions of Bush’s handling of reform is
significant at the 10 percent level for all respondents. The relationship between atten‑
tiveness and Bush’s handling of reform is not significant for conservatives, moderates,
independents, and Republicans; for liberals, the relationship is significant at the 1
percent level; for Democrats, the relationship is significant at the .1 percent level.
Attentiveness to Bush’s proposal for Social Security and opinions of reform more
generally is significant at the .1 percent level for all respondents. The relationship
between attentiveness and reform more generally is not significant for conservatives
and Republicans; for moderates, the relationship is significant at the 10 percent level;
for liberals, the relationship is significant at the 5 percent level; for independents,
the relationship is significant at the 5 percent level; for Democrats, the relationship
is significant at the .1 percent level. The relationship between those who “heard”
about Social Security and opinions of reform is significant for all respondents at
the .1 percent level; for conservatives, the relationship is not statistically significant;
for moderates, the relationship is significant at the .1 percent level; for liberals, the
relationship is significant at the .1 percent level; for Republicans, the relationship is
significant at the 1 percent level; for independents, the relationship is significant at
the 3 percent level; for Democrats, the relationship is significant at the .1 percent
level.
74. CNN, “Poll: Wealthy Should Bolster Social Security,” CNN, February 8,

2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/02/08/poll.socialsecurity/.
75. CNN, “Poll: Support Lags for Social Security Plan,” CNN, May 2, 2005,

http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/05/02/bush.poll/.
76. Raymond Hernandez, “Bush’s Plan for Retirement Leaves G.O.P. in a Quan‑

dary,” New York Times, May 23, 2005, 1(A).
77. David E. Sanger, “Bush Takes His Campaign on Social Security to Ohio,”

New York Times, April 16, 2005, 11(A).
78. Steven Greenhouse, “Unions Protest against Bush’s Social Security Proposal,”

New York Times, April 1, 2005, 20(A).
79. David E. Rosenbaum, “Few See Gains from Social Security Tour,” New York

Times, April 3, 2005, 24(A).
80. Richard W. Stevenson, “Many Hurdles for Bush Plan,” New York Times,

March 2, 2005, 1(A).
81. Robin Toner, “Republicans Weigh Voter Response to Retirement Plan,” New

York Times, March 10, 2005, 24(A).
82. Frank Newport, “Obama Signs Stimulus into Law with Majority Support,”

Gallup, February 17, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/114691/obama signs stimulus
-
-
-
law majority support.aspx.
-
-
83. Polling Report, “Gallup Poll,” Pollingreport.com, January 6–7, 2009, http://

www.pollingreport.com/budget.htm; Polling Report, “Diageo/Hotline Poll,” Pollingre‑
port.com, January 21–24, 2009, http://www.pollingreport.com/budget.htm.
84. Polling Report, “CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll,” Pollingreport.

com, December 19–21, 2008, http://www.pollingreport.com/budget10.htm.
85. Inter‑University Consortium for Political and Social Research, “CBS News/

New York Times Poll,” University of Michigan, January 2009; CBS/New York Times,
“CBS/New York Times Poll,” January 11–15, 2009, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/pack‑
ages/pdf/politics/20090117obama_poll.pdf.
86. Polling Report, “ABC News/Washington Post Poll,” Pollingreport.com, Feb‑

ruary 19–22, 2009, http://www.pollingreport.com/budget6.htm.
87. Polling Report, “USA Today/Gallup Poll,” Pollingreport.com, February

20–22, 2009, http://www.pollingreport.com/budget6.htm.

com, March 12–15, 2009, http://www.pollingreport.com/budget6.htm.
89. Polling Report, “CBS/New York Times Poll,” Pollingreport.com, April 1–5,

2009, http://www.pollingreport.com/budget6.htm.
90. Polling Report, “ABC News/Washington Post,” Pollingreport.com, March

91. Polling Report, “CBS News/New York Times,” Pollingreport.com, February

92. The February attentiveness question was drawn from the Pew Research Cen‑

ter’s question search database, and pulled from the February “News Interest Index”
poll.
93. Pew, “Stimulus News Seen as More Negative than Positive.”

94. Inter‑University Consortium for Political and Social Research, “CBS News/

New York Times Poll,” University of Michigan, January 2009; CBS/New York Times,
“CBS/New York Times Poll,” January 11–15, 2009, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/pack‑
ages/pdf/politics/20090117obama_poll.pdf.
95. For the Pew Research Center survey from January 2009, the relationship

between attention to the stimulus and attitudes toward it is significant at the 10 per‑
cent level for all respondents.
96. For the Pew Research Center survey from January 2009, the relationship

between attention to the stimulus and attitudes toward it is not significant for con‑
servatives, liberals, or Democrats; for moderates, the relationship is significant at the
.1 percent level; for Republicans, the relationship is significant at the 5 percent level;
for independents, the relationship is significant at the 1 percent level.
97. An Interaction variable measuring the relationship between respondents’

partisanship and media consumption was statistically significant for January Pew sur‑
vey at the 5 percent level, after controlling for respondents’ ideology, income, age,
education, race and sex.
98. I documented Democratic and Republican negativity in the news in chap‑

ter 5. Negative attacks on the other party were included in the vast majority of Congres‑
sional Record entries from both parties, as already discussed in chapter 5. Chapter 6
also contained an analysis of how often Republicans made statements in Congress on
the stimulus, as seen in the Congressional Record. For a discussion of how 90 percent
of congressional Republican statements on the stimulus were negative, see: Gary Lee
Malecha and Daniel J. Reagan, The Public Congress: Congressional Deliberation in a
New Media Age (New York: Routledge, 2012), 132.
99. David M. Herszenhorn, “Stimulus Plan Encounters Stiff Resistance in

Senate,” New York Times, January 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/31/us/
politics/31stimulus.html; Sharon Otterman, “Democrats Indicate Areas of Compromise
on Stimulus,” New York Times, February 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/02/
us/politics/02web talkshows.html?ref=business; David M. Herszenhorn, “Stimulus
-
Talks Set to Continue After Centrists Push Cuts,” New York Times, February 5, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/06/us/politics/06stimulus.html?pagewanted=all.
100. For such a short period of time (a week and a half) a second coder was not

needed, as the number of articles on the stimulus (relative to the entire time period
analyzed) was small enough that computing inter‑coder reliability scores would have
proven unfeasible.
101. In calculating the CBS findings, I examined stories appearing in the Lexis

Nexis database from January 1 through February 17, 2009. Any story that referenced
the “stimulus” was included. When looking for evidence of each party’s presence, I
included any stories that either mentioned the “Republican” Party or “Republicans,”
or the “Democratic” Party or Democrats. Furthermore, I looked for mentions of party
leaders, including House Minority Leader John Boehner and Senate Minority Leader
Mitch McConnell. I also looked for mentions on the Democratic side for Speaker
of the House Nancy Pelosi, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, or Senate Majority
Leader Harry Reid.
102. Peter Hart, “Stimulus Snake Oil,” Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting,

March 1, 2009, http://fair.org/extra online articles/stimulus snake oil/.
-
-
-
-
103. In analyzing the Congressional Record, I coded as an “appearance” any

entry with statements from Republicans or Democrats and from entry titles that
clearly related solely to the stimulus. I looked for entries with words such as stimu‑
lus, stimulate, and American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in their title to include
in this analysis. I then counted whether a member or members of the Republican
Party made appearances in each entry, coming up with the 125 total entries with
Republican appearances in January and the 340 entries with appearances in February.
104. Pew Research Center, “Stimulus News Seen as More Negative than Posi‑

tive,” Pew Research Center, February 11, 2009, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1118/
economic stimulus news seen as negative.
-
-
-
-
-
105. For the Pew Research Center February 2009 survey, the relationship

between attention to the stimulus and attitudes toward it is significant at the 5 percent
level, after controlling for respondents’ party, ideology, sex, age, race, education, and
income. The relationship between attention to the stimulus and attitudes toward it is
significant for conservatives at the 5 percent level; for moderates, the relationship is
significant at the 5 percent level; for liberals and Democrats, the relationship is not
significant; for Republicans, the relationship is significant at the 1 percent level; for
independents, the relationship is significant at the 10 percent level.
106. The interaction variable for the Pew February 2009 survey, between respon‑

dents’ partisanship and media attention, was significant at the .01 percent level, after
controlling for respondents’ ideology, age, income, age, education, and race.
107. University of Michigan, “CBS News/New York Times Monthly Poll, Feb‑

ruary 2009,” Inter‑University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2009,
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/26944?q=ICPSR+26944&se
archSource=find analyze home&sortBy=. An analysis of the February 2009 CBS
-
-
stimulus survey finds that attention to reporting is a statistically significant predictor
of opposition at the 5 percent level, after controlling for respondents’ sex, age, educa‑
tion, race, income, political party, and ideology. A variable measuring the interaction
between political party and media attention is a significant predictor of opposition
at the .01 percent level, after controlling for respondents’ ideology, age, education,
income, race, and sex.
108. Pew Research Center, “Pew Weekly News Interest Index Poll,” Pew Research

Center, March 2009.
109. Polling Report, “CBS News Poll,” Pollingreport.com, October 3–5, 2008,

http://www.pollingreport.com/business2.htm.
110. Polling Report, “Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg Poll,” Pollingreport.com,

October 10–13, 2008, http://www.pollingreport.com/business2.htm.
111. Polling Report, “Diageo/Hotline Poll,” Pollingreport.com, January 21–24,

2009, http://www.pollingreport.com/business2.htm.
112. Polling Report, “Harris Poll,” Pollingreport.com, February 10–15, 2009,

http://www.pollingreport.com/business2.htm.
113. Polling Report, “ABC News/Washington Post Poll,” Pollingreport.com,

March 26–29, 2009, http://www.pollingreport.com/business2.htm.
114. Polling Report, “USA Today/Gallup Poll,” Pollingreport.com, March 21–22,

2009, http://www.pollingreport.com/business2.htm; Polling Report, “CBS News Poll,”
Pollingreport.com, March 20–22, 2009, http://www.pollingreport.com/business2.htm.
115. Polling Report, “CBS News Poll,” Pollingreport.com, March 20–22, 2009,

http://www.pollingreport.com/business2.htm; Polling Report, “The Harris Poll,” Poll‑
ingreport.com, February 10–15, 2009, http://www.pollingreport.com/business2.htm.

