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Set Theory1
J. Bagaria
ICREA (Catalan Institution for Research and
Advanced Studies) and University of Barcelona
1 Introduction
Set theory is the theory of abstract sets. It occu-
pies a special place among all mathematical disci-
plines, for it is both an area of mathematics and,
at the same time, it provides mathematics with its
foundation. Moreover, insofar as set theory is a
source of the axioms of mathematics and consti-
tutes a sound basis for the existence of infinite
mathematical objects, it is also of philosophical
significance.
2 The Theory of Transfinite Num-
bers
Set theory began with the work of Georg Can-
tor. In 1874, he proved that the set of algebraic
numbers is countable. This means they can be
enumerated, that is, put into one-to-one correspon-
dence with the set N of natural numbers. Recall
that the algebraic numbers are the complex solu-
tions of polynomial equations of the form:
an X n + an−1 X n−1 + · · · + a1 X + a0 = 0
where the coefficients ai are integers and an is non-
zero (and so may as well be assumed to be strictly
positive). Given such an equation, let the number
|an | + |an−1 | + · · · + |a0 | + n
be its index. It is clear that for every k > 0 there
are only a finite number of equations of index k.
For instance, there are only 4 equations of index 3
with strictly positive an , namely, X 2 = 0, 2X = 0,
X + 1 = 0, and X − 1 = 0, which have as solutions
0, −1, and 1. It follows that for all k > 0 there are
only finitely-many solutions of equations of index
k. Thus, we can enumerate all algebraic numbers
by enumerating all solutions of equations of index
1 This is an expanded version of the article published in:
The Princeton Companion to Mathematics. Edited
by Timothy Gowers. June Barrow-Green and Imre Leader,
associate editors. Princeton University Press, 2008.
1
1, followed by all new solutions of equations of in-
dex 2, and so on.
Two sets A and B have the same size, or cardi-
nality, if there is a bijection between them, that is,
the elements of A can be put into one-to-one cor-
respondence with the elements of B. Thus, N and
the set of algebraic numbers have the same cardi-
nality. It follows that Z and Q have also the same
cardinality as N. All these sets are countable.
But Cantor discovered that, surprisingly, the set
R of real numbers is not countable. Here is Can-
tor’s original proof: suppose, aiming for a con-
tradiction, that r0 , r1 , r2 , . . . is an enumeration of
R. Let a0 = r0 . Choose the least k such that
a0 < rk and put b0 = rk . Given an and bn ,
choose the least l such that an < rl < bn , and
put an+1 = rl . And choose the least m such that
an+1 < rm < bn , and put bn+1 = rm . Thus, we
have a0 < a1 < a2 < · · · · · · < b2 < b1 < b0 . Now
let a be the limit of the an . Then a is a real num-
ber different from rn , for all n, contradicting our
assumption that the sequence r0 , r1 , r2 , . . . enume-
rates all real numbers.
So, for the first time it was established that there
are at least two kinds of infinite sets: the count-
able and the uncountable. Cantor also showed that
there are bijections between any two of the sets Rn ,
n ≥ 1, and even RN , the set of all infinite sequences
r0 , r1 , r2 . . . of real numbers, and therefore all have
the same uncountable cardinality.
From 1879 to 1884 Cantor published a series of
works that constitute the origin of set theory. In
them he introduced the notion of infinite, or trans-
finite, ordinals. When we use the natural num-
bers to count a collection of objects we assign a
number to each counted object, starting with 1,
continuing with 2, 3, etc., and stopping when we
have counted each object exactly once. When this
process is over we have done two things. On one
hand we have obtained a number n, the last one
in the sequence, that tells us how many objects
there are in the collection. On the other hand
we have at the same time ordered the objects be-
ing counted in accordance with the ordering of the
natural numbers. Thus, natural numbers are both
cardinal numbers, which indicate a quantity, and
ordinal numbers, which indicate a position in an
ordered sequence. Suppose now we want to count
the points in the unit interval [0, 1]. Cantor’s ar-
2
gument given above shows that no matter how the
points are counted we will run out of natural num-
bers before we have counted all the points in the
interval. That is, a one-to-one function from N
into R can never be onto. Nothing prevents us,
however, from introducing new ordinal numbers
and continuing ‘counting’. For this, we first need
an ordinal number that represents the position in
the ordinal sequence that comes right after all the
natural numbers. This is the first infinite ordi-
nal number, which Cantor denoted by ω. In other
words, after 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . comes ω. It is also the
first limit ordinal, for it is not the immediate suc-
cessor of any of its predecessors. But once we have
ω we can continue the ordinal sequence simply by
adding 1 repeatedly. Thus, the sequence of ordinal
numbers begins as follows:
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, . . . , ω, ω + 1, ω + 2, ω + 3, . . .
Then comes the next limit ordinal, which it seems
natural to call ω + ω, and which we can write as
ω · 2. The sequence continues as:
ω · 2, ω · 2 + 1, ω · 2 + 2, . . . , ω · n, . . . , ω · n + m, . . .
As this discussion indicates, there are two basic
rules for generating new ordinals: adding 1 and
passing to the limit. What we mean by “passing
to the limit” is “assigning a new ordinal number
to the position in the ordinal sequence that comes
straight after all the ordinals obtained so far”. For
example, after all the ordinals ω ·n, comes the next
limit ordinal, which we write as ω · ω, or ω 2 , and
we obtain:
ω 2 , ω 2 + 1, . . . , ω 2 + ω, . . . , ω 2 + ω · n, . . . , ω 2 · n, . . .
Eventually, we reach ω 3 and the sequence contin-
ues as:
ω 3 , ω 3 + 1, . . . , ω 3 + ω, . . . , ω 3 + ω 2 , . . . , ω 3 · n, . . .
The next limit ordinal is ω 4 , etc. After all the ω n ,
for n a natural number, comes ω ω . And after ω ω ,
ω ωω
ω ω , ω ω ,... comes the limit ordinal denoted by
0 . And on and on it goes.
In set theory, one likes to regard all mathemat-
ical objects as sets. For ordinals this can be done
in a particularly simple way: we represent 0 by
the empty set and the ordinal number α is repre-
sented by the set of all its predecessors. Thus, for
Figure 1: ω and ω + 1 have the same cardinality.
instance, the natural number n is represented by
the set {0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1}, which has cardinality
n, and the ordinal ω + 3 is identified with the set
{0, 1, 2, . . . , ω, ω + 1, ω + 2}. Thinking of ordinals
this way, the ordering on the ordinals becomes set
membership: if α comes before β in the ordinal
sequence, then α is one of the predecessors of β
and therefore an element of β. A critically impor-
tant property of this ordering is that each ordinal
is a well-ordered set, which means that every non-
empty subset of it has a least element.
As we said earlier, cardinal numbers are used
for measuring the sizes of sets, while ordinal num-
bers indicate the position in an ordered sequence.
This distinction is much more apparent for infinite
numbers than for finite ones, because it is possible
for two infinite ordinals to have the same size. For
example, ω and ω + 1 are different ordinals, but, as
Figure 1 shows, the corresponding sets {0, 1, 2, . . .}
and {0, 1, 2, . . . , ω} have the same cardinality. In
fact, all sets that can be counted using the infinite
ordinals we have described so far are countable. So
in what sense are different ordinals different? The
point is that although two sets such as {0, 1, 2, . . .}
and {0, 1, 2, . . . , ω} have the same cardinality, they
are not order isomorphic: that is, you cannot find
a bijection f from one set to the other such that
f (x) < f (y) whenever x < y. Thus they are the
same “as sets” but not “as ordered sets”.
Informally, the cardinal numbers are the possi-
ble sizes of sets. A formal definition of a cardi-
nal number is that it is an ordinal number that is
bigger than all its predecessors. Thus, all natural
numbers are cardinal numbers, and so is ω. Can-
tor used the first letter of the Hebrew alphabet ℵ
(aleph) to represent the infinite cardinal numbers,
ℵ0 denoting the first one, so that ℵ0 = ω.
Cantor called numbers of the second class– the
natural numbers being the numbers of the first
class – those infinite ordinal numbers that are ob-
tained starting from ω by means of the two gen-
2. THE THEORY OF TRANSFINITE NUMBERS
erating rules of adding 1 and passing to the limit,
and are countable. The set of all such ordinals is
a new ordinal, which Cantor called ω1 , that rep-
resents the position in the ordinal sequence that
comes right after all the countable infinite ordi-
nals. He also observed that ω1 is not countable,
for it cannot contain itself as an element, and rep-
resented the cardinal number corresponding to this
set by ℵ1 . Thus ℵ1 = ω1 is the first uncountable
cardinal.
This process can be repeated. The ordinals of
the third class are those obtained starting from
ω1 by the two generating rules of adding 1 and
passing to the limit, and have cardinality ℵ1 (or
equivalently the set of all ordinals that can be
put in one-to-one correspondence with ω1 ). The
set of all such ordinals, called ω2 , is the small-
est ordinal having cardinality greater than ℵ1 , and
so the corresponding cardinal is then called ℵ2 .
We can continue generating a sequence of ordi-
nals ω1 , ω2 , ω3 , . . . of larger and larger cardinaltiy.
Moreover, using limits as well, e can continue the
sequence transfinitely. For example, the ordinal
obtained as the limit of the ωn , n ∈ N, is called ωω ,
and the corresponding limit cardinal ℵω . In this
way we obtain the sequence of infinite, or transfi-
nite, ordinals,
ω
0, 1, . . . , ω, ω+1, . . . , ω , . . . , ω1 , . . . , ω2 , . . . , ωω , . . . extremely hard, there is a sense in which it cannot
as well as the sequence of infinite, or transfinite,
cardinals:
ℵ0 , ℵ1 , . . . , ℵω , ℵω+1 , . . . , ℵωω , . . . ,
ℵω1 , . . . , ℵω2 , . . . , ℵωω , . . .
where for each ordinal α we have a cardinal ℵα .
Observe that the alephs give the cardinality of the
infinite initial segments of the ordinal sequence,
namely, ℵα is the cardinality of the set of all ordi-
nals less than β, for any β greater or equal than
ωα and strictly less than ωα+1 .
Given two natural numbers, we can calculate
their sum and product. A convenient set-theoretic
way to do define these binary operations is as fol-
lows. Given natural numbers m and n, take any
two disjoint sets A and B of size m and n, respec-
tively; m + n is then the size of the union A ∪ B.
As for the product, it is the size of the set A × B,
the set of all ordered pairs (a, b) with a ∈ A and
3
b ∈ B. (For this set, which is called the Cartesian
product, we do not need A and B to be disjoint.)
The point of these definitions is that they apply
just as well to infinite cardinal numbers: the sum
of two infinite cardinals κ and λ is the cardinal of
the union of any two disjoint sets, one of cardi-
nality κ and the other of cardinality λ. And the
product of κ and λ is the cardinal of the Cartesian
product of any two sets, one of cardinality κ and
the other of cardinality λ. The resulting arithmetic
of transfinite cardinals is very simple, however. It
turns out that for all transfinite cardinals ℵα and
ℵβ ,
ℵα + ℵβ = ℵα · ℵβ = max(ℵα , ℵβ ) = ℵmax(α,β) .
It is also possible to define exponentiation for
transfinite cardinals, but for this the picture
changes completely. If κ and λ are cardinals, then
κλ is defined as the cardinal of the Cartesian prod-
uct of λ copies of any set of cardinality κ. Equiva-
lently, it is the cardinality of the set of all functions
from a set of cardinality λ into a set of cardinal-
ity κ. Again, if κ and λ are finite, this gives the
usual definition: for instance the number of func-
tion from a set of size 3 to a set of size 4 is 43 .
What happens if we take the simplest nontrivial
transfinite example, 2ℵ0 ? Not only is this question
be resolved, as we shall see later.
The most obvious set of cardinality 2ℵ0 is the set
of all functions from N into {0, 1}. If f is such a
function, then we can regard it as giving the binary
expansion of the number
X
x= f (n)2−(n+1) ,
n∈N
which belongs to the closed interval [0, 1]. (The
power is 2−(n+1) rather than 2−n because we are
using the convention, standard in set theory, that
0 is the first natural number rather than 1.) Since
every point in [0, 1] has at most two different bi-
nary representations, it follows easily that 2ℵ0 is
also the cardinality of [0, 1], and therefore also the
cardinality of R. Thus, 2ℵ0 is uncountable, and so
greater or equal than ℵ1 . Cantor’s conjecture that
it is exactly ℵ1 is the famous Continuum Hypoth-
esis, which will be discussed at length in section 5
below.
