Systems, Governance and Institutions: 5.1 From Robust Technical Systems To Integral Robustness

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Chapter No.: 5 Date: 11-6-2022 Time: 2:38 pm Page: 53/81
2
3 Systems, Governance and Institutions
5
6
5 Abstract important role in the management of nuclear waste, con- 40
ventional waste and CO2 in the long run (Krütli et al. 2012). 41 AQ1
7 The standard (technical) robustness concept (of Chap. 4)
This argues that the standard concept of (technical) “ro- 42
8 is enlarged by societal and institutional, including regu-
bustness” is necessary to ensure safety but not sufficient. 43
9 latory, aspects, and then amplified by the more dynamic
Risk attributes not dealt with in risk studies play a vital 44
10 notion of “resilience” and “adaptiveness”, followed by an
role in the public dispute (Wynne 1980; Hansson 1989), 45
11 analysis of processes and procedures in all three policy
sometimes not prone to be covered by experts due to 46
12 areas under scrutiny: radioactive waste, conventional
“overcomplexity”. In nuclear technology this may be the 47
13 hazardous waste and carbon storage CCS. The approach
connection of civil and military use or proliferation, the 48
14 culminates in turning over the concept of “governance” to
“normality” of disasters with system immanent failure 49
15 the applications, thus establishing a framework for the
(Perrow 1982, 1984) or the longevity and irreversibility of 50
16 intended “Strategic Monitoring”.
potential impacts. According to Wynne the public appraises 51
a technology as a whole including its institutions (Wynne 52

19
18 Keywords 1980).

53
20 System Institution Organisation Time The systems approach (Box 5.1) spells out the fact that 54
the various project phases of a facility site require at least

55
21 Long-term Robustness Resilience
22 Adaptiveness/adaptability Governance Evaluation several decades, from characterisation, design via operation 56
to monitoring and closure/sealing (Fig. 3.2). Consequently,

57
23 SWOT method Radioactive/nuclear waste
24 Conventional toxic/hazardous waste Carbon capture, management fundamentals and concepts are liable to an 58
25 utilisation, and storage, CCUS/CCS integration into a consistent and stepwise decision-making 59
26
process. Their instruments have to be designed in a dynamic, 60
adaptive, even experimental manner (Cook et al. 1990; 61
27 Learning Objectives Ascher 1999, 375), but the ultimate goal remains, viz., the 62
passive protection of present and future generations and 63
28 • Expand your view of robustness to resilience and environments. According to Rip, a system is “socially 64
29 governance; robust” if most arguments, evidence, social alignments, 65
30 • Acknowledge different views on what is “long-term”; interests and cultural values lead to a consistent option (Rip 66
31 • Accept the “trans” character of the issues: transdisci- 1987, 359). Therefore, the concerned and deciding stake- 67
32 plinary, transscientific, transgenerational, transpolitical; holders have to eventually achieve consent on some com- 68
33 • Learn relevant details about the three-step approach. mon interests, along the lines suggested in Table 3.1. 69
According to Bijker and colleagues, “closure” in science 70
occurs “when a consensus emerges that the ‘truth’ has been 71
34
35 5.1 From Robust Technical Systems winnowed from the various interpretations” (Bijker et al. 72
36 to Integral Robustness 1987, 12). 73
37 As pointed out before, science cannot define what waste1 is,

38 in either field. Procedural and process issues make it explicit
39 that perspectives (and their changes) and dynamics play an 1
For key terms and concepts refer to Glossary in the back.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 53

T. Flüeler, Governance of Radioactive Waste, Special Waste and Carbon Storage, Springer Textbooks in Earth Sciences,
Geography and Environment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-03902-7_5
54 5 Systems, Governance and Institutions
Separation promotion/oversight Pa IAEA IAEA

( )
75 Box 5.1: System Publication P E Pa
Traceability E E P
76 A system consists of subunits with certain
77 boundary conditions between which … processes Criteria E E
78 take place”, “organized complexity … with strong Independent reviewing P E P
79 interactions”, “set of elements standing in inter- Host rock E

80 relations”, “the basis of the open-system model is Controllability E P
81 the dynamic interaction of its components. (von Retrievability EP
82 Bertalanffy 1968, 21, 19, 55, 150) Disposition concept D FD eFD
83
Transparent funding Pa/P
84 Organisations, Part 1 Public involvement P P ( )P P (v) P (v)

86
85
Nagra estd.1972 1980 1990 2000
87 Characteristic of organization, whether a living
88 organism or a society, are notions like those of Fig. 5.1 Integration of relevant aspects into the official disposition
concept for radioactive waste in Switzerland. Note the time difference
89 wholeness, growth, differentiation, hierarchical
between first issue raising (P, E, Pa) and its adoption in the
90 order, dominance, control, competition, etc. (von system/programme (✓). The empirical basis for the table is the content
91 Bertalanffy 1968, 47) analysis over 40 years by Flüeler (2002). Pa Parliament, E Expert(s), P
92
Public (v: vote at potential repository site Wellenberg 1995/2002),
IAEA international atomic energy agency (recommendation; waste
93 Structure convention 1997), D underground disposition, FD final disposal, eFD
95 extended final disposal/monitored long-term geological disposal (acc.
94 to EKRA 2000) (reproduced and translated from Flüeler 2002d, 170)
96 The arrangement and organization of mutually
97 connected and dependent elements in a system or
98 construct (Oxford English Dictionary, entry 3a) tolerability in society (Fig. 5.2). This implies that many insti- 125
tutions have a role to play with various functions (e.g., Flüeler 126
99 A combination or network of mutually connected 2000b, c, 2006b, 2014b, 2015, 2021; Flüeler and Scholz 2004b; 127
100 and dependent parts or elements; an organized Kuppler and Hocke 2018; Metlay 2021), in a communicative 128
101 body or system (Oxford English Dictionary, atmosphere of mutual respect and learning (Chap. 6). 129
102 entry 7) The primary goal in radioactive waste governance is the 130
103
104 stability of the system: the permanent protection of humans 131
and the environment from release of (harmful) radioactivity. 132
105 “Overall robustness”, in a way, is a fuzzy notion, but it The complimentary goal is flexibility, defined as the 133
106 recognises the complex sociotechnical character of the issues potential to intervene. A conclusive programme for control 134
107 and has the potential to stepwise and iteratively integrate and monitoring has to be specified, including publication of 135
108 structural and procedural/dynamic elements—as well as the work, intensive reviewing, respective quality assurance 136
109 various and diverse types of uncertainty—into long-time and a wide involvement of affected and concerned parties. In 137
110 governance. Over time, various stakeholder groups have compliance with the International Waste Convention (IAEA 138
111 raised critical and crucial topics which, eventually, were 1997) the nuclear waste issue is considered a national task, 139
112 adopted by the institutions in charge (Fig. 5.1). These are, which has to be carried out on the territory of the waste 140 AQ2
113 i.e. and specifically in Switzerland, the separation of pro- producing country and on the basis of current knowledge, as 141
114 motion and oversight in the Federal administration, adequate a Swedish advisory body suggested (KASAM 1998, 4). 142
115 funding according to the causality principle, extensive duty We are faced with a pronouncedly long-term project: “A 143
116 of publication, traceability of reasoning, transparent formu- repository is, by definition, a long-term project, extending 144
117 lation of criteria (for siting, inventory, etc.), controllability, over centuries … or even much longer periods … involves a 145
118 retrievability, extensive independent, i.e., pluralistic, relatively long lead time (possibly more than 20 years [sic!] 146
119 reviewing, stepwise and phased procedure and participation for [high-level waste] or spent fuel) and is then anticipated to 147
120 of the public (e.g., also in oversight committees). receive waste during several decades. After closing the 148
121 The system calls for multiple technical barriers against the repository, a surveillance and monitoring period will almost 149
122 release of ra-dioactivity or other toxic substances, as well as for certainly be carried out even [sic!] for shallow land burial 150
123 phased societal checks to achieve and sustain confidence in type repositories with [low- and intermediate-level waste]. 151
124 technical assessments and, hence, acceptance or at least This underlines once again the importance of the continuity 152
5.2 What is “Long-Term”, Really? Definitions and Implications 55
Fig. 5.2 Societal/institutional Public: Level IV: Political backup

robustness. Stakeholders are to L ocal/regional
overall decision
act according to their respective NGO's, objectors
responsibilities. Dependent on reviewing, problem identifiers
l)
their mutual trust, their activities
ua
Government, parliament
Govt'l. and parliamentary decision
serve as institutional barriers and
ut
ce
(m
Public administration
potentially lead to a consistent, Notification, zoning, ownership
en
i.e., robust decision, backed up by
of
In tern. organisations
id
incremental building of Guidelines
nf
g
in
confidence in the overall disposal Oversight bodies
co
Oversight, reviewing
ld
system and trust in the respective
nd
Safety authorities
ui
actors. System levels are Licencing, control
ta
Experts
indicated (reproduced from
us
Consultancy, reviewing
Flüeler 2002d, 2004a, 2006b)
tr
Level III: Technical backup
Conditioners,
interim storage
Waste package
Waste producers Level II: Implementation
Waste, funding
Suppliers Repository
Radioactive implementers, operators
material Design, safety case
Level I: Input
Suppliers Stakeholders, concerned/interested parties