October 15–18, 2009, http://www.pollingreport.com/business2.htm.
117. Polling Report, “Gallup Poll,” Pollingreport.com, March 17, 2009, http://

www.pollingreport.com/business.htm http://www.pollingreport.com/business.htm;

Polling Report, “CBS/New York Times Poll,” Pollingreport.com, February 18–22, 2009,
http://www.pollingreport.com/business.htm; Marjorie Connelly, “Poll: Public Wants
Government to Recover Bonuses,” New York Times, March 23, 2009, http://thecaucus.
blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/23/poll public wants government to recover bonus funds/
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
comment page 3/?_r=0&gwh=99596A246EB662BF59EC99E757647B9B&gwt=pay.
-
-

March 26–29, 2009, http://www.pollingreport.com/business.htm.
119. Polling Report, “CBS News Poll,” Pollingreport.com, March 20–22, 2009,

http://www.pollingreport.com/business.htm.
120. Polling Report, “Diageo/Hotline Poll,” Pollingreport.com, March 26–29,

2009, http://www.pollingreport.com/business.htm.
121. For the March 2009 Pew Research Center survey, the relationship between

attentiveness to the bonuses and Congress’s response is significant at the .1 percent
level, while the relationship between those following the issue most closely and opin‑
ions of Congress and the bonuses is also significant at the .1 percent level.
122. University of Michigan, “CBS News Monthly Poll #2, March 2009,”

Inter‑University Consortium on Political and Social Research, 2009, https://www.
icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/26945?q=ICPSR+26945&searchSource
=icpsr landing; For the CBS survey data, the relationship between attention to the
-
news and feelings that the bonuses were unacceptable is significant at the .01 percent
level, as is the relationship between media attention and anger over bonuses. The
relationship between attention and the feeling that Obama should have prevented
the bonuses is significant at the 5 percent level. All these relationships are significant
after controlling for respondents’ political party, ideology, race, sex, age, income, and
education.
123. For the March 2009 Pew Research Center survey, the relationship between

attentiveness and attitudes toward Congress’s response to the bonuses is significant for
Republicans at the 5 percent level; for independents and Democrats, the relationship
is not significant. For the March 2009 Pew Research Center survey, the relationship
between those paying most attention to the bonus issue and attitudes toward Con‑
gress’s response to the bonuses is not significant for Republicans; for independents,
the relationship is significant at the 1 percent level; for Democrats, the relationship
is significant at the 10 percent level.
124. In searching the Congressional Record, I used the search term “Execu‑

tive Bonus” to compile a list of entries. Of those entries, I examined any entry that
contained a title suggesting the main focus may have been pay, including those refer‑
ring to the bailout (which funded the bonuses), to AIG, the main company that was
criticized by Democrats for paying out bonuses, and direct references to executive
bonuses. I counted an official as discussing bonuses if they used the word bonus in
reference to executive pay and pay regulations during their time speaking on the floor
of the House or Senate.
125. Virginia Foxx, “Fruit of the Bailout Mania,” Congressional Record, March

23, 2009; Mike Pence, “Taxing Executive Bonuses Paid by Companies Receiving TARP
Assistance,” Congressional Record, March 19, 2009; Steven La Tourette, “Bonus Mys‑
tery,” Congressional Record, March 19, 2009; Paul Broun, “Special Inspector General
for the Troubled Asset Relief Program Act of 2009,” Congressional Record, March 25,
2009; Jeff Sessions, “AIG Bonuses,” Congressional Record, March 16, 2009.
126. As argued earlier in this chapter, I say the public was familiar with execu‑

tive pay because the topic was closely followed in the news, and the issue of tax‑
payer‑funded bonuses was not particularly difficult to understand for the average
American.
Chapter 7. Media Coverage and Its Effects
1. Barack H. Obama, “Opening Remarks of President Barack Obama,” The

White House, February 9, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog_post/the_

first_press_conference.
2. BBC, “Bush Mocks Bush,” BBC News, March 25, 2001, http://news.bbc.

co.uk/2/hi/americas/1241240.stm.
3. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The

Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: Free Press, 1991).
4. For the 2009–10 and 1993–94 health care debates, I examined news stories

that ran from September 1, 1993, to August 31, 1994, the period covering President
Clinton’s introduction of his push for health care reform (with his September 1993
speech to Congress), through the legislative process considering health care, which
ended in failure by August 1994 (when Democratic Senate Majority Leader George
Mitchell acknowledged health care reform would need to wait until another session of
Congress). For the 2009–10 health care debate, the analysis began in July 2009, when
Obama delivered his first major speech pushing for health care reform, through March
2010, when a health care proposal officially became law. Any story that included the
words health care was included in my analyses.
5. Jacob Hacker, The Path to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton’s Plan

for Health Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
6. Ed O’Keefe, “The House Has Voted 54 Times in Four Years on Obamacare,”

Washington Post, March 21, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the fix/
-
wp/2014/03/21/the house has voted 54 times in four years on obamacare heres the
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
full list/.
-
7. My analysis of the government shutdown started on September 20, 2013,

when legislation attempting to repeal the Obama health care law (tied to the budget)
was passed in the House of Representatives. Coverage of the shutdown ended on
October 17, when an appropriations bill was finally signed into law. Any story that
included the words “government” and “shutdown” was included in this analysis.
8. Avik Roy, “New Poll: Only One‑Third of Americans Support Repealing,

Defunding or Delaying Obamacare,” Forbes, September 30, 2013, http://www.forbes.
com/sites/theapothecary/2013/09/30/new poll only one third of americans support
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
repealing defunding or delaying obamacare/; Paul Steinhauser, “CNN Poll: GOP

-
-
-
-
Would Bear the Brunt of Shutdown Blame,” CNN, September 30, 2013, http://www.
cnn.com/2013/09/30/politics/cnn poll shutdown blame/.
-
-
-
9. My analysis of the Bush tax cuts begins in February 2003, when legislation

was introduced into the House of Representatives, through May 2003, when the tax
cuts officially became law. Any story that included the words “tax cut” was included
in this analysis.
10. William Ahern, “Comparing the Kennedy, Reagan, and Bush Tax Cuts,”

The Tax Foundation, August 24, 2004, http://taxfoundation.org/article/comparing
-
kennedy reagan and bush tax cuts.
-
-
-
-
-
11. My analysis of the 2003 Medicare reform begins in June 2003, when the

House of Representatives introduced legislation, through December 2003, when the
Republican Medicare reform proposal officially became law. In my analysis, I included
any stories that referenced “Medicare” and “reform.”
12. Robert Pear, “Bill to Let Medicare Negotiate Drug Prices Is Blocked,” New

York Times, April 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/18/washington/18cnd
-
medicare.html?_r=0.
13. My analysis of Paul Ryan’s proposed Medicare reform of 2011 began on

April 15, when the House of Representatives voted on Ryan’s “Path to Prosperity”
legislation that would have privatized Medicare, through April 30, including the two
weeks after the proposal first entered the news. I included any stories that referenced
“Medicare” and “reform” during this period in my analysis.
14. Simon Lazarus, “The Ryan Proposal Compels Americans to Buy Insur‑

ance—Just like Obamacare Does,” Slate, May 3, 2011, http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/05/paul_ryans_individual_mandate.html.
15. New York Times, “House Vote 277—Passes Ryan Budget Bill,” New York

Times, April 15, 2011, http://politics.nytimes.com/congress/votes/112/house/1/277.
16. My analysis of the 2011 debt ceiling crisis began on June 1, when President

Obama and congressional Republicans started talks on the “grand bargain” over cut‑
ting spending and raising taxes, and ended by July 31, when it was recognized that
talks between both parties had failed to produce a compromise agreement. I included
any stories that included the words “debt ceiling” in my analysis of this time period.
17. Peter Wallsten, Lori Montgomery, and Scott Wilson, “Obama’s Evolution:

Behind the Failed ‘Grand Bargain’ on the Debt,” Washington Post, March 17, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obamas evolution behind the failed grand
-
-
-
-
-
-
bargain on the debt/2012/03/15/gIQAHyyfJS_story.html.
-
-
-
18. My analysis of the 2008 bailout spanned from September 29, when the

House of Representatives first voted on the bailout, through October 7, a few days
after the bailout officially became law. I included any stories that mentioned either the
“bailout” or the “Emergency Economic Stabilization Act” in my analysis.
19. Pew Research Center, “57% of Public Favors Wall Street Bailout,”

Pew Research Center, September 23, 2008, http://www.people press.org/2008/09/
-
23/57 of public favors wall street bailout/.
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-
-
-
-
-
Table 5.3. Within‑Party Rejections of the President in Voting and the News
Minimum Wage (1/1–5/31/1996)


The President’s Party: Rejection The President’s Party: Congressional

of the Policy Proposal
Opposition to Policy Proposal
(as a % of all Cong. Statements from (as a % of all Pres. Party Votes)

Pres. Party Members)





Tax Cuts (1/1–5/31/2001)




Stimulus (1/1–2/28/2009)




Executive Pay (1/1–3/31/2009)


New York Times 9.4% House 13%


From Table 5.3, one sees that, for reporting on the 1996 minimum
wage, substantive criticisms within the president’s party rarely appeared in
the news, representing just 1 percent of the within‑party statements in the
New York Times, and none of the statements in the Chicago Sun Times.31 By
er to Act on Harmful Gases,” New York Times, April 3, 2007, http://www.nytimes.

com/2007/04/03/washington/03scotus.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
29. My analyses from Figure 7.1 looked for references to each political party, in

addition to party leaders, to see which political actors were setting the agenda for how
each political issue was discussed in news stories, op‑eds, and editorials. The ability to
set this agenda translated into more favorable media coverage for a party if it appeared
more often in the news. For the 2009–10 health care reform debate, I counted how many
stories mentioned not only “health care,” but other terms as well. For Republicans, the
analysis included references to the Republican Party or Republican officials, specifically
Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell and House Minority Leader John Boehner.
For Democrats, the analysis included references to the Democratic Party or Democratic
leaders, including President Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden, House Majority
Leader Steny Hoyer, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, or Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid. For the 1993–94 health care debate, my coding for the Republican side
included references to the Republican Party or Republican leaders, including Senate
Minority Leader Bob Dole, or House Minority Leader Bob Michel. The Democratic
side included references to the Democratic Party or party leaders, including President
Bill Clinton, Vice President Al Gore, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, Speaker
of the House Tom Foley, and House Majority Leader Dick Gephardt. For the tax cuts
debate of 2003 and the Medicare debate of 2003, I coded the Republican side to include
references to the Republican Party and party leaders, including President George Bush,
Vice President Dick Cheney, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, Speaker of the House
Dennis Hastert, and House Majority Leader Tom Delay. The Democratic side included
references to the Democratic Party and party leaders, including House Minority Leader
Nancy Pelosi, and Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle.
30. My analyses from Figure 7.2 looked for references to each political party, in

addition to party leaders, to see which political actors were setting the agenda for how
each political issue was discussed in news stories, op‑eds, and editorials. For reporting
on the 2014 EPA Emissions mandate, the 2014 minimum wage debate, the 2013 gov‑
ernment shutdown, the 2011 debt ceiling crisis, and the 2011 Medicare debate, I coded
the Democratic side as including any references to the Democratic Party and party
leaders, including President Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden, Senate Majority
Leader Harry Reid, and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi. The Republican side
included references to the Republican Party and party leaders, including Speaker of
the House John Boehner, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, and Senate Minority
Leader Mitch McConnell. For the 2008 bailout reporting, I coded the Democratic
side as including any references to the Democratic Party and party leaders, includ‑
ing Democratic Presidential Candidate Barack Obama, Senate Majority Leader Harry
Reid, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Vice Presidential Candidate Joe Biden, and
House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer. The Republican side included references to the
Republican Party and party leaders, including President George Bush, Vice President
Dick Cheney, Republican presidential candidate John McCain, Senate Minority Leader
Mitch McConnell, and House Minority Leader John Boehner.
31. Coral Davenport, “President Said to Be Planning to Use Executive Authority

on Carbon Rule,” New York Times, May 28, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/
us/politics/obama to offer rules to sharply curb power plants carbon emissions.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
html?_r=0.
32. For more on the discussion of cap and trade as compared to a carbon tax,

see: Graham Research Institute, “Carbon Tax v. Cap‑and‑Trade: Which Is Better?”
Guardian, January 31, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jan/31/
carbon tax cap and trade; Jonathan Cohn, “One More Reason Obama’s Power Plant
-
-
-
-
Rules Will Make the GOP Nuts,” New Republic, May 29, 2014, http://www.newrepublic.
com/article/117941/cap and trade back obamas new proposal climate change coal.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
33. Recall that Groeling argues that a consistent negativity bias exists in media

effects against the party of the president.
34. Raluca Cozma and Steve Adams, “Health Care Reform Coverage Improves

in 2000–2010 over Clinton Era,” Newspaper Research Journal 32, no. 3 (2011): 24–39.
35. Pew Research Center, “What Americans Learned from the Media about

the Health Care Debate,” Pew Research Center, June 19, 2012, http://www.journalism.
org/2012/06/19/how media has covered health care debate/.
-
-
-
-
-
-
36. DiMaggio, The Rise of the Tea Party.