4
It is not immediately obvious, but there are
many mathematical contexts in which transfinite
ordinals occur naturally. Cantor himself devised
his theory of transfinite ordinals and cardinals as
a result of his attempts, which were eventually
successful, to prove the continuum hypothesis for
closed sets of real numbers. he first defined the
derivative of a set X of real numbers to be the set
you obtain when you throw out all the “isolated”
points of X. These are points x for which you can
find a small neighborhood around x that contains
no other points in X. For example, if X is the set
{0}∪{1, 12 , 13 , . . .}, then all points in X are isolated,
except for 0. So the derivative of X is {0}.
In general, given a set X, we can take its deriva-
tive repeatedly. If we set X = X 0 , then we obtain
a sequence X 0 ⊇ X 1 ⊇ X 2 ⊇ · · · , where X n+1
is the derivative of X n . It may happen that this
sequence does not become constant at any finite
stage, that is, new isolated points appear at each
step. If this is the case, then we can take the inter-
section of all the X n , call it X ω , and continue with
the derivation. Then we can define X ω+1 to be
the derivative of X ω , and so on. Thus, the reason
that ordinals appear naturally is that we have two
operations, taking the derivative and taking the
intersection of everything obtained so far, which
correspond to successors and limits in the ordinal
sequence. Cantor initially regarded superscripts
such as ω + 1 as tags that marked the transfinite
stages of the derivation. These tags later became
the countable ordinal numbers.
Cantor was then able to prove that for every
closed set X of real numbers there is a count-
able ordinal α (which could be finite) such that
X α = X α+1 . It is easy to show that each X β in the
sequence of derivatives is closed, and that it con-
tains all but countably many points of the original
set X. Therefore, X α is a closed set that contains
no isolated points. Such sets are called perfect sets
and it is not too hard to show that they are either
empty or have cardinality 2ℵ0 . From this it follows
that X is either countable or of cardinality 2ℵ0 .
The intimate connection, discovered by Cantor,
between transfinite ordinals and cardinals and the
structure of the continuum was destined to leave
its mark on the entire subsequent development of
set theory.
3 The Universe of All Sets
In the discussion so far we have taken for granted
that every set has a cardinality, or in other words
that for every set X there is a unique cardinal num-
ber that can be put into one-to-one correspondence
with X. If κ is such a cardinal and f : X → X is a
bijection (recall that we identify κ with the set of
its predecessors), then we can define an ordering
on X by taking x < y if and only if f (x) < f (y).
Since κ is a well-ordered set, this makes X into a
well-ordered set. But it is far from obvious that
every set can be given a well-ordering. Indeed, it
is not obvious even for the set R. (If you need
convincing of this, then try to find one.)
Thus, to make full use of the theory of transfi-
nite ordinals and cardinals and solve some of the
fundamental problems – such as computing where
in the aleph hierarchy of infinite cardinals the car-
dinal of R is – one needs to appeal to the well-
ordering principle: the assertion that every set can
be well-ordered. Without this assertion, one can-
not even make sense of the questions. The well-
ordering principle was introduced by Cantor, but
he was unable to prove it. David Hilbert listed
proving that R could be well-ordered as part of
the first problem in his celebrated list of twenty-
three unsolved mathematical problems presented
in 1900 at the Second International Congress of
Mathematicians, in Paris. Four years later, Ernst
Zermelo gave a proof of the well-ordering principle
that drew a lot of criticism for its use of the Axiom
of Choice (AC), a principle that had been tacitly
used for many years, but was now brought into fo-
cus by Zermelo’s result. AC states that for every
set X of pairwise-disjoint non-empty sets there is
a set that contains exactly one element from each
set in X. In a second, much more detailed proof
published in 1908, Zermelo spells out some of the
principles or axioms involved in his proof of the
well-ordering principle, including AC.
In that same year, Zermelo published the first
axiomatization of set theory, the main motivation
being the need to continue with the development
of set theory while avoiding the logical traps, or
paradoxes, that originated in the careless use of
the intuitive notion of set. For instance, it seems
intuitively clear that every property determines a
set, namely, the set of those objects that have it.
But then consider the property of being an ordi-
3. THE UNIVERSE OF ALL SETS 5

nal number. If this property determined a set, this

would be the set of all ordinal numbers. But a mo-
ment of reflection shows that there cannot be such
a set, since it would be well-ordered and would
therefore correspond to an ordinal greater than all
ordinals, which is absurd. Similarly, the property
of being a set that is not an element of itself cannot
determine a set, for otherwise we fall into Russell’s
paradox, that if A is such a set, then A is an ele-
ment of A if and only if A is not an element of A,
which is absurd. Thus, not every collection of ob-
jects, not even those that are defined by some prop-
erty, can be taken to be a set. So, what is a set?
Zermelo’s 1908 axiomatization provides the first
attempt to capture our intuitive notion of set in a
short list of basic principles. It was later improved
through contributions from Thoralf Skolem, Abra- Figure 2: The universe V of all pure sets.
ham H. Fraenkel, and John von Neumann, becom-
ing what is now known as Zermelo-Fraenkel set
theory with the Axiom of Choice, or ZF C. sets already obtained in the previous stages. Once
again, this can be continued transfinitely: at limit
The basic idea behind the axioms of ZF C is that stages we collect into a set all the sets obtained
there is a “universe of all sets” that we would like to so far, and keep going. The universe of all (pure)
understand. The naturalness of the ZF C axioms sets, represented by the letter V and usually drawn
is best appreciated when viewing them as a list as a V -shape with a vertical axis representing the
of principles that produce new sets out of already ordinals (see Figure 2), therefore forms a cumula-
given ones in successive stages along the ordinal tive well-ordered hierarchy, indexed by the ordinal
sequence, eventually generating the universe of all numbers, beginning with the empty set ∅. That is,
sets. In usual mathematical practice we take sets we let
of integers, sets of real numbers, sets of functions,
V0 = ∅
etc., but also sets of sets, like sets of open sets in
a topological space, sets of sets of sets, like sets of Vα+1 = P(Vα ), the set of all subsets of Vα .
open covers, and so on. Thus, the universe of all [
sets should consist not only of sets of objects, but Vλ = Vβ , the union of all the Vβ , β < λ,
also of sets of sets of objects, etc. Now, it turns β<λ
out that it is much more convenient to dispense
if λ is a limit ordinal.
with “objects” altogether and consider only sets
whose elements are sets, whose elements are also The universe of all sets is then the union of all
sets, etc. Let us call those sets “pure sets”. The the sets Vα such that α is an ordinal. More con-
restriction to pure sets is technically advantageous cisely,
[
and yields a more elegant theory. Moreover, it is V = Vα
possible to model traditional mathematical con- α

cepts such as real numbers using pure sets, so one

does not lose any mathematical power. Pure sets
are built from nothing, i.e., the empty set, by suc- 3.1 The Axioms of ZF C
cessively applying the “set of” operation. A simple The ZF C axioms, stated informally, are the fo-
example is {∅, {∅, {∅}}}: to build this we start by llowing:
forming {∅}, then {∅, {∅}}, and putting these two
sets together gives us {∅, {∅, {∅}}}. Thus, at ev- 1. Extensionality. If two sets have the same
ery stage we form all the sets whose elements are elements, they are equal.
6

2. Power Set. For every set x there is a set and the “cumulative hierarchy of Vα ’s” need not
P(x) whose elements are all the subsets of x. appear in the formulation of the axioms of ZF C.
In ZF C, the ordinals are identified, according
3. Infinity. There is an infinite set.
to the definition given by John Von Neumann,
4. Replacement. If x is a set and f is a with the set of their predecessors, starting with
function-class 1 restricted to x, then there is 0 = ∅. Thus, 1 = {0}, . . . , n + 1 = n ∪ {n}, . . . , ω =
a set y = {f (z) : z ∈ x}. {0, 1, 2, 3, . . .}, α+1 = α∪{α}, etc. And the cardi-
nals are identified with the ordinals for which there
5. Union. For every set x, there is a set x is no bijection with any of their elements. Thus,
S
whose elements are all the elements of the ele- S ℵ0 = ω, ℵ1 = ω1 , . . . , ℵn = ωn , . . . , ℵω = ωω =
ments of x. n ℵn , etc. The existence and the basic properties
of transfinite ordinal and cardinal numbers can be
6. Regularity. Every set x belongs to Vα , for proved from the ZF C axioms. For example, one
some ordinal α. can prove that there is no largest cardinal, or that
2κ > κ for every cardinal κ.
7. Axiom of Choice (AC). For every set X of
pairwise-disjoint nonempty sets there is a set The axioms of ZF C lead a kind of double life.
that contains exactly one element from each On the one hand, they tell us the things we can
set in X. do, based on what we tend to do, with sets. In
this sense, ZF C is just like any other collection of
Usually a further axiom appears on this list, axioms for algebraic structures, e.g., the axioms for
called the Pairing axiom. It asserts that for any groups, or fields. So, in a similar manner as one
given two sets A and B, the set {A, B} exists. In studies abstract groups, i.e., algebraic structures
particular, {A} exists. Applying the Union axiom that satisfy the axioms for groups, one can also
to the set {A, B} one then gets the union A ∪ B study those structures that satisfy the axioms of
of A and B. But Pairing can be derived from the ZF C. These are called models of ZF C. Since, for
other axioms. Another important axiom that ap- reasons to be explained below, models of ZF C are
peared in Zermelo’s original list, one that is both not easy to come by, one is also interested in mod-
natural and very useful, is the axiom of Separa- els of fragments of ZF C. Thus, a model of some
tion. It states that for every set A and every de- fragment A of ZF C is just a pair hM, Ei, where
finable property P , the set of elements of A that M is a non-empty set and E is a binary relation
have the property P is also a set. But this axiom is on M so that all axioms of A are true when the
a consequence of the axiom of Replacement, and elements of M are interpreted as the sets and E
so there is no need to include this axiom in the is interpreted as the membership relation. For in-
list. Using the axiom of Separation one can eas- stance, hVω , ∈i is a model of all the axioms of ZF C
ily prove the existence of the empty set ∅, as well except Infinity, and hVω+ω , ∈i is a model of ZF C
as the intersection A ∩ B and difference A − B of except Replacement. But one can also look at a
any two sets A and B. The axiom of Regularity completely different relation E on a set M , and see
is also known as the axiom of Foundation and it whether it happens to satisfy some of the axioms of
is usually stated as follows: every non-empty set ZFC. For example, the pair hN, Ei, where E is the
X has an ∈-minimal element, i.e., an element that relation given by: mEn iff the m-th digit (counting
no element of X belongs to. In the presence of the from right to left) in the binary expansion of n is
other axioms the two formulations are equivalent. 1, is a model of ZF C minus Infinity.
We chose the formulation in terms of the Vα ’s to But on the other hand we can view the ZF C
stress the fact that this is a natural axiom based on axioms as telling us how to build up the hierar-
the construction of the universe of all sets. But it is chy of the Vα ’s. Indeed, axiom 1, Extensionality,
important to notice that the notions of “ordinal” just states that a set is something entirely deter-
1 A function-class can be thought of as a function that is mined by its elements. Axioms 2-5 are tailored to
given as a definition rather than an object that exists as a construct V . The Power Set axiom takes us from
set. The concept will be made precise in section 3.2. Vα to Vα+1 . The Infinity axiom allows the con-
3. THE UNIVERSE OF ALL SETS
struction to go into the transfinite. Indeed, in the
context of the other ZF C axioms, Infinity is equiv-
alent to the assertion that ω exists. Replacement
is used to continue the construction of V at limit
stages λ. To see this, consider the function defined
by: F (x) = y if and only if x is an ordinal and
y = Vx . Then the range of F restricted to λ con-
sists of all Vβ , β < λ, which by Replacement form
a set. Now by an application of the axiom of Union
to this set one obtains Vλ . Finally, the axiom of
Regularity states that all sets are obtained in this
way, that is, the universe of all sets is precisely V .
This rules out pathologies, such as sets that belong
to themselves. The point is that for every set X
there is a first α such that X ∈ Vα+1 . This α is
called the rank of X and it marks the stage of the
cumulative hierarchy where X was formed. So, we
couldn’t possibly have X ∈ X, since all elements
of X must have a rank strictly smaller than the
rank of X. AC is equivalent, in the context of the
other ZF C axioms, to the Well-Ordering Princi-
ple, i.e., to the assertion that every set A can be
well-ordered and, therefore, can be put into one-
to-one correspondence with an ordinal.
