History, Theory and Practice

of Philosophy for Children

This book on Philosophy for Children (P4C) is a compilation of articles written by its
founders and the movement’s leaders worldwide. These articles have been prepared in the
dialogue and interview format. Part I explains the genesis of the movement and its philo-
sophical and theoretical foundations. Part II examines the specialized uses of philosophical
dialogues in teaching philosophy, morality, ethics and sciences. Part III examines theoreti-
cal concerns, such as the aims of the method with regard to the search for truth or sense
of meaning, or the debate over novels and short stories and their characteristics. Part IV
explains the practices of P4C worldwide and the issue of cultural differences, the ways of
the community of inquiry and the necessary adaptation to suit local concerns. The book
concludes with a notable review of the progress of P4C, the obstacles, and its international
spread to over 60 countries. These penetrating insights make the book an incredibly rich
resource for anyone interested or involved in implementing a P4C programme.
Chapters include:

• Brave old subject, brave new world

• Teaching science and morality via P4C
• Showing children can do philosophy

Saeed Naji is an Iranian scholar, trained in physics and philosophy of science, and is a faculty
member at the Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies (IHCS) in Tehran and a spe-
cialist in Philosophy for Children. He and various colleagues introduced P4C in Iran around
the turn of the century, and he founded the Philosophy for Children Research Department
(FABAK) at IHCS, with the goal of producing an appropriate version of the program for the
Iranian people, as well as organizing academic activities in this area. Dr. Naji, founder of the
Philosophy for Children (P4C) movement in Iran, trains teachers and school administrators in
P4C, provides workshops for students in schools, university students and professors, and has
co-founded a peer review journal, Thinking and Children, under the aegis of FABAK. He has
written nine books in Persian about P4C. Naji’s Iranian P4C website is: www.p4c.ir.

Rosnani Hashim is Professor of Social Foundations of Education at the Faculty of Education,

International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). She founded the Centre for Philosophi-
cal Inquiry in Education in 2006, which has now been renamed The Centre for Teaching
Thinking. The Centre actively promotes the Wisdom (Hikmah) Pedagogy, which is a version
of the P4C Program in Malaysia. She has translated Lipman’s Pixie and Elfie and authored
three P4C storybooks and a monograph for teachers on using the Hikmah Pedagogy. Her
other works include Educational Dualism in Malaysia (1996), Teaching Thinking in Malaysia
(2003) and Reclaiming the Conversation: Islamic Intellectual Tradition in the Malay Archi-
pelago (2010). She is presently the chief editor of the IIUM Journal of Educational Studies.
Routledge Research in Education
For a full list of titles in this series, please visit www.routledge.com

183 Teacher Educators’ Professional Learning in Communities

Linor L. Hadar and David L. Brody

184 Spirituality, Community, and Race Consciousness

in Adult Higher Education
Breaking the Cycle of Racialization
Timothy Paul Westbrook

185 Multiracial Identity in Children’s Literature

Amina Chaudhri

186 Transnationalism, Education and Empowerment

The Latent Legacies of Empire
Niranjan Casinader

187 Reflective Practice

Voices from the Field
Edited by Roger Barnard and Jonathon Ryan

188 Citizenship Education in America

A Historical Perspective
Iftikhar Ahmad

189 Transformative Learning and Teaching in Physical Education

Edited by Malcolm Thorburn

190 Teaching young learners in a superdiverse world

Multimodal Approaches and Perspectives
Edited by Heather Lotherington & Cheryl Paige

191 History, Theory and Practice of Philosophy for Children

International Perspectives
Edited by Saeed Naji and Rosnani Hashim
History, Theory and Practice
of Philosophy for Children
International Perspectives

Edited by Saeed Naji

and Rosnani Hashim
First published 2017
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
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© 2017 selection and editorial matter, Saeed Naji and Rosnani Hashim;
individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Saeed Naji and Rosnani Hashim to be identified as the authors
of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters,
has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
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Contents

Prefaceviii
Introductionxi
Names of contributors and affiliationsxvi
List of figuresxxii
List of tablesxxiii

PART I
Historical, philosophical and theoretical roots1

  1 The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy

for Children (IAPC) program 3
MATTHEW LIPMAN

  2 Brave old subject, brave new world 12

MATTHEW LIPMAN

  3 Philosophical novel 18
ANN MARGARET SHARP

  4 Philosophy in the school curriculum 30

ANN MARGARET SHARP

  5 P4C and rationality in the new world 43

MATTHEW LIPMAN AND ANN MARGARET SHARP

  6 Doing philosophy with children rejects Piaget’s assumptions 53

GARETH B. MATTHEWS

  7 The difference between P4C and PwC 56

ROGER SUTCLIFFE
vi  Contents
PART II
Specialized uses of philosophical dialogues65

  8 Teaching science and morality via P4C 67

TIM SPROD

  9 A new approach in teaching philosophy and ethics in schools 72

STEPHAN MILLETT

10 P4C and picturebooks 81

KARIN SASKIA MURRIS

PART III
Theoretical concerns of philosophy for children87

11 Showing that children can do philosophy 89

MICHEL SASSEVILLE

12 Reasonableness instead of rationality 102

CLINTON GOLDING

13 Necessity of truth in the community of inquiry 107

SUSAN GARDNER

14 P4C stories: different approaches and similar applications? 118

PHILIP CAM

15 The contribution of philosophy to the P4C movement 129

DAVID KENNEDY

PART IV
The practice of philosophy for children worldwide141

16 P4C in Denmark 143

PER JESPERSEN

17 The cultural elements in the Norwegian approach to

philosophy for children 150
ØYVIND OLSHOLT
 Contents vii
18 Philosophy in schools: an Australian perspective 157
GILBERT BURGH

19 Teaching philosophy and ethics in Japan 167

TETSUYA KONO

20 P4C in the context of Muslim education 170

ROSNANI HASHIM

21 Islamic tradition and creative dialogue 180

ROBERT FISHER

22 Philosophical games for children and thinking skills 188

LARISA RETYUNSKIKH

23 Philosophy of childhood from a Latin American perspective 199

WALTER KOHAN

PART V
Conclusion205

24 Philosophy for children: where are we now? 207

MAUGHN GREGORY

25 Postscript 222
SAEED NAJI

Index228
Preface

Both of us live in different countries and have different sociocultural experiences,

although we profess the same faith. However, our experiences had led both of
us to separately discover the program called Philosophy for Children (P4C) and
caused our paths to cross. Naji experienced the Iranian revolution in 1978 and
the Iraq-Iran war in 1980 when he was in elementary school and he was dis-
turbed by the social and moral problems among the youths in his country when
he was in high school. He realized that the school was not offering life lessons
for the students to apply for their survival. It became more annoying when he
studied philosophy of science in an industrial university, as his colleagues were
concerned only with science and technology and could not have cared less about
the human and social sciences. How he wished to communicate and talk to his
classmates on issues raised by our lives in the modern age. It was during this
period, while searching for such books in various fields, that he was introduced
to Philosophy for Children by Professor Dell Cannon. This drew him to the
IAPC website of Montclair State University, and he noticed that the Philosophy
for Children Program (P4C) was what he had been looking for. He thought
that this was the way for him to talk to children in order to help them to protect
themselves from the moral and human problems that harm them and also to have
a purposeful life.
Hashim grew up in a society experiencing modernization and all its costs,
such as family disintegration and moral crises among the youth. Being a school
teacher, she realized that the school’s concern was how to ensure that their stu-
dents excel in standardized national examinations, even if it meant lots and lots
of drilling at the expense of the other goods – moral, spiritual, emotional and
aesthetics. Even Islamic religious education was taught in preparation for exami-
nation rather than for the good life. There was no effort at teaching for wisdom
and good thinking. Edward de Bono’s CORT program was beginning to be
introduced and implemented in the MARA Junior Science College, a system of
elite schools in Malaysia. But Hashim was looking for a method that has been
proven to be successful in helping people to think naturally rather than techni-
cally. She was concerned that Muslims read the Qurán, which calls for think-
ing, and yet they could not solve their problems. She did some research on the
various pedagogies that could help develop the critical mind and found from
 Preface ix
her experience and knowledge of Muslim philosophers that philosophy holds
promise because it means love for wisdom, for truth. She realized that one of
the factors behind the scientific advances achieved by the early Muslim civiliza-
tion was their spirit of critical inquiry. So, she sought a pedagogy that is based
on philosophy, and it was this search that led her to become acquainted with
Philosophy for Children and to journey to Mendham, New Jersey, to study with
its founders and leaders.
Both of us felt that this program has great compatibility with our tradition and
culture. Islam’s holy book, the Qur’an, has invited man to think and reflect much
more than other religions and other isms. According to the Qur’an, everyone is
responsible for his own life. According to a Prophetic Tradition (Hadith), “one
hour of thinking [reflecting]” is better than seventy years of praying.” Therefore,
children should be able to make great and influential decisions at this age to
properly build their lives. Proper judgment, including critical, creative and car-
ing thinking, is among the main goals of training in this tradition. Listening to
speeches or reading texts, as well as analyzing and evaluating them and then fol-
lowing the best of them, is what can lead to wisdom and guidance. Paying atten-
tion to the world of nature – humans, other creatures of the universe in the plant,
animal and mineral kingdom and respecting them – has been highly regarded.
This allows for caring thinking to reach its climax.
Both the editors then tried in their own ways to introduce P4C in their respec-
tive countries, Iran and Malaysia. Naji began a series of interviews with the found-
ers and leaders of P4C. Some of these interviews were published in the IAPC
websites. Many, especially those new to P4C, including Hashim, found that his
interviews were very useful in helping to understand P4C theories and methods
in addition to reading Lipmann and Sharp’s works. Hashim began attempts to
integrate P4C within Muslim education in Malaysia, first using IAPC texts and
manuals. Later, after the experiences with primary students, she began writing
her own texts. It was this direction of her work that brought Naji into contact
with her. Their mutual acquaintance and interest in reviving philosophical inquiry
into the Muslim civilization, which has undergone many close encounters with
the West and the failure of both to understand each other, leading to many major
world crises, make this work the more urgent in an attempt to make the world
a better place for future generations. This is more so when Naji realized that his
interviews also drew interest from many other P4C leaders in other continents,
such as Latin America and the Scandinavian countries. This means that this work
can reach out to all civilizations and thus can together be useful in the democratic
process of mutual respect and meaningful deliberation in negotiations for the
benefit of all.
We are confident that the P4C Program will be developed and grow increas-
ingly in our countries, especially in Iran, which has a stronger tradition of phi-
losophy, and also throughout Western civilization.
Before we end, we would like to thank all our contributors, five of whom have
departed from this world, for their cooperation and consideration, despite the
short notice. We extend our gratitude to the publishers of Thinking: The Journal
x  Preface
of Philosophy for Children for the permission to reprint Naji, S. and ­Lipman, M.
(2005). An Interview with Matthew Lipman, 17(4), pp. 23–29; and C ­ hildhood &
Philosophy for the permission to reprint Saeed Naji (2013). Recent interviews with
philosophy for children (P4C) scholars and practitioners, 8 (17), pp. 153–170.
We also wish to thank our editors with Routledge Singapore, Christina and
ShengBin, for being very patient in answering all our queries and for encour-
aging us as well. Last but not least, we dedicate this work to Matthew Lipman
and Ann Margaret Sharp, the respective founder and co-founder of P4C, who
responsibly answered Saeed’s weekly questions and criticisms, which led to this
series of interviews.
Saeed Naji, Tehran
Rosnani Hashim, Kuala Lumpur
February 2017
Introduction

In November 2010, I flew to Iran to attend the World Philosophy Day I­ nternational

Conference, which had the theme Philosophy: Theory and Practice. I have to admit
that, while I knew a little about Iran, I had no idea of the status of Philosophy for
Children in that country.
To my surprise, the conference section that focused on Philosophy for Children
(P4C) was held in a large lecture theater, which was often filled to overflowing.
I soon discovered that there was a real hunger in Iran for transforming educa-
tion from being memory-based to being thinking-based, and P4C was seen by
many as an important educational approach. Indeed, the Institute for Humanities
and Cultural Studies had set up a special Philosophy for Children Department
(FABAK) in 2007. Saeed Naji, co-editor of this volume, was one of the founding
members. Thus, I found out that Iran gave more official support to P4C than
Australia did.
When Saeed subsequently asked me to do an interview, to be translated into
Farsi/Persian and circulated in Iran, I was delighted to oblige. That interview
joined many others in the three volumes of Interviews with Leaders of P4C
throughout the World, published in Iran and (in English versions) posted by
FABAK on the Internet. Now many of those interviews have been gathered
together to form the present book.
If this short history makes the reader think that the book will be of interest only
to those involved in P4C in Iran, then they will be sadly misinformed. Practition-
ers and theorists of P4C from all around the world, as well as those who are new
to P4C, will find a great deal to interest them in this wide-ranging collection. The
21 interviewees come from 12 different countries, on six continents – a global
coverage that is (unfortunately) rare in books about P4C. As I shall explore in
more detail below, this diversity guarantees that readers will have access to many
divergent thoughts and practices – yet it is a diversity that also contains many
interesting intersections and similarities.
Of course, many more than 21 people would qualify as leaders of the various
philosophy in schools programs, which have been implemented in many more
than 12 countries. A book that sought to cover all this variety not only would
be unwieldy, but also would take an enormous amount of effort to assemble.
Indeed, thinking about this effort highlights the fact that Saeed Naji, Rosnani
xii  Introduction
Hashim and their collaborators, Samira Pezeshkpour and Maryam Safaae, have
themselves expended a good deal of energy to carry out and collate the interviews
you have in your hands. For that, we can all be thankful.
So what is Philosophy for Children, and why is it valuable? While many readers
will already have been in contact with P4C (or a similar approach under another
name), others will have only recently heard of it. All these approaches (and I am
lazily using ‘P4C’ to cover them all) have at core some method for raising and
discussing philosophical ideas with youngsters. As this methodology – and the
many possible variations – are discussed in detail by a good number of the inter-
viewees, I shall not say more here. I will, however, try to draw together many of
the reasons that so many teachers find it valuable.
On the surface, we might see the value in exposing youngsters to one of the
great academic traditions – one that is mysteriously absent from many educa-
tion systems. Looking a little more, we can see philosophical inquiry as a tool
for improving critical thinking. Both of these are important, but the value of P4C
is much wider than that. It is, at heart, a method for transforming education –
moving away from the sterile argument between teacher-centered and child-centered
education towards a centering on inquiry. In P4C, teachers are re-empowered and
youngsters are given a voice – as well as access to the voices of their peers (some-
thing they often comment on when asked about the value of P4C). In listening
to and learning from each other – students and teachers alike – all are engaged
in a democratic process, utilizing (and improving) the soft skills involved in the
other aspects of thinking – creative, caring, contextual, collaborative, emotional
and so on. As youngsters draw upon – and reflect upon – their own experiences
in, and approaches to, life, the classroom becomes more inclusive of difference,
be it learning styles, gender or culture. In transforming education in this way, we
believe that – gradually – we can transform society.
A brief note about the form of the book. The interviews you read were origi-
nally conducted via email, giving each interviewee the chance to consider and
craft their answers at their leisure. Subsequently, those still active were invited to
edit their contributions specifically for this volume. The intention was to allow the
interviewees to reflect on both their own understanding of the practice of P4C
and the theoretical underpinnings for that practice, often taking into account the
history of their involvement with the movement. You will be reading directly the
considered thoughts of the contributors.
The richness of the contributions here makes the task of summarizing their con-
tents difficult. Many cover a good deal of ground. In what follows, I try to pick
out the main themes. The reader, however, will find that many interviews contain
fascinating thoughts and reflections on matters not obviously related to their titles.
We can be especially thankful that the founders of P4C – Matthew Lipman and
Ann Margaret Sharp (both of whom, sadly, have since passed away) – are so well
represented. Indeed, Lipman (chapters 1 and 2) and Sharp (chapters 3 and 4)
have each been interviewed twice separately, and once together (chapter 5). These
chapters range widely. The reader will learn a good deal about the history of P4C,
the philosophical and theoretical roots of the program, practical considerations
 Introduction xiii
in writing texts and manuals, invaluable advice for teachers implementing the pro-
gram and much more. Gareth Matthews, another of the now deceased A ­ merican
pioneers of philosophy in schools, explores the psychological underpinnings of
the movement in a short but incisive interview (chapter 6). Taken together, this
material is so rich that I am tempted to say that these chapters ought to be com-
pulsory reading for those new to P4C. Much misunderstanding – and much shal-
low criticism – of P4C could be avoided in that way.
Both Lipman and Sharp have directly addressed the question of the core attrib-
utes of their founding version of P4C, and its boundaries with other ways to
approach philosophy in schools. In chapter 7, Roger Sutcliffe tackles this ques-
tion head on. In doing so, he identifies the factor that he finds common to these
various approaches: they all use a version of the community of inquiry. Many
of the other contributors to this volume also touch on the question of the key
features that make philosophy in schools (whether or not in the P4C tradition)
effective and worthwhile pursuing. As one might expect, they do not all agree on
the essential features, nor on the ways in which other approaches are differenti-
ated. There is much food for thought here.
The next three chapters deal with more specialized uses of philosophical dia-
logue. My own interview (chapter 8) looks at how specific sectors of the school –
early childhood, science and ethics – can be enhanced by the community of inquiry.
Stephan Millet (chapter 9) introduces materials that he and Alan Tapper wrote for
use in senior secondary philosophy and ethics education. Millet discusses some of
the interesting differences – but also similarities – in the approach they have chosen
in the context of teaching older students, as opposed to P4C for younger children.
He also addresses the important problem of how to assist teachers who lack a
formal philosophy background. Karin Murris (chapter 10) is mainly concerned
with the other end of the school experience: using picturebooks in early childhood
education (though, as she points out, such books can be used with all age groups).
Murris explains what features to look for in picking suitable picturebooks and dis-
cusses some of the differences between her theoretical bases and Lipman’s.
There are five chapters that make theory a central concern. In Michel Sas-
seville’s (chapter 11) wide-ranging interview, we find a good deal of practical
advice for teachers carefully embedded in its theoretical setting. Moreover, we
learn a good deal about P4C in Quebec, Canada, and the steps his team have
taken to both publicize and spread P4C. It is interesting to consider Clinton
Golding’s (chapter 12) and Susan Gardner’s (chapter 13) contributions side by
side. Both are concerned with the goals of the community of inquiry, and – on
the surface – it might appear that they are arguing for incompatible conclusions.
After all, Golding says that making sense within a given context is the goal, not
truth, while Gardner, following on from her highly influential paper “Inquiry is
no Mere Conversation,” argues for the necessity of seeking the truth. However,
both views are much more nuanced than this bald statement might indicate.
Close reading of these chapters is necessary to work out whether they are at odds,
or merely saying similar things in different ways. I will leave it to the reader to
make up their own mind.
xiv  Introduction
Perhaps the most extensive interviews in this collection are those with Philip
Cam (chapter 14) and David Kennedy (chapter 15). As two of the leading theo-
rists in the P4C movement, their thoughts and ideas can help us to draw together
all we have read in this book. While Cam’s interview has a nominal focus on sto-
ries and Kennedy’s on applied philosophy, they each range widely over the field,
touching on many matters that have arisen in other interviews.
Several interviewees focus on how philosophy in schools has been imple-
mented in their own country. They discuss not only the cultural differences and
the adaptation of P4C to the local culture but also some theoretical aspects. Per
Jespersen (chapter 16) outlines his independent development of a school phi-
losophy program in Denmark, subsequently influenced by Lipman’s Philosophy
In The Classroom – which, as Jespersen indicates, also strongly affected Sweden
and Norway. He has some interesting comments to make on the effects of cul-
ture on the details of how philosophy can be done in schools. Øyvind Olsholt
(chapter 17), in discussing P4C in Norway, warns us against assuming either that
there are sharp differences between cultures, or that the approach to P4C of all
those within a given culture is uniform. Nevertheless, he gives interesting exam-
ples of Norwegian cultural traits and how they affect philosophical discussions in
classrooms there.
Gilbert Burgh (chapter 18) also addresses the issue of P4C and culture in his
survey of the Australian experience. Here, it is the educational culture that seems
to have had the most effect on modifying P4C, leading to a proliferation of new
materials, some of which Burgh surveys. Tetsuya Kono (chapter 19) reflects on
the specific constraints placed on P4C in Japan by factors both cultural and hav-
ing to do with the organizational structures of education. These mean that the
emphasis in Japan is firmly on philosophy through ethics. Kono has some very
interesting thoughts on the relationship between the community of inquiry and
the debate format, in the context of trying to change an educational paradigm
from the recitation of facts to the reflective.
Rosnani Hashim (chapter 20) considers the place of P4C in the context of
Muslim Education. She emphasizes the importance of critical thinking in the
Islamic tradition and explains how P4C can help to revive Islamic philosophical
inquiry in the contemporary situation. She asserts the compatibility of P4C with
the Islamic tradition through, for example, the dialogical flavor of P4C and the
halaqa (study circle) and describes some of the achievements and problems in
implementing P4C in Malaysia. Robert Fisher (chapter 21) also discusses the
relation between Islamic traditions and P4C, before moving on to exploring
practical matters about the running of what he labels creative dialogues. Larisa
Retyunskikh (chapter 22), too, is concerned with practical matters: the use of
philosophical games as a way into dialogue. Along the way, we learn about both
the similarities and differences between this approach and Lipman’s, and the his-
tory of P4C in Russia. Walter Kohan (chapter 23) surveys the implementation of
P4C in Brazil as well as other Central and South American countries, emphasiz-
ing the role of philosophy in decolonization, before moving on to a fascinating
theoretical discussion of the nature of childhood.
 Introduction xv
It is apt to conclude the book with an especially notable review by Maughn
Gregory in chapter 24. His survey of the progress of P4C – and the obstacles in
its way – makes for essential reading for those trying to implement a program of
philosophy in schools. Gregory discusses the international spread of P4C, and
programs that are either derived from it, or have developed in parallel, to over
60 countries.
Taken as a whole, then, this collection of interviews is an incredibly rich
resource for anyone involved in, or interested in learning more about, the philos-
ophy for children/philosophy in schools movement. Like all such collections, it
can be dipped into at random. Yet perhaps readers should be encouraged to read
it all. Its ambitious reach – geographically, practically and intellectually – makes it
by far the best source I know of for gaining a deep and broad grasp of perhaps the
most important and sorely needed educational reconstruction in the world today.
Tim Sprod
Names of contributors
and affiliations

Gilbert Burgh is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of ­Queensland,

where he teaches Environmental Philosophy, Philosophy and Education,
and Political Philosophy. Gilbert is active in the promotion of philosophy in
schools and philosophy as active engagement in public affairs. His research
concentration is in educational philosophy (defined as the use of philosophy
for obtaining educational objectives), with a focus on pedagogical reform
and democratic education. He is co-author of Values Education in Schools:
A Resource Book for Student Inquiry (Australian Council for Educational
Research, 2008), Ethics and the Community of Inquiry: Education for Deliber-
ative Democracy (Thomson, 2006), and Engaging with Ethics: Ethical Inquiry
for Teachers (Social Science Press, 2000), and has published widely on collabo-
rative philosophical inquiry as pedagogy, the development of a ‘community
of inquiry’ in educational discourse, the role of genuine doubt in classroom
inquiry, and the history of philosophy in schools in Australia.
Philip Cam is Associate Professor in the School of Humanities and Languages at
the University of New South Wales, Australia, and President of the Philosophy
in Schools Association of New South Wales. He has a DPhil in Philosophy
from the University of Oxford and is an international authority on philoso-
phy in schools. Philip helped to pioneer the introduction of philosophy into
schools in Australia and has run workshops for educators around the world.
He has published extensively in the field, and his work has been widely trans-
lated. His publications include books for teachers such as Thinking Together,
Twenty Thinking Tools and Teaching Ethics in Schools, and classroom materials,
including Thinking Stories, a philosophical novella Sophia’s Question, and Phi-
losophy Park, a history of philosophy. Philip is past-President of the Asia-Pacific
Philosophy Education Network for Democracy, for which he edited a series of
books on philosophy, democracy, education and human values.
Robert Fisher is a professor of Education in the School of Education, Brunel
University, UK. He is also Director of the Centre for Research in Teaching
Thinking, with a particular interest in the teaching of Philosophy to children.
He taught in schools in the UK, Africa and Hong Kong, before becoming
professor of education at Brunel University. His many books include Teaching
 Names of contributors and affiliations xvii
Thinking, Teaching Children to Think, Teaching Children to Learn, the Stories
for Thinking series, Creative Dialogue and Brain Games for Your Child.
Susan T. Gardner is Professor of Philosophy at Capilano University in North Van-
couver, Canada. Her specialties include Critical Thinking, Bioethics, Gender
Relations and Philosophy for Children (P4C). She has published extensively in
the field of P4C, and her Critical Thinking Text, entitled Thinking Your Way to
Freedom, was published by Temple University Press January of 2009. Dr. Gard-
ner is also co-director of the Vancouver Institute of Philosophy for Children
(www.vip4c.ca) and was the prime mover in bringing Philosophy for Children
to Vancouver in the form of summer camps in 2014 (www.thinkfuncamps.ca).
Clinton Golding is Associate Professor in the Higher Education Development
Centre at the University of Otago, New Zealand. Prior to that, he was a lec-
turer in the Thinking Curriculum at the Faculty of Education, University of
Melbourne. He previously held the position of ‘Thinking Coordinator’ and
‘Head of Thinking’ in two schools in New Zealand, where he was working
to develop the thinking of staff and students across all year levels and sub-
ject areas. One of his special fields of research is creating an educational cul-
ture of good thinking. He has presented many workshops and conference
papers related to this theme in New Zealand, Australia and Singapore, and has
also published several books, for example, Developing a Thinking Classroom:
A Workbook for Professional Development.
Maughn Rollins Gregory is a professor of Educational Foundations at Montclair
State University (USA), where he succeeded Matthew Lipman as the director
of the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children in 2001. He
holds a JD and a PhD in philosophy. He publishes and teaches in the areas
of philosophy of education, Philosophy for Children, pragmatism, gender,
Socratic pedagogy and contemplative pedagogy. He is co-editor of the Rout-
ledge International Handbook of Philosophy for Children (Routledge 2016) and
has edited a number of special journal issues on Philosophy for Children.
Per Jespersen is one of the P4C leaders in Denmark. He is an influential teacher
in promoting P4C throughout the world, especially in Denmark. He has writ-
ten a lot of stories and manuals for children and teachers, which have been
translated into several languages.
David Kennedy is a professor of Educational Foundations, College of Education
and Human Services, Montclair State University. He teaches courses in his-
tory and philosophy of education, critical thinking, philosophy for children,
and philosophy of childhood, at the undergraduate, master’s and doctoral
levels. He was Past President of the International Council for Philosophical
Inquiry with Children (2001–2003), Founder and Co-Editor, Childhood and
Philosophy, (2005), editor, Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children
(1998–2006), Associate Editor, Analytic Teaching: The Community of Inquiry
Journal, (1992–1997). He co-edits Childhood and Philosophy with Walter
xviii  Names of contributors and affiliations
Kohan. His most recent book, My Name is Myshkin: A Philosophical Novel for
Children, is published by LIT Verlag.
Walter Omar Kohan is Full Professor at the Childhood Studies Department
of the State University of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil); Senior Researcher of the
National Council of Scientific and Technologic Development (CNPQ, Brazil)
and of the Foundation of Support of Research of the State of Rio de Janeiro
(FAPERJ); former President (1999–2001) and member of the Advisory Board
of the International Council for Philosophical Inquiry with Children (ICPIC);
and co-editor of the ICPIC journal Childhood & Philosophy. He has published
books in Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, English and French. In English, his
books include Philosophy and Childhood: Critical Perspectives and Affirmative
Practices (Palgrave, 2014); Childhood, Education and Philosophy: New Ideas
for an Old Relationship (Routledge, 2015); and The Inventive Schoolmaster
(Sense, 2015).
Tetsuya Kono (PhD, Philosophy) is a professor at Rikkyo University (Tokyo),
director of the Philosophical Association of Japan, Phenomenological Associa-
tion of Japan, etc. His research interests lie in phenomenology and philoso-
phy of mind, as well as philosophy of education. He is also concerned with
philosophical practice, especially in Philosophy for/with Children. He practices
philosophical dialogue in kindergartens and primary and secondary schools,
and also organizes philosophy cafés. His major publications include (books, all
in Japanese): Phenomenology of Body and Special Needs Education (2015), ‘Phi-
losophy of Children’ Helps Foster the Ability to Dialogue and Think (2014), and
Re-questioning the Moral Education (2011).
Matthew Lipman (1922–2010) is recognized as the founder of Philosophy for
Children. His decision to bring philosophy to young people came from his
experience as a professor at Columbia University, where he witnessed under-
developed reasoning skills in his students. One of his interests was developing
reasoning skills by teaching logic. The belief that children possess the ability
to think abstractly from an early age led him to the conviction that bringing
logic to children’s education earlier would help them to improve their reason-
ing skills. In 1972, he left Columbia for Montclair State College to establish
the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC), where
he began to take philosophy into K-12 classrooms in Montclair. That year,
he also published his first book specifically designed to help children practice
philosophy, Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery. The IAPC continues to develop
and publish curriculum, working internationally to advance and improve phi-
losophy for children.
Gareth Matthews (1929–2011) was a renowned American philosopher who
specialized in ancient philosophy and the philosophy of childhood. Matthews
first established himself with a series of important papers on Aristotle. He also
wrote a number of scholarly articles on St. Augustine. He began writing about
philosophy in children’s literature in the 1970s and later wrote two books
 Names of contributors and affiliations xix
on doing philosophy with children. He wrote extensively on philosophical
critique of developmental psychology and was one of the founding scholars
of the new field of philosophy of childhood. His works have been translated
into a dozen languages, including Chinese, Japanese and Indonesian, as well
as various European languages.
Stephan Millett is a professor and the foundation director of the Centre for
Applied Ethics and Philosophy at Curtin University of Technology, was for-
merly Chair of the University’s Human Research Ethics Committee and is an
Ethics Specialist with the Faculty of Health Sciences. He is immediate past
president and now executive member of the Association for Philosophy in
Schools (WA) and was for seven years a full-time teacher of philosophy from
pre-primary through to Year 12. He has conducted many courses for teachers
and was the writer for the Western Australian Certificate of Education course
in Philosophy and Ethics. With Alan Tapper he is the author of three text-
books for this course. His doctoral dissertation examined an Aristotelian basis
for environmental ethics. Before turning to philosophy, he was a journalist,
newspaper editor and journalism academic.
Karin Muris is Professor of philosophy and pedagogy at the University of the
Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. She trained with Lipman and
adapted his method by using picturebooks. She published the resource mate-
rial for teachers called Teaching Philosophy with Picture Books and also uses a
whole range of stimuli, including music, objects and pictures. She and Joanna
Haynes have written Storywise: Thinking through Stories and Newswise: Think-
ing through the News. Karin is also an accredited Socratic dialogue facilitator,
philosophical counselor and is currently introducing, in collaboration with
Joanna Haynes, Dilemma Training – a method of ethical decision making – in
primary, secondary schools, detached youth work and higher education after
working with the method in business and public service contexts.
Øyvind Olsholt (b. 1963) is a Norwegian “kids philosopher.” He has worked
with philosophy for children since 1997. In 2000, he co-founded the com-
pany Children and Youth Philosophers (www.buf.no) and has since partici-
pated in a number of philosophy projects for kindergartens, schools, museums
and other institutions. He has also arranged philosophical summer camps and
weekly philosophy clubs for children. He is co-author of the books Philosophy
in School (1999), Philosophical Dialogues in Kindergarten (2008) and Phi-
losophy and ethics for pre-school teachers (2013).
Larisa Retyunskik defended her doctoral dissertation, “Ontology of Game,”
and received a degree of Doctor of Philosophical Science in 1990. She is
the creator and the leader of the family club “Sokrat’s school,” where she
uses her game method in teaching Philosophy for Children. She is the presi-
dent of Interregional Fund “Philosophy for Children.” She often takes part
in conferences and was the Chair of the Organising Committee of the First
International Conference on “Philosophy for Children” in Moscow on 27–29
xx  Names of contributors and affiliations
January 2005, the Head of the Round Table on The IV Russian Philosophical
Congress, 24–28 May 2005.
Michel Sasseville is Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of
Laval (Quebec), where he heads the philosophy training programs for chil-
dren in this university. He chaired the International Council of Philosophical
Inquiry with Children (ICPIC) in 1997–1999. He has written several books
on philosophy for children, lectured extensively on the subject worldwide,
was a visiting professor at several universities, counselor or member of various
associations or groups in Philosophy for Children in Europe. He has worked
in the development of this practice for almost 30 years and received several
awards, including one from the Department of Education, Recreation and
Sports in Quebec for its online courses observation in philosophy for children.
Ann Margaret Sharp (1942–2010) was Professor of educational foundations
and co-director of the IAPC at Montclair State University. The “grand-old-
lady” of the philosophy for children movement, she collaborated with IAPC
co-founder Matthew Lipman for many years. She wrote dozens of articles and
book chapters and was largely responsible for theorizing the community of
inquiry. She also wrote dozens of philosophical novels and short stories for
children and contributed to all of the IAPC teacher manuals. Sharp traveled
extensively and was responsible for bringing philosophy for children to many
parts of the world.
Tim Sprod is a past secretary of the International Council for Philosophical
Inquiry with Children (ICPIC), past chair of the Federation of Australasian
Philosophy in Schools Associations (FAPSA) and present chair of the Associa-
tion for Philosophy in Tasmanian Schools. Recognized by ICPIC as a teacher
educator, he has presented workshops for teachers and researchers in philo-
sophical inquiry for schools in Australia, the UK, the USA, Iran, Japan, Sin-
gapore, South Africa, Germany and Thailand. He is the author of Books into
Ideas and (with Laurance Splitter) Places for Thinking, which both address the
use of the community of inquiry with picturebooks in early childhood, Philo-
sophical and Discussion in Moral Education: The Community of Ethical Inquiry
and Discussions in Science: Promoting Conceptual Understanding in the Middle
School Years. His research interests cover the place of discussion in education
for scientific and ethical inquiry.
Roger Sutcliffe is the Director of Dialogue Works (www.dialogueworks.co.uk)
and one of the UK’s leading educationalists. He is a former president of
SAPERE, the UK charity for promoting P4C, and a former president of
ICPIC, the International Council for Philosophical Inquiry with Children and
former vice-chair of the Values Education Council in England. Having gradu-
ated in Philosophy and Modern Languages at Oxford in the early 1970s, he
taught first at primary level and then at secondary level until 1990, when he
trained in P4C under Professor Lipman. He also trained in Rogerian coun-
seling back in the UK, before embarking on a freelance career, introducing
 Names of contributors and affiliations xxi
P4C and Communities of Inquiry to teachers and others throughout the UK
and, occasionally, abroad. He is the co-author of The Philosophy Club and of
Newswise, a current affairs resource, and has written for many journals and for
www.p4c.com. He is an outstanding facilitator of dialogue, with both large
audiences and small groups, and has contributed significantly to the whole
field of teaching thinking.
Figures

3.1 God’s and mortals’ view of truth

1 109
13.2 Summary description of a good thinker 115
13.3 How participating in Communities of Inquiry facilitates
good thinking 115
Table

21.1 Creative dialogue vs. traditional teacher–pupil interaction 183

Part I

Historical, philosophical
and theoretical roots
1 The Institute for the
Advancement of Philosophy
for Children (IAPC) program
Matthew Lipman

What is the philosophy for children program?

In the late 1960s, I was a full professor of philosophy at Columbia University, in
New York. I thought that my undergraduate students were lacking in reasoning
and judgment, but that it was too late to improve their thinking significantly.
I thought (and I was almost alone in this opinion at that time) that it needed to
be done in childhood. There should be courses for children in Critical Thinking
when the children were 11 or 12 years of age. But to make the subject “user-
friendly,” the text would have to be written in the form of a novel – a novel about
children discovering logic. But this too seemed to me too narrow. The novel
should be about children discovering philosophy. So I wrote Harry Stottlemeier’s
Discovery (Lipman, 1974) (the title a pun on Aristotle). When I tried it out in
an experiment (in 1970), it seemed to work very well, so I wrote (together with
Ann Margaret Sharp) a teacher’s manual containing hundreds of philosophical
exercises. That worked well also. I left Columbia and set up the Institute for
the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC), as part of Montclair State
University. After a few years, I wrote a book dealing solely with Ethics – a sequel
to Harry called Lisa (Lipman, 1983), for slightly older children. More and more
books were written, each for a different age level, and with its own instructional
manual. Also a variety of theoretical books were written and published (by uni-
versity presses like Temple, Cambridge and Teachers College Press).
In addition to requiring very unique textbooks (philosophical novels for chil-
dren), Philosophy for Children has a unique pedagogy, in that students at every
level begin by reading an episode aloud, raising questions about it, and then dis-
cussing the questions. It is this methodology, involving mutual criticism and scru-
pulously careful voicing of opinions and judgment, that educators recognize as an
educational approach that prepares children to become citizens in a democracy.

How did it arise and how was it developed?

Philosophy for Children (P4C) didn’t just emerge out of nowhere. It built upon
the recommendations of John Dewey and the Russian educator Lev Vygotsky,
who emphasized the necessity of teaching for thinking, not just for memorizing.
4  Matthew Lipman
It is not enough for children merely to remember what has been said to them:
they must examine and analyze that material. Just as thinking is the processing
of what children learn about the world through their senses, so they must think
about what they learn in school. Memorizing is a relatively low-level thinking
skill; children must be taught concept-formation, judgment, reasoning, etc.
After a small but intensive experiment with the program (which showed that
children could be taught improved deductive reasoning without “teaching for
the test”), a number of Philosophy PhDs were taught to train teachers through-
out the United States, which they proceeded to do in the 1970s. By the end of
the decade, some 5,000 classrooms in the country were using the program. (The
experiment indicated that children of age 11 could be taught to reason 27 weeks
better in mental age on formal reasoning problems, after only 9 weeks of expo-
sure to the program.)
We proceeded, through the assistance of the New Jersey Department of Educa-
tion and private foundation grants, to hold workshops for the training of teacher-
trainers, who would then turn around and train teachers, who would proceed to
use the program with children. The trained teachers reported that the children
responded to the program joyously, as it gave them an opportunity to talk openly
in the classroom and to discuss their ideas with one another and with the teacher.
Since Philosophy for Children is largely a language-based program, its success
is related closely to its being accurately developed through a large number of lan-
guages. (Every country wants its own translation, and quite rightly so.)

How many approaches are there to philosophy for children? Could

you please discuss them?
Just as there is only one discipline called “philosophy,” so there is only one Phi-
losophy for Children. But there are many different versions of each. For example,
there are many different versions of the philosophy of science, the philosophy of
psychology, the philosophy of art, and so on. Each “philosophy of” is an extensive
critique of the discipline upon which it focuses. But the Philosophy for Children
is not identical with Education, nor is it identical with Philosophy of Educa-
tion. What is called “Philosophy for Children” represents an effort to develop
philosophy so that it may function as a kind of education. It becomes education
that employs philosophy to engage the mind of the child so as to try to satisfy the
hunger of the child for meaning.
Philosophy with children has grown up as a small offshoot of Philosophy for
Children, in the sense that philosophy with children utilizes discussion of philo-
sophical ideas, but not through specially written children’s stories. Philosophy with
children aims to develop children as young philosophers. Philosophy for children aims
to help children utilize philosophy so as to improve their learning of all the subjects in
the curriculum [author’s italics].
When I first became interested in this field, I thought that children could do no
better than “Critical thinking” – that is, having their thinking trained to make it
more rigorous, consistent and coherent. But critical thinking contains no concept
 IAPC 5
formation, no formal logic, and no study of the works of traditional ­philosophy
[author’s italics], all of which I have endeavored to supply in Philosophy for
Children. Critical thinking does not lead children back into philosophy, and yet
it is my contention that children will not settle for anything less. Nor should they
have to. Critical thinking seeks to make the child’s mind more precise; philoso-
phy deepens it and makes it grow.

Which is the best and most influential approach to philosophy for

children?
To me, the program that I have developed and that goes by the name of P­ hilosophy
for Children is identifiable as the best approach to the improvement of children’s
thinking. Here are some reasons:

1. Interest
Children work best at whatever it is that most keenly interests them. This
is P4C, first because it involves imaginative fiction, second because it is
about children like themselves, and third because it involves them in the
discussion of controversial issues (e.g., ethics). P4C goes beyond Critical
Thinking.
2. Emotion
P4C is not limited to the improvement of critical thinking. It recognizes that
thinking can be intensely exciting and emotional, and it provides ways in
which children can talk about and analyze those emotions.
3. Critical Thinking
P4C wholly embraces critical thinking, but it does so with greater breadth
and depth. Critical thinking is generally only an “add-on” to the existing
curriculum, but P4C recognizes the need children have to deal truth-
fully with what they find problematic or puzzling.
4. Values
Children discover early on that our treatment of value issues tends to be
ambiguous, vague and muddled. Consequently they welcome efforts
to get them to think precisely and clearly. But this doesn’t mean that
their thinking should be dispassionate or lacking in feeling. Children
can think better about issues that concern them, when their thinking,
in addition to being critical, is caring, appreciative and compassionate.
5. Creativity
Good thinking can be charged with imagination, as when we enter whole-
heartedly into a story, or develop a hypothesis. P4C is therefore espe-
cially successful in the area of creativity.
6  Matthew Lipman
6. Communality
Philosophy is dialogical: it stresses the need to open the dialogue to all mem-
bers of the community. In other words, it stresses shared inquiry. The
world can think better about how to treat innocent victims when it feels
compassion for them than when it does not.

What is your invented method in this area?

I’ve taken many familiar components and combined them in a new way, so as
to devise a new form of education. Until Philosophy for Children came along,
philosophy and education were considered quite alien to one another, not mix-
ing, the way oil and water don’t mix. But a program like P4C that urges chil-
dren to think up questions and try to answer one another’s questions through
open discussion is a program that combines learning and enthusiasm, feeling
and thought, imagination and understanding. This is why one reviewer, speak-
ing of my 2003 book Thinking in Education (Lipman, 2003), says that I have
“created the great maieutic epic. It is a passionate vision of what education can
and should be.”
I have tried to develop a new, reflective paradigm of education, whose reg-
ulative ideas are reasonableness (in personal character) and democracy (in
social character). This paradigm emphasizes the importance not just of critical
thinking, but of creative and caring thinking as well – all three varieties are
necessary. It stresses making, saying, doing and feeling as the main arter-
ies of judgment. Disciplined practice in these forms of understanding lies at
the heart of the philosophical version of education. The pedagogy of such
practice is what we call the “community of inquiry.” This balanced, coopera-
tive approach accords well with Rawls’ “reflective equilibrium” and Dewey’s
experimentalism.
Children puzzle over many of the same concepts that philosophers puzzle over –
concepts like rules, truth, goodness, justice etc. They have opinions on these
matters, but they learn to develop these opinions into considered judgments. By
giving them a great deal of practice in finding good reasons for their judgments,
Philosophy for Children gives children an education of which they may well be
proud. It teaches them how they ought to think.

What philosophers and psychologists greatly influenced your work

in these areas?

John Dewey
The American philosopher for his intense sympathy for the child, his emphasis
upon thinking in the classroom, and his seeing the importance of artistic
creativity in getting the child to be emotionally expressive.
 IAPC 7

Justus Buchler
The American philosopher in the 20th century, for his important studies in the
nature of human judgment, and for his understanding of the role of judg-
ment in the education of the child.

Lev Vygotsky
The 20th-century Russian psychologist, who recognized the connections
between classroom discussion and children’s thinking, between the child
and the society by means of and through the teacher, and between the lan-
guage of the adult world and the growing intelligence of the child.

Jean Piaget
The 20th-century psychologist and educator, whose work illuminated the
relationships between thinking and behavior.

Gilbert Ryle
The 20th-century British philosopher, who analyzed the connections between
language, teaching and self-teaching.

George Herbert Mead

The American philosopher and social psychologist, whose work dealt almost
exclusively with the social nature of the self.

Ludwig Wittgenstein
The 20th-century Austrian-British philosopher, who explored with enormous
sensitivity the complex social relationships that are expressed through the
subtleties of language.

What are the advantages of your method?

I attempt to show those who prepare teachers for the classroom that educa-
tion without philosophy in the elementary school is just as deficient as educa-
tion without philosophy would be in the undergraduate and graduate areas of
education. Children need to discover criteria for distinguishing between valid
and invalid reasoning (logic), between supported and unsupported theories of
knowledge (epistemology), and between acceptable and unacceptable forms of
moral judgment (ethics), etc. The soundest way of doing this is to see education
in all its vast complexity as a mode of inquiry, and to see philosophy as a mode
8  Matthew Lipman
of inquiry into that mode of inquiry. Only in this way can students be encour-
aged to think for themselves about their own thinking. Another way of putting
this is to say that inquiry is the genus of which the various forms of philosophy
are species. Thus there is ethical inquiry, aesthetic inquiry, social inquiry, and
so on.
Another advantage of this method is that it provides our various forms of
knowledge and understanding with coherence and consistency. Children learn
that most of the questions they ask can be dealt with in a reliable fashion by
seeing them as occasions for philosophical inquiry. They also discover that this
same method is in use now throughout the world, and that the time is not far off
when this one basic method will enable them to communicate clearly with other
children in similar programs in many countries and continents.

What terms, circumstances, instruments and environment are

needed in order to perform the program?
To teach this program in a classroom, the teacher needs only one novel for each
child, as well as an instructional manual for the teacher.
However, the teacher needs to have had training in how to conduct a philo-
sophical discussion, how to employ the exercises and discussion plans, and how
to encourage children to think for themselves. This course in training would also
make use of the text Philosophy in the Classroom, by Lipman, M., & Sharp, A.M.
(1988).
The children in a class, plus their teacher, are seated in a circle so that they
can speak face-to-face with one another. The students read the assigned epi-
sode aloud, no more than one paragraph at a time. (The equal distribution of
time has democratic implications not lost on the children.) When the reading
is completed, the teacher recruits questions, asking such questions as “Did
anything in this reading puzzle you?” and “Did this episode make you won-
der?” “Can you put your feelings in the form of a question?” The teacher
then writes each child’s question on the chalkboard, adding to it that child’s
name, as well as the page and line number in the text that is at issue. Next,
the teacher asks who wants to begin the discussion. The hands go up, and the
teacher selects one child to begin by discussing one of the questions written
on the board. At an appropriate moment, the teacher may introduce an exer-
cise on that topic taken from the instructional manual. Suppose the question
is something like, “Are Harry and Bill friends?” Before long, the children will
begin to see that the concept of friendship is vague or ambiguous or both, and
she may introduce a discussion plan on the nature of friendship. (The ethical
implications of friendship are bound to be noticed by the students.) In this
way, the children engage in concept development that can help them not only
with philosophy but with all of their studies that deal with concepts. It is a
method that provokes their thinking and that does not rest until it has evoked
their capacity for criticism and self-criticism, and this in turn engages them in
self-correction.
 IAPC 9
Assuming the teacher has been properly prepared, children will feel at home in
the program, and at the end of a session, generally enjoy it so much that they hate
to see it end. This is because it stimulates them to think for themselves rather than
allow others to do their thinking for them. Also, they love to be able to express
their ideas to one another, defend their reasoning if necessary, and help each
other become aware of the implications of their assumptions.