37. Shahira Fahmy, Christopher J. McKinley, Christine R. Filer, and Paul J.

Wright, “Pulling the Plug on Grandma: Obama’s Health Care Pitch, Media Coverage,
and Public Opinion,” Advances in Journalism and Communication 1, no. 3 (2013):
19–25; DiMaggio, The Rise of the Tea Party.
38. DiMaggio, The Rise of the Tea Party; For my analysis of public opinion data

from 2009 and 2010, survey questions asked Americans (1) about how much they had
“heard” about the national debate on health care reform, and (2) about how closely
they were paying attention to the debate in Washington over health care reform.
39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. In the December 2009 Pew Research Center survey, the relationship between

media attentiveness to health care and opposition to reform was significant at the 1
percent level. For the January 2010 survey from Kaiser, the relationship between media
consumption and opposition to health care was significant at the .01 percent level.
For the February 2010 survey done by Pew, the relationship was significant at the 10
percent level. Finally, for the Pew March 2010 survey, the relationship was significant
at the 5 percent level.
42. I did not include January and March 2010 survey questions in Figure 7.2

because those questions were worded differently from the questions examined in the
figure. This made presenting those questions impossible within the same format as
the other questions presented in Figure 7.2.
43. These findings were pulled from the July 2009 Pew survey on health care.

I measured simple bivariate correlations between attention to health care in the news
and elsewhere and opinions of a government health plan and opinions of Obama on
health care. For moderates, the relationships between attention and opposition to a
government plan and opposition to Obama on health care were significant at the 5
percent and 10 percent levels respectively. For independents, the relationships between
attention and opposition to a government plan and opposition to Obama on health
care were significant at the .01 percent level for both regressions.
44. For the December 2009 and January, February, and March 2010 surveys on

health care, I included an interactive variable between media attention and political
partisanship. This variable was statistically significant at the .01 percent level for all
four surveys, after controlling for respondents’ sex, age, education, race, income, and
ideology.
45. Lydia Saad, “Cost Is Foremost Healthcare Issue for Americans,” Gallup,

September 23, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/123149/cost is foremost healthcare
-
-
-
-
issue for americans.aspx; Polling Report, “Pew Poll,” Pollingreport.com, July 22–26,
-
-
2009, http://www.pollingreport.com/health11.htm.
46. Saad, “Cost Is Foremost Healthcare Issue for Americans.”

47. Glenn Thrush, “Poll: 41 Percent Believe in Death Panels,” Politico,

September 14, 2009, http://www.politico.com/blogs/on congress/2009/09/poll 41

-
-
-
percent believe in death panels 021365.
-
-
-
-
-
48. Lydia Saad, “Seniors Most Skeptical of Healthcare Reform,” Gallup Politics,

July 31, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/121982/seniors skeptical healthcare reform.
-
-
-
aspx.
49. Rob Stein and Alexi Mostrous, “Health‑Care Debate Focuses on Majority in

U.S. Who Are Satisfied with Their Insurance,” Washington Post, July 28, 2009, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp dyn/content/article/2009/07/27/AR2009072701372.
-
html.
50. Polling Report, “CBS News/New York Times Poll,” Pollingreport.com, Sep‑

tember 19–23, 2009, http://www.pollingreport.com/health9.htm.
51. Pew Research Center, “Many Fault Media Coverage of Health Care Debate,”

Pew Research Center, August 6, 2009, http://www.people press.org/2009/08/06/
-
many fault media coverage of health care debate/.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
52. Polling Report, “Gallup Poll,” Pollingreport.com, August 31‑September 2,

53. The relationship between media consumption and policy attitudes is sta‑

tistically significant for all the questions in Figure 7.3, after controlling for other
respondent demographic variables, including age, sex, race, income, education, ideol‑
ogy, and political party. For opinions of the 2003 Medicare reform, the relationship
between media consumption and attitudes was significant at the 1 percent level. For
the 2003 tax cuts, the relationship was significant at the .01 percent level. For the 2011
Medicare privatization debate, the relationship was significant at the 5 percent level,
and for the 2011 debt crisis and debt reduction talks, the relationship was significant
at the .01 percent level.
54. For the “unsure” responses ranging from 10 to 21 percent of responses, see

polling done in CNN/USA Today/Gallup polling, on the following dates: 1/10–12/2003,
1/23–25/2003, 1/31–2/2/2003, and 2/24–2/26/2003. These surveys were drawn from
the Polling Report website at: http://www.pollingreport.com/budget.htm. For survey

data on uncertainty regarding the 2001 tax cuts and their effects, see Polling Report,
“Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll,” May 20–21, 2003, Pollingreport.com, http://www.
pollingreport.com/budget.htm.
55. Polling Report, “Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll.”

56. iPoll, “ABC News/Washington Post Poll,” Roper Center for Public Opinion

Research, January 2003. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.
html.
57. I include an interactive variable for respondents’ partisanship and media

consumption, and it is significant at the .01 percent level, after controlling for educa‑
tion, sex, age, income, ideology, and race.
58. The January 2003 Pew Research Center survey data suggest significant

media effects among an already supportive public. The relationship between attention
to the news and support for tax cuts as a priority was significant at the 5 percent level,
after controlling for other respondent factors, including sex, age, income, education,
political party, ideology, and race.
59. Polling Report, “CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll,” Pollingreport.com, February

60. Pew Research Center, “Americans More Optimistic about Economy, but

Not Bush Tax Cut,” Pew Research Center, May 7, 2003, http://www.people press.
-
org/2003/05/07/americans more optimistic about economy but not bush tax cut/.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
61. Ibid.

62. Jeffrey M. Jones, “Public Endorses Need for Medicare Reform, but Is Skep‑

tical of Recent Legislation,” Gallup, July 7, 2003, http://www.gallup.com/poll/8770/
public endorses need medicare reform skeptical recent legislation.aspx.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
63. iPoll, “Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll,” Roper Center for Public Opinion

Research, January 2003.
64. iPoll, “NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll,” Roper Center for Public Opinion

Research, January 2003.
65. Pew Research Center, “Press Values Update Survey,” Pew Research Center,

July 14‑August 5, 2003.
66. Pew Research Center, “Pew News Interest Index Poll,” Pew Research Center,

December 2003.
67. Gallup, “Medicare,” Gallup, 2015, http://www.gallup.com/poll/14596/medi‑

care.aspx.
68. Two survey questions came from Gallup; one asked Americans what they

thought of “the new prescription drug benefit for Medicare recipients,” while the other
asked their opinion of the “changes made in Medicare coverage.” A third question
from ABC News and the Washington Post asked whether the public approved or
disapproved of “the Medicare changes voted on by Congress.” See: Frank Newport,
“Senior Citizens Wary of New Medicare Bill” Gallup, December 10, 2003, http://www.
gallup.com/poll/9883/senior citizens wary new medicare bill.aspx; Polling Report,
-
-
-
-
-
“ABC News/Washington Post Poll,” Pollingreport.com, December 3–7, 2003, http://
www.pollingreport.com/health13.htm.
69. In the August 2003 Gallup survey, the relationship between attention to

Medicare news and disapproval of Bush was significant at the 10 percent level, after
controlling for other factors, including respondents’ sex, age, education, race, income,
political party, and ideology.
70. For public opinion of the Medicare prescription expansion, the interaction

variable that included respondents’ political partisanship and media consumption was
statistically significant at the .01 percent level, after controlling for other variables such
as ideology, age, income, education, race, and sex.
71. Looking only at Republican respondents in the December 2003 Pew Medi‑

care survey, I find that attention to the news exhibited no impact on attitudes toward
health care reform, after controlling for other factors such as respondents’ sex, age,
education, income, race, and ideology.
72. ABC News, “ABC News/Washington Post Poll,” ABC News, December 8,

2003, http://abcnews.go.com/images/pdf/883a37Medicare.pdf.
73. Frank Newport, “Senior Citizens Wary of New Medicare Bill,” Gallup, Decem‑

ber 10, 2003, http://www.gallup.com/poll/9883/senior citizens wary new medicare
-
-
-
-
-
bill.aspx.
74. Ibid.

75. Robert Pear, “New Medicare Plan for Drug Benefit Prohibits Insurance”

New York Times, December 7, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/07/us/new
-
medicare plan for drug benefits prohibits insurance.html.
-
-
-
-
-
-
76. Kaiser, “Health Poll Report Survey,” Kaiser Family Foundation, January/

February 2004, http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/kaiser

-
health poll report survey toplines.pdf.
-
-
-
-
77. Frank Newport, “Medicare Drug Plan Still Not Generating Much Enthu‑

siasm,” Gallup, January 26, 2006, http://www.gallup.com/poll/21097/medicare drug
-
-
plan still generating much enthusiasm.aspx.
-
-
-
-
78. Kaiser, “Health Poll Report Survey,” January/February 2004.

79. David Jackson, “Poll: Medicare Prescription Drug Program Popular,”

USA Today, October 3, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/story/onpolitics/2012/10/03/
poll medicare prescription drug program popular/1609995/.
-
-
-
-
-
80. Simon Lazarus, “Paul Ryan’s ‘Individual Mandate,’ ” Slate, May 3, 2011,

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/05/paul_ryans_
individual_mandate.html.
81. Kate Pickert, “The Nitty‑Gritty Details of Paul Ryan’s Medicare

Plan,” Time, April 6, 2011, http://swampland.time.com/2011/04/06/the nitty gritty
-
-
-
details of paul ryan’s medicare plan/.
-
-
-
-
-
82. Paul N. Van de Water, “The Ryan Budget’s Radical Priorities,” Center on Bud‑

get and Policy Priorities, July 7, 2010, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3114.
83. Congressional Budget Office, “Long‑Term Analysis of a Budget Proposal

by Chairman Ryan,” Congressional Budget Office, April 5, 2011, http://www.cbo.gov/
publication/25159.
84. Robert Greenstein, “CBO Report: Ryan Plan Specifies Spending Path that

Would Nearly End Most of Government Other than Social Security, Health Care, and
Defense by 2050,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, April 7, 2011, http://www.
cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3453.
85. Polling Report, “Quinnipiac University Poll,” Pollingreport.com, April

26‑May 1, 2011, http://www.pollingreport.com/health5.htm; Polling Report, “ABC
News/Washington Post Poll,” Pollingreport.com, Aril 14–17, 2011, http://www.polling
report.com/health5.htm.
86. Polling Report, “Quinnipiac University Poll,” 2011.