3.2 Formulas and models
The ZF C axioms can be formalized using the
language of first-order logic for sets, that is, for-
mal logic with quantifiers that range over objects
(in our case the objects being sets), with equal-
ity, and with the binary relation symbol ∈ as
the unique non-logical symbol. ∈ represents, of
course, the membership relation. More precisely,
the symbols of the formal language are: variables
x, y, z, . . . , X, Y, Z, . . .; quantifiers ∀ (for all) and ∃
(there exists); logical connectives ¬ (not), ∧ (and),
∨ (or), → (if ..., then ...), and ↔ (if and only if);
equality =, and membership ∈, as well as paren-
theses. The formulas of the language are built up
from the atomic formulas x = y and x ∈ y by
means of the logical connectives and the quanti-
fiers. Namely, if ϕ and ψ are formulas, then so are
¬ϕ, (ϕ ∧ ψ), (ϕ ∨ ψ), (ϕ → ψ), (ϕ ↔ ψ), ∀xϕ, and
∃xϕ. Thus, the formulas are the formal counter-
part of the sentences in English (or in any other
natural language) that talk only about sets and the
membership relation. For instance, in this formal
language the axiom of Extensionality is written as
7
the formula:
∀x∀y(∀z(z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) → x = y)
which reads as: for every set x and every set y, if
every set z belongs to x if and only if it belongs to
y (i.e., if x and y have the same elements), then x
and y are equal.
Conversely, any formula of the formal language
can be interpreted as a sentence (in English) about
sets, and it makes sense to ask whether the inter-
preted sentence is true or not. Usually, by ’true’
we mean ‘true in the universe V of all sets’, but
it also makes sense to ask for the truth or falsity
of a formula in any structure of the form hM, Ei,
where E is a binary relation on M . For exam-
ple, the formula ∀x∃y x ∈ y is true in all models
hM, Ei of ZF C, while the formula ∃x∀y y ∈ x is
false (because of Regularity). Now, a formula may
have free variables, namely, variables that are not
under the scope of a quantifier. For instance, in
the formula ∃y y ∈ x the variable x is free. Given
a formula with a free variable x, we can ask: what
are the solutions? That is, what are the sets a
that make the sentence true, if any? This is en-
tirely analogous to the case when we ask for the
solutions to a given algebraic equation with vari-
able x. Thus, for example, every non-empty set a
is a solution to the formula ∃y y ∈ x. To keep track
of the free variables in a given formula ϕ, we usu-
ally write ϕ(x, y, . . .) to indicate that the variables
x, y, . . . are free in ϕ. And we write ϕ(a, b, . . .) to
express that the sets a, b, . . . are solutions to the
formula ϕ(x, y, . . .). Notice that, as in the last ex-
ample, the solutions to a given formula may not
form a set. So, in general, instead of talking about
‘the set of solutions to ϕ(x, y, . . .)’ we talk about
‘the class defined by ϕ(x, y, . . .)’. Notice that if
ϕ has n free variables, then the class defined by
ϕ will have n-tuples as elements, if non-empty.
This is fine, since n-tuples can also be regarded
as sets (see the beginning of next section). If the
formula has more than one free variable, for in-
stance, ϕ(x1 , . . . , xn ), with n > 1, then we may
‘fix the value’ of one of the variables, say xn , by
taking a fixed set a and look for the n − 1-tuples
ha1 , . . . , an−1 i such that ha1 , . . . , an−1 , ai is a solu-
tion of ϕ(x1 , . . . , xn ). This is usually referred to as
‘the class defined by ϕ(x1 , . . . , xn−1 , a)’, and a is
called a parameter. Notice that every set a is also
8
a class, namely, the class defined by the formula
x ∈ a.
One advantage of this formalization, but by no
means the only one, as we shall have the chance
to see later on, is that it makes it possible to for-
mulate in a completely precise way the axiom of
Replacement. Indeed, in order to specify what is
meant by a definable function, we just say that
a definable function is a class function definable,
possibly with parameters, by a formula of the for-
mal language. That is, there is a formula ϕ(x, y, w)
and a set a such that ϕ(x, y, a) defines a class that
is a function, namely, for all sets b, c, and d, if
ϕ(b, c, a) and ϕ(b, d, a) hold, then c = d. Thus,
Replacement is not really an axiom, but an axiom
scheme, namely, a collection of infinitely-many ax-
ioms, one for each formula of the formal language
with at least two free variables. A typical formal-
ized instance of the axiom is:
∀w(∀x∀y∀z((ϕ(x, y, w) ∧ ϕ(x, z, w)) → y = z) →
∀X∃Y ∀y(y ∈ Y ↔ ∃x(x ∈ X ∧ ϕ(x, y, w))))
This says that for every set a, if ϕ(x, y, a) defines
a class function, then for every set A, there is a set
B that is the range of the function restricted to A.
An important consequence of the fact that ZF C
can be formalized in first-order logic is that it is
subject to the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. This
is a general theorem about first-order formal lan-
guages which, in the particular case of ZF C, says
that if ZF C has a model, then it has a countable
one. More precisely, given any model M = hM, Ei
of ZF C, there is a model N of ZF C contained
in M which is countable and satisfies exactly the
same sentences as M . At first, this may seem para-
doxical, for how can ZF C have a countable model
if one can prove in ZF C that there are uncount-
able sets? Doesn’t the Theorem imply, in fact, that
there are no models of ZF C? Not quite. There is
nothing paradoxical in having a countable model
N of ZF C and a set a in N such that the state-
ment saying ’a is uncountable’ is true in N . For
’a is uncountable’ means ’There is no map from ω
onto a’. Such a map may exist in V , or in some
model M larger than N , but not in N . Thus, from
the point of view of N , a is uncountable, but in
fact, i.e., from the point of view of V , a may be
countable. Far from presenting a problem, the rel-
ativity of certain set-theoretic notions, like being
countable or having a certain cardinality, with re-
spect to different models of ZF C is an important
phenomenon which, even if a bit disconcerting at
first, may be used to a great advantage in consis-
tency proofs (see Section 5 below).
It is not difficult to see that all the axioms of
ZF C are true in V , which is hardly surprising
since they were designed for that to happen. But
the ZF C axioms may conceivably hold in some
smaller universes. That is, there may be some class
M properly contained in V , or even some set M ,
and therefore by the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem
also some countable set M , which is a model of
ZF C. As we shall see, while the existence of mod-
els of ZF C cannot be proved in ZF C, the fact that
one can consistently assume they exist – provided
ZF C is consistent, of course – is of the greatest
importance for set theory.
4 Set theory and the foundation of
mathematics
ZF C not only allows us to develop the theory of
transfinite numbers but also, being an extremely
general and abstract theory based on the funda-
mental notion of set, it allows us to develop all
standard mathematics. This means that all mathe-
matical objects may be viewed as sets, and all clas-
sical mathematical theorems can be proved from
ZF C using the usual logical rules of proof.
Regarding mathematical objects as sets is com-
mon practice in modern mathematics. The na-
tural numbers are the finite ordinals, so each one
of them may be identified with the set of its pre-
decessors. An ordered pair ha, bi is defined as the
set {{a}, {a, b}}. The binary relations on a set
A are identified with sets of ordered pairs of ele-
ments of A. For instance, the divisibility relation
between natural numbers is identified with the set
of ordered pairs hm, ni of natural numbers such
that m divides n. An n + 1-ary relation on A
is a set of n + 1-tuples of elements of A, i.e., a
set of ordered pairs whose first component is a n-
tuple of elements of A and the second component
is an element of A. The integers are constructed
as equivalence classes, i.e., equivalence sets, of or-
dered pairs of natural numbers, and the rationals
as equivalence classes of ordered pairs of integers.
Real numbers are just Dedekind cuts, which are
4. SET THEORY AND THE FOUNDATION OF MATHEMATICS
non-empty bounded sets of rationals closed under
predecessors and with no greatest element. An n-
ary function on a set A is just a special kind of
n + 1-ary relation on A, since such a function f
may be identified with the set of ordered n + 1-
tuples hx1 , ..., xn , yi such that f (hx1 , ..., xn i) = y.
An algebraic structure, e.g., a group or a ring, is
a tuple of the form hA, R, S, . . . , f, g, . . .i, where A
is a non-empty set, R, S, . . . are relations on A and
f, g . . . are functions on A of various n-arities. A
topological space X is precisely a set with a topol-
ogy, which is a set of subsets of X closed under ar-
bitrary unions and finite intersections, and so on.
By viewing them as sets, the existence of all usual
mathematical objects: numbers, algebraic struc-
tures, topological and vector spaces, smooth man-
ifolds and dynamical systems, etc., can be proved
in ZF C.
As for mathematical theorems, take for instance
the classical Bolzano Theorem, which is a special
case of the Intermediate Value Theorem found at
the beginning of any Analysis course. It states
that if a < b are real numbers, f : [a, b] → R is
a continuous function, and f (a) < 0 < f (b), then
there exists some c ∈ [a, b] such that f (c) = 0.
We have just observed that all the mathemati-
cal objects that appear in this theorem may be
viewed as sets. The existence and basic properties
of these objects can be formally proved from ZF C,
for example, the completeness of the real numbers.
Then, the usual proof of the theorem may be seen
as a formal proof from ZF C, obtained by the ap-
plication of the deduction rules of first-order logic.
Of course, writing the complete proof using the
formal language is both laborious and inadvisable
for practical reasons, for the proof would not only
be very long but also intuitively incomprehensi-
ble. It is important, however, to convince oneself
that in principle this can be done. Indeed, the
fact that all standard mathematics can be formu-
lated and developed within the axiomatic system
of ZF C makes meta-mathematics possible, that
is, the mathematical study of mathematics itself.
Questions like the possibility or impossibility of
proving a mathematical statement make now per-
fect sense, for they become mathematical questions
once we understand by mathematical statement a
statement in the formal language of set theory, and
by proof a formal proof from ZF C.
9
4.1 Undecidable statements.
Let ϕ be a mathematical statement. We may ask
if ϕ is true or not. But in mathematics the truth of
a mathematical statement is established by means
of a proof from basic principles or axioms. Thus,
to establish the truth of ϕ a proof of it should
be found. But, if such a proof doesn’t exist, how
can we know that? One way would be to find a
proof of the negation of ϕ. This would tell us that
there cannot be a proof of ϕ, unless mathematics is
inconsistent! But, what if there is no proof of the
negation of ϕ either? Then ϕ would be undecidable
from the axioms.
Kurt Gödel proved in 1931 his famous in-
completeness theorems (see Kurt Gödel in sec-
tion V). The first one says that in every axiomatic
formal system that is consistent and rich enough
to develop basic arithmetic there are undecidable
statements, that is, statements such that neither
they nor their negations are provable in the system.
In particular, there are statements of the formal
language of set theory that are neither provable
nor disprovable from the ZF C axioms, supposing,
that is, that ZF C is consistent.
But is ZF C consistent? The statement that as-
serts the consistency of ZF C, usually written as
CON (ZF C), is the translation into the language
of set theory of:
0 = 1 is not provable in ZFC
This is an arithmetical statement, because it as-
serts that the sequence of symbols 0 = 1 is not
the last step of any formal proof from ZF C, and
formal proofs may be coded by finite sequences of
natural numbers. Gödel’s second incompleteness
theorem is even more surprising than the first. It
says that in any consistent axiomatic formal sys-
tem that is rich enough to develop basic arithmetic,
the arithmetical statement that asserts the consis-
tency of the system cannot be proved. Thus, if
ZF C is consistent, then its consistency can nei-
ther be proved nor disproved in ZF C.
ZF C is currently accepted as the standard for-
mal system in which to develop mathematics.
Thus, the truth of a mathematical statement is
firmly established if its translation into the lan-
guage of set theory is provable in ZF C. But what
about undecidable statements? Since ZF C em-
bodies all standard mathematical methods, the
10

fact that a given mathematical statement ϕ is un- 5 The Continuum Hypothesis

decidable in ZF C means that the truth or fal-
sity of ϕ cannot be established by means of usual Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis (CH), first
mathematical practice. If all undecidable state- formulated in 1878, states that every infinite set of
ments were like CON (ZF C) this would probably real numbers is either countable or has the same
not be a cause of worry, since they seem not to cardinality as R. In ZF C, since AC implies that
directly affect the kind of mathematical problems every set, and in particular every infinite set of
that people are usually interested in. But for bet- real numbers, can be put into one-to-one and onto
ter or worse this is not so. As we will see, there correspondence with a cardinal number, one can
are many statements of mathematical interest that easily see that CH is equivalent to the assertion
are undecidable in ZF C. that the cardinality of R is ℵ1 , or equivalently, that
2ℵ0 = ℵ1 .