Is philosophy for children appropriate for all children?

Any child that is capable of using language intelligibly is capable of schooling and
growth, and is therefore capable of the kind of discourse and conversation that
philosophy involves. Philosophy begins when we can discuss the language we use
to discuss the world. The aim is not to make children into little philosophers,
but to help them think better than they now think. Of course, the more accom-
plished children are with regard to listening and speaking, the more quickly they
can adapt to philosophy, with its emphasis on mental acts, thinking skills, rea-
soning and judgment. But the program attempts to avoid any use of technical
terminology.

Have you any message to Iranian philosophers and educational

administrators about the importance and necessities of the
program?
Philosophy for Children is a world-class educational program with relatively low
maintenance costs. But these advantages are somewhat offset by the need to
follow instructions for installing the program. It is precisely among developing
countries that Philosophy for Children can make a remarkable difference. The
following steps are those we recommend be taken by any country contemplating
the use of Philosophy for Children:

1. Send a representative or representatives to the International Training Center

for Philosophy for Children in Mendham, New Jersey, which is held every
year in the last week of May and again in the last two weeks of August. Each
representative should be a philosopher or should have taken a number of
courses in philosophy. Representatives should be ready, upon return to their
country, to train future teachers of P4C, and even more immediately, to
translate texts and see them through publication. (The program cannot be
carried through without the availability of such translations.)
2. Select a first group of teachers to be given a one- or two-semester course in in-
service teacher education. (Such selection should be limited to volunteers.)
3. Specialists in educational psychology should be utilized to develop measure-
ments of quantitative and qualitative impact of program. (This can be post-
poned for a year or two, until the use of the program is well under way.)
4. As the program becomes established, it is good to prepare to develop graduate
students with philosophy backgrounds to receive pre-service preparation.
10  Matthew Lipman

If the program is to perform in developing countries like Iran,

what should the starting point be?
In deciding on the sequence of steps to be taken in starting the program, here are
some considerations to keep in mind:

1. The representative or representatives to be sent to a Mendham workshop/­

conference should have an adequate command of English and some back-
ground knowledge of philosophy. This person should also direct the t­ ranslation
of the texts and the training of teachers upon his or her return to Iran.
2. The group of children chosen to initiate the program should be represent-
ative. There is no need to select only “gifted” children, but neither is it
appropriate to begin with special populations such as emotionally disturbed
children or deaf children.
3. The age level of the students in the beginning should be 8–10 years. This
suggests that the program with which to begin would be Pixie (Lipman,
1981), the teacher’s manual to which is entitled Looking for Meaning. This
is not to say that other age groups or other programs would necessarily be
wrong, but simply that the probabilities favor Pixie. (Thus Harry might
work well with ages 11–12 or Elfie (Lipman, 1988) with ages 6–8. If a
program is preferred that stresses thinking skills and environmental consid-
erations for ages 6–9 you might want to start with Kio and Gus (Lipman,
1982).) Actually, all the programs involve practice in thinking skills and in
moral reasoning.
4. The design that has been sketched out so far is one that involves a minimum
of expense and is limited in the impact it can have upon a large population.
We would be happy to propose a much larger process, such as the dissemina-
tion process we are now engaged in in Ukraine. This involves the training
of teachers in Philosophy for Children and the training of college under-
graduates in Critical Thinking. It also involves the English Department of
Kirovgrad State Pedagogical University, and numerous exchanges of univer-
sity personnel from both countries. Now in its third year, this dissemination
program appears to be highly successful.
5. It is highly desirable that one of the first things to do, following the train-
ing received at Mendham workshop/conference, is to establish a center in
Iran. This can be called something like Iranian Center for Advancement
of Philosophy for Children. It would offer curriculum materials translated
into your language or languages, the training of schoolteachers and would
conduct research projects to determine the degree of success the program
is having in Iranian schools. You could, if you like, be considered an affili-
ate center of the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Chil-
dren (IAPC) here at Montclair State University. There is no charge for this
identification. The chief cost to you would be the travel and registration
costs for the Mendham workshop/conference, two weeks in August and/
or eight days in May.
 IAPC 11

References
Lipman, M. (1974). Harry Stottlemeier’s discovery. Upper Montclair, NJ: IAPC.
Lipman, M. (1981). Pixie. Upper Montclair, NJ: IAPC.
Lipman, M. (1982). Kio and Gus. Upper Montclair, NJ: IAPC.
Lipman, M. (1983). Lisa (2nd ed.). Upper Montclair, NJ: IAPC.
Lipman, M. (1988). Elfie. Upper Montclair, NJ: IAPC.
Lipman, M. (2003). Thinking in education. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lipman, M., & Sharp, A. M. (1988). Philosophy in the classroom. Temple, PA: Temple
University Press.
2 Brave old subject, brave
new world
Matthew Lipman

In your book Thinking in Education, 2nd edition (Cambridge,

2003) you contrast two paradigms of education, the traditional
one and the reflective one. Can you explain this contrast?
Not without great oversimplification, I’m afraid. The traditional understanding
people had of education, reaching all the way back to antiquity, was that it was a
way of getting the younger generations to adopt the same knowledge – the same
facts and relationships and values – as were considered true by the generations
that had immediately preceded them. There was thought to be no need for stu-
dents to reflect on or analyze what they were taught: such a critical examination
had already taken place in the preceding generations.
The Enlightenment brought a call for reform. Montaigne demanded the teach-
ing of judgment, but no one seemed to know how this was to be done, and, in fact,
there was little attempt to teach judgment until the end of the 19th century. Kant
called for an education that would get children to think for themselves instead of
parroting their elders; he even contributed to the design of the reflective model by
referring to what he was advocating as “the practice of philosophical inquiry.” But,
again, no one knew how this was to be done, so it was largely forgotten.
It was only with the beginning of the 20th century, particularly during the first
half of that century, that educators like John Dewey began to erect the scaffolding of
the new reflective paradigm. There were other educators, of course – like Durkheim
and Goodman and Mead – educators who were inspired by the social sciences or by
logic, enabling them to call for new principles in education, new criteria, new stand-
ards, and the best of these led to the formation of the reflective education paradigm.
Except for Dewey, there was no call here (America) for a thorough going pedagogi-
cal change. Dewey demanded over and over again that teachers must teach for think-
ing. It was not enough to teach merely for more up-to-date factual knowledge, just
as it was not enough to teach just for reasoning or for truth. Children, like scientists,
had to work together, because all inquiry was cooperative. All of it involved delibera-
tion and participation. Thus the leaders of the reflective method of education in the
20th century saw that teaching for thinking had to be teaching for precise, open-
minded, fair-minded thinking. Consequently, in the latter half of the 20th century,
the slogan of the more progressive educators was that the schools needed to teach
 Brave old subject, brave new world 13
for critical thinking – for thinking that did not violate the principles of experimental
science or of formal, or even of informal logic. But only Dewey went far beyond
Ryle, Scheffler, Goodman, Nelson, Rawls and the like to visualize education as the
operative leading edge of an enormous social reform aimed at revising society into a
world order in which people lived democratically as naturally as they walked upright.
With the end of the 20th century came the end of the Deweyan phase of reflective
education. With the start of the 21st century came the phase characterized by the
introduction of such useful operatives as the community of inquiry, the reflective
equilibrium, and the strengthening of judgment.
We can therefore distinguish the earlier reflective model, shaped by the peda-
gogical philosophy of Dewey, from the later reflective model, characterized by
Philosophy for Children. The goal of thinking permeates both phases: both aim
at producing thinking students, thinking teachers, thinking schools of education.
Both have become sufficiently strong and enduring to see themselves planted in
virtually every portion of the globe.

Why has the position you advanced in the second edition of

thinking in education been called the “great maieutic epic”?
The word “maieutic” is the Greek term for midwifery. It is usually taken to mean,
by Socrates, that there is an analogy between midwifery and teaching: the midwife
delivers the pregnant mother of her child, as the philosopher delivers the ideationally
pregnant student of his or her thinking. (A number of alternative interpretations have
been advanced as to precisely how Socrates’s pronouncement is to be understood.
I think this one is as helpful as any and has the distinct merit of being applicable to the
cornerstone of Philosophy for Children: helping children to think for themselves.)
And so the midwife helps the mother give birth not just to a child but to a liv-
ing thinker, indeed, to an entire world society of living thinkers. Socrates daringly
invokes the maieutic paradigm: his doing so is a dialectical stroke of epic propor-
tions. Thinking in Education, 2nd Edition, is an effort to show that we are only at
the beginning of the redesigning and refashioning of education. Our efforts can
be considered heroically successful only when education as conceptual midwifery
becomes the rule rather than the exception.

You say that to overcome the deficiency of education in elementary

schools, we need to see education in all its vast complexity as
a mode of inquiry, and to see philosophy as a mode of inquiry
into that mode of inquiry. Furthermore, you see inquiry as “the
genus of which the various forms of philosophy are species.”
This is a new conception of education and philosophy and
their relations. In what sense can education and philosophy be
regarded as inquiry?
Inquiry is the investigative response to problematic aspects of human experi-
ence. It generally begins as questioning and moves from there into interpretation
14  Matthew Lipman
and hypothesis formation. Through discussion and deliberation, it seeks to trans-
form the problematic into the controversial, the participatory and ultimately the
reasonable.
Scientific inquiry is often invoked as alone embodying inquiry, but this is
unjustified. All imaginative and creative thinking (hence all art) is inquiry, and
all investigation of the ethically or valuationally problematic is inquiry. Aristotle
was moving in this direction, I believe, when he asserted that all deliberation is
inquiry.
But what of education and philosophy? To assert that education is not inquiry
is to claim that it has to be identified with traditional rather than with reflective
education, and this is unacceptable.
There is no justification for denying the status of inquiry to philosophy. All the
humanities are forms of inquiry, and philosophy is one of the humanities. Phi-
losophy can also be seen as a highly sophisticated form of education.

Generally speaking, why is a philosophical novel more effective in

education than a merely philosophical text?
A textbook is an assemblage of a huge amount of information compiled by schol-
ars and for scholars. But if the audience at which the textbook is aimed is made up
not of scholars, but of children, some device is needed to motivate the reading.
A novel may provide a fictional, imaginative setting, an energetic dialogue, lively
characters, a sprightly style, animation, humor, or all of these. In this manner,
the author is able to pack the information to be communicated into the form of
a story with which the reader identifies and which the reader is able to enjoy and
understand. Those who write Philosophy for Children novels and workbooks can
thus intersperse each page with lightly concealed philosophical meanings, prob-
lems and relationships. The children are likely to draw these out of the stories
and bring them to the attention of their classmates. A sentence, a word – strikes
them as ambiguous or vague or misleading. In this way, their inquiry begins, and
continues until they are satisfied that they know the meaning of what was written
or said.
In short, graduate students in philosophy may bring with them their own
personal motivation for reading very abstract texts, but children need a moti-
vation for doing so, and a story is often the best way of doing so. This is not
a reason, however, to agree with Piaget’s conception that young children
cannot deal with abstractions. It would be better to say that children don’t
want to be made to deal with abstract, dry and technical vocabularies. They
can do very well with short abstract words like good, bad, law, fair, hope,
happy etc. when it happens that these are words whose usage they share with
philosophers.
However, it is no simple matter to write a philosophical novel, for in addi-
tion to the criteria or considerations just cited, such a novel must challenge the
readers to think independently and to discuss the embedded ideas with one
another.
 Brave old subject, brave new world 15

What characteristics, elements and components do the books

concerning philosophy for children need to involve?
For any given novel, there is no set number of components, but a set of such
novels (such as Philosophy for Children, which contains almost a dozen novels)
will make demands on the author that are more specific:

1. Ideas must be drawn from a variety of sources in philosophy, such as episte-

mology, metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, philosophy of education, logic etc.
Some of these may be omitted in order to spend more time on others. For
example, some areas of ethics must be represented in virtually every chapter
of a given text. On the other hand, there could be a relatively small amount
of ethics, but it is inadvisable to skip it completely.
2. There should be at least one program (a program is here a novel plus a
manual) for each age level (a level usually comprises one or two ages.) Thus
Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery is designed for children ages 9–11, and Pixie is
for ages 7–9.
3. As much as possible, the language used by the speakers in the novels should
correspond with the real-life language of the readers in the classrooms, their
homes, and with one another.
4. Thinking exercises for each chapter of the novels should be provided in each
separate manual (Lipman, 1997).

In addition to the humanistic contents that elementary school philosophy pro-

vides to children who study it, there are the cognitive structures and processes
that it illuminates and thereby strengthens. Some of these are:

Modes of Types of Systems Thinking Mental Act Affective States

Judgment Thinking Skills

Making Critical Reasoning Deciding Hoping

Saying Creative Inquiry Considering Liking
Doing Caring Concept- Wondering Honoring
Formation
Feeling Translation Remembering Encouraging
etc. Explaining Prizing
Understanding Esteeming
etc. etc.

What are the differences between this kind of novel and other
novels at the children’s level?
Children’s literature is a vast, complex and relatively uncharted field of writing
and publishing. Much of it is directed to the home of the child, or to the school
library, or to the individual to use for occasional purposes. On the other hand,
16  Matthew Lipman
P4C is specifically aimed at the classroom, where the teacher has been especially
prepared for the teaching of philosophy with children.
Another significant difference is that P4C aims at teaching children how to do
philosophy – i.e., how to engage in philosophical practice. This is very different
from fables or from proverbs, which aim to impart a small gem of wisdom, usually
on the final page of the story.

The books in P4C are said to be novels about children “discovering

philosophy.” What do you mean by “children discovering
philosophy”?
The stories are written in such a way as to scatter a number of quite diverse
philosophical ideas at random on each page. Children, with their natural curios-
ity, cannot help being intrigued by these, and want the other members of the
class to examine and discuss them. Such discussions should be encouraged by
the teacher, and encourage the children to have faith in their own philosophical
powers.

What are the differences among books concerning children of

different ages, during which children may have special demands?
To some extent, I’ve already dealt with this in response to the question on the
characteristics, elements and components of the books for philosophy for chil-
dren. I would add only that philosophy can be used to make children aware of
how they are one with all people, and how, on the other hand, they are different
from one another. These differences may involve differences of family traditions,
manner of thinking, modes of artistic expression, language, skills etc.

What kinds of books are the best among all the books written in
this field?
I find it difficult to answer this question, largely because I haven’t read English
translations of numerous books intended to be novels for teaching philosophy
to children, nor have I been able to read those books that remain untranslated.

What methods are used in the books to teach reasoning and

judgment? What is the difference between this method and the
method for adults?
When preparing teachers to teach P4C, we use the same method as the method
to be used by those teachers when they eventually teach P4C to children. That
is, the children read excerpts from the novels dealing with reasoning, and they
then discuss them, if they have any questions they want to ask. It is true that,
with regards to teaching logic, the proportion of questions making use of didactic
teaching is likely to be larger than those from other areas of philosophy. But there
 Brave old subject, brave new world 17
are a good many portions of logic that lend themselves to being taught by the
discussion method: logical fallacies and informal reasoning are examples.

It is suggested that the books be translated, but there are

difficulties in doing this. There are ethical values in the novels
that the children of some countries would not have sympathy
with. Also, there may be a cultural spirit that is inconsistent
with the ethical values in different countries. How can this
difficulty be overcome?
It is very difficult to try to teach Philosophy for Children in countries where the
curriculum has not been translated into the language of those countries. The
translation need not be literal, but it should be the same language that the people
in that country speak.
Those who try using IAPC materials that touch on ethical or religious values
should read Philosophy in the Classroom (Lipman, Sharp, & Oscanyan, 1977).
They should also read the instructional manuals for the novels they are planning
to teach. The situation is far from hopeless, even in countries where the influence
of religion upon education is very strong.

There are some writers in Iran, as well as in other countries, who

are working on writing thinking novels at the children’s level.
What rules should they follow so that their books conform to
P4C standards?
I think you might address this question initially to the International Council for
Philosophical Inquiry with Children [http://www.icpic.org]. If, after reading
the ICPIC response, you still have questions you would like me to deal with,
I would be happy to give you further suggestions.

References
Lipman, M. (1997, March). Philosophical discussion plans and exercises. Critical and
Creative Thinking, 5(1): 1–17.
Lipman, M. (2003). Thinking in education (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Lipman, M., Sharp, A. M., & Oscanyan, F. (1977). Philosophy in the classroom. Upper
Montclair, NJ: IAPC.
3 Philosophical novel
Ann Margaret Sharp

Why is the philosophical novel more effective in education than

the philosophical text?
John Dewey was wont to remind educators that there is a big difference between
the logical development and presentation of a discipline and the psychological,
developmental presentation of a discipline.
The philosophical text is an attempt to present philosophy in a logical and compre-
hensive manner devoid of experience. The philosophical story-as-text is an attempt
to motivate children to inquire into philosophical concepts and philosophical proce-
dures in a way that is directly related to children’s experience. In other words, the
narrative presents philosophy embedded in the experience of fictional characters.
Children enjoy stories and can be motivated by them to think and inquire if the
stories focus on issues and event that they find intriguing and contestable, while
remaining connected to their own daily experience. When a story is discussed by
a group of children, it becomes a vehicle over which children, rather than adults,
have control. Unlike the traditional textbook, it is their story and they use it to
set an agenda for discussion and philosophical inquiry.
But there is a further reason for using narrative when working with children.
We cannot assume that children walk into the classroom able to do philoso-
phy well. They need to know how to proceed, and one effective way to help
them acquire this procedural knowledge is to involve them, intellectually as well
as emotionally, in the lives of characters who enact and model the processes of
inquiry. These characters do not have to be the heroes, heroines and villains one
finds in many literary children’s classics, but can be presented as ordinary children
much like themselves. These fictional children take up the struggle of articulating
what constitutes a good reason, or a good analogy or a good distinction or of
examining the assumptions and implications of what is said. By what they think,
say and do, they show that they care about ideas and value good thinking – even
if they do not always exemplify it in their own behavior. If we can encourage chil-
dren to identify with the intellectual processes of these characters, then they too
will begin to practice these procedures of good inquiry and come to value them.
This view of narrative as a preparation for and a stimulus to children doing
philosophy matches, in part, Martha Nussbaum’s account of the relationship
 Philosophical novel 19
between moral education, ethical judgment and narrative. Noting that philos-
ophy must be directed to practical as well as theoretical concerns, Nussbaum
(1992), in her Love’s Knowledge, makes a compelling case for approaching ethical
judgment-making via the particular lives and complex predicaments of fictional
characters:

Without a presentation of the mystery, conflict and riskiness of the lived

deliberative situation, it will be hard for philosophy to convey the peculiar
value and beauty of choosing humanly well . . . It is this idea that human
deliberation is constantly an adventure of the personality, undertaken against
terrific odds and among frightening mysteries, and that this is, in fact, the
source of much of its beauty and richness, that texts written in traditional
philosophical style have the most insuperable difficulty conveying.
(p. 142)

All children are engaged in an adventure of making better judgments (whether

they realize it or not). This involves thinking, critical, creative and caring think-
ing, about many aspects of human experience that are not tapped by traditional
philosophy textbooks. Children who are in the process of building their own
communities of philosophical inquiry will use stories as a springboard or trigger
for their own further inquiry. What begins as reflection on a puzzling concept in
a story will move to a consideration of questions and ideas that come from the
children’s own experience. The stories themselves constitute a vehicle for young
persons to gain access to the realm of philosophical inquiry in such a way that
they can see the connection between their ongoing inquiry and their making of
better judgments in their daily lives.

What characteristics, elements and components do the books

concerning philosophy for Children need to involve?
  1. Each page should contain a variety of philosophical concepts that are com-
mon to most children of the age level, central to their experience and, most
importantly, controversial. These concepts should be so very obvious that it
would be very difficult not to notice them.
 2. Each chapter should present as puzzling some aspects of philosophical
inquiry, e.g., trying to identify what is a good reason or a good inference or
an important question.
  3. Each novel should have the fictional children themselves modeling the proce-
dures of philosophical inquiry: the richness and complexity of philosophical
dialogue, the differing of points of view, the analysis of inferences, reasons,
assumptions, analogies, the offerings of counter-examples and alternative
positions and the process of self-correction that goes on among the children
in the community.
  4. Each novel should model characters engaged in a growing care, respect and
sensitivity to each other’s philosophical styles and worldviews.
20  Ann Margaret Sharp
  5. Each novel should model a sensitivity to the emotions of others and how
these emotions influence the character’s points of view in the philosophical
dialogue.
  6. Each novel should model a cooperative and collaborative inquiry, a willing-
ness to build on the ideas of others, and eventually to identify with the work
of the group while at the same time constructing a sense of trust, care and
solidarity.
  7. Although a philosophical novel can focus on one aspect of philosophy (e.g.,
in my Nakeesha and Jesse for 5–6 year olds, I focus on philosophy of body)
but should include as many dimensions of philosophy as possible (ethical,
logical, aesthetic, epistemological, metaphysical, etc.).
  8. Each novel should embed the philosophical concepts and procedures deeply
within the daily experience of the fictional children in such a way that the stu-
dent readers will feel that it really matters to figure out what these concepts
mean and what these procedures can deliver in the way of meaning.
  9. Drawing on the history of philosophy, each novel should present different
views about philosophical concepts and procedures, so as to encourage chil-
dren to enter the philosophical conversation and think for themselves about
the meaning of these concepts and what role they play in how they view
themselves and the world. These differing views can be voiced by different
fictional characters in language that is representative of their age level.
10. Each novel should model the judgment-making process in all of its complex-
ity (showing children engaging in critical, creative and caring thinking.)
11. Each novel should also model the children in the novel growing emotionally
and socially, as well as cognitively.
12. Each novel should model an adult teacher as philosophical facilitator, as inter-
ested in the outcome of the inquiry as any individual child. Such a teacher
should refrain from lecturing, be willing to model philosophical inquiry for
the children in such a way that they can internalize the procedure and start
to practice it for themselves and by themselves. Good philosophy teachers
tend to be philosophically self-effacing, prone to asking open-ended ques-
tions. However, they are pedagogically strong in terms of helping children
master the skills needed to do good philosophical inquiry. They know how
to model these skills and are quick to point out alternative positions if others
do not, just as they are ready to question an analogy or ask for assumptions,
if the children in the group do not do it.

This is not to say that all fictional philosophy teachers should have the same kind
of personality or philosophical style . . . Some can be much more directive, prob-
ing, serious, fun-loving, grouchy, confident, outgoing, young, relaxed, timid,
conservative than others – but what they have in common is a certain wonder and
curiosity to find out about things that they think really matter and not assume
that they know the answers to these philosophically puzzling issues. Further, they
should model a respect for the ideas and feelings of children, as well as an ability
to establish an environment of trust and openness in the classroom.
 Philosophical novel 21

What are the differences between this kind of novel and other
novels at the children’s level?
Philosophy for Children novels are a new genre with a specific purpose: to invite
children to participate in the ongoing philosophical conversation about central
and common and controversial concepts that are embedded in human experi-
ence. In that sense, they have a strong didactic purpose and often are constructed
around a spine of traditional philosophical concepts and strategies designed to
reflect, on the one hand, aspects of the tradition of philosophy, and on the other,
the kinds of ideas and thinking styles which are welcomed by children who reflect
on their own experiences.
These novels are accompanied by manuals that:

1. point out the leading ideas to the teachers and give them some idea of the dif-
ferent positions that have been held about them in the history of philosophy,
2. provide teachers with exercises and discussion plans that are an attempt to
reconstruct the history of philosophy, on one hand, and involve children in
philosophical inquiry that probes the relationship of the concepts to their
own experience,
3. are also committed to giving teachers and students a myriad of exercises and
discussion plans that help them to refine their own thinking and become
conscious of the process of inquiry as it evolves.

Such raising of consciousness about one’s own thinking eventuates in children’s

self-correction, one of the chief traits of critical thinking.
Traditional literature for children does not have this didactic purpose, nor are
the stories accompanied by manuals that aim to involve children in the doing
of philosophy at a highly conscious level. Even though some might believe that
approaching philosophical issues through traditional literature is easier than
working from these purpose-written novels and manuals, I suspect that it is more
likely to be the other way around. In most countries, teachers are not prepared
in the art and craft of philosophical inquiry. Exploring the philosophical dimen-
sion of literature, and teaching children to do the same, requires an expertise that
cannot be taken for granted, especially given the complexity of a good piece of
literature.
Where analysis of plot and character development are crucial goals in a litera-
ture class, what one looks for in philosophy is a way into the thinking strategies
and ideas that lie beneath the surface of the story. Standard literature does not
set out to provide the reader with the tools needed for actually doing philosophy.
It is not concerned with concept formation and analysis, open-ended questions
and dialogue, generating speculative and creative hypotheses about the nature of
things, identifying the structure of arguments and fallacies of reasoning, or weav-
ing, in a reflective and self-correcting manner, the procedures of inquiry into the
story. These procedures often become the focus of attention in a philosophical
discussion, and it cannot be taken for granted that teachers and students will
22  Ann Margaret Sharp
simply pick them up in the course of analyzing a literary work. Even the recogni-
tion of a particular concept as controversial, and thus ripe for inquiry, is some-
thing that has to be learned through practice.
The philosophy for children story-as-text functions as an appropriate spring-
board to inquiry because:

1. These stories expose ordinary emotions and feelings to scrutiny without

putting real children and their problems under the spotlight. In this way,
the children can discuss the reasonableness of the character’s emotions and
together try to understand why they feel as they do.
2. In addition to their value as art, they portray philosophical practice as a craft
that can be taught and learned.
3. They present philosophical concepts, procedures and situations in real-life
contexts that are readily transferable for the children.

In summary, I would not say that the procedure that lies at the heart of philo-
sophical inquiry cannot be mastered by teachers and children using standard lit-
erature. But I think that this strategy, when compared with the application of a
structured didactic philosophical story-as-text is more difficult, and it is more
likely that the philosophical dimension of the dialogue will give way to literary
analysis or “explication de text.”

What are the differences between the P4C novels and some
philosophical stories, such as Sophie’s World by Jostein Gaarder?
Sophie’s World (Gaarder, 2007) is an ingenious story that aims to present the his-
tory of philosophy to children. Philosophy for children stories are an attempt to
engage children in the doing of philosophy itself. They constitute a reconstruc-
tion of the history of philosophy in such a way that it is embedded in fictional
children’s experience. This reconstruction models the inquiry process, motivates
the children to inquire and facilitates the children in the classroom relating the
concepts and procedures of philosophy to their everyday life.

You have written some novels and short stories in other series.
How is it possible to intersperse each page in these stories
with lightly concealed philosophical meanings, problems and
relationships?
I have written a number of philosophical short stories and have constructed three
programs in philosophy for children, two (The Doll Hospital (Sharp, 2006) and
Nakeesha and Jesse (Sharp, 2005)) aimed at 5–6 year olds, and the other, Han-
nah, with its manual, Breaking the Vicious Circle, aimed at early adolescents.
The Doll Hospital, with its manual, Making Sense of My World, focuses on the
procedures of communal inquiry while helping children become conscious of
the central philosophical concepts such as person, real, good, beauty, truth and
 Philosophical novel 23
identity. Nakeesha and Jesse, a sequel to The Doll Hospital, with its manual, Flesh
of My World, focuses on philosophy of body, while at the same time bringing
children’s attention to the ageless philosophical concepts that make up their
world: love, friendship, compassion, mind, self, knowing, time and exploitive
relationships.
Nakeesha and Jesse and Hannah, a program for middle school children, are
different in the sense that they also focus on a disturbing social problem: child
abuse. They are part of a project of La Traversee in Quebec, Canada (there are
seven programs in all) that aims to help children understand the problem of child
abuse and become conscious of strategies to prevent their being subjected to such
abuse. What is different about the approach is that, instead of giving children a
list of rules to follow, the issue of child abuse is introduced through an expo-
sure to philosophy of body, together with the ageless philosophical concepts that
underlie children’s experience. Further, children are afforded an opportunity to
practice self-consciously the various skills of critical, creative and caring thinking,
while probing philosophical concepts such as unjust relationships.
Whether I am writing a philosophical short story or a philosophical novel, to
the extent that the story deals with children’s questions, children’s puzzlement,
children’s daily experience, it is inevitable that philosophical concepts will arise.
What child isn’t interested in friendship and what child isn’t puzzled by fam-
ily relationships, time, space and what makes a person a person? On the other
hand, short stories usually allow for less attention to philosophical strategies and
procedures. It is at this point that the manuals accompanying these short stories
must introduce a variety of exercises on good reasons, good distinction-making,
good analogies, good inferences, assumption finding and logical fallacies. What
one often gains with a short story is an opportunity to focus on one central ques-
tion that is meaningful for young persons. For example, I remember writing a
short story on “Why Do People Have Babies”? This story (Jesse’s question) not
only afforded an opportunity to explore a question many children are interested
in, but allowed me to introduce concepts such as nature, love and relationships,
while at the same time exploring in depth what constitutes a good reason.

What are the differences among books concerning children of

different ages, during which children may have special demands?
If one studies the structure of the philosophy for children novels, one recognizes
quickly that the philosophical concepts appear again and again, whether the child
is four or eighteen. The reason for this is that most philosophical concepts are
ageless: we need them when we begin to speak and to put together some under-
standing of our world. Even if I am three, I have to have some working concep-
tion of friend, parent, self, body, mind, good, time and truth. For the most part,
children pick up these working conceptions from the incipient folk psychology
that permeates their family and neighborhood environment.
It is when children begin to do philosophy with their peers that they begin to
realize that many of these concepts are controversial: many people see things very
24  Ann Margaret Sharp
differently than they do. It is this problematic situation that gives rise to com-
munal philosophical dialogical inquiry.
On the other hand, there is a sequence to the introduction of thinking skills,
philosophical procedures and strategies. One does not present the whole of them
for consideration in the first book for four year olds. Why? It would be over-
whelming. But this is not to say that children of four are not engaged in perform-
ing many of these skills: it is just that they are not aware that they are doing it,
nor can they recognize when they are doing it well or doing it badly. Thus in
The Doll Hospital for children aged 4 or 5, I focus on two skills, contradiction
and hypothetical thinking, as well as introducing the children to the concept of
good reason, cause and effect and criteria . . . In Nakeesha and Jesse, I focus on
perceptual inference, while at the same time giving the children more practice in
hypothetical thinking and contradiction. Elfie focuses on distinction-making and
comparisons; Kio and Gus on thinking skills such as inclusion and exclusion and
detecting assumptions. Pixie focuses on analogical reasoning, while Harry Stot-
tlemeier’s Discovery focuses on formal reasoning, conversion, syllogistic reason-
ing, relational logic, informal fallacies, contradiction and hypothetical thinking.
One last thing on this topic: many people mistakenly think that the stories for
very young children should be less metaphysical, when just the opposite is true.
Very young children do not make the distinctions that older people make. They
see the world much more holistically and they puzzle over why it is the way it
is and how the parts are related to the whole. Because they are in the process of
acquiring language, they are not so quick to close off inquiry by engaging in lin-
guistic games or citing what they think is factual evidence. The young child, like
the philosopher of science, is not sure what a fact is or how something becomes
fact. In that sense, they are more open to counterfactuals, possible worlds and
alternative solutions to problematic issues.

What method in philosophy for children is used to teach reasoning

and judgment? What is the difference between this method and
the method for adults?
Adults who want to do philosophy with children learn good reasoning and good
judgment-making in the same way that children do:

1. by being exposed to a story that is problematic and motivates the reader to

inquire;
2. by constructing a community of inquiry with one’s peers in which the indi-
viduals learn how to listen to each other, question well, ask for criteria, reasons
and point out assumptions, build on each other’s ideas, offer counter-examples,
question the inferences of others, suggest alternative points of view, criticize
the analogies of one another, begin to understand the worldviews of one
another, construct new meanings and new relationships, develop a sensitiv-
ity to the feelings and emotions of each other, develop a love for the tools of
inquiry, especially self-correction, and follow the inquiry where it leads;
 Philosophical novel 25
3. by engaging in critical, creative and caring thinking: that is, becoming con-
scious of criteria, context and the need for self correction; thinking in terms
of alternative possibilities and asking each other to work out the conse-
quences of individual judgments in terms of the effect it would have on the
self, other and nature in general;
4. by developing certain dispositions conducive to communal inquiry: atten-
tive listening, imaginative sympathy for the worldviews of others, tolerance
for different positions, curiosity, wonder, compassion for persons and other
modes of nature, critical questioning, caring thinking, intellectual tentative-
ness, intellectual humility, sense of solidarity with one’s communal inquirers,
thinking in terms of possibilities, projecting ideal worlds and ideal selves, and
developing a love of egalitarianism and reasonableness.

It is suggested that the Philosophy for Children novels be translated,

but there are difficulties in doing this. There are ethical values
in the novels that the children of some countries would not
have sympathy with. Also, there may be a cultural spirit that is
inconsistent with the ethical values in different countries. How
can this difficulty be overcome?
The novels should not only be translated but adapted to the culture of the chil-
dren. This means that if there are some issues that would just never come up in
a certain country (e.g., in Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery there is the problem of
saluting the flag), then it is the task of the translator and adaptor to find a similar
issue that would provoke analogous open inquiry among the children. And it
stands to reasons that particulars can be changed to suit the culture: baseball can
become soccer; peanut butter and jelly sandwiches can become tacos, the names
of children should reflect the society in which the program is being taught. But
in a sense these are technicalities and a matter of skill on the part of the adaptor.
However, with regard to the inherent value for children of philosophy, with
its emphasis on communal inquiry and children’s coming to think for themselves
about philosophical concepts and procedures, I can say the following:
There is a big difference between procedural values and substantive values. It is
certainly true that Philosophy for Children (and I might say most philosophy) makes
a commitment to procedural values: questioning, egalitarianism, non-indoctrination,
critical judgment-making, open-ended inquiry, self-correction and democratic proce-
dures. These are the criteria that govern how the doing of philosophy proceeds in the
classroom, the how of the dialogical thinking, the how of communal inquiry.
However, the what of the dialogical thinking and communal inquiry is always
open. Philosophy for Children encourages children:

1. to be conscious of what others have said about an issue (and that includes
philosophers of the past, even if the child is not aware that the words spoken
by fictional characters are the words of Spinoza or Aristotle or Marx);
2. to be conscious of what one’s peers think about an issue;
26  Ann Margaret Sharp
3. to engage in reflective and communal inquiry with one’s peers about the
issue;
4. and, ultimately, to make a judgment. This judgment is a manifestation of the
child’s thinking for himself or herself about the issue under question.

For example, there are issues of dating and divorce and stealing, lying, child abuse
and exploitation that come up in the context of the philosophical stories. These
then becomes issues into which the children inquire, taking into consideration
contexts, consequences, projections of ideal personhood, ideal worlds, empathy,
good reasons, comprehensiveness. But ultimately they have to make up their own
minds whether in this particular circumstance lying or divorcing or stealing was
the right or wrong thing to do.
In other words, Philosophy for Children does not tell the child what to think:
ultimately that is up to the child. What it does do is give children the intellectual,
social and emotional tools that they need to think well, to think judiciously and
reasonably and, by means of the classroom community of inquiry, fosters the
care, commitment and courage to act on their thinking.

You have written some teacher manuals containing hundreds of

philosophical exercises and discussion plans. Can you tell me
about the experience and discuss the necessary contents of such
manuals and the way they are employed
Yes, I have collaborated with Professor Lipman on a number of manuals, and have
constructed three manuals myself in Philosophy for Children. First, I would like
to say that I have learned a great deal from Professor Lipman, most importantly,
how to construct exercises and discussion plans that truly foster philosophical
thinking and self-correction on the part of children. The experience of creating
manuals has been very rich and satisfying for the following reasons:

 1. It motivated me to restudy the history of philosophy and consider what

alternative philosophers have had to say on many philosophical issues.
  2. It goaded me to consider the myriad of philosophical procedures and how
they could be instantiated in such a way that children could practice them in
a way that was relevant to their own experience.
  3. It encouraged me to rethink the awesome, complex art of good teaching and
all that it involves.
  4. It motivated me to try to give teachers all the help I could in enabling them
to conduct good philosophical dialogues in their classrooms.
  5. It provoked me to listen carefully to the discourse of children in informal
environments: how they use words and concepts and how they try to reason
in such a way that they make sense to themselves and others.
  6. It called out my creativity in the sense that I found myself having to con-
struct a myriad of activities involving role playing, mime, song, dance, paint-
ing, and other modes of philosophical communication.
 Philosophical novel 27
  7. It forced me to explain the leading philosophical ideas to teachers in ways
that were faithful to the history of philosophy, while at the same time in lan-
guage that teachers could understand and relate to their own experience as
well as the experience of children.
  8. The more I became involved in the writing of manuals, the more I began to
see that much of good philosophy is the ability to ask the right question at
the right time in the right circumstances.
  9. The construction of the discussion plans revealed the complex and intricate
beauty of philosophical dialogue when it is done well. In other words there
is a strong aesthetic dimension to philosophical communal dialogue that can
be brought to consciousness and used as one means of student evaluation of
their own dialogues.
10. It heightened my respect for the depth and the potential of children’s think-
ing, children’s inquiry and children’s potential in making fine judgments
when they learn how to inquire together.

Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that there can be no doing of phi-
losophy on the part of children divorced from the transformation of traditional
authoritarian classrooms into democratic classroom communities of inquiry.
Such a community is a group of children who inquire together about common
problematic issues, offer each other reasons, give each other counter-examples,
question each other’s inferences and assumptions, encourage each other to come
up with better reasons for their view, offer alternative solutions to the problem
at hand, respect each other as persons and follow the inquiry where it leads. In
time, the children come to identify with the work of the group, instead of always
fixating on what they think. They slowly learn how to cooperatively build mean-
ings and commit themselves to an ongoing self-conscious reconstruction of one’s
worldview as the inquiry proceeds. This constructing and reconstructing of the
meaning of philosophical concepts and thus one’s own worldview is the hard
work of communal inquiry.
The classroom community of inquiry enables children to experience what it is
like to live in a context of mutual respect, disciplined dialogue and cooperative
inquiry free from arbitrariness and manipulation. Such a model permits the direct
practice of certain dispositions: interrelation of all participants for the equilib-
rium of the whole, preservation of what is thought of as valuable, tolerance for
different perspectives and fostering of care. The community of inquiry, at its
best, offers children an immersion into a democratic, epistemological, ethical
and aesthetic experience that can serve as funded experience of the group as they
begin to envision new possibilities, new relationships, new values. The growing
sensitivity to each other, the appreciative discerning of parts and wholes, the
imaginative manipulation of elements to construct meaning will be dependent
on the consciousness and quality of this immersion. As children become more
conscious of the various dimensions of the community of inquiry, they find that
28  Ann Margaret Sharp
it takes on more meaning: they come to truly care about its form, its procedures
and its outcome.
What children care about reveals to others and to themselves what really mat-
ters to them. To care is the opposite of being indifferent. Care is the source of
friendship, love, values, commitment, human tenderness and compassion. Such
care ties oneself to conviction. Once this tie has been established, it follows that
children are motivated to act on their beliefs. When children care, they feel they
must do something about the problematic situation. They must make some judg-
ment and then act.
The fostering of such care is important because, without it, valuational think-
ing, ethical thinking is impossible. With all our technology and wealth, there
exists among many young persons today a fear that maybe nothing ultimately
matters. The threat of this feeling is apathy, non-participation and the grasp-
ing for external stimulants. If children really don’t care about anything out-
side of survival, the possibility of creating a more just and peaceful world is
non-existent.
It is in this sense that the classroom community of inquiry offers children the
opportunity not only to discover and practice cognitive skills, but to discover and
create values, ideals and people they truly care about. It affords them an envi-
ronment in which they can grow emotionally, as well as cognitively, socially and
politically. It is in such a context that they experience authentic dialogue, respect
for each other as persons, a growing mutual trust and the ability to communicate
on a myriad of levels. This growing trust in the seriousness and commitment of
each other is invaluable in the education of the emotions.
Thus, if we are to foster caring inquiry (of which ethical inquiry is an
important component), much more is needed that an expertise in the practice
of logic and reasoning. What happens in participating in a classroom com-
munity of inquiry is that children become aware of a meaningful structure in
the relationship of their lives to each other and the world. They discover many
things about themselves and the world, but they also create many possibili-
ties as they proceed. As children come to commit themselves to communal
inquiry and all that it involves (including a commitment to the principle of
fallibilism) something much more important than fostering of thinking skills
is happening. Children find themselves living a democratic and inquiring form
of life that has intrinsic meaning and calls forth their care, their love and their
commitment. They discover themselves as cooperative inquirers, persons who
are feeling, intuiting, sharing, wondering, speculating, creating, loving and
willing, encountering the whole range of human experience with their class-
mates and teacher.
This is an experience of caring based on a trust that whatever happens in the
external world, communication, friendship, love, solidarity, creativity, meaning
construction, sharing of ideals such as beauty, justice, goodness and compassion
are what really matter. It does no good to “tell” young people this: they have to
experience it for themselves.
 Philosophical novel 29

References
Gaarder, J. (2007). Sophie’s world. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Nussbaum, M. (1992). Love’s knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sharp, A. M. (2005). Nakeesha and Jesse (S. Dekyndt, Trans.). Quebec: Les Presses
De L'université Laval.
Sharp, A. M. (2006). Doll hospital. Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational
Research.
4 Philosophy in the school
curriculum
Ann Margaret Sharp

What is the essential difference between philosophy for children

(P4C, PfC) and philosophy with children (PwC)?
Philosophy for Children and Philosophy with Children have a lot in common:
First, both see the doing of philosophy in a communal atmosphere as essential.
Secondly, teachers have a responsibility to be pedagogically strong and philo-
sophically self-effacing. What I mean by that is that their role is to model the
inquiry procedure sufficiently till the children have internalized the procedure
and can proceed by themselves. By philosophically self-effacing, I mean it is
not the role of the facilitator to be giving answers to the philosophical ques-
tions that are raised by the group. If asked for his opinion, he should not give
it until the children have been successful in mastering the procedures of philo-
sophical inquiry and will treat the teacher’s view as one more view to be taken
into consideration.
Thirdly, both see the moral dimension of the communal inquiry procedures
as important (respect for persons, learning how to listen to views very different
from one’s own, allowing oneself to enter imaginatively into different world-
views, so that one can understand the issue from the perspective of a world-
view very different from one’s own, refraining from calling names, accepting
of counter-examples, willingness to give reasons for one’s views, willingness to
self-correct, willingness to build on the ideas of others, willingness to put one’s
ego in perspective as the inquiry proceeds, etc.). Fourthly, both are aware of the
political dimension of communal inquiry with its commitment to reasonableness,
fallibilism, self-correction and democratic procedures of dialogue and inquiry.
But there are differences. Philosophy for Children is committed to the recon-
struction of the history of philosophy by means of stories and manuals – so that
children are exposed to the ideas of a variety of philosophers on issues that they
have agreed to inquire about. Most often these various views are presented as the
ideas of different children in the stories, or as options to be considered in exer-
cises and discussion plans in the manuals.
Thus, for Philosophy for Children, the sequenced and structured curriculum
is very important for pedagogical reasons. The stories are sequenced as to afford
children growing consciousness in the procedures of philosophical inquiry, while
 Philosophy in the school curriculum 31
at the same time presenting them with the ever-recurring, ageless philosophical
themes that are part and parcel of human experience (e.g., fairness, friendship,
love, self, rights, beauty and goodness.)
The manuals aim to refine the children’s ability to do philosophy with one
another (e.g., make better distinctions, inferences and judgments, give better
reasons for one’s own point of view, offer plausible counter-examples, suggest
alternative points of view, imagine better ways of organizing institutions, etc.),
while at the same time exposing them to the myriad of ideas that Western philos-
ophers have offered us. This refinement and exposure is accomplished by means
of exercises in which one practices the various skills of doing philosophy and
discussion plans that offer various philosophical views to consider before making
a judgment.
If there is any criticism I have of the existing Philosophy for Children cur-
riculum it is that it does not pay sufficient attention to the various philosophical
positions of the Eastern and Near Eastern philosophers – but hopefully this will
be corrected in the very near future as more philosophers from these areas begin
to develop their own curriculums.
It is my understanding that Philosophy with Children is not committed to the
use of a structured and sequenced curriculum that is aimed at the reconstruc-
tion of the history of philosophy and to the detailed practicing and refining of
philosophical skills in a manner that is accessible to young children, while at the
same time providing for the social, emotional, moral and political education of
the children.

The new paradigm of education called for by philosophy for

children appears to be resisted by school administrators. Why?
In the last chapter of Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery (Lipman, 1982), Lisa talks
about a poem that her father read to her called Mind. Unfortunately, she remem-
bers only the first and last lines. “Mind in its purest play is like some bat that beats
about in caverns all alone.” “And that in the happiest intellection a graceful error
may correct the cave.”
Earlier in the story, Jill had said that her thoughts were like bats, flying around
inside a dark cave. The poet here similarly thinks of our ideas as bounded by the
walls of our understanding. It sometimes happens that someone makes a mistake
and in the process changes the boundary lines. To an older generation, what was
done was an error, but as it turned out, it opened new vistas of understanding
and later generations look back on the idea as a stroke of genius. This is the way
it frequently is with explorers and discoverers. In their own day, they are consid-
ered simply wrong, but their discoveries cause a considerable reorganization of
human knowledge, and it is in the light of the more comprehensive understand-
ing that such discoverers are later considered right. The example given by Lisa
is Columbus. To the people of his day, he was a fool, but once his point of view
was understood, the rest of the world came around and began to share his way
of looking at things.
32  Ann Margaret Sharp
The move from one paradigm of understanding to another happens rarely, but
when it does, it is as if all our knowledge has to be rethought in light of the new
paradigm. Philosophy for Children could well be one of those “graceful errors
that correct that cave.” If its assumptions about the nature of education are cor-
rect, assumptions such as:

• Education should be primarily concerned with higher-order thinking

• Classrooms should be converted into communities of inquiry
• All disciplines should be taught in an inquiry way
• The underlying assumptions of each discipline should be brought to the
attention of children, and they should be encouraged to inquire about these
assumptions
• Children should be encouraged to inquire about the philosophical dimen-
sion of their daily experience once they acquire language
• Teachers should be thought of as facilitators who enable children to inquire
into problematic situations rather than as founts of knowledge
• A commitment to fallibilism and self-correction on the part of teachers and
students is an essential component of learning how to think well and to think
for oneself
• Education is primarily about helping children to make better judgments

it follows that all the components of traditional education need to be rethought,

including the curriculum, the role of the teacher, the purpose of grading, indi-
vidual vs. social inquiry, competitive activities in the school, the architecture of
schools and classrooms and the aims of education itself.
This can be quite upsetting for those who thought they understood the nature
of education as the accumulation of knowledge. The new paradigm of education
questions all the aims, objectives and practices of traditional education and calls
for a new understanding of what education is all about.
Such change involves the reform of teacher education, the rethinking of school
buildings, the restructuring of the curriculum, the rethinking of the role of the
teacher in the classroom community of inquiry, and a rethinking of the role of
administrators in schools committed to ongoing inquiry, critical, creative, caring
and collaborative thinking and inquiry. This kind of change can be not only quite
expensive but also quite frightening and threatening to those who are committed
to maintaining the status quo.
Nothing is as hard for a human being as moving from one paradigm to
another because it requires that she rethink everything – reconstruct every-
thing she thought she knew – and begin again to try to make sense of things
in a whole new world of understanding. Being the creatures of habit that we
are, we are bound to resist, and yet the progress of humanity is dependent
on the more comprehensive understanding of the new paradigm and the
willingness to change. Ultimately, to refuse to change is to be left alone in
the “dark ages.”
 Philosophy in the school curriculum 33

Is it possible to do philosophy with school children without using

a philosophy curriculum especially designed for this purpose?
The curriculum developed by the IAPC constitutes a genuine philosophical cur-
riculum in two senses:

• First, the philosophical content is part of the content of philosophy as it has

evolved in the West for the past 2,500 years. The concepts, procedures and
questions that fill the novels and manuals are borrowed from a long history
of philosophy beginning with the pre-Socratics.
• Each program in the curriculum (novel plus manual) has a structure compris-
ing a range of concepts and procedures, so that children, who work through
the materials, taken separately and also in sequence, see themselves moving
from one point to another. This is not surprising, given that each story is
constructed around a spine of philosophical concepts and strategies designed
to reflect, on the one hand, aspects of the tradition of philosophy, and on the
other, the kinds of ideas and thinking skills that are welcomed by children
who reflect on their own experiences.