87. Polling Report, “Pew Research Center Poll,” Pollingreport.com, May 25–30,

88. iPoll, “Kaiser Health Tracking Poll,” iPoll, February 2011.

89. iPoll, “Bloomberg Poll,” iPoll, March 4–7, 2011.

90. iPoll, “NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll,” iPoll, March 2011.

91. Polling Report, “Quinnipiac University Poll,” 2011.

92. For general senior opposition to the Medicare reform plan, see: Phil Gale‑

witz, “Few Seniors Support GOP Plan to Restructure Medicare,” Kaiser Health News,
April 27, 2011, http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011/april/27/kaiser poll on
-
-
-
medicare.aspx; In the 2011 Pew Research Center poll, a simple bivariate regression
test finds that older Americans were more likely to be paying attention to news on
Medicare reform, and more likely to be opposed to that reform.
93. CNN Political Unit,” CNN Poll: Majority Gives Thumbs Down to Ryan

Plan,” CNN, June 1, 2011, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/01/cnn poll
-
-
majority gives thumbs down to ryan plan/.
-
-
-
-
-
-
94. Galewitz, “Few Seniors Support GOP Plan to Restructure Medicare.”

95. Matt Bai, “Obama v. Boehner: Who Killed the Debt Deal?” New York

Times, March 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/magazine/obama vs -
-
boehner who killed the debt deal.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
-
-
-
-
-
96. Alan Silverleib and Tom Cohen, “Obama Seeks $4 Trillion in Cuts; GOP

Assails Call for Tax Hikes,” CNN, April 14, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLI‑
TICS/04/13/obama.deficits/.
97. Ibid.

98. Bai, “Obama v. Boehner: Who Killed the Debt Deal?”

99. CNN Wire Staff, “Debt Talks between Obama, House Speaker Boehner

Collapse,” CNN, July 22, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/07/22/debt.
talks/; Bai, “Obama v. Boehner: Who Killed the Debt Deal?”
100. Bai, “Obama v. Boehner, Who Killed the Debt Deal?”

101. Mike Dorning and Heidi Przybyla, “Boehner Says Debt Deal ‘Not Close,’ ”

Bloomberg, July 22, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011 07 22/obama
-
-
-
boehner press for broad u s deficit agreement amid internal strife.html.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
102. CNN Wire Staff, “Debt Talks between Obama, House Speaker Boehner

Collapse.”
103. Bai, “Obama v. Boehner: Who Killed the Debt Deal?”

104. Suzy Khimm, “The Sequester Explained,” Washington Post, September

14, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/09/14/the

-
sequester explained/.
-
105. Jonathan Weisman, “Answers to Questions on Capital’s Top Topic,” New

York Times, February 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/22/us/politics/
questions and answers about the sequester.html.
-
-
-
-
-
106. Polling Report, “Pew Research Center Poll,” Pollingreport.com, May 19–22,

107. Polling Report, “Gallup Poll,” Pollingreport.com, July 7–10, 2011, http://

www.pollingreport.com/health5.htm.
108. Polling Report, “ABC/Washington Post Poll,” Pollingreport.com, April

14–17, 2011, http://www.pollingreport.com/health5.htm.

com, http://www.pollingreport.com/health5.htm. This citation applies to polls con‑
ducted on the following dates: January 14–16, 2011, April 29‑May 1, 2011, April 9–10,
2011; March 18–20, 2011; March 11–13, 2011; April 29‑May 1, 2011.
110. Pew Research Center, “Debt Limit Fight Top 5 News Interest, Coverage,”

Pew Research Center, July 19, 2011, http://www.people press.org/2011/07/19/debt
-
-
limit fight tops news interest coverage/; Pew Research Center, “Attention to Debt
-
-
-
-
-
Debate Grew Steadily in July,” Pew Research Center, August 2, 2011, http://www.
people press.org/2011/08/02/attention to debt debate grew steadily in july/; Pew
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-

Research Center, “Number Hearing Mostly Bad Economic News Soars,” Pew Research
Center, August 10, 2011, http://www.people press.org/2011/08/10/number hearing
-
-
-
mostly bad economic news soars/; Pew Research Center, “Economy, Weiner Top Pub‑
-
-
-
-
lic’s News Interests,” Pew Research Center, June 22, 2011, http://www.people press.
-
org/2011/06/22/economy weiner top publics news interests/; Pew Research Center,
-
-
-
-
-
“Interest in Campaign News on Par with 2007,” Pew Research Center, July 7, 2011, http://
www.people press.org/2011/07/07/interest in campaign news on par with 2007/.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
111. Polling Report, “Quinnipiac University Poll,” Pollingreport.com, http://

www.pollingreport.com/cong_rep.htm. This citation applies to polls conducted on
the following dates: March 22–28, 2011, May 31‑June 6, 2011, July 5–11, 2011, and
August 16–27, 2011.
112. Polling Report, “CBS News/New York Times Poll,” Pollingreport.com, April

5, 2010, http://www.pollingreport.com/budget4.htm; Polling Report, “CBS News/New
York Times Poll,” Pollingreport.com, April 15–20 2011, http://www.pollingreport.com/
budget4.htm.
113. Polling Report, “USA Today/Gallup Poll,” Pollingreport.com, April 11,

114. Polling Report, “USA Today/Gallup Poll,” Pollingreport.com, April 20–23,

115. Polling Report, “CNN/ORC Poll,” Pollingreport.com, July 18–20, 2011,

http://www.pollingreport.com/health5.htm.
116. Drawing from the August 2011 monthly Pew survey, the relationship

between attention to the news on the debt and increased trust of the Obama admin‑
istration was significant at the 5 percent level, after controlling for other variables,
including respondents’ political party, ideology, income, age, education, race, and
sex.
117. Polling Report, “CBS News Poll,” Pollingreport.com, July 15–17, 2011,

http://www.pollingreport.com/budget5.htm.
118. Polling Report, “CBS News/New York Times Poll,” Pollingreport.com,

August 2–3, 2011, http://www.pollingreport.com/budget6.htm.
119. Wallsten, Montgomery, and Wilson, “Obama’s Evolution.”

120. Pew Research Center, “Public Would Blame Both Sides if Government Shuts

Down,” Pew Research Center, April 4, 2011, http://www.people press.org/2011/04/04/
-
public would blame both sides if government shuts down/.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
121. Polling Report, “Fox News Poll,” Pollingreport.com, August 7–9, 2011,

122. Polling Report, “Reuters/Ipsos Poll,” Pollingreport.com, July 25, 2011,

123. Polling Report, “CBS News Poll,” Pollingreport.com, July 15–17, 2011,

124. Pew Research Center, “Public Wants a Debt Ceiling Compromise,

Expects a Deal Before Deadline,” Pew Research Center, July 26, 2011, http://www.
people press.org/2011/07/26/public wants a debt ceiling compromise expects a deal
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
before deadline/.
-
125. Pew Research Center, “Pocketbook Concerns: Prices Matter More than

Jobs, Economic Views Sag, Obama Rating Slips,” Pew Research Center, April 7,
2011, http://www.people press.org/files/legacy pdf/04 07 11%20April%20Political%20
-
-
-
-
Release.pdf.
126. Dan Balz and Jon Cohen, “Post‑ABC Poll: GOP Too Dug In on Debt

Talks; Public Fears Default Consequences,” Washington Post, July 19, 2011, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/post abc news poll public sees dire consequences if
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
no budget deal/2011/07/19/gIQA4MQPOI_story.html.
-
-
127. Ibid.

128. Polling Report, “CBS News/New York Times Poll,” Pollingreport.com,

August 2–3, 2011, http://www.pollingreport.com/budget6.htm.
Chapter 8. Experimental Evidence of Media Effects

on Public Opinion
1. The survey questions in my experiments were drawn from commonly used,

professionally worded polling questions, from various survey organizations, including
CNN/ORC polling, CBS, and the New York Times.
2. Paul Sniderman and Sean M. Theriault, “The Structure of Political Argu‑

ment and the Logic of Issue Framing,” in Studies in Public Opinion, ed. Willem E.
Saris and Paul M. Sniderman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 133–65.
3. William G. Howell and John C. Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather: Con‑

gressional Checks on Presidential War Powers (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2007), 207–10; Matthew A. Baum and Tim J. Groeling, War Stories: The Causes and
Consequences of Public Views of War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010),

116–26.
4. Lydia Saad, “Stimulus Support Edges Higher, Now 59 Percent,” Gallup, Feb‑

ruary 11, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/114577/stimulus support edges higher.aspx.
-
-
-
5. Pat Garofalo, “GOP Derides Obama Jobs Plan as ‘Second Stimulus,’ Ignor‑

ing Success of the First,” Think Progress, September 9, 2011, http://thinkprogress.org/
economy/2011/09/09/315347/gop second stimulus/; Dave Boyer, “Obama Pushes Bil‑
-
-
lion Dollar Stimulus Plan,” Washington Times, May 12, 2012, http://www.washington‑
times.com/news/2012/may/12/obama pushes billion dollar stimulus plan/.
-
-
-
-
-
6. Stephen Dinan, “Congressional Budget Office: Stimulus Hurt the Economy

in the Long Term,” Washington Times, November 22, 2011, http://www.washington‑
times.com/news/2011/nov/22/cbo stimulus hurts economy long run/?page=all.
-
-
-
-
-
7. Peter Roff, “Another Study Shows Stimulus Spending Doesn’t Work,” U.S.

News and World Report, November 14, 2011, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/
peter roff/2011/11/14/another study shows stimulus spending doesnt work.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
8. Reince Priebus, “The Five Biggest Failures from President Obama,” U.S.

News and World Report, February 17, 2012, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/
2012/02/17/the five biggest failures from president obamas stimulus law.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
9. Erik Wasson, “CBO: Obama Stimulus Helping Economy,” The Hill,

November 22, 2011, http://thehill.com/policy/finance/195181 cbo says obama

-
-
-
-
stimulus still helps economy.
-
-
-
10. David Sirota, “What a Second Stimulus Should—and Shouldn’t—Look

Like,” Common Dreams, September 7, 2010, http://www.commondreams.org/views/
2010/09/07/what second stimulus should and shouldnt look.
-
-
-
-
-
-
11. Barbara Hagenbaugh, “Majority of Economists in USA Today Survey Back

2nd Stimulus,” USA Today, October 28, 2008, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/
economy/2008 10 27 second economic stimulus proposal_N.htm.
-
-
-
-
-
-
12. Wendy W. Simmons, “Public Has Mixed Feelings about Tax Cuts,” Gallup,

January 24, 2001, http://www.gallup.com/poll/2077/public has mixed feelings about
-
-
-
-
-
tax cuts.aspx.
-
13. Ibid.