Solving CH was the first problem in Hilbert’s
famous list of 23 unsolved problems, and has been
How can it be possible to prove, mathematically,
one of the main driving forces for the development
that a given mathematical statement ϕ is unde-
of set theory. In spite of many attempts at proving
cidable in ZF C? It is possible because ZF C is
CH by Cantor himself and by many leading math-
a formal theory in a first-order language, and the
ematicians of the first third of the twentieth cen-
correctness of the rules of proof for first-order logic
tury, no major progress was made until, 60 years
tells us that in order to show that ϕ cannot be
after its formulation, Gödel was able to prove its
proved in ZFC it is enough to find a model of ZF C
consistency with ZF C.
in which ϕ is false. Recall that a model M of ZF C
is an ordered pair hM, Ei where M is a non-empty
set, E is a binary relation on M , and all axioms of 5.1 The constructible universe
ZF C are true in hM, Ei when the elements of M
In 1938, Gödel found a way to construct, start-
are interpreted as the sets and E is interpreted as
ing with a model M of ZF C, another model of
the membership relation. Therefore, if we can find
ZF C, contained in M , where CH holds, thereby
models M and N of ZF C with ϕ true in M and
proving the relative consistency of CH with ZF C.
false in N , we can conclude that ϕ is undecidable.
This model is known as the constructible universe
Unfortunately, a consequence of Gödel’s second in-
and is represented by the letter L. Since M is
completeness theorem is that it is not possible to
a model of ZF C, we may view M as the uni-
prove in ZF C the existence of a model of ZF C.
verse V of all sets. Then L is built inside M si-
This is because, by Gödel’s completeness theorem
milarly to the way in which we built V , but un-
for first-order logic, ZF C is consistent if and only if
like in the construction of V , where when pass-
it has a model. Thus, a proof of the undecidability
ing from Vα to Vα+1 one takes all subsets of Vα ,
of ϕ splits into two relative consistency proofs: a
to go from Lα to Lα+1 one only takes those sub-
proof that if ZF C is consistent, then so is ZF C
sets of Lα that are definable in Lα (with parame-
plus ϕ, and a proof that if ZF C is consistent, then
ters). That is, Lα+1 consists of all sets of the form
so is ZF C plus the negation of ϕ. That is, one as-
{a : a ∈ Lα and ϕ(a) holds in Lα }, where ϕ(x) is
sumes that there is a model M of ZF C and proves
a formula of the language of set theory (or, more
the existence of two models of ZF C: one where ϕ
precisely, a formula of M ’s version of the language
holds, and one where it fails. The assumption of
of set theory), that may mention elements of Lα .
the existence of a model of ZF C is harmless, for if
If λ is a limit ordinal, then Lλ is just the union of
there is no such model then ZF C must be incon-
all the Lα , α < λ, and L is the union of all the
sistent and therefore everything is provable.
Lα , α an ordinal. Of course, we can also build L
inside V . This is the real L, the universe of all
constructible sets.
One of the most surprising results of twentieth- One important observation is that to build L it is
century mathematics is that the Continuum Hy- not necessary to use AC, and so we do not require
pothesis is undecidable in ZF C. AC to hold in M . But once L is constructed it can
5. THE CONTINUUM HYPOTHESIS 11

be verified that AC, and indeed all ZF C, holds in be defined here, enable us to carry out construc-
L. The verification of AC is based on the fact that tions of uncountable mathematical structures by
every element of L is defined at some stage α, and induction on the ordinals so that the construc-
so it is uniquely determined by a formula and some tion does not break down at limit stages. Both ♦
ordinals. So, any sensible well-ordering of all the and  have been widely used to prove the consis-
formulas will naturally yield a well-ordering of L, tency of mathematical statements without having
and therefore of every set in L. This shows that to construct models every single time, for since,
if ZF (i.e., ZF C minus AC) is consistent, then as Jensen showed, these principles hold in L, so
so is ZF C and, therefore, by adding AC to the does any statement implied by them. Thus, they
ZF axioms no contradiction is introduced into the are ready-made tools for proving consistency with
system. This is very reassuring, for although AC ZF C without requiring any knowledge of con-
has many desirable consequences it also has some structible sets.
that at first sight can appear counterintuitive, such Another important outgrowth of constructibility
as the Banach-Tarski Paradox. is inner model theory. Given any set A it is possi-
That CH holds in L is due to the fact that in L ble to build the constructible closure of A, namely,
every real number appears at some countable stage the smallest model of ZF that contains all ordinals
of the construction, i.e., in some Lα , α countable in and A. This model is called L(A) and is built in
L. This can be shown as follows: if r is a real, say the same way as L, but instead of beginning with
an infinite binary sequence, then it belongs to some the empty set, one begins with the transitive clo-
Lβ that satisfies those axioms of ZF C that are sure of A, namely, A together with the elements
needed to build L. Using the Löwenheim-Skolem of A, the elements of elements of A, etc. Models
theorem for first-order logic inside L, we can find of this sort are examples of inner models, that is,
a countable, in the sense of L, subset X of Lβ that models of ZF that contain all the ordinals and all
contains r and satisfies exactly the same sentences the elements of their elements. Especially promi-
as Lβ . But then X must be isomorphic to some nent are the inner models L(r), where r is a real
Lα , with an isomorphism that is the identity on the number, and L(R), the constructible closure of the
natural numbers, and therefore on r. And since Lα set of real numbers. Very important also are the
is countable in L, so is α. But since there are only inner models of large cardinal axioms, which will
ℵ1 -many countable ordinals, and for each ordinal α be discussed in section 6 below.
that is countable in L, Lα is also countable, there After the result of Gödel, and given the repeated
can only be ℵ1 -many real numbers in L. failed attempts to prove CH in ZF C, the idea
started to take shape that maybe it was undecida-
Since for each ordinal α, Lα contains only the ble. To prove this, it was necessary to find a way to
sets that are strictly necessary, namely, those that build a model of ZF C in which CH is false. This
were explicitly definable in one of the previous was finally accomplished 25 years later, in 1963, by
stages, L is the smallest possible model of ZF C Paul J. Cohen using a revolutionary new technique
containing all the ordinals, and in it the cardinal- called forcing.
ity of R is also the smallest possible, namely ℵ1 . In
fact, in L the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis
(GCH) holds, that is, for every ordinal α, 2ℵα has 5.2 Forcing
the smallest possible value, namely, ℵα+1 . The forcing technique is an extremely flexible and
The theory of constructible sets went through an powerful tool for building models of ZF C. It al-
extraordinary development in the hands of Ronald lows one to construct models with the most di-
Jensen [22]. He showed that in L Suslin’s Hypo- verse properties and with great control over the
thesis fails (see section 10 below) and isolated the statements that will hold in the model being con-
combinatorial principle known as ♦ (diamond). structed, thereby allowing one to prove the consis-
Moreover, using his fine-structural analysis of the tency with, and the undecidability from, ZF C of
constructible sets, he proved that another impor- many mathematical statements.
tant combinatorial principle, known as  (square), In a manner reminiscent of the way one passes
holds in L. These two principles, which will not from a field K to an algebraic extension K[a], one
12
goes from a model M of ZF C to a forcing ex-
tension M [G] that is also a model of ZF C. How-
ever, in spite of the analogy, the forcing method is,
both conceptually and technically, far more com-
plex, involving set-theoretic, combinatorial, topo-
logical, logical and metamathematical aspects.
To give an idea of how it works, let us con-
sider Cohen’s original problem of obtaining, start-
ing from a model M of ZF C, a model where CH
fails. The only thing we know about M is that it
is a model of ZF C, and so as far as we know CH
may hold in it. In fact, for all we can tell M may
just be L, in the sense that when we build L inside
M we obtain the whole of M . Therefore, we need
to add to M new real numbers to ensure that in the
extension M [G] there will be at least ℵ2 -many of
them; more precisely, we need the extended model
to satisfy the sentence that says that there are at
least ℵ2 -many real numbers. However, the ‘real
numbers’ in M [G] may not be real numbers at all,
and the element of M [G] that plays the rôle of ℵ2
need not be the real cardinal ℵ2 in V .
To simplify the problem, suppose first that we
only want to add to M a single real number and, to
simplify it even further, think of the real number
to be added as just a binary representation of a
real in [0, 1], that is, an infinite binary sequence in
the real world V .
A first difficulty is that M may already contain
all infinite binary sequences, so there aren’t any to
be added. Fortunately, by the Löwenheim-Skolem
Theorem, every model M of ZF C has a countable
N ⊆ M that satisfies exactly the same sentences of
the language of set theory as M . Let us emphasize
that N is countable in the real world, that is, in V ;
so there is, outside N , a function that enumerates
all its elements. Since M was a model of ZF C,
so is N . So, since we really don’t care about the
size of M , but only that it is a model of ZF C,
we may as well assume that M is countable. Now,
since there are uncountably many infinite binary
sequences, there are plenty of them that do not
belong to M .
So, can we just pick any one of them and add
it to M ? Well, no. For suppose M is of the form
Lα , as constructed in V , where α is a countable
ordinal in V . For all we know, M may be just
that. Indeed, the existence of models of ZF C of
this form follows, for instance, from the existence
of large cardinals (see section 6 below). Since we
want to build a model M [c] of ZF C that contains
a new infinite binary sequence c and all the ele-
ments of M , M [c] will have to contain Lα (c), i.e.,
all sets that can be constructed in less than α steps
starting with c. If we take M [c] = Lα (c), then c
might unfortunately code α by encoding a binary
relation on the natural numbers order-isomorphic
to α, so that α ∈ M [c]. Thus, if M [c] were a
model of ZF C, then Lα (c) would belong to itself,
which is impossible. If we try to circumvent the
problem by adding more sets to M [c] so that it
becomes a model of ZF C, then we may end up
with M [c] = Lγ , for some ordinal γ greater than
α. And this is not good for our purposes, for in all
models of ZF C of the form Lγ , CH holds. The
conclusion is that we cannot just pick any c that is
not in M . We will have to choose c very carefully.
The idea is that c should be generic, it the sense
that it should have no special property that sin-
gles it out. The reason for this is that if, as before,
M = Lα , and we want to ensure that M [c] = Lα (c)
is still a model of ZF C, then we don’t want c to
have any special property that would interfere in
the construction of M [c] so that some ZF C ax-
iom would no longer hold. To accomplish this we
build c little by little, i.e., by finite approxima-
tions, while at the same time taking care of all
possible properties that c could possibly have in
M [c]. More precisely, suppose ϕ(x) is a formula
with free variable x and p is a finite binary se-
quence. Think of ϕ(x) as a property of the infinite
binary sequence x and p as a finite approximation
to c. If we can extend p to a longer finite sequence
q so that in M no infinite binary sequence a that
begins with q has the property ϕ(x), i.e., ϕ(a) is
false in M , then we do it. In this way, since c will
extend q, we have a good chance, though by no
means a certitude, that c will not have the prop-
erty ϕ(x) in M [c]. Of course, things are actually
more complicated. For example, when adding c
we also add many other new sets, e.g., the binary
sequence obtained by switching zeros and ones in
c, so besides the properties of c one also needs to
keep track of all the properties these other new sets
might have in M [c]. Let us now see in some detail
how it really works.
Let us begin by viewing finite binary sequences
as approximations to the infinite sequence we want
5. THE CONTINUUM HYPOTHESIS
Figure 3: The complete binary tree P and a generic
branch.
to add, and consider the partial ordering P in M
consisting of all finite binary sequences ordered by
extension: p ≤ q if and only if q extends p. Observe
that P is a tree, that is, for every q, the set of all p
less than q is linearly ordered. We may then look
at infinite binary sequences as branches of this tree
(see Figure 3).
Let us call a property of the branches of P avoid-
able if given any p ∈ P, we can always find a q ∈ P
extending p so that every branch that extends q
does not have the property in question. For in-
stance, the property: all terms in the sequence are
zero is avoidable, while the property: there are ten
ϕ, between elements
consecutive ones in the sequence is not avoidable.