Radioactive material Products, activity, responsibility
153 factor not only from a contractual, but also from a technical,
154 point of view (possibility/obligation to transfer/receive 5.2 What is “Long-Term”, Really? Definitions 166
167
155 waste, waste acceptance criteria and quality of waste, and Implications 168
156 control and monitoring, etc.)” (IAEA 1998, 9). Conse-

157 quently, it is of utmost relevance that the various “barriers” We learned that there is no objective definition of “waste”. 169
158 adequately mesh. Figure 5.3 depicts the integration of When coming back to the time dimensions we will see that 170
159 technical and societal/institutional aspects into overall—or this also applies to what “long-term” is. What it means 171
160 “integral”—robustness (Fig. 5.3). depends on the chosen perspectives—who defines, what the 172
161 In order to achieve this aim, it is crucial that long-term context is, what it is defined for. In actual fact we talk about 173
162 comprehensive, but also stepwise, planning is set up. If the different views on what time frames to look at (from Flüeler 174
163 concerned public indeed is given an adequate share, the 2006d, expanded). 175
164 chances rise that the decisions taken will be accepted also in We may distinguish among the following sensibilities2: 176
165 the future as being legitimate (Espejo and Gill 1998). 177
178
2
Knowing that time is a multifaceted concept, esp. in our fields (cf.
Moser et al. 2012a, b).
Fig. 5.3 Integral robustness.

Overall system robustness Integral =
depends on (dotted) technical overall system robustness
robustness (Sect. 4.6) and societal
(=decision) robustness. The
sequenced symbolic portrayal of Societal (=decision) robustness
the types of robustness shall not
infer an objectivistic approach.
The final and decisive validation (Technical) system robustness
of the concept is the
implementation of a disposal Performance robustness
concept with demonstrated
long-term safety backed up by
Intrinsic robustness
respective decisions and actions.
This presupposes an effective
coupling, i.e., Engineered
robustness
complementing/meshing, of the
various types of robustness = Technical
(reproduced from Flüeler 2001a, robustness
319 and 2006b, 265)
179 Technical (Waste Disposal) Perspective3,4 AQ3
Complete containment (ILW3) 100 y
Complete technical isolaon (HLW/SNF4 Switzerland/Nagra) 10,000 y
Limit due to geological (i.e., glaciaon) processes (convenonal waste,

Switzerland, Austria) 20,000 y
Complete technical isolaon (SNF Sweden) 1,000,000 y
Geological retenon (HLW/SNF Switzerland/Nagra) 1,000,000 y
Comment: Depending on waste characteriscs, disposal objecves and dis-

posal design even technical me frames span over orders of magnitude. It
is implied that “technical” also means environmental since the protecon
of the (long-term) environment is aimed at.
3
ILW: Intermediate-level waste.
4
HLW: High-level waste, SNF: Spent nuclear fuel.
185 Technology (Policy) Perspective5
Military ulisaon - 60 y (1940s)
Civil use of nuclear energy - 50 y (1950s)
Operaon of NPPs5 50 y
Decommissioning of NPPs 70 y (50+20 y)
New generaon of NPPs 70 y (exisng NPPs+20 y)
“Closing” the nuclear cycle 100+ y (breeder reactors, transmutaon)
Comment: Energy policy plays an important (and driving) part in the (nu-
clear) issue. Nuclear history has to be taken into account. Whether or not
the nuclear path is perpetuated, “long-term” assumes another slant and
responsibility is passed on to a greater or lesser degree to future genera-
ons (connuaon or phase-out, respecvely).
5
NPP: Nuclear power plant.
186 Institutional Perspective6,7,8,9,10
Short-level waste6 30 y
Operaon of waste storage7 50 y
Operaon of waste disposal8 60-70 y
Post-closure of waste disposal: Acve safety measures9 +70-300-500 y
Post-closure of waste disposal: Passive safety measures10 +300-+500 y
Post-closure of waste disposal: Memory +500 y
Comment: What is “short-lived” was defined by a technical nuclear in-

stuon (Internaonal Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA 1994). There are con-
nuous transions between different phases, again depending on waste
characteriscs, disposal objecves and disposal design. Specificaons, e.g.,
for monitoring, have to be given with regards to purpose (why, what for),
locaons (where), parameters (what), and methods (how).
6
As defined by the technical nuclear community (radionuclide half-life
period less than 30 years).
7
Storage denotes (intermediary and) controlled disposition of waste
(with the intention of retrieval).
8
Disposal denotes (final) and, ultimately, uncontrolled disposition of
waste (without the intention of retrieval).
9
in situ monitoring, environmental surveillance, etc.
10
Land-use restrictions, land register.
192 Societal Perspective11
One generaon 30 y
Working populaon (responsible for business decisions, generaon[s]

“n-1, n”) 50 – 60 y
Contemporaries
(filial generaon, parental generaon II [working populaon], parental
generaon I [pensioners]) 100 y
(n+1) (n-1, n) (n-2)
Yardsck of the “seven generaons”

(Canadian first naons’ target for assessment or evaluaon of conse-
quences of current issues11) 175 y
Comment: In general, societal perspecves depend on the sociees they

apply to – contemporary Western European noons evidently are different
from Canadian first naons or from Chinese or from Middle Age European
noons. The history of nuclear acvies denotes that the n-2/n-3 genera-
on (-50 to 60 y) started the nuclear enterprise. The waste programme set-
backs and the waste longevity make the issue a “long-term” problem and
require a transfer to future generaons (Fig. 3.2): a transfer of disposion
raonale (and opons), of know-how, of resources, of procedure, of ins-
tuonal constancy.
11
“Traditionally, no decision was made until it was understood how it
would affect the next seven generations” (https://healingoftheseven
generations.ca/about/history/).
193 Political Perspective
Term of office (polics), legislaon 4 – 5 y
Scope of the radioacve waste management policy 300 – 500 y
Guardian of the process (programme policy) (e.g., 10x term of office) 40

– 50 y
Comment: Decade-long programmes are prone to polical volality and

arbitrariness: Not In My Term Of Office (NIMTOO). Consequently, it sug-
gests itself to establish some sort of a “guardian” of the radioacve waste
management policy to overcome discreonary polics and to see to it that
the programme is on target. In view of the “trans” character of the issue
(beyond party polics: “transpolical”, and more than an interdisciplinary
scienfic issue: “transscienfic”), it is suggested that the body be pluralis-
cally composed of knowledgeable, trustworthy personalies, highly re-
spected by society, and not driven by daily polics. This demonstrates the
interconnecon of instuonal, societal and polical perspecves (see
Chapters 4 and 7).
194 Individual Perspective
Atude and worldview 0 – n y
Comment: Individuals’ worldviews are very heterogeneous (“n” can be any

number). Usually one encounters a preference for the present, at least a
high discount rate, i.e., me periods beyond close future (and thus future
generaons) are not relevant to the majority of people.
195 Economic Perspective
Quarterly to decennial 0.25 – 30 y
Comment: The percepon of me frames in companies ranges from three-

month calculaons (and related pay-back periods) to 30-year scenarios as
a basis for investment decisions. Economic growth (and thus decisive inter-
est rates) cannot be calculated beyond 3 to 5 years.
199 Time—Past, Present, Future You are time. If you are good, the times are good. 211
200 What now is time? If nobody asks me I know; Augustinus Aurelius 212
201 but if I wanted to explain Le temps te construit des racines. 213
202 it to somebody on his quest, I do not know. This I can say with Time builds roots for you. 214
203 confidence: I know that there would not be passed time if Antoine de Saint-Exupéry (1900–1944), Citadelle, (1948) 215
204 nothing went by, and no future time if nothing were present.
Die Vergangenheit hat mich gedichtet/ 216
205 Augustinus Aurelius, 354–430, Bishop of Hippo, ich habe/die Zukunft geerbt/ 217
206 philosopher, Confessiones, 397–401, Book XI, Chapter 14 Mein Atem heisst/ jetzt. 218
207 … not the times are malicious but our actions. The past has versified me/ 219
208 And we are time. I have/ inherted the future/ 220
My breath is/ now 221