14. Jeffrey M. Jones, “Americans OK Allowing Tax Cuts for the Wealthy to

Expire,” Gallup, September 10, 2010, http://www.gallup.com/poll/142940/Americans
-
Allowing Tax Cuts Wealthy Expire.aspx.
-
-
-
-
15. Stephanie Condon, “Poll: Most Americans Want Tax Cuts for the Rich

to Expire,” CBS News, September 15, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll
-
most americans want tax cuts for the rich to expire/.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
16. C. Eugene Emery Jr., “U.S. Senate Candidate Barry Hinckley Says the

Nation’s Tax Code is 80,000 Pages,” Politifact, December 27, 2011, http://www.
politifact.com/rhode island/statements/2011/dec/27/barry hinckley/us senate
-
-
-
-
candidate barry hinckley says nations ta/.
-
-
-
-
-
17. Chris Isidore, “Economists: Extend the Bush Tax Cuts,” CNN Money, July

9, 2012, http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/09/news/economy/bush tax cuts/.
-
-
18. Jeffrey A. Miron, “How the Bush Tax Cuts Worked,” New York Times,

July 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/09/08/mixing economics
-
-
with politics/how the bush tax cuts worked.
-
-
-
-
-
-
19. Editorial, “Fiddling While Jobs Burn,” New York Post, December 4, 2010,

http://nypost.com/2010/12/04/fiddling while jobs burn/.
-
-
-
20. Mark Thoma, “Did the Bush Tax Cuts Lead to Economic Growth,” CBS

News, November 30, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/did the bush tax cuts lead
-
-
-
-
-
-
to economic growth/.
-
-
21. Andrew Fieldhouse, “Ten Years Later, the Bush Tax Cuts Remain Unfair,

Ineffective, and Expensive,” Economic Policy Institute, June 6, 2011, http://www.epi.
org/publication/ten_years_later_the_bush_tax_cuts_remain_unfair_ineffective_and_
expensive/.
22. Robert Reich, “Why We Really Shouldn’t Keep the Bush Tax Cut for the

Wealthy,” RobertReich.org, August 2, 2010, http://robertreich.org/post/894152905.
23. Polling Report, “CBS/New York Times Poll,” Pollingreport.com, September

12–15, 2014, http://www.pollingreport.com/work.htm.
24. Alexander Bolton, “Centrist Republicans Cool to Minimum Wage Hike

Compromise,” The Hill, April 4, 2014, http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/202641
-
centrist republicans cool to wage compromise.
-
-
-
-
-
25. S. A. Miller, “Obama’s Minimum Wage Hike Will Cost up to 1M Jobs:

Report,” New York Post, February 19, 2014, http://nypost.com/2014/02/19/cbo obamas
-
-
minimum wage hike will cost up to 1 million jobs/.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
26. Emmarie Huetteman, “Obama Calls for Minimum Wage Rise and Equal

Pay as Elections Approach,” New York Times, September 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/09/02/us/politics/obama takes to road to push rise in minimum wage.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
html.
27. Lawrence Mishel, “Declining Value of the Federal Minimum Wage Is Major

Factor Driving Inequality,” Economic Policy Institute, February 21, 2013, http://www.
epi.org/publication/declining federal minimum wage inequality/.
-
-
-
-
28. Tyler Kingkade, “Student Loan Rates Should not Increase, Americans Say

in Poll,” Huffington Post, June 19, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/18/
student loan rates poll_n_3461145.html.
-
-
-
29. Allie Bidwell, “Average Student Loan Debt Approaches $30,000,” U.S. News

and World Report, November 13, 2014, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/
11/13/average student loan debt hits 30 000.
-
-
-
-
-
-
30. Kyla Calvert, “Percentage of Americans with College Degrees Rises,

Paying for Degrees Tops Financial Challenges,” PBS, April 22, 2014, http://www.pbs.
org/newshour/rundown/percentage americans college degrees rises paying degrees
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
tops financial challenges/.
-
-
31. Michael Stratford, “Loan Bill Blocked,” Inside Higher Ed, June 12, 2014,

https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/06/12/senate republicans block student
-
-
-
-
loan reform legislation.
-
-
Notes to Conclusion 349
32. Ramsey Cox, “GOP Blocks Warren’s Student Loan Bill,” The Hill, Septem

-
ber 16, 2014, http://thehill.com/blogs/floor action/senate/217908 gop blocks warrens
-
-
-
-
-
student loan bill.
-
-
33. David Leonhardt, “Q&A: The Real Cost of College,” New York Times, November

19, 2009, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/q a the real cost of college/.
-
-
-
-
-
-
34. Allie Bidwell, “Obama Sidesteps Congress to Expand Student Loan

Repayment Program,” U.S. News and World Report, June 9, 2014, http://www.
usnews.com/news/articles/2014/06/09/obama sidesteps congress to expand student
-
-
-
-
-
-
loan repayment program.
-
-
35. Michael Jamrisko and Llan Kolet, “College Costs Surge 500% in U.S. Since

1985,” Bloomberg News, August 26, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013 08
-
-
26/college costs surge 500 in u s since 1985 chart of the day.html.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
36. Josh Sanburn, “Higher Education Poll,” Time, October 18, 2012, http://

nation.time.com/2012/10/18/higher education poll/; Pew Research Center, “Is College
-
-

Worth It?” Pew Research Center, May 15, 2011, http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/
2011/05/15/is college worth it/.
-
-
-
Conclusion
1. Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins, Setting the Agenda: Responsible

Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni‑
versity Press, 2005).
2. Sparrow, “A Research Agenda for an Institutional Media”; Sparrow, Uncer‑

tain Guardians, 76–80.
3. Uscinski, The People’s News.

4. Amber E. Boydstun, Making the News: Politics, the Media, and Agenda

Setting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).
5. David Croteau, “Examining the ‘Liberal Media’ Claim,” Fairness and

Accuracy in Reporting, June 1, 1998, http://fair.org/press release/examining the quot
-
-
-
liberal mediaquot claim/.
-
-
6. Markus Prior, Post Broadcast Democracy: How Media Choice Increases

Inequality in Political Involvement and Polarizes Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007).
7. For documentation of Rush Limbaugh’s weekly audience, see: Paul Farhi,

“Limbaugh’s Audience Size? It’s Largely up in the Air,” Washington Post, March 7, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp dyn/content/article/2009/03/06/AR20090306
-
03435.html; For documentation of total daily viewers for MSNBC and Fox News, see:
Project for Excellence in Journalism, “State of the News Media 2012,” Pew Research
Center, 2012, http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2012/cable cnn ends its ratings slide
-
-
-
-
-
-
fox falls again/.
-
-
8. Eshbaugh‑Soha and Peake, Breaking Through the Noise, 183.

Source: Lexis Nexis
Figure 5.2. New York Times coverage of tax cuts (January–May 2001).

Source: Lexis Nexis
Figure 5.3. New York Times reporting on social security reform (January–May 2005).

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reporting was characterized by sustained negativity, although the debate on

the House and Senate floors between both parties was also intense, as docu‑
mented earlier in this chapter.
As with tax cuts, negative reporting on the stimulus varied. As seen
in Figure 5.4, reporting in January was strongly sympathetic to the Demo‑
crats. More than 80 percent of sources quoted and mentions of partisan lead‑
ers were from Democrats, and less than 20 percent were from Republicans.
Similarly, negative stories emphasizing partisan and public disagreement on
the stimulus were infrequent, appearing in less than 20 percent of coverage.
By February, however, Democratic sources and party mentions had
shrunken by more than twenty percentage points, and negativity appeared
in more than 40 percent of stories. Overall, coverage ranged from positive
to increasingly negative, although emphasis on negativity never appeared in
more than half of stories per month.
Finally, for executive pay, negative news was rare. As Figure 5.5 sug‑
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making up between 20 percent to one‑third of all sources quoted and men‑
tions of party leaders. These numbers declined by February and March, with
Republicans ranging from a high from 20 percent to a low of none of sources
quoted and party mentions. Stories emphasizing negativity never appeared
Source: Lexis Nexis

Figure 5.4. New York Times reporting on the stimulus (January–February 2009).

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Index
Aartz, Lee, 287n50 American International Group (AIG),

ABC News, 31, 34, 134 108, 113, 115–16, 118, 120, 123,
ABC News polls, 170–72, 180, 189, 216, 190–92
220 American Presidency Project database,
Academics (in news), 3, 29, 52, 54–55, 11, 265
65, 71–72, 84, 103–04, 120–21, American Recovery and Reinvestment
126. 257, 263, 269 Act of 2009, 98
Adkins Covert, 288n77 American Society of Civil Engineers, 96
Adler, Glenn, 26, 287n49 Ansolabehere, Stephen, 291n111
Advertising, 4, 263–265 Arceneaux, Kevin, 281n46
Afghanistan war, 226 Armey, Dick, 40, 45
AFL-CIO, 45, 51 Arnold, Doulas, 280n43
Agenda setting, 4, 14–15, 53, 86, 127,
145, 154, 160, 256–57 Baby boomers, 69
Aldrich, John, 274n5 Bachus, Spencer, 113, 122
Alger, Dean, 27, 287n59 Bagdikian, Ben, 27, 287n59
Allen, Mike, 284n5 Baier, Brett, 101
Alliance for American Manufacturing, Bailout, see Troubled Asset Relief
103 Program
Almond, Gabriel, 275n18 Barker, David, 281n46
Alterman, Eric, 288n75 Barrett, Andrew, 280n43
Alternative Minimum Tax, 199, 212 Bartels, Larry, 294n21, 327n33–34
Althaus, Scott, 25, 284n6, 286n42 Baum, Matthew, 35, 131, 140–141,
American Association of Retired 156–157, 275n8, 281n46, 291n115,
Persons (AARP), 79, 168, 178 323n4–5, 325n25–28, 326n24–30,
American Economic Association (AEA), 346n3
42 Baumgartner, Frank, 284n5
American Enterprise Institute, 97, 103 Beck, Glenn, 15, 123
American Federation of Government Beckett, Katherine, 292n126
Employees, 82 Beland, Daniel, 79, 307n70, 328n50
363
364 Index
Bennett, Bob, 113 Blackburn, Marsha, 136

Bennett, W. Lance, 21–22, 131, 284n6, Bloch-Elkon, 275n14, 285n17, 324n18,
284n12–14, 285n15, 323n11, 326n19
326n31 Bloomberg News, 251
Berger, Bennett, 278n29 Bloomberg polls, 221
Berger, Peter, 22, 285n22 Blunt, Roy, 9, 79
Berinsky, Adam, 156, 280n40, 326n22– Boehlert, Erik, 285n17
23 Boehner, John, 100, 106, 122, 211, 224,
Berry, Jeffrey, 34, 274n6, 281n47, 247
290n103–05 Bonn, Scott, 275n14, 276n22, 285n17,
Bias (in the media) 324n18, 326n19, 326n31
Bad news bias, 4, 11–13, 17, 35–37, Boydstun, Amber, 262, 349n4

128–51, 153–96, 206, 210–11, 214, Boykoff, Jules, 26, 287n51–52
219, 229, 257 Bozell, Brent, 288n73
Demand side model, 34 Broadcasting, see “Media”

Distortion of reality, 7, 20 Brock, David, 323n127

Framing, see “Framing” Brody, Richard, 155, 326n18

Indexing bias, 3–5, 7–8, 12, 17, 21, Broun, Paul, 115

27–29, 37, 39, 46, 48, 53–54, 56, Brown-Waite, Ginny, 136
59, 61, 63, 69–70, 73–74, 76, 83, Bryant, Jennings, 284n5
87–88, 90, 93, 103, 105–07, 120, Buchanan, William, 275n10
123, 127–28, 131–35, 147, 151, Bucy, Erik, 278n29, 289n78
153–96, 202, 229, 257–58, 269, 271 Budget Control Act (2011), 225
Power indexing, 21 Budget surplus, 64–65, 67–70, 74–75,