If we endow P with the order topology, that is, the
topology generated by the cones {q : p ≤ q}, it is
easy to see that if a property is avoidable, then the
set of all q such that every branch that extends q
does not have the property in question is a dense
(and open) set. Thus, every avoidable property
that is defined (with parameters) in M determines
a dense subset of P that belongs to M . Conversely,
if D is a dense subset of P in M , then the property:
none of the initial segments of the sequence belongs
to D is avoidable and definable in M with D as a
parameter. So, there is an exact correspondence
between avoidable properties that are definable in
13
M (with parameters) and dense subsets of P that
belong to M .
Now suppose that c is a branch of P that in-
tersects all dense subsets of P that belong to M ,
that is, in every such subset there is some p that
is an initial segment of c. Such a c is called
generic or Cohen over M . We can easily see that
c cannot belong to M : if it did, then the set
D = {p : p is not an initial segment of c} would
be dense, and it would belong to M ; therefore,
c would have to intersect D, which is impossible.
But c being generic over M not only guarantees
that it is not in M , but also that it will not have
any avoidable property that is definable in M with
parameters.
Are there any generic branches over M ? Yes,
because M is countable. To find one, fix an enu-
meration hDn : n ∈ Ni of all dense subsets of P
that belong to M . Then let p0 be any element of
D0 , and given pn in Dn pick pn+1 in Dn+1 such
that pn ≤ pn+1 . If we take c to be the union of all
pn , then c is generic over M .
Now let M [c] be the set of all sets that can be
constructed, using c and the elements of M as pa-
rameters, in as many steps as the ordinals of M .
For instance, if M were of the form Lα , then M [c]
would just be Lα (c). The model M [c] is called a
P-generic extension of M .
It turns out that, miraculously, M [c] is a model
of ZF C. Moreover, it has the same ordinals as M
and, therefore, it is not of the form Lγ , for any ordi-
nal γ. In particular, when we build L inside M [c],
c does not belong to it. To prove that the ZF C
axioms hold in M [c], Cohen introduces the rela-
tion p forces ϕ, written p
of P and formulas of the language of set theory
augmented with names for the elements of of the
P-generic extension. The point of using names is
that the truth or falsity in M [c] of a given formula
depends not only on the sets in M and, of course,
on c itself, but also on the sets that can be con-
structed from sets in M together with c. Since the
elements of M [c] can be constructed, using c and
the elements of M as parameters, in ≤ α steps,
where α is an ordinal in M , one defines in M , for
each ordinal α, the class of names of rank ≤ α.
The idea is that if τ is a name of rank ≤ α, then
the set in M [c] named by τ will be constructed
from τ and c in ≤ α steps and, conversely, all sets
14

in M [c] constructed in ≤ α steps can actually be α’s, pα is empty. Arguing as before, we can find
constructed from c and some name of rank ≤ α. A a sequence hcβ : β < ℵM 2 i of generic branches over
typical name is a set τ of pairs hp, σi, where p ∈ P M , one for each copy of P, which are all different.
and σ is a name of lower rank than τ . Then the But before we can conclude that in the resulting
element of M [c] named by τ , also called the inter- model M [hcβ : β < ℵM 2 i] the cardinality of R is
pretation of τ by c and denoted by ic (τ ), is just ℵM2 and therefore CH fails, there is a small point
the set of all ic (σ) such that hp, σi ∈ τ , for some that needs to be addressed. We have to make sure
initial segment p of c. To see a concrete example, that ℵ2 is preserved, i.e., when we add the sequence
let τ be the set of all pairs hp, qi, where p ∈ P and q hcβ : β < ℵM2 i to M , the ℵ2 of the expanded model
is obtained from p by switching 0’s and 1’s. Then M [hcβ : β < ℵM2 i], that is, the ordinal that in this
ic (τ ) is the set of all finite binary sequences ob- model is the second uncountable cardinal, is pre-
tained by switching the 0’s and 1’s on some initial cisely ℵM
2 . Otherwise, if CH held in M , it would
segment of c. Notice that ic (τ ) is not in M , since continue to hold in M [hcβ : β < ℵM 2 i] and our
c can be easily obtained from it. One can prove work would have been wasted. Fortunately, thanks
that, as desired, M [c] is precisely the set N of all to the topological properties of the product of ℵM 2
interpretations ic (τ ) of names τ ∈ M , although copies of P, ℵ2 is preserved, although checking this
this is by no means trivial. It follows from the fact requires, again, use of the forcing relation.
that N satisfies all ZF C axioms, and therefore so
The same kind of forcing argument allows one to
does M [c], but to prove this one needs to use the
construct models where the cardinality of R is ℵ3 ,
Forcing Theorem.
or ℵ27 , or any other cardinal of uncountable cofi-
The Forcing Theorem, proved by Cohen, asserts nality, i.e., any uncountable cardinal that is not the
that a formula ϕ, possibly with parameters, is true supremum (least upper bound) of countably many
in N , defined as the set of all interpretations ic (τ ) smaller cardinals. The cardinality of the contin-
of names τ ∈ M , if and only if there exists an uum is, therefore, undetermined by ZF C. In any
initial segment p of c that forces ϕ. More pre- case, since CH holds in Gödel’s constructible uni-
cisely, for all formulas ϕ(x1 , . . . , xn ) of the formal verse L and fails in the model constructed by Co-
language of set theory and all names τ1 , . . . , τn , hen using forcing, CH is undecidable in ZF C.
the formula ϕ(ic (τ1 ), . . . , ic (τn )) is true in N if and
We now turn to the independence of AC. Since
only if there is an initial segment p of c such that
AC holds in L, it only remains to prove the consis-
p
ϕ(τ1 , . . . , τn ). Cohen also proves the crucial
tency, relative to ZF , of the failure of AC. So, as-
Definability Theorem, which says that the forc-
suming there is a model of ZF , one needs to build
ing relation is definable in M . Thus it is possible
a model of ZF where AC fails. Since AC is equiv-
to determine what formulas are true in M [c] just
alent to the Well-Ordering Principle, it is enough
by knowing the initial segments of c, for one only
to build a model of ZF in which there is a set of
needs to check that for some initial segment p of
reals that cannot be well-ordered. This was first
c the relation p forces ϕ holds in M to conclude
done by Cohen, using forcing, in the following way:
that ϕ is true in M [c].
let P be, as before, the partial ordering of all finite
Returning to the problem of building a model binary sequences. Given a countable model M of
where CH fails, we have to add to M at least ℵM 2 ZF , force over M with the product of ℵ0 copies of
generic branches over M , where ℵM 2 is the ordi- P to obtain a model M [hcn : n ∈ Ni] where each cn
nal that in M plays the role of ℵ2 , i.e., it is the is generic over M . Let N be the smallest submodel
second uncountable cardinal (of course, ℵM 2 need of M [hcn : n ∈ Ni] that contains all the ordinals
not be the real ℵ2 , as will happen, for instance, and the un-ordered set A = {cn : n ∈ N}. Thus, N
if M is of the form Lα , α a countable ordinal in is just L(A), as built inside M [hcn : n ∈ Ni]. One
V ). Adding ℵM2 generic branches can be done by can then show that N is a model of ZF , but that
working, instead of P, with the product, as defined in N there is no well-ordering of A. The reason is
in M , of ℵM2 copies of P. The elements of this that any well-ordering of A would be definable in
product are sequences hpα : α < ℵM 2 i of finite bi- L(A) with a finite number of ordinals and finitely-
nary sequences such that for all but finitely many many elements of A as parameters, and then each
6. LARGE CARDINALS
one of the cn would be in its turn definable by
indicating its ordinal position in the well-ordering.
But since the whole sequence of cn ’s is generic over
L, no formula can distinguish one of the cn ’s from
another, unless they appear as parameters in the
formula. So, if we choose cn that does not appear
as a parameter in the definition of the well-ordering
of A, any definition of the ordinal position of cn in
the well-ordering will also be satisfied by some cm ,
m > n, and so cn and cm would have to be equal.
But they are not.
The forcing technique is much more general than
the previous examples might lead one to think. In-
deed, by forcing it is possible to add to a countable
model M not only real numbers, but almost any
other kind of set. For this, one has to design an
appropriate forcing notion in M , i.e., a partial or-
dering P in M , so that if G is a generic subset of P
over M , then the model M [G] resulting from the
addition of G to M contains the required set. In
this general setting, a generic subset of P over M is
a subset of P whose elements are compatible (they
better be, since they are the bits that will make
up the set to be added to M !) and intersects all
dense subsets of P that belong to M . As before,
the properties of the model M [G] are forced by the
elements of P, and the crucial notion is the forcing
relation p ` ϕ(τ1 , ..., τn ), where p is an element of P
and ϕ(τ1 , ..., τn ) is a formula of the language of set
theory expanded with names τ1 , ..., τn for elements
of M [G].
Immediately after Cohen’s proof of the indepen-
dence of AC from ZF and of CH from ZF C,
a result for which he got the Fields Medal in
1966, many set theorists started developing the
forcing technique in its full generality (notably
Azriel Lévy, Dana Scott, Joseph R. Shoenfield,
and Robert M. Solovay) and began to apply it to
other well-known mathematical problems. For in-
stance, Solovay [43] constructed a model of ZF in
which every set of real numbers is Lebesgue mea-
surable, thereby showing that AC is necessary for
the existence of non-measurable sets. He also con-
structed a model of ZF C where every definable
set of real numbers is Lebesgue measurable, and so
non-measurable sets, although they can be proved
to exist (see the example in 6.1 below), cannot be
explicitly given; Solovay and Stanley Tennenbaum
[41] developed the theory of iterated forcing and
15
used it to prove the consistency of Suslin’s Hypoth-
esis (see Section 10 below); Adrian R. D. Mathias
[32] proved the consistency of the infinitary form of
the Ramsey Theorem; Saharon Shelah [37] proved
the undecidability of the Whitehead Problem in
group theory; Richard Laver [28] proved the con-
sistency of the Borel Conjecture; to cite just a few
remarkable examples from the seventies.
The forcing technique now pervades all of set
theory. It continues to be a research area of
great interest, very sophisticated from the tech-
nical point of view and of great beauty. It keeps
producing important results, with applications in
most areas of mathematics (see some examples in
[5], [9], and in the references below). Especially
influential has been the development over the last
25 years of the theory of Proper Forcing, intro-
duced by Shelah ([36]). Proper forcing has been
very useful in the context of forcing iterations and
their applications to the analysis of the cardinal
characteristics of the continuum (see [2] for a sur-
vey), as well as in applications to general topology
and combinatorics (see [3] and [45]). Other impor-
tant developments have been the formulation and
study of forcing axioms like the Proper Forcing Ax-
iom (see section 10 below), the use of class forcing
for coding the universe into a single real number
(see [16]), or the invention by W. Hugh Woodin of
new powerful forcing notions associated to the the-
ory of large cardinals, like Pmax and the Stationary
Tower (see [27] and [46]).
The large number of independence results ob-
tained by forcing made explicit the insufficiency of
ZF C to answer many fundamental mathematical
questions. Thus, it became desirable to find new
axioms that, once added to ZF C, would provide a
solution to some of those questions.
6 Large cardinals
As we have already seen, the collection of all ordi-
nal numbers cannot form a set. But if it did, to it
would correspond an ordinal number, call it κ, that
would coincide with the κ-th cardinal ℵκ . More-
over, Vκ would be a model of ZF C. We cannot
prove in ZF C that there is a κ with these proper-
ties, for then we would have proved in ZF C that
ZF C has a model, which is impossible by Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem. So, why don’t we
16
add to ZF C the axiom that says that there is a
cardinal κ such that Vκ is a model of ZFC?
This axiom, with the further requirement that
κ be regular, that is, not the limit of less than κ-
many smaller cardinals, was proposed in 1930 by
Waclaw Sierpiński and Alfred Tarski, and it is the
first of the large cardinal axioms. A cardinal κ
with those properties is called inaccessible.
Other notions of large cardinals, implying inac-
cessibility, kept appearing along the 20th century.
Some of them originated in generalizations to the
uncountable of the Ramsey Theorem in its infinite
version, which says that if each (unordered) pair of
elements of ω (i.e., of natural numbers) is painted
either red or blue, then there is an infinite sub-
set X of ω such that all pairs of elements of X
have the same color. The natural generalization
of the theorem to ω1 turns out to be false. How-
ever, on the positive side, Paul Erdős and Richard
Rado ([7]) proved that for every cardinal κ > 2ℵ0 ,
if each pair of elements of κ is painted either red
or blue, then there is a subset X of κ of size ω1
such that all pairs of elements of X have the same
color. This is one of the landmark results of the
partition calculus, an important area of combina-
torial set theory developed mainly by the Hun-
garian school, led by Erdős and András Hajnal.