209 Augustinus Aurelius,
210 In epistulam Ioannis ad Parthos, tractatus IX, 9 Rose Ausländer (1901–1988), Mein Atem (excerpt), (1978) 222
Fig. 5.4 Different dimensions of a Potenal Swiss sing region North of Lägern – Wehntal (20 km northwest of Zurich),
what “long-term” means: today
objective (a, b), institutional
(c, d) (reproduced from: a b
Mammutmuseum.ch, c Fuchs
2016, d US DoD)
b Potenal Swiss sing region North of Lägern – Wehntal, 140,000 years before present
Fig. 5.4 (continued) c Today: Swiss site-selecon procedure, (final) phase 3 started – Dome of Cologne, 2016
d Tomorrow: 70 yrs from now, waste facility closed – Dome of Cologne, 70 yrs back: April
1945
223 Apart from the technical challenges, the main societal and et al. 2002, 4ff; Holling 1996) (Box 5.2). It is not enough to 237
224 institutional challenge is to match and reconcile the geologic keep a system, a building, an institution, etc. stable or “ro- 238
225 long-term dimension of (passive) protection (Fig. 5.4a, b) bust” or, for that matter, from just falling apart. Emergency 239
226 with the longevity of a coherent programme and its targeted planning is needed, but if this is meant to create resilience, it 240
227 implementation (Fig. 5.4c, d). is putting the cart before the horse. Resilience is essentially 241
proactive and must be strived at at all levels: the micro 242
(individual, staff), meso (group, institution, company) and 243

228
229 5.3 From Robustness to Resilience macro (nation state, inter- and supranational). 244
The concept of “long-term stewardship” (Tonn 2001; 245
230 The overall system robustness strived at, across all technical LaPorte 2004) as proposed and practiced by the US 246
231 and non-technical subsystems, is more than “engineering Department of Energy with respect to legacy radioactive 247
232 resilience”, the speed of return to a stable steady state fol- waste (DOE 1999, 2001a, b) falls short of a comprehensive 248
233 lowing some perturbation (Pimm 1984). It might amount to understanding of the issue. Even official analyses of 249
234 what Gunderson and colleagues called “ecological resi- institutional monitoring of US sites demonstrate in frustrat- 250
235 lience”, ie., the capacity with which a system may absorb ing openness: “It is now becoming clear that relatively few 251
236 disturbance before having to be restructured (Gunderson … DOE waste sites will be cleaned up to the point where 252
5.4 Excursus: COVID-19—Lessons from a Virus to Humanity 63
253 they can be released for unrestricted use. ‘Long-term stew-

254 ardship’ (activities to protect human health and the envi- (a) crafting normalcy, (b) affirming identity 302
255 ronment from hazards that may remain at its sites after anchors, (c) maintaining and using communication 303
256 cessation of the remediation) will be required for over 100 of networks, (d) putting alternative logics to work, and 304
308
257 the 144 waste sites under DOE control …. The details of (e) downplaying negative feelings while fore- 305
307
258 long-term stewardship planning are yet to be specified, the grounding positive emotions” (Buzzanell 2010). 306
259 adequacy of funding is not assured, and there is no con-

Adaptability 309
260 vincing evidence that institutional controls and other stew-
261 ardship measures are reliable over the long-term” (NAS
– Adaptive systems: “Complex adaptive systems 310
262 2000, 2).12 Strohl was of the opinion in 1995 already: “…
involve many components that adapt or learn as 311
263 institutional instruments, although indispensable with regard
they interact” (Holland 2006); 312
264 to long-term safety, should only be considered as making a
– Adaptability: ability to change something or oneself 313
265 contribution of relative importance and of limited duration,
to fit to occurring changes, with or without an external 314
266 and this must be made clear” (Strohl 1995, 25f). This per-
demand for change (Andresen and Gronau 2005). 315
267 spective has been maintained ever since (NEA 2014).
316
268 It was, and still is, widely recognised that (high-level)
269 nuclear repositories are “first-of-a-kind, complex and long-term
270 projects that must actively manage hazardous material for many 317
271 decades” (NRC 2002, 1). Thus adequate measures must be 5.4 Excursus: COVID-19—Lessons 318
272 taken. The institution(s) in charge of and entrusted with stew- from a Virus to Humanity 319
273 ardship must be more than a”guardian” who does the “stopping
274 activities that could be dangerous” (NAS 2003, 2), more than a Even though pandemics and wastes are two different issues, 320
275 “watchman”, “land manager”, “repairer”, “archivist”, “educa- some insights might be learned from the ongoing spread of 321
276 tor to affected communities” or “trustee … assuring the financial the SARS-CoV-19 virus all over the globe and the way we 322
277 wherewithal” (ibid., 2). It is not sufficient to guarantee con- treat it.13 China informed the world on New Year’s Eve 323
278 stancy, the guardian must be respected and trusted by the 2019 about a new virus discovered in the fish market of the 324
279 majority of the other parties involved. In many countries, City of Wuhan—less than two and a half months later, on 12 325
280 nuclear-centered state agencies have a mixed reputation March 2020, the World Health Organisation, WHO declared 326
281 (Torfing 2006; Probst and McGovern 1998). its outbreak a pandemic.14 It had and still has enormous 327
282 Kuppler and Hocke ask “which institution will care for impacts on all aspects of life: individual, social, economic 328
283 the repository over decades or eventually longer periods like lives, effects on civil society and politics. Some character- 329
284 some centuries?” (Kuppler and Hocke 2018, 1352). Even istics may be highlighted: 330
285 though the author has long voted for a “guardian” body—
286 and still does—a thorough system analysis suggests that • Disease uncertainties: Transmission paths, emergence of 331
287 there will be no one institution to do that. The entire process new variants, incubation time, often asymptomatic appear- 332
288 along the proposed three steps (Chap. 3) will have to be both ance, gender and age differences, tracing methodology, etc. 333
289 tight and flexible to secure a “rolling present” with an —there was a long-standing dispute among experts; 334
290 ongoing targeted yet adaptive programme. • Response types and times: Some countries decreed a 335
rapid and strict lockdown at an early stage (e.g., South 336
Corea, Victoria in Australia) whereas others counted on 337
292 Box 5.2: Resilience herd immunity (United Kingdom for some time) or 338
293
slackened the reins until 2021 (USA); 339
294 – Ecological: “the capacity of a system to absorb dis- • Response philosophies: Trust in players and systems was 340
295 turbance and reorganize while undergoing change so very diverging (self-responsibility in Sweden vs. curfews 341
296 as to still retain essentially the same function, struc- in Singapore); 342
297 ture, identity, and feedbacks” (Walker et al. 2004); • Systemic risks: The health systems with their infrastruc- 343
298 – Organisational: human “resilience is developed, ture (hospitals, intensive care units: staff, beds) were 344
299 sustained, and grown through discourse, interac-