Source indexing, 21 145, 160–61, 164, 206

Liberal media bias, 4, 11, 17, 30–32, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 243

48, 51, 54, 56, 61, 73, 83, 86, 90, Bureaucracy, 53
93, 103, 106, 127, 154, 257 Burgess, Michael, 137
Materialistic, 24, 27 Burrell, Nancy, 284n5

Media pluralism, 4, 7, 12, 17–18, Bush, George W, 1, 9, 31, 44–45, 50,

32–35, 51, 53–54, 57, 59, 61, 70, 53–54, 64–92, 112, 133, 145, 148,
74, 76, 83–84, 87–88, 90, 94, 103, 156, 162, 167–72, 174–76, 178–79,
107, 119, 123, 127, 257 197–99, 201, 211, 225–26, 232–33,
One-sidedness, 7, 12–13, 20 241–45

Pro-business (hegemonic) bias, 4, 7, Bush, George H. W, 21

11, 17–18, 21–29, 51, 56, 61–62, Butler, Daniel, 274n7, 289n78
64, 71, 86, 93, 123–127, 204–06,
229–30, 269 Cable news, 10
Stereotyping (working class/poor/ Cameron, Charles, 305n41

unions), 24–25, 28 Campbell, Angus, 275n17
Strategic framing, 36 Canes-Wrone, Brandice, 274n3

Watchdog role, 23, 30, 92 Cantor, Eric, 100, 102

Bizer, George, 274n4 Cap and trade, 205
Index 365
Capital gains tax, 89, 241, 199, 212 CNN, 134, 242
Cappella, Michael, 36, 281n46, CNN polls, 163, 177, 180
291n123–24, 323n1 Coffman, Mike, 139
Carbon tax, 205 Cohen, Bernard, 276n20
Card, David, 41, 50 Cohen, Jeffrey, 35, 273n3, 274n3,
Carlson, Tucker, 50, 59, 87 291n109
Carter, Jimmy, 35 Cohen, Steve, 139
CATO Institute, 77, 82, 84, 97, 108–09, Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs),
242 109
Cavuto, Neil, 59 Colmes, Alan, 59, 74, 87
CBS News, 14–15, 31, 34, 43, 47, 51–52, Common Cause, 110
55–57, 69–70, 72, 74, 81, 85–86, Competitive Enterprise Institute, 97
100–02, 104–05, 116–17, 121–23, Congress, 1, 4–5, 9, 11, 15, 25, 31, 43,
127, 134, 184, 190, 243, 271–72 45, 48, 53, 63–64, 66–68, 73, 78,
CBS News polls, 166, 170, 180–81, 80, 82, 84, 97, 99–100, 102, 106,
187–89, 192–93, 207, 210, 240, 245 108, 111–13, 114–15, 117, 130,
Censorship 132–33, 135–40, 142–44, 146–47,
Pro-advertiser, 23–24, 29, 258 151, 155–57, 161, 168–69, 171, 179,

Self-censorship, 23–24 184, 188, 191–92, 199–203, 210,

Census (U.S.), 243 212, 214–15, 224–25, 227–28, 233,
Center for American Progress, 103 236, 242, 251, 255, 259
Center for Economic and Policy Congressional Budget Office, 41, 64–65,
Research, 110 77, 96–97, 108, 220, 237–38
Center for Tax and Budget Congressional Record database, 11, 31,
Accountability, 88 135, 138–39, 185, 193
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Conrad, Kent, 69–70, 83
71, 77, 96, 220 Consumerism, 4, 24, 27
Cheney, Dick, 73, 86 Converse, Philip, 275n17
Chicago Sun Times, 14–15, 43, 47, Cook, Timothy, 28, 287n64–65
50–53, 55–59, 67, 71, 72, 74–76, Coulter, Anne, 288n73
80–81, 83–86, 88, 98, 101–07, 116, Cox, Gary, 274n5, 349n1
118, 120–23, 127, 145–47, 271 Crigler, Ann, 283n49
Chicago Tribune, 15, 75, 88, 107, 123 Crime reporting, 36–37
Chiu, Dennis, 21, 284n10–11, 325n6 Cromwell, David, 288n75
Chomsky, Noam, 22, 274n4, 275n14, Croteau, David, 22, 24, 285n23,
283n50, 285n16, 288n71, 326n31 286n37–38, 288n72, 349n5
Chrysler (bailout), 111 Cuellar, Henry, 136
Class (economic), 28, 31 Cultivation research, 37
Class conflict, 48
Climate change, 202 Dadge, David, 285n17
Clinton, William J, 10, 31, 40, 43, Dahl, Robert, 32, 290n93
45–48, 53–54, 198–99, 244 Dalton, Russell, 290n92
Cizmar, Anne, 25, 286n42 Daschle, Tom, 43, 69
366 Index
Dayton, Mark, 80 Dunaway, Johanna, 25, 286n44,

D’Alessio, David, 288n77 291n111, 304n40
Dearing, James, 280n42, 284n5, 326n3, Durbin, Dick, 80, 136, 139
327n37
Death panels, 133, 207, 209 Economic crash (2008), 8–9, 64, 91,
Debt 94–96, 113, 118, 188, 194, 200–02,
Household/personal, 5, 70 236–39, 242

National, 64–66, 68–70, 90, 99, 102, Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act

132, 136, 139, 145, 162–64, 181, (2001), 66
198–200, 237–38, 244 Economic Policy Institute, 65–66, 71,
Debt ceiling debate, 10, 16, 133, 84, 96, 124, 243, 247, 255
198–200, 204–07, 211, 223–30, 260, Editorials
262, 267–68, 272
Executive pay, 122–23
Grand bargain, 224 Minimum wage, 57–60

DeFazio, Peter, 136–37, 139 Social Security, 86–88

Deficit, 44, 64–66, 68, 70, 76, 83, 90, 95, Stimulus, 106–07

99, 106, 145, 181, 198, 200, 205, Tax cuts, 74–76

222, 225–28, 260 Edwards, David, 288n75
Deindustrialization, 27 Edwards, Elizabeth, 50
DeLauro, Rosa, 136 Edwards, John, 50
Delay, Tom, 45, 86 Edy, Jill, 284n6
Demand side model, see “Bias” Eisenhower, Dwight, 89–90
Democracy, 6, 18, 23, 32, 90, 105, 269 Election coverage
Department of Labor, 46 1988, 36

Deregulation, 94–95, 110, 125, 193 1992, 35–36

Derivative (investments), 109, 200 1996, 36

Devinish, Nicole, 82 2000, 36, 66

Diageo polls, 180, 190 2004, 78

DiMaggio, Anthony, 274n4, 275n13, 2008, 94–95

275n14, 276n19, 276n22, 280n43, Employment Policies Institute, 58
283n50, 284n9, 285n17, 290n92, Entman, Robert, 278n29, 284n6
290n95, 292n128, 305n40, 324n18, Environmental Protection Act (1970),
326n31, 340n36–38 202
Dividends tax, 199, 212 Environmental Protection Agency
Dodd, Christopher, 117, 120 (emission rules), 198, 201–02,
Dodd-Frank financial reform, 113, 125 204–05, 267–68, 272
Dole, Robert, 43–45, 47–48 Environmentalist protests, 33
Domke, David, 285n17, 288n76 Epstein, Richard, 97
Dorgan, Byron, 68, 136 Erickson, Christopher, 25, 286n41,
Drift, 27 290n97
Druckman, James, 274n3, 274n4 Eshbaugh-Soha, 273n3, 349n8
Dubay, Curtis, 97 Estate tax, 66
Index 367
Excise tax, 111 Gallup (polling), 20, 108, 163, 169, 180,
Executive branch, 2–3, 5, 52–55, 72–73, 188, 190, 215–17, 240
83–85, 87, 104, 120–121, 131–32, Gamson, William, 22, 285n23
140, 201–03, 247, 259 Gans, Herbert, 27–28, 287n61–62
Executive pay controversy (2009), 8–9, Garrett, Scott, 136
16–17, 93–94, 107–27, 146–47, 150, Gay and lesbian rights, 33
153, 187–95, 229, 259, 266, 268 Gayle, Mae, 284n5
Experimental media data, 231–56 Geithner, Timothy, 102, 105, 117–18
Conservative exposure group, 234, Gelman, Andrew, 289n90

237, 242, 246, 250–51, 253–55 General Accounting Office, 76
External validity, 232 General Motors (bailout), 111

Liberal exposure group, 234, 238, Gentzkow, Matthew, 34, 291n107

242–44, 247, 251, 253–55 Gephardt, Dick, 69
Gilbert, Dennis, 292n4
Fannie Mae, 109 Gilens, Martin, 274n7, 275n7
Farnsworth, Stephen, 36, 129, 131, Gilliam, Frank, 284n5
291n122, 323n2, 323n9 Gimpel, James, 25, 286n42
Federal Reserve, 96, 112–13, 117, 243 Gingrey, Phil, 137
Ferguson protests, 33 Gingrich, Newt, 48
Filibuster, 133, 148, 201 Giuffo, John, 26, 286n48
Fishman, Mark, 28, 287n63 Glass Steagall Act, 95
Food stamps, 96, 99, 102, 106, 238 Glenn, David, 24, 286n34
Forgacs, David, 285n18–19 Global Warming, see “climate change”
Fox News, 14–16, 43, 48, 50, 55, 57–59, Globalization
69, 72, 74, 81–82, 85–87, 101–02, Anti-corporate globalization, 26, 32

104–07, 116, 118, 121–23, 127–28, International Monetary Fund protests,

134, 263–64, 271–72 26
Fox News polls, 163 Seattle protests, 26

Foxx, Virginia, 139 World Bank protests, 26

Framing, 3, 11, 24, 111, 194 World Trade Organization protests,

Executive Pay, 114–15 26

Minimum wage, 45–51, 56–57, 61 Goeddertz, Tamara, 26, 287n50

Social Security, 80–83 Goffman, Erving, 278n29

Stimulus, 98–103 Goldberg, Bernard, 288n73

Tax cuts, 67–70, 164 Goldman, Robert, 286n39

Frank, Barney, 117, 120 Government shutdown, see “Shutdown”
Freddie Mac, 109 Government takeover (health care), 207
Free Markets, 27, 80 Grabe, Elizabeth, 278n29, 289n78
Free Trade (media coverage), 24, 26 Graber, Doris, 276n19, 304n40
Frist, Bill, 86 Gramsci, Antonio, 22, 285n18–19
Grassley, Charles, 86, 178
Gainous, Jason, 281n48, 282n48 Great Depression, 95, 190, 200
368 Index
Greenspan, Alan, 69 Hill (magazine), 20, 238, 247, 251

Groeling, Tim, 29, 35, 129–30, 140–41, Hoeffel, Joe, 69
156–57, 274n3, 275n8, 276n21, House of Representatives, 1–2, 11, 40,
281n46, 288n69, 291n115–18, 43–46, 48, 50, 58, 66–67, 69, 79–