However, if philosophy is to become an integrated and accepted component of the

school curriculum, I do acknowledge that there is a need to develop a broad range
of classroom materials. Some of these might not pass the test of time. Others have
and will become the subject of debate as to their philosophical and/or pedagogi-
cal worth. No doubt, the original IAPC curriculum will need to be updated and
expanded to take into account Eastern philosophy and additional sub branches of
philosophy (e.g., philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, etc.).
Thus it is only through the gradual creation of a broad corpus of philosophical
materials rendered appropriate for classroom use and reflecting more and more
of the heritage that is handed down from generation to generation that we will
begin to see philosophy in schools taken seriously.
At present, philosophers and teachers in many countries are constructing, pub-
lishing and piloting philosophical stories for children, ranging from a few pages to
full-length novels and accompanied by manual-style resource books for teachers and
children, which focus on identifying and exploring key philosophical concepts and
providing philosophical exercises and discussion plans that will motivate philosophi-
cal inquiry in the classroom. These stories cover a wide range of themes and age
groups and are often the result of collaboration that includes the children themselves.
There are others who think that philosophy can be taught using standard literature.
Although certainly possible when taught by a professional philosopher, I think that
there are certain things we should consider when using such literature in the class-
room. Even though some might think that approaching philosophical issues through
picturebooks and novels is easier than working from a pedagogically designed phi-
losophy curriculum, I suspect that it is more likely to be very difficult for the class-
room teacher. In most countries, teachers are not trained in the art and craft of
34  Ann Margaret Sharp
philosophical inquiry. To explore the philosophical dimensions of literature – and
to prepare children to do the same – requires an expertise that cannot be taken for
granted, especially given the complexity of a good piece of literature. Since analyses
of plot and character development are crucial goals in a literature class, what one
looks for in philosophy is a way into the thinking strategies and ideas that lie beneath
the surface of the story. The philosophical story-as-text provides a direct passage for
the child and teacher to these procedures and ideas, though it does not, of course,
guarantee that the task of actually doing philosophy will be accomplished in the class-
room well. Whether the children end up doing philosophy depends a great deal on
the ability of teachers and how well they have been prepared.
Standard literature does not set out to provide readers with the reasoning skills,
concept formation skills and inquiry skills necessary to do philosophy well. Analy-
sis of concepts, open-ended questioning and dialogue, generating speculative and
creative hypotheses about the nature of things, identifying the structure of argu-
ments and fallacies of reasoning, or weaving in a reflective and self-correcting
manner the procedures of inquiry into the primary subject is usually not its con-
cern. These procedures often become the focus of attention in a philosophical
discussion, and it cannot be taken for granted that teachers and students will sim-
ply pick them up in the course of analyzing a literary work. Even the recognition
of a particular concept as controversial, and thus ripe for inquiry, is something
that has to be learned through determined practice.
The stories in Philosophy for Children function as appropriate springboards to
inquiry because:

• They expose ordinary emotions and feelings of children to scrutiny without

putting real children and their problems under the spotlight.
• They provide an immediacy that helps the child connect the philosophical
concepts and practice with their own daily experience.
• They model philosophical practice as a communal dialogical process which
can be practiced by ordinary children.
• They present philosophical concepts, procedures and situations in real-life
contexts which are readily transferable.
• They provide a common focus for inquiry, dialogue and meaning making.
• They provide a means of binding the community in solidarity as they col-
laboratively struggle with their own inquiry.
• Philosophical stories provide endless opportunities to engage in moral imagi-
nation, necessary for augmenting the critical deliberation for good judgment.
Principles alone cannot give us what we need for wise decision-making. The
philosophical story gives the children a particular context with particular
characters in particular situations, which necessitates the children’s coming
to attend to this particularity when discussing the questions raised by the
text. Thus, philosophical stories, if they are any good, model the complex-
ity of life. The children in the community take account of this complexity.
They find themselves engaging in a vicarious experience, dealing with these
complexities as best they can in coming to some judgment.
 Philosophy in the school curriculum 35
Iris Murdoch asserts that it is this common text that is crucial to the concept
formation work that is to be done by the group, as well as to understanding what
others say and why they say it. This understanding involves a slow progressive
ability to enter into the worldview of others. Without a common text for focus,
communication may break down and the same words may occasion different
results in different hearers. Human beings can become obscure to each other in
certain respects, unless there are mutual objects of attention that call for dialogue
and systematic inquiry. Being able to return to the text when confusion reigns is,
from a pedagogical point of view, most important.
And what of those who think that you do not have to use any curriculum at
all to teach philosophy – that one can rely on discussion of children’s experience
to provide enough context to motivate a good philosophical discussion? Again,
this might be so, if the discussion is being facilitated by a professional philosopher
who (a) knows the history of philosophy well, (b) can hear the philosophical
dimension in what children say, (c) knows how to model the philosophical pro-
cedures and skills that are necessary to do philosophy well, (d) can invent discus-
sion plans on her feet as the conversation proceeds so as to delve deeper into the
philosophical dimension and (e) knows how to involve a classroom discussion in
a philosophical dialogue that focuses on philosophical issues.
The problem is that most classroom teachers are not prepared to do this. They
need help from a sequenced curriculum that highlights the important concepts
and provides exercises and discussion plans that help children to perfect their
reasoning skills while at the same time encouraging them to explore philosophical
concepts and their meaning as they affect their daily behavior.
But if one is interested in bringing philosophy to the elementary school cur-
riculum, one cannot rely solely on professional philosophers to make philosophy
happen in the classroom. Teachers must be prepared to teach philosophy and
teachers need a curriculum.
If philosophy is to enter the curriculum, it has to be much more than a mere
time slot for teachers and children to do philosophy in an ad hoc and unstruc-
tured manner with a professional philosopher. There may well be much to criti-
cize in the teaching of disciplines such as history, science and mathematics. But
few would seriously suggest that a curriculum in one of these subjects would
consist of a random collection of stories or an ad hoc discussion about the math-
ematic, scientific or historical dimension of some common experience of some of
the children in the room.
Serious philosophical inquiry involves the study of a structured philosophy
curriculum. Of course, it doesn’t have to be the IAPC curriculum, but that par-
ticular curriculum can serve as an exemplar of what such a curriculum would look
like. Of course teachers should encourage their students to read, think and talk
philosophically across a broad range of contexts and materials. But such encour-
agement is more likely to bear fruit when these same students are given the oppor-
tunity to engage in philosophy as a discipline and a curriculum. We must face the
reality that if we want to bring a sense of structure, continuity, comprehensive-
ness and even profundity to philosophy in the classroom, finding a collection of
36  Ann Margaret Sharp
philosophical themes and concepts within the pages of a picturebook or novel or
an isolated experience of some children is not likely to do the job.
Thus, in practical terms, I would recommend the following: proceed by way of
a structured and expanding philosophy curriculum to a broader range of stimulus
materials and resources. To an extent, this recommendation reflects current prac-
tice, for many people in different parts of the world are engaged in trialing both
purpose-written materials and standard literature, in a cooperative effort to bring
philosophy into the mainstream curriculum.

Why do you make the assumption that waiting till someone is

university age is too late to improve young people’s thinking?
I wonder what would happen if we waited till a child went to university to teach
her mathematics, or scientific inquiry or history or how to read or write? One
might question why one would do such a thing, if the child were more than able
to start learning these disciplines throughout the formative years of her life. Why
then do we think that the practice of philosophy should be postponed until one
has finished adolescence?
The older we are, the more socialized we become. Philosophy involves the
acquisition of many dispositions that are in conflict with the socialization process,
dispositions to question, to be critical, to look for assumptions, to analyze the
inherent meanings of practices, especially their ethical consequences, to consider
alternative ways of looking at things and to self-correct.
To introduce philosophy to university age students often involves as much
unlearning as learning. Young children do not have this problem. Once they
acquire language, they are naturally social, wondering, curious persons who are
motivated to make sense of their world. Since they know little, they are open to
a variety of alternative ways of looking at things, and they often are willing to
self-correct much easier than young adults who are so convinced that they know
so many things.
Lipman (2003) says in Thinking in Education that to withhold from children
access to philosophical ideas, and procedures, reasoning skills and criteria for
good judgment and yet to expect them to judge well is like withholding air from
them and expecting them not to suffocate. And how else are we to make these
intellectual tools available to children if not through a series of courses in phi-
losophy, redesigned so as to be accessible to children? If they are afforded no
opportunity to compare and contrast the reasons people have for calling things
true and good, how can they be expected to know what they are talking about
when they are asked to decide which statements are true and which are not, or
which things are good and which are not?
Many years ago, Margaret Donaldson (1986) in her Children’s Minds pro-
duced evidence that Piaget’s assumption that children need be about 12 or 13
before they can engage in formal operations and inquire about abstract concepts
was incorrect. Children are as able to practice thinking and reasoning skills with
their peers as well as they are able to do mathematics or science, read and write.
 Philosophy in the school curriculum 37
There is at present a widespread recognition in education that something is
amiss, but efforts at improvement often turn out to be merely cosmetic. There is
nothing wrong with attempting to infuse critical thinking into the teaching of the
disciplines. But these efforts at infusion are bound to be fumbling, haphazard and
unavailing as long as children are not permitted to examine directly and for them-
selves the standards, criteria, concepts and values that are needed to evaluate what-
ever it is they are talking and thinking about. Merely to encourage differences of
opinion, open discussion and debate will not provide a comfortable escalator to the
improvement of thinking. This will happen only if students are given access to the
tools of inquiry, the methods and principles of reasoning, practice in concept analy-
sis, experience in critical reading and writing, opportunities for creative description
and narration as well as in the formulation of arguments and explanations and a
community setting in which ideas and intellectual contexts can be fluently and
openly exchanged. These are the educational conditions that provide an infrastruc-
ture upon which a sound superstructure of good judgment can be erected.
Those who are willing to devote themselves to a redesign of education should
take the objective of fostering good judgment among children learning very seri-
ously. For if freedom involves both the freedom to choose among alternatives and
the freedom to carry out those alternatives that are selected, then children need
to be made aware of the alternatives that are open to them, to help them discover
the means needed to achieve these objectives and to become conscious of the
consequences that might possibly flow from their realization.
To be sure, children’s liberation entails much more than the liberation of judg-
ment, but this cannot conceal the fact that the fostering of good judgment is an
indispensable component of children’s becoming free.
People sometimes remark that actually doing philosophy with one’s peers is too
much for children, and yet if one studies the video tapes of children around the world
doing philosophy, one concludes that not only can they do it well with a teacher who
knows what she is doing, but often can do it as well, if not better, than adults.
One of the most impressive pieces of evidence that we have of children doing
fine philosophy is Michel Sasseville’s (of the University of Laval in Quebec City)
television series. He, with the help of his graduate students, has just finished 15
series of children doing philosophy that will be shown on public TV throughout
all of Canada. As the children proceed, there is a voice-over (Michel’s voice)
pointing out the various philosophical moves that the children are making as they
collaboratively inquire. Some of the children are as young as five years old. This
television series, in turn, became the text for an Online Introductory Course in
Philosophy for Children for Teachers that is now available worldwide.

What is the relationship between philosophy for children (philo­

sophical inquiry) and scientific inquiry?
When we talk of inquiry, we mean a self-corrective practice in which a subject mat-
ter is investigated with the aim of discovering or inventing ways of dealing with
what is problematic. Inquiry often begins when problems arise regarding things,
38  Ann Margaret Sharp
which till then had been taken for granted. The products of inquiry are judg-
ments. We can have historical inquiry, religious inquiry, mathematical inquiry,
aesthetic inquiry, language inquiry, scientific inquiry and philosophical inquiry.
When we speak of general inquiry skills, we are speaking of:

• Feeling of difficulty or frustration

• Doubt
• Formulation of the problem
• Hypothesis formation
• Efforts to test the hypothesis
• Discovery of evidence which contradicts the hypothesis
• Revising the hypothesis to account for contradictory evidence
• Applying the revised hypothesis to life situation

It is primarily through inquiry skills that children learn to connect their present
experiences with what has already happened in their lives and with what they
can expect to happen. They learn to explain and predict, to identify causes and
effects, means and ends, means and consequences as well as to distinguish these
things from one another. They learn to formulate problems, estimate, and meas-
ure and develop the countless proficiencies that make up the practice association
with the process of inquiry. Most important, they learn how to self-correct.
When a classroom has been converted into a community of inquiry, the moves that
are made in order to inquire collaboratively are many. As the community proceeds
with its deliberations, every move engenders some new sense of what is required.
The discovery of a piece of evidence throws light on the nature of the further evi-
dence that is now needed. The disclosure of a claim makes it necessary to discover
the reasons for that claim. The making of an inference compels the participants to
explore what was being assumed or taken for granted that led to the selection of that
particular inference. A claim that several things being discussed are different demands
that the question be raised of how they are to be distinguished. Each move sets up a
train of countering or supporting moves involving reasoning and concept formation
skills. As subsidiary issues are settled, the community’s sense of direction is confirmed
and clarified, and the inquiry proceeds with renewed vigor.
In time, the community might make some final judgment. But we should not
delude ourselves with regard to these occasional settlements. They are perches or
resting places, without finality. As Dewey (1938) puts it:

The settlements of a particular situation by a particular inquiry is no guar-

antee that that settled conclusion will always remain settled. The attainment
of settled beliefs is a progressive matter: there is no belief so settled as not to
be exposed to further inquiry. In scientific inquiry, the criterion of what is
taken to be settled, or to be knowledge, is being so settled that it is available
as a resource in further inquiry; not being settled in such a way as not to be
subject to revision in further inquiry.
(Logic, pp. 8–9)
 Philosophy in the school curriculum 39
If we were to redefine teaching and learning as inquiry-based activities,
­children and teachers could participate in the process, while at the same time
improving thinking in both students and teachers. Moreover, the school dis-
ciplines that shape our knowledge are themselves forms of inquiry – content
enlivened and enriched by the ongoing processes of inquiry. In this inter-
weaving of process and content, the concepts that are integral to the disci-
plines play a crucial role, as do the thinking procedures that are common to
all the disciplines.
In practice, this means that teachers of science must tap into the conceptual
cases of their discipline and allow their students full scope to explore contestable
issues as they arise. As students gain an understanding of what it means to think
scientifically, they will be well placed to integrate those aspects of the discipline
that past generations have deemed to be of value. They will also come to appreci-
ate that the discipline of science is itself interconnected in various ways with other
disciplines, not entirely separate and unconnected, as the traditional school cur-
riculum would lead them to believe.
Philosophical inquiry, however, is more than scientific inquiry. It is concerned
not only with empirical problems but also with conceptual problems, logical
problems, epistemological problems, ethical problems, aesthetic problems, social
and political problems – all of which may or may not have relevance to a particu-
lar scientific inquiry.
And there is something else. In Experience and Nature, Dewey (1925) puts forth
a conception of philosophy as criticism. He locates philosophy as a special non-
scientific form of cognition that is concerned with the judgment of value as a unique
form of inquiry – a judgment of judgment, a “criticism of criticism” (p. 398).
We turn to communal philosophical inquiry to find out not only what we
value, but also what we can judge valuable, reasonable and just. In other words,
philosophy is not descriptive but normative. It aims to help us to inquire into
what we ought to do to bring about a better world.
It is in this sense that the function of philosophy is to bring about a join-
ing of the new and the old, to articulate the basic principles and values of a
culture, and to reconstruct these into a more coherent and imaginative vision.
Philosophy is therefore essentially critical and, as such, will always have work to
do. Indeed, in pointing the way to new ideals and in showing how these may
be effectively realized, philosophy is one of the means we have for changing a
culture.
Philosophy then is not some merely descriptive undertaking; nor is it a remote
undertaking disengaged from the economic, social and political context in which
we do not find ourselves; nor can values be ascertained without reference to the
problems and conditions of human life. Nowhere can the function of reconstruc-
tion of human experience and criticism be better appreciated than in transform-
ing classrooms into communities of philosophical inquiry.
In summary, I would say that all good science teaching involves not only
inquiry but also philosophical inquiry. However, it does not follow that all philo-
sophical inquiry involves scientific inquiry.
40  Ann Margaret Sharp

Can you discuss the applied philosophy movement in the United

States and why Lipman thinks that Philosophy for Children
is the last achievement of applied philosophy? How did this
movement lead to Philosophy for Children?
I think the applied philosophy movement in the U.S.A. was an outgrowth of the
Sixties and the social and political consciousness of those times. As a culture we
began to realize that there was a need for medical ethics, nursing ethics, environ-
mental ethics, counseling informed by philosophy, business organizational ethics,
police ethics, etc. etc. Further, it was thought that to do any of these things, one
would need a general understanding of philosophy and its many sub-disciplines
and how they relate to the enterprise at hand. For example, one cannot engage in
police ethics without metaphysical, logical and epistemological considerations as
they relate to the question “what is a person”?
The Sixties were also a time when we became conscious of the sexism and rac-
ism that pervaded our society. Thus, courses in Feminist philosophy and Black
philosophy appeared in many universities. These courses, although more general
than Business Ethics or Medical Ethics, could not be divorced from the general
area of applied philosophy.
When Lipman says that Philosophy for Children is the last achievement of
applied philosophy, I would think that he probably means that it is the most gen-
eral. If we are successful in transforming traditional classrooms into communities
of philosophical inquiry, we are preparing the entire next generation with the
social, emotional, cognitive and inquiry skills, dispositions and procedures that
they need to be participatory, informed, critical, creative and caring citizens of
the world.

Are we involved in a vicious circle in disseminating philosophy for

children? Parents who have not been educated in communities
of philosophical inquiry do not value such an education for
their children. Are there any methods to promote thinking
skills in adults?
I do not think we are necessarily involved in a vicious circle in bringing philoso-
phy to the children of the world. If one looks around the world, one sees philoso-
phy in schools thriving in many countries and on many continents. One reason
for this is that the general public is conscious that something essential has been
missing from public education – that something is askew or wrong with how
traditional education is preparing children to enter into the world of the 21st
century – and they are willing to take the steps necessary to change the paradigm
of good education in their states and nations.
Secondly, if one studies the original curriculum of Philosophy for Children, one
begins to realize that the process of philosophical dialogue, once mastered, does
not stop at the doors of the school. Often the fictional children bring home issues
for discussion, and parents find themselves drawn into philosophical inquiry at
 Philosophy in the school curriculum 41
the dinner table or in the car. Discussions on “what constitutes a good reason?”
or “how do we know when we have made a good judgment?” or “should we eat
meat?” can become part of the daily experience of parents and children.
One teacher educator in Hawaii tells the story of one kindergarten child who
participated in a community of philosophical inquiry and returned home to find
his parents arguing. He felt quite helpless, but stayed in the room. His mother
was saying, “You never listen to me.” His father responded, “I always listen to
you, all the time.” At this point, the child entered the conversation. “At school,
we learned that we can tell when we are listening to each other.” “And how can
you tell?” asked his father. “If you can repeat what the other person said in your
own words, then you were probably listening,” responded the child. “Daddy, can
you repeat what Mommy said in your own words?” Daddy, winking at his wife,
answers, “I don’t think so, Peter. I guess I wasn’t really listening to Mommy.”
Finally, there is much evidence in the world that teachers can be prepared not
only to think well, but to transform their classrooms into communities of philo-
sophical inquiry. Teacher education workshops in Philosophy for Children are
part and parcel of staff development in many countries. For the most part, the
adults are invited to do philosophy much as the children will in the classroom.
They are asked to read a section of the novel-as-text, to identify questions or
issues that they might want to inquire into and to participate in the communal
inquiry that ensues in an effort to investigate the question.
These workshops are conducted by prepared philosophers who have good
experience with the curriculum and with the various procedures of good philo-
sophical inquiry. They know when to turn to a discussion plan or exercise to
deepen the dialogue; they model the asking of appropriate follow-up questions,
they know how to call for alternative views, counter-examples and identification
of assumptions. Further, they know how to create an atmosphere of trust and
respect for persons that is conducive to people probing into their own assump-
tion and questioning their validity in collaboration with other adults.
Such teacher educators are also experts in setting up various criteria for what
constitutes a good community of philosophical inquiry and helping the teachers
to evaluate their own discussions with an eye to self-correction. Teacher educa-
tors, like good teachers in the classroom, model the adage to be pedagogically
strong, but philosophically self-effacing. Thus, they are successful in eliciting
alternative views from adults and modeling procedures to try to help them decide
among these alternatives, or perhaps cooperatively create new alternatives. It has
been my experience that, in time, the teachers can internalize these procedures
and one day find themselves conducting philosophical discussions in the class-
room with their own students.
Such teachers very often consider themselves very lucky to be involved in an
inquiry that equally stimulates their wonder, their curiosity and their willingness
to actively engage in inquiry regarding their own assumptions and beliefs.
As Matthew Lipman (2003) says in Thinking in Education, teachers, whose
professional life is given over to making judgments of how best to prepare students
to make good judgments about philosophical issues, often discover themselves
42  Ann Margaret Sharp
as co-inquirers involved in a practice that is most fulfilling and l­iberating for
themselves, as well as their students. As she becomes more and more involved in
teaching-as-inquiry, she finds her teaching taking on an excitement and joy that
is most satisfying.
Just think of how much we could move toward the new paradigm of education
as inquiry, if we could replicate these teacher workshops in the preparation of
prospective teachers in the myriad schools of education in the world.

References
Dewey, J. (1925). Experience and nature. Chicago: Open Court.
Dewey, J. (1938). Logic: The theory of inquiry. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Donaldson, M. (1986). Children’s minds (New ed.). New York: HarperCollins.
Lipman, M. (1982). Harry Stottlemeier’s discovery. Upper Montclair, NJ: IAPC.
Lipman, M. (2003). Thinking in education. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5 P4C and rationality
in the new world
Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp

Reason has been considered the most important characteristic of

human beings in some periods in history of thought. It was
called “the candle of Lord.” The Enlightenment rendered its
importance more and more. But in recent ages, postmodernism
has decreased the position of reason and didn’t see it as an
important possession of humanity. Then, we encounter the
grounding of human rationality now. In this situation, you are
one of the philosophers who want to return the old importance
to reason and reasoning and insist on its worthiness again.
By what foundations and how can we face the current (post­
modernism’s) irrationality?
We must confront those who dismiss rationality and reason and fail to see it as an
important possession of humanity. Human rationality must be grounded anew.
Its foundations must be freshly identified. Thus, Thoreau (1854) writes in Wal-
den: “If you have built castles in the air, your work need not be lost; that is where
they should be. Now put the foundations under them.”
This seems to characterize what we have done with philosophy when we recon-
structed it in order to sweep away its obsolete aspects while at the same time
holding fast to what is sound and relevant about it. Instead of appealing always to
reason or rationality, we have aimed to appeal to reasonableness, which we have
identified as reason tempered by good judgment.
Thus, Philosophy for Children is part of a worldwide effort to create a commu-
nity of philosophical inquiry – a community that embraces the rational as well as
the irrational, the empiricistic as well as the rationalistic. We deny that this makes
us neutral: instead, it is an effort to hold on to our integrity.
Another way of saying this is to say that philosophy in the classroom commu-
nity of inquiry always looks for an opportunity to nudge students in the direction
of reasonableness through practice in the making of judgments. If this requires a
curriculum that fosters feeling as well as thoughtfulness, ideas as well as emotions,
we can only say, “So be it!”
With regard to rationality, I am not sure there ever was a firm foundation for
it. Dewey realized this at the turn of the 19th century. If one reads Quest for
Certainty (Dewey, 1929), one senses his understanding that human beings are
44  Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp
very fallible creatures, yet capable of inquiry, reasoning, forming concepts and
dialogue – but always in need of an intellectual humility that helps one realize
that “one can always be wrong.”
But because absolutely certainty is not something we can ever attain, it does
not follow that one opinion is as good as another, or that one judgment is as
good as another, or that one reason is as good as another. There is a craft to good
thinking and, like any craft, we can learn it and, in practicing it, we can get better
at it, more refined, more insightful, more subtle, more wise.
In Philosophy for Children, we don’t focus on rationality but on reasona-
bleness: that is rationality tempered by good judgment. We also make certain
assumptions about what we can know:

a. fallibilism
b. the necessity for ongoing inquiry
c. all products of inquiry are warranted assertions, for that time – however, in
the near future, more data might come in that would cause us to revise what
we thought of as “warranted.”
d. the necessity of a shift of focus from knowledge (certainty) to understanding

To say the above is not to say that we give up the quest for reasonableness and
turn to irrationality. We can still help children to think critically, creatively (imagi-
natively) and caringly (ethically and appreciatively). Children who do so make
better judgments in their daily lives, judgments marked by appropriate criteria,
relevance, sense and attention to context.
To participate in a classroom community of inquiry is not only to learn how to
be critical (to detect assumptions, pay attention to context and self-correct) but
also to reflect – that is, to think about one’s own thinking. When we think about
our own thinking, we have more than “critical” standards: we also have ethical
and social standards, as well as aesthetic standards of appreciation, sensitivity,
imagination, originality, balance and harmony. When we think about our own
thinking, we are guided by ideals that we project, imagine and judge important,
ideals that really matter to us even if we can’t adequately explain them. Ideals like
goodness, beauty and truth. These ideals that we hold to be important are in a
sense part and parcel of who we are and how we go about our world.
Remember in Pixie (Lipman, 1988: 96) when Pixie says, “Is that why, when
we go to the movies, and at the end of the film, when the good guys win and the
bad guys lose, we just can’t help crying for joy, because we’re so happy to be for
a minute where everything comes out right?
And remember Brian’s response, “Yes, I think so. And that’s why we sort of
shiver when we see something beautiful or when we discover something True.
It’s like we’re back home where we belong again, and we’re happy.”
I guess one would say that we are empiricists rather than rationalists, because
in teaching children how to be sensitive to context and conscious of the criteria
they use in making judgments, we encourage them to recognize the differences
between rules that work in some contexts rather than others, until the differ-
ences emerge out of their experience rather than out of past theories. We want
 P4C and rationality in the new world 45
to encourage children to think about their own thinking, reflect upon their own
reflecting, so as to ground their individual inquiry into the inquiry that culture
makes into its own reflection.
Maybe that is why we stress practice at first only to be able to stress better practice
later on. We give priority to practicing inquiry in order to be in a better position to
give reasonableness priority over reason and to give inquiry priority over instruction.

Some people (for example, some psychologists, mystics, philos­

ophers, etc.) believe that thinking might deviate the usual
process of human life from the natural way and demolish it.
Thinking can destroy the tranquility of the individual as well as
the society. The less one thinks, the better s/he lives. Since we
cannot answer the fundamental questions, thinking (philosophy)
is destructive. Neglect is a virtue; life will be easy to the extent
that we are ignorant: ignorance is the key to happiness. . . . If so,
then not only is there no need to teach children to think but also
we must teach them to be free of thinking. What is your idea?
What is wrong with this view? How can it be criticized? Could
you discuss it, please?
I know there are those few who think that we would be better off without think-
ing; ignorance is bliss and intensive thinking can only cause one to suffer. How-
ever, I find it hard to take them very seriously if one is considering the education
of the next generation. If one did, one would do it as the expense of personhood
and autonomy. As Kant insisted, there are always those who are willing to do our
thinking for us, if we would rather remain ignorant.
Kant argued long ago that if one wants to be a person, the price is learning not
only how to think but how to think well, to think imaginatively, critically, respon-
sibly, reflectively and autonomously. For him, these are the attributes of beings
we call persons, self-conscious beings who are purposive.
Later, Dewey and others stressed that persons are beings who make judgments
and carry them out. They are beings who can self-correct. They are marked by the
ability to dialogue with others, to think about their own thinking and share their
thinking with others. They are beings who can project/create ideals and use these
ideals to regulate their behavior. They are the kind of beings who are willing to be
held responsible for their judgments and their actions. Further, they are the kind
of beings who need others to think and act well.
This is not to say that we must surrender completely to traditional claims of
reason. What looks like a return to reason in philosophy for children may be, in
actuality, a strengthening of its setting, with the result that we find ourselves hav-
ing to make new distinctions and definitions rather than rely on older ones that
work only awkwardly. Thus, for example, our renewed respect for the distinction
between process and product may lead us to toast the distinction between thought
and thinking or between emotions and feeling. Mind may become more and more,
rather than less and less, of a difficult a concept to work with, while thinking may
come to be more widespread and pervasive, and not at all a crony of ignorance.
46  Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp
At the same time, reasonableness, with its stress on the importance of making
good judgments, may be finding itself new allies where previously there had been
old enemies. On the other hand, there are newer and more productive relation-
ships to be found in, say, the notions of method and inquiry, emotion and think-
ing, experience and good judgment making. It could be that the experience the
world is having with children more than eager to do philosophy with each other,
more than eager to seek for a reasonableness world, is coming to be a more pow-
erful refutation of irrationalism that any we have thought of entertaining.

As Saint-Exupery (1943) propounded in the Little Prince, it

seems that there is something of a “class antagonism” between
children and grown ups (as feminists proposed between men
and women). The grown ups always think and decide instead
of children. They control children and give themselves, rather
than children, the right to make decisions. And children (unlike
feminist women) have no power or other means to revolt
against the grown ups’ supremacy. But now P4C arises and
wants children to think for and about themselves. Therefore,
it seems to be the first stage or spark of a children’s (thinking)
revolution for their rights. What is your view on this?
In chapter five of Harry Stottlemier’s Discovery (Lipman, 1974), Mark claims that
“All schools are bad.” Harry questions, “What makes them so bad?” and Mark
retorts “grownups.” Maria then says, quietly, “Mark, they’re only trying to do
what’s good for us.” “Yeah,” said Mark, “and you can be sure they’ll call it good,
no matter what they do.”
Of course, the above is a reconstruction of the dialogue between Thrasyma-
chus and Socrates in the Republic (Cornford, 1964) on the question, “What is
good?” But it also speaks to the antagonism between adults, who seem to have
all the power, and children, who seem to have little.
If one looks back on the history of women and their fight for their rights, we
remember that for many centuries men were always “thinking and deciding for”
women, just as adults today, in many places in the world, “think and decide for”
children. What changed all this is that women got together and began to think, to
dialogue, to share perspectives, to deliberate together. In time, they began to real-
ize that they had many common problems and that with numbers they eventually
came to have the strength to fight for their rights. In time, many women found
themselves no longer mute, speaking their views making choices and acting on
the world. Not all women, for sure. But some. Enough to give hope to the others
who are still in the position of having men make all their decisions for them.
It could very well be that the same will happen with children. As they gain
practice in thinking together, deliberating together, reasoning about matters of
importance, it is inevitable that they will realize that they have the capacity to
think well and to think for themselves and should be allowed into the conversa-
tion of humanity about matters of importance.
 P4C and rationality in the new world 47
The history of philosophy for children is marked with the initiation of philo-
sophical conferences run by children in Brazil. During the nineties, Children
who had at least one year of experience in doing philosophy in the classroom,
(somewhere between the ages of 8-–l4) wrote the papers, formed committees to
select papers, made the arrangements with the help of adults to run a two-day
philosophical conference in which they discussed such issues as environmental
ethics (our relationship to nature), children’s rights and the nature of justice. If
one were to study the transcripts of the papers submitted and accepted for the
conference, one would be amazed at the insight of these children in speaking on
issues that many adults are ill equipped to discuss or vote upon.
If this is the case, why shouldn’t children’s voices be brought to the global table
of deliberation with regard to many issues of global importance – issues that affect
children as well as adults? As Kant insisted, there are always people who want to
do our thinking for us. Children can protect themselves against such people by
learning how to think well, to think imaginatively and to dialogue and inquire
together, while at the same time paying close attention to their experience – that
imparts authenticity to what they teach themselves.
If we favor empiricism rather than rationalism, it is in part because we want to
encourage children to draw upon their own experience, just as students in a poetry
workshop should be encouraged to draw their poetry out of their own experi-
ences, and thus out of their own lives. Part of that experience hopefully will be the
living of the life of the classroom community of inquiry in which they will practice
the art of dialogue, deliberation and inquiry. As this practice grows and intensifies
worldwide, it is only a matter of time until children will be accepted at the table of
global deliberation. Till that time we, as adults, bear responsibility for speaking out
in favor of children’s rights to engage in philosophical dialogical inquiry.

In the Little Prince, the prince, after exploring the planet Earth
for some friends (when he arrived at a mountain that reflects
his sounds), thought that “the people have no imagination.
They repeat whatever one says to them.” This deficiency seems
to be a destructive result of modern civilization and its media.
The media, in spite of their primary aims, no longer wants
to promote the consciousness of people. Most of them like
people buy all things they propagate – whether intellectual or
material things. Conciseness and self-consciousness no longer
have any importance, unlike in the Enlightenment age. And
then money is going to be the only important thing – as some
thinkers browbeat us in the East. What made people abandon
reflection and rationality and forget most values? Considering
that P4C can neutralize such destructiveness, how can we face
these difficulties, such as alienation created by the media?
In The Evolving Self and other works by Czechseatmihalyi (1993), it was pointed
out that constant watching of TV has a deadening effect on the imagination and,
48  Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp
thus, the creativity of the human being. Children who watch a lot of television
tend to be passive, unimaginative and uncritical of the various desires created by
the media to influence young people to buy more and more.
The more the media has the power to transform active, inquisitive, curious,
wondering children into passive consumers, the more children themselves are in
need of a “form of life,” like the classroom community of inquiry, where certain
dispositions are fostered and skills developed that enable children to critically
analyze the media and its values to which they are exposed as well as the adequacy
of the institutions of the society in which they live.
What dispositions?

l. The disposition to detect assumptions, to question what everyone seems to

take for granted.
2. The disposition to seek alternative points of views.
3. The disposition to critically analyze inferences and analogies.
4. The disposition to give counter examples.
5. The disposition to listen to and take into account views that are different
from one’s own.
6. The disposition to regulate one’s behavior using ideals such as beauty, good-
ness, truth, meaning.

What skills?

1. Reasoning skills
2. Concept formation skills.
3. Inquiry skills.
4. Dialogical skills.
5. Emotional skills.
6. Social skills.

Children who do communal inquiry together often experience an intellectual,

social and emotional joy that is very different from the media consumer expe-
rience. They practice the art of deliberating as a procedure. When they argue
among themselves, it is not uncommon for them to challenge one another,
sometimes quite intensely. They demand to know the reason supporting this
judgment, or the meaning of this expression of what lies behind a certain point
of view. The community of inquiry experience teaches them that challenging is
good but it need not be heated. It is one among many cognitive procedures that
the participants actively perform in the course of their inquiry.
Their deliberations often involve them in a consideration of alternative point
of view through examination of the reasons supporting each alternative. Since
the deliberation usually takes place in preparation for the making of a judgment,
we speak of the process as a weighing of the reasons and the alternatives. Chil-
dren’s inquiry pursues an investigation of a matter of importance in an open,
self-corrective and contextualistic manner. It often culminates in a settlement that
 P4C and rationality in the new world 49
takes into account all the considerations and points of view, as well as the interests
of everyone. Children prod each other to think up possible worlds, new values,
new relationships, new ways of looking at things that could issue in a more rea-
sonable world. Such speculation is the stuff of creativity – the stuff of hypothesis
­formation – the stuff of real educational growth. And once one has really tasted
of it, one wants more and more because it allows one to experience qualitative
meaning experiences. As one child told me at the end of an exceptional session,
“that was great – it really hung together and we got somewhere. And I am as
surprised as everyone else with what we came up with . . . really surprised. It’s
wonderful. We’re wonderful.”
Such intense satisfaction in communal deliberation slowly builds a critical
stance based upon their own daily experience to the common social assumption
that money is the source of all happiness and that it is in owning “things” that
we find satisfaction. They know they have experienced intense happiness in a way
very different from what is portrayed in the media as satisfying.
Communal inquiry involves children in actively thinking for themselves about
matters of importance. In such inquiry, children discover not only that they are
persons but that they are active beings who can make a difference in the world.
In time, students find themselves taking pride in the originality of their responses
and a slow growing awareness of the insight of their classmates. The opinions of
others need to be respected, but they do not have to be mimicked. In a healthy
community of inquiry, students learn to build on each other’s ideas, although not
necessarily with identical architecture. They also learn that in a community that
urges the discovery of the other side of the question, there are many occasions on
which one may well be proud to be on that other side.
Children who live the life of the community of inquiry often experience deep
feelings of solidarity. Some children are often found to bond together in intense
friendships, which serve to allay feelings of powerlessness and alienation that are
often encountered in the larger society. They begin to realize that they are think-
ing persons who can inquire together in a productive manner. As they build on
each other’s ideas, they discover themselves as meaning makers, hopeful inquirers
interested in creating a more beautiful world.
As Brian says to Pixie, “And that’s why we sort of shiver when we see some-
thing beautiful or when we discover something true. It’s like we’re back home
where we belong again, and we’re happy.”

In your invented program (P4C), “thinking,” “deliberation,”

“reasoning” and “reflection” are very important and necessary.
These are characters that are frequently recommended in the
Islamic tradition, as our prophet says: “one hour thinking
[/reflecting] is better than seventy years praying.” These
characters can help us in two areas, individual and social, as
well as spiritual and secular worlds. The way that you speak
about applied philosophy and the importance of thinking is so
50  Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp

similar to our cultural point of view, as we believe a scientist

(thinker) who cannot (or does not) use his/her knowledge
is like a bee that cannot make any honey. This similarity and
agreement is very interesting to me. What is your idea about
this? Has your idea about thinking (P4C) got some Eastern
roots as well as Western?
(A) There is a saying that “One hour reflecting is better than praying for seventy
years.” How can reflecting help us? When one speaks of reflection, one is dealing
with the difference between consciousness and self-consciousness, that is, exam-
ining the world and examining the way one examines the world.
A creature may be highly adapted to its environment without ever having to
examine its own assumptions or methods of dealing with the world. Polar bears
may be well adapted to the Arctic, but they do not reflect what it is to be a polar
bear; nor do they consider by what alternative ways there might be for them to
cope with their environment in a more successful manner.
On the other hand, a creature may act toward itself without reflecting on its
own actions. For example, a cat chasing its tail or a monkey preening himself is
not reflecting. A boy who brushes his teeth every day is engaged in a habit, not
in the appraising of the habit.
The same principle applies to education of the young. One can be involved
in a classroom, studying many disciplines, and yet not be involved in reflective
education. One can even teach a particular discipline very well without engaging
in reflective thought about that discipline. Wherever there is progress, whenever
people go beyond what they have been doing, it is because they have felt a need
to reexamine the approach they are taking in the course of what they do. This
applies to engineers, artists and political officials. There is no reason why it can’t
apply to learners and teachers also.
Moreover, when a classroom community reflects on what they inquire about,
the adequacy of the procedures they use, the amount of understanding that has
been revealed or not revealed, the adequacy of the inquiry itself, the community
is reflecting. Such reflecting leads to self-correction, one of the essential charac-
teristics of persons.
(B) There is a saying in Persian culture that “a thinker who cannot use her
knowledge is like a bee that cannot make any honey.” Thus the importance of
applied or practical reasoning is something that both Persian and Eastern cultures
value. The application of knowledge and understanding is a judgment and the
fostering of better judgment is one of the most important aims of Philosophy for
Children. The curriculum to prepare children in good judgment making must of
necessity involve the fostering of:

• Critical thinking
• Creative thinking
• Caring thinking
• Education of the emotions.
 P4C and rationality in the new world 51
Why? Because it is the combination of all four that prepares the child to make
judgments that are appropriate, insightful and relevant. And these judgments in
turn determine the behavior of children in the world.

Another interesting characteristic of P4C is the importance that it

gives to dialogue. As for the new tendency to introversion and
lack of attention to the environment and society in which one
lives, this characteristic can be very useful, especially for children
and the young since they spend more of their time playing
computer games and watching TV programs than in the past.
Could you please explain the importance of dialogue in this age?
We see dialogue as being of inestimable importance in the present era, first because
it provides for communication and continuity within communities and, secondly,
because it makes such communication possible among communities. By fostering
the practice of communal inquiry in the classroom, philosophy for children provides
a model of the importance of dialogue within a school and within a society.
As children begin to do philosophy, they begin to question other children as
well as themselves. Instead of being mute, they begin to share their perspectives
in classroom discussion, as they move from having opinions to making judgments;
they begin to understand how the practice of philosophical dialogue leads them to
generate more reasonable questions, readings, friendships and taste. Such improve-
ment in their judgment leads to qualitatively richer experiences. Such improvement
in their experience leads to improvement that is based on such experience: they
teach themselves to look for and find the kinds of empiricism that welcomes ideas
and the relationships that such ideas rest upon.
Martin Buber’s espousal of dialogue is well known. He conceives of it as dis-
course in which “each of the participants really has in mind the other or others
in their present and particular being, and turns to them with the intention of
establishing a living mutual relation between himself and them.” Buber contrasts
such dialogue with monologue, which is self- serving; debates, in which each
treats the other as a position rather than as a person; conversations, in which
one is primarily concerned to make an impression on the other; friendly chats, in
which each considers himself absolute and legitimate and the other gelatinized
and questionable; and lovers’ talk, in which each is concerned with enjoying his
or her own experience. Buber proceeds to show the connection of dialogue with
thinking, on the one hand, and community, on the other.
The classroom community of inquiry is characterized by dialogue that is dis-
ciplined by logic. One must reason in order to follow the inquiry and where it
leads. The moves that are made by each participant to follow the inquiry where
it leads are logical moves, and it is for this reason that Dewey (1938) correctly
identifies logic with the methodology of inquiry. As the community of inquiry
proceeds with its deliberation, every move engenders some new requirement.
The discovery of a piece of evidence throws light on the nature of the further evi-
dence that is now needed. The disclosure of a claim makes it necessary to discover
52  Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp
the reasons for that claim. The making of an inference compels the participants to
explore what was being assumed or taken for granted that led to the selection of
that particular inference. A contention that several things are different demands
that the question be raised of how they are to be distinguished. Each move sets
up a train of countering or supporting moves. As subsidiary issues are settled,
the community’s sense of direction is confirmed and clarified and the inquiry
proceeds with renewed vigor.
Such dialogical deliberation is the experience of good education. Of course, we
should not delude ourselves about occasional settlements. They are perches or
resting places, without finality. Such settlements provide children with grounds
for assuming, warrants for asserting. They represent provisional judgments rather
than certainty for absolute convictions.
This process of dialogue is, in one sense, learning together and it is an example
of the value of shared experience. But in another sense, it represents a magnifica-
tion of the efficiency of the learning process itself, since students who thought
that all learning had to be learning by oneself come to discover that they can also
use and profit from the learning experiences and perspectives of others.
Having education revolve around inquiry represents a request that the class-
room be converted into a community in which friendship and cooperation would
be welcomes as positive contributions to a learning atmosphere, rather than the
semi-adversarial and competitive conditions that prevail in too many classrooms.
Communities of inquiry are characterized by non-adversarial deliberations,
shared perspectives, shared feelings, the cultivation of philosophical imagination,
the encouragement of deep reading, probing coupled with the enjoyment of
philosophical dialogue.
Children are avid for understanding, and as a result try to squeeze the mean-
ing out of every experience. Classroom communities of inquiry are dialogical
attempts to seek for meaning in somewhat the way that intensive care units in
hospitals are life preserving. In such communities, children learn not only how
to dialogue but how to deliberate together, while at the same time learning how
to think for oneself. It is a great realization when one becomes conscious of the
need that we have for other perspectives, other points of views, other worldviews
in order to discover what we really think for ourselves.

References
Czechseatmihalyi, M. (1993). The evolving self: A psychology for the third millennium.
New York: Harper Collins.
Dewey, J. (1929). Quest for certainty. Guifford Lectures.
Dewey, J. (1938). Logic: The theory of inquiry. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Lipman, M. (1974). Harry Stottlemeier’s discovery. Upper Montclair, NJ: IAPC.
Lipman, M. (1988). Pixie. Upper Montclair, NJ: IAPC.
Plato. (1964). Republic. F. M. Cornford, Trans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Saint-Exupéry, A. de (1943). Little prince. New York: Harcourt Inc.
Thoreau, H. D. (1854). Walden. London: Bibliolis Bk.
6 Doing philosophy with
children rejects Piaget’s
assumptions
Gareth B. Matthews

No doubt, Piaget was a great psychologist and his ideas have

constructed the foundations of traditional education systems.
However, it has gradually been found that Piaget’s theories
and ideas, as is true of other theories, have got some false
presuppositions and results. We know, for example, that Piaget’s
assumption that children need to be about l2 or l3 before they
can engage in formal operations and inquire about abstract
concepts is incorrect. What is your idea about the assumption?
Could you discuss its problems, please?
Piaget certainly was a great psychologist. In fact, he was the greatest and most
influential developmental psychologist of the 20th century. His early research led
him to the surprising conclusion that young infants do not even have the idea
that a ball or a toy is a “permanent object.” He tried to chart cognitive develop-
ment in children and concluded that there is first a “sensorimotor stage” (birth
to about 2 years), then a “preoperational stage” (about 2 years to 7), then a stage
of merely “concrete operations” (7 to 11), and then, finally, a stage of “formal
operations” (12 and up).
One serious trouble with this developmental story is that it makes no room for
philosophical thinking in children, at least in children under 12 years of age. But
we have ample evidence that young children sometimes have interesting philo-
sophical thoughts all on their own. I give many examples in my book, Philosophy
and the Young Child (1982).

Are there any other incorrect assumptions (or deficiencies) in

Piaget’s theory in this area? Would you please discuss them?
In our modern society, we tend to look to developmental psychologists to tell us
what it is like to be a child. But, by the very nature of their discipline, developmen-
tal psychologists focus on concepts and capacities that can be studied in a devel-
opmental way, such that, say, a 4-year-old can be expected to have only a primitive
concept or capacity, a 7-year-old, a more complex concept or capacity, and an
adolescent a mature concept or capacity. But the capacity to think philosophically
54  Gareth B. Matthews
does not standardly develop in this way. In fact, the 4-year-old and the 7-year-old
are more likely to have philosophically interesting thoughts and questions – even
engage in philosophical reasoning – than the “normal” or standard adult.
Another way of putting the point is this. To get our conception of what it
is like to be a child solely from the findings of developmental psychology is to
accept what I call a “deficit conception” of childhood. On this conception, to be
a child is essentially to be a human being who lacks certain capacities that grown-
ups standardly have. But we know that children are much better at, for example,
learning languages than they will be as adults. We should also know that they
are better at making aesthetically interesting and worthwhile drawings than they
will likely be as adults. Finally, they are much more likely to have philosophically
interesting thoughts as children than they will have as adults. So, even though we
can learn important things about childhood from developmental psychology, we
should not try to understand the nature or value of childhood primarily as a set of
deficiencies. Instead, we should open ourselves to the possibility of, among other
things, hearing interesting questions and interesting lines of reasoning from our
children. Moreover, we should engage them in discussions even on issues on
which we ourselves do not have settled opinions.