300 tion, and material considerations. There are several
301 communicative processes involved. These include: 13
Recognising that this is very daring as a Google search alone gave
473 mio entries for “COVID-19 lessons learned” in autumn 2020
(2020–09–16, 13:00 CEST). At the beginning of 2022, the figure was
652 mio entries (2022–01–26, 17:15 CEST).
12 14
This still holds true over the years (DOE 2012; NCSL 2017, 2022). https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019.
345 stretched to and beyond their limits; they were clearly Coronavirus disease exposed structural inequalities 363
346 defined as systematically relevant (just like information within and between states and vulnerabilities in states with 364
347 and communication technology or energy supply—too weak or ill-prepared health systems which had not been 365
348 important to fail); qualified as such before. According to the Global Health 366
349 • Use of language: Technocratic terms like “social dis- Index, “[n]ational health security is fundamentally weak 367
350 tancing” were deconstructed (“come close but keep around the world. No country is fully prepared for epidemics 368
351 distance!”); or pandemics, and every country has important gaps to 369
352 • Perception of risk and measures depend on perspectives: address. Countries are not prepared for a globally catas- 370
353 Innkeepers, hairdressers, elderly people, pupils, teachers, trophic biological event” (GHI 2019). It is interesting to see 371
354 bus drivers, workers, etc.; the differences between their preparedness ex ante judged by 372
355 • Not intended side effects: The lockdown of educational experts and their actual performance during the ongoing 373
356 systems led to a reduction of performance and intensifi- COVID-19 pandemic (Table 5.1). Experts’ views (on 374
357 cation of social inequalities as the access to IT varied national health systems) do not pass the reality check, the 375
358 especially for educationally disadvantaged; challenges for ongoing COVID pandemic, where these systems could have 376
359 all: digital tools, distance learning, novel socialising … been validated. (Some of) the best ranking countries score 377
360 • Tradeoffs in ethics: Individual liberties vs. control of badly (US, UK, NL) whereas others have done relatively 378
361 disease, triage of patients, segretation of risk groups, well during the pandemic (Vietnam, China, Taiwan; as to 379
362 disadvanages of economic groups, etc. available information). For instance, “public health 380
Table 5.1 Most recent global health index, GHI versus experience during the COVID-19 pandemic
Rank GHI 2019 (195 Total of infected Infections per Least infections per mio Deaths per mio Least deaths per mio
countries) persons (mio) million inhabitants inh. (selection) inhabitants inhabitants (selection)
a b c, d c, d, e d, f d, e, f
*
1 USA (83.5 out USA 6.61 Chile 22,912 Laos 3 Peru 938 Cambodia/Eritrea/Laos 0.0
of 100)
2 United India 5.02 Peru 22,383 Tansania 9 Belgium 857 Taiwan 0.29
Kingdom UK
3 Netherlands Brazil 4.38 Brazil 20,617 Vietnam 11 Spain 642 Tanzania 0.35
NL
4 Australia Russia 1.07 USA 19,958 Cambodia 16 Bolivia 638 Vietnam 0.36
5 Canada Peru 0.74 Israel 19,270 Taiwan 21 Chile 630 Sri Lanka 0.61
6 Thailand Colombia 0.73 Colombia 14,319 Niger 49 Brazil 626 Myanmar 0.72
7 Sweden Mexico 0.68 Argentina 12,511 Thailand 50 Ecuador 621 Thailand 0.83
8 Denmark South Africa 0.65 Costa Rica 11,413 China 63 UK 614 Mozambique 1.18
9 South Korea Spain 0.60 Bolivia 10,990 Chad 66 USA 592 Uganda 1.27
10 Finland (68.7) Argentina 0.57 South Africa 10,985 Yemen 68 Italy 589 Rwanda 1.70
Vietnam (50.) Chile (11.) 0.44 Singapore (11.) South Korea Sweden (11.) China (15.) 3.29
49.1 Iran (12.) 0.41 9826 439 579 South Korea (33.) 7.16
China (51.) France (13.) 0.40 Sweden (14.) 8649 Australia 1049 NL (16.) 265 Australia 32
48.2 UK (14.) 0.37 NL 4943 Finland 1575 Canada (21.) Finland 61
Taiwan: not Italy (20.) 0.29 UK 5513 243 Denmark 109
analysed Canada (26.) 0.14 Canada 3703
China (31.) 0.090 India 3638
Sweden (32.) Denmark 3475
0.087
NL (33.) 0.085
Australia 0.03
Thailand 0.003
a
https://www.ghsindex.org/
b
https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus
c
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/total-confirmed-cases-of-covid-19-per-million-people?tab=table&time=2020-01-22..latest
d
total confirmed cases, countries with population of > 5 mio
e
actual rank in brackets, GHI countries of column 2 included
f
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality (accessed 16 September 2020)
Acknowledging that there is a dispute on whether a person died of SARS-CoV-19 or with it
Explanations are given in the text. Snapshot as of 16 September 2020 (Sources:*)
5.5 Governance 65
381 vulnerabilities” as an indicator group is meant to reflect the Now is the time to use the tools we have: our best 428
382 “ability of a country to prevent, detect, or respond to an science, our global ability to share information and 429
our collective cooperation under the UN system to 430

383 epidemic or pandemic”, i.e., the healthcare access and ensure we can contain these outbreaks. If we let 431
384 quality (GHI 2019, 65). The partial score of 93.3/100 for misinformation and panic take hold, we will limit our 432
385 USA does not match with the COVID-19 experience so far; ability to create a global solution for what could 433
386 the death toll was over 260,000 in November 2020, over potentially grow to a global epidemic. 434
Smidt (2020) 435

387 880,000 in January 2022.15 Or: Switzerland, ranked 13 in
388 the overall score (67/100), indeed had a pandemic concept
436
389 (of 2017) which required the stock of masks. At the begin- 5.5 Governance 437
390 ning of the COVID-19 pandemic, in March 2020, the federal

391 administrators argued that wearing masks would not be How does one set up a programme which has the capability to 438
392 useful—reports showed that this assertion was based on the follow and reach goals once agreed upon but also the flexi- 439
393 fact that masks were not available to the public (TA 2020). bility to allow changes where necessary over the time span of 440
394 Overall, not the management thinking of prohibition and decades? The notion of “governance” comes in (Box 5.3). 441
395 command-and-control proved to be successful but the firm

396 and trustworthy demeanour of politicians and communica-
397 tors, setting clear goals,16 abiding to their own rules, based Box 5.3: Governance 443
398 on sound science with scientific advisory bodies supporting

Governance is about the rules of collective 444
399 public health and governance from the very beginning. This
decision-making in settings where there are a 445
400 made it possible for people to accept the recommended
plurality of actors or organisations and where no 446
401 measures, gain skill in a new normality (hygiene rules
formal control system can dictate the terms of 447
402 adhered to, spatial distancing and mask wearing in crowds
relationship between these actors and organisa- 448
403 and enclosed spaces) and even tolerate some infringements
tions (Chhotray and Stoker 2009, 3), with four 449
404 on personal liberties. This all was in view of the common
key elements 450
405 good of solidarity, “the most important resource in the fight 451
406 against COVID-19”, as WHO’s Director-General exclaimed Rules: incorporate established institutional forms and 452
407 in April 2020 (WHO 2020a): “Health is not a cost, it’s an procedures (legislation, guidelines, licensing, etc.) as 453
408 investment” (WHO 2020b). Note that Gross Stein had long well as “rules-in-use” (Ostrom 1999, 38) where informal 454
409 ago, in her analysis of the “cult of efficiency” in Canada, conventions and participatory elements come into play; 455
410 identified the health system to be systematically relevant, Collective refers to the fact that a multitude of 456
411 incidentally together with the educational system (Gross actors, institutional and individual, are on the stage, 457
412 Stein 2002)—talking about literacy (Sect. 7.1). with issues of mutual influence and control. A sub- 458
stantial “stakeholder involvement” includes rights for 459
413 Facts Instead of Fear, Limit Spread of Virus and Spread (more) actors to have a say but, conversely, also their 460
414 of Misinformation responsibility to accept collective decisions; 461
Decision-making: Deciding is not just the prefer- 462

415 This outbreak is a test of solidarity — political, financial and
416 scientific. We need to come together to fight a common enemy ence of an option. Decision-making includes the pro- 463
417 that does not respect borders, ensure that we have the resources cess of deciding, the judgement made, the choice taken, 464
418 necessary to bring this outbreak to an end and bring our best and, ideally, the decision implemented (Flüeler 2006b, 465
419 science to the forefront to find shared 101ff). This can be on various dimensions and levels 466
420 answers to shared problems.
421 Research is an integral part of the outbreak response. (global to local, strategic to day-to-day business). 467
422 The only way we will defeat this outbreak is for No formal control system: There is no “governor in 468
423 all countries to work together in the spirit of charge” of all, decisions are not top down but inclu- 469
424 cooperation. This is the time for facts, not fear. sive, they rely on communication, deliberation, nego- 470
425 This is the time for science, not rumors.
426 This is the time, not stigma. tiation and mutual influence. 471
427 AG Tedros, WHO Director-General, from Smidt (2020) (Nation-state) Governance was also defined as “the 472
set of traditions and institutions by which authority in 473
a country is exercised. The political, economic, and 474

15
Worldometer: 262,701 cases for 23 November 2020, 894,880 for 26 institutional dimensions of governance are captured by 475
January 2022 (https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus).
16
six aggregate indicators”. These are in the fields of 476
Slow down spreading of virus, Cure infected persons, Minimise
voice and accountability, political stability and 477
health risks, Have as many vaccinated as possible, Protect health,
Minimise negative impacts on society and economy (knowing that absence of violence, and government effectiveness 478
there are contradictions for solidarity and necessary trade-offs). (IBRD/Worldbank 2006, 3). 479
complexity, uncertainty, path dependence, ambivalence and 534

480 Global Governance, today, “refers to the exercise distributed control as a starting point to characterise the 535
481 of authority across national borders as well as con- governance problem surrounding sustainable development. 536
482 sented norms and rules beyond the nation state, both They derived six strategies to prevent societal development 537
483 of them justified with reference to common goods or from being undermined by the unintended detrimental 538
484 transnational problems”. This acknowledges that effects of steering activities: (1) integrated knowledge pro- 539
485 international (e.g., European Union) and transnational duction, (2) experiments and adaptivity of strategies and 540
486 (e.g., Greenpeace) institutions play a part (Zürn 2018, institutions, (3) iterative, participatory goal formulation, 541
487 3f, Italics in the original). (4) anticipation of long-term systemic effects of measures 542
489
(developments), (5) interactive strategy development and 543
488
490 Institutions and Organisations, Part 2 (cf. Box 5.1) (6) creating congruence between problem space and gover- 544
491 Institutions are the formal and informal rules and nance (Voss et al. 2006). 545
492 norms that organise social, political and eco-

493 nomic relations. (North 1990) 546
494 5.6 Procedure: Examples 547
495 International institutions: European Union, etc.