323n1, 323n3–5, 325n23, 325n25– 80, 83, 86, 95, 97–100, 102, 106,
28, 326n24–30, 327n33, 346n3 111, 113–15, 118, 120, 122, 135
Groseclose, Tim, 31, 289n89 Housing bubble, 94–95, 108, 110, 200
Gross Domestic Product (U.S.), 96, 238 Howell, William, 346n3
Grossmann, Matt, 34, 290n106 Hoyer, Steny, 106
Grossman, Michael, 304n40 Hoynes, William, 22, 24, 285n23,
Guardino, Matt, 285n17, 326n31 286n37–38
Gulf War (1991), 21, 155 Hudson Institute, 71
Human rights (coverage), 29
Hacker, Jacob, 27, 274n6, 287n54–55, Hunter, Duncan, 139
326n5 Hurwitz, Jon, 274n4
Hallin, Daniel, 21–22, 131, 284n7,
323n10, 323n12 Indexing, see Bias
Hamilton, James, 34, 290n107 Indoctrination, 154–57, 229
Hannity, Sean, 15, 59, 74, 87, 123, Inequality, 5, 40, 61, 65, 90, 94, 124–25,
288n73 248
Hardball (MSNBC), 50, 102, 104 Inflation, 27–28, 30, 40–42, 60–61, 96,
Harding, Steve, 50 205, 243, 246, 248
Harris polls, 189 Informational effects (of media),
Hayes, Danny, 281n47, 285n17, 326n31 158–59, 196
Health care reform Infrastructure (spending), 98–101, 106,
Bill Clinton, 16, 198–99, 203–04, 180, 184, 238, 254

265–66, 272 Inhofe, James, 112
Barack Obama, 1, 16, 132–33, 198– Inside Higher Ed, 251

99, 203–04, 206–10, 214, 229–30, Interest Groups, 33–35, 39, 63, 71, 75, 84,
259, 267–68, 272 91, 94, 110, 121, 168, 178, 263, 269
Hegemony theory, 4, 11, 17, 22, 26, 33, International Monetary Fund, 26
60–61, 73, 88–90, 204–05, 229–30, Iraq war, 35, 45, 156, 226
258 Issue ownership (and news), 34–35
Heinz, Eulan, 275n10 Iyengar, Shanto, 276n20, 284n5,
Heith, Diane, 273n3, 281n46 291n111, 325n3, 327n37
Heritage Foundation, 65, 77–78, 97,
108–09, 243 Jackson-Lee, Barbara, 137
Herman, Edward, 22, 274n4, 275n14, Jacobs, Lawrence, 274n3, 274n4, 275n11
283n50, 285n16, 288n71, 288n75, Jamieson, Kathleen, 36, 281n46,
326n31 291n123–24, 323n1
Hertsgaard, Mark, 274n3, 304n40 Jobs and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
Hetherington, Marc, 26, 35, 274n6, of 2003, 199
287n53, 291n112 Johnson, Martin, 281n46
Index 369
Johnson, Tim, 136 Leach, Jim, 178

Johnson-Cartee, Karen, 278n29 Lee, Han Soo, 30, 288n79
Jones, Bryan, 284n5 Legislative branch, 44–45, 52, 55, 72–72,
Journalism 79, 85, 97, 104, 120–22, 126, 132,
Norms, 27–28 135, 141–42

Objectivity, see “Objectivity” LeShay, Steven, 31, 289n88

Judicial branch, 55, 72, 85, 104, 121, Levendusky, Matthew, 281n46
132, 202 Lexis Nexis (database), 14, 149–51, 203,
Just, Marion, 283n49 271
Lichter, Linda, 30, 289n80
Kaiser polls, 207, 221 Lichter, S. Robert, 30, 36, 129, 131,
Kamalipour, Yahya, 287n50 289n80, 291n119–20, 291n122,
Kaptur, Marcy, 136 323n2, 323n9
Kendall, Diana, 24, 278n29, 286n29–30 Liddy, Edward, 118
Kennedy, Edward, 43 Lieberman, Trudy, 288n75
Kerbel, Matthew, 36, 291n121 Limbaugh, Rush, 264
Kernell, Samuel, 273n3 Lindsey, Lawrence, 66
Keynes, John Maynard, 95, 312n2 Lipinski, Dan, 101
Keynesian economics, 95–97 Lippmann, Walter, 5, 20, 275n9, 275n16,
Keystone Research Center, 238 284n4
Kimball, David, 291n111 Living wage, 40, 60, 206
Kinder, Donald, 276n20, 284n5, 325n3, Livingston, Steven, 131, 284n6, 284n14,
327n37 285n15, 323n11, 326n31
Kingdon, John, 284n5 Lobbying (business), 27, 34
Kingston, Jack, 137 Local news, 10, 127, 134
Klinger, Mark, 284n5 Lodge, Milton, 274n4, 274n6
Kollmeyer, Christopher, 24, 286n35–36 Los Angeles Times, 24
Kondracke, Mort, 118 Los Angeles Times polls, 188
Kraidy, Marwan, 26, 287n50 Lowry, Dennis, 31, 36, 289n85
Krosnick, Jon, 274n4 Luckmann, Thomas, 22, 285n22
Krueger, Alan, 41, 50
Kucinich, Dennis, 80, 136 MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour (PBS), 24
Kuklinski, James, 276n23 Maddow, Rachel, 15, 59, 123
Kumar, Deepa, 33, 290n101–02 Major, Mark, 285n17
Kumar, Martha Joynt, 304n40, 305n40 Malecha, Gary Lee, 273n3
Kuypers, Jim, 31, 289n84 Mansell, Robin, 22, 285n20
Kyl, John, 106, 112, 115, 122 Manufacturing Consent, see “Public
Opinion”
Labor unions, see “Unions” Marcin, Phil, 25, 286n43
Ladd, Jonathan, 290n91 Martin, Christopher, 33, 290n99
Laracey, Mel, 274n3 Martinez, Mel, 112
Lawrence, Regina, 131, 284n6, 284n14, Matthews, Chris, 50, 59, 102
323n11, 326n31 McCain, John, 102
370 Index
McCarty, Nolan, 287n56, 324n14 Privatization Reform, 10, 16,

McCaskill, Claire, 111 198–200, 204, 206, 210–11, 219–23,
McConnell, Mitch, 99–100, 251 229–30, 260, 262, 272
McChesney, Robert, 22–23, 285n16, Public opposition (to reform), 213–23

285n24–25, 288n75 Melancon, Charlie, 139
McCombs, Maxwell, 280n42, 326n3 Mermin, Jonathan, 21, 284n8, 326n31
McCrery, Jim, 82 Miller, George, 46, 50
McCubbins, Matthew, 274n5, 349n1 Miller, Warren, 275n17
McDermott, Jim, 137 Mindich, David, 28, 287n66–68
McKeon, Howard, 50 Minimal effects (theory), 154
McManus, John, 25, 286n46 Minimum wage, 8–9, 17, 27, 39–92,
McMorris-Rodgers, Cathy, 139 124, 145–47, 198, 201–02, 204–06,
Media 232–33, 244–50, 255, 266–68, 272
Agenda building, 20, 29 Employment effects, 40–42, 44–47,

Agenda Setting, see “Agenda Setting” 49–50, 58

Bias, see “Bias” Executive order (2014), 201–02

Broadcasting, 14–15, 31, 35, 157 Inflation effects, 40–42, 44–46, 49

Effects on public opinion, 12, 17, 130, Small business effects, 40, 48, 50

133–35, 153–97, 206–29, 231–257, Miron, Jeffrey, 242
259–60 Mishel, Lawrence, 248
Experimental media data, 231–56 Mitchell, Daniel, 45, 286n41, 290n97

Framing, see “Framing” Mittelman, James, 26, 287n49

Informational role, 19–20, 158–59, Mizruchi, Mark, 311n111

196, 216 Moody’s, 242
Narrowcasting, 14–15, 264 Morella, Jennifer, 292n128

Newswire services, 10, 14–15 Morgan, Michael, 292n127

Priming, see “Priming” MSNBC, 14–16, 48, 50, 55, 57–59, 72,

Semi-independence (from government), 74, 81–82, 85–87, 101–02, 105–07,

22 116, 118, 121–23, 127–28, 134,
Socialization, 6 263–64, 271–72

Propaganda, see “Propaganda”

Watchdog role, 23 Nacos, Brigitte, 275n14, 285n17,

Media effects, see “Media” 292n128, 324n18
Media Institute, 31 Narrowcasting, see “Media”
Media Research Center, 35 National Bureau of Economic Research,
Medicaid, 75–76, 101, 199, 206 110
Medicare National Federation of Independent
Budgetary costs, 67, 69, 75–76, 164, Business, 51, 54

206, 224 National Public Radio, 134
Donut hole, 218 National Restaurant Association, 54

Prescription drugs, 10, 16, 75, 200, National Retail Federation, 103

202–204, 206, 210–11, 213–19, NBC News, 31, 33–34
229–30, 260, 262, 265–66, 268, 272 NBC News polls, 221
Index 371
Nelson, Ben, 68 Page, Benjamin, 275n7, 276n19, 280n41

Neuman, W. Russell, 283n49 Palin, Sarah, 133
Neumark, David, 41, 50 Parenti, Michael, 22, 24, 285n21, 286n33
Neustadt, Richard, 273n3, 336n3 Parties
New Deal, 97 Agenda setting, 257

New York Post, 15, 59, 75, 88, 107, 123, Control of government, 2–4, 12,

242, 247 258–59, 261, 265, 268
New York Times, 1–2, 10, 14–15, 34, 43, Cross-party criticisms, 135–140, 157,

47, 49–52, 54–59, 64, 67, 69–72, 159, 194, 198–200, 202
74–76, 79, 81–88, 98, 100–07, Effects on public opinion, 153–96

113, 116–19, 121–23, 127–28, 134, Gridlock, 43, 202

145–51, 171, 178, 184, 190, 202, Mentions of in news, 1–2, 56–57, 61,

218, 240, 242, 247, 271 74, 86, 90, 105, 114, 120, 122, 127,
New York Times polls, 170, 180–81, 210, 148, 150, 184, 202–04
245 News dominance, 61–63, 257

Nie, Norman, 326n20–21 Obstruction, 94

Niemi, Richard, 291n111 Polarization, 4–5, 26–27, 39, 60, 64,

Nightline (ABC), 24–25 80, 89, 125, 130, 132–133, 197,
Niven, David, 288n77 201–02, 223–29, 257
Nominations (executive), 133 Split/divided control of government,

Norms, see “Journalism” 4, 8, 12, 39–62, 93, 198, 203–04,
Norris, Pippa, 278n29 258, 261–62, 265–67, 271–72
Noyes, Richard, 36, 291n119–20 Unified control of government, 4, 8,

Nyhan, Brendan, 288n75, 289n90 12, 36, 63–128, 156, 159, 194, 198,
202–03, 212, 258, 261–62, 265–67,
Obama, Barack H., 1, 41, 67, 93–128, 271–72
133, 138, 188, 192, 197–98, 200–02, Within-party criticisms, 140–46, 157,