What do psychologists in the scientific community think about

the deficiencies of Piaget’s view about children’s intellectual
development? Do they agree with all of the criticisms?
Developmental psychologists today reject many of the specific claims that Piaget
made. But, by the nature of their discipline, they continue to focus on concepts
and capacities that can be seen to develop toward an adult norm. Since most
adults in our society are not very good philosophers, we need to complement
what we can learn from developmental psychologists about childhood with what
we can learn about children (and ourselves!) by doing philosophy with them.

We know that the traditional education systems were founded

on Piaget’s view about children’s intellectual development (at
least in my country). I think Piaget’s approach to education is
a Kuhnian paradigm of education against Dewey’s paradigm
of education (in which the aim of education is to strengthen
judgment and philosophy as inquiry and critical thinking can
and must be taught in classrooms). The two paradigms cannot
work together. (Apparently, Dewey himself had found that
his ideas on education when dropped into Piaget’s context of
education, were interpreted as and transformed into something
quiet contrary to his intentions). Now we find that P4/wC is
unworkable if we accept and recognize Piaget’s views. What is
your view on this? Can we reform elements of Piaget’s theory
to make it compatible with Dewey’s paradigm of education?
 P4C rejects Piaget’s assumptions 55

Or should we reject Piaget’s theory of children’s intellectual

development once and for all?
I think we have to supplement the findings of developmental psychologists with
what we can learn about children by doing philosophy with them.

In your two earlier books, Dialogues with Children (1984) and

Philosophy and the Young Child (1982), you argue that young
children are natural philosophers. This is a revolutionary,
interesting opinion in education and philosophy. In other words,
in addition to non-professionals, neither people who subscribe
to traditional theories of education or the proud philosophers
can agree with it. Can you explain your view in summary for
our readers, please? What does philosophy/philosopher exactly
mean in your view (in the cited quotation)? Why do people find
it difficult to accept that children are able to be philosophers?
In my judgment, the best way to become convinced that young children have
genuinely philosophical thoughts is not to define “philosophy” and then see
whether there is any evidence that children have thoughts that fit the definition.
The best way is rather to see whether anything that children say or ask is similar
to what some philosopher has once said or asked.
Thus, for example, it is not unusual for a young child to ask how we know that
we are not dreaming. Notoriously, this is an important philosophical question
that Descartes asked.
In my book, Philosophy and the Young Child, I report on Ian, who, at six
years of age, found to his chagrin that the three children of his parents’ friends
monopolized the television; they kept him from watching his favorite program.
“Mother,” he asked in frustration, “why is it better for three people to be selfish
than for one?” Ian’s mother seems to have suggested to him that three people
were being made happy rather than just one, namely, Ian himself.
According to Utilitarianism, this outcome should be morally right, since the
amount of happiness in the world was being maximized. In effect, Ian’s question
offers a way to criticize Utilitarianism. If maximizing happiness also increases self-
ishness in the world, can this outcome be morally justified? Elizabeth Anscombe,
a famous English philosopher of the late 20th century, once used Ian’s question
in a lecture she was giving at Oxford to criticize Utilitarianism. Clearly, Ian was
thinking an interesting philosophical thought.

References
Matthews, G. (1982). Philosophy and the young child. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Matthews, G. (1984). Dialogues with children. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
7 The difference between P4C
and PwC
Roger Sutcliffe

Introduction
Many centers around the world have started working with Philosophy for Chil-
dren (P4C). Many of them use PfC (or P4C) as the name of their activities.
For example, Matthew Lipman’s IAPC (Institute for the Advancement of Phi-
losophy for Children) uses PfC in its title. Others, however, have begun using
PwC instead, meaning Philosophy with Children. For instance, ICPIC uses PwC
to denote its activities. This makes us wonder: what is actually the difference
between the two? Are they two different approaches or just two interchangeable
titles describing basically the same type of activity?
Professor Matthew Lipman gave us some hints regarding the difference
between PfC and PwC in my earlier interview. He pointed out that: “Philosophy
with Children (PwC) has grown up as a small offshoot of Philosophy for Chil-
dren (PfC), in the sense that PwC utilizes discussion of philosophical ideas, but
not through specially written children’s stories. PfC aims to develop children
as young philosophers. PfC aims to help children utilize philosophy so as to
improve their learning of all the subjects in the curriculum.”

Now, Professor Sutcliffe, I would like to know your idea about

the differences between PfC and PwC. Can you, as one of
PwC-leaders, discuss the differences and distinctions between
them and the main character of PwC?
Well, the first thing I would suggest is that “PwC” – “Philosophy with Chil-
dren” – is not a well-formed concept, or at least not a well-formed organization.
Certainly there are no institutes or associations specifically promoting something
called “PwC” as distinct from “Philosophy for Children” or “PfC.”
But there is, of course, some thinking behind the concept! As I see it, one
reason why some people use the word “with” rather than “for” is indeed
to indicate that they are not necessarily using the materials which Professor
Lipman and his colleagues wrote (and which constitute a curriculum called
“Philosophy for Children”). This alternative wording is, in its way, a mark of
respect to that curriculum, since to use the phrase “Philosophy for Children”
 The difference between P4C and PwC 57
but not the curriculum might be regarded as pretending to do something that
it is not doing.
Another reason why some people use the word “with” rather than “for” is to
make clearer that the idea of “philosophy” in these cases is more like a process –
inquiry – that is shared with children, and not so much of a body of knowledge
that is being presented for them.
It is worth noting that ICPIC itself uses “with.” I cannot say if the reasoning
behind this was/is exactly the same, but I do believe that it is appropriate for the
international body to be ready to embrace approaches to philosophical inquiry
with children that may not follow exactly the curriculum that originated in the
United States.
To be reassuring, though, I find that most people who use the phrase “Philoso-
phy with Children” are very happy to acknowledge the debt their practice owes
to Professor Lipman and his colleagues. The process of philosophical enquiry
that they promote, generally referred to as “community of inquiry,” is not signifi-
cantly different from that promoted by “Philosophy for Children.”
If someone described himself or herself as “doing philosophy with children”
but did not follow or promote the traditional, community of inquiry, practice of
Philosophy for/with Children, they should, perhaps, make it clear that they are
not espousing that practice. There are, in fact, people and organizations in this
category in the UK, the rest of Europe, and probably elsewhere. Some acknowl-
edge a debt to the Lipman tradition, if only in its having raised the profile of
doing philosophy with children, but others distinguish themselves even to the
point of disparaging the tradition.
To return to the specific abbreviation of PwC, it seems to me quite accurate to
say that this represented an offshoot of Philosophy for Children.
However, insofar as PwC may be used to indicate any practice of philosophical
inquiry with children that does not use purpose-written material such as Lip-
man’s, it may be misleading to refer to PwC as a “small” offshoot of Philosophy
for Children. This is because many people in different countries are using stories
and other “stimuli” for philosophical inquiry that are not created specially for
that purpose. And if they were all to be described as doing PwC rather than PfC,
then those doing PfC might now, or before long, be the minority.
Actually, I do not think PwC is, or should, be used quite so sharply to divide
practitioners.
Firstly, there are people who describe their practice as “Philosophy with Chil-
dren” but who use the Lipman or other purpose-written materials as well as oth-
ers, for stimulating philosophical inquiry. And then there are people who describe
their practice as “Philosophy for Children” but who use stories and other “stim-
uli” for philosophical inquiry that are not created specially for that purpose, as
well as ones that are.
One could, of course, be very strict and say that either one is following exactly
the “Philosophy for Children” curriculum or one is not. I respect that point of
view, but personally think it is not flexible enough for the needs of differing cul-
tures or even differing children.
58  Roger Sutcliffe
On the other hand, I would regard it as ridiculous to attempt to specify what
proportion of purpose-written materials are to be used so as to put people into
one category or the other.
In the end, it seems to me, what unites those who describe themselves as doing
“Philosophy for Children” or “PfC” or “P4C” or “Philosophy with Children” or
“PwC” or “Philosophical Inquiry with Children” or “Philosophical Inquiry” or
“Philosophical Enquiry” (or whatever other label is taken to imply some big dif-
ference) is far more important than what might seem to divide them. The uniting
factor is, what I mentioned before: the guiding ideal of “community of inquiry.”

In your opinion, which approach is the best and most influential

in this area? Can you tell us your reasons?
I think I’ve more or less just answered that. The best approach is that which is
guided by the ideal of “community of inquiry.”
Of course, being an ideal, (but not a Platonic one!) that concept will mean
slightly different things to different people. (The realization that every concept
does mean a different thing to each person is, to my mind, a post-Platonic gift of
philosophy to human beings, but one they still ignore all too often!) But I believe
there is sufficient common understanding of the ideal among practitioners to
enable it to be translated into a recognizable and powerful practice.
I will not now explain my understanding of the common understanding, but
I am quite happy to assert that it has been shaped and influenced more by Pro-
fessors Lipman (1991) and Sharp (1987) than by any others – and that their
influence in this regard has been almost entirely to the good. In my view, anyone
embarking on philosophical inquiry with children in a studied way would be a
poor student if they did not appreciate this influence. But also I should say, lest
I appear uncritical, that I believe it is the calling of students to try and improve
upon the concepts of their best influences. So, I would expect, and even hope,
that the ideal of “community of inquiry” will develop and adapt, like a river flow-
ing towards the sea.

What is your distinctive method or idea in this area?

Again, I think I have largely answered this question. But, if I were to speak more
of my personal conception of P4C (which, incidentally, I suggest is the simplest
and potentially most uniting way of labeling all the practice in this area, along
with the concept of “community of inquiry”), then I would talk briefly of the
four Cs of P4C. Three of these were pointed to by Professor Lipman and are
commonly accepted as ways of thinking that can and should be promoted in a
community of inquiry:

• Critical thinking
• Creative thinking
• Caring thinking
 The difference between P4C and PwC 59
To these, I myself add Collaborative thinking and present that, along with Caring
thinking, as strongly connected to the community aspect of the community of
inquiry, while Critical and Creative thinking are more strongly connected with
the inquiry aspect.
But the beauty of the model (and it is only a model, or a way of looking at
what goes on in a community of inquiry) is that it is holistic. In other words,
each way of thinking depends, to some extent, on the other three. You cannot be
truly critical, in my view, if you do not engage caringly with what or whom you
are being critical of. And, despite the image (or, I would say, myth) of the lone
creator, I would argue that most creative thinking emerges from some sort of
dialogical, i.e., collaborative, activity.
Well, I begin to use rather grand and theoretical language to explain myself,
and I would rather go back to the language I use with children. I invite them to
question the ideas around them (critically), to put forward new ideas of their own
(creatively), to take each other as seriously as they wish to be taken (caringly) and
to support each other in building common understanding (collaboratively). By
these means and emphases, I hope, they develop not just skills of thinking – ques-
tioning, reasoning, supposing, evaluating, etc. – but also the dispositions to think
well. I capture those dispositions under the acronym of SOCRATES:

• Seriousness
• Openness
• Collaborativeness
• Reasonableness
• Amiability
• Tenacity
• Empathy
• Sense of Humor

It is an artificial scheme, of course – all acronyms are artificial – but it points in

some healthy directions and remains, for me, as good a “measure” of progress as
any others I have come across.

What is collaborative thinking exactly? Are the 4C (critical,

creative, caring and collaborative) thinkings all of the same
genus, of which the various forms of thinking (4C thinking)
are species?
These are two good questions and, on the face of it, should be answered in
reverse order, since it should be easier to specify (!) what sort of thinking can be
called ‘collaborative’ if one firstly had a more general account or classification of
thinking into which it could fit.
But actually I am not sure if there is a very satisfactory classification of think-
ing. People will generally refer to Bloom, or perhaps Anderson, Krathwohl, et al.
(2001), his student, as having giving something like a definitive taxonomy, but
60  Roger Sutcliffe
a fairly recent book by Moseley,D., Baumfield, V., et al. (2005), Frameworks for
Thinking, evidenced many different schemes and ended up creating and recom-
mending a new, compromise, scheme of its own. I’ve come to the view, myself,
that human thought processes are so varied and mutable that it might be impos-
sible to produce an all-purpose scheme. Different schemes, I think, serve differ-
ent purposes.
The 4C framework, by my account, serves well as a guide to some sorts of
thinking that P4C is particularly good at promoting, and is promoting for the
common good.
I don’t think any justification is needed here for trying to develop critical think-
ing and creative thinking in young people. Devisers of national curricula across
the world emphasize and target these, without necessarily having a good idea as
to how the target can be reached. (They have not all heard of P4C!)
Lipman and Sharp, of course, were right to emphasize that critical thinking
needs to be balanced with caring thinking, lest education systems produce minds
that are brilliantly creative and/or good at winning arguments, but completely
lacking in moral or aesthetic imagination and appreciation.
But, now, how does collaborative thinking sit alongside these other three? Is
it, indeed, a sort of ‘cognitive’ act at all – or should it be rather thought of as a
conative act – an act of will? Given the usual usage of the word ‘collaborative’ in
English, viz. to describe acting together, i.e., with a common will, to some practi-
cal purpose – often towards a material, or at least visible, end, such as a building – it
should be no surprise that some people do not regard it as a sort of thinking. And,
indeed, when I first floated to Matt Lipman himself the idea that thinking could,
and often should, be thought of as collaborative, his first reaction was that I was
making a category mistake.
I regret now that I did not pursue the idea with him, because I think he would
have come round to agreeing, not only that thinking is (of course) just as much
an act as building a house, but also (equally of course) that it is an act that can be
done in collaboration with others.
Indeed, the notion of the community of inquiry is somewhat premised on this
idea, and one of its most powerful aims – building on each other’s ideas – cap-
tures very well this sense of thinking together.
We can take this account a little further, though. Thinking together in a com-
munity of inquiry is not just a matter of each person’s bringing different ideas
to contribute to a common purpose (understanding and appreciation, or good
judgment) in the way that workers might bring different material and skills to the
building of a house. In this latter case, the contributions are complementary –
which is what certainly makes the whole a collaborative process and project.
But what makes the collaboration in a community of inquiry rather special is
that the ‘building’ of ideas is not merely a putting together of different things in
a complementary, cumulative way. In this case, each idea that is put forward is
what it is because of the ideas that have gone before. It is not pre-determined, like
the materials and skills that go to make up a physical building. What is going on is
much more like a game of football, where skills are exercised in continual response
 The difference between P4C and PwC 61
to the exercise of other skills (in collaboration with those of one’s own team, and
of course in contention with those of the other!)
There is yet more that could be said of this special sense of collaborativeness,
but this is an interview, not a paper, and so I shall content myself with just quot-
ing a colleague of mine, who pointed at that “you think differently when in dia-
logue with another person.” This is not just to say that the circumstance of having
your ideas stimulated and tested by another person can lead to much more crea-
tive and (self-)critical thinking than you might typically come up with by yourself.
It is to say that you typically frame your thoughts differently when speaking to
one or more other people, and, if you are doing so in a community of inquiry,
you frame them precisely to tune in with theirs, and not to ‘do your own thing.’
This might occasionally be too much of a constraint, but more often it is a proper
and productive discipline.
In short, one way of thinking of collaborative thinking is to see it as dialogical
thinking.
But there are a couple of other ways of thinking of it that I would mention
briefly now, via a rehearsal of Sharp’s (2007) account of Caring thinking. She
analyzed this into four elements or aspects, labeling them valuational (which
I prefer to call ‘appreciative’), affective, active, and normative (which I prefer to
call ‘advocative’).
My contention has always been that the first two represent caring thinking
pure and simple – thinking that is sensitive (in oneself) to the value dimension of
human life – while the latter two represent more of an outward reaction to that
dimension: a sense that one wants to take action – minimally to engage in dia-
logue with others (showing one’s interest) and at times going so far as to advocate
a particular belief or course of action (promoting an interest).
However one cuts the particular cake of Caring thinking (and, of course, we
must be careful when using a physical metaphor like that for a complex activ-
ity), it makes sense to me to see this active engagement in dialogue – this form
of collaboration – as representing a special feature not just of the practice of the
community of inquiry but of thinking itself.
My last framing of collaborative thinking is (to go back to the question of
sorts/species and type/genus) to suggest that this is not, after all, a cutting of a
cake, so much as a viewing of a cake from different perspectives. Or, to use yet
another way of speaking, I suggest that the 4Cs are best viewed not as four dif-
ferent sorts of thinking but as four different dimensions of thinking. And if that
is still not quite the right way of speaking and thinking about it, let me finally
suggest that they are four different modes, or even moods of thinking.
It certainly makes sense to me to say that one can be in a ‘critical’ mode or
mood of thinking, and also in a ‘caring’ mode or mood. I’m pretty happy, also,
to talk about being in a ‘creative’ mood or mode, as well, of course, as being in
a ‘collaborative’ mode or mood. This framework, indeed, reminds us that there
is a conative aspect to each of the original 3Cs, and from this perspective the
category mistake is that of not including them in the same (conative) category as
‘collaborative.’
62  Roger Sutcliffe
I hope I have shown, however, that ‘collaborative’ belongs equally in a ‘cogni-
tive’ category. It is, in fact, impossible to think collaboratively without being very
much ‘on the ball’ cognitively (an aspect of playing football, incidentally, that is
not as much appreciated as it should be!)
Afterthoughts:

(1) Regardless of any subsequent critiques by myself or anyone else of the 4C

framework, I should just note that there is, in any case, a mathematical ele-
gance and a pedagogical pragmatism to correlating the 4Cs with the very
idea (l) of the Community of Inquiry. Caring and Collaborative thinking fits
almost perfectly with the notion of building Community, and Creative and
Critical thinking fits equally well with the notion of building Inquiry.
(2) A good reason, perhaps, to avoid regarding the 4Cs as ‘sorts’ of thinking –
and certainly to avoid saying that they are thinking ‘skills’ – is that it is not
obvious what exactly it would be to ‘do’ caring or collaborative thinking, or
even to ‘do’ creative or critical thinking. One is much more inclined to say,
‘be caring (or collaborative, or creative, or critical),’ suggesting at least that
these might be better thought of as dispositions, if not moods.

The notion of thinking ‘skills’ is itself, I argue, not well-formed, or at least not
well understood, in the educational world, and I prefer to analyze thinking much
more precisely and practically by reference to ‘moves.’ In fact, I shall be pub-
lishing a comprehensive scheme of thinking under exactly the title of ‘Thinking
Moves’ before long. It consists of 36 distinct, deliberate, moves that one can
make as a thinker, and these are expressed in as memorable a form as possible, so
that the scheme is as comprehensible as it is comprehensive.

What are the advantages of your method?

I think its advantages can be summed up in two words – humane and holistic. It
emphasizes that the most important learning we have to do, in the classroom and
beyond, is how to be more human(e), and how that is almost certainly a matter
of bringing different aspects of our being/thinking into (a whole) balance.
I have spent many years practicing as a teacher, of all ages from the very young
to the old, and I have become ever more concerned about the failure of educa-
tional ‘systems’ to meet the personal and human needs of students. Part of this
failure involves a blindness towards the changing role and importance of informa-
tion and data gathering, but part of it involves a blindness about how humans
make sense of their world and create value in it.
School curricula, particularly, still focus far too much on a questionable collec-
tion of ‘facts that must be known’ – most of which, in fact (!), are of little value
to students, personally or culturally, when they enter the adult world. At the same
time, they focus on a narrow range of ‘skills,’ with not nearly enough emphasis
on how to think better. Thinking skills and dispositions are precisely the ones that
Pf/wC sets out to cultivate, and to do so in a way that is responsive to student
 The difference between P4C and PwC 63
interests and to their capacity to make meaning for themselves. Where it succeeds
in this aim – and there is increasing evidence that it can do so to great effect – it
brings to education something very special and very precious: not just the skills
for lifelong learning, but also the will to learn throughout one’s life.

References
Anderson, L. W., Krathwohl, D. R., et al. (Eds.). (2001). A taxonomy for learning,
teaching, and assessing: A revision of Bloom’s taxonomy of educational objectives.
­Boston, MA (Pearson Education Group): Allyn & Bacon.
Lipman, M. (1991). Thinking in education. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moseley, D., Baumfield, V., Elliott, J., Gregson, M., Higgins, S., Miller, J., Newton, D.
(2005). Frameworks for thinking. Cambridge: ­Cambridge University Press.
Sharp, A. M. (1987). What is a community of inquiry? Analytic Teaching, 8(1): 13–18.
Sharp, A. M. (2007). Education of the emotions in the classroom community of
inquiry. Gifted Education International, 22(2–3): 248–257.
Part II

Specialized uses of
philosophical dialogues
8 Teaching science and morality
via P4C
Tim Sprod

Could you please explain your own program for introducing

philosophical thinking to children in the first four years of
school?
In the early years of schooling, I think that our aim is to help young children
to improve their abilities to think well. Obviously, children have been learning
to think better ever since they were born. At the time that they start to acquire
language, this process speeds up a lot, as there is clearly a close link between
being able to think and being able to use language. Much of our more complex
thinking has to be done in a language, and it is often small, common words that
are vital to thinking. In English, these include words like ‘all,’ ‘no,’ ‘some,’ if . . .
then,’ ‘only,’ ‘rather.’
My book, Books into Ideas (Sprod, 1993) is aimed at encouraging children to
think aloud, in a community, with the aid of their teacher. To get the thinking
started, I suggest that the teacher read a carefully chosen picturebook to the class.
The next step is to ask the children what interested or puzzled them. Your readers
who are familiar with Philosophy for Children will know that, traditionally, the
next step is for the class to choose an issue to discuss. This can work with young
children, but I find that the teacher may need to be more directive than would be
the case with older children. They may need to ask children questions that arise
from their interests and puzzles.
In Books into Ideas, I have tried to choose books that build essential skills.
For example, the first book I mention is Burningham (1994)’s Would You
Rather? The book proposes several alternatives and asks the reader to choose
the one they would rather, such as asking whether the child would rather their
house was surrounded by water, jungle, snow or mud. Discussing this book
with children can build several basic skills: giving reasons for their answer;
speaking to the whole group; listening to what others say; and learning the
meaning of ‘rather.’ ‘Rather’ is an interesting logical word: it is not asking
which you like, but which you prefer – even if all the alternative are nice, or
all unpleasant.
In my view, children need to learn skills such as the ones above, as well as
making connections, drawing distinctions, waiting their turn, distinguishing a
68  Tim Sprod
question from a statement, being aware of ambiguities and many more, before
we can expect them to discuss deeper issues with insight and ability. However,
I do not advocate separating out the deep issues, and first learning the skills
on shallow ones. It is my view that the skills are learned through trying to
discuss issues that matter – deep, philosophical issues – with the support of
other children and (importantly) a more skilled adult, such as their teacher
or parent.

How can the community of inquiry be utilized in teaching the

discipline of science?
The community of inquiry can contribute to the teaching of science education in
many ways (Sprod, 2011). Most obviously from the philosophical point of view,
discussing puzzles that arise in doing science can help students to understand
the nature of the scientific enterprise better. This is the domain of philosophy of
science. For example, students can explore whether science can ever be said to
have conclusively proved something, or whether there is always the possibility of
contrary evidence arising. They can explore the power and success of science, and
the methodologies it uses, and question whether there are issues that are beyond
the scope of science. I believe that students who have more insight into the
nature of science will be able to avoid the twin dangers of placing more belief in
particular scientific findings than the evidence warrants, or of dismissing science
and its power to help us.
We can also encourage students to explore the key concepts of science more
deeply. Science uses terms more precisely than ordinary language, and I am not
sure that science teaching at present allows students to grasp these differences
properly. This leads to confusion. Take the word ‘work.’ I could sit here with my
eyes closed, thinking hard about how to answer your questions: in everyday lan-
guage, we would say I was doing a lot of work. In physics, though, there would
be virtually no work done. Science is full of such key concepts: energy, species,
light, bonds, elasticity. Many are ordinary words, but with special conceptual
meanings.
The community of inquiry is an ideal medium for investigating the moral
dimensions of science. Some scientists claim that their work is value free – that
they are merely discovering more knowledge. This is contentious, of course, but
a citizen has no such escape clause. As citizens, we need to be able to weigh up
scientific evidence and possibilities, and help make decisions about which science
should be used and in what ways. Both for students who will eventually become
scientists, and for those who will never work with science again, becoming more
able to think through the moral dimensions of scientific findings is very impor-
tant to our future.
As with all uses of P4C, discussion will aid the development of students’ abili-
ties to think well – both generally, and especially in scientific thinking. Addition-
ally, P4C helps students to link their science learning to their everyday lives and,
I believe, increases their enjoyment of, and enthusiasm for, science.
 Teaching science and morality 69

I have studied the introduction of your book Philosophical Discus­

sion in Moral Education: The Community of Ethical Inquiry
(Sprod, 2001). It is clear that you are concerned with moral
education. What is the importance of morality in the
contemporary world? What is the place of philosophical discus­
sion in moral education?
I have alluded to this in my previous answer. In my view, morality touches on
most things that we do. I believe that Aristotle (1980) had it largely right. It is
about our character: what sort of person we are and how we act in the world.
Our personal futures, and the futures of our societies (local, national, global)
all depend on educating children to be more morally sensitive and thoughtful
adults.
There are many aspects to becoming morally good persons. Upbringing is
important: we need to be taught morally good habits. We need to be placed in
situations where we can practice morality. But there is another, very important,
aspect as well. Aristotle called in practical wisdom. We need to be able to make
morally good judgments. One class of these is about what to do in specific cir-
cumstances. Another is about the moral habits, attitudes and principles we have
developed. Our parents, or society, might be wrong, as in the example of the
once widespread acceptance of slavery.
While moral education is much wider than what schools do and, even in
schools, wider than what happens in the community of inquiry, I do believe that
philosophical discussion has an important role to play. In brief, by encouraging
students to discuss and think through fictional situations with moral implications,
it can allow students to strengthen their moral capacities without the dangers
that can occur in real life. They can try out positions, hear the reactions of oth-
ers, clarify moral concepts, explore the importance of context and many more. In
this, they engage their intellect and their emotions, all the while listening care-
fully to how others experience the world.
When their practical wisdom, strengthened in such discussions (and in other
ways as well), is incorporated into their habitual approach to the world, then we
can say that they are morally good characters.

What is your view about the achievement of your work in the

classrooms on P4C?
An interesting question. I am proud of the difference I feel I have made to many
of the children I have worked with over the years. It has been great fun to be in
some many, varied communities of inquiry, and to have learned so much from the
children and young adults. I am also proud of the work I have done with teach-
ers, and the impact I have had through my writing. To see enthusiastic teachers
in action, engaging their classes and bringing out the kids’ best, and to feel that
I have had a role in that is very gratifying. I am delighted when teachers let me
know how they have drawn on my work.
70  Tim Sprod
However, like most people who are involved in philosophy with youngsters,
I can get frustrated when I consider the much larger numbers of children and
adolescents – and teachers – who have never benefited from exposure to an edu-
cational methodology that I consider extremely powerful and effective. So there
is a lot more work to do. Thank you, for allowing me the chance to spread the
message a little further.

As most of our readers haven’t read your books about using

picturebooks [Books into Ideas and Places for Thinking (with
Laurance Splitter)], please briefly explain

1. What is the structure of picturebooks that are useful for P4C?

In Books into Ideas, all the books used to get the children talking about ideas
are ordinary picturebooks, not published especially for philosophy with chil-
dren. Many of them were books I had read to my own children when they were
young. All of them, though, have some big idea in them, and children’s ques-
tions can bring these ideas out. My son Liam called them ‘philosoful books.’
They raise concepts such as reality, existence, ethics, truth and lying, identity
and so on.
Places for Thinking (Splitter and Sprod, 1999) on the other hand, was written
to accompany four picturebooks. These books had been written by Francesca
Partridge and Franck Dubuc as ordinary picturebooks, and they asked ACER
if they wanted to publish them. Laurance Splitter and I saw that they were suit-
able for starting philosophical discussions, and wrote Places for Thinking to help
teachers see the philosophical possibilities, as well as asking Francesca and Franck
to make some small changes to bring out the philosophy more.

2. How can we use this kind of book in the community of inquiry

in early childhood?
Once teachers are familiar with the methods of Philosophy for Children, and
have developed an ability to recognize and develop philosophical ideas, then they
can look for suitable books among those books they already use. Not all good
picturebooks are suitable for philosophy. Some wonderful picturebooks are good
for other reasons, such as the artwork, or the poetry of the text. However, many
children’s books (like many books for grown-ups) do have one or more ‘big
ideas’ embedded in the text (and sometimes the pictures).
A very good way for a teacher to make sure that they understand how to draw
out the big ideas from a picturebook is to have used the Matthew Lipman materi-
als before, especially Elfie. There are many excellent exercises and discussion plans
in the manual for Elfie called Getting our Thoughts Together. I have also tried to
give similar advice in Books into Ideas.
As to what to do with such a book when you have one, I have talked about this
in my answer to your first question.
 Teaching science and morality 71

You have made a distinction between “a community of philos­

ophical inquiry” and “a community of ethical inquiry” in your
philosophical discussion in moral education. Could you please
tell us about this distinction?
Generally, ethics is considered to be a sub-discipline of philosophy, so in that
sense the community of ethical inquiry is a particular type of the more general
community of philosophical inquiry: one where the focus is on ethics. However,
if we are inquiring into what makes a particular way of living (morally) good,
or what actions we should take in particular situations, then it is both likely and
desirable that the community will introduce considerations from other areas –
psychological, sociological and (most importantly) from everyday life. Of course,
other areas of philosophy might do so as well, so this is not a sharp distinction.
I would always like the discussions in any sort of community of philosophical
inquiry to make a difference to the way the children in it understand, and act in,
the world. However, it is of vital importance in the community of ethical inquiry.
If the ethical discussion is cut off from the children’s real world, and makes no
difference to how they live, or what they do, then it is hard to see the justifica-
tion for it. Ethical inquiry should not be merely a game, trying to show off how
clever we are. It should strengthen our moral judgment, but also transfer out of
the classroom and affect all we do. That means, I think, that it needs to be used
in conjunction with other means in a school: a set of ethically based rules for the
school, an expectation that they will be followed, the opportunity for children
to discuss and question the rules, and many opportunities for students to act
ethically.

References
Aristotle. (1980). The Nicomachean ethics. Tran. Ross David. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Burningham, J. (1994). Would you rather. . .? London: Red Fox.
Splitter, L., & Sprod, T. (1999). Places for thinking. Melbourne: ACER.
Sprod, T. (1993). Books into ideas. Melbourne: Hawker Brownlow Education.
Sprod, T. (2001). Philosophical discussion in moral education: The community of ethical
inquiry. London: Routledge.
Sprod, T. (2011). Discussions in science: Promoting conceptual understanding in the
middle school years. Melbourne: ACER.
9 A new approach in teaching
philosophy and ethics
in schools
Stephan Millett

You have some books (Millett and Tapper, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c)
on teaching Philosophy and Ethics for children and the young.
They are interesting, unparalleled and of a different type from
other P4C books. There are some questions about them. What
is the relation between these and Lipman’s formal P4C books?
Are they similar in their structure to Lipman’s book?
The books were written for a curriculum that is set for Year 11 and 12 students in
Western Australia (students aged 16–17), but we wrote them also with a general
audience in mind and the hope that educators around the world would be able to
make use of them. There are three books in the series. They make strong use of
the community of inquiry method; however, they are different from the Lipman
materials in that the philosophical content is mainly in the text, rather than in the
exercises and teacher guides.
The books are very different in structure from Lipman’s but have the same
sorts of goals. The books combine philosophical content, stories and exercises. The
approach is a mix of community of inquiry, collaborative learning theory and phil-
osophical content, with enough in them that solo learners can work through them
in a self-paced way (we had in mind students who were in remote communities or
farms a long way from towns). We hope that students who cannot come together
for normal classes are able to do philosophy using our books. It will be difficult for
them, but possible as long as there is some sort of dialogue, such as is now possible
with Skype, Blackboard and other Internet-based interactive technologies.
There are not many school teachers in Australia who have university qualifications
in philosophy, so we wrote the books also with teachers in mind. While the books
are designed for high school students (the three final years of high school), we think
that primary school teachers can use them to teach themselves enough philosophy to
improve their ability to teach philosophy using the Lipman method in junior schools.

Do we use these books in the same way or should they be taught

via a new way?
The books are used in new ways, but the (Lipman-inspired) Community of
Inquiry is an essential component. As noted above, the books (in particular the
 Teaching philosophy and ethics 73
first book in the series) are based on collaborative learning theory and a student-
centered, outcomes-focused approach, as well as on content.
There is a mix of didactic teaching and collaborative learning. Some content
(such as critical thinking) we believe is best taught directly and then practiced
using examples. In the main, though, the course is based on students learn-
ing together (from a Vygotskyian psychology point of view (Vygotsky, 1930),
the students aid each other in their zones of proximal development and in
various ways turn interpersonal language and discussions into intrapersonal
“language”).

Do the teachers have to go for training to learn how to use these

books? It seems there is no manual for teachers.
The teachers have training courses run by the Curriculum Council in Western
Australia and some short courses that my co-author, Alan Tapper, and I have run.
In attempting to get philosophy into the curriculum we (those involved) knew
that there would not be enough university-trained philosophy graduates available
to be teachers, so we wrote a book that could be used (if necessary) by someone
without formal philosophy training.
We know it is desirable to have formal philosophical training, but there was
a conundrum: There were too few teachers with philosophy training to start
teaching philosophy across the state of Western Australia; and we would not get
future teachers taking up philosophy at university unless there was a course for
them to teach in schools once they graduated. When we set up the school phi-
losophy program we knew there would not be many who were already trained,
so we made a textbook that would help teachers train themselves while teaching.
The Curriculum Council in Western Australia also made available a lot of support
materials knowing that teachers would need them. We hope that within a few
years enrolment patterns in universities will change and there will be more fully
qualified teachers who have philosophy in their degrees and are able to teach the
school Philosophy and Ethics program.

How can foreign teachers contribute [participate] in your courses?

Are there any online courses they can use?
We do not have online courses. We intended that the books would provide a
basic structure and that teachers would make use of the great amount of online
material that is available in philosophy, even though we know that a lot of the
philosophy material available online is difficult and not suitable for schools [e.g.,
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/]. It would be
difficult to teach the mix of methods in our books via an online course, but that
does not mean it should not be attempted. We (Alan Tapper and myself) do not
have the resources to make an online course available, but this might be some-
thing that could be done in collaboration with others. Our books are written
in English, and I do not speak another language well enough to teach in that
language.
74  Stephan Millett

What is the relation between these books and Philip Cam’s books
(such as Thinking Stories)? What are their differences?
You will see in the first book in the series that we have used some short narratives.
We found that Philip Cam’s books (which are very good) are not suited to the age
group or the degree of philosophical sophistication required of Year 11 and 12 (the
final years of school). Short narratives such as those in our first book allow a topic
to be explored in one or two class sessions, which is desirable in our system, as the
full syllabus needs to be taught. Our books are different from Philip Cam’s because
there is overt philosophical content included. Much of our text is focused on simple
explanation of complex philosophical issues. The teaching and learning is still based,
in considerable part, on students’ questions and on collaborative inquiry, but the
content of the chapters is more overtly philosophical than Philip Cam’s books.

What do you mean by “the overtly philosophical content”? Why

do you think Cam’s books aren’t overly philosophical?
Phil Cam’s stories are written in such a way that a community of inquiry can draw
philosophical meaning from them. The teacher resource books that come with
the stories help teachers to draw that content out during the community, and
with exercises. Parts of our approach are similar to Philip Cam’s, but ours also
includes explicit explanation of core concepts. I meant by “overt philosophical
content” such things as explanations of inference, explanation of modus ponens,
demonstrations of elenchus, and summaries of philosophical positions.

What about stories? Do you use stories in your books to start

talking about your topics?
We wrote some short narratives. Most of these are in the first book, which is intended
for students who are not necessarily intending to go on to higher education. How-
ever, the philosophical content is written in a way that we hope will enable it to be
used in the same sorts of ways as narrative stories in the Lipman tradition. The books
are designed as a series that increases in complexity. The first book in the series was
written for 16 year olds who do not intend to go on to University but is also suited
to high-achieving 13–15 year olds. The second book is of middle difficulty and writ-
ten specifically for Year 11 students completing the first year in a two-year program
the grades for which can be counted toward University entry requirements. The
third book is for those in the second year of the two-year program. Students in this
program are generally intending to go to University (but not necessarily to study
philosophy). Not all students will work through all three books.

Is there a scientific reason for naming the books the way you do
(1A-1B/2A-2B/3A-3B in the first editions)? If so, what is it?
No, there is no scientific reason for naming the books this way. The books were
written for a specific curriculum (in Western Australia). Under the guidelines of
 Teaching philosophy and ethics 75
the Western Australian Curriculum Framework, all courses available to Year 11
and 12 students must be available at three levels (1,2 and 3) and must comprise
two subsidiary courses that can be taught in one semester each (A and B). So, the
names were provided by the curriculum the books were written for. 1A is the first
sub-unit, 1B is the second sub-unit at the first level; 2A is the first sub-unit at the
second level, and 2B the second sub unit at this level. 3A and 3B are respectively
the first and second sub-units at the third level. The most common approach
taken by schools is to provide 2A and 2B in Year 11 and 3A and 3B in Year 12
for students intending to enter university. 1A and 1B are intended for students
headed for vocational education (e.g., learning a trade such as mechanic) but are
also increasingly used in Years 9 and 10 as an introduction to philosophy.

In the text recently published by UNESCO, Teaching Philosophy

in Asia and the Pacific, you wrote: “The success of the program
has aroused great interest and the Buranda School receives many
requests for visits from teachers from Australia and overseas.”
This refers to the Philosophy for Children program, not our books. Buranda is
a small state school in suburban Brisbane. Its philosophy program is integrated
across the curriculum in all classes, in all years. Teachers and academics (for exam-
ple, Chesters, Fynes-Clinton, Hinton, & Scholl, 2013) have worked together at
the school to develop a very important scope and sequence of philosophical ideas
across the curriculum. I have had the privilege of working there, and with other
schools that Buranda has influenced there. The effect that teaching philosophy
has had on the children is remarkable, and wonderful.

Yes, we know the P4C program has aroused great interest in

schools but you mentioned in your article “Coming in from
the Margins . . .” (published in Journal of Thinking) that P4C
has not translated into policy. Why hasn’t it? What are the
reasons? In other words, if managers of schools find benefits in
this program, why didn’t they all use it?
There are many reasons that the P4C program has not been translated into policy.
These include:

• The historical lack of a large body of clear research data demonstrating the
effectiveness of philosophy in schools. That is changing, notably with the
Scottish study led by Topping and Trickey (2007) and a more recent English
study. Millett and Tapper (2011) discuss these and other evidence in a paper
of ours published in the journal Educational Philosophy and Theory.
• The new National Curriculum is only beginning to be well embedded in all
Australian states. The lack of a national curriculum, and the very crowded
nature of curricula across all state jurisdictions, has impeded the inclusion of
philosophy, with the most common objection being “what can we remove
from the curriculum to make way for philosophy?” This question does not
76  Stephan Millett
acknowledge the very real benefits of employing philosophical methods
across the curriculum, but there has been progress. Proponents of philoso-
phy in schools were involved in early discussions on the creation of a new
national curriculum in Australia. The discussions did not lead to philosophy
being a core learning area, but did help ensure that philosophical method
could be included. There is now room for philosophy because the new cur-
riculum requires core concepts to be taught, many of which can be taught
very effectively (perhaps most effectively) through philosophical inquiry. The
new National Curriculum in Australia (2016) does not include philosophy
by name, but in all eight of the learning areas of the curriculum there are
core concepts for which philosophical inquiry is a valuable teaching tool.
For example, in the middle years of high school (years 7–10) the English
language curriculum “provides opportunities to practise, consolidate and
extend . . . knowledge, skills and understanding . . . Students critically analyse
and evaluate texts”; and the Science curriculum . . . “develops understand-
ing of important science concepts across the major science disciplines. . . .
It focuses on explaining phenomena involving science and its applications
using evidence and explanation to move to more abstract models and theories
of science.”

The task remains for proponents of philosophy to continue arguing for the inclu-
sion of philosophical method across the curriculum.

• School managers in primary schools are more free to implement philosophy

than are managers in secondary schools (high schools) because the curricu-
lum for them is more flexible. School managers in state secondary schools
can only introduce senior school courses from an approved list. In Western
Australian, that list now includes Philosophy and Ethics (for years 11 and
12) but this is only since 2008 and has been the result of much campaign-
ing by a group of dedicated philosophers and teachers. As a result of similar
campaigning, most states in Australia now have philosophy programs in the
final years of secondary schooling, but in each case the program is an elective
option for students.
• Philosophy has generally been regarded as a difficult subject suitable only
for very intelligent people, with a special sort of intelligence, so most people
have avoided it. The philosophy in schools movement has started to break
down that stereotyped view of philosophy, but progress on this has been
slow. There is widespread misunderstanding about the nature of philosophi-
cal inquiry and of the rich suite of tools that it can bring to bear in decision-
making. Policy-makers have frequently held the stereotyped view and have
been difficult to move. That they have had little room to move in an increas-
ingly crowded curriculum has compounded the problem.
• To teach in secondary school, teachers generally need to have specialized in a
subject (or two) at university. So, English literature teachers need a “major”
in literature; geography teachers need a major in geography; and so on for
 Teaching philosophy and ethics 77
physics, chemistry, biology, etc. Because there has been no course in philoso-
phy at schools, prospective teachers have not seen any advantage in taking a
major or minor in philosophy as to do so would limit the range of subjects
that they could be employed to teach. We hope that with the new course in
Philosophy and Ethics, more prospective teachers will choose philosophy at
university.

Do the European countries and others use your method? (It seems
that your method is different from Lipman’s – at least because
of your books.)
Not yet! We had in mind that our books could be taught in a number of differ-
ent countries and wrote them in a way that they could be readily adapted. We
continue to explore publication outside Australia.

How can we use your method and books in Iran?

There is no reason I can think of why Iranian teachers (who read and understand
English) should not use our books. The method is reasonably well explained in
the books themselves (we think), but I am not opposed to visiting Iran to help
teachers. If someone wished to translate the books into Farsi I am sure we could
work out how to proceed in Iran.

Also you mentioned that the principal movers in favor of philos­

ophy come from outside the central education system. In your
view, why does the Central education system go this way? What
is the ground of the resistance?
There is generally a resistance to ‘the new’ in education. Teachers are very busy
people who resist change unless there is very clear evidence of benefit or they are
given no choice. There is only in recent years a growing body of formal evidence
that philosophy can be taught to children and that there are substantial benefits
to their general learning and their behavior (Millet & Tapper, 2011).
There is also a large number of educators who see “content” as the most
important element and for whom measuring the uptake of that content is the
only valid criterion for educational success. Philosophy offers benefits that are
more difficult to quantify and philosophy as a discipline is (in general) poorly
understood. [See also the answer above.]

Can you explain more, please? Why is the current plan in schools
not fit for our life?
Fitness for life is an increasingly stronger part of our education system, but there
is no uniform agreement on what this means. We (the philosopher teachers) have
been pushing very strongly the idea that philosophy makes all children better
78  Stephan Millett
citizens and better able to cope with rapidly changing social and technological
environments. This argument is slowly being taken up.
However, there is still a lot of competition for a place in the curriculum. In a
democracy such as Australia’s there are many voices clamoring (sometimes shout-
ing) for attention and sometimes what is most popular is included to the exclusion
of what some consider is best. There are strong voices calling for more didactic
teaching, for going back to the ‘old way of teaching’ and for teaching only that
which can be measured. The voices calling for change in education are strong, and
being heard at all can be difficult, especially if those making the policy decisions do
not fully understand the benefits of cultivating inquiry and creativity in children.
Philosophical inquiry helps children become better adults because they are able
to differentiate between good and bad arguments, can come to reasoned posi-
tions on information they have analyzed, clarified and critiqued. They can listen
carefully and respectfully to opposing points of view before coming to a reasoned
position of their own.

You have emphasized critical thinking in your books. What is

the importance of critical thinking in new (modern and
postmodern) societies?
We believe that critical thinking is one of the pillars of clear thinking. Seeing the
logic of an argument or claim (or its lack of clear logic) is necessary to understand
it. Knowing how to structure (and critique) an argument is a seriously useful skill
for all people. It allows us to identify false claims. It gives us some measure of
control over the effects of advertising and propaganda and clear critical thinking
together – that is, in groups – is a necessary part of a society that values freedom
of thought. Critical thinking is a tool that can be employed in all parts of our
lives. It is a necessary (but not sufficient) part of being a conscientious member
of civil society. Critical thinking is not negative thinking, which it is often con-
fused with (it involves critique, not criticism); nor is it anathema to faith-based
positions. One can be a person of deep faith and employ critical thinking without
undermining that faith.

We learned from your UNESCO note that you emphasize teaching

philosophy in primary schools. Why? What is the point?
The note made the point that philosophy had been accepted into primary schools,
not that we made a conscious decision to focus on primary to the exclusion of
secondary schools. Teaching philosophy in primary schools became one of the
levers to have it introduced into secondary school. This has been part of a long-
term plan by a number of us.
Primary schools have a much more flexible curriculum structure and teach-
ers are able to modify their syllabi to include philosophy. A philosophy class in
primary school, for example, might allow the class to meet outcomes in science,
mathematics, literacy or social and environmental understanding.
 Teaching philosophy and ethics 79
As students move through to high school, the flexibility decreases. In the final
years students, specialize into five or six discrete subjects (e.g., chemistry, cal-
culus, biology, literature, history, etc. – there are 50 subjects to choose from).
Getting philosophy included as one of the 50 subjects to choose from in Western
Australia took a lot of effort, and we consider it a major victory. Other states have
their own stories.

Who is the administrator for teaching philosophy in primary

schools? When did it start there? Can we know about its
syllabus?
There is no administrator for teaching philosophy in primary schools. The cur-
riculum for all schools in our state (Western Australia) is decided by the Western
Australian Curriculum Council. Philosophy is a formal part of only the Year 11
and 12 curriculum: we are still trying to have it become a core component of all
schooling.
Primary schools have more flexibility to include or exclude strategies or
approaches or specific syllabi. Those schools that have included philosophy have
done so because the school principal, or a committed teacher, has promoted it as
an idea. That is part of the problem because when that committed teacher leaves
the school (for whatever reason) or the school principal leaves the impetus behind
teaching philosophy is no longer there. Teaching philosophy is an option that too
few schools take up.

Did you write any books for primary schools or lower levels too?
I have not written books for primary school, but I have teaching materials for all
levels of primary school, as I taught Philosophy from pre-primary (five-year-old
children) to Year 12 (17–18 year olds) for seven years. The material and methods
in my books for senior school were drawn largely from my experience teaching in
primary and middle schools. These materials and methods work and I have heard
from teachers and students that the students enjoy this approach to philosophy.