496 Transnational institutions: Greenpeace, Friends of To bring the concept to life, the three-step procedure pro- 548
497 the Earth, etc. posed in Sect. 3.4 is demonstrated with real approaches in 549
498 Epistemic institutions: “international institutions various countries. 550
499 involved in creating shared scientific knowledge”:

500 International Panel on Climate Change, IPCC; Nuclear Step 1, Discuss: Evolving from a Linear to a More Plu- 551
501 Energy Agency, NEA; International Atomic Energy ralistic Model 552
502 Agency, IAEA; Worldbank, etc. (Meyer 2013).

503 Organisations are “groups of individuals bound by Having learned from the failures at Wellenberg, the planned 553
504 a common purpose”, shaped by institutions and, in site für low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste, 554
505 turn, influence how institutions change. (GSDRC where the cantonal voters rejected an initial as well as a 555
506
507
2020, website). developed project in 1995 and 2002, respectively, the Swiss 556
508 Confederation started an extensive consultation about a 557
509 Governance as a problem-solving concept has emerged site-selection process to be set up. The underlying concept 558
510 with increasing globalisation and the cry for more document was reviewed in several rounds by technical and 559
511 democratisation (Chhotray and Stoker 2009), with a parallel political actors, in fact, it was a comprehensive stocktaking 560
512 decline and deepening in global governance (Zürn 2018) not in the policy field (BFE 2008, 5), even though it was not as 561
513 investigated in the present analysis. It may be reasoned that widespread as the Canadian dialogue called “Choosing a 562
514 with globalised production also waste and environmental way forward” (NWMO 2005). The ongoing so-called Sec- 563
515 stress globalised. This, in turn, has led to resistance—glob- toral Plan for deep geological repositories includes a thor- 564
516 alised and regionalised at the same time. Both have posed ough “regional participation” of potential siting regions. 565
517 challenges to the basic units of political organisation and When setting up “regional conferences” in each of six 566
518 economy, respectively: the nation state and the company. On geologically suitable areas it was given special attention to 567
519 the positive side, harmonisation of standards and exchange consider the entire societal spectrum, from political parties to 568
520 of knowledge and experience also took place. Governance is churches, though females and youngsters were and still are 569
521 a practice, of political and human activity, in the context of underrepresented (Planval 2014). The conferences have a 570
522 our bounded rationality. Dunn calls governance the “cun- consultative character; to give them sufficient legitimation 571
523 ning of unreason” (Dunn 2000). (and stability) the quorum of elected members of municipal 572 AQ4
524 Beck observed that “social, political, economic and councils was set to be 50 per cent. Experience so far shows 573
525 individual risks increasingly tend to escape the institutions that the safety-first paradigm is accepted on all levels, 574
526 for monitoring and protection in industrial society” (Beck national, cantonal, regional, communal. Regional stake- 575
527 1994, 5f). He proposed “reflexive modernization” as a holders have been able to have a say, esp. on the 576
528 counterweight to “the effects of risk society that cannot be spatial-planning topics (Fig. 6.4). 577
529 dealt with and assimilated in the system of industrial soci- Overall, it is essential to allow a comprehensive discourse 578
530 ety” (ibid.). In research, technology assessment provides an in society about the matter under scrutiny so that no perti- 579
531 instrument for coping with unintended consequences. In this nent issues go by the board. The approaches in various 580
532 vein, Voss and colleagues developed the notion of “reflexive countries evolved over time (Fig. 5.5), basically from tech- 581
533 governance” and took the interconnected issues of nocratic to more pluralistic models as the former failed in 582
5.6 Procedure: Examples 67
Fig. 5.5 Shift of approaches over time in various countries: 2003: MUM; Flüeler 2016; NEA, website: country profiles; own
emphasis towards objectives “Safety” or “Participation” along the appraisal and graph) B Belgium, Can Canada, CH/Wellenberg
antagonists of decision modelling “DAD” versus “MUM”. Note that Switzerland, D/Gorleben Germany, E Spain, F France, Jap Japan,
indications towards “Participation” do not deny “Safety” (using NL Netherlands, S Sweden, SF Finland, UK Unted Kingdom,
information from Blowers et al. 1991: DAD, Flüeler 2003c/Clarke USA/Yucca Mtn United States
583 every case. Kemp (1992) analysed the nuclear waste and cultural values, as required for solutions to be truly 613
584 decision-making process in seven industrialised nations in a socially robust, may so be identified. 614
585 study pioneering regarding systematics but, evidently, out- It is apparent that the process of disposition (of all wastes) 615
586 dated with respect to state programmes (Kemp 1992, 167). will last for de-cades, from site characterisation via con- 616
587 According to that author, one extreme approach is DAD, struction, emplacement, surveil-lance, closure, monitoring 617
588 “Decide–Announce–Defend”. Public involvement is min- and sealing. Such a situation helps to ensure that the prin- 618
589 imised, the authorities in charge have the process under ciples of the “chain of obligation” and of the “rolling pre- 619
590 control, therefore it was labelled “centralised” and “closed”. sent” are not violated: The needs of the living and secondary 620
591 The other extreme is—in ideal terms—“devolved” and generations are met, the secondary and third generations will 621
592 “open” planning with the steps: “Establish criteria–Consult– take crucial decisions with respect to project management 622
593 Filter–Decide”. The public is involved at an early stage; (Figs. 3.2 and 5.6). Such a process contributes to the interest 623
594 “filtering”, doubtlessly the act of trading off, takes place in a of the issue. It increases awareness and ownership of the 624
595 phased and transparent manner. problem on all levels in all societal communities (engineers, 625
596 An early and broad goal discussion has to be established scientists, politicians, regional affected parties, etc.), and it 626
597 to increase the legitimacy of the key conceptual decisions obviously has an effect on knowledge transfer, updating 627
598 (Klinke and Renn 2001), regarding decision impacts to be archives and securing financing. There is a clear need for 628
599 borne by future generations (termination of control, uncov- thoughts and action in this field, for there have been pro- 629
600 ering reasons for retrievability, etc.) and for an early detec- duced only a few studies on the topic (e.g., seminal like 630
601 tion of “system and decision weaknesses” (no technical or Posner 1984; Isaacs 1984; Tannenbaum 1984; Berndes and 631
602 political, safety-compromising, “fixes”); thereby society’s Kornwachs 1996; SKB 1996; IAEA 1999; NEA 2019). It 632
603 risk of enormous costs of corrective actions may be reduced. has been acknowledged that the “context has changed 633
604 If appropriately set up, votes may be viewed as inclusive greatly since the 1980s, when [Records, Knowledge and 634
605 reviewing; as a much more representative instrument they Memory, RK&M] was thought to serve the sole function of 635
606 are not replaceable by “more modern” modes of participa- deterring intrusion into a repository. Today, the goal is to 636
607 tion but may be complemented. In fact, they should be, as preserve information to be used by future generations while 637
608 votes (opposed to elections) are in many countries not part of maintaining technical and societal oversight of the repository 638
609 the political culture and as considerate participation better for as long as practicable”, as the NEA administator in 639
610 reflects public opinions than plain yes/no decisions. Well charge of the NEA RK&M Initiative stated (Pescatore 640
611 designed participatory tools also structure a discourse in a 2014). But is not sufficient to provide markers and other 641
612 systematic, traceable manner. Social alignments, interests artifacts for knowledge transfer in the long run. 642
Fig. 5.6 Reference time frames and examples for important activities, periods and decisions during the implementation process of deep geological
radioactive waste repositories (reproduced from NEA 2019, 21)
643 As the entire programme stretches over decades, a place on principles and alternative options based thereon. 671
644 surveillance institution must be installed. As shown above, Proponents, authorities and this body reach a consensus on a 672
645 the concept of “long-term stewardship” was proposed conceptual framework. This agreement undergoes a wide 673
646 against the background of waste legacies in the USA. The public debate. Following an inclusive consultation, the 674
647 present idea of an oversight body was somewhat embraced proponent elaborates a project. The authorities review and 675
648 by the Swiss federal authorities (BFE 2008) when starting commission expertise. Eventually the project is revised. 676
649 the ongoing site-selection process. The six-member “Nuclear Finally, the concerned region (the concerned public) decides 677
650 Waste Management Advisory Board” is pluralistically on the project. The process is characterised by dynamic 678
651 composed, with one representative of the nuclear industry, mutual understanding and learning, as well as drawing up of 679
652 others are independent experts from the geological disposal the programme and project(s), respectively. A transparent 680
653 community, ethics and media. It is chaired by a member of decision base, with all relevant advantages and disadvan- 681
654 the Council of States (Senate). The anti-nuclear NGOs tages of the options, must be provided for and openly dis- 682
655 refused to collaborate but they do participate in Sectoral- cussed. Modifications and changes in time and context have 683
656 Plan bodies. Even though its mandate is to “offer views from to be considered, i.e., decision criteria may change in the 684
657 an outside perspective” and to “help identify process risks course of a project, such as the appraisal of monitoring of 685
658 and barriers to progress” (BFE 2020, website) the board has long-term disposition facilities. Contradictory goals with all 686
659 not played a major role in solving conflicts so far. At any their pros and cons have to be fully put on the table. Such a 687
660 rate and overall, however, the traditional strategy of linear procedure corresponds to so-called “double-loop learning” 688
661 decision-making (by the authorities and proponents) is ten- proposed by organisational learning theory (Argyris 1976), 689
662 tatively superseded by a dynamic and integrative, pluralistic whose requisite, however, is, i.e., institutionalised pro- 690
663 model. Such a debate has not been launched so far with gramme evaluation (Leeuw et al. 1995, 3ff). 691
664 regard to CO2. One issue is that much of the CCS activities
665 and research, including site selection, characterisation and Step 2, Decide: Passive Safety and Retrievability in a 692
666 engineering designs, are proprietary and thus not disclosed Phased and Flexible Process 693
667 to a wider public (Dean et al. 2020).