206–11, 214, 221, 224, 226–28, 232, 178, 184, 194, 199
236–38, 247, 251, 255 Patterson, Thomas, 35, 131, 275n8,
Objectivity (journalistic), 15–16, 23, 291n110, 323n1, 323n6–8
27–28, 57, 133, 268 Paul, Ron, 136
Occupy Wall Street, 33 Payroll tax, 77
Office of Management and Budget, 77 Peake, Jeffrey, 280n43, 349n8
Olbermann, Keith, 15, 59, 87, 102, 123 Peffley, Mark, 274n4
Olson, James, 274n4 Pelosi, Nancy, 80, 102, 106
O’Neil, Paul, 73 Pence, Mike, 102, 137, 139
Op–Eds Perino, Dana, 112
Executive pay, 122–23 Petrocik, John, 326n20–21

Minimum wage, 57–61 Pevehouse, John, 346n3

Social Security, 86–88 Pew Research Center, 16, 19, 30–31,

Stimulus, 106–07 133–34, 160, 163–64, 166, 171–72,

Tax cuts, 74–76 176, 181–82, 185–87, 192–93,

O’Reilly, Bill, 15, 59, 74, 87, 123 206–07, 212–13, 216, 223, 255
372 Index
Phalen, Patricia, 284n6 Media effects, see “Media”

Phillips curve, 41 Medicare reform, 211, 213–23, 229

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Minimum wage, 245–49

Economic Policy Studies, 237 Non-attitudes, 6

Pierson, Paul, 27, 274n6, 287n54–56 Official distrust of, 5, 258

Plante, Bill, 102 Prior attitudes, 3, 13–14, 153, 158–59,

Pluralism (theory of power), 32, 269 162–64, 167–69, 174–75, 177–80,
Poole, Keith, 324n14 182–83, 187–89, 193, 195, 197, 207,
Popkin, Samuel, 276n19 209–21, 223, 225–26, 230–32, 234,
Pork barrel politics, 100–02 236, 240–42, 244–46, 248–50, 253,
Poverty, 40, 47, 50, 58, 60, 87, 99, 108, 256, 258–62, 268
199 Semi-independence, 7

Preiss, Raymond, 284n5
Social Security, 168–79, 229
Prescription drugs, 44 Stability of, 13–14, 231

Price, Tom, 136 Stimulus, 179–87, 229, 235–40

Prior, Markus, 264, 327n35, 349n6 Student loans, 249–53

Priming, 20, 154, 256 Tax cuts, 162–68, 211–13, 229, 241–45

Progressive Policy Institute, 71 Public works, 95–96, 101
Propaganda, 17–18, 22, 53, 62–63, Puette, William, 25, 286n41
91–92, 94, 127, 195, 256, 258
Public Citizen, 110 Quinn, Jack, 40
Public Opinion Quinnipiac polls, 220–21
Debt ceiling, 211, 223–29

Executive Pay, 187–95, 229 Rajagopal, Arvind, 286n39

Experimental media effects, 231–56 Rationing (health care), 207

Familiarity with issues, 3, 12–13, Reagan, Daniel, 273n3

153, 158–59, 162, 168–70, 177–79, Receive-Accept-Sample model (RAS),
188–90, 193, 195, 197, 209–16, 155
218–20, 223, 225, 230–32, 234, 236, Recession
240–41, 244–46, 249–50, 253–54, Post-2000, 67, 199, 213, 232, 242

256, 259–61, 268 Post-2008, 95, 97, 102, 106, 139, 200,

Government distrust, 18–20, 26–27, 223

36, 130, 133–35, 160, 258 Redistribution
Government trust, 129, 133–35, 257 Minimum wage, 40–41

Health care (2009–10), 206–10, 229 Stimulus, 97

Indexing, 155–156, 183, 193, 195, 230 Reed, Jack, 136

Interaction effect (partisanship and Reich, Robert, 40, 46–48, 244

media consumption), 167, 175, Reid, Harry, 136
182, 209, 212–13, 216, 221, 227 Ridout, Travis, 281n47
Manufacturing consent, 5–6, 17, 22, Reuters polls, 163

153, 195, 197–98, 219, 229, 259, Robinson, Eugene, 118
269 Rogers, Everett, 280n42, 284n5,
Marginalized (in news), 62, 71 326n3, 327n37

374 Index
Stimulus program (2009) 146–47, Clinton, William J., 40, 43–46, 48–49,

150–51, 153, 160–62, 179–87, 194, 89
229, 232–33, 235–44, 246, 248, 250, For the rich, 66, 68–69, 90

254–55, 259–60, 262, 267–68 Obama, Barack H., 96–101, 106, 180

Disability benefits, 96 Tax Policy Center, 103

Economic effects, 96, 254 Tea Party, 33, 207

Education funding, 180 Team Act, 43

Food stamps, 96 Tewksbury, David, 284n5

Homeowner assistance, 181 Theriault, Sean, 346n2

Infrastructure spending, 96, 98, 101, Thomas, Bill, 86

180, 184, 238, 254 Thomas, Sari, 31, 289n88
Job creation, 181, 184 Thrall, Trevor, 33, 290n96

Public opinion, 179–87, 229 Time Magazine polls, 163

Scientific research, 180 Titus, Dina, 114

State aid, 180–81 Torricelli, Robert, 69–70

Tax cuts, 96, 180, 184, 254 Tracy, James, 25, 286n40

Unemployment benefits, 96, 254 Treasury Department (U.S.), 109

Veterans benefits, 96 Troubled Asset Relief Program (bailout),

Stokes, Donald, 275n17 9–10, 94–95, 107–11, 113–14,
Stromer-Galley, Jennifer, 281n47 118–19, 123, 125, 188–90, 192, 198,
Stroud, Natalie, 281n46 200–01, 204–05, 272
Student loans, 17, 44, 232–33, 241, 244, Tuchman, Gaye, 22, 27–28, 287n60
246–49, 253, 255–56 Tulis, Jeffrey, 274n3
Interest rates, 232–33, 249–53

Subprime Mortgages, 109, 200 Unemployment, 65–66, 95–96, 99, 102,
Summers, Lawrence, 106, 117, 120 105, 108, 125, 201, 237–38, 246–47,
Supply Side Economics, 65, 95 254
Supreme Court, 202 Unemployment insurance, 89, 96, 99,
Sutter, Daniel, 30, 288n74 101–02, 106, 238
Sweeney, John, 51 Unions (and media coverage), 24–25,
27–28, 33–34, 39, 44–45, 47–48,
Taber, Charles, 274n4, 274n6 50–51, 52, 54–55, 60, 62, 70–72,
Tabloid “news,” 263–264 81, 84–85, 97, 103, 119–20, 124,
Talk radio, 263 178, 263
Tanner, Michael, 82 UPS strike, 33

Tax Cuts Universal health care, 204, 206
Bush, George W., 8–10, 16–17, 27, Urban Institute, 71

44–45, 50, 58, 63–76, 88–91, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 54
145–150, 153, 162–68, 194, 198–99, U.S. News and World Report, 237–38,
202–04, 206, 211–13, 224, 226, 229, 251
232–33, 241–46, 248, 250, 253–54, USA Today, 33–34, 108, 180
259, 265–66, 268, 272 USA Today polling, 163, 189, 238
Index 375
Uscinski, Joseph, 34, 262, 291n108, Washington Post polls, 170–72, 180, 189,
349n3 216, 220
Washington Times, 15, 59, 75, 88, 107,
Veith, Craig, 48 123, 237
Verba, Sidney, 326n20–21 Watergate scandal, 156
Vietnam War, 21, 155–56 Weapons of Mass Destruction, 156
Vining, Richard, 25, 286n43 Weaver, David, 289n81
Visser, Penny, 274n4 Weisberg, Herbert, 291n111
Voinovich, George, 146 Welfare, 40
Wilhoit, G. Cleveland, 289n81
Waddan, Alex, 79, 307n70, 328n50 Wills, Deborah, 283n50, 285n17
Wagner, Kevin, 281n48, 282n48 Wilson, Joe, 139
Waldman, Paul, 288n75 Wisconsin Protests (Madison), 33
Wahlke, John, 275n10 Wolf, Frank, 139
Walker, David, 76–77 Wood, B. Dan, 273n3
Wall Street, 9 World Bank, 26
Wall Street Journal, 15, 59, 75, 88, 107, World Trade Organization, 26, 32
123 World War II, 42, 48, 243
Wall Street Journal polls, 221
Wall Street Reform and Protection Act, Zaller, John, 21, 154–56, 158, 284n10–
113 11, 325n1–2, 325n4–17, 327n32
Wallace, Chris, 102 Zandi, Mark, 242
War on Terrorism, 133 Zanna, Mark, 274n4
Wasburn, Philo, 288n77 Zeichmeister, Elizabeth, 292n128
Washington Post, 34 Zogby polling, 163

The Politics of Persuasion - Economic Policy and Media Bias in The Modern Era (PDFDrive)

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© 2017 State University of New York

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever

For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY

Production, Eileen Nizer

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Dimaggio, Anthony R., 1980– author.

List of Illustrations vii

Table I.1. News Sources and Their Importance 14

Table 3.5 Social Security (1/1–5/31/2005): Political Actors in the

Table 4.5 Executive Pay (1/1–3/31/2009): Political Actors in

Figure I.1 Shifting Reporting on the Child Health Insurance

© 2017 State University of New York

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever

For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY

Production, Eileen Nizer

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Dimaggio, Anthony R., 1980– author.

Figure 6.12 Media Consumption and Opinions of Social Security

Figure 7.6 Attention and Opposition to Medicare Privatization as

This book represents the culmination of a research agenda that occupied

2 Shi$ing Repor-ng on the ofChild

50 % of Quotes from

Democratic quotes and mentions in the news constituted approximately

Media Bias in Reporting the News

In my research, I examine five different theories of media bias concerning

Media and the “Manufacture of Consent”

uncovers numerous instances where political officials discount public opinion

Measuring Media Bias

Figure I.2 Conditions for Successful Persuasion 13

1. The 1993–94 Clinton health care debate

Expectations for Media Bias and Media Effects

will be evident if a pro‑business agenda is driving the types of

familiar more likely to be influenced by one‑sided media content. Finally, a

Figure I.2. Conditions for Successful Persuasion.

As a secondary measure of the influence of prior public attitudes, I

Table I.1. News Sources and Their Importance

News Outlet Importance for this Study

Fox News/MSNBC Privileged, relatively elite audiences (subscription‑based);

Chicago Sun Times Local newspaper audiences, wire service–based stories

record,” it is responsible for much of the original national reporting on public

Public Opinion Data

Structure of the Book

are explored—pro‑government bias, media pluralism, the liberal media, and

Normative Implications for Constrained Media

A major implication of my findings centers on whether journalists promote

nongovernmental voices. The neglect of nonofficial viewpoints is concerning

This book represents the culmination of a research agenda that occupied

compared to a high of 55 percent in 1985. Sixty‑seven percent said that news

Media Bias: What It Is and Why It Matters

In Public Opinion, Walter Lippmann argued that biases in the informa‑

Competing Theories of Bias

The Pro‑Government, Indexing Bias

The pro‑government bias theory portrays journalists as “indexing” their cov‑

In situations where political consensus seems to prevail, journalists

There are two indispensable functions that journalism must serve

Aside from advertising pressure, scholars speak of “cultural hegemony”

leaders.37 On Nightline programs covering the economy, 37 percent of guests

Finally, some scholars claim that journalists marginalize social move‑