References
Davey Chesters, S., Fynes-Clinton, L., Hinton, L., & Scholl, R. (2013). Philosophical
and ethical inquiry for students in the middle years and beyond. Deakin West, ACT:
Australian Curriculum Studies Association.
Millett, S., & Tapper, A. (2011). Benefits of collaborative philosophical inquiry
in schools. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 44(5), 546–567. doi:10.1111/
j.1469–5812.2010.00727
Millett, S., & Tapper, A. (2015a). Philosophy and ethics: A resource for year 12 ATAR.
Cottesloe, Australia: Impact Publishing.
Millett, S., & Tapper, A. (2015b). Philosophy and ethics: A resource for year 11 general.
Cottesloe, Australia: Impact Publishing.
80  Stephan Millett
Millett, S., & Tapper, A. (2015c). Philosophy and ethics: A resource for year 11 ATAR
and year 12 general. Cottesloe, Australia: Impact Publishing.
National Curriculum in Australia. http://www.australiancurriculum.edu.au/overview/
7–10 (accessed 21 September 2016).
Topping, K.J., & Trickey, S. (2007). Collaborative philosophical enquiry for school
children: Cognitive effects at 10–12 years. British Journal of Educational Psychology,
77, 271–288.
Vygotsky, L. S. (1930). Mind and society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
10 P4C and picturebooks
Karin Saskia Murris

We know that picturebooks are used in young children’s class­

rooms. How old are these children exactly?
I use picturebooks from the age of three upwards until old age pensioners! With
adolescents, I make sure that I select them carefully and put them on PowerPoint
or use a visualizer.

In your PhD thesis (Murris, 1997) entitled “Metaphors of the

Child’s Mind: Teaching Philosophy to Young Children,” you
trace the history of ideas where these philosophical assumptions
about children’s mind originate (Plato) and the damage this
has done to respecting young children as independent abstract
thinkers. You also critique the P4C program as developed by
the IAPC by looking at its modernist, rationalist assumptions
and propose a more philosophically consistent alternative by
using picturebooks. Can you discuss your different view about
these assumptions and also about using picturebooks in P4C?
I introduced Philosophy with Picturebooks in 1989 when researching for my
PhD and published my first textbook (Murris, 1992) Teaching Philosophy with
Picturebooks in 1992. I drew on my training and experiences as a youth librarian.
The theory and practice continues to develop, especially through my collabora-
tion with Joanna Haynes, whom I met in 1994. We wrote about this in our book
(Haynes and Murris, 2012) Picturebooks, Pedagogy and Philosophy, but in my lat-
est book (Murris, 2016) I theorize the practice from a posthuman philosophical
orientation, which has made me substantially rethink my practice (The Posthuman
Child: Educational Transformation through Philosophy with Picturebooks. Since its
introduction, Philosophy with Picturebooks has proven to be popular in practice,
not only in early years’ settings or primary/elementary education, but there is
diversity in the field in how they are being used. For example, Matthews (1992,
1993) used to select picturebooks on the basis of the classical philosophical
themes and topics they ‘contain,’ such as freedom versus determinism, lying ver-
sus truth-telling or justified anger. Wartenberg (2009) does something similar.
82  Karin Saskia Murris
The practice is regarded as philosophical because children’s verbal utterances
resemble the ideas of established adult academic philosophers – often dead ones.
Philosophy with Picturebooks does not take analytic reason as its normative ideal.
I am more interested in philosophical dialogue that generates communal reflec-
tion, philosophical conversations and democratic practices that include child and
young people’s own ideas and interests. The P4C curriculum contains the prom-
ise of a complete, whole, continuous curriculum that expresses a developmental
view of the human being – in terms of development in understanding philosophi-
cal concepts. The latter are introduced in an age-related sequential manner, each
time with a little more depth, breadth and sophistication. I don’t work in that
way with picturebooks.
My work is also different from other approaches to the use of picturebooks for
P4C that focus on critical and creative thinking. For example, Roche (2014) has
embedded P4C in the critical and creative teaching of literacy, which is, of course,
very helpful for teachers. Avoiding the term ‘philosophy’ can be helpful in not
alienating teachers, but the risk attached is that P4C is conceptualized as a mere
thinking skills approach without the history of philosophy to draw on as resource.
Also, teachers trained in P4C tend to select picturebooks that contain a theme
they are familiar with and find useful for various reasons, often social-emotional
topics, such as bullying or anger. For me, the crucial question is how the implied
reader is positioned in the texts that are chosen for the philosophical work and
what the assumed role is of the teacher pedagogically, and how this differs from
hegemonic literacy practices (Haynes and Murris, 2016a).

Could you please introduce me to a picturebook?

In Storywise: Thinking through Stories (Haynes and Murris, 2002), Haynes and
I give examples of picturebooks and how we have used them. Teachers are shown
how to use picturebooks that they can buy in shops or often already have on the
shelves in their school. So, they are popular books often already used for literacy
and then our material offers supports in the sense that it alerts teachers to the
philosophical issues, concepts and ideas in the stories. For example, in McKee
(1980)’s Not Now Bernard, issues have been raised such as neglect, adult/child
relationship, quality of life, suicide and monster. When using what some people
call the first-ever picturebook, Sendak’s (1963) Where the Wild Things Are, chil-
dren (and teachers) have raised questions about fair punishment, power, dream-
ing/reality or time. But, as said before, these are not models to be followed. They
are offered as examples to inspire, not to be copied.

It is said that illustrated storybooks prevent children’s imagination.

In your view, what characteristics should picturebooks have in
order to overcome this problem?
I don’t agree that there is a problem, but that has to do with the important distinc-
tion between illustrated storybooks and picturebooks. Good quality picturebooks
 P4C and picturebooks 83
are more than just books with illustrations (hence the spelling of ‘picturebooks,’
instead of ‘picturebooks’) and carefully selected picturebooks very much engage
the imagination. They don’t restrict it. We shouldn’t confuse imagination with
the capacity to produce images. Joanna Haynes and I offer various criteria for the
right selection of picturebooks in our book and, just recently, we have started to
philosophically theorize these criteria in a new paper to be published soon. We
are always looking for texts that engage the imagination, don’t moralize and open
up conceptual questions. Questions that cannot be answered by factual answers
such as a Google search or easy definitions. With the right kind of picturebook,
I would argue that the picturebook as text complexifies enquiries and also pro-
vides children with more opportunities to express their own ideas.
Classic points of reference in children’s literature research argue that picture-
books involve two very different interdependent sign systems (the images and
the words). The reader, so the argument goes, is pulled in different directions
of meaning-making by the use of these two different sign systems; the linear
direction of the text invites readers to continue reading; the pictures compel
them to ponder. Importantly, the ‘gaps’ between text and image may be expe-
rienced differently as people grow older, which challenges teachers to listen and
respond differently from children. Picturebook narratives often feature unusual
characters (e.g., humans covered in body hair, aliens), extreme concepts (e.g.,
immortality, the size of the universe) and obscure thought experiments. The
interaction between image and text is neither stable nor predictable and, guided
by trained facilitators, these narratives can provoke philosophical conversations
and a focus on criteria for the judgments people are making in a community of
inquiry.

When we use a picture as a stimulating device in a CoI some

problems may arise. First, the Inquiry in CoI may turn into
the interpretation of the picture, and second, when we use
a story in CoI if a confusion arises in the conversation, the
community can refer to the text as a framework, but in using a
picture there is no such framework to refer to. Since children’s
interpretations/conceptions of the picture could be quite
different and we cannot focus on the coordinate reference to
fix the discussion, how can we overcome these problems?
Again, I don’t think there are problems here. Much depends on how you see
your own role as philosophical educator. Reading picturebooks philosophically
does not involve a process of finding out what pictures denote or literally repre-
sent, but requires sensitivity in bringing together what is said and what is unsaid.
These judgments are often complex and unpredictable, and involve emotional,
imaginative and reasoned responses – not necessarily with a focus on the philo-
sophical concepts that adults find interesting. I also don’t see my role as needing
to fix a discussion or use an established framework. As philosophical educators,
we are always left with more questions than answers.
84  Karin Saskia Murris

Until what age are these picturebooks usable and available?

The picturebooks I use are age-less. I use them even in my teaching at university
to explain and illustrate difficult philosophical ideas. Joanna Haynes and I dem-
onstrate this in our book, for example, with Child and Borland (2005)’s The
Princess and the Pea. Jon Klassen’s (2014) This Is Not My Hat is also perfect for
exploring with student teachers some core ideas in ethics. And there are many
others. You can often find YouTube clips of these picturebooks – perfect for
teaching in large lecture halls. I also use the work of Shaun Tan, Armin Greder
and Colin Thompson. I have found that people of all ages respond well to visual
art. Much of my writing is about age prejudice and our assumptions that chil-
dren’s thinking develops in linear sequential ways. The idea that real texts do not
have pictures is also engrained in how we tend to teach literacy: the sooner we
don’t need illustrations, the better a reader you are, but this goes back to my ear-
lier point about the difference between illustrated storybooks and picturebooks.

You use video clips in the community of inquiry in P4C classes.

Apparently stimulus stories are replaced by video clips. What
kind of video clips can be used for this purpose? What charac­
teristics should the videos have?
The criteria for videos are the same as those for picturebooks. I sometimes use vid-
eos of picturebooks, but I am always looking for texts in the news and other nar-
ratives. For example, I have used The Black Hole (https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=P5_Msrdg3Hk) I) very often in my classes at university. An important
practical consideration is that any text should not be too long, although I some-
times ask my students to watch a film at home and then we have discussions in
the lectures or seminar room afterwards. It depends of course on the subject you
teach, but I have found the Korean film Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter . . . and
Spring by director Ki-duk Kim very inspiring in opening up enquiries with my
student teachers about discipline and classroom management.

The final question is about artworks as a provocation for philos­

ophical enquiry and its appropriateness. What is the contri­
bution of artworks in encouraging children to think in P4C
program?
The picturebooks I select are works of art. They involve children as knowledge
creators in enquiries about fantastical scenarios in the void between reality and
fantasy, rather than about the world as it ‘is’ (for the adult philosopher). We
should be careful in our adult assumptions and desires about how a child should
be, and that includes what it means to be a child-philosopher. In contrast, phi-
losophy with picturebooks does not locate the philosophical ‘in’ texts themselves
but in the space in between text, child reader and adult reader (teacher). It is
this kind of philosophy that cannot be mapped out or modeled by, for example,
 P4C and picturebooks 85
philosophical novels. This position assumes that we have to be more modest in
our claims about what narratives can do when doing philosophy in class. A philo-
sophical pedagogy involves consciously giving up regarding education as the for-
mation of childhood as well as regarding children as adult opportunities to carry
out adults’ ideals and to use education as an instrument for such ends.

References
Child, L., & Borland, P. (2005). The princess and the pea. London: Puffin.
Haynes, J., & Murris, K. (2012). Picturebooks, pedagogy and philosophy. New York:
Routledge.
Haynes, J., & Murris, K. (2016a). Intra-generational education: Imagining a post-age
pedagogy. Educational Philosophy and Theory.
Haynes, J., & Murris, K. (2016b). Readings and readers of texts in philosophy for
children. In M. Gregory Rollins, J. Haynes, & K. Murris (Eds.), The Routledge
international handbook of philosophy for children. London: Routledge.
Klassen, J. (2014). I want my hat. London: Walker Books.
Matthews, G. (1992). Thinking in stories. Thinking: American Journal of Philosophy
for Children, 10(2), 1.
Matthews, G. (1993). Philosophy and children’s literature. In M. Lipman (Ed.),
Thinking, children and education (pp. 274–280). Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt.
McKee, D. (1980). Not Now Bernard. London: Andersen Press.
Murris, K. (1992). Teaching philosophy with picture books. London: Infonet.
Murris, K. (1997). Metaphors of the child’s mind: Teaching philosophy to young children.
PhD. Thesis, University of Hull.
Murris, K. (2016). The posthuman child: Educational transformation through philoso-
phy with picturebooks. Contesting Early Childhood Series. London: Routledge.
Murris, K., & Haynes, J. (2002). Storywise: Thinking through Stories. Newport: Dia-
logue Works.
Roche, M. (2014). Developing children’s critical thinking through picturebooks. Lon-
don: Routledge.
Sendak, M. (1963). Where the wild things are. London: Bodley Head.
Wartenberg, T. E. (2009). Big ideas for little kids: Teaching philosophy through chil-
dren’s literature.Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Education.
Part III

Theoretical concerns of
philosophy for children
11 Showing that children
can do philosophy
Michel Sasseville

Most philosophers and people hearing the term “Philosophy for

Children” wonder and ask: Children and Philosophy? How
come? Philosophers and grown-ups might understand some
philosophical ideas, but how can you teach children abstract
philosophical ideas? One of the most impressive responses to
those wondering (curious) people is your television series on
P4C. You present the series as evidence of children doing fine
philosophy. Could you tell us about your experiences in the
series? What is your opinion of children’s ability to deal with
philosophy?
Your question reminds me the comments I heard many times when I tried to
bring P4C to Laval University 30 years ago. Many were saying: well, if it is phi-
losophy it is not for children and if it is for children it can’t be philosophy. Twenty
years later, this comment totally disappeared. What happened?

1. I would say that the research of Vygotsky (1985) is now well known in the
field of education. Piaget is no more the king in this discipline. Vygotsky’s
insights, supported by many researches after his death, show clearly that chil-
dren can work with abstract notions.
2. Some of my colleagues have rethought their conception of philosophy and,
more specifically, their conception of how philosophy can be taught. If, as
Lipman and Sharp did (1980, 1984, 1988, 1991, 1992),we redesign the
teaching of philosophy in such a way that this discipline can be interest-
ing and useful for children, then the possibility of doing it with children is
evident.
3. We have seen a profound reform in education in Québec over the past
30 years and now, in primary school, we talk about competencies and trans-
versal competencies and making critical judgments. More than that, the Min-
istry of Education of Québec says that the classroom should be transformed
into a community of learners. In this context, Philosophy for Children (P4C)
is more than welcome because doing philosophy with children means invit-
ing them to become critical thinkers, not only that, but also that within a
90  Michel Sasseville
community of inquiry. This is exactly what people in primary schools are
looking for. And here we are with more than 40 years of experience showing
how this could be done and the impacts of doing this on the performance of
the child in other disciplines. It is no surprise that people are more and more
interested in P4C.
4. For nearly 30 years, we have trained thousands of teachers (by means of pro-
grams of formation, see https: //philoenfant.org) who have learned how to
do philosophy with children. So, with their help, we have collected a series
of discussions among children showing that they can do philosophy if they
are assisted by a teacher who knows how to invite them to engage themselves
in philosophical inquiry. For sure, we can talk and talk theoretically about
the capacity or not of the child to do philosophy. But there is nothing better
than a base of observation to talk about it. And this base shows clearly that
children can do philosophy.

In 2004, with the help of Laval University and Canal Savoir (an educative chan-
nel television in Québec), we have created a television series of 13 shows (30
minutes each) about Philosophy for Children. Called “Des enfants philosophent,”
(Sasseville, 2004) this television series shows that children (from 6 to 12 years
old) can engage themselves in a philosophical inquiry. What we see in this series
is children trying to define concepts like friendship, love, war, curiosity, differ-
ence, justice, freedom, and on and on in such a way that they give reasons,
examples, counter-examples, formulate hypothesis, are looking for criteria. All
these moves (and many more) are those we can observe when we look carefully
at what philosophers are doing. If there is a difference, it is only a difference of
degree, not of kind. Just like when we see children playing baseball (or hockey
or football). Even if they are not professional, no one would say that they are not
playing baseball.
In the television series on P4C, we see and hear children engagement in dia-
logue with each other, trying to become more clear about their own ideas, help-
ing each other, trying to contradict what others have said . . . We see them
puzzled by what someone else has said, ready to self-correct if an argument leads
to another conclusion than the one they had previously given . . . Well, the list
of cognitive behaviors as well as social behaviors is quite long. And through this
television series, we can also hear children talking about their experience of doing
philosophy together. Their comments are quite clear: they love to do philoso-
phy, they think that it is better to inquire with others than to be alone to do this
inquiry, they think that defining terms is very important, they think that thinking
is some sort of dialogue within ourselves.
Some of the children believe that doing philosophy can be summarized by: lis-
tening to the person who is talking, looking at the person who is talking, moving,
reading a story, thinking, talking, and asking questions (Elisabeth, 6 years old).
Others would say that they love philosophy because they learn how to think for
themselves. And what about this one who says: “Philosophy is really interesting,
because if you find a philosophical question, there is no answer to it. You can
 Children can do philosophy 91
always find more answers. And once you found your opinion, you can still change
it” (Gabriel, 11 years old). So if we want to argue about the possibility of children
doing philosophy, first let’s have a look at what they do in a situation designed for
this. Then we will be able to support our judgment. The television series, among
other things, serves this purpose.

Please tell our readers more about the series. What were the
preliminary purposes of developing the series?
As I said previously, we have programs of formation for teachers at Laval Uni-
versity in which teachers can learn how to do philosophy with children. For that
purpose, I have followed the pedagogical principles that Lipman and Sharp have
shown to me, that is, learning by doing. Clearly, it means that teachers (actual
or future) learn to do philosophy with children by being engaged themselves
in the creation of a community of inquiry. But, for many years, we were aware
that something was missing in our way of doing this: children. Certainly, it is
important to be a member of a community of inquiry before trying to do it with
children, but it is also quite good to see children doing it. This aspect was absent
from my courses at the university. So, we decided to create a television series on
P4C that not only could explain what is philosophy for children, but also, and
mainly, would show children doing philosophy.
Actually, what we have done is a combination of sequences showing children
doing philosophy and children talking about their experience, as well as teachers
doing the same, parents and experts (like Lipman, Sharp, Kennedy, as well as phi-
losophers of Quebec) explaining some aspects of the process. The 13 documen-
taries can be taken as 13 introductions to philosophy for children, one presenting
the role of the facilitator, another one presenting the importance of inquiry in
education, and the other one introducing the relationships between philosophy
for children and prevention of violence. Here is the list of all the main topics
covered by the documentaries:

  1 Doing philosophy with children

  2 Observing a community of inquiry
  3 Thinking for oneself and self-correction
 4 The first moments of a philosophical community of inquiry (reading and
questioning)
  5 The importance of talking
  6 Facilitating the construction of a community of inquiry
 7 Reasoning
 8 Inquiring
 9 Defining
10 Prevention of violence
11 Ethical inquiry
12 The education of citizen
13 Enrichment of the experience
92  Michel Sasseville

We know your television series on P4C is connected to an online

course where students can observe children doing philosophy.
This course focuses on the cognitive, social and philosophical
moves of the children as well as of the teachers engaged in the
building of a community of inquiry. Could you tell us more
about the course, please? How can foreign or Persian students
use this online course?
Though the documentaries are a good introduction to Philosophy for Children,
we rapidly came to the conclusion that a television series would not be enough,
especially if we want to keep the main principles that govern the pedagogy of a
community of inquiry: social construction of knowledge, critical thinking, self-
correction, dialogue . . .
The problem with the television series is that the students are passive. We
wanted to make sure that students would become active in the process of
discovering philosophy for children. So we moved on to the creation of a
course that would combine the television series and a website in which stu-
dents would be invited to create a virtual community of inquiry. That was
not easy to do because, as it seems, in 2003, no online tools were available
to help us in this process. Of course, we have discussion forums, but we
wanted to go beyond the forum. We wanted to make sure that students will
be engaged in a process where they will be “forced” to correct their position,
if necessary. So we created what we call the Collaborative Virtual Observatory
(CVO). The CVO looks like a little virtual building in which you can find
six rooms: the Staff Room, the Observatory, the Library, the Secretariat, the
Video Library and the Agora. Each of these rooms gives to the students the
possibility of being in touch with other students. Combined with the televi-
sion series, the CVO gives to the student the possibility of learning how to
observe a philosophical community of inquiry composed of children aged
from 6 to 12 and to justify their judgment about what they think is present or
not in the sequence studied each week. The main idea is to become a member
of a virtual community of inquiry in which your task is to observe sequences
of children doing philosophy, sharing your comments about these sequence,
as well as your justifications about your judgment concerning the presence
or not of some elements (cognitive, social, philosophical) in these sequences
(Sasseville & Gagnon, 2007).
A foreign student is certainly able to follow that course. Actually, we have stu-
dents from France and Switzerland. Of course, for the moment, everything is in
French. But my hope is that everything will be translated in different languages
and people from abroad might want to introduce this type of course in their
own country. That’s why, for example, I went to Oxford recently: presenting this
course to persons who might want to translate the whole thing and use the CVO
in their country.
 Children can do philosophy 93

It seems that the series presents some evidence against Piaget’s

conception that young children cannot deal with abstractions.
Can you discuss the problem? How much might his conception
cause children’s education to deviate from its real purposes?
Well, Piaget was right when he said that young children are not able to engage
themselves in abstract processes. He was right, given the context in which he
was working. But if you change this context, that is, if you invite children to
work with peers and invite them to go beyond what we can normally (Piagetian’s
context) expect from them. Then you see them able to engage in highly abstract
processes. In other words, if you use another experimental context, like the one
suggested by Vygotsky (1985), you arrive at results that are very different from
what you can expect if you work in a Piagetian context. Now the question is:
Should we invite children to go beyond what we would normally expect from
them? My answer is yes, because I think they deserve it. And what we see in the
documentaries, as well as in the 12 hours of sequences accessible through the
course online, is very young children who like to be challenged, who like to go
deeper than what we might expect from them. I think the fact that they like it is
already a good reason to do so.

We know that the teacher’s roles in the building of a Community

of Inquiry are similar to the Socratic dialogical Method. Is
having Socratic skills enough for a P4C teacher, or are there
some other skills that he or she must learn? Could you tell
us your distinctive ideas about the skills (art) a P4C teacher
should learn?
Socrates is probably a good model of what we can expect from a teacher in P4C.
He wanted to make sure that his interlocutor will, with time, discover that what
he thought he knew for sure was not necessarily so sure. And Socrates was doing
so by inviting his interlocutor to follow the arguments where they lead. From that
point of view, Socrates, as I said, is probably a good example of what a teacher in
P4C can do.
But I don’t think we should follow Socrates in every way. What I mean is that
I am not sure that Socrates was always an inquirer like the teacher in P4C should
be. Sometimes, I get the impression that Socrates knows in advance the answers
(or the absence of answers) he wants his interlocutor will get. In a community of
philosophical inquiry, we never begin (except when the question is a logical one
for which we have some answers) the inquiry with the idea that we should arrive
at any answer at all or at some specific one. We just don’t know where we will
end up. For this reason, there is no move done by the teacher to make sure that
students will arrive at this or that. The pedagogical behaviors of the teacher are
directed toward the formation of the judgment of the students, not toward some
sort of answers (or no answer at all).
94  Michel Sasseville
In order to help students to become better judges, he or she will ask them
some questions that will invite them, if necessary, to make nuances in their judg-
ment, to define terms, to underline presuppositions, to identify consequences,
to look for counter-examples, to inquire with others, and on and on. The list of
pedagogical moves done by the teachers is quite long.
Also, we have to remember that, most of the time, Socrates is discussing with
one person at a time. This is very different from the situation in a community of
inquiry where 25 to 30 persons are involved in the discussion. Given this con-
text, the teacher has to make sure that students will be connected to each other.
So there is a social dimension, as well as an affective dimension that seem to be
absent in Socrates’s dialogues. And this makes a big difference in the role of the
teacher compared to the one Socrates had. In a community of inquiry, the teacher
not only facilitates the philosophical inquiry by helping children to engage in the
metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, etc. dimension of the problem they are
investigating together, but also tries to make sure that the whole process will be
a co-construction of understanding among children, in which distributive think-
ing will take place. In other words, by her interventions, she tries to make sure
that this child will take into account what others have said, this other one will try
to find a counter-example of what the previously have said, this other one will
reformulate what another one has said. . . .
So, her task is not to make sure that the interlocutor will follow her argument
where it leads, but to help everyone involved in the inquiry to follow the arguments
where they lead, including her arguments but not only them. Moreover, her task
is to make sure that the affective dimension of the persons involved in the inquiry
will serve the development of the inquiry. And in order to do so, she will try, for
example, to help every student listen carefully to everyone involved, to respect the
different points of view expressed during the discussion, in a word, to make sure
(at least as much as she can because here, also, we cannot be absolutely sure) that
people will feel at ease (not be scared) to say something during the inquiry.
So, given what has been said before, I would say that a teacher in P4C will
become better and better at facilitating the inquiry if she or he:

1. Knows how to foster the practice of all the thinking skills: reasoning, inquir-
ing, concept formation, translation (and probably more than that, given that
we just don’t know for sure exactly how many they are). In order to do
so, she has to know these skills and be able to recognize how they are well
employed. Only for this reason (there are many others), it takes more than
a couple of days of training to become a good facilitator in a community
of inquiry. In my case, even if I already had a master’s degree in philoso-
phy when I began to facilitate philosophical inquiry with children, it took
me many years to feel at ease about recognizing whether these skills were
employed rightly during the discussion. And I have to confess that, after
nearly 30 years of experience with children and teachers and a PhD in this
field, it is still hard work to see clearly all the time when this or that skill is
well employed in a community of inquiry. Because, more than knowing all
 Children can do philosophy 95
those skills, you have to be a very good listener. And this, sometimes, is not
easy either because you are simply tired, or because so many things are going
on at the same time that your attention to this aspect of the educational pro-
cess involved in P4C is not totally there.
2. A teacher in P4C will become better and better at facilitating the inquiry if
she or he knows how to recognize the different styles of thinking and to help
each child to become himself in his own style of thinking without forgetting
that other styles of thinking are also very productive if we want to enlarge
our understanding of the world. In order to do so, the teacher has to admit,
at least, that her own style of thinking, let’s say Socratic style, is not the only
one that should be fostered in a community of inquiry, that her way of look-
ing at things is not the only one that should be practiced. After all, the goal
is not to make sure that we will have 25 Socrateses at the end! The goal is to
make sure that we will have 25 persons who will think for themselves, in their
own way of thinking that might be very different of the one that Socrates
had (or the teacher has). And in order to achieve this goal, she has to make
sure that every child will get a chance to express himself during the inquiry,
even the one (and I would say especially the one) that, in his own style of
thinking, seems to be at the opposite of the style of the teacher.

So, the teacher has to become more and more aware that the different styles of
thinking and of learning are sources of enrichment in a community of inquiry,
and not sources of impoverishment. But this is easier to say than to do because,
for a lot of people, it seems that, at first, the difference, whatever it is, is a scary
thing. And it is also difficult because some people think that if children are not
doing exactly what we have asked them to do, then the goal will not be reached.
I am not saying that, in a community of inquiry, we should just let the children
express themselves, without, let’s say, helping them to support their judgment by
reasons and, more than that, good reasons (which supposes that you take time
to invite children to evaluate reasons that are given). The only thing I am saying
is that if you foster only one style of thinking, Socrates’s or your own style of
thinking, because you think that this style is the ONE that should be fostered,
given that a philosophical investigation is more than expressing yourself about
the world, you miss the point.
Yes, it is true that philosophical investigation in a community of inquiry is more
than just asking children what they think, but it is also more than leading them to
think that the way the teacher thinks is the one that should be retained. For that
reason, I am always skeptical about those who think that doing philosophy with
children is mainly a question of being engaged in a discussion where the teacher
is at the center of the process and what the children have to do is to emulate what
the teachers is doing. Indoctrination is not only a question of content. It can be
also a question of procedure.

3. A teacher in P4C will become better and better at facilitating the inquiry
if she or he knows how to facilitate collaboration instead of competition
96  Michel Sasseville
among children. Again, it is easier to say than to do, because collaboration
is not a question of being friends with each other. Collaboration means that
you will accept being engaged in cognitive conflict (socio-constructivism),
being challenged by the other and, eventually, modifying your point of view
because what has been said led to this change. You see, the point in a com-
munity of inquiry is not to win a debate, but to collaborate to the under-
standing through deliberation. Most of the time, if children are invited to say
something in the traditional classroom, it is either to give a short conference
to others or to express themselves in such a way that some will win while
others will lose the debate (battle) about this or that topic. In a community
of inquiry, at least one that has reached its cruising speed, there is no debate,
but deliberation.

So, it is not a question of competition (who will win and who will lose), but who
can contribute to the development of the common understanding. And in order
to do so, the teacher has to promote the context in which the deliberation will
occur. If she or he focuses mainly on how this position is not acceptable, while
another one is clearly the one that should be retained, she is not helping children
to see that the game here is not a debate. Also, she has to make sure that children
will say what they believe, and not say what they don’t believe just to make sure
that by this they will convince other children and therefore win the debate. I like
how Lipman (1991) differentiates a debate from deliberation when he says that
those engaged in a debate try to convince the other of what they don’t necessar-
ily believe, while those engaged in a deliberation don’t try to convince the other
of what they themselves believe. I really like this way of distinguishing debate
and deliberation because it shows well that in a community of inquiry, where
deliberation occurs, the idea is not to win against others but to participate in the
development of the understanding. If the teacher is not ready to engage him or
herself in this context, the whole thing will collapse at one point.
Does that mean that it is useless to engage children in debates? Well it depends.
If your goal is to foster thinking skills, it might be interesting and even useful. But
if your goal is to help them to think for themselves, in other words to become
more and more aware of what they think, more and more aware of the values
they have (and should have, given what has been discussed), the sort of person
they are and they want to be, then I think the debate is useless. More than that,
I think it can be harmful because you can get the idea that what is important is
not what you think but the impression you can make when you think, regardless
of the impact this impression can have to the quality of your own life as well as
the one of your peers. When you take into account the values you have and the
values others have and you try to create a world in which everyone would like to
live in, maybe then you can say: you are my friend.
As you can see, this type of friendship is not easy to build, but I assume that it
is the one involved in a community of inquiry. So when I said that collaboration
is not a question of being friend to each other, I should add: it is a question of
 Children can do philosophy 97
learning how to become friends with each other. This learning is not an easy task
and requires from the teachers a deep understanding of how the relationships
(social, emotional as well as cognitive) among children are an important aspect
of P4C.

4. A last point concerning the quality of the teacher (don’t get the impression,
though, that everything will then be said about this topic). To become a
good facilitator in a community of inquiry, you have also to develop all the
dispositions that you think your students might develop during the process:
disposition to become critical, self-critical, to wonder, to feel a need for rea-
sons, principles, regulative ideas, to take care of the tools of inquiry, and on
and on again . . . The more you interiorize these dispositions, the more you
will be an example for your students, and the more you become an example,
the more what you do will be coherent with what you say when you invite
them to develop these dispositions. A good facilitator in a community of
inquiry is the opposite of the one who says: do what I say and not what I do
(or what I am). Doing philosophy with children is not a job. It is a way of
doing things, of acting in the world, of being a member of a larger com-
munity, that is, the international community of human beings interested by
the liberation of the child and the development of a planet liberated of the
tyranny of those who think that freedom is only for some people.

If, as a facilitator of a community of inquiry, you act in such a way that we have the
impression that only some of the children have the right to express themselves,
only some questions are interesting, only some thinking skills are important, only
some points of view are acceptable, etc., then you are not acting as someone
who has developed the dispositions involved in the educational dimension of this
process. And if this is so, be sure that the incoherence between what you say and
what you do will be underlined by the children, as if you were inviting them to do
what you don’t believe, as if you are engaged with them in a debate. My experi-
ence in this is that rapidly children will tell you that doing philosophy is not very
interesting because what they are invited to do is not what the teacher is doing.
And because of that, most of the time, the teacher will stop doing philosophy in
the classroom on the basis that children don’t like this activity. But, as you can
imagine, the reason given here might not be the right one. I am not saying that
a teacher should wait to begin doing philosophy with children up to the point
where he or she feels that she has developed all the dispositions. It might not be
possible.
The only thing I am trying to say is that self-correction is very important in this
process, and when teachers become aware that they might change some of their
dispositions in order to become more and more coherent with the goals of P4C,
they should do it and help children to become aware that this change is occurring
in themselves. After all, no one is perfect right at the beginning (nor at the end),
but self-correction, I hope, is always possible.
98  Michel Sasseville

What are the Canadian education administrators’ views about

accomplishing the program in all of the Canadian schools? Is
there any resistance against it?
I can’t say about all Canada, and each province of the country has its own way
of dealing with education. What I can say about the province of Québec (where
I live) is that the Ministry of Education is aware of the existence of P4C and has
nothing against the idea of introducing it in schools, given the recent reform
in education in Québec (the shift from objectives to the formation of compe-
tencies, the transformation of the classroom into a community of learners, the
importance of transversal competencies like critical judgment, self-identity, com-
munication skills, and on) and the theoretical foundations of P4C (I am thinking
of Bruner’s cultural psychology (Bruner, Goodnow & Austin, 1956), Vygotsky
and, of course, Dewey).
But having nothing against P4C does not mean that the Ministry of Education
has introduced P4C as another discipline in the curriculum. P4C is still an option
in the curriculum. And as long as philosophy will not be introduced officially as
an obligatory discipline, its presence in the primary and secondary schools of
Québec (or everywhere else) will be in the hands of the teachers who think that,
without philosophy, something is missing. There may be a lot out there doing
philosophy with their students (I don’t have a list of the teachers who, after
having followed the training at Laval University, have decided to implement phi-
losophy in their classroom, but I have received much mail from them asking for
materials and follow-up. But, given, as I said, that it is not an obligatory part of
the curriculum, the life of P4C in Québec’s schools is very fragile.
When the Ministry of Education introduced its reform, I thought to myself:
great, here is another occasion to show how philosophy can be very useful if
we want to make the shift proposed by this reform. But this reform came also
with the assumption that transversal competencies will emerge from the teaching
of specific disciplines and therefore we don’t need another discipline, like phi-
losophy, to make sure that transversal competencies (like critical judgment, com-
munication . . .) will be part of the education system. I have to say that I share
this assumption. I agree with those who think that transversal competencies are
always contextual, and the training of these competencies cannot be done in a
vacuum.
But what most of the people in education have not seen yet is that the disci-
pline of philosophy, with its content, its concepts, its problems, its methodology,
is the most appropriate discipline to foster these transversal competencies. To my
knowledge, it is the only discipline (given also, I must say, the transformation
of the classroom into a community of inquiry) that combines all the transver-
sal competencies into a unified and coherent whole. Experimental research has
shown that there is nothing like the practice of philosophy to foster critical think-
ing, to develop your identity, to become a better inquirer, a better citizen . . .
because by doing philosophy you engage yourself, with others, in the investiga-
tion of problems that force you to become critical, to be conscious of your own
 Children can do philosophy 99
thinking process, to inquire, to be part of a society as a reasonable person. I don’t
see how this can be done so well with the other disciplines taught in primary
schools.
So, yes, I agree that these competencies cannot be developed in vacuum. But
something more valuable can be done in schools to foster these competencies
than teaching only the traditional disciplines. And philosophy is the discipline
that should be introduced if we want children not only to be able to think in the
disciplines, but also to be able to think between the disciplines. If this is so, we
could ask: why has the Ministry of Education not introduced philosophy as an
obligatory discipline with its reform? To answer this question, I would propose
the following hypothesis:

1. Those who were responsible for the reform didn’t know too much about P4C;
2. Those who were responsible for the reform knew enough of P4C to see how
it could be an obligatory part of the curriculum, but were persuaded that
introducing this discipline would require too much change in the system of
education;
3. The combination of both hypotheses: they knew enough about P4C and
estimated that its introduction would mean such a big change that they
decided to move slowly but surely in this direction.

I know, the third hypothesis is very pretentious. As if P4C can be a model toward
which we should go. But what if it would be the case? What if schools became
more and more communities of inquiry? What if the system of education focused
on the cultivation of judgment? It would mean going up to the end of what has
been introduced with the actual reform. It would mean stopping to see disciplines
as non-overlapping areas, changing the way teachers are trained at the university,
giving more attention to the process of thinking, introducing epistemological
considerations in every discipline, changing the way we evaluate children in their
performance, and so on.
Here in Québec, the schools and the universities are moving slowly toward
these changes. Maybe the next reform will be the one where philosophy will be
seen as an exemplary discipline if we want to understand the spirit of this new
reform. Of course, I don’t know what the future will be, but, to take the words
of Lipman, it seems that it is already too late to go back.
One more thing before going to your next question. Recently, some schools
have introduced P4C with the aim of preventing violence. And the Ministry of
Education endorsed this project. But even if the prevention of violence is a good
thing, I think it is only one aspect of P4C and not the most important one. For
me, what is central in P4C is the cultivation of judgment. Certainly, to see the
benefit of doing philosophy by the effects it could bring about is important. But
when we pay too much attention to the effects, we sometimes forget the causes
of these effects. As long as the causes are not seen as the most important thing in
education (fostering critical thinking, creative thinking, caring thinking, to name
only some of the causes that lead to prevention of violence), philosophy will not
100  Michel Sasseville
be treated as what it is: an extraordinary tool by which we can take care of what,
I think, is the most important dimension of a human being: its mind.

We have some kinds of books (including stories, questions and

pictures) that are used in a Community of Inquiry (CoI).
What kind of books can be very interesting and exciting (user-
friendly) for children in CoI? If you agree with using some
stories in CoI, what is your point of view about the content of
the books?
This last question, as simple as it is, is so complex. Because it is not any kind of
books that can be used in P4C. Lipman wrote stories that are good models of
what can be used as a starting point of the process. If we look at them carefully,
we see that each story:

1. Exemplifies the dialogue that may occur in a community of inquiry;

2. Presents children not as what they are without support, but as what they are
when they are invited, with the help of their peers as well of adults, to think
for themselves in a critical, creative and caring manner;
3. Contains some sort of intrigue that leads the children to desire to go further;
4. Does not contain some sort of moral that the children should get by reading it;
5. Presents the knowledge as something that is ambiguous, not clearly defined;
6. Shows adults as persons who like to talk with children, who like to inquire;
7. Introduces philosophical content (concepts, reasoning process) that will
invite children to go beyond their original wonder;
8. Shows how thinking together can be done in practical situations and how
self-correction might be very valuable if we want to live together.

We could add more criteria to these, but let me stop here just to say that, if we
want to respect only the criteria I just cited, it is not so easy to find books that
may serve as a starting point of the process. For sure, Lipman’s stories are not the
only stories we can use. Others have written wonderful stories in P4C (I think of
those written by A. Sharp, R. Reek, P. Cam, G. Talbot, M. F. Daniel). And I am
not saying that only stories written by philosophers in P4C should be used in the
classroom.
But when you choose a story that could be the starting point of the creation
a community of philosophical investigation, I would say: be careful to make a
choice that will not go against what you intend to do with children, that is help-
ing them to think for themselves. Especially if you are at the beginning of the
process with them. Children, as well as adults, need models. Why not make sure
that these models will not be in contradiction with the kind of behaviors (cogni-
tive, social) that are involved in a community of philosophical inquiry?
Having said that, this does not mean that all characters in the story should be
as reasonable as we could expect all the time. If you take Pixie (Lipman’s story)
for example, we see her having some behaviors that might not be part of what we
 Children can do philosophy 101
could consider as a reasonable person. But on the overall, Pixie likes to think for
herself, she likes to ask questions, she likes to wonder, she likes to invite her peers
to be part of the inquiry, and on. By reading the story, children in the classroom
might be interested in following what Pixie is doing. And by doing so, the story
becomes, by itself, a wonderful tool in order to achieve the goal of P4C: helping
children to become themselves, by becoming more and more able to think for
themselves in a democratic situation where everyone participates actively to the
development of a more reasonable society.

References
Bruner, J. S., Goodnow, J. J, & Austin, G. A. (1956). A study of thinking, New York:
Wiley.
Lipman, M. (1984). Philosophy goes to school. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
Press.
Lipman, M. (1991). Thinking in education. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lipman, M., Sharp, A. M., & Oscanyan, F. S. (1980). Philosophy in the classroom.
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Lipman, M., Sharp, A. M., & Oscanyan, F. S. (1988). Philosophy in the classroom. 2d
Ed. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Lipman, M., Sharp, A. M., & Reed, D. F. (1992). Studies in philosophy for children.
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Sasseville, M. (2004). Des enfants philosophent, Université Laval.
Sasseville, M., & Gagnon, M. (2007). Penser ensemble à l’école: des outils pour
l’observation d’une communauté de recherche philosophique en action, PUL, Coll.
Dialoguer.
Vygotsky, L. (1985). Pensée et langage. Paris: Terrains.
12 Reasonableness instead
of rationality
Clinton Golding

Due to the fact that a proportion of your studies are dedicated

to connecting subjects of school lessons to P4C programs, do
you believe that we can use the community of inquiry in all the
school lessons, for example, physics?
I try to connect P4C with other subjects by having P4C students consider
philosophical issues that arise in the other subjects, and likewise I encourage
the teachers of different subject areas to encourage their students to explore
the philosophical underpinnings of what they teach. Yet I do not think that
P4C is an appropriate way of teaching subjects besides philosophy. Rather, it is
the pedagogical theory that underlies P4C which Lipman (2004, p. 6) some-
times calls ‘educational philosophy’ that is important for teaching in other
subject areas. One major part of this theory is that learning involves inquiry.
Without a problem to inquire into, there is no learning. So, we should teach
all subjects by enabling students to experience the problems that need to be
resolved (the scientific, mathematical and historical problems, for example)
and then enable them to resolve these problems, or at least to understand a
resolution to these problems.
I recommend that all subject areas use a ‘community of inquiry’ approach
and that, at least some of the time, students learn by engaging in the same
sort of inquiry that experts engage in, but at the appropriate level for the stu-
dents. In this way, students develop meaningful knowledge rather than merely
a collection of discrete chunks of information that they might remember, but
which do not make sense to them. However, a community of scientific or math-
ematical inquiry in the classroom, for example, is different from the primarily
discussion-based community of philosophical inquiry in P4C. For the most
part, mathematical or scientific inquiry would involve students engaging with
mathematical and scientific problems and doing calculations, testing theorems,
gathering data, or designing and conducting experiments. This will only some-
times include philosophical meta-inquiry and discussion into philosophical
problems about the nature of the discipline and its fundamental concepts and
assumptions.
 Reasonableness instead of rationality 103

Regarding your article “creating a thinking school” (Golding,

2006), it seems that you have made many changes in the
previous curriculum. If yes, please explain briefly
In this article, I advocate a rethink or a restructure of an entire school, including the
curriculum. For example, I advocate that the development of thinking skills, think-
ing dispositions and deep understanding be added as curriculum goals when these
are absent. To learn a subject or discipline, students have to learn the ways of think-
ing involved, as well as the body of knowledge. But I rarely advocate any change to
the body of knowledge to be covered, except perhaps that students should cover
less, so that they can develop a deeper understanding of the subject matter.
The main changes I advocate for schools are pedagogical and institutional,
rather than curricular, in order to allow for the education of thinking. I advocate
that the curriculum be taught in a reflective manner, where students develop
knowledge as the result of their own inquiry, for the reasons I gave in my answer
to the first question. I also advocate that, if a school wants to be a ‘thinking
school’ and provide an environment that is educative for thinking, then it needs
to place education for thinking as one of its highest priorities. Otherwise, being
a ‘thinking school’ will be mere rhetoric, and educating for thinking will always
be neglected because there is no time left after doing what is really important
(such as drilling students for exams). I focus more on the leadership required for
creating a thinking school in a later article: Leadership for a Thinking School at
Buranda State School (Golding, Gurr, & Hinton, 2012).

According to your article “Epistemic Positions and Philosophy

for Children” (Golding, 2009a), it seems that you believe in
rationalistic ideas. What are the strongest reasons you may
respond to relativistic ideas?

Some believe that there is an opposition between rationalism and

pragmatism (especially new pragmatism). In your opinion,
what ideas and solutions are there for this problem? Are they
originally compatible?
I will answer the two above questions together. I do not think there is a clear oppo-
sition or distinction between pragmatism and rationalism or relativism, because
pragmatism, or at least the pragmatism I advocate, shares characteristics of both
rationalism and relativism. For pragmatism, like relativism, there are no impartial,
universal standards we can appeal to, only standards relative to some perspective or
another. But equally for pragmatism, like rationalism, some perspectives are better
than others. This is not because some are true and the others false, but because some
better satisfy objective criteria than others, such as surviving the tribunal of the com-
munity of inquirers or resolving a problem (meaning what actually resolves the prob-
lem within the constraints of the world, rather than the solution we want or like).
104  Clinton Golding
Pragmatism is in opposition only to extreme versions of relativism where every
perspective is equally as good as every other, and to extreme versions of rational-
ism where there is an external truth that we can apprehend impartially and with
certainty. I do not attempt to prove that pragmatism is correct and extreme or
radical relativism and rationalism are incorrect (as this would not be a pragmatist
argument, and would instead be playing the rationalist game), but I can offer good
reasons for taking pragmatism to be a better position. My argument is that pragma-
tism is better than both extreme relativism and rationalism because they ignore use-
ful and legitimate epistemic standards that are available to pragmatism. Rationalism
can admit only of true and false. Relativism admits only of opinions. Both ignore
the range of epistemically legitimate standards by which we can make reasoned
judgments that are neither ‘true’ nor ‘false’ as such, but nor are they mere opinions.
Extreme forms of rationalism set epistemic standards that are impossibly and
unnecessarily high. Even if it were possible to attain truth, we could not verify
that we have done so, and could not even tell if we had moved closer, because
we do not have the independent access to the truth that is needed to measure the
distance between our current conception and the true conception. This means
that under extreme forms of rationalism, we cannot make or verify epistemic judg-
ments, because the only standards we have available are impossible to meet. A con-
sequence of this is that rationalism leaves us constantly in danger of dogmatism.
Extreme relativism sets epistemic standards that are unreasonably and need-
lessly low (in reality, having no epistemic standards at all). Relativism starts with
an acknowledgment that we cannot have, or verify whether we have, final truth,
but then draws the conclusion that therefore we cannot have anything of epis-
temic value, only subjective opinions.
Pragmatism, on the other hand, is able to employ legitimate epistemic standards
that fall between the impossible absolute truth and unreasonable mere opinions.
For example, pragmatism can appeal to logical coherence, harmony with other
conceptions or the empirical data, absence of fallacies or strength of logical support.
I do not reject rationalism on the basis of the inductive argument that we
haven’t yet produced final truths so we probably never will. Nor do I reject rela-
tivism because we might produce truths one day. Instead, I argue that we better
understand our epistemic standards under pragmatism rather than extreme rela-
tivism or rationalism; We have a better grasp of epistemic standards if we consider
the legitimate epistemic achievements that pragmatism can support such as new
or more refined arguments, questions and positions, rather than by only consid-
ering whether or not we can reach the truth, or if it is all a matter of opinion.

According to your article (Golding, 2005) “Truth or Making

Sense; What Is More Important in Education?” can you “make
sense” without paying attention to truth? It seems that inquiry
consists in finding the meaning of truth.
In this article, I argued that the aim of education is not for students to have the
truth, as such, but to make sense of it. A truth we do not (or cannot) make sense
 Reasonableness instead of rationality 105
of is useless as an educative goal. Now I would argue differently – though I have
yet to fully work out my position. The aim of education is to make sense. This is
a different ‘game’ than seeking the truth, though, as I argue, in my PhD thesis
(Golding, 2009b), “there are similarities between these games as there are between
Australian Rules, Rugby, and American football, but they are different games with
different rules, methods of play and most importantly, ways of scoring” (p. 240).
The epistemic aim of education, I argue, is for students to construct or under-
stand theories, interpretations, explanations, metaphors or descriptions that prove
insightful and enable them to resolve inadequacies and incongruities in their con-
ceptions, or in other words, to put all their various conceptions in greater reflec-
tive equilibrium (in the pragmatist sense I discussed in the previous answer). For
example, we teach 10-year-olds a simplified view of science so they can better
understand the world at their current level of understanding, and, as they get
older, we teach them more sophisticated conceptions. However, asking whether
the simplified science we teach 10-year-olds (or 16-year-olds or second-year uni-
versity students) is ‘true’ seems to be a muddled question and a category error.
The science we teach at the different levels assists students to develop more and
more sophisticated conceptions, which enable them to more and more make sense
of and act successfully in the world. The question of truth or falsity is irrelevant
to this endeavor (though I have to stress that this does not mean that anything
goes in education, as this would be to resort to a radical relativism. The new con-
ceptions have to enable students to make sense of the world, and such things as
wishful thinking, conceptions based on logical error etc. will not serve this aim).
If we really wanted to teach the truth (if there is such a thing), we would
have to teach materials that were far beyond the comprehension of most of our
students. But this is not the point of education. We have succeeded in education
when students make sense of or understand more than previously, not when they
have the truth.