668 Thus, a possible generic way forward might be the fol- With regard to problem recognition, a multitude of polls in 694
669 lowing: On the initiative of such a conceptual body, with a Switzerland confirmed that the majority of respondents 695
670 broad composition of societal concerns, a discourse takes recognised the nuclear waste issue as a technological 696
5.6 Procedure: Examples 69
697 constraint (waste exists), that a solution must be found, and excuse to make any compromise with respect to the level of 750
698 that a domestic site would be favoured (e.g., Dichter-Institut scientific and technical soundness” (Zuidema 2000). 751
699 1992). In line with it, nine out of ten Europeans want their In Switzerland, most criteria for a “socially robust” pro- 752
700 member states to “have a management plan for radioactive cedure were considered: arguments (domestic geologic 753
701 waste which specifies fixed deadlines” (EC 2019). repository), evidence (one host rock, Opalinus clay), social 754
702 Way back in the 1970s the Swiss national electorate, by a alignments (the majority of the actors in the Sectoral Plan) 755
703 two-third majority, voted for a Federal Decree on the then and interests (procedural steps such as transparency and 756
704 Atomic Energy Act, according to which “the permanent and traceability). That (main) cultural values among such 757
705 safe final disposition and disposal of the … radioactive divergent actors like proponents of nuclear installations and 758
706 wastes” have to be “guaranteed” (Federal Decree 1979). The opponents may be shared is not expected. 759
707 primary goal of radioactive waste management, passive In applying the findings on decision processes to the 760
708 safety in a geological environment, was confirmed in the scope and focus of the EU research project COWAM 2, the 761
709 currently valid Nuclear Energy Act of 2003. The notion of respective Work Package chose the following structure for a 762
710 final and domestic disposal has since overwhelmingly been comparison of countries, consisting of five parts (Flüeler 763
711 endorsed in numerous national and regional surveys. One 2007a): 764
712 may, therefore, conclude that there is consensus in the Swiss

713 society on geological disposal as the way to go. The national A. Look at what was done in the PAST; 765
714 Parliament passed the revised respective act prohibiting— B. Find out the CONTEXT the decision-making process is 766
715 upon the Cantonal vetoes on Wellenberg—a final vote by an in (embedding in the national policy, framing, research 767
716 eventual host canton but stipulating that “the Department strategy, legislation); 768
717 [Ministry] gives a share to the host canton as well as to the C. Identify the ACTORS with their roles and 769
718 neighbouring cantons and countries in direct vicinity with responsibilities; 770
719 regard to the preparation of the general licensing decision” D. Structure the DECISION-MAKING PROCESS (with 771
720 (Federal Nuclear Energy Act, SNEA, art. 44). The option of substantive and procedural principles and goals); 772
721 a—final—national referendum on the ultimately chosen site E. Trace the INVOLVEMENT OF SOCIETY. 773
722 is foreseen by this law.

723 With regard to the technical concept, a pluralistically This may be visualised as follows (Fig. 5.7): 774
724 composed expert group was initiated in 1999. It proposed DMP decision-making process. 775
725 the concept of “monitored long-term geological disposal”,

726 an extension of the traditional concept of final disposal by, to A THE PAST: Experience; 776
727 a certain extent, integrating controllability/monitoring and B THE CONTEXT 777
728 retrievability (EKRA 2000). These aspects were adopted in BI Framing: Embedding in the national policy 778
729 legislation, although clearly as secondary to passive safety. BII Current official research strategy 779
730 The mentioned Sectoral Plan for site selection foresees three BIII Legislation: Embedding in the regulatory system; 780
731 phases and is evidently in line with the US NRC’s “adaptive C THE ACTORS 781
732 staging” (NRC 2002), progressively become common in the CI Formulary (institutional) stakeholders 782
733 community (NEA 2004). Some sort of forgiveness strategy CII Societal stakeholders; 783
734 has been installed or discussed in many countries: (possible) D DECISION-MAKING 784
735 retrievability for 300 years in France (CNDP 2020), DI Substantive principles and goals 785
736 recourses as suggested by a German expert committee DII Procedural principles and rules; 786
737 (AkEnd 2002). E INVOLVEMENT OF SOCIETY. 787
738 Internationally, a sound of retreat from disposal philos-

739 ophy can be detected (especially in USA, Japan, UK, par- Many ways may lead to an expected outcome, e.g., 788
740 tially France), where the motives are manifold. They stretch Belgium (local partnerships), Finland (dependence on safety 789
741 from an anti-nuclear attitude via an anticipated increase of regulator as guardian of the process), Sweden (safety regu- 790
742 nuclear acceptance to the strategy of resource storage on lator and empowered municipalities), United Kingdom (op- 791
743 behalf of subsequent reprocessing. UK and Japan resorted to tion discourse triggered by newly created body CoRWM, 792
744 a voluntaristic approach (within so-called “nuclear commu- now Partnership with voluntary candidates), Germany (site 793
745 nities”, Fig. 6.4). If there is no goal discussion or their selection procedure recommended by a specific body, i.e., 794
746 results are open, every stakeholder group may put forward AkEnd, and newly started site-selection programme), France 795
747 their motives to legitimise their particular strategy. In this (single-shot Public Debate exercise in 2006, focus on 796
748 sense it is understandable that the safety experts are tem- selected region), Switzerland (pragmatic mixture of technical 797
749 porising, for whom “retrievability should never be used as an approach with participation by way of spatial planning law). 798
B-I Framing B-II Research strategy

B Energy policy Waste strategy
B-III Legislation
Reversibility DMP
CONTEXT Process considered Retrievability Reconsideration
Options reconsidered Underground labs Main decisions
Influence of DMP on national strategy Decisions
D-II
D-I Scope
Procedural
Substantive D Principles
Principles Commitment
Types DECISION-MAKING
A Learning
Authors PROCESS
PAST
Monitoring
C-I Formulary C-II Societal Evaluation

C stakeholders stakeholders
Issue raised Implementers Overall attitude
Programme ACTORS Regulators Political parties
E
Site selection Research Associations
Public involvement Committees Local/regional level INVOLVEMENT
Roles, Industry
Success/failure responsibilities of the public
Fig. 5.7 Decision-making-process criteria applied in the EU research project COWAM 2 to twelve European countries (reproduced from Flüeler
2007a)
799 Various cross-disciplinary and cross-country analyses near Rotterdam, public engagement was organised by a 833
800 draw similar conclusions: “Each repository not only has “dedicated Stakeholder Management team” which “pre- 834
801 geological uniqueness but also has to consider cultural, vented that the project would be locked in a purely tech- 835
802 historical, political and socio-economic aspects in the nical tunnel vision” (Read et al. 2019, 11). 836
803 region” (Brunnengräber 2019, 16; cf. Fig. 6.4). This bears
804 on virtually all dimensions: physical (the need for long-term Step 3, Implement: Well Started—But Prepared for the 837
805 safety of the material disposed of), technological (control Long-Term? 838
806 versus safety/security) and social/political on multiple levels,