The problem of whether the Ramsey Theorem can
be generalized to some uncountable cardinal leads
naturally to weakly-compact cardinals: a cardinal
κ is weakly compact if it is uncountable and when-
ever all pairs of elements of κ are painted either
red or blue, there is a subset X of κ of size κ
such that all pairs of elements of X have the same
color. Weakly-compact cardinals are inaccessible
and, therefore, their existence cannot be proved
in ZF C. Moreover, it turns out that below the
first weakly-compact cardinal, assuming it exists,
there are many inaccessible cardinals, and so the
existence of a weakly-compact cardinal cannot be
proved even assuming the existence of inaccessible
cardinals.
The most important large cardinals, the mea-
surable cardinals, are much larger than the weakly-
compact, and were discovered in 1930 by Stanislaw
M. Ulam.
6.1 Measurable cardinals
Recall that a set of real numbers is Borel if it can
be obtained in countably-many steps starting from
the open intervals and applying the two operations
of taking complements and countable unions. Re-
call also that a set A of real numbers is null, or has
measure zero, if for every ε > 0 there is a sequence
S
P intervals I0 , I1 , I2 , . . . such that A ⊆ n In
of open
and n |In | < ε. A is Lebesgue measurable if it is
almost a Borel set, that is, if it differs from a Borel
set by a null set. To each measurable set A corre-
sponds a number µ(A) ∈ [0, ∞], its measure, that
is invariant under translation of A and is count-
ably additive, that is, the measure of a countable
union of measurable pairwise disjoint sets is the
sum of their measures. Moreover, the measure of
an interval is its length.
On can prove in ZF C that there exist non-
Lebesgue-measurable sets of real numbers, for ex-
ample the set discovered in 1905 by Giuseppe Vi-
tali: let A be a subset of [0, 1] that is maximal
with respect to the property that for every dis-
tinct x, y ∈ A, x − y is not rational. The ex-
istence of A is guaranteed by AC. To see that
A is not measurable, consider for each rational p,
the set Ap = {x + p : x ∈ A}. All these sets
are pairwise disjoint. Let B be the union of all
Ap , where p is a rational number of the interval
[−1, 1]. A cannot have measure zero, for then B
itself would have measure zero, and this is impos-
sible because [0, 1] ⊆ B. On the other hand, A
cannot have positive measure either, since then B
would have infinite measure, and this is impossible
because B ⊆ [−1, 2].
Trivially, all Borel sets are measurable. And in
1905 Lebesgue showed that there are measurable
sets that are not Borel. While reading Lebesgue’s
work, Mikhail Suslin noticed that Lebesgue had
made a mistake in claiming that continuous images
of Borel sets are Borel. Indeed, Suslin soon found
a counterexample, which led eventually to the dis-
covery of a new natural hierarchy of sets of reals
beyond the Borel sets, the so-called projective sets.
These are the sets that can be obtained from the
Borel sets by taking continuous images and com-
plements (see section 9 below). In 1917 Nikolai N.
Luzin showed that all continuous images of Borel
sets, the analytic sets, are also measurable. If a set
is measurable, then so is its complement, hence all
6. LARGE CARDINALS 17

complements of analytic sets, the coanalytic sets,

are also Lebesgue measurable. The natural ques- be L, that is, there are non-constructible sets, even
tion is then if the continuous images of coanalytic non-constructible real numbers. In fact, if there is
sets, the so-called Σ12 sets, are measurable. But the a measurable cardinal, then V is much larger than
answer is undecidable in ZF C. In L it turns out L. For instance, the first uncountable cardinal, ℵ1 ,
that there are Σ12 sets that are not Lebesgue mea- is an inaccessible cardinal in L.
surable, and with forcing one can construct models After the invention of forcing and the subsequent
where all Σ12 sets are measurable. avalanche of independence results, the hope arose
that axioms asserting the existence of large cardi-
The proof given above of the existence of a non- nals, like measurable cardinals, would settle some
Lebesgue measurable set of reals hinges on the of the questions that, thanks to the forcing tech-
fact that Lebesgue measure is translation invari- nique, had been proved undecidable in ZF C. It
ant. In fact, the proof shows that there cannot was shown soon, however, by Lévy and Solovay,
be any countably additive translation invariant that large cardinal axioms could not settle CH, as
measure that extends Lebesgue measure and mea- one could easily change by forcing the cardinality
sures all sets of reals. Thus, a natural question, of the continuum and make CH hold or fail with-
known as the measure problem, is whether there out destroying the large cardinals. But Solovay
can exist some countably additive measure extend- proved in 1969 that, surprisingly, if there exists a
ing Lebesgue measure and measuring all sets of measurable cardinal, then all Σ12 sets of real num-
reals. If such a measure exists, then the cardinal- bers are Lebesgue measurable. So, while the axiom
ity of the continuum cannot be ℵ1 , nor ℵ2 , nor that asserts the existence of a measurable cardinal
any ℵn with n < ω, etc. In fact, Ulam proved in cannot settle the size of the continuum, it has a
1930 that a positive solution to the measure prob- profound effect on its structure. It is indeed aston-
lem implies that the cardinality of R is extremely ishing that measurable cardinals, so far away from
large, namely, greater or equal than the least un- the sets of real numbers in the universe V , have
countable regular cardinal that is a limit of smaller such a strong influence on their basic properties.
cardinals. He also proved that the existence of a While the relationship between large cardinals and
nontrivial countably additive measure on any set the structure of the continuum is not yet fully un-
implies either a positive solution to the measure derstood, great progress has been made in the last
problem, or that there exists an uncountable car- 30 years through the work done in Descriptive Set
dinal κ with a (nontrivial) {0, 1}-valued κ-additive Theory and Determinacy, described in sections 8
measure that measures all its subsets. Such a car- and 9 below.
dinal is called measurable. If κ is measurable, then
it is weakly-compact, and therefore inaccessible. In
fact, the set of weakly-compact cardinals smaller 6.2 Even larger cardinals
than κ has measure one, and so κ is itself the κ-th
Curiously, the existence of a measurable cardinal
weakly-compact cardinal. It follows that the exis-
is equivalent to the existence of an elementary em-
tence of a measurable cardinal cannot be proved in
bedding (different from the identity) of the uni-
ZF C, even if one adds the axiom that inaccessi-
verse V into a subuniverse M that contains all the
ble, or weakly-compact, cardinals exist (unless, of
ordinals and is transitive, meaning that it contains
course, ZF C plus the existence of such cardinals
all elements of its elements. An elementary embed-
is inconsistent!). A complete clarification of the
ding is a function j : V → M that respects truth,
measure problem was finally provided by Solovay
namely, if x is a set and P is a property definable
[42] by showing that if the solution is positive, then
in the formal language of set theory, then x has
there is an inner model with a measurable cardinal.
property P in V if and only if j(x) has property
On the other hand, if there is a measurable cardi-
P in M . For instance, if κ is a cardinal, then j(κ)
nal, then one can build a forcing extension where
is a cardinal in M (see Figure 4). In particular, V
the measure problem has a positive solution.
and M satisfy the same sentences of the language
An unexpected consequence of the existence of a of set theory, and therefore all the axioms of ZF C
measurable cardinal is that the universe V cannot are true in M . The measurable cardinal corre-
18
Figure 4: The elementary embedding arising from a
measurable cardinal κ.
sponding to this embedding is the so-called critical
point of the embedding, that is, the first ordinal κ
such that j(κ) 6= κ. On the other hand, an elemen-
tary embedding can be obtained from a two-valued
κ-additive measure U on a measurable cardinal κ
by building M using a model-theoretic construc-
tion known as the κ-ultrapower of V modulo U. A
famous result of Kenneth Kunen from 1971 says
that there cannot be any non-trivial elementary
embedding of V into V . But by demanding that
M is very close to V one obtains ever stronger large
cardinal axioms. For instance, if we demand that
for each ordinal α there is an elementary embed-
ding j : V → M with critical point κ and Vα ⊆ M ,
then κ is a so-called strong cardinal. If we demand
that for every α there is an elementary embed-
ding j : V → M with critical point κ and all α-
sequences of elements of M contained in M , then
κ is what is known as a supercompact cardinal, etc.
The existence of a supercompact cardinal implies
the existence of many strong cardinals below it,
and the existence of a strong cardinal implies the
existence of many measurable cardinals below it.
For more on large cardinals, see [23].
Some of the deepest and most technically diffi-
cult work in set theory is currently devoted to the
construction and analysis of canonical inner mo-
dels for large cardinals. These are analogs of L for
large cardinals, that is, they are models built in
some canonical way that contain all the ordinals
and are transitive (i.e., they contain all elements
of their elements), and in which certain large car-
dinals exist. The larger the cardinal, the more dif-
ficult it is to build the model. This work is known
as the inner model programme (see [48]).
One of the striking consequences of the inner
model program is that the consistency strength
of virtually any set-theoretic statement ϕ can be
measured by large cardinal axioms. That is, there
are large cardinal axioms A1 and A2 such that the
consistency of ZFC plus ϕ implies that of ZFC plus
A1 and is implied by the consistency of ZFC plus
A2 . We refer to A1 as a lower bound for the con-
sistency of ϕ and A2 as an upper bound. In the
fortunate cases when the lower and upper bound
coincide, we obtain an exact measure of the con-
sistency strength of ϕ. An upper bound A2 is usu-
ally obtained by forcing over a model of ZFC plus
A2 , whereas a lower bound A1 is obtained by in-
ner model theory. In section 6.1 we saw that the
consistency strength of a positive solution to the
measure problem is exactly that of the existence
of a measurable cardinal. We shall see another im-
portant example in the next section.
Knowing upper and lower bounds for the consis-
tency strength of set-theoretic statements, or even
better, knowing their exact consistency strength,
is extremely useful for comparing them. Indeed, if
the lower bound for a sentence ϕ is greater than
the upper bound for another sentence ψ, then we
can conclude, via Gödel’s incompleteness, that ψ
does not imply ϕ.
The construction of canonical inner models for
large cardinals has now reached the level of Woodin
cardinals ([34]). Woodin cardinals lie in the large
cardinal hierarchy between strong cardinals and
supercompact cardinals. These inner models have
structural properties similar to L. For example,
they satisfy the covering property (see next sec-
tion), and Jensen’s combinatorial principle  holds
in them ([35]). The techniques developed for the
construction of the models and for the verifica-
tion of their structural properties have made pos-
sible to establish lower bounds on the consistency
strength of an astounding number of set-theoretic
statements.