Due to the fact that many of our readers have not studied your
book Connecting Concepts (Golding, 2002), please discuss its
subjects briefly.
Connecting Concepts was designed to give a quick, easy, but still rigorous, strat-
egy for assisting students to philosophize – with a particular focus on conceptual
analysis. It is inspired by materials in various P4C texts, and works according to
the same model of inquiry learning underpinning the P4C method, and with the
same basic structure of inquiry. First, start with a stimulus for inquiry: some kind
of problem that the students experience as needing to be resolved. Then, through
creative and critical thinking, the students suggest and test possible resolutions to
this problem. In the standard approach to P4C, students would read a story and,
from the narrative or the dialogue, they would pick out philosophical problems
that they felt needed resolution. In the approach I take in Connecting Concepts,
the strategy is to take a rich philosophical concept and have students address
and try to categorize cases that might be clear examples, counter-examples or
106  Clinton Golding
borderline examples of this concept. The borderline examples, in particular, pre-
sent philosophical problems for the students because they are so difficult to cat-
egorize one way or the other, and these become the stimulus for inquiry. For
example, students might inquire into the concept of responsibility and they have
to decide whether the following are examples of someone who is responsible,
someone who is not responsible, or whether they are uncertain how to categorize
the example.

• You break a plate while moving furniture.

• You break a plate that was left in the middle of the hallway.
• You break a plate that you were throwing in the air and catching.
• A driver intends to hit someone, but misses because he or she isn’t a very
good driver.
• You teach your friend basketball and they go on to become a famous player.
• Jim was born with a genius IQ and gets a top job.

Students attempt to categorize these different cases, and because they are incon-
gruous they quickly discover philosophical problems. For example, they might
decide that they are responsible for breaking a plate that they were carelessly
throwing in the air, but they are not responsible for breaking the plate that was
left in the middle of the floor. But the problem then is why are they not respon-
sible for breaking the plate that was in the middle of the floor? In both cases,
you were the one who broke the plate, and in neither case did you intend to
break the plate, so why do we think you are responsible in one but not the other?
Students discuss these examples and raise questions, alternative perspectives and
possible definitions. The resulting inquiry and discussion is philosophically rich
and fruitful.

References
Golding, C. (2002). Connecting concepts: Thinking activities for students. Melbourne:
Australian Council for Educational Research.
Golding, C. (2005). Truth or making sense – what is more important in education? In
M. Mason (Ed.), 34th PESA Conference, November 24–27 (pp. 143–151). Hong
Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Education.
Golding, C. (2006). Creating a thinking school. In S. Wilks (Ed.), Designing a think-
ing curriculum (rev. ed., pp. 29–41). Melbourne: Australian Council for Educa-
tional Research.
Golding, C. (2009a). Epistemic positions and philosophy for children. Farhang:
Quarterly Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies, 22(69), 83–116.
Golding, C. (2009b). “That’s a better idea!” Philosophical progress and philosophy
for children. Childhood and Philosophy, 5(10), 223–269.
Golding, C., Gurr, D., & Hinton, L. (2012). Leadership for a thinking school at
Buranda state school. Leading and Managing, 18(1), 91–106.
Lipman, M. (2004). Philosophy for children’s debt to Dewey. Critical and Creative
Thinking: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy in Education, 12(1), 1–8.
13 Necessity of truth in the
community of inquiry
Susan Gardner

As you said in your paper (Gardner, 1995) “Inquiry Is No Mere

Conversation,” “a Community of Inquiry is . . . centered on
and controlled by the demands of truth. Truth is absolutely
essential to this method.” . . . I think so and a meaning of
truth is needed for every inquiry Please discuss your recent
ideas about it.
Many of the following points are discussed at length in my critical thinking text
Thinking Your Way to Freedom: A Guide to Owning Your Own Practical Reason-
ing. Temple, (Gardner, 2009), as well as in my article (Gardner, 1998), “Truth in
Ethics (and elsewhere),” Analytic Teaching. Vol. 19, No. 2, 55–62.

“Truth” is entirely a function of the process

The term “truth” is common in science, but it is not an accurate term or phrase.
A more accurate way of speaking of claims that are held to be true would be to
refer to them as claims that have not been proven to be false. As Popper (1963)
pointed out, science does not progress on the backs of “once and for all” truths,
but rather, on the backs of falsifications. A good scientist does not attempt to
prove her/his claim to be true. Indeed, logically s/he cannot. This is so for two
reasons. For one, the claim under investigation always refers to classes of things,
i.e., that something is true of all of a class. A statement about all of a class can
never be verified because one can never access literally all of a class. However,
an “all” statement can be falsified by finding one counter-example. The second
reason why verification is not logically possible is that the kind of hypothetical
reasoning that would be required for verification is fallacious. “If theory X is true,
then Y should happen. Y happens. Therefore, theory X is true.” In logic, this is
referred to as the fallacy of “affirming the consequent” or “affirming the neces-
sary condition.” On the other hand, the kind of hypothetical reasoning that is
required for falsification is perfectly valid. Falsification starts with the null hypoth-
esis: If theory X is not true, then Y should not happen. Then, if Y does happen,
that shows that it is not the case that theory X is not true. This is a valid inference
that, in logic, is referred to as “modus tollens” or denying the necessary condition.
108  Susan Gardner
A scientist, in other words, cannot prove that his/her theories are true; how-
ever, s/he can prove them false. Thus, what a good scientist does when faced
with an intriguing hypothesis is to examine as much evidence as possible, in a
manner that is as precise and as “objective” as possible, and only after s/he has
failed to prove her/his theory false, i.e., it is not the case that theory X is not true,
is s/he justified in proclaiming its truth, but even then only conditionally, i.e., on
the condition that the theory remain open to re-evaluation should new relevant
evidence or reasoning emerge.
Few would find the claim that “a good scientist always remains open to new
relevant reasoning and evidence with regard to truth claims” contentious. How-
ever, if we re-examine our assumptions about truth, it is at least odd that we do
not find such an assertion contentious. After all, Truth (with a capital “T”) car-
ries with it the notion of infallibility. A claim that is later proven to be false was
not once True. It was never True; it was merely erroneously thought to be True,
though, in fact, it was false all along. It is built into our concept of Truth that, if
a claim is true it must be true for all time. Given that this is the case, doesn’t a
scientist contradict him or herself by making the claim that a theory or claim is
True, while nonetheless remaining open to the possibility that it may one day be
proven false? Surely, if someone believes that a theory or claim is open to further
scrutiny, that person does not believe that that theory or claim has been proven
to be True for all time. But if it is not True for all time, then, it is not True at all.
Something cannot be True now and false later.
In actual fact, few scientists would claim to have discovered an eternal Truth,
i.e., a Truth with a capital “T.” When scientists use the word “true,” they are
not referring to a product that is epistemologically independent of the process
from which it has emerged. When they use the word “true,” they are implicitly
referring to a process: what is true is whatever survives the process. And since the
process is not one of verification, but rather falsification, when a scientist asserts
that a theory or claim is true, what s/he means is that rigorous, objective, multi-
faceted, and public attempts to prove the claim or theory false have been futile.
That is, strictly speaking, what a scientist means is not that a claim or theory is
True, but rather that, having been subjected to a rigorous public process of falsi­
fication, the claim or theory has not been proven to be false. The phrase “though
subjected to a rigorous public process of falsification, has not yet been proven
false” is cumbersome. And since theoretically, the opposite of being false is true,
and since the claim in question is, so far as we know, not false, labeling it true with
a small “t” seems a fairly innocent move.

Establishing “truth” through a falsification process is not possible.

Estimating “truth” is
Calling a claim “true” when one means “though subjected to a rigorous public
process of falsification, it has not yet been proven false” may appear innocuous to
those close to the process; however, it is dangerous. It leads many to the erroneous
assumption that truth and falsity, in the absolute sense, divide the world in two;
that truth and falsity are mirror concepts; that if a claim is not one, it must be the
 Necessity of truth 109
other. However, truth and falsity are not mirror concepts. Though we must assume
that, from “a God’s eye view,” truth and falsity are mirror concepts, i.e., that either
a claim is true or false in the absolute sense, from a practical point of view, since we
mortals can only falsify and not verify, and since, in principle, falsification can lead
us to Truth in the absolute sense only in those situations in which we have falsified
all possibilities but one, and since we mortals can never assume that we have in
fact falsified all conceivable and actual possibilities but one, we mortals can never
assume that we have reached the “Truth” in the absolute sense. But if we mortals can
never know that we have eliminated all possibilities but one, if we mortals can never
know whether or not we have accessed “Truth” with a capital “T,” are we not back
again at the claim that the whole notion of truth is vacuous?
The moral of the story is that, while a rigorous public falsification process does
not prove that a claim is true in the absolute sense, it increases the probability of
that claim being true, and it is this increase in probability that we refer to as “true” –
with a small “t.” And as long as we know what we mean, or ought to mean, by
“true,” i.e., that a claim or theory has withstood a rigorous test of falsification,
e.g., that the claim does not contradict the facts (correspondence theory of truth/
falsehood), or that nothing contradicts the theory’s predictions (pragmatic theory
of truth/falsehood), or that the theory doesn’t contradict other “true” theories
(the coherence theory of truth/falsehood), asserting that a claim or theory is
true probably facilitates communication, particularly for those claims that have
endured a long test of time. However, we must keep in mind that this notion of
“true” is not the opposite of false. This is truth with a small “t,” one for which the
odds of its being True increase proportionately with the rigor of the falsification
process, but one for which the odds are never absolute. See Figure 13.1 below.

A GOD’S EYE VIEW (a synthetic a priori assumption)

False True
MORTAL VIEW
False true True
False claims Synthetic truths. These are claims for Analytic Truths, e.g.,
which we have grounds to believe are definitional Truths
True, but may nonetheless turn out to (bachelors are
be false. The more rigorous the testing, unmarried men);
the greater our justification in placing mathematical
these claims to the right of this column, Truths. These
i.e., closer to the “Truth” column. This are Truths with a
category also includes claims that we capital T.
believe to be true but have not yet been
subjected to rigorous testing. Such
claims are more appropriately placed
to the left of this column, i.e., further
away from the Truth column.

Figure 13.1  God’s and mortals’ view of truth

110  Susan Gardner

Truth-seeking in ethics
What is true in theoretical reasoning is true in practical reasoning; what is true in
science is also true in philosophy. When we say that we can make progress toward
truth in ethics, what we are really saying is that, since we can subject claims to a
rigorous, objective, multi-faceted and public falsification process, we can increase
the probability of these claims being True in the absolute sense.
Philosophers have spent a great deal of energy trying to suggest ways to maxi-
mize objectivity in philosophical ethical inquiry. Kant argued for universalizabil-
ity, Mill argued that one should seek to find what would produce the greatest
good for the greatest number, Rawls argued that one should imagine oneself
behind a veil of ignorance, Hare argued for Universal Prescriptivism. As is evi-
dent even from this short list, controversy abounds in philosophy. However, this
does not open up the way to relativity. Simply because we cannot know for sure
whether “a” or “b” is the best course of action in a given situation, that does not
mean that we cannot know for sure that “g,” “h,” and “i” are unacceptable. In
science, though we may not know for sure whether or not a total radical mas-
tectomy is better or worse than a lumpectomy in treating breast cancer, we can
for sure rule out singing “Gone With the Wind” at noon every second week, or
eating peanuts for breakfast. Similarly, if you are the captain of a sinking lifeboat,
it may not be clear whether the best ethical course of action is to throw off some
to save the rest, and if so, how to decide who hits the water, however, we can for
sure rule out throwing off more than you need to, letting bribes determine who
stays, and raping the women and children before you toss them over.
For those who remain uncomfortable with predicating “truth” of an ethical
judgment, the word “objective” or “impartial” or “globally sufficient” can be
substituted in its stead, however, the meaning remains the same: that an indi-
vidual has tried to eliminate personal and/or societal bias by attempting to view
the situation from a “multidimensional,” truly interactive, perspective in order
to test, through a falsification process, whether or not, from those perspectives,
the purported action still appears fair, just, or moral. There is no epistemological
space between the process and the product.

Practical reasoning is inevitably a two-step falsification process

Though truth-seeking in ethics is similar to truth-seeking in science in the sense
that both are grounded in falsification, practical reasoning is often more compli-
cated than theoretical reasoning since, in deciding a course of action, discard-
ing all contenders is never an option. Doing nothing, after all, is just as much
doing something as any other alternative. Thus, not only must each option be
evaluated in and of itself, surviving options must themselves be evaluated against
each other. In practical reasoning, in other words, judging quality is inevitably a
two-step process. One begins first of all with a process of elimination, i.e., throw-
ing out any given option, suggestion, or judgment if it lacks local sufficiency,
i.e., it has been shown to be inadequate because it is vulnerable to a powerful
 Necessity of truth 111
counter-example that shows that it does not fit the facts (correspondence theory
of truth/falsehood), or that it contradicts an agent’s other beliefs (coherence
­theory of truth/falsehood), or it contradicts concrete predictions (pragmatic the-
ory of truth). The remaining contenders are then compared in order to estimate
the least bad option, i.e., which is least weakened by a possible counter-example.
This second step, which we will refer to as global sufficiency, is particularly
important as, through it, an otherwise good option may turn out to be poor by
comparison, or a relatively weak option may turn out to be the best alternative
available under the circumstances.

Believing in truth also is important in our lives. In other words,

denying truth may be inconsistent with our behaviors in everyday
life. As you pointed out in the paper “Truth: In Ethics and
Elsewhere,” anyone who claims that there is no [kind of] truth . . .
is being hypocritical. It will be more important if we recognize
that life is an unending inquiry.” Please explain your idea about
the necessity of recognizing some true beliefs in our lives.
Since anyone who gets on a plane, or crosses a bridge, or whatever, obviously
thinks that there are truths with regard to building planes and bridges, those who
worry about truth, or deny its possibility, deny it with regard to matters of value.
These are your standard “relativists.” They believe that everyone’s opinion is as
good as anyone else’s. Who are we to judge others?
Such individuals are often reluctant to engage in genuine co-operative inquiry
as they fail to see the point. That is, they remain genuinely perplexed as to how it
is possible to judge one person’s value judgments as better or worse than anyone
else’s, while others dismiss the possibility of tracking truth in ethics altogether.
Such skepticism leads many to believe that seriously pondering the reasons for or
against a given action is not worth the effort. If genuine dialogue is to continue
in such situations, good thinkers need to remember, when confronted with such
skeptics, to turn the issue about truth on its head. You need to remember to con-
cede that you are not claiming that you can know what is True when you see or
hear it. What you are claiming is that you can know what is false, or unacceptable
by analyzing the adequacy of the reasons that support it (local sufficiency) and,
as well, you can judge whether one course of action is more or less problematic
than another (global sufficiency). Remind the relativist that absolute Truth is
like absolute cleanliness: for all practical purposes, there is no such thing. But,
from that admission, it does not follow that we therefore ought not to engage in
“truth-processing,” any more than it means that we ought not to wash. Nor does
it follow that we cannot detect that one person’s reasoning is more faulty than
another’s, any more than it follows that we can’t judge when someone’s clothes
are considerably dirtier than someone else’s.
What we are trying to do when we are trying to make progress toward truth in
ethics is to judge which of competing options is the best under the circumstances.
We are not trying to do that directly by focusing on which option is better; rather
112  Susan Gardner
we are approaching the goal indirectly by focusing on which are the least worthy
candidates. Like a jet engine, we are trying to make haste forward by putting
behind us that which is faulty.
We may end up with more than one plausible way to handle a situation. That
may be because both options are in fact equally sound, or that we have simply
been unable to detect the inherent weaknesses in one or both options, or that
there is a still better way to handle the situation than we have hitherto imagined.
However, if we have tried our best to reason as impartially as possible with respect
to as many options as possible, we ought to be comfortable with the fact that that
is the best that a finite mind can do.

In general, pragmatism’s attitude to truth is insufficient or non-

empathetic. Pragmatists generally do not have a good rapport
with truth. Can we explain the epistemic aims of a community
of inquiry within the theory of pragmatism without appealing
to any conception of truth?
I think pragmatism could be characterized as having a “non-empathetic view of
truth” only if truth is viewed as having a capital “T” (see above), and only if truth
is viewed as being a potential product of a solitary thinker. With regard to the
latter point, American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce tried valiantly to place
philosophy on a scientific basis and argued that what distinguishes the scientific
method of inquiry was that it was an inter-subjective process of cooperative
or public inquiry. And because truth (or objectivity or impartiality) is a product
of an inter-subjective process, and because the process is never-ending (i.e., we
ought always to be open to opposing viewpoints), we must recognize, as Peirce
(1955) argues in his paper “The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism,” that we can
never hope to obtain “absolute certainty, absolute exactitude, absolute univer-
salizability.” So, in this sense, but only in this sense (i.e., that we cannot achieve
absolute “Truth” and that any confidence of making progress toward Truth can
never be a product of individual rationality), can pragmatism be characterized as
having a “non-empathetic view of truth.”
What is of particular interest with regard to this pragmatist point of view that
moving toward truth or impartiality is an inter-subjective process is that it dif-
fers substantially from Kant’s view that truth or impartiality can be approached
through an intra-subjective process.
Kant argued that the route to impartiality, truth, and thus autonomy, was
through rationality. Obviously, if one were able to be perfectly rational (e.g., Star
Trek’s Data), one could be sure that one’s judgments were “impartial” or “objec-
tive,” and, from Kant’s perspective, therefore moral. Kant offered the Categorical
Imperative (so act that the maxim of your action can become a universal law) as
a negative test of rationality. Since universality is a mark of rationality (e.g., two
plus two equals four in all possible worlds), if one’s maxims for action were not
universalizable, one would know that they were not contenders for objectivity
and morality.
 Necessity of truth 113
Kant’s universalizability test is a kind of “reverse roles” or “golden rule” proce-
dure. Using this procedure, a creditor, for example, can quickly see that his view
that “a debtor ought to be hung, drawn, and quartered” could not be a candidate
for rationality, or impartiality, as he himself (presumably) would not wish to be
hung, drawn, and quartered were he a debtor.
Kant’s emphasis on the importance of rationality has lent powerful support to
the glorification of the solitary thinker. Kant’s model suggests that good think-
ing, in and of itself, is the road to human excellence. After all, if impartiality
resides in one’s capacity to be rational, then it appears that all one need do to
become impartial, i.e., the best to which we humans can aspire, is, through suf-
ficient will power, and with the use of various skills, rise up from one’s lower,
biased, particular point of view to the more ethereal, objective, universal point
of view. All one need do to move toward truth, objectivity, and impartiality is to
travel upward within one’s own mind.
The difficulty with the process advocated by Kant is that the only check on the
potential bias of one’s own thinking is one’s own biased self. “I have reasoned it
through,” so one says, “and I can assure you that I am not the least bit biased.”
It is a danger similar to the one inherent in postulating the possibility of a private
language. As Wittgenstein has pointed out, this is like checking the accuracy of
a newspaper by going out and buying another copy of the same edition. It also
leads to a travesty of one apparently legitimately universalizing one’s own biases,
e.g., Hare’s fanatic Nazi who argues that the extermination of the Jews is moral
because he can universalize his maxim, i.e., he can will that, even if he were a Jew,
he would still wish that all Jews of the world be exterminated.
If we cannot go inward to find impartiality, what is the alternative? The goal
is to view a given situation, or issue, as objectively as possible, to see it for what
it really is rather than as a function of one’s preconceived ideas. The optimum
viewpoint, as Kant correctly pointed out, would be a universal, or a God’s eye
view. However, since striving for a universal view “internally” is problematic,
surely the next best option is to go the other way, i.e., try and see the situation
from as many actual points of view as possible – with the regulative ideal being
an infinite number of viewpoints. Impartiality, in other words, is not a state of
being, nor is it something that is best achieved through the play of one’s own
imagination or rationality. Impartiality requires precisely what American Pragma-
tist Charles Peirce suggested: i.e., a “community of scientific inquiry” in which
participants actually communicate with one another and genuinely try to perceive
the issue from as many actual perspectives as possible. One cannot claim to be
impartial or objective, in other words, unless there has been a genuine attempt to
objectively evaluate the legitimacy of opposing positions. Impartial Reasoning, in
other words, is inevitably interactive.
Listening to others, thus, interestingly, turns out to be a necessary condition
for impartiality. However, not any kind of listening will do. One must keep in
mind that the point of this endeavor is to view issues from as many perspectives
as possible in order to estimate their relative adequacy. This, in turn, requires that
one clearly understand not only the viewpoints of others, but also the reasoning
114  Susan Gardner
that backs those positions. Ferreting out the reasoning that underpins the view-
points of others can be a delicate and often arduous task. Genuine listening, thus,
paradoxically, almost always requires dialogue. You need to speak, i.e., consist-
ently question and clarify, in order to listen well. You need to learn to become an
articulate listener. You need to learn to genuinely communicate with others in
order to become yourself.
In summary, though pure rationality, or objectivity, or aspiring toward member-
ship in Kant’s “Kingdom of Ends” is the regulative ideal, the way toward that ideal
is concrete. Because the determining influence of others is most prevalent within
one’s own mind, the only way to ensure that one has in fact neutralized the internal
determining influence of others is to force oneself to test those perspectives against
the viewpoints of actual others. This precludes the possibility of a Pyrrhic victory,
or what, in Critical Thinking circles, is referred to as an illegitimate “strawperson”
maneuver, i.e., the underestimation of the strength and wisdom of perspectives
that are radically different from one’s own. It is only by forcing ourselves to test
our judgments against the strongest possible actual opposition, or, in the words of
American pragmatists Peirce and Dewey, it is only by continuously submitting our
knowledge claims to the public test of a Community of Inquirers, that we can strive
toward impartiality, and ultimately our own freedom.

Anyone who is faced with P4C for the first time may, at first
glance, think P4C will lead students to relativistic ideas. But we
know it is because of a lack of good awareness of P4C issues.
Can you illustrate the current ideas about this issue?
Often when people first view a Community of Inquiry, they believe that this is
just letting participants find their voices. Since any good classroom teacher does
this, this view is blind to the value of P4C. That is why the topic of truth is so
important. If there is no such thing as “truth,” if there is no way to estimate
which of competing views are better or worse, then there would be little point
in exchanging viewpoints – or at least that is all it would be – exchanging view-
points. If a Community of Inquiry is genuinely about “inquiry,” then one must
believe that such inquiry will result in a movement toward truth. Thus, before
demonstrating the value of participating in a Community of Inquiry, the topic of
“truth” must first be covered.
Following a discussion of truth, one way to demonstrate the value of engag-
ing in Communities of Inquiry is to show how the experience enhances “good
­thinking” – though, again, it is important to keep in mind that the notion of
“good thinking” is predicated on the assumption that progress toward truth is
possible; after all, what is the point of thinking at all, let alone good thinking, if
truth is not possible. Thus a discussion about truth is primary.
Figure 13.2 below summarizes a description of what a “good thinker” looks
like. Figure 13.3 shows, in round brackets, how participating in a Community of
Inquiry facilitates that end.
A GOOD THINKER
– Figures out which questions are important to ask, i.e., is awake;
– Is courageous in tackling any question;
– Listens to the points of view of others ;
– Accesses as much relevant data as possible from as many angles as possible;
– Insists on accurate, precise formulations;
– Assesses how the reasons/data bears on the question at hand;
– Judges (without bias) which of competing answers are least plausible (are
underpinned with faulty reasoning), or generates novel solutions in the face of
untenable conflict;
– Is comfortable in generating novel hypotheses that might account for conflicting
viewpoints;
– Is prepared to abandon answers that are inadequate;
– Modulates confidence in proportion to the strength of the data (reasoning) to
which s/he has access;
– Understands that her/his fallibility requires that s/he always remain open to new data;
– Perseveres in the face of complexity;
– Puts “good thinker” at or near the top of her/his identity characteristics;
– Is moved by reasons;
– Has an image of what good thinking looks like.

Figure 13.2  Summary description of a good thinker

GOOD THINKING
is nourished through participation in a Philosophical Community of Inquiry
because, through such experience, a participant will learn to
– Figure out which questions are important to ask, i.e., is awake;
(Participants must come up with their own questions.)
– Be courageous in tackling any question;
(The discussion may focus on any question that the community chooses, and all students
will be strongly encouraged to comment.)
– Listen to the points of view of others;
(This does not mean only “listening to refute” – since such “knee jerk reactions” are
rarely possible within a Community of Inquiry – but, rather, genuinely reflecting
upon the degree to which the perspectives of others contribute to a more profound
understanding of the issue.)
– Access as much relevant data as possible from as many angles as possible;
(which, interestingly, is why Communities of Inquiry in multi-cultural societies are
particularly productive)
– Insist on accurate, precise formulations;
(which will be insisted upon by the facilitator, i.e., no “politician’s rhetoric” will be
allowed)
– Assess how the data bears on the question at hand;
(by asking that very question)

Figure 13.3  How participation in Communities of Inquiry facilitates good thinking

116  Susan Gardner

GOOD THINKING
– Judge (without bias) which of competing answers are more plausible, i.e., closer to
the truth;
(Bias becomes evident through demands by the facilitator of, for example, logical
consistency and value coherence, e.g., so if that is what you believe then it follows that
you believe “x,” right?)
– Be comfortable in generating novel hypotheses that might account for conflicting
viewpoints;
(The variety of viewpoints generated in a Community of Inquiry contributes to the
development of “creative” as well as “critical” thinking.)
– Be prepared to abandon answers that are inadequate;
(Often the first sign of a successful Community of Inquiry is when a participant says
“when we first began the discussion I thought x; now I think not-x.”)
– Modulate confidence in proportion to the strength of the data to which they have
access;
(Since participants will be expected to supply data and/or reasoning in support of their
positions, they soon learn that unsupported over-confidence may eventually be a source
of embarrassment.)
– Understand that their fallibility requires that they always remain open to new data;
(as it may be more humiliating in a public inquiry to adhere to an untenable position
than to be moved by reasons)
– Persevere in the face of complexity;
(Long-term membership in a Community of Inquiry convinces participants that there is
value in progress made toward truth despite lack of closure.)
– Put “good thinker” at or near the top of their identity characteristics;
(because participants find that “good thinking” enhances their well being)
– Be moved by reasons;
(because the community moves toward truth on relevant issues, e.g., how people ought to
act in real life situations, not whether or not they might have worked for the French
underground during WW II)
– Understand what an image of good thinking looks like.
(by internalizing the Community of Inquiry of which s/he is a part)

Figure 13.3 (Continued)

Before closing, I would like to note that aside from participating in Commu-
nities of Inquiry, I think it is vital that students become familiar with the basic
logical moves required to establish local and global sufficiency, e.g., subjecting
the hidden premise to counter-examples.
And, as pointed out above, I also believe that a detailed discussion of truth is
critical so that participants can know that a Community of Inquiry is not just a
mere exchange of opinions. Understanding that one can never achieve absolute
“Truth” is also important to help maintain the enthusiasm of participants who
may be initially discouraged by the lack of closure.
As well, it is helpful to review with participants why they are being asked to
engage in Communities of Inquiry, i.e., why it is important to track “truth.” The
answer is that it is a necessary condition for freedom, i.e., for becoming one’s
own person. But that is another discussion altogether and is covered in detail in
my book Thinking Your Way to Freedom.
 Necessity of truth 117

References
Gardner, S. T. (1995, October). Inquiry is no mere conversation: It is hard work. The
Australian Journal for Critical and Creative Thinking, 3(2), 38–49.
Gardner, S. T. (1998, April). Truth in ethics (and elsewhere). Analytic Teaching,
19(2), 55–62.
Gardner, S. T. (2009). Thinking your way to freedom: A guide to owning your own
practical reasoning. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Peirce, C. S. (1955). The scientific attitude and fallibilism. In J. Buckler (Ed.), Philo-
sophical writings of Peirce, (pp. 42–59). New York: Dover Pub.
Popper, K. (1963). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge.
London: Routledge.
14 P4C stories
Different approaches and similar
applications?
Philip Cam

First, please tell us your general view about P4C. What is your
evaluation of its results? In your opinion, how long will it take
before P4C (as a reflective paradigm of education) can replace
the traditional paradigm of education throughout the world?
First, let me say that in what follows I use the term Philosophy for Children broadly
to include all those approaches influenced by Matthew Lipman, rather than as apply-
ing only to the IAPC program. I should also admit that I am not as well informed
about the research literature on the educational effects of Philosophy for Children
interventions as perhaps I ought to be. My only excuse is that I am a philosopher
rather than an educational researcher. Still, as anyone even slightly acquainted with
that literature will know, there has been a g ­ rowing body of evidence in recent
years that these kinds of interventions yield significant results. The consistency in
the results of these studies is worth noting. For example, I was interested to see
the cognitive gains in the Scottish study by Trickey and Topping (2007) because,
although they were using a different measure, there was a parallel between what
Trickey and Topping observed and the improvements in state-wide testing scores
of students at Buranda State School in B ­ risbane, ­Australia, where the philosophy
program has become integral to the way teaching and learning occurs in the school.
All the same, it seems to me that Philosophy for Children around the world has
relatively little professionally designed empirical investigation, and the movement
needs to recruit more people with the credentials to do educational testing.
If you are asking how long I believe it will take for the kind of reflective para-
digm of education represented by Philosophy for Children to replace what you’re
calling the traditional one around the world, I am not at all sure that this will
happen. There has been some movement in that direction in at least some of the
countries with which I am familiar, but I am reminded of John Dewey’s discussion
of the relationship between the form of education and the nature of the society
in which it occurs. I would like to think that the world is becoming increasingly
more open, pluralist and democratic, and to that extent the basic conditions for
the kind of transformation you’re asking about will continue to foster it. But it is
by no means a foregone conclusion that the world will inevitably continue in that
direction. The 21st century is going to see a continental shift in economic and
 P4C stories 119
political dominance, possibly including large-scale conflict, and who knows what
that will mean for education around the world in the longer term.

What is your evaluation of the resistance of the traditional

paradigm (and its advocates) against the reflective paradigm
of education? Will the structure of our societies, in which
media and economic values are dominant, allow us to promote
thinking in all schools in the world?
To some extent, I have begun to address this question in what I said above. It is
interesting to note, however, that we are beginning to experience a transforma-
tion in media with the advent of digital media and social networking. It is already
demonstrating some of its capacity to decentralize power and give more people a
voice. If things continue to go in that direction, we are likely to see most educational
authorities place greater emphasis upon educating for good judgment and the abil-
ity to engage in open discussion and dialogue. Therefore, the changes wrought by
this new technology are themselves a force for growth in the kind of education in
which we are engaged. Technological and economic change is also inclining edu-
cational authorities to place greater emphasis on critical and creative thinking in
many parts of the world and this makes it hard to resist John Dewey’s idea that the
development of thinking should lie at the heart of school education. Over recent
years, I have been running workshops in Singapore, a place where not too long ago
there would have been strong resistance to any incursions on what you’re calling
the traditional paradigm. In a way, that says it all. As to what I see as the humanistic
dimension of philosophy, however, I am less sanguine. It is all too easy for there to
be greater emphasis upon critical and creative thinking in school education for eco-
nomic reasons, and an emphasis upon the importance of new technologies, without
any significant attention to the kinds of reflections that we associate with philosophy.

So, unlike Heidegger, you are an optimist about the nature and
future of technology and believe that the virtual world can
compensate for the deficiencies of the real world without any
problem. Aside from this issue, in P4C we try to deal with real
experiences and we cannot deal with a virtual world and promote
many thinking skills through this means – for example, in a
community of inquiry (CoI) the presence of students and their
face-to-face meeting and interaction is necessary. So we cannot
organize CoI via media such as television, etc. Consequently,
the media are excluded in the P4C approach automatically. If
we’re hopeful and optimistic about using media in this area,
how can we overcome this contradiction?
I am neither an optimist nor a pessimist regarding the impact of new technolo-
gies in society overall. They can and do have both good and regrettable effects.
Even the development of social media is a mixed blessing. The same applies to
120  Philip Cam
the possibilities of virtual communities of inquiry. I am a strong believer in the
value of the kind of face-to-face encounters that the community of inquiry stand-
ardly employs. However, don’t forget that the conception originally derives from
Charles Sanders Peirce, who conceived of the worldwide community of scientific
inquiry in the 19th century. The advance of scientific communication through
the development of things like internationally circulated scientific journals made
this possible. Maybe 21st-century technologies can help us to develop more
global versions of the community of philosophical inquiry. That might be done
through schools as well as in other contexts – getting people around the world
thinking together.

The story collections suggested for P4C classes are increasing.

Except for Lipman’s novels for the IAPC program and some
other novels, almost all P4C stories are short stories. Some
scholars, for example Per Jespersen, use Hans Christian Andersen
stories; others, such as Robert Fisher, introduce fairy tales and
a summary of some famous stories. Still others, such as Karin
Murris, use picturebooks, and so on. You also have another
approach and have introduced stories that are written specially
for P4C class. In your opinion, what are the weaknesses and
strengths of each of these approaches?
While Lipman’s novels are very little used in Australia these days, in some respects
they still represent the gold standard for Philosophy for Children story materials.
The continuity provided by the novel as a format, the fact that they were purpose-
written with a focus on philosophical subject matter, and the fact that they at least
attempt to provide a sequence of materials that extend throughout the school
years, are all in their favor. By comparison, fables and fairy stories are problematic.
Take fables, for instance. They are usually meant to drive home a moral and, as
in the traditional presentation of Aesop’s fables, the moral may even be explicitly
drawn at the end. In any event, the structure and intent of the story is didactic
rather than being driven by a commitment to ethical inquiry. While fairy stories
may contain things that can be cause for philosophical wonderment, they are
certainly not written with that in mind – and the same is true of the great bulk
of children’s literature. This is not to say that this whole corpus of literary work
contains nothing of value when it comes to stimulating philosophical reflection.
There is sometimes a sense of philosophical whimsy in children’s literature and a
teacher or materials constructor who knows how to judiciously select material for
the purpose and construct support materials around it will be able to provide the
philosophy class with something serviceable.
Years ago, I wrote a book called Thinking Together, which was based around
selecting and using children’s literature as a basis for philosophical discussion.
When I began collecting philosophical stories from people around the world
(including from Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp) the short-story
format simply came with the territory. However, the collections of my own
 P4C stories 121
stories (e.g., (Cam, 1997) Thinking Stories 3 and my more recent (Cam, 2011)
Sophia’s Question) make use of continuity. Thinking Stories 3 uses a cycle of stories
with many of the same characters appearing in different stories and occasion-
ally even revisits the same events from a different perspective. Sophia’s Question
is a philosophical novella, very much in the tradition of Lipman’s well-known
works. At the moment, I am working on a history of philosophy in story form
for 10–12 year-olds, starting with the pre-Socratics, and based very closely on
famous passages and central ideas of the various philosophers I have included. So
far as I am aware, nothing like this has been attempted before. Although I am
using the short-story format, the book will have as much continuity as the his-
tory of philosophy affords and the story material hones in on some of the most
significant ideas and debates in that history. They are two major strengths, so far
as I am concerned.
If we look at the issue you raised, placing children’s literature (whether tradi-
tional or contemporary) in one basket and purpose-written materials in the other,
there is an obvious kind of trade-off. Quality children’s literature has the advan-
tages of skillful story-telling, with compelling characterization and a well-crafted
plot. Picturebooks sometimes (although not always) have the added advantage
of imaginative and vivid illustration. With the odd exception, however, children’s
literature isn’t overtly philosophical and teachers who almost always have little in
the way of philosophical training have to learn how to use that material to assist
children to bring out any latent philosophical interest that the material may pos-
sess. By contrast, purpose-written story material is likely to be philosophically
informed and to come with support materials that assist the teacher and students
to engage in philosophical inquiry. The downside is that the narrative and charac-
terization skills of the author may not be outstanding and, in any case, he or she
faces the unique challenge of integrating a philosophical exploration with these
traditional elements. Character and plot cannot be the flimsiest covering for the
philosophical content, but neither must those traditional narrative elements so
submerge the philosophical content as to make it all but invisible. Like walking a
tightrope, you have to keep the balance just right.
Finally, let me note that the philosophical narrative devised for the purposes
of school education is a genre in its infancy. I think it has great potential that
has hardly had the chance to show itself as yet. I only wish that there were more
people in the Philosophy for Children movement who were willing to have a go.

What is your view about open-ended short stories? What is their

strength and deficiency if we try to use them in P4C classes (as
Gareth Matthews apparently did)?
Gareth Matthews was well-known for his recommendation of children’s literature
as a stimulus for philosophical inquiry. He had a good eye for its philosophi-
cal possibilities, although I wouldn’t say that those books necessarily contained
open-ended stories in the sense of lacking narrative closure. It is rather that they
have an open intellectual quality that can stimulate thinking about issues and
122  Philip Cam
ideas and thereby provide an entry-point for inquiry and discussion. That seems
to be a requirement on any stimulus for philosophical thought and certainly
argues in their favor.
Even if a storybook is promising, however, teachers may have to devise their
own support materials for it and they may have little background in philosophy
to call upon and precious little time to devote to the task. As a result, the lesson
plans may not be philosophically very well informed and the teacher may find the
task of devising such lessons extremely demanding. One way out of this prob-
lem is for teachers who would like to use short story materials to begin by using
purpose-written materials or, at least, stories for which good support materials
are available.

As Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyan (1980) says, P4C books should

encourage children’s imaginations rather than pre-empt them.
But there is something unwholesome, even parasitical, in the
thought of adults (writers of children’s books) seeking to hold
on to their own creativity by pre-empting the creativity of
their own children. So, until we can devise effective ways of
getting children to think for themselves, the least we can do is
write books for them that will promote their creativity rather
than diminish it. The question is: how can a writer abandon
his/her desires and traumas and make stories free of his/her
imaginations? Is it possible psychologically? How?
The problem here would be clearly illustrated by a children’s author who cre-
ated a rich imaginary world that left nothing to the imagination of the reader,
or where the lives of those who inhabited that world were fully circumscribed by
the author. On the other hand, I don’t see a problem with authors of children’s
literature using their own creative powers to develop children’s imaginative and
creative abilities. In my view, educators need to attend to creative thinking every
bit as much as critical thinking and the writers of children’s books can certainly
support them. I don’t think this involves writers abandoning matters with which
they are concerned or freeing themselves from their own imaginings. As you
suggest, it is not obvious how that would be possible, even were it desirable. Yet
it is entirely possible for an author to create circumstances – situations, predica-
ments, or dilemmas – where various characters respond differently, or where the
characters are not sure how to proceed, or where they respond in ways that are
questionable. In these and other ways, children’s authors can raise issues and
ideas in a manner that enables children to exercise their own imaginations and to
respond creatively to them.

And how can we find out that a writer is able to make his/her
writing free of them?
As you can see, I am not at all sure that a writer either can or should do this.
 P4C stories 123

Among P4C stories we can find fantasy stories and science fiction
as well as real ones. If they are equally useful, this question still
remains: what could the contribution of imagination be? In
other words, how much must these stories be imaginative – far
from reality and realism? Or is there no relationship between
the philosophical adequacy of the stories and the percentage of
imagination in them?
I am reminded of the fact that philosophers have often used imaginary realms
and situations to help us think about an issue or a problem. I recall, as an under-
graduate, coming across the discussion of personal identity in the English philos-
opher John Locke, who asks us to imagine that the soul of a prince has come to
inhabit the body of a cobbler, whose soul has just departed. Locke’s (somewhat
dubious) forced-choice question is: Do we now have the prince or the cobbler?
This thought experiment could have come straight out of a fairy story – say, the
Frog Prince. Likewise, children’s thought experiments often begin with “Imag-
ine that . . .” or something similar. So, while I think that children’s philosophy
needs to speak to children’s experience, that doesn’t mean sticking resolutely to
realism. We should look to the ways in which either realism or fantasy can play
upon the imagination function within the story, not at whether the story belongs
to one genre or another.

Per Jespersen believes that Lipman’s stories are so typically

American that they are of no interest to Danish children. He
says that in his stories, Lipman tries to make logic the only
basis of philosophy and even ethics, and this makes his stories
unworkable in some other countries such as Denmark. What is
your view about this? Are the stories really so? In your opinion,
what are the strengths and weaknesses of Lipman’s novels?
There are a couple of issues here that need to be distinguished. The first
is about the cultural baggage that Lipman (or, indeed, any storywriter) is
bound to be carrying. Although Australia is subject to a continual barrage
of American popular culture, we found some resistance among teachers to
Lipman’s novels as being too American. My suspicion is that the same is true
in Denmark. Frankly, I doubt whether Danish children are likely to be less
interested in Lipman’s stories than Australian children because the stories are
American. They may not be much interested, but that is far more likely to be
because the stories are now dated and they were never all that captivating for
the average student.
The second issue concerns the philosophical basis of the stories. While it
is true that Lipman (1974) began by building Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery
around an introduction to Aristotelian logic, it is not fair to characterize his
entire corpus as a series of courses on logic. Logic is one element, but then so
are ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, the philosophy of language,
124  Philip Cam
and so on. That Lipman wanted to teach children to think logically in all these
fields is hardly a criticism, unless one takes issue with philosophical enterprise
as a whole.
As you have written in your book (Cam, 1995), Thinking Together, P4C stories
must contain all these characteristics:

a. They must contain something of philosophical promise (philosophical

themes).
b. They must have an open-minded outlook on life that will encourage children
to puzzle and question, to hypothesize and explore.
c. They must contain plenty of dialogue. It is better the dialogue to be explora-
tory, involves deliberation, and shows people thinking together.
d. If a story contains pictures, the pictures must be imaginative and as much
as possible express ideas, to be evocative and have something to puzzle
over.

A. According to (a), each story should embed the philosophical

concepts because of children’s concept formation. What kind
of concepts can we use in the stories? Is there any psychological
guide to find out what kind of philosophical concepts are
appropriate for children in the different age periods?
As you may know, there is a large psychological literature on children’s concep-
tual development that goes back at least as far as Piaget’s (1929) The Child’s
Conception of the World – a wonderful book, by the way, even if it is mistaken in
many ways (as Gareth Matthews, among others, has pointed out). I first read a
précis of the book as an article that Piaget (1933) wrote entitled “Children’s Phi-
losophies.” Piaget didn’t think that children were able to engage in philosophy, at
least not properly speaking, but anyone who is interested in a psychological guide
to children’s philosophical conceptions at various ages could do a lot worse than
beginning with Piaget.
Having said this, my many years of experience of working with teachers and
children, and often writing for them, is consistent with the view expressed by
the educationalist Bruner (1960) in The Process of Education half a century
ago, that the rudiments of any discipline can be taught to anyone at any
age provided that they are appropriately introduced. This is definitely true of
philosophy and for much the same reason that Bruner gives. This is that the
basic ideas that lie at the heart of a discipline and the basic themes that give
form to life are both simple and powerful. They remain inaccessible to young
children only if these things are presented in too formal or elaborate a way
prior to children having the chance to try them out for themselves. In other
words, the basic concepts of philosophy are appropriate to children of any
school age and the secret to their successful introduction is to couch them in
ways that meet with the experience and understanding of children of a given
background and age.
 P4C stories 125

B. Regarding the meaning of philosophy in P4C, it may include

logic, the logic of moral judgments, the logic of decision-making
in social areas and so on. What about the logic of scientific
discovery and mathematical proof? Can P4C stories contain
the logic of scientific discovery and mathematical proof? If yes,
which approach to scientific discovery is it better to use in the
stories?
A little over 100 years ago, John Dewey published a book for teachers entitled
How We Think. It is still in print. In that book, Dewey (1910) treats thinking
as inquiry, and it is very much scientific inquiry that he has in mind. So, when
Dewey (1916) says in Democracy and Education that learning to think should lie
at the heart of school education, he thought of science education as providing
the model. It is of some interest that when Lipman put forward the view that
philosophy rather than science might occupy that role, his basic model of the
thinking process was very close to Dewey’s.
As a philosophy student, I was brought up on the debate around the logic of
scientific discovery initiated by Karl Popper’s response to David Hume’s so-called
problem of induction. Taking this as an example, I would rather that students
gain a sense of the problem of whether science relies upon induction or whether
the logic of scientific discovery is essentially deductive than merely teach them a
preferred model.
More generally, there is no problem with generating philosophically inspired
discussions in science. My Australian colleague Tim Sprod, who has been involved
in the Philosophy in Schools movement for many years, has recently published a
book entitled Discussions in Science. Tim’s book provides a good example of what
can be done.

C. One part of my PhD thesis was devoted to replacing the

Popperian falsification with problem-solving processes in CoI,
although they are somewhat similar and related to scientific
research areas. What is your opinion about such a replacement
generally?
It seems to me that there is a close connection between Popper’s basic idea
that science proceeds by conjecture and refutation and the procedures under-
lying Lipman’s community of philosophical inquiry. If they are following the
process that Lipman envisaged, when students address a philosophical ques-
tion, they come up with suggestions – opinions for others to consider, ideas
that may be worth exploring, possible solutions, and so on. They explore the
implications of these suggestions and test them out, drawing upon experience
and their broader knowledge and understanding. Suggestions are discarded
when they are found to be unsatisfactory in one way or another, while oth-
ers survive to face the test of further experience, as the inquiry progresses.
Having said this, it is obvious enough that philosophical inquiry is in many
126  Philip Cam
respects different from scientific inquiry. In a nutshell, I would say that sci-
ence deals with problems and questions for which we have developed math-
ematically rigorous methods of empirical testing, whereas philosophy deals
with questions and issues that, at least as things stand, are not susceptible to
such methods. Therefore, in philosophy, emphasis is placed upon concep-
tual exploration and invention and attention is paid to careful reasoning in
ordinary language. That difference needs to be reflected in the philosophy
classroom and, in my view, should be deeply embedded in general education.
After all, most of the important issues and problems in life are closer to the
philosophical than the scientific.

D. According to (d), is it possible to use animations instead of

stories in P4C classes? And if a facilitator wants to use some
animations in P4C classes, what characteristics must the ani­
mation have?
I haven’t used animations myself, but I know that many philosophy teachers have
successfully used animations, film clips, and the like as a stimulus for philosophi-
cal discussion. It may turn out that there are some features of animations we need
to look for that are peculiar to them, but my initial suggestion is that they would
tend to work best if they had the same kinds of features that you listed above from
Thinking Together.