807 “namely the conflict situations reflected in the landscape of After more than a decade of Sectoral Plan, at the start of the 839
808 complex actors, including the state, civil society and private decisive final phase 3, one may say that the Swiss 840
809 actors” (Brunnengräber and Di Nucci 2019, 351). site-selection process for radioactive waste disposal is and 841
810 The fundamental decision on conventional hazardous continues to be long and tough (longer than initially planned 842
811 waste is being taken every time we get rid of paint, grease, by the Office of Energy), but it is ongoing, there are no major 843
812 car tyres, bulbs, mobiles, etc. “Special waste” is a fuzzy term dropouts, critical comments were recognised, the work has 844
813 and has to be handled in a special way (cf. definitions in been improved. The players recognise each other to con- 845
814 Sect. 4.2). Some is recycled, some upgraded, some incin- tribute their share (Flüeler 2014d, 2015). They have to plan 846
815 erated, some has to be deposited—about half of the haz- for the real long-term, also staffwise and institutionally, and 847
816 ardous waste in the European Union is landfilled (Fig. 5.8). need persistence and stamina. Whether they are prepared for 848
817 In the CCS field, engagement with the public is limited the programme’s longevity remains to be seen: find the 849
818 even though similar perception issues as in the nuclear field “right” location, build, operate, close, post-monitor the site, 850
819 exist and have to be addressed: Not in (or under) My Back and all this in a positive national to local embedding. 851
820 Yard, NIMBY (Krause et al. 2014), process transparency, Conventional hazardous waste is led into many differ- 852
821 lack of mutual trust, respect and understanding (Feenstra ent material streams and treated in many ways. As its defi- 853
822 et al. 2010), etc. Some engineers conclude that “future leaks nition is very fuzzy, i.e., sweeping, it is illustrative to look 854
823 are as good as ruled out” once the (injection) well is closed into well itemised waste such as from electrical and elec- 855
824 and decommissioned and the CO2-proof sealing has been tronic equipment: TV sets, computers, cell phones, ovens, 856
825 successfully carried out, recognising that after closure refrigerators, etc. Globally, this waste field grows dramati- 857
826 monitoring possibilities are limited anyway. And “there is cally (https://globalewaste.org/map/), and only one fifth is 858
827 no reason to assume that leakage will develop after injec- currently recycled even though the collection rate is rela- 859
828 tion is completed” (Read et al. 2019, 10). The CCS tively high in major producing regions (e.g., 42.5% in 860
829 Directive of the European Union allows to reduce the Europe in 2019 according to Forti et al. 2020, 76). Some of 861
830 (minimum) leakage control period of 20 years and, conse- it, unfortunately, is exported and its track is lost (Fig. 5.9). 862 AQ5
831 quently, transfer all responsibility to the competent Worldwide, we lose secondary raw material amounting to 57 863
832 authorities (EC 2009). In the case of the ROAD project, billion USD, as many goods contain gold, silver, palladium, 864
5.7 (Instead of) Policy Evaluation: A Quick Glimpse at SWOTs 71
Fig. 5.8 Conventional toxic waste produced in Europe, “energy recovery” means incineration (reproduced from Eurostat 2020)
865 copper and other precious substances. A tonne of mobile flexibility; the players stick to their given roles; safety first is 889
866 phone waste alone is worth 10,000 EUR (ibid.). held up; transparency and traceability are practised. Weak- 890
867 The Norwegian CCS projects Sleipner and Snøvit in the nesses: asymmetry of players; concerned regions without 891
868 Barents Sea have a “uniquely long track record of experi- right of decision; motivation sinking; frustration rising. 892
869 ence”, namely 22 years (Ringrose 2018), with a predicted Chances (Opportunities): freedom of action. Risks (Threats): 893
870 CO2 dissolution of 10% within two decades. Boundary Dam clash of interests; diverse levels of state, introduction of veto 894
871 (Canada) and Petra Nova (USA) are the only two commercial- right for stakeholders. In detail: 895
872 scale (retrofit) coal-fired power plants currently operational in Statements of representatives of six main players: 896
873 the world that use CCS technology, evidently with no suffi-
– Lead regulator (conduct of Sectoral Plan): Federal Office 897
874 cient data base (Mantripragada et al. 2019).
of Energy; 898
– Technical regulator: ENSI; 899
– Implementer: Nagra; 900

875
876 5.7 (Instead of) Policy Evaluation: A Quick – Cantons (joint statement by project managers from 901
877 Glimpse at SWOTs potential siting cantons); 902
– Regions (joint statement by chairmen of regional con- 903
878 Technical assessments are continually undertaken in the ferences in potential siting regions); 904
879 Swiss nuclear site-selection procedure (e.g., Leuz and Rahn – Free-lance expert. 905
880 2014). But full-fledged policy evaluations, whether contin-

881 uous or periodic, are rare, in fact just punctual up to this Strengths (+) of Swiss Sectoral Plan 906
882 point (like Planval 2014, on regional participation). To give

883 a current impression at least, the following presentation Lead regulator 907
884 (Flüeler 2014c, 2015) reflects on a quick-and-dirty profile of

885 strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats rendered by Comprehensive coordination; division of roles, participation 908
886 members of major players (SWOT analysis, Kotler et al. of most important players, sufficient flexibility to incorporate 909
887 2010, Fig. 5.10 in table form). Strengths are: overall, the new evidence and requirements; knowledge transfer to siting 910
888 Sectoral Plan is a suitable instrument with adequate cantons and regions. 911
a Global e-waste trade network, data as of 2012
b Origins and destinations of electronic waste: the former are mainly Europe, USA, Japan,
and Australia, the latter China and developing countries
Fig. 5.9 Electronic and electric waste flows (reproduced from: a Lepawsky 2015, 155, b Okeme and Arrandale 2019). Note China has been
banning imports of plastics and e-waste since
5.7 (Instead of) Policy Evaluation: A Quick Glimpse at SWOTs 73
912 Technical regulator hinder traceability of procedural routines; lengthy procedure 951
may lead to problems in understanding and to fatigue in 952
913 Safety-related criteria and stepwise procedure as base; participation; regional conferences not legitimised by 953
914 causality principle as legal basis for procedure and partici- elections. 954
915 pating institutions, clear division of roles; independent

916 competence of the federal level, synchronisation with dis- Cantons 955
917 posal programme.

Asymmetry of players (competence, resources, power); 956
918 Implementer concerned and affected regions without right of decision; 957
sporadic signs of sinking motivation and rising frustration. 958
919 Clear legal basis (on disposal concept as laid down in the
920 Swiss Nuclear Energy Act (with monitoring and retriev- Regions 959
921 ability, SNEA 2003), site-selection process widely sup-

922 ported; rules, process and criteria broadly discussed before Incoherence in central issues (surface facilities, socioeco- 960
923 Government decision, consensus on safety first, trans- nomical studies); no co-decisioning regarding safety; leading 961
924 parency; defined tasks, responsibilities and division of roles; institutions not open in dialogue (access issues denied, 962
925 broad and early participation of and cooperation with con- policy decisions technocratically framed; no equal footing). 963
926 cerned parties (regions, cantons, neighbouring countries);

927 intense discussions of diverse issues. Free-lance expert 964
928 Cantons Sectoral plan with substantive construction flaws (strategic 965
roles, methods of investigation, conceptual intractability); 966
929 Sectoral plan is a suitable instrument with adequate flexibility procedural deficits in managing criticism and in controlling 967
930 AND safety-first paradigm, compliance with requirement of the project leadership; safety issues are reduced to technical 968
931 division of roles; transparency and traceability practised. expert groups despite failing expert culture (Asse, Morsle- 969
ben, Germany; WIPP, USA). 970
932 Regions
Opportunities and Threats Combined, Lessons (in the 971
933 Know-how acquisition renders regional conferences a Swiss Sectoral Plan) 972
934 cross-boundary player and partner (of cantons and German

935 districts); capability of co-setting agendas to a certain extent; Continuous Tension (!?) between O and T 973
936 critics can participate; participation makes shaky basis for

937 regions clear. • Actors’ preparedness to dialogue; 974
• Unruptured handing over to (technical, political, societal) 975
938 Weaknesses (−) of the Swiss Sectoral Plan generations; 976
• Project longevity; 977
939 Lead regulator • Specification of requirements (criteria to narrow down); 978
• Management of uncertainties; 979
940 Long-lasting and complex procedure with sufficient staff • Learning and failure culture; 980
941 resources only; scheduling (duration prolonged), possibly • Are concepts/models sufficient for comparability (of 981
942 resulting in demotivation and loss of know-how; preparation of geological regions)? 982
943 information for target audience difficult; high number of actors.