7. CARDINAL ARITHMETIC 19

7 Cardinal arithmetic below κ, then it also holds on κ. That this is also

the case for singular cardinals of countable cofinal-
Beyond the Continuum Hypothesis, the behavior ity is a consequence of the Singular Cardinal Hypo-
of the exponential function 2κ for arbitrary infi- thesis (SCH), a general principle weaker than the
nite cardinals κ has been a motivating force in setGCH that completely determines singular cardinal
theory. Cantor had proved that 2κ > κ for all κ, exponentiation, relative to exponentiation for reg-
and Dénes König that the cofinality of 2κ is al- ular cardinals. A special case of SCH is: Suppose
ways greater than κ, that is, 2κ is not the limit that 2ℵn < ℵω for all finite n. Then 2ℵω = ℵω+1 .
of ≤ κ-many smaller cardinals. The GCH, which, So, in particular, if the GCH holds below ℵω , then
as we saw, holds in the constructible universe L, it must hold at ℵω . Shelah used his powerful pcf
states precisely that 2κ has the least possible value,
theory ([38]) to obtain the unexpected result that
namely, the least cardinal greater than κ, usually if 2ℵn < ℵω for all n, then 2ℵω < ℵω4 . So, if
denoted by κ+ . One might think that, as in the GCH holds below ℵω , then there is a bound (in
case of 2ℵ0 , by forcing it should be possible to build
ZF C!) on the possible values of 2ℵω . But can this
models of ZF C where 2κ takes any prescribed value actually be greater than the least possible
value, subject only to the necessary requirement one, namely ℵω+1 ? In particular, can the GCH
that its cofinality be greater than κ. This is truefirst fail at ℵω ? The answer is yes, but large cardi-
for cardinals κ that are regular, that is, not the nals are needed. Indeed, on one hand Magidor [29]
limit of less than κ smaller cardinals. Indeed, proved the consistency of the first failure of GCH
William B. Easton [8] showed that for any function at ℵω , assuming the consistency of the existence
F on the regular cardinals such that κ ≤ λ im- of a supercompact cardinal. Thus, the existence
plies F (κ) ≤ F (λ) and F (κ) has cofinality greater
of a supercompact cardinal is an upper bound for
than κ, there is a forcing extension of L in which the failure of SCH. On the other hand, using in-
2κ = F (κ), for all regular κ. So, for instance, ner model theory, Anthony J. Dodd and Ronald
one can build a model of ZF C where 2ℵ0 = ℵ7 , B. Jensen (see [6]) showed that large cardinals are
2ℵ1 = ℵ20 , 2ℵ2 = ℵ20 , 2ℵ3 = ℵ101 , etc. This shows
required for this to happen: they built a model K,
that the behavior of the exponential function for called the core model for a measurable cardinal,
infinite regular cardinals is totally undetermined which satisfies the GCH, and with the property
in ZF C, and anything possible can be attained by that either there is an inner model (of V ) with
forcing. a measurable cardinal in it, or V has the cover-
But how about non-regular cardinals? Non- ing property relative to K, which means that V is
regular cardinals are called singular. Thus, an infi-
close to K in the sense that every uncountable set
nite cardinal κ is singular if it is the supremum of
of ordinals is covered by, i.e., is a subset of, a set
less than κ-many smaller cardinals. For instance, of the same cardinality which belongs to K. Now
ℵω , being the supremum of the ℵn , n ∈ N, is the if V has the covering property relative to K, then
first singular cardinal. Determining the possible it follows that 2ℵω = ℵω+1 . And similarly with ℵω
values of the exponential function at singular car-replaced by any singular cardinal. So we can con-
dinals is a very hard problem that has generated clude: If SCH fails, then there is an inner model
much important research and involves, quite sur- with a measurable cardinal, and therefore the exis-
prisingly, the necessary use of large cardinals. tence of a measurable cardinal is a lower bound for
Using a supercompact cardinal, Matthew Fore- the consistency strength of a failure of the SCH.
man and W. Hugh Woodin [13] built a model of An exact measure of the consistency strength of
ZF C in which GCH fails everywhere, i.e., 2κ > κ+ the failure of SCH was later established by Moti
for all cardinals κ. But curiously, the value of Gitik ([17]).
the exponential function at a singular cardinal of
uncountable cofinality is somehow determined by
its values at smaller regular cardinals. Indeed, in 8 Determinacy
1975, Jack H. Silver [40] proved that if κ is singu-
lar of uncountable cofinality and 2α = α+ for all It turns out that the existence of very large car-
α < κ, then 2κ = κ+ . That is, if the GCH holds dinals, such as Woodin or supercompact, has a
20
Figure 5: A run of the infinite game associated to a set
A ⊆ [0, 1].
dramatic effect on the properties of sets of real
numbers, especially on those that can be defined
in some simple way.
The reason for this can be seen through the anal-
ysis of certain infinite two-player games with per-
fect information associated to sets of real numbers.
Given A ⊆ [0, 1], or equivalently A being a collec-
tion of binary sequences, consider the following in-
finite game associated to A: there are two players,
I and II, who alternately play some ni ∈ {0, 1}.
I plays n0 , then II plays n1 , to which I answers
by playing n2 , and so on. A run of the game is
displayed in Figure 5. At the end of the run, the
players have produced an infinite binary sequence:
n0 , n1 , n2 , . . .. Player I wins the game if the se-
quence n0 , n1 , n2 , . . . belongs to A, and II wins
otherwise.
For example, if A is the interval [0, 12 ], then
player I wins the game by starting playing 0.
Whereas if A = [0, 14 ), then player II wins the
game by playing 1 in her first move. But for most
games, the question of who wins is not decided af-
ter any finite number of moves. For instance, if A
is the set of rational points of [0, 1], then one can
easily see that player II has a strategy for winning
the game, but she will not win at any finite stage
of the run.
The game is determined if one of the two play-
ers has a winning strategy. A winning strategy
for player II is a function f that assigns 0 or 1
to each finite binary sequence in such a way that
if II plays in accordance with f by always play-
ing f (n0 , n1 , ..., n2k ) in the k-th turn, she wins the
game independently of what I plays. Similarly for
a winning strategy for I. We say that the set A is
determined if so is the game associated to A. One
might guess that every game is determined, but
actually it is quite easy, using AC, to find a game
that is not determined.
Now, the determinacy of the games associated
to certain classes of sets of reals implies that all
sets in the class have properties similar to those of
the Borel sets. Thus, the Axiom of Determinacy
(AD), which asserts that all sets of reals are deter-
mined, implies that every set of reals is Lebesgue
measurable, has the property of Baire (i.e., it dif-
fers from an open set by a set of first category), and
has the perfect set property (i.e., if uncountable,
it contains a perfect set). For instance, to show
that every set A of reals, i.e., of infinite binary se-
quences, is Lebesgue measurable it is enough to
show that if all measurable subsets of A are null,
then A itself must be null. And for this one plays,
for every  > 0, the covering game for A and .
In this game, player I plays so that the sequence
a = hn0 , n2 , n4 , . . .i is in A, and player II plays
binary codes for finite unions of rational intervals,
with measure converging to 0, while attempting to
cover a. Now, it can be shown that the assumption
that every measurable subset of A is null implies
that player I cannot have a winning strategy. So
by AD there must be a winning strategy for II.
Using this strategy one can show that the outer
measure of A is at most . And since this works
for all  > 0, A must be null.
While AD rules out the existence of badly-
behaved sets of reals, it implies the negation of
AC, and so AD is inconsistent with ZF C. How-
ever, weaker versions of AD are compatible with,
and even follow from, ZF C. Indeed, Donald A.
Martin proved in 1975 that ZF C implies that ev-
ery Borel set is determined. Moreover, if there
exists a measurable cardinal, then every analytic
set, and therefore also every co-analytic set, is de-
termined. A natural question is, therefore, if the
existence of larger cardinals implies the determi-
nacy of more complex sets, like the Σ12 sets, and
more.
The intimate connection between large cardinals
and the determinacy of simple sets of reals was
first made explicit by Leo Harrington [19], who
showed that the determinacy of all analytic sets
is in fact equivalent to a large-cardinal principle
slightly weaker than the existence of a measurable
cardinal. As we shall shortly see, large cardinals
imply the determinacy of certain simply definable
sets of reals, the so-called projective sets, while
the determinacy of those sets implies in turn the
existence of the same kind of large cardinals in
some inner models.
9. PROJECTIVE SETS AND DESCRIPTIVE SET THEORY
9 Projective sets and descriptive set tain a perfect set. However, as we already pointed
theory out, one cannot prove in ZF C that all Σ12 sets have
The study of the structure of definable sets of re-
als is the subject of descriptive set theory. Ex-
amples of such sets are the Borel sets and the
projective sets, namely, those that are obtained
from Borel sets by taking continuous images and
complements. Equivalently, those that can be ob-
tained from some closed subset of Rn , some finite
n, by taking projections and complements; hence
the name projective. Thus, every projective set is
definable from a closed subset of Rn , since comple-
ments correspond to negations and projections to
existential quantification. The analytic sets, being
the continuous images of Borel sets, are projective.
And so are the complements of the analytic sets,
the coanalytic, and the continuous images of co-
analytic sets, the Σ12 . More complex projective
sets are obtained by taking complements of Σ12
sets, the so-called Π12 sets, their continuous im-
ages, called Σ13 , etc. The projective sets form a
hierarchy of increasing complexity, in accordance
with the number of steps (always finite) that are
necessary to obtain them, starting from the Borel
sets. Many sets of reals that appear naturally in
usual mathematical practice are projective. More-
over, the results and techniques of descriptive set
theory, although originally developed for the study
of sets of reals, also apply to definable sets in any
Polish space (a separable and complete-metrizable
space), like Rn , C, separable Banach spaces, etc.,
where projective sets arise in a very natural way.
For example, in the space C[0, 1] of continuous
real-valued functions on [0, 1] with the sup norm,
the set of everywhere differentiable functions is co-
analytic, and the set of functions that satisfy the
Mean-Value Theorem is Π12 . More examples can
be found in [24]. Thus, since descriptive set the-
ory deals with rather natural sets in Polish spaces
of general mathematical interest, it is not surpris-
ing that it has found many applications in other
areas of mathematics such as: harmonic analysis,
group actions, ergodic theory, and dynamical sys-
tems (see [25], [20], and [11]).
Classical results of descriptive set theory are
that all analytic sets, hence also all coanalytic sets,
are Lebesgue measurable and have the Baire pro-
perty; and that all uncountable analytic sets con-
21
those properties, since in L there are counterex-
amples. In contrast, if there exists a measurable
cardinal, then they do have them. But what about
more complex projective sets?
The theory of projective sets is closely tied to
large cardinals. On the one hand, Solovay [43]
showed that if the existence of an inaccessible car-
dinal is consistent, then so is that every projective
set of reals is Lebesgue measurable, has the Baire
property, etc. On the other hand, Shelah showed,
quite unexpectedly, that the inaccessible cardinal
is necessary, in the sense that if all Σ13 sets are
Lebesgue measurable, then ℵ1 is an inaccessible
cardinal in L.
Nearly all the classical properties of Borel and
analytic sets are also held by the projective sets
assuming that they are determined. So, since the
determinacy of all projective sets cannot be proved
in ZF C and allows for the extension of the the-
ory of Borel and analytic sets to all projective sets
in a very elegant and satisfactory way, it consti-
tutes an excellent candidate as a new set-theoretic
axiom. This axiom is known as Projective Deter-
minacy (P D). It implies, for instance, that ev-
ery projective set is Lebesgue measurable, has the
Baire property, and has the perfect set property.
In particular, since every uncountable perfect set
has the same cardinality as R, it implies that there
is no projective counterexample to CH.
One of the most remarkable advances in set the-
ory over the last 20 years has been the proof that
P D follows from the existence of large cardinals.
Donald A. Martin and John R. Steel proved in
1988 (see [31]) that if there exist infinitely many
Woodin cardinals, then P D holds. Subsequently,
Woodin showed that, surprisingly, the hypothesis
that for each n, it is consistent that there exist
n Woodin cardinals is necessary in order to ob-
tain the consistency of P D. Thus the existence
of infinitely many Woodin cardinals is a sufficient,
and essentially necessary, assumption for extend-
ing the classical theory of Borel and analytic sets
to all projective sets of reals, and more generally
to all projective sets in Polish spaces.
In spite of the enormous success of the known
large cardinal axioms, not only in descriptive set
theory but also in many other areas of mathe-
22
matics, their status as true axioms of set theory
is still a matter of debate. This is more so in
the case of very large cardinals, like the supercom-
pact, the reason being that there is yet no inner
model theory available for them, and therefore not
even strong evidence for their consistency. How-
ever, it should be noted that, as Harvey Friedman
has shown (see [15]), large cardinals are necessary
even for proving quite simple-looking and rather
natural statements about finite functions on the
integers, which provides evidence for their essen-
tial rôle even for the most basic parts of mathe-
matics. Another shortcoming of the known large
cardinal axioms is that they cannot decide some
fundamental questions. The most conspicuous is
CH, but there are others.
10 Forcing axioms
An old and basic question about the continuum
that the known large cardinal axioms cannot solve
either is Suslin’s Hypothesis (SH). Cantor had
proved that every linearly ordered set that is dense
(i.e., any two distinct elements have another ele-
ment in-between), complete (i.e., every non-empty
subset with an upper bound has a supremum),
separable (i.e., contains a dense countable subset),
and without endpoints is order-isomorphic to the
real line. In 1920 Mikhail Y. Suslin conjectured
that if instead of being separable one assumes the
weaker countable chain condition, or ccc, that is,
every pairwise disjoint collection of open intervals
is at most countable, then it is also isomorphic to
R. The importance of SH for the development of
set theory is that it led to the discovery of a new
class of axioms, the so-called forcing axioms.