Some people may believe that decentralization is one of the chief

aims of P4C stories or the first and most important of them.
Their reason may be that the stories offer the child the chance
to ‘decenter’ from the immediacy of their own personal ideas
(whatever they are). Some people may go beyond this and
claim that philosophizing is decentralization and vice versa.
They may argue that decentralization is philosophizing. But
it seems that it is not so important to be equal with only the
philosophical characters of P4C stories. What is your view?
Novels, plays and short stories all involve de-centering, by placing us in the
author’s, playwright’s, or story-teller’s world, which is presented from the
perspective of a narrator or one or more characters. When we come to what
we may call a story of ideas, we also have an intellectual and conceptual de-
centering. Thus, a philosophical exploration carried by interaction and dia-
logue between characters, as typically occurs in P4C stories, produces at one
and the same time a double de-centering, that is both philosophical and nar-
rative. I would say that, to be educationally effective, both the social and
intellectual positioning of material should be in Vygotsky’s zone of proximal
development (ZPD). That is to say, as a provocation to thought, it requires
students to extend themselves, while not being either socially or philosophi-
cally out of reach.
 P4C stories 127

P4C can increase the rational and dialogical basis of culture –

so it can make a considerable impact in this area. How much
can the program promote the culture and morality of different
countries in your point of view? Can we be optimistic about an
international community of children and the youth?
I am fully convinced of the moral and cultural potential of this work, but in
order for that potential to be realized it will have to find its way from the
margins of our educational systems to their center. In parts of the world that
I know, neither the educational culture nor the culture in general makes this
transition at all easy. So, the potential is considerable but not easily realized.
Establishing such a culture within a global community of children and youth
is an even more a distant prospect, but it is certainly something worth working
towards.

Can this reconstruction of philosophy that is P4C be considered

a movement against the skepticism (radical localism) caused by
some postmodern approaches?
The collaborative inquiry-based teaching and learning that lies at the heart
of P4C pedagogy represents a middle way between traditional epistemologi-
cal absolutism and the relativism associated with postmodernism. While phi-
losophy is not an empirical science, it shares with science some aspects of its
experimental methods. It deals with open questions. It treats initial responses
to such questions as suggestions – ideas, hypotheses, propositions, theories, and
what have you – that need to be investigated. Evaluation by way of reason and
argument, and the exploration of alternatives, then provides the way forward.
And, as in science, the end results are not typically final or absolute conclusions,
but rather ones that have so far stood up to our best efforts to investigate the
matter. Such an approach eschews both skepticism and dogmatism in favor of
reasoned inquiry.

References
Bruner, J. (1960). The process of education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Cam, P. (1995). Thinking together: Philosophical inquiry for the classroom. Sydney:
Hale & Iremonger.
Cam, P. (1997). Thinking stories 3. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger.
Cam, P. (2011). Sophia’s question. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger.
Dewey, J. (1910). How we think. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.
Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and education. New York: Macmillan.
Lipman, M. (1974). Harry Stottlemeier’s discovery. Montclair, NJ: First Mountain
Foundation.
Lipman, M., Sharp, A.M., Oscanyan, F. (1980). Philosophy in the classroom. Philadel-
phia: Temple University Press.
Piaget, J. (1929). The child’s conception of the world. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
128  Philip Cam
Piaget, J. (1933). Children’s philosophies. In C. Murchison (Ed.), A handbook of
child psychology (2nd rev. ed., pp. 534–547). Clark University Press.
Topping, K. J., & Trickey, S. (2007). Collaborative philosophical inquiry for school-
children: Cognitive gains at 2-year follow-up. British Journal of Educational Psy-
chology, 77, 787–796.
15 The contribution of philosophy
to the P4C movement
David Kennedy

For its founder Matthew Lipman, P4C is a clear example of applied

philosophy, and in a way the most privileged representative of
the applied philosophy movement, which is applied to education
for the purpose of preparing students to become good citizens
through fostering their proficiency in reasoning and judgment.
So, philosophical (and logical) themes are strongly emphasized
in stories and teacher-training programs designed by him. But in
some latest branches/versions of P4C it has gradually faded. It
is said that P4C facilitators have no need to learn philosophical
themes – that only basic acquaintance of the field is enough. It
is also suggested that there is no need to write philosophical
novels like Lipman’s – that many existent stories in children’s
literature can be useful in the community of inquiry (CoI).
What is your view about the contribution of philosophy to the
P4C movement and its success as an educational alternative to
traditional education?

Applied philosophy
The idea of “preparing” students for a putative future, or even with “improved
proficiencies” in the service of purposes of state (“citizens”), is a bit paternal-
istic, isn’t it? It suggests the “production” model of education, for which the
student is implicitly understood as raw material, unskilled and in need of being
skilled, empty and in need of filling. Is it an appropriate way of speaking about
education at all? I wouldn’t call that kind of relation to children and childhood
“applied philosophy,” but rather training or even conditioning of some kind. It’s
a non-philosophical goal, and the idea of using philosophy to replicate adults in
the image of ourselves (or even of what we want to be) represents a reproduc-
tive and indoctrinatory rather than a transformative or reconstructive educational
impulse. So, if we hold to the latter, we need to find some other goal to rely
on when we do philosophy with children, and I would suggest that we identify
ourselves as philosopher-educators under the sign of dialogue. Then our form
of applied philosophy is understood as a practice that unfolds between child and
130  David Kennedy
adult. The application in “applied” is in recognizing the child as interlocutor, as
voiced, as subject, above all as capable of mastering – indeed, for many children,
as already possessing what many adults do not – the basic critical elements of
philosophical discourse, which implies the capability of using those same ele-
ments creatively.

Philosophical themes
Do you mean the ones that fall under the traditional categories of ontology, met-
aphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics? What we find in talking with children
is the obvious, which is that those categories describe thematic elements of lived
experience itself: they are already present in children’s thinking and feeling, once
something puts that thinking/feeling in motion. Children are already thinking
about being and the nature of persons when they are confronted with other kinds
of animals than ourselves, for example. They are already thinking about personal
identity when they wake up from a strange dream. They are already thinking
about authority and power when dealing with adults (or other children) who boss
them around, or accuse or punish them unjustly. And one can get to any one of
the philosophical themes by finding it in a narrative of some kind, whether it is a
Lipmanian novel, a children’s picturebook or a Kiarostami film. So although the
stimulus may be essential and important to the group inquiry that follows it in a
CPI session, it is somewhat like the ladder that falls away once one has climbed
up on the building.
Also, I think that every person develops their own key philosophical themes
over the course of their lifetime, if they are awakened to reflection. How that
awakening happens is another matter, but once it happens, the theme of jus-
tice (dikaiosune), for example, will develop for each person through their life
experience. What Plato has to say about justice in the Republic – or Rumi in
a poem – will, in the best of circumstances, act as a dialectical challenge to my
own thematization of justice. It is not so much a question of my agreeing or
disagreeing with Plato or Rumi, but of the ongoing reconstruction of my own
concept through interaction with Plato’s development of the concept, or Rumi’s
aphoristic impact. And that concept will be triggered into action – into felt-
realization and the imperative to act – if only by speaking out against injustice,
for example – when I encounter either positive or negative instances of the con-
cept. When, for example, I am subjected to unprovoked police brutality or even
witness it unleashed against others, my concept of justice is encountered and
realized in a situation that demands some kind of action of me, whether internal
or external. True philosophy always ends in life – right in the middle of it.

The teacher’s philosophical preparation

So, as a philosophy teacher talking with children, should I have a broad knowl-
edge of how the concept of justice (for example) is constructed throughout the
canon – whether philosophical or theological? How could one not wish for that?
 The contribution of philosophy 131
Personally, I believe that everyone who practices P4C should be involved in a
steady course of reading in philosophy, and that it should include both primary
and secondary sources, as well as readings in poetry, literature, and philosophy of
science and of religion. The richer the teacher’s personal reading of philosophy,
the richer will be the resonances that are struck in his or her mind when she or
he sits down with a group of children to listen, clarify, question and connect the
ideas that flow from the fountain of children’s group discourse. As Lipman sug-
gests in the first episode of Elfie (1988), in which Elfie replicates Descartes’ cogito
ergo sum by way of reacting internally to the taunts of a classroom tease, we do
find children at times actually articulating ideas that are in the canon – whether
Descartes’ cogito, Spinoza’s conatus, Hegel’s master-slave, or whatever. They are
philosophical memes, and the teacher’s job is to listen for and to recognize them,
which, of course, implies having read some philosophy. When I became inter-
ested in P4C, I started out by reading all nine volumes of Frederick Copleston’s
very good History of Philosophy (1977). The idea was to develop a philosophical
ear, so that I could hear the themes and patterns in children’s discourse – how
they are the same and different from adult’s discourse. There is, of course, the
issue of how that ear is developed – whether there is a genetic dimension that
makes it stronger in some people than in others from birth; its connection with
early childrearing patterns that implicitly discourage and even punish or encour-
age questioning; its relationship to other forms of intelligence, and so on. One
could, I suppose, have read the whole canon and every book about the canon
through, and still not recognize philosophical themes when they emerge in chil-
dren’s untrained discourse; but that seems to me to depend on how we see chil-
dren, what we expect of them, and what we think they are capable of or not, not
to speak of what we think is bona fide philosophical discourse. What criteria do
we invoke when we judge a conversation to be philosophical or not? That is a
question that community of philosophical inquiry (CoPI) has triggered in the
philosophical community, which is immediately present as soon as philosophy is
practiced between people rather than by individuals, and which is only amplified
as soon as philosophy is practiced among children.
What is an appropriate philosophical text for use with children? Lipman’s
novels, as both banal of plot and philosophically extraordinary as they are, rep-
resent a cultural and literary invention, a new genre, based on what he called the
“dramatization” of philosophy. Lipman had virtually no literary models to work
from – nothing anywhere near what he set out to do, which was to present philo-
sophical issues and problems to children in language they could understand; to
do so apart from any particular philosopher or school of philosophy; and to do so
in the context of their own lived experience, communicated through a narrative.
That narrative context of the novels was the classroom, which tends to be osten-
sibly a bit dull. Children are portrayed in traditional public school situations,
set in turn in traditional U.S. northeastern-states-middle-class social situations.
The atmosphere of the children’s conversations is didactic, but the didacticism
is inverted: the teacher is moderately good at suggesting questions and puzzles
and that’s all; the children are interrogating each other, and as such teaching one
132  David Kennedy
another. They are in effect modeling a new pedagogy – or at least the possibility
of one – for the adults around them.
As a new genre of fiction, the philosophical novel for children has great liter-
ary potential, which is already being explored, and the form is expected to move
from being just a classroom tool – a sort of “hands on” textbook – into mainstream
children’s fiction circles. Nor is there any dearth of analogous books written for
children – most especially the short illustrated books for young children that evoke
philosophical themes. The major difference between the philosophical richness of
many picturebooks and the Lipman-type text is that, in the latter, the philosophical
material is on the “top” – visible and emphasized and consciously discussed in the
characters’ conversations – whereas, in the former, the material is not directly refer-
enced as such, but is embodied in the narrative. For example, in the famous British
children’s book Peter Rabbit by Beatrix Potter (1902) – and see my “Using Peter
Rabbit as a Philosophical Text with Young Children” (1992) – none of the themes
powerfully evoked by the story – good and bad, adults and children, humans and
animals, accidents, stealing, rules, danger, fear – are discussed by any of the characters
or even directly referenced by the author; rather, they are evoked by the plot itself. In
a Lipmanian text, the philosophical themes come even before the story, prominently
placed and meant to be drawn attention to. This presents a methodological challenge
for the facilitator, who, if she or he follows “classic” Lipman/Sharp pedagogy, starts
with the children’s own questions rather than the writer’s or the teacher’s. With no
philosophical concepts or dialogue visible in the text for children to encounter, those
questions will typically be limited to queries like “Why did Peter . . .?” or “Should
Peter have done this or that . . . ?” or “Why is Mr. McGregor so mean?” etc. It takes
some work, and often some sort of subtle manipulation of the conversation to get
from “comprehension” questions like that to the philosophical level. This represents
a complex ethical issue for the facilitator to work out if she or he seeks a balance
between student and teacher choice, for teacher manipulation of any sort is seen
by many as disempowering, whereas CPI is – intrinsically it would seem – about
personal and social empowerment, and if the pedagogical form doesn’t match the
intrinsically empowering discourse, there is conflict, or loss of interest. Of course it
often takes the facilitator some effort and manipulation to get most children to ques-
tion the philosophical themes in the Lipmanian novel as well, just because they are
not used to asking these kinds of questions of a text, or recognizing philosophical
prompts as they read. In other words, the problematic pedagogical issue of the justi-
fication of teacher manipulation in order to move the conversation from the behav-
ioral, psychological, or sociological toward the philosophical is, essentially, present in
the case both of the picturebook and the Lipmanian novel.
In fact, any number and kinds of “texts” can be used as stimuli in CPI – all the way
from a photograph, an aphorism, a film clip, a whole book or movie, a poem, a song,
a role play, a dance, a scientific theory, or even a walk somewhere or a period of medi-
tation. Once children have learned to ask the philosophical question or questions
that the text suggests – once, that is, they become “users” of that discourse – they
can find the deeper questions most anywhere. Lipman was concerned – and rightly
so – to stay in touch with the Western philosophic tradition with its implicit canon,
 The contribution of philosophy 133
but, as philosophy as a common, dialogical discursive practice with unmistakable con-
nections with democracy – that is, as CPI – works its way into the fabric of standard
educational practice, the range of possible thought-provoking stimuli moves to the
boundaries of art, drama and literature. We see, in fact, how porous the boundaries
between philosophy and the arts and sciences are – and thereby, analogously, how
close philosophy is to all the disciplines that are studied in school. We see how we
need move only slightly within the field of science, for example, to find ourselves
thinking and talking philosophically – about epistemological matters (what can be
known and how), ontological issues relating to the nature and modalities of beings,
ethical issues having to do with the use and misuse of technology, or the relation
between scientific and religious knowledge and practice, and so on – in short, doing
philosophy of science. It is the same with each of the disciplines, as Nadia Kennedy
and I have argued (e.g., Kennedy, 2011).
The further implication of this is that the moment we allow authentic philo-
sophical inquiry into the schoolroom, there are opportunities for educational
reconstruction on a profound level. When the school moves from the realm of
the answer to the realm of the question, from indoctrination to inquiry, from
a frozen epistemological zone to a fluid, transformational one, this also affects
power – the way the school is governed, and thus the way dikaiosune is practiced.
If understood as an emancipatory practice, a school in which CPI is the ground-
ing discourse becomes a site for adult-child dialogue on every level, including
what is studied and how. It includes how decisions are made – both in the class-
room and school-wide. Because its model is an ideal speech community – a com-
munity which strives to reach shared authority – it acts to deconstruct hierarchy
and patriarchy, and hence acts as a leaven for social democracy throughout any
system in which it is practiced (see Kennedy, 2014).

You assert in your paper “Philosophy for Children and the Recon­
struction of Philosophy” (Kennedy, 2000) that it is children’s
historical marginalization in the Western construction of
ration­ality that now makes of them privileged strangers to the
tradition. In your opinion, how can P4C give them their
philosophical rights and permission to enter this realm? Isn’t
there too much resistance by powerful gatekeepers (e.g., some
academic philosophers), by people who choose ignorance, by
those for whom complex critical, creative and caring thinking
is troublesome and even dangerous?
I’m not sure I completely understand what you are getting at in this question, but
I suspect that it has at least something to do with children’s contribution to the
post-Cartesian reconstruction of rationality. Merleau-Ponty (1964) said, famously,
that the “task of the 20th century” was to “explore the irrational and integrate it
into an expanded reason.” The post-colonial and post-Holocaust West, where it
has not become reactionary and xenophobic, has pursued that expansion by open-
ing itself to the other, in search of the dialogical self; it has been shamed by its own
134  David Kennedy
history of patriarchy, domination, exploitation, authoritarianism and cruelty into
seeking its own salvation in that self-reconstruction. The voices of the marginal-
ized – women, children, aboriginals, the immigrant, the enslaved, people of color,
the mad, the artist, the principled enemy of the state, the sexual “deviant” – these
heretofore silenced and brutalized people have attained a privilege – we might call
it the privilege of having suffered at the hands of – to put it bluntly – white male
supremacy. Those who accuse the West of “decadence” tout court don’t under-
stand this dialectical situation. It is a situation of risk and danger, but only because
it is a prolonged moment of transvaluation of values.
Children and women constitute the only groups of these “privileged strangers”
that have the appearance of being “natives” – who are, so to speak “inside the gates of
the culture.” Hence their epistemic privilege is different from that of the imprisoned
or enslaved or discriminated against because of color or ethnicity or religion. But
they both undermine and challenge the values and practices of white male suprema-
cist culture, and hence their voices are either not heard or are suppressed, and their
otherness is constructed as a deficit, a weakness, a fault, or even an evil. They are
considered to be without “reason.” But just what is interesting is the contribution
they can make to an “expanded reason,” and what it would mean for the evolution
of our species if adults valued the psychological time and space of childhood in their
own lives. For this, adults would have to begin to listen seriously to real children,
and to take them seriously as moral agents as well, which means treating them to
the greatest extent possible in every situation as if they had the same capacity for
reflection, autonomous thinking and ethical choice as they expect from other adults.
Only in this way, it seems to me, could we even dream of evolving into a species for
which war and violence and injustice and oppression and vicious subspeciation (that
is, treating other groups of humans as if they were a different species) had become
so abhorrent to our inmost sensibilities that we would, generally, find their practice
unnatural and repulsive. Not just children but childhood as a form of subjectivity
are, then, our best and perhaps only hope for the sort of planetary transformation
for which we are desperately crying out for right now, and that hope can be realized
only by reconstructing the way we see children – that is, our philosophy of childhood
(Kennedy, 2006; Kennedy & Bahler, 2016). Practicing community of philosophical
inquiry with children is one of the key methodologies for reconstructing our phi-
losophy of childhood, and the adult-child collective called “school” is one best site
for realizing that reconstruction in fostering the skills and dispositions of a new, non-
violent sensibility and culture (Kennedy, 2016).

In addition to being a reconstruction of traditional philosophy,

CoPI represents a new paradigm of education – namely a reflec­
tive one. In your opinion, how long will it take for this new
reflective paradigm of education to replace the traditional one
around the world?
This paradigm which you describe as “reflective” is already present and growing
around the world, as represented, for example, by two exemplary international
 The contribution of philosophy 135
organizations: the International Democratic Education Network (IDEC) (http://
www.idenetwork.org/index.htm), which provides links to schools that practice
direct democracy and student empowerment in more than 30 countries, as well as
hosting a large yearly conference; and the Alternative Education Resource Organi-
zation (AERO) (http://www.educationrevolution.org/). There are many more,
some of them more radical than others, but the one hallmark of them all is the
central concept of living with children as beings with voice and agency, capable, in
cooperation with facilitating adults, of reason and choice. The fundamental idea
of democratic schools is that children learn autonomy and cooperation, and hence
justice and peace through practicing it in their own lives and the lives of their
co-participants in the adult-child collective called school, which is an embryonic
society. The key unresolved issues that both drive and preoccupy the democratic
school movement revolve, in my opinion, around questions that are most directly
encountered by philosophical anarchism, which are questions of authority. There
may, in fact, be a working discrepancy that emerges around issues of authority
between democratic education and what I would call dialogical education. The
credo of typical democratic educational theory is anchored in individual “rights”
discourse. For example, participants at the Berlin IDEC Conference (2005),
agreed on a statement that described the major characteristic of democratic educa-
tion as follows: “We believe that, in any educational setting, young people have the
right: to decide individually how, when, what, where and with whom they learn.”
Dialogic education theory, on the other hand, might insist that the decisions as
to “how, when, what, where and with whom” are in fact arrived at through com-
municative interaction, that tensions between the goals of adults and children are
a natural outcome of their different standpoints, and that democratic dialogue
assumes compromise. Hence, the form of curricular agency more characteristic of
dialogical education is what is called “emergent curriculum,” whereby students
express interest as to “what,” and adults propose as to “how, when, where and
with whom,” relying on the rational authority of age and experience. The role of
CoPI in this adult-child dialogue seems to me to be crucial. The discussion circle
of CoPI is the space in which that form of “expanded reason” that is the natural
potential birthright of the big human brain can find expression – in which the
epistemological and ontological assumptions that tend to restrict our capacities as
peace- and justice-makers can be challenged and replaced with more adequate and
more adaptive ones (for which see Kennedy, 2017).
In any case – whether the approach is directly anarchistic or dialogical, it may
be expected that neither educational approach will be taken up by more than
an awakened minority of educationalists, given the powerful role of universal
nationalized schooling as an ideological state apparatus, and the growing colo-
nization of education by corporate capitalist goals – what is referred to as “the
economic model” of education; a model which, ironically enough, serves only
to dramatically accentuate and reproduce ever-increasing levels of economic ine-
quality and exploitation world-wide. Combined with this global trend, what we
find in the present historical moment is that as the democratic, emancipatory
and justice-oriented impulses of peoples all over the world grow and spill over
136  David Kennedy
into the public space of the street, the forces of extreme, irrationally punitive,
even sadistic violence by the repressive state apparatus grow as well. With each
upheaval of the people followed by violent crackdown by the repressive state
apparatus, the specter of the police state is becoming more of a reality, from
Europe to the North and South America, to the Middle East to the Far East to
Africa – that is, worldwide. The values of reflective, dialogical, democratic edu-
cation are at absolute odds with this growing dystopic reality, and apart from a
historic breakthrough – which, I am convinced, will ultimately come only from
“the street” – we can look forward to a long period of painful struggle with the
state- and corporate-organized powers of darkness.

Lipman in the first interview (chapter one) considered Piaget –

whose work illuminated the relationships between thinking
and behavior – as a psychologist who greatly influenced his
work about P4C, while he disagreed with Piaget’s claim that
young children cannot deal with abstractions (chapter two).
Gareth Matthews critiqued developmental psychology for its
presumptions about childhood and maturity. It seems as though
the very existence of P4C has challenged an older paradigm of
psychology. Please discuss the exact relationship between P4C,
developmental psychology, and Piaget’s work. To what extent
are they in contradiction?
In my opinion, Piaget was both a prolific genius and a conventional European
intellectual of his time, who both opened up our view of children’s thinking and, at
the same time, was deeply biased by Kantian epistemology, Cartesian rationalism,
and the hegemony of organismic developmental theory. Like other anthropolo-
gists and psychologists of the early 20th century, he associated children’s thinking
with that of “primitives” and psychotics – a scientistic, colonialist, adultist and
ethnocentric default position. On the other hand, his analysis of the construction
of cognitive schema, beginning with the embodied logic implicit in the sensori-
motor interaction between self and world, seems indisputable; his basic logic and
Dewey’s are virtually identical at their root. Both are biologically rooted, based on
the transformative interaction between organism and environment, and an implicit
understanding of adaptation as ongoing reconstruction – which, when applied to
the possibility of cultural evolution, could be seen as an optimistic viewpoint. And
in what little he wrote directly about education (e.g., Piaget, 1973) he was a radi-
cal: his notions of the progressive reorganization of cognitive structures through
an equilibrative process of assimilation and accommodation, driven by an active,
intrinsic drive for meaning and understanding, if respected and applied, would
lead to quite a different kind of schooling from what surrounds us today.
The problem comes with his experimental designs, which were simplistic and
flawed, and his stage theory, which suffers from theoretical and practical problems –
the problem of transitions, of unilinearity, of over-categorization and normali-
zation, of biologism, of a narrow understanding of rationality, of ahistoricism
 The contribution of philosophy 137
and cultural universalism, of domain-general assumptions, and of a misplaced
concreteness. Piaget himself reflected on some of these weaknesses as he moved
through a theoretical journey of half a century. And it did act to protect children
from the “trickle-down,” child-unfriendly curriculum of conventional schooling
by implicitly insisting on open-structure learning in settings in which children
have the opportunity to exercise their intrinsic hunger for meaning. Where it
damaged P4C’s prospects (in the U.S. at least) was not so much its theoretical
status or progress, but its political use by – ironically! – the very progressive edu-
cationalists who, in their very desire to protect children from adultist curriculum,
used his theory to claim that to expect children to think logically before the age
of Piaget’s last stage, “formal operations,” was “developmentally inappropriate.”
This claim, whose patent untruth can be demonstrated by just one observation
(and I have experienced many) of a five-year old making a s­yllogism – whether
worded formally or not – in a P4C session, was taken as a given by kindergarten
and primary school teachers beginning in the mid to late 1960s, when Piaget’s
theory was being popularized and promoted in teacher education circles. It dem-
onstrates, not just the extraordinary capacity of doctrine to distort perception
and blind us to experience, but the intellectual poverty of the school-teaching
profession as a general demographic, and beyond that, the narrow rationalism of
the Western “scientific world view,” which understands philosophy as little more
than an exercise in formal logic. As such, the resistance to and gradual ignoring
of P4C at the primary level in the name of the developmentally “inappropriate”
was replicated in the realm of higher education, where, throughout the 1980s,
Lipman and Matthews encountered flat-out denial and resistance from influential
philosophers at national conferences, most notably from the most prominent
Piaget scholar of the time (Kitchener, 1990). This fact points, at least obliquely,
to the hidden epistemological resources of p4c and its dialogical and communal
methodology, which, in taking children’s epistemological convictions seriously,
acts to break analytic philosophy’s stranglehold on the tradition, and widen the
epistemological tent, leading to the recognition of other standpoints – whether
feminist, spiritual or post-colonial. As such, P4C may be said to be excluded
by the unconscious guardians of the epistemological lockdown of mainstream
American education.
P4C is in fact not actually threatened theoretically or methodologically by the
entrenched “big theories” that shape and color educational institutions and prac-
tices, whether behaviorism or developmental stage theory, given that the commu-
nity of philosophical inquiry is, in its commitment to dialogue, an “ideal speech
situation” – a place apart, where the teacher-facilitator is just another interlocu-
tor, however influential. What does threaten P4C is an historically maintained
anti-intellectualism and a misplaced pragmatism in U.S. educational institutions,
where the fear of philosophy as ethically debilitating and cognitively distract-
ing from the pursuit of the skills and knowledge proper to a “safe” worker/­
consumer/citizen combines with a view of education as purely an instrumental
good. The goods that follow from participating in communal philosophical
dialogue – the capacity to think for oneself and with others, to express one’s ideas
138  David Kennedy
with the help of others, to entertain other perspectives, to identify and problema-
tize one’s own and others’ beliefs and assumptions, to experience both identity
and difference in a community of mind – are not, apparently, felt by mainstream
educationalists to be necessary conditions for the success of global corporate cap-
italism, the national security state, or the control society. If, in fact, they were,
those forms of success would no longer be felt to be necessary.

What is your assessment of P4C’s achievements in the teaching of

the sciences and mathematics? Will the P4C teaching method
be available in all school materials soon?
As of yet, CoPI has not fulfilled its logical promise of spreading through the cur-
riculum and taking its place as the philosophical understructure of each of the dis-
ciplines. Some of Lipman’s novels, and several others of the same genre, do in fact
focus on disciplinary or near-disciplinary themes – aesthetics, ethics, language,
environmental philosophy, poetry – but as yet there is no systematic application
of the “philosophy of” each discipline to the study of the discipline itself. We
might imagine a school in which the science and the math curricula each devoted
one day a week to philosophy of science and philosophy of math. Further, we
might imagine a school in which science and history, art and even mathematics
curricula emerged from the philosophical inquiry rather than vice versa. I am
thinking, for example, of how a group philosophical inquiry into the concept
“alive” led naturally to an empirical inquiry by the class into the nature and clas-
sification of organisms, which led back to a philosophical exploration of the con-
cept of “organism,” and the ontological assumptions of the classificatory systems
of Aristotle and Linnaeus, which led back to a project which involved the playful
invention of alternative classificatory systems, and so on. My sense is that the ulti-
mate best outcome of bringing philosophy to every discipline would be the actual
reconstruction of the school disciplines as we know them, because the conceptual
interconnections between disciplines would increasingly emerge, leading to the
invention of new ways to construct cross disciplinary curriculum – for example,
through science and history and mathematics projects which were approached
through multiple disciplinary lenses (see Kennedy & Kennedy, 2013).
Just as CoPI as a dialogic paradigm promises the reconstruction of power in
schools (democracy) and hence the reconstruction of authority, so it promises
profound reconstruction in curriculum, which in this case implies reconstruction
of our broad epistemological paradigm and of our ontological convictions. This
epistemological shift is particularly critical at this moment in our planetary his-
tory, when our dominant assumptions about the human relationship with nature,
with other species, and with each other have become so dangerously depersonal-
ized and instrumentalized as to represent an empirically verifiable threat to the
global ecosystem. And as I’ve been trying to say, it is no surprise to me that
our hope for this shift in epistemological and ontological paradigms is tied to
childhood, children, and the places in which adults and children encounter each
other – in educational settings. The new, reconstructed sensibility that I spoke of
 The contribution of philosophy 139
above – the evolved “human nature” that “instinctively” repudiates oppression,
violence and sub-speciation, and of whom we know very well there are millions
of exemplars already on this earth – has its deepest origins in childhood, and will
emerge, among other places, in the interactions between children and adults. The
dialectical logic of these interactions is such that this new sensibility promises to
emerge, not through indoctrination or psychological conditioning of children by
adults, but through the mutual influence of the two: through children internal-
izing adult subjectivity in such a way that it incorporates the changes in adult
subjectivity that arise from adults engaging in authentic dialogue with children. It
is this promise that, in my understanding, is CoPI’s is highest calling, which has
been P4C’s fundamental motivation from the start.

References
Berlin IDEC Conference. (2005). http://en.idec2005.org/principles/.
Copleston, F. (1977). A history of philosophy (9 vols.). Garden City, NY: Doubleday
and Co.
Kennedy, D. (1992, November). Using Peter Rabbit as a philosophical text with
young children. Analytic Teaching, 13(1), 53–62.
Kennedy, D. (2000, April). Philosophy for children and the reconstruction of phi-
losophy. Metaphilosophy.
Kennedy, D. (2006). The well of being: Childhood, subjectivity, and education. Albany,
NY: SUNY Press.
Kennedy, D. (2014). Dialogic schooling. Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Prac-
tice, 35, 1. http://journal.viterbo.edu/index.php/atpp/article/view/953/793.
Kennedy, D. (2016, September). Anarchism, schooling, and democratic sensibility.
Studies in Philosophy and Education, 35(5), 1–18.
Kennedy, D. (2017, April). An archetypal phenomenology of skholé. Educational
Theory.
Kennedy, D., & Bahler, B. (Eds.). (2016). Philosophy of childhood: Exploring the
boundaries. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Kennedy, N., & Kennedy, D. (2011, May). Community of philosophical inquiry as a
discursive structure, and its role in school curriculum design. Journal of Philosophy
of Education, 45(2), 265–283.
Kennedy, N., & Kennedy, D. (2013). Philosophical inquiry in the content areas: The
case of mathematics. In M. Glina (Ed.), Philosophy for, with, and of children, (pp.
21–40). Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Kitchener, R. F. (1990). Do children think philosophically? Metaphilosophy, 21(4),
416–431.
Lipman, M. (1988). Elfie. Montclair, NJ: Institute for the Advancement of Philoso-
phy for Children.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). Hegel’s existentialism. In H.L. Dreyfus & P.A. Dreyfus
(Trans.), Sense and non-sense, (pp. 63–70). Evanston IL: Northwestern University
Press.
Piaget, J. (1973). To understand is to invent: The future of education. New York:
Grossman.
Potter, B. (1902). Peter Rabbit. London: Frederick Warne.
Part IV

The practice of philosophy

for children worldwide
16 P4C in Denmark
Per Jespersen

I learned from your paper “Problems with Philosophy for Children”

(Jespersen, 1991) that after Christen Kold’s new private
schools, the Danish method of teaching has changed very
much and that Danish schools are surprisingly different from
the English, Australian, and American schools. Can you tell us
about this difference? What is the difference between Danish
schools and schools from other countries?
In Danish schools there is much more freedom for teachers and students. The
law tells us to build up education in the mind of the single child, i.e., that every
student has to take part in the planning of his/her own education. This means
that teachers can choose their ways of teaching in class without asking anybody.
There is not even a curriculum, only a goal. This means that if a teacher chooses
to use philosophy as a tool for his/her teaching, he/she can do it. So when I try
to introduce P4C to the schools, I have to contact the class teachers and not the
headmaster or the ministry of education.
So my goal is to make teachers see the values of a Socratic dialogue and see
the values of philosophy as such. This is done through lectures on different
schools and websites, on which they can find texts with manuals. Some teach-
ers do need a little training, as the role of a P4C-teacher is different from the
role of a teacher in all other subjects. In P4C, the teacher is not the man/
woman who knows everything – on the contrary, he/she is the mediator of the
dialogue going on in the classroom. This means that you build your questions
on the children’s statements, because the supreme goal is to help each single
student to find his/her own opinion. Each child is of a special value and differ-
ent from all other human beings; therefore, the education has to be individual.
The best way to find oneself through philosophy and a Socratic dialogue is to
do it together with others in the classroom. You can find yourself only when
you mirror yourself in other people.
To see what all this is about, you could read The Coky Man (Jespersen, 2000),
which you are welcome to translate into your language. In this text, which has
been published in many countries, you can see how to talk philosophy with a
child without interfering in his own subjective thinking.
144  Per Jespersen

In your opinion, a story written in one country with a certain

culture may not be useful for the children of other countries
with another culture. Can we change the story in a way that
it becomes useful for these children when we are translating
them?
Something in a child’s mind is universal; something comes from the culture a
child grows up in. Therefore, the texts could be changed, so they fit into another
culture. But there is always something universal in philosophical texts, and this
has to be underlined. Every culture has its roots in philosophy, as I see philosophy
as the deepest of mankind. So everybody is welcome to change my texts, so that
they are on the same level as a certain culture is. We are all human beings, and
culture is “only” a way of living on a specific place of the globe.
Universality is very important, and it is crucial to understand, and that the
children too understand, that philosophy and a Socratic dialogue do not put any
culture aside – on the contrary: it gives a perspective to the way of life you live,
wherever on the globe you might be. As I see it, this perspective is missing in
many cultures – the Internet could be the reason; superficiality could also be the
reason. Children have subconsciously a desperate need for a universal perspective
in their lives, and P4C can provide them with that.
In a way, you could put it as follows: Deep inside in every human being there
is the existentialist perspective, covered by religion, science, culture, and politics.
So the way to do philosophy with children is to discuss concepts of cultural value
and, from there, work your way through the levels of science, religion and finally
existentialism. This gives the child philosophical perspectives to all the above-
mentioned levels of life. We are all alike and different simultaneously, but seen
through philosophy we have something in common: to find ourselves, our own I
(soul), and the responsibility that is a consequence of that.

Some believe that every story includes some international elements

and some national ones. Therefore, when we are translating the
stories we can eliminate the national elements (or replace them
with other elements) in order to be understood by children of
other countries. What is your opinion about this?
Of course every text for P4C has some national elements. But it should be very
easy to change them into one’s own culture or country. Let us say that a Mark
and Deena story in Wonder Dough (Jespersen, 1988) takes place in Copenhagen
and some streets are mentioned. Change them and use the names of squares,
streets, and parks in Tehran. The idea of the story should then be the same.
But even philosophical concepts can have some national elements. What is rel-
evant in my country might be of no interest in New Zealand, China or Iran. But
it is still possible to change a few sentences, so that the story contains important
philosophical issues. I do accept that, and I can tell you that some of my stories
have been translated into Korean, and they have of course been changed a little
 P4C in Denmark 145
bit, so that they fit into a Korean culture. Right now I am writing stories going
on in Quito, Ecuador, but as I have been there, I can easily make them South
American.
The important thing is that the philosophical issues are still the same, as philos-
ophy lies under any national and even political topic. It is crucial that children see
that; it will make it easier for them to cope with events going on in their culture.

What are the differences between the Lipman/Sharp stories

and your stories (Danish stories) on philosophical inquiry for
children?
First of all Lipman stories are so typically American that they are of no interest for
Danish children. A few of his texts have been translated into Danish, but they do
not work, and children are so bored with them. When Lipman was introduced
in Denmark, his book Philosophy in the Classroom (Lipman, Sharp, & Oscanyan,
1985) was very much read, and his intentions were wonderful, but as soon as
Danish teachers saw his texts for children, and especially his manuals, they gave
up. It seems as if Lipman wants to show children his way, and his way only, and
that he tries to make logic the only basis of philosophy, even ethics. This we see
as a mistake. We see philosophy divided into the four classical areas: aesthetics,
ethics, logic and metaphysics. And we see metaphysics as the most profound basis
of all philosophy. That is the reason why many of my texts end up, after some
time, in metaphysics. We do see the American texts as too superficial – they do
not consider the philosophical depths a child has.
Besides that, you had to take a course in Denmark on his texts and get an “A”
to get permission to use his material. This is not a Danish way of doing things.
Ann Sharp’s stories have never been translated into Danish. She has a fresher
view, but there are so many Danish texts, and Norwegian and Swedish as well,
that we have enough. I have worked out a series of stories from the second grade
to high school with the same children as main characters. This makes it easier for
the students to cope with them; they know these children, love them, and discuss
their statements eagerly. Some of them have been translated into German, Span-
ish, Portuguese and English, and I have used them in South America, and they
seem to work wonderfully: they are in a way universal. The manuals of the stories
are not too long, and the manual is to be understood only as suggestions to the
teacher. I do think this is the way all over the globe.

How successful has P4C/PwC been in Denmark?

It has been very successful, as many schools use the Danish stuff. It can be found
on three websites, and the copying is free. The books, which were printed some
20 years ago, are still in many schools, but it is important to say that P4C is not
scheduled – it suddenly pops up in class, and it is the teacher’s task to grasp it
when it is there: he changes his role from being a knowing person into a mediator
and catalyst. Thus, P4C is more art than teaching, and P4C should be integrated
146  Per Jespersen
into any subject. The success grew out of a Danish film Du og jeg (You and I),
which has been shown on Danish television several times, and which is still in use
in many schools. This film was the first one being made on P4C, and it inspired
thousands of teachers – and still does.

Do Danish educational administrators agree with instituting the

P4C/PwC program in the Danish classrooms?
It is not a question of administrators here, as teachers are free to choose their own
way of teaching. But I happen to know that the minister of education agrees with
the concept, but it is really not a question of his approval, but of the teacher’s
agreement. I am often called to Danish schools to start up a week with P4C, and
all teachers report back that it was a success. I recently worked out manuals on
P4C for 20 of Hans Christian Andersen’s fairy tales, and many teachers tell me
that they have spent marvelous lessons with their class doing these tales the P4C
way. They are the only manuals on this poet’s tales and prepared in 2005 for the
200-year anniversary of his birth. They can be found on the net, as well – and
they were published in Ecuador September 2005.

We have translated some of your manuals for Hans Christian

Anderson’s tales. But apparently, it does not show or tell how
a teacher can use them. What are the instructions for students
and what are the instructions for teachers? Can you tell me (and
interested teachers worldwide) how one can use the manuals
and stories in classrooms?
The manual is a guideline for the teacher – a way that he can choose to open
the dialogue in class. Therefore, he does not have to follow the manual word
by word. It’s only there to help the teacher to help the children to stay on the
track. If you open a dialogue by asking “What is the difference between fantasy
and reality?” you don’t know what the children will answer, so you must listen
to their words and build your next question on their statements. Even if they are
way out of H. C. Andersen.

It seems that there is an invisible resistance to acceptance of the

new paradigm of education (reflective paradigm, as Lipman
says) in the Ministry of Education (educational administrators)
of all countries. In other words, to agree with instituting P4C/
PwC in all schools is not easy for educational administrators
of the countries. Did you face the same problem in Denmark?
No not really – for the reasons I told you. But even in Denmark, political admin-
istration is growing more and more fundamentalist. This makes it even more
necessary to show these administrators that they can destroy the lives of our
children, if they tend to prevent our goals. There is an ongoing dialogue between
 P4C in Denmark 147
the political administration and P4C people. We do have a firm belief that they
will understand, as so many investigations show the necessity of P4C. The Swed-
ish government has seen the light and has approved P4C as an important part of
growing up.

Can one claim that there is a Danish version of P4C/PwC? If yes,

what are the characters of the version? How much does it owe
to Lipman’s works?
There is a Scandinavian version of P4C, which has its inspiration from Matthew
Lipman, especially the book Philosophy in the Classroom. This book inspired some
people in Sweden and Norway in particular, but in Denmark P4C started indepen-
dently from Lipman’s works, as we did not know about it. It all started at a small
school in the Southern part of Denmark, where I still live. I was a class teacher
for a class for seven years, and by coincidence I wrote some texts for the class that
seemed to work well. We discussed the philosophical issues, and also discussed
how to make new texts for P4C. The very first text was The Wonder Dough, which
is still in use. Later followed more texts for the same class, and we decided to
publish them ourselves, as no official publisher wanted to go into the project. In
the following years, a lot of books were published, among others, a series of books
with the two children Kim and Marianne (Mark and Deena in English). A lot
were sold during the next five years, and they are still in use in many schools. At
that time I did not know that there was anything in the world called P4C. When
I heard about it, I could see that this was what I was doing, and it grew into a
project worldwide. I still lecture all over the world on P4C in the Danish version.
The typical Danish version is that the manual does not try to take the students
to a certain conclusion. Each student has to find his/her own way, and the goal
is to strengthen students’ self-confidence, as I see this as the biggest problem
we have. The teacher never expresses his own opinion, and the students do not
ask for it – ever. They do like that their teacher is a spiritually searching person,
as they are themselves. They like to see a teacher as a normal human being with
curiosity, growing into self-development and knowledge about oneself. This is
the clue – and it works. I have seen it working in so many countries, and as I later
met Gareth Matthews, saw him work with children in Norway and had wonder-
ful talks with him, I was sure that this was the way.

What is your distinctive method or idea in this area?

I guess you now see the idea and the method. Let me give you an example. Let
us say that a text deals with the concept “soul.” This is a metaphysical issue, and
you will see a manual like this:

• What is soul, in your opinion? Have all students make their statements.
• Discuss in class what you have heard.
• Try to find a definition for the concept “soul.”
148  Per Jespersen
And the texts for the teacher could be as follows:

• The intention is not that you tell the students about your opinion on soul,
but that you help them to find their own opinion. You can be sure that all
students have been doing a lot of thinking on this subject, but in modern
society they often have nowhere to discuss it. You can open a discussion in
class, and the students will love it!

I can tell you that I had a group of children with whom I was supposed to read
Hans Christian Andersen’s Little Ida’s Flowers during 15 lessons. They went so
deep into the philosophical discussion that we read only the first ten lines of the
tale! All this is because I never give the children my view, but built my new ques-
tions on the statements of the children. This was a wonderful experience, and
their parents even thanked me for those lessons.

Are the cultural elements effective in the foundation of the

approach and its development? If yes, can you discuss it?
Of course there are, but together with the students I try to get behind the cul-
tural concepts to make them discover what kind of philosophy there is behind
culture. It could be historical issues, habits, religion – but if the lessons succeed,
you will land on philosophical concepts, and when they are felt and understood
by the students, they become better readers and achieve a greater knowledge
about society and their role in it.
Remember: philosophy grew into religion, science, culture and politics. This
is the crucial concept behind the Danish way of working with children – and you
can be sure: they love it.

Can you tell us about the achievements of P4C/PwC in Denmark?

To what extent is it accomplished?
We are not in the habit of conducting tests or scientific investigations on this kind
of education. So I can only tell you what teachers tell me: we see our children
grow spiritually, they learn to care for each other, respect each other, and love all
the questions of life that can never be answered definitely.
And I can only say: that is the intention!
If you want to translate some of my texts into your language, please let me
know. I would be so happy.

What is your view about the use of your stories and manuals in
other countries such as the United States, and what is your
view regarding IAPC materials?
I find it marvelous that my stories are used all over the world, including the U.S.,
where the IAPC materials are more and more considered not useful.
 P4C in Denmark 149

References
Jespersen, P. (1988). The wonder dough. Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis,
8(2): 69–70.
Jespersen, P. (1991). Problems with philosophy for children. Analytic Teaching,
14(1): 69–71.
Jespersen, P. (2000). The Coky man. Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis,
19(2): 145–151
Lipman, M., Sharp, A. M., & Oscanyan, F. (1985). Philosophy in the classroom (2nd
ed.). Temple: Temple University Press.
17 The cultural elements
in the Norwegian approach
to philosophy for children
Øyvind Olsholt

In 2001, you gave a speech at the international conference

“Philosophy in Society” in Oslo about the Norwegian approach
to philosophy for children. Can you tell us, briefly, what are the
main characteristics of the Norwegian approach and how does
it differ from other approaches (e.g., the Lipman-approach)
First, I think it may be a bit early to talk about one specific Norwegian approach to
philosophy for children. One may speak meaningfully of the “Anglo-­American”
and the “European Continental” approaches as two more or less separate fla-
vors of today’s philosophy for children-movement – a division very similar to
the traditional division in the history of Western philosophy. The first approach
focuses on language and logic, the second on metaphysics and “Weltanschau-
ung.” However, it is not my impression that it is possible to subdivide the two
into clearly distinguishable national styles and methods. In most countries where
you find philosophy for children, there seems to be an array of individual prac-
titioners, or groups of practitioners, most of whom have slightly different aims
and strategies.
At least this is the case in Norway so far. We are still in the “eclectic mode,”
absorbing teachings and methodologies from a variety of sources. For instance,
the French philosopher Oscar Brenifier has recently won the hearts of many Nor-
wegian educators and practitioners with his philosophical “interrogation” tech-
nique combined with a useful dose of humor and histrionics. Others have sought
inspiration from the Danes Sanne Nielsen and Per Jespersen – two remarkable
personalities with lots of practical experience with children.
However, despite this pluralist tendency, there is no denying that the well-
structured and comprehensive IAPC curriculum has been a major source of inspi-
ration from day one. People have translated excerpts from the novels and manuals
and tried to use them with children; and educators and researchers have shown
great interest in the theoretical body of works from the IAPC. There is, of course,
also criticism. First, there is the usual complaint that the novels are boring to
read. Besides, many teachers find them culturally foreign, bearing too much upon
American culture and worldview. Therefore, teachers often prefer other kinds of
literature as starting points in their philosophical communities (e.g., children’s
 The Norwegian approach 151
books). Second, some find that the IAPC-program focuses too heavily on the
child’s logical reasoning and the appropriation of analytic thinking skills, thus
failing to address the child’s spiritual and artistic aspirations and abilities.
Third, there is the existential qualm that the IAPC uses philosophical thinking
as a mere tool to achieve certain desirable (and external) ends: improved writing
and reading, improved output in other school subjects, friendliness, democratic
attitudes etc. The qualm is that one should not try to convert philosophy into
an instrument for achieving extra-philosophical goals. Then it is not philosophy
proper anymore, not in the Socratic, wisdom-loving sense where one thinks for
the sake of thinking; then philosophy becomes a method among methods, a way
of doing things, a procedure – a curriculum. Then the philosophical spirit some-
how gets lost along the way.

If the IAPC curriculum novels are boring to read, what kind

of novels are you using in the community of inquiry? What
characteristics do those novels have?
I don’t use novels at all. I am not a schoolteacher, so I seldom meet a group of
children more than once or twice. Reading novels takes too much time. Now and
then we read a short text as an initiating event, or I read it to them, but mostly
we just start out with a simple question, either proposed by me or by the group.