Conclusion 983
944 Technical Regulator

– Inclusive, systematic and participatory approach needed 984
945 Technical state of knowledge in Sectoral Plan not in line to single out goal priorities (presumably with safety first); 985
946 with public information needs; time slot to integrate cantonal – Setting up a respective process is a prerequisite to pro- 986
947 experts (repaired in Stage 2). ceed in site selection; 987
– (National) lead agency in conjunction with; 988
948 Implementer – Clear division of roles among the players; 989
– Rules of the “game”; 990
949 Pioneering procedure not rulable in detail from the begin- – Criteria to judge; 991
992
950 ning; high number of actors, bodies and working groups

SO/WO Strengths/Weaknesses and Opportunities

ST/WT Strengths/Weaknesses and Threats
Fig. 5.10 SWOT analysis of CCS development in China (reproduced from Ming et al. 2014, 615)
993 and Hints 1021

1022
994 – Regular programme and policy evaluation (concept

995 upcoming) mandatory to control if procedure on track. The ones to take profit of waste generation (electricity pro- 1023
vision) and the waste producing units (electricity producing 1024
996 Albeit quite generic, a SWOT analysis for CCS in China plants) do not coincide with the waste sites, esp. not the one 1025
997 gives the picture reproduced in Fig. 5.10 (Ming et al. 2014). repository site of Yucca Mountain US Congress reduced all 1026
investigations to in an Amendment of 1987 to the Nuclear 1027
Waste Policy Act. 1028

998
999 5.8 Conclusions and Summary
Questions 1029
1000 The notion of “robustness” to qualify and stabilise a system is 1030

1. What is the use to move from the established con- 1031
1001 amplified to the more adequate dynamic approach of “re-
cept of “robustness” to the modern idea of 1032
1002 silience” and “adaptiveness”. Complexity and dynamics
“resilience”? 1033
1003 imply that many institutions have a role to play with various
2. Time is counted in seconds, minutes, hours, years. 1034
1004 functions, in a communicative atmosphere of mutual respect
Why isn’t there a one-and-only definition? 1035
1005 and learning (Chap. 6). The extended robustness concept,
3. We already have Government. Why do you want 1036
1006 then, is used to specify the relatively vague concept of
governance? 1037
1007 “governance”. A clear regulation of parameters and require-
1008 ments as well as competencies and responsibilities of the
Answers 1038
1009 involved parties are central. Independent regulators, on a par
1039
1010 with the implementer, must accompany and supervise all 1. Robustness is a well investigated and used concept to 1040
1011 relevant steps. They need respective competence, resources assess the stability of technical systems. We, however, 1041
1012 and staff. It is wise to adequately involve third parties—and deal with complex and controversial sociotechnical 1042
1013 the larger public—at an early stage. By that, we may avoid systems directed towards an unknown future. It is not 1043
1014 “institutional crisis” as well as “regulatory crises” (Kasperson adequate to just “add” another layer (barrier) around 1044
1015 et al. 1992; Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock 2017, respectively). the existing ones. Long-term waste programmes are, in 1045
individual human terms, open-ended and moving tar- 1046
1016 Example gets. Our modes to cope with this situation must be 1047
1017
1018 Figure 5.11 highlights different perspectives on the siting accordingly. 1048
1019 conditions of high-level radioactive waste in the USA. What

1020 can be said regarding distributional equity? b
5.8 Conclusions and Summary 75
a US Electricity users (USA at night, composite visible infrared imaging radiometer suite,
VIIRS, from Suomi NPP satellite in April and October 2012)
b US Electricity producers (96 operating commercial nuclear reactors at 58 nuclear power

plants in 29 states, 2019)
Fig. 5.11 Starting points, i.e., some boundary conditions, for site selection (Photos by a NASA Earth Observatory/NOAA NGDC, b EIA 2019,
c US CRS 2020)
1049 2. We do have government, even governments, all over 3. Correct, we count time precisely, with atomic clocks. 1056
1050 (policemen, taxes, regulations …). They also do gov- As our living generation(s) tackle and somehow pre- 1057
1051 ern the country. But if we are confronted with multiple condition future generations’ environments we have to 1058
1052 actors, from local to global and back, with public and understand that our and their concepts of time may not 1059
1053 private interests, in several arenas, dealing with the coincide. We—necessarily!—discount time, i.e., “my” 1060
1054 climate of our descendants and waste with a half-life 60 min right now are more valuable to me than an 1061
1055 of 30,000 years—what then? unknown John Doe’s 60 min in March 2143. 1062
c US nuclear interim storage sites and planned final repository (80 waste sites across the
nation, 2020, red dot (added, tf): 1 then planned repository in Yucca Mtn, NV)
Fig. 5.11 (continued)
1063 Exercise 5.1

1064
1065 Apply the SWOT technique to one of the three policy areas
1066 (radioactive waste, conventional hazardous waste, carbon
1067 storage) in a particular country):
1069
1070
Helpful Harmful
1071 Internal Strengths Weaknesses
… …
1072 External Opportunities Threats
… …
1073 Note “Internal” means attributes of the organisation/programme itself
1074 (mostly “today” and rather under control), “External” denotes attributes
1075 of the surroundings (environment) (generally in the future and out of
1076 control). “Helpful” are positive factors, “Harmful” negative ones
1077
1078 Refined techniques are encouraged, e.g.:

1079
,c
,c
b
b
a,
a,
ria
ria
ite
ite
cr
cr
o
o
,t
,t
,3
,3
s
,2
,2
e
s1
s1
ni
e
rtu
ut
ut
s
at
rib
rib
po
re
A
A
Op
Th
…
Number of + Number of -
1
Strength
Criteria: a ++ 0 - + 0 3 1
b 0 + ++ 0 0 3 0
c…
Weaknesses
Criteria ... xyz - -- + 0 - 1 4
x 0 ++ -- + ++ 5 2
y
z
1081
Institutions, Learning 77
1136
1082 Additional Information Governance 1137
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1563 Gallimard, Paris (quote, Sect. 5.2)
1583
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Systems, Governance and Institutions: 5.1 From Robust Technical Systems To Integral Robustness

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Layout: T3_Color Book ID: 498174_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-031-03901-0

Chapter No.: 5 Date: 11-6-2022 Time: 2:38 pm Page: 53/81

a technology as a whole including its institutions (Wynne 52

the various project phases of a facility site require at least

to monitoring and closure/sealing (Fig. 3.2). Consequently,

adaptive, even experimental manner (Cook et al. 1990; 61

passive protection of present and future generations and 63

29 governance; robust” if most arguments, evidence, social alignments, 65

According to Bijker and colleagues, “closure” in science 70

occurs “when a consensus emerges that the ‘truth’ has been 71

36 to Integral Robustness 1987, 12). 73

37 As pointed out before, science cannot deﬁne what waste1 is,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 53

54 5 Systems, Governance and Institutions

Separation promotion/oversight Pa IAEA IAEA

78 take place”, “organized complexity … with strong Independent reviewing P E P

79 interactions”, “set of elements standing in inter- Host rock E

Transparent funding Pa/P

84 Organisations, Part 1 Public involvement P P ( )P P (v) P (v)

and the environment from release of (harmful) radioactivity. 132

5.2 What is “Long-Term”, Really? Definitions and Implications 55

Fig. 5.2 Societal/institutional Public: Level IV: Political backup

Suppliers Stakeholders, concerned/interested parties

156 control and monitoring, etc.)” (IAEA 1998, 9). Conse-

56 5 Systems, Governance and Institutions

Fig. 5.3 Integral robustness.

179 Technical (Waste Disposal) Perspective3,4 AQ3

Complete containment (ILW3) 100 y

Complete technical isolaon (HLW/SNF4 Switzerland/Nagra) 10,000 y

Limit due to geological (i.e., glaciaon) processes (convenonal waste,

Complete technical isolaon (SNF Sweden) 1,000,000 y

Geological retenon (HLW/SNF Switzerland/Nagra) 1,000,000 y

Comment: Depending on waste characteriscs, disposal objecves and dis-

5.2 What is “Long-Term”, Really? Definitions and Implications 57

185 Technology (Policy) Perspective5

Military ulisaon - 60 y (1940s)

Civil use of nuclear energy - 50 y (1950s)

Decommissioning of NPPs 70 y (50+20 y)

New generaon of NPPs 70 y (exisng NPPs+20 y)

“Closing” the nuclear cycle 100+ y (breeder reactors, transmutaon)

58 5 Systems, Governance and Institutions

186 Institutional Perspective6,7,8,9,10

Operaon of waste storage7 50 y

Operaon of waste disposal8 60-70 y

Post-closure of waste disposal: Acve safety measures9 +70-300-500 y

Post-closure of waste disposal: Passive safety measures10 +300-+500 y

Post-closure of waste disposal: Memory +500 y

Comment: What is “short-lived” was deﬁned by a technical nuclear in-

5.2 What is “Long-Term”, Really? Definitions and Implications 59

192 Societal Perspective11

Working populaon (responsible for business decisions, generaon[s]

Yardsck of the “seven generaons”

Comment: In general, societal perspecves depend on the sociees they

60 5 Systems, Governance and Institutions

193 Political Perspective

Term of oﬃce (polics), legislaon 4 – 5 y

Scope of the radioacve waste management policy 300 – 500 y

Guardian of the process (programme policy) (e.g., 10x term of oﬃce) 40

Comment: Decade-long programmes are prone to polical volality and

194 Individual Perspective

Atude and worldview 0 – n y

Comment: Individuals’ worldviews are very heterogeneous (“n” can be any

195 Economic Perspective

Atude and worldview 0 – n y