Robert M. Solovay and Stanley Tennenbaum
[41] constructed in 1967 by forcing a model where
SH holds. The idea is to destroy any counterex-
amples to SH by forcing. But by destroying coun-
terexamples new ones may be created, and so one
needs to force again and again. The iteration of
forcing is technically cumbersome and difficult to
control, for many unwanted things may happen at
the limit stages. For instance ω1 may be collapsed,
i.e., it may become countable. But fortunately, if
one starts with a model where GCH holds, uses
only forcing notions that are ccc – i.e., partial or-
derings in which every set of incompatible elements
is countable –, and takes so-called direct limits at
the limit stages, then in ω2 steps one can destroy
all counterexamples so that SH holds in the final
model. On the other hand, Jensen proved in 1968
that a counterexample to SH exists in L, thereby
proving the undecidability of SH in ZF C. In fact,
Jensen showed that one can build a counterexam-
ple to SH using the ♦ principle.
From the construction of Solovay and Tennen-
baum, Martin isolated a new principle now known
as Martin’s axiom (M A) that is a generalization
of the well-known Baire category theorem, which
states that in every compact Hausdorff topologi-
cal space, the intersection of countably-many open
dense sets is not empty. M A says the following:
In every compact Hausdorff ccc topological space,
the intersection of ℵ1 -many open dense sets is not
empty.
The condition that the space be ccc (i.e., every
collection of pairwise disjoint open sets is count-
able) is necessary, for without it the statement is
false. It is easy to see that M A implies the nega-
tion of CH, for if there are only ℵ1 real numbers,
then the intersection of the ℵ1 -many dense open
sets R \ {r}, r a real number, is empty. However,
M A does not decide the cardinality of R, for since
there is no restriction on how long the Solovay and
Tennenbaum iteration can be, and since new re-
als are always added along the iteration and all
the cardinals are preserved, one can obtain models
of M A with the size of the continuum as large as
wanted, although it will always be a regular cardi-
nal. M A has been used with great success to solve
many questions that are undecidable in ZF C. For
example, it implies SH and that every Σ12 set is
Lebesgue measurable (see [14] for many more con-
sequences and applications). But is M A really an
axiom? In what sense, if any, is it a natural, or at
least plausible, assumption about sets? Does the
fact that it decides many ZF C undecidable ques-
tions suffice for it being accepted on a par with the
ZF C axioms, or the axioms of large cardinals? We
shall come back to this.
M A has many different equivalent formulations.
Martin’s original one is the following:
For every ccc partial ordering P and every family
{Dα : α < ω1 } of dense subsets of P, there is G ⊆
P whose elements are pairwise compatible and such
that G ∩ Dα 6= ∅, for all α < ω1 .
11. GENERIC ABSOLUTENESS 23

Thus, M A is just saying that for forcing notions which have been used with great success by Stevo
P that are ccc there exist generic subsets G of P Todorčević to solve many outstanding problems in
over models M of size ℵ1 . (Recall from section 5.2 general topology (e.g., the S space problem) and
that for every P there are always generic subsets infinite combinatorics (see [45]; also [3] and [10]).
G of P over countable models.) This explains why As we already pointed out, forcing axioms are,
M A is referred to as a forcing axiom. apparently, not as intuitively evident as the ZF C
Stronger forcing axioms can be obtained from axioms, or even the axioms of large cardinals, and
this last formulation of M A by expanding the class so the question is to what extent they should be
of partial orderings to which it applies. Unfortu- considered as true axioms of set theory rather
nately, we cannot allow all partial orderings, for than just useful principles for showing that certain
if P is the partial ordering of all functions with statements are consistent with ZF C. In the case
domain a finite subset of ω and values in ω1 , the of M A and some weaker forms of P F A and M M ,
existence of a pairwise compatible G intersecting some justification for their being taken as true ax-
all the dense sets Dα = {f ∈ P : α ∈ range(f ioms is based on the fact that they are equivalent
S)}, to principles of generic absoluteness. That is, they
α < ω1 , would make ω1 countable. Indeed, G
would be a function from ω onto ω1 . So, in order assert, under certain restrictions which are neces-
to obtain useful stronger forms of M A one needs sary to avoid inconsistency, that everything which
to relax the ccc requirement while keeping the ax- might exist, does exist. More precisely, if some set
iom consistent. An important such strengthening having certain properties could be forced to ex-
of M A is the Proper Forcing Axiom (P F A), which ist over V , then a set having the same properties
is formulated for partial orderings that are proper. already exists (in V ). So, like the axioms of large
Properness is a property weaker than the ccc that cardinals, they are maximality principles, i.e., they
was discovered by Shelah and is particularly use- attempt to make V as large as possible.
ful when working with complicated forcing itera-
tions. Indeed, proper forcing notions can be iter-
ated without collapsing ω1 , although unlike the ccc 11 Generic absoluteness
forcing iterations, one needs to take so-called in-
Given a set X, its transitive closure is the set
verse limits at limit stages of countable cofinality.
whose elements are X, the elements of X, the el-
The strongest possible forcing axiom of this type
ements of elements of X, etc. For an infinite car-
was discovered by Matthew Foreman, Menachem
dinal κ, let H(κ) be the set of all sets whose tran-
Magidor, and Saharon Shelah in 1988 ([12]). It is
sitive closure has cardinality less than κ. Thus,
called Martin’s Maximum (M M ) and is consistent
H(ω) = Vω , and H(ω1 ) is the set of all count-
with ZF C assuming the consistency of a super-
able sets whose elements, the elements of its ele-
compact cardinal. M M is formulated as above
ments, etc. are also countable. We always have
but for partial orderings that have a property
H(κ) ⊆ Vκ , but not the converse, as, for instance,
even weaker than properness called stationary-set
Vω1 is not contained in H(ω1 ). If κ is inaccessible,
preservation.
then H(κ) = Vκ . The sets H(κ) also form a cumu-
Both M M and P F A have striking conse- lative hierarchy, similar to the Vκ , and the union
quences. For example, P F A, and therefore also of all the H(κ) is V .
M M , implies the axiom of projective determinacy Forcing is normally used to construct exten-
P D, the singular cardinal hypothesis SCH, and sions of countable models of ZF C. Each extension
that the cardinality of R is ℵ2 . (See [3] and [12] depends on a partial ordering P, which is, typi-
for more consequences of P F A and M M , respec- cally, the partial ordering of approximations to the
tively.) generic set one wants to add. But it is also pos-
An advantage of forcing axioms is that they are sible to consider forcing extensions of V . Clearly,
readily applicable without having to go into the these extensions are ideal – i.e., they do not exist
details of forcing. A very good example of this is – since all sets are in V . But given a partial or-
P F A and some combinatorial principles derived dering P, one can define the Boolean-valued model
from it, like the Open Coloring Axiom (OCA), V P , which contains names for all the elements of
24
the ideal forcing extension, and is better thought of
as the universe that would be obtained by forcing
with P over V , if that were possible.
There is always a certain degree of generic ab-
soluteness between V P and V . For instance, by
the so-called Levy-Shoenfield absoluteness theo-
rem, given an existential statement about sets in
H(ω1 ), if it holds in V P , for some P, then it also
holds in V , i.e., it is true. That is, if a set X with
certain properties that depend exclusively on sets
in its transitive closure and sets in H(ω1 ) could be
forced to exist, then such a set X already exists.
Let us write this in a concise form as: For every
partial ordering P,
H(ω1 ) ≺∃ V P .
This kind of generic absoluteness for H(ω1 ) is very
useful, especially in descriptive set theory, since the
projective sets of real numbers are precisely those
that are definable in H(ω1 ) with parameters. But
consider now the natural generalization to H(ω2 ),
namely: Every existential statement about sets in
H(ω2 ) that holds in V P , for some P, is true. i.e.,
for every partial ordering P,
H(ω2 ) ≺∃ V P .
Unfortunately, this generalization is inconsistent
with ZF C, unless we restrict the kind of forcing
extensions. But as it turns out, M A is equiva-
lent to H(ω2 ) ≺∃ V P for all ccc P. This char-
acterization of M A in terms of generic absolute-
ness provides some justification for regarding M A
as a true axiom of set theory. The same ap-
plies to the corresponding axioms for forcing ex-
tensions with proper partial orderings and par-
tial orderings that are stationary-set preserving:
the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom (BP F A) is
H(ω2 ) ≺∃ V P for all P proper, and the Bounded
Martin’s Maximum (BM M ) is H(ω2 ) ≺∃ V P for
all P stationary-set preserving. Both BP F A and
BM M , although weaker than P F A and M M , re-
spectively, are strong enough to decide many ques-
tions that the large cardinal axioms are unable
to settle. Indeed, as a culmination of a series
of results by Woodin and David Asperó, in 2002
Todorčević [44] proved that BM M implies that
the cardinality of R is ℵ2 . And recently, Justin T.
Moore [33] has shown that BP F A also implies it.
12 Some recent advances
To finish, let us briefly mention some recent deep
results which establish strong underlying connec-
tions between large cardinals, inner models, deter-
minacy, forcing axioms, generic absoluteness, and
the continuum. Those results hold under the as-
sumption that for every ordinal α there exists a
Woodin cardinal greater than α.
The first result, due to Shelah and Woodin [39]
is that the theory of L(R) is generically absolute.
That is, all sentences with real numbers as pa-
rameters that would hold in the L(R) of any ideal
generic extension V P of V , are already true in the
real L(R). This kind of generic absoluteness is suf-
ficient for showing that all sets of reals in L(R),
and in particular the projective sets, are Lebesgue
measurable, have the Baire property, etc. Fur-
thermore, by refining the Martin-Steel result ([31])
that large cardinals imply P D, Woodin showed
that in L(R) every set of reals is determined.
Another result of Woodin ([46]) is that there is
an axiom, called (∗), which can be viewed as a gen-
eralization of BM M in the context of large cardi-
nals, and is intended to play the role for H(ω2 )
that P D plays for H(ω1 ), in the sense that it de-
cides ‘practically all’ questions about H(ω2 ). Of
course, no consistent axiom can decide ‘all’ ques-
tions about H(ω2 ), since by Gödel’s incomplete-
ness there will always be undecidable arithmetical
statements. So, to formulate precisely the notion
of deciding practically all questions about H(ω2 ),
Woodin introduces a new logic, called Ω-logic (see
[1] and [46]), which strengthens ordinary first-order
logic. A main feature of Ω-logic is that the valid
statements in Ω-logic are generically absolute. Un-
der suitable large cardinal hypotheses, (∗) is con-
sistent in Ω-logic and decides in Ω-logic the theory
of H(ω2 ). The most important open problem is
the Ω-conjecture, whose formulation is quite tech-
nical and beyond the scope of this article. If the
Ω-conjecture is true, then any axiom compatible
with the existence of large cardinals that decides
all questions about H(ω2 ) in Ω-logic must imply
the negation of CH. Thus, the theories: ZF C
plus CH, and ZF C plus the negation of CH are
not equally reasonable from the point of view of
Ω-logic, for in the presence of large cardinals, CH
puts an unnecessary limitation on the possibility
of settling all natural questions about H(ω2 ).
13. FINAL REMARKS
13 Final remarks 3.
In this short outline of set theory, we have re-
viewed some of the key developments since its be-
ginnings in the late 19th century. What started 4.
in the hands of Cantor as a mathematical theory
of transfinite numbers has developed to become 5.
a general theory of infinite sets and a foundation
of mathematics. The fact that it has been pos-
sible to unify all classical mathematics into one 6.
single theoretical framework, the ZF C axiom sys-
tem, is certainly remarkable. But beyond this, and
most importantly, the techniques developed by set 7.
theory, such as constructibility, forcing, infinite
combinatorics, the theory of large cardinals, de-
terminacy, the descriptive theory of definable sets 8.
in Polish spaces, etc., have turned it into a dis-
cipline of great depth and beauty, with fascinat-
9.
ing results that stimulate and challenge our imag-
ination, and with numerous applications in areas
such as algebra, topology, real and complex anal-
ysis, functional analysis, and measure theory. In 10.
the twenty-first century, the ideas and techniques
generated within set theory will surely continue to
contribute to the solution of outstanding mathe- 11.
matical problems, old as well as new, and will help
mathematicians gain an ever deeper insight into
the complexities and vastness of the mathematical
universe.
12.
14 Acknowledgements
Thanks to David Asperó, Roger Bosch, Matt Fore-
man, Sy D. Friedman, and Ignasi Jané for read- 13.
ing early versions of the article and making valu-
able suggestions for improvement. I am especially
grateful to Timothy Gowers and Imre Leader, edi- 14.
tors of The Princeton Companion to Mathematics,
for their invitation to contribute to the Volume and
for their excellent work at editing the article. 15.
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