You say the IAPC uses philosophical thinking as a mere tool to

achieve certain desirable (and external) ends, e.g., improved
writing and reading. What is the problem of practical philosophy
in your view?
I believe that philosophy has its purpose, its raison d’etre, within itself. The primary
purpose of philosophical activity is, therefore, or should be, the activity itself. So
one should enjoy philosophy for its own sake, as a pointless but entirely pleasant
exercise of the spirit – like Aristotle’s concept of theoria as the greatest happiness,
or like Plato’s disinterested contemplation of the Forms. Philosophizing is akin to
engaging in other spiritual activities, like music and art, but differs from those in
that it is conceptual rather than aesthetic. One might say that it is an activity where
the rational intellect play games with itself, the most god-like of human activities.
This is practical philosophy, as far as I am concerned, and not a problem.

Are the cultural elements effective in the foundation of the

approach and its development? If yes, can you discuss it?
Yes, I would indeed say that cultural elements are effective in the formation of a
national approach. One central cultural issue in Norway would be, to quote Oscar
Wilde, “the importance of being earnest.” Norwegians are traditionally sober and
solemn people, not known for taking things too lightly (a trait no doubt formed
by a less than favorable mix of heavy Protestant religious background and our
152  Øyvind Olsholt
inhospitable and barren nature). Therefore, when we do philosophy, be it with
children or adults, it is usually a most serious and grave undertaking. We have
pragmatic ideals too, of course, but the picture of philosophy as an esoteric art
for the initiated still prevails with many educators. This can sometimes make it
rather difficult to introduce philosophy for children to new audiences: they do
not believe that this is something they can do. Maybe they nurture an idea of
philosophy as something divine and mystic (like the Norwegian nature), some-
thing to be admired on a pedestal (much as we admired/hated the Danish public
officials that ruled in Norway for hundreds of years).
Another cultural aspect of a Norwegian approach would be that of equality.
Modern Scandinavia adheres strongly to social democratic thinking, with jus-
tice and equality as leading ideals. Therefore, I think, Norwegians are culturally
inclined also to think of children and adults as equals. I suspect that this is the
main reason why we seek to treat children in a philosophical setting with humility
and respect (an important facet of “caring thinking”).
A third cultural aspect is nicety (which relates to equality). In Norway, peo-
ple generally want to appear nice and polite. It is always important to have a
good time, especially when you are with friends and family. Not surprisingly then,
research shows that Norwegian parents are very concerned that their offspring
feel loved. In fact, this is more important to the parents than to accomplish par-
enting with authority and predictability. Poor children: their parents love them
to death! Another unsavory consequence of this nicety is that we often avoid or
escape underlying problems and conflicts. This can create huge problems for the
philosophical community of inquiry. For instance, it makes adults afraid to stop
children from chatting away, although what they say is not even remotely relevant
to the topic, or to point out to children that this is not a very good argument (or
example, definition etc.), or to insist on questioning when the children give obvi-
ous hints that they are bored with questions etc. They are simply afraid to spoil
the nice atmosphere in the classroom (which is of course exactly what happens)!
One reason for nicety is that many adults think of children as fragile and vul-
nerable creatures. Therefore, we must handle them with delicate care. However,
one could easily argue that here the adults are simply projecting their own fragil-
ity and vulnerability on to the children, who are in fact not as limp as the adults
are often thinking. This misapprehension is common in today’s Norwegian soci-
ety, but I hope to see some change in P4C practice in the near future. At least we
will do what we can to meet this cultural challenge.

To what extent has P4C/PwC been successful in Norway?

Well, so far it has at least been successful in creating a general awareness of phi-
losophy for children as a viable option in many different contexts with children.
Thus, there have been P4C/PwC experiments carried out in numerous schools
and kindergartens, and we, the Children and Youth Philosophers, have arranged
philosophy clubs and philosophy summer camps for children. Many of these
experiments and events have received a fair amount of media attention.
 The Norwegian approach 153
However, to measure the success of these activities is difficult. Children have
reported that doing philosophy means a lot to them, e.g., that it gives them an
opportunity to express their thoughts in a manner and in a degree not previously
possible. Besides, the philosopher quite often baffles the children (in a positive
way) by his or her radical acceptance of any point of view that emanates from the
group (provided the child gives a reason).
To my knowledge, however, no one has yet carried out a major research study
in order to establish the “scientific” validity and quality of P4C/PwC. We hope
do to something in this field in the next year, though.

Are the children interested in doing P4C/PwC and to what

extent do Norwegian leaders attach importance to it?
You mean, do the leaders bother whether children find philosophy fun or not?
The question seems to be loaded. It implies that a typical thing for a P4C leader
to do would be to carry on with his or her pet project regardless of feedback.
Anyway, as may be deduced from my above comments on “nicety,” I do not
think this is an issue in Norway. On the contrary, my impression is that educa-
tional leaders do consider the response from children in the implementation of
new pedagogical schemes. For our own part, we always end each term or event
by asking the participants for an evaluation.
That said, it would be wrong to conclude that the momentum of the move-
ment lies with the interest of the children. The development in Norway depends
on a few dedicated individuals who work around the clock to gain a little new
terrain every day.
Besides, there is no denying that children often show fatigue after confronta-
tion with the rigor and consequence of the philosophical dialogue. We simply
do not expect to round off each session with nothing but rejoicing, exuberant
children! I think we have to live with the fact that true “philosophical enlighten-
ment” is something rather unpredictable that occurs from time to time. I ­suppose the
best we can do is to work steadily, with determination and inspiration, thereby
showing the children that we always find inquiry worthwhile.

Can you tell us about the achievements of P4C/PwC in Norway?

To what extent is it accomplished?
The philosophy for children movement started to gain momentum in the latter
half of the 1990s. At that time, different milieus, both governmental and pri-
vate, started to pay attention to what looked more and more like a new interna-
tional trend in education. Here I will mention the two oldest and most important
milieus.
The first centers on Beate Børresen, associate professor at the Oslo University
College. After having initiated the first major publication in Norwegian on phi-
losophy for children – the book Philosophy in School (Filosofi i skolen), written by
Ariane Schjelderup and Øyvind Olsholt, and published in 1999 – she designed
154  Øyvind Olsholt
an adult education course at the OUC – “Philosophy with children” – in close
collaboration with the Swedish expatriate Bo Malmhester. The course launched
in 2001 and consists of two modules: “Philosophy with children – theory and
practice” and “History of philosophy, ethics, and philosophy of science.” Each
module is one year, although students may proceed with both modules simulta-
neously. Since this is a distance education course, the students, mostly teachers in
primary and secondary school, do the greater part of their studying from home
using the Internet to gain access to various educational resources at the OUC
web. Four weekends a year, students come together at the OUC for workshops.
In 2003, Børresen and Malmhester (2003) wrote Let the Children Philosophize –
The Philosophical Dialogue in School (La barna filosofere – den filosofiske samtale
i skolen). This book was the second major philosophy for children publication in
Norwegian. Its main purpose was to aid teachers and other practitioners in the art
of facilitating philosophical communities of inquiry with children. The last couple
of years, besides running the adult education course at the OUC, Børresen and
Malmhester have initiated several P4C-projects in Norwegian primary and sec-
ondary schools. The most prestigious project is probably the one at Marienlyst
skole (primary school in Oslo) where all the third- and fourth-graders have had
philosophy sessions once a week for a year.
The second milieu is one that emerged from the Philosophy Institute at the
University of Oslo in the 1990s. The master’s students at the time wanted their
philosophy degree to add up to something more than just another academic ivory
tower education. They wanted to apply their acquired philosophical competence –
just like a newly graduated medical student or dentist would be eager to start
working in real life. As the years went by, however, the former students branched
off into different directions. Many of them ended up pursuing academic careers
after all. Others followed the “narrow paths,” and one of those paths was phi-
losophy for children. Two philosophers chose this way back then, and they were
Ariane Schjelderup (later to become my wife) and I.
In 2000, after engagements in two kindergartens and the Museum for Con-
temporary Art in Oslo, and after having written the very first book in Norwegian
on P4C (Schjelderup and Olsholt, 1999), Filosofi i skolen, Ariane and I established
the company Children and Youth Philosophers (Barne-og ungdomsfilosofene
ANS, www.buf.no). Since then we have done a variety of philosophical work with
children and with adults (mostly but not exclusively teachers), trying to promote
P4C/PwC. Ariane wrote a book about Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle for teenag-
ers (Schjelderup, 2001), Filosofi – Sokrates, Platon og Aristoteles. Last year, we
started a philosophy club in Oslo for children aged 8–12; and this summer we
arranged philosophy summer camp for children for the second time.
I would also like to mention that, in 2002, we started an ambitious project
called Skoletorget (which means “school market/square”), which is a website for
Norwegian primary and secondary schools offering teaching material in the six
basic subjects: Norwegian, English, Social Studies, Religion, Mathematics, and
Natural Science. A vast range of philosophical questions and exercises accompa-
nies all teaching material on this site. The idea is to help pupils and teachers to
 The Norwegian approach 155
discover philosophy as an integral part of all school subjects. The Skoletorget
project is perhaps particularly interesting in view of the latest declarations from
the Norwegian Ministry of Education: “The Ministry would also like to stimu-
late new projects with philosophy as a separate subject in the school, as well as
the use of philosophy in other subjects in the entire range of education” (from
Parliamentary Proposition, no. 30 – “Culture for Learning”).
Independently of the OUC, the Philosophy Institute at the University of Oslo
offered this spring an adult education course in P4C for the first time. The course,
Philosophy as Method, runs for one semester, and the students read selected
philosophical texts and practice community of inquiry with groups of children.
We (Children and Youth Philosophers) have been teachers for this course. There
is now a new willingness at the University of Oslo to do more research and to
initiate more activities in this field, so I hope Norway’s biggest university may
establish itself as an interesting P4C center in the future.
Finally, I would like to mention the University of Tromsø. Paul Opdal, one
of the philosophy professors here, has been a promoter of P4C/PwC for many
years. At this university, we also find Steinar Bøyum, a doctoral student in phi-
losophy, soon to finish Norway’s first dissertation related to P4C/PwC. His main
theme is the educational significance of philosophy. Bøyum (2004) has also pub-
lished several articles, for instance, “Philosophical Experience in Childhood” in
the IAPC Journal of Thinking.

What is your new opinion about P4C now (2016)?

Things do look a little different now. In the past ten years we have seen a decline
in the public interest in philosophy for children. Contemporary Western society
has more pressing issues to deal with than the possible absence of philosophical
awareness in children. This means that what I wrote at the time is still mostly
relevant (although some of it does belong to the historical archives) and also that
my general outlook on philosophy for children has not changed that much over
the years.

What are the pressing issues that contemporary Western society

has to deal with more?
The political, economical and social destabilization and fragmentation in the
West since 2005, accelerated by the financial crisis and the immigration chaos
last year, have nudged the culture towards more realism and less idealism. It
has created a growing preference for sober action rather than for deep words,
for new (regional, national, ethnic) forms of consolidation rather than for the
old universal ideas of individualism and relativism, traits that, it is popularly
believed, philosophy promotes. Many people, even governments, are beginning
to have second thoughts about reflection and dialogue as a panacea for peace
and prosperity and, correspondingly, start departing from their hitherto ardent
secular faith in a common good. This doesn’t mean that philosophy has become
156  Øyvind Olsholt
irrelevant or unimportant. It just means that it is no longer the buzzword on
everyone’s lips. As philosophy is pushed backwards in the consciousness of the
Zeitgeist, it has become increasingly difficult to sell.

References
Børresen & Malmhester. (2003). La barna filosofere – den filosofiske samtale i ­skolen
[Let the children philosophize – the philosophical dialogue in school]. Oslo:
Høyskoleforlaget.
Boyum, S. (2004). Philosophical experience in childhood. Journal of Thinking, 17, 3.
Schjelderup, A. (2001). Filosofi – Sokrates, Platon og Aristoteles [Philosophy – Socrates,
Plato, and Aristotle]. Oslo: Gyldendal.
Schjelderup, A., & Olsholt, O. (1999). Filosofi i skolen [Philosophy in school]. Oslo:
TANO Aschehoug.
18 Philosophy in schools
An Australian perspective
Gilbert Burgh

It seems that when P4C finds its way to another country it in

some way changes in relation to the culture of that country
Yes, there seems to be evidence of this. In the UK, the emphasis on ‘with’ rather
than ‘for’ is one example. Thus, Murris and Haynes (2001) argue that the term
philosophy with children is broader than the term Philosophy for Children, which
refers to a particular tradition that stems from Matthew Lipman and his emphasis
on community of inquiry. Philosophy with Children includes other traditions also
used in the classroom, such as Nelson’s (1965) Socratic Dialogue, which is popu-
lar in Europe and is used by people such as Marinoff (1999) in the United States,
whose Plato Not Prozac places emphasis on philosophical counseling rather than
classroom pedagogy.
Australia is renowned for its production of diverse materials that provide alter-
natives to the story-as-text novels with accompanying manuals that characterize
the curricular materials developed by Lipman and his colleagues, especially Ann
Sharp, at the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC).
Context played a large part in shaping this history. Issues of politics, including
individuals who began to develop consultancies, competing visions of the dis-
ciplinary core of P4C, and the curriculum have influenced the prevailing view
that the implementation of philosophy into school classrooms is best achieved
through integration into the school curriculum and the development of suitable
materials. Subsequently, Australia has become a major innovator in the develop-
ment of materials and has contributed to its international standing.
It should be noted that in his autobiography, A Life Teaching Thinking, Lip-
man (2008) was never intent to prescribe one philosophy to children, but to
encourage children to develop their own philosophy and their own thinking
about the world. Philosophy for Children is about process and not content.
Indeed, Lipman has always claimed to be delighted to see the growing body
of literature around the world that makes up what he called the Philosophy for
Children curriculum and to discover that the approach to education he started
had found its way in one form or another in various countries around the world.
P4C is an experiment to reconstruct education, as Lipman, following Dewey,
intended it to be. So, it is no surprise that philosophy in schools will continue
158  Gilbert Burgh
to evolve according to the specific cultural, political and educational context in
which it is introduced.

When I saw Philip Cam’s books on philosophical inquiry for

children, I thought there could be a different version of P4C
in Australia because his edited stories in the area were to some
extent different
Phil Cam’s books represent one way in which P4C developed, rather than being a
“different version of P4C.” In the early stages, Philosophy for Children (P4C) in
Australia referred to a particular methodology, curriculum, syllabus or program
founded and developed by Lipman, which consists of the community of inquiry
pedagogy and curriculum content in the form of purpose-written philosophical
stories-as-text for children. This is reflected in the fact that, from 1982, when
Laurance Splitter first met Lipman, until the early 1990s, Australia followed the
U.S. and used the IAPC materials.
Later, P4C referred to a discipline with its own set of materials, in which
Lipman’s curriculum played a significant role. From 1993 onwards, an ever-­
increasing range of books were being published. Sprod (1993) developed Book
into Ideas, followed by de Haan, MacColl and McCutcheon’s (1995a; 1995b)
Philosophy with Kids. These teacher support materials to accompany carefully
selected children’s literature already available presented an alternative to the
­purpose-written materials. Around the same time, Cam’s (1993, 1994) Thinking
Stories 1 & 2, comprising purpose-written narratives and resource/activity books,
became available. They differ from the IAPC material in that they are not consid-
ered to be a curricular program and are in the form of short stories. These were
followed by Wilks' (1995) Critical & Creative Thinking, which also focused on
selected children’s literature, but also includes sections on how to choose suitable
stimulus material from the vast range of classical and contemporary children’s
stories and picturebooks, Thinking Together, a teacher instruction book by Cam
(1995), and Splitter and Sharp (1995)’s Teaching for Better Thinking, which is a
general text for P4C and the community of inquiry.
More materials followed, but they either expanded on or diversified these
previous publications. By this time, Philosophy for Children referred to a sub-
discipline of philosophy with its own history and traditions. Currently, Australia
uses the term “philosophy” in schools to describe the diversity of the teaching
materials that include new innovations, such as 20 Thinking Tools (Cam, 2006)
and Philosophy Park by Cam (2013), and the theoretical scholarship that has
been emerging in Australia, including Sprod (2001) ’s Philosophical Discussion
in Moral Education, The Socratic Classroom by Davey Chesters (2012) and Social
Reconstruction Learning by Bleazby (2013), as well as the practice of collabora-
tive philosophical inquiry in the classroom. Taking all these developments into
account, I would still not say there is a different version of P4C in Australia.
Undeniably, Australia has contributed to the worldwide development of P4C,
and to this end it has been a forerunner in many aspects.
 An Australian perspective 159

Is there a distinctly different version of P4C in Australia? If there

is, please tell us what you think it is
Aside from the publication of classroom materials I’ve just mentioned, in Aus-
tralia the emphasis is on the integration of curriculum, pedagogy and assessment.
We tend to not introduce a Philosophy curriculum using a package such as Lip-
man’s story-as-text and accompanying teaching manuals. What we do is develop
teachers’ expertise (through professional development and training) on how to
use philosophy for pedagogical reform or as pedagogy to integrate curriculum.
There have, however, been attempts to develop ways to establish and promote
the inclusion of philosophy in the National Curriculum and to develop pedagogi-
cal strategies to address the State and Territory policies on the assessment of the
general capabilities described in the National Curriculum. For example, in 1995
the Australian Council for Educational Research (ACER) and the Federation of
Australasian Philosophy in Schools Association (FAPSA) invited philosophers,
educators and other stakeholders to be members of an advisory committee to
develop a philosophy curriculum profile for Australian schools. Later, in 2009,
the Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) established a working party to
promote the inclusion of Philosophy in the Australian Curriculum. The work-
ing party submitted a proposal to the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and
Reporting Authority (ACARA), but, unfortunately, it was unsuccessful.

Can you tell us about any achievements related to philosophy in

schools in Australia? To what extent is it being accomplished?
I consider the development of innovative materials to be a significant achieve-
ment. Also, in Queensland an inner-city school was one of the first schools to
successfully establish a whole-school practical philosophy program. Since then,
a number of schools around Australia have developed their own approach to
implementing philosophy throughout the school. Other achievements include:
Philosothons, in which schools send their best philosophy students to partici-
pate in communities of inquiry; the establishment of an international journal
for philosophy in schools; ongoing empirical research conducted by universities;
the establishment of philosophy as a senior syllabus; philosophy included as an
optional subject in some university teacher preparation programs.

What about any achievements in enhancing children’s thinking

skills?
In Australia, like other countries where P4C has been implemented in classrooms,
teachers have different reasons for introducing philosophy into the classrooms as
well as different ways of introducing it. All teachers are concerned with enhanc-
ing students’ thinking skills. In addition, some extend their concern to develop-
ing students’ social and intellectual capacities and dispositions as citizens. The
inner-city school I just mentioned has received a number of awards and grants
160  Gilbert Burgh
due to the results from the State tests, which measure student outcomes in terms
of academic ability. But these tests are not studies, and thus do not demonstrate
any necessary correlation.
Recent international research findings on the effectiveness of philosophy in
schools indicate marked cognitive and social benefits (Millett & Tapper, 2011).
An analysis of 18 studies by Garcia-Moriyon, Robello, and Colom (2005) con-
cluded that the implementation of P4C led to an improvement in students’
reasoning skills of more than half a standard deviation. Topping and Trickey’s
studies concluded that the practice of collaborative philosophical inquiry pro-
duces increases in measured IQ, sustained cognitive benefits, and clear perfor-
mance gains in other school studies (Topping & Trickey, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c;
Trickey & Topping, 2004, 2006, 2007).

How successful has P4C been in Australia?

There are many ways to measure success. For example, success can be measured
by the number of classrooms or schools that have integrated philosophy into the
school curriculum or that teach it as a separate subject. From the early 1980s
until now, countless numbers of teachers have, to some extent, implemented
philosophy in their classroom. However, depending on how much support they
received from the school, or the kind of professional development that was avail-
able, not all teachers were able to produce the expected results. Success can also
be measured by student outcomes, e.g., the development of students’ ability to
think critically, or the impact of implementing philosophy on pedagogy, e.g.,
whether philosophy can significantly broaden teachers’ pedagogical repertoire.
Educational reform could also be a measure of success. Observations from
teachers suggest that even minimal time in the classroom improves students’ abil-
ity to communicate or think and that teaching philosophy has changed their per-
ceptions of pedagogy. This is supported by recent empirical studies coming out
of the University of Queensland that have shown that collaborative philosophi-
cal inquiry does indeed improve student learning and teachers’ practice. They
have demonstrated the potential for collaborative philosophical inquiry to foster
pedagogical transformation (Nichols, Burgh, & Fynes-Clinton, 2016; Scholl,
Nichols, & Burgh, 2009, 2014, 2016) and more effective learning in the science
classroom (Burgh & Nichols, 2012; Nichols, Burgh, & Kennedy, 2015).
In recent years, there has been an increased interest in the impact of philosophy
on students’ thinking. What all this shows is that philosophy in schools has had some
degree of success. However, it has been far from successful if we measure success by
the government and institutional support philosophy in schools has received.

Is the Philip Cam series being taught in the Australian schools

(or in other countries)? Or are they taught in optional courses?
They are used in some schools as stimulus material, along with other purpose-
written materials and existing materials. The choice of materials is up to the
 An Australian perspective 161
teacher to decide which fits best. Some teachers use picturebooks, others use the
student’s environment as stimulus for discussion, and others use a combination of
purpose-written materials, picturebooks and other resources. There is no stand-
ard curriculum for philosophy in schools in Australia.

So, is there a unique pedagogy and timetable for teaching the books?
We do not teach from the books. Rather, they are used as stimulus materials to
discuss matters related to the key learning areas or subjects. Some teachers have
a philosophy class once a week or more frequently, others incorporate it into
all their lessons, some do both and others use a whole-school approach. How
teachers introduce it depends on a lot of factors. Currently, philosophy is not a
compulsory key learning area in Australian schools, although in some States phi-
losophy is an optional subject at the senior level (the last two years of high school)
and teachers are required teach the syllabus.

How interested in doing philosophy are the children, and how

much importance do Australian leaders attach to it?
My involvement in research with educators from the School of Education at the
University of Queensland (empirical studies and applied research supported by
grants or as part of extensive PhD studies), as well as my experience of being in
classrooms and working with teachers, suggests that students do see the benefits
of learning through collaborative philosophical inquiry. On the other hand, there
is very little support from Australian leaders, but this may have nothing to do
with their interest per se but a matter of political agendas, especially political
party agendas that are driven my vested interests. However, in Australia, like else-
where, educational reform is not a matter of convincing leaders but of developing
strategies to collaborate with teachers, schools, education departments, universi-
ties and bureaucracies. In Queensland, we did get the previous State education
minister (who, prior to becoming a politician, had an appointment as a Lecturer
in Philosophy at the University of Queensland) interested, but since then there
have been many education ministers due to cabinet re-shuffles and elections. But
leaders’ support is not necessarily an indication of success or actually support.
A good measure is, I think, the amount of teacher education courses for pre-­
service teachers that have included P4C. So far, significant support from universi-
ties for such pre-service programs has not been forthcoming.

What is the Australian education administrators’ view about

instituting the program in all Australian schools? Is there any
resistance to it?
While it could be said that educational bureaucracies around Australia over the
past few decades have, to varying degrees, supported or ‘forced’ innovations,
there is very little indication of such support for philosophy in schools. But while
162  Gilbert Burgh
support from educational bureaucracies is crucial, curriculum interventions and
reforms have to some degree offered opportunities to influence further changes
and, thus, opportunities to integrate philosophy into the school curriculum. To
date, the introduction of philosophy into Australian schools has been a gradual
process. Its success has relied on the interest of teachers and school administrators
who wish to introduce it either in their classroom or whole school.

This resistance may be because P4C proposes a new paradigm

(reflective thinking) for education. Can we regard P4C as an
alternative paradigm and a rival for the current (traditional)
education paradigm?
I don’t think this is important either way. For me, it is a matter of students having
access to the best possible education system and, at the same time, recognizing
that there are existing educational programs that have merit also. For education
to be effective, diversity and difference need to be foremost in the minds of edu-
cators, curriculum designers and policy makers, as children come from different
cultural backgrounds and that within those cultures there are differences. I think
the term ‘traditional education’ is overused and misused, as if there is such a
thing as traditional education and everything else is an ‘alternative paradigm.’
What do we mean by traditional education? If we mean teaching as transmission,
or what Freire (1970) referred to as the ‘banking conception of education,’ then
two other ‘alternative paradigms’ come to mind: teaching as transaction, i.e.,
creating situations to enable students to interact with learning materials in order
to construct knowledge, and teaching as transformation, i.e., creating condition
that have the potential to transform learners’ experiences (e.g., cognitive, emo-
tional, social).
Lipman (1991) spoke of transforming classrooms into communities of inquiry.
By this, I don’t think he meant that all classroom activities should occur within the
classroom community of inquiry model whereby children sit in a circle and end-
lessly dialogue together. Charles Peirce’s model of a community of inquirers, on
which Lipman and Sharp’s model of the community of inquiry is founded (which
they first mentioned in an article they wrote together for the Oxford Review of
Education in 1978), recognizes that inquiry also requires research, experimenta-
tion, reading reports, attending conferences, and other means of gathering and
disseminating information. The classroom is no different. To learn, students need
to understand that they are part of a number of greater disciplinary inquiries
when they learn history, mathematics, geography, science and other subject areas.
They are also part of what John Dewey called the greater community in which
the school functions. The point I am leading to is that the three different perspec-
tives of teaching and learning all have their place. My main concern is to develop
ways in which to work with individual schools to integrate philosophy, wherever
and whenever possible, into their existing programs and curriculum. In this way
we take context and locality, cultural and political institutions into consideration,
rather than a one-size-fits-all model of education.
 An Australian perspective 163

In your opinion, in order to improve the current education system

is there a need for a revolution, or can we overcome its defi­
ciencies with some reforms?
I see reform as attempts to change existing institutional structures from within
that structure. Revolution, on the other hand, rejects the prevailing power struc-
ture in favor of another one by disrupting the status quo, usually by adopting
drastic measures. Revolutions can occur only at grassroots levels, and in Aus-
tralia this is unlikely to happen. In a democracy – if we mean policy must come
from the people – then reform seems to be the only possible way to introduce
something if it is to have an impact. Revolution is, I think, not in line with P4C
ideals if we consider Lipman’s educational ideas were informed by John Dewey’s
(1916/1966) views on democracy and education and Charles Peirce (1899)’s
notion of a community of inquirers.
To transform education through a process that is congruent with the meth-
ods of P4C requires ongoing collaborative dialogue with schools (classrooms
and staff rooms), with parents and the community, and with curriculum design-
ers and policy makers. Of course, such a process can lead to sweeping political
changes that would be better described as ‘reconstructionist,’ where emphasis
is on addressing social questions and focusing on a curriculum that highlights
social reform as the aim of education, rather than as a revolution. To address
this question properly, however, we would need to also consider the limitations
of modern democracies in bringing about change in terms of the public interest
and the degree of deliberation and participation by citizens in matters of policy.

According to the P4C literature, many authors contend that class­

room education environments will be (made) more democratic.
What is Lipman’s opinion, as well as yours, about the political
ramifications of sharing power (sharing decision making) with
children? How can teachers be supported in valuing a partic­
ipatory approach to learning?
Lipman is clear that the community of inquiry is an exemplar of democracy in
action. It represents what he describes as the social dimension of democracy in
practice, insofar as it provides an educational environment for the implementa-
tion of such practice and is symbolic of what such practice has the potential to
become. In other words, the community of inquiry provides a model of democ-
racy as inquiry, as well as being an educative process in itself. Since Lipman’s
pronouncement, there has been a proliferation of literature on the merits of phi-
losophy as a productive pedagogy that claims to have the capacity to cultivate
democratic dispositions and skills required for active citizenship.
The view that the community of inquiry provides an ideal setting for practic-
ing democracy presents both practical and theoretical difficulties in relation to
distribution of power among the participants of a community of inquiry. Under-
pinning this view are two presuppositions presented as preconditions necessary
164  Gilbert Burgh
to the creation of a community of inquiry, namely, openness to inquiry and
readiness to reason, and mutual respect of students and teachers towards one
another. However, these presuppositions are dependent upon the ability of par-
ticipants to share power and the community of inquiry to provide opportunities
for participants to develop the ability to inquire together while refraining from
behaviors that abuse their personal power, such as dominating the inquiry pro-
cess and practicing coercion on the community; behaviors commonly interpreted
as obstacles to dialogue or reflective inquiry. To recognize that students bring
power-related behaviors to the classroom, which can act as potential obstacles
to inquiry, requires pedagogic action on the part of the teacher. The community
of inquiry can be an effective pedagogy. However, its effectiveness is dependent
on the ways in which teachers understand and deal with power and the distribu-
tion of power as a resource. Teachers must remain alert to power structures that
govern children’s lives and the ways in which these manifest in the classroom and
to provide opportunities for communicative interchange so that students can be
receptive to changing their patterns of behavior.
What this indicates is that the communicative interchange between the teacher
and students in a community of inquiry is not strictly egalitarian. Unlike the
students, the teacher, in addition to being co-inquirer, is also facilitator. This also
has implications for classroom practice in relation to a participatory approach
to teaching and learning. The role of facilitator requires teachers to draw on
their expertise as members of professional communities (they are members of the
teaching profession with interests in learning areas, such as the arts, mathematics,
science, history). Students come to understand that teachers have subject knowl-
edge, but teachers also need to be aware that their expertise and the expertise of
their discipline or profession is limited, and they must also convey or model this
limitation in their role as co-inquirer. Effective pedagogical practice, therefore,
requires teachers to be sensitive to the social dynamics of the classroom as an
integral part of cultivating communities of inquiry. This, however, is not an easy
task! Nor should it be, as building democratic communities requires political
commitment to dialogue as sharing power.

References
Bleazby, J. (2013). Social reconstruction learning: Dualism, Dewey and philosophy in
schools. New York: Routledge.
Burgh, G., & Nichols, K. (2012). The parallels between philosophical inquiry and
scientific inquiry: Implications for science education. Educational Philosophy and
Theory, 44(10), 1045–1059.
Cam, P. (1993). Thinking stories 1 and teacher resource/activity book: Philosophical
inquiry for children. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger.
Cam, P. (1994). Thinking stories 2 and teacher resource/activity book: Philosophical
inquiry for children. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger.
Cam, P. (1995). Thinking together: Philosophical inquiry for the classroom. Sydney:
Hale & Iremonger.
Cam, P. (2006). 20 Thinking tools. Camberwell: ACER Press.
 An Australian perspective 165
Cam, P. (2013). Philosophy Park. Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational
Research Press.
Davey Chesters, S. (2012). The Socratic classroom: Reflective thinking through collabo-
rative inquiry. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
De Haan, C., MacColl, S., & McCutcheon, L. (1995a). Philosophy with kids: Books
1–3. Sth Melbourne: Longman Australia.
De Haan, C., MacColl, S., & McCutcheon, L. (1995b). Philosophy with kids: More
ideas & activities. Sth Melbourne: Longman Australia.
Dewey, J. (1916/1966). Democracy and education: An introduction to the philosophy
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Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Continuum.
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Marinoff, L. (1999). Plato not Prozac!: Applying eternal wisdom to everyday problems.
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Millett, S., & Tapper, A. (2012). Benefits of collaborative philosophical inquiry in
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Murris, K., & Haynes, J. (2001). Philosophical enquiry with children. In T. Curnow
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munities and curriculum, annual conference of the Australian Teacher Education
Association, Albury, Australia, 28 June – 1 July 2009, 1–15.
Scholl, R., Nichols, K., & Burgh, G. (2014). Transforming pedagogy through philo-
sophical inquiry. International Journal of Pedagogies and Learning, 9(3), 253–272.
Scholl, R., Nichols, K., & Burgh, G. (2016). Connecting learning to the world beyond
the classroom through collaborative philosophical inquiry. Asia-Pacific Journal of
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Splitter, L. J., & Sharp, A. M. (1995). Teaching for better thinking: The classroom com-
munity of inquiry. Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research.
Sprod, T. (1993). Books into ideas. Cheltenham: Hawker Brownlow.
166  Gilbert Burgh
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Topping, K. J., & Trickey, S. (2007a). Collaborative philosophical enquiry for school
children: Cognitive gains at two-year follow-up. British Journal of Educational Psy-
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Topping, K. J., & Trickey, S. (2007b). Impact of philosophical enquiry on school
students’ interactive behaviour. Thinking Skills and Creativity, 2(2), 73–84.
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Armadale: Eleanor Curtain.
19 Teaching philosophy and ethics
in Japan
Tetsuya Kono

We know that P4C achievements have had some effects in all

countries. The program is under consideration in many
countries. Could you tell us what effect the P4C program had
on educational activities in Japan?
As for philosophy education, there is no class of philosophy but only a class of moral
or character education up to the upper secondary level. In elementary school, teach-
ers teach pupils how to judge moral issues and how to behave morally with an aim
to teaching good citizenship in the class named “Doutoku (morality).” At the same
time, teachers try to develop pupils’ moral emotions and their sympathy to others in
the class of literature. However, in these classes of “morality” and “literature,” teach-
ers do not facilitate pupils’ ability to think and discuss with other classmates. The
essence of philosophy consists in thinking and debating. Accordingly, these teachings
at elementary school cannot be called philosophical education. However, recently,
there is a trend to introduce educational debate in the class of moral education at
primary and lower secondary schools; there are several guidebooks for teachers to
practice debates in a class of moral education at primary and lower secondary schools
in Japan. Educational debate surely develops pupils’ ability to think deeply and logi-
cally. I hope that this educational method will be widely adopted in the classes of
human and social sciences, as well as the class of philosophy.

We have some problems with our current system of education, as

you have cited in your paper related to the Japanese entrance
examination: “our system of education will not be changed,
when the structures of exams are the same.” Do you have
any suggestion on how to change the style of evaluation and
assessment in schools?
Most Japanese entrance examinations of human and social sciences are to test
general knowledge, and most of them are multiple choice type, word filling type,
or even true-false type. Such types of test would be valid in the case of mathemat-
ics, some natural sciences, and foreign languages. Nevertheless, if most questions
about the human and social sciences are of those types, their effects on education
168  Tetsuya Kono
would be catastrophic. They make students wrongly believe that what is needed
for the study of human and social sciences is only memorization, never one’s
thinking and construction of logical arguments. If we want to examine students’
abilities to think and argue, entrance examinations should be in the form of long-
essay writing, commentary writing on a text, or group discussion. Actually, these
types of tests are often used in companies as entrance examinations or promotion
tests. However, in order to adopt these types of entrance examinations, Japanese
universities do not have a big enough budgets or enough manpower. Japanese
university professors are too busy to make more time for entrance examination.
Japanese universities cannot give examinations without the aid of professors,
since they don’t have specialized secretaries for entrance examination. Accord-
ingly, Japanese universities need a bigger budget and more specialized offices to
change the way entrance examinations are conducted.

How could we access these books (English versions) that you

mentioned in your paper: The Method of Knowledge, Araki (1996),
and Ethics. We found them interesting and would like to study
and maybe use them in our teaching. Do you know any English
books that could help students in universities (like the method
of knowledge)?
As I said, educational debate is often introduced in the class of moral education,
and there are many guidebooks for teachers to practice debates in a class of moral
education (Araki, 1996; Matsuo & Sagana, 1995; Okamoto, 1992; Yoshimizu,
1995). I also wrote a theoretical book to maintain how important dialogue or
debate is for moral education (Kono, 2011). I sometimes make students debate
in philosophy classes in a university, but I don’t use a specialized text for debat-
ing. I use only philosophical textbooks in which there are “summary questions”
and make students debate on the questions. I have used Stephen Law’s (2003)
The Philosophy Gym as a text in an introductory class.

Are you sure the “how-to books” do not create problems like the
older ways? I mean, is it possible that students just memorize
them and again do not learn anything practically?
To develop one’s ability of thinking is, I think, not an easy thing. It surely needs
long-term practice and its end is open. So called “how-to books” are not apt to
such type of practice.

How do you use the “debates” method in schools in practice? Do

you change the styles of the classes and curriculum? What are
the differences of this method with the community of inquiry?
I already partly answered this question in the answer to the third question. In
my university, I often use the debate type education in university classes. The
 Teaching philosophy and ethics in Japan 169
possibility of debate-type learning depends on the size of a class. Naturally, if
there are more than 30 students, the class debate or discussion becomes very dif-
ficult. I think that educational debate is one way to practice the Community of
Inquiry. Educational debate is a method to develop especially the ability of logical
and critical thinking.

Can you discuss the differences between a debate and a dialogue?

I know that in the Islamic tradition there is the method of
debate but just two parties are in involved. From where have
you been inspired by the idea of the debate? Did the Japanese
tradition inspire you?
The aims of dialogue are various. Sometimes it aims for mutual understanding,
sometimes reconciliation, sometimes reaching common agreement, sometimes
deepening one’s thinking and moral reflection. But recently I have also used the
philosophical dialogue method, such as Matthew Lipman’s, in my class (Kono,
2014). On the other hand, the aim of debate is to win, namely, to persuade the
audience more effectively than one’s opponent. In terms of educational debate,
I have mentioned models based on debates in law courts. Debate makes partici-
pants more competitive and more motivated. However, there are some limits for
educational debate. Debate can be used only for the themes that can be answered
with a yes or no answer like in a law court debate. Not only I but most Japanese
teachers who use educational debate are inspired by the pedagogy for commu-
nication and critical thinking. There have been religious and ideological debates
in the history of Japan. In the 13th and 15th century, there were many debates
among opposing schools of Buddhism, as well as among Buddhists and Chris-
tians. During the epoch of Tokugawa Shogunate in the 17th century, there were
also debates among Buddhists, Confucians, and Shintoists on various ideological
and political themes. Nevertheless, there is no direct connection between these
traditions and our actual educational practice.

References
Araki, N. (1996). Teaching materials for the class of moral dilemmas. Tokyo: Meiji-
Tosho publisher. (in Japanese)
Kono, T. (2011). Re-questioning the moral education: Liberalism and the future of
education. Tokyo: Chikuma-shobo publisher. (in Japanese)
Kono, T. (2014). ‘Philosophy of Children’ helps foster the ability to dialogue and think.
Tokyo: Kawade-shobo-shinsha publisher.
Law, S. (2003). The philosophy gym. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Matsuo, M., & Sagana, K. (1995). Planning of the class of social studies by educational
debate. Tokyo: Meiji-Tosho publisher. (in Japanese)
Okamoto, A. (1992). An introduction of educational debate. Tokyo: Meiji-Tosho
publisher. (in Japanese)
Yoshimizu, Y. (1995). Social studies class improved by debate. Tokyo: Meiji-Tosho pub-
lisher. (in Japanese)
20 P4C in the context
of Muslim education
Rosnani Hashim

Concerning living in the modern world, in your opinion, what

are the important things that Muslim children should learn?
Our world is more complex now than before. With globalization spawned by
the revolution in information and communication technology, specifically the
Internet, every culture and civilization has been forced to interact with other
cultures and civilizations. The risks and opportunities are there. I am sure you
have heard of Huntington’s (1996) Clash of Civilization and the event of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, in the United States, which almost realized that theory of
the clash between Western and Islamic civilizations. Therefore, one of the most
important things Muslim children need today is to learn to live and deal with
cultural diversities in a constructive way. This means that they have to know
the tools and possess the abilities to deal with it. This is crucial for the survival
of every human group today and especially to avoid conflicts. Among the most
important tools, therefore, are the tools of engagement and negotiation, which
would require the ability to think critically, creatively and ethically and then to
communicate one’s ideas in an articulate manner in order to persuade rationally.
Of course, above all, this is the good heart that ought to be nurtured effectively.
The Islamic faith does emphasize both. An intelligent man without a good heart
might be destructive and, similarly, a kind-hearted man without intellectual skills
might be easily deceived.

Why is thinking (including reasoning and judgment) a necessary

thing for Muslims?
Actually thinking is necessary for all human beings, not only Muslims. The aql
or the faculty of reasoning is endowed to man and it is the distinguishing factor
between us and all other creation. Man is considered a superior being due to
this. Islamically, besides the guidance revealed through the Messengers of God,
it is this gift of aql to man that enables him to be God’s steward on earth, which
means to worship Him, to plan for his life’s prosperity, to draw out all the riches
of the earth for that purpose, to maintain peace and order with each other. All
these acts require wise thinking. Is the aql similar to the “mind?” It is similar if
 P4C in Muslim education 171
both refer to the faculty of reasoning. But in Islam the aql is more than that, it
also has a spiritual quality, that is, it is able to receive knowledge from the spiritual
world.
Why is thinking more necessary for Muslims? This is due to their tradition.
Their Holy Book, the Qurán urged them to think and to reflect, not to take
things for granted. There are many such injunctions, as evident in the verses cited
below (al-Qur’an, 2016).
Most surely in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of
the night and the day, there are signs for men who understand (Qur’an 3:190).
And He it is Who spread the earth and made in it firm mountains and rivers,
and of all fruits He has made in it two kinds; He makes the night cover the day;
most surely there are signs in this for a people who reflect. (The Qurán 13:3)
In addition to these verses, there are many other verses in the Qur’an that chal-
lenge the readers to reflect and to think. For instance:

Do they not then meditate on the Qur’an? And if it were from any other than
Allah, they would have found in it many a discrepancy. (The Qur’an 4:82)
Say: “Can the blind be held equal to the seeing?” Will ye then consider not?
(Qurán 6:50)
Have you considered the water which you drink? Is it you that send it down
from the clouds, or are We the senders? (The Qurán 56:68–9)

The fact is that Muslims are still in possession of the authentic Holy Scripture, the
Qur’an, which is claimed to be valid for all times and places. The Qur’an is the
fountainhead of knowledge for them and also a book of guidance bearing many
life principles. It requires deep thinking to draw an interpretation from the
Qur’anic verses. Therefore, thinking over the verses of the Qur’an and the phe-
nomena in the universe is a command and is crucial for them.

Why do you prefer the P4/wC method for teaching children

about subjects/skills?
I prefer the P4/wC method in teaching because I realized that the conventional
methods, which are very subject-centered, are quite boring, sometimes too much
parroting and drilling for examinations and, most of all, they do not give meaning
to the students. I found that using P4/wC, or what I call the Hikmah (wisdom)
pedagogy, gives more meaning to students and the dialogical inquiry makes them
more thoughtful. They cannot get away with just a one-word answer anymore.
Students explain verbally and in writing of their happiness to be given the oppor-
tunity to express their views and to be able to listen to their friends’ views. They
say that all the views they hear give them many ideas. The teachers also confirm
this, especially the language teachers. They spoke of the tremendous change in
their students’ writing ability, as evident from their ability to write more in a
page than they used to, and the students attributed this to the increase in ideas
they have now as compared to prior being taught using this method. They also
172  Rosnani Hashim
pinpointed how they realized that using P4C has revealed their friends’ capability
in thought, which they never knew before. They are so pleased with this method
that they feel it ought to be used for all subjects and offered to all students. This is
also true in the study of the Qur’an for Islamic education. Previously, the teacher
would give notes or feed his own idea or version of the meaning of the verses
read. But, applying this method, they can discuss the possible meaning and come
to a stronger understanding. They can even discuss the relevance of the verses for
their present life – even for primary children.

As for the complicated concepts (ideas) of Islamic philosophy,

how did you use Islamic thinking in P4C and what kind of
materials did you use?
First, let us state at the outset that the term Islamic philosophy in itself sets its
own prescription and parameter. In the case of Islamic philosophy, metaphysics is
an aspect that is already defined within the Qurán and thus the activity of Islamic
philosophy is not to set new ones but rather to reinforce it or provide an intellec-
tual basis for it. This is definitely in contrast to some Western and/or secular phi-
losophies, which do not recognize any metaphysical system and therefore decide
to formulate it or even abandon it.
One significant observation I had made when I looked at Muslims and their
understanding of their faith is that many are dependent on other ‘knowledgeable’
ones for its elaboration, although the Holy Book is in their possession. Some even
memorized the verses, but with little understanding of their significance or mean-
ing. This is especially true for those for whom Arabic is not their first language.
No doubt, these memorizations are useful for recitation in their five daily prayers
or other ritual ceremonies. It occurred to me that the P4C approach could be
used as a great mechanism to enhance not only critical, creative and ethical think-
ing but also their understanding of the spirit of the Qur’an. The Community of
Inquiry (CoI) forms a great device to exchange views and negotiate meanings
that the Holy Qur’an is filled with, since it is supposed to be a book valid and
proper for all times and ages. Of course, the discourse will turn out slightly dif-
ferently for different CoIs, since it depends very much on the composition of the
members of the CoIs. The concept of CoI itself parallels the concept of Halaqah
in the Muslim tradition, which denotes a study circle. I want to use the CoI and
P4C as a means for children to examine and understand Qur’anic concepts.
Having this in mind, I began to develop my own materials based on the
ideas of developing P4C materials I had gained from my training at the IAPC
in New Jersey, my own understanding and experience using Lipman’s novels –
Elfie, Pixie, Harry, Nous, Lisa and Mark. What is crucial is that each episode
has at least one problem or confusion that is related to a central and common
concept – something I also picked up from Clinton Golding at the Singapore
P4C Conference and the dialogue that has within it embedded philosophical
ideas and questions. Most of the central concepts that Lipman introduced in his
works such as names, rules, freedom, real, stereotyping and fairness are universal
 P4C in Muslim education 173
and could be applied to any children. Consequently, I began writing a short
series of thinking books for children. For example, in the first book of this series
(Hashim, 2010), Mira’s Trip to the Zoo, I draw the children’s attention to chap-
ter 105 in the Qur’an entitled “The Elephant,” which was about the attempt of
an ancient ruler from Yemen to destroy the Ka’bah (House of God) in Mecca. His
army rode on elephants, and they were shattered by a miraculous action of birds
carrying stones brimming with fires and dropping them on the elephant. Thus,
the students were able to discuss the concept of God’s power and the similarity
of the birds’ action to military planes dropping bombs in wars today. In another
instance, as the children visited the snake den, I raised the concept of the real and
the apparent through the story of how the magicians were able to change their
sticks into snakes but yet how powerless they were compared to Prophet Moses
and posed the question, are the snakes in the zoo real? The four titles in this series
which were later combined into one book (Hashim, 2014) are: (1) Mira’s Visit to
the Zoo; (2) Mira’s New School; (3) Mira’s Thinking about God; and (4) Mira on
Helping the Poor. Since the first series, I have written Sarah (2012) and compiled
and translated stories from Hoca Nasruddin (2014) into Malay.

So, your definition of “philosophy” is completely different from

the Western meaning of philosophy. Can you discuss it more,
please?
Actually, there is not much of a difference, if we consider that philosophy deals
with the four major ingredients of metaphysics, epistemology, axiology and logic.
However, we do differ in in some aspects of each of those ingredients, due to our
epistemology. For instance, in the Islamic epistemology we not only recognize
rational thinking and the sense experience as sources of our knowledge but we
also recognize the revealed truths as another source of knowledge. Of course the
consequence of this is vast between Islamic and secular philosophies. The secular
philosophies would know no limit to thought, contrary to the Islamic philoso-
phies. There are areas in which we can exercise our sense experiences to know,
while there are areas that we cannot, especially those related to beliefs regarding
the unseen, such as the hereafter. Although we could use our mind to reflect and
contemplate about it, just as Plato argued for the necessity of another world in
the Republic (1952) – was it the Myth of Er, where there is heaven and hell to
mete out justice. Even scientific discoveries are confirming the revealed truths,
such as the beginning of time and the expansion of the universe. So the Islamic
worldview is not anti-intellectual. By using our intellect or rational mind and also
sense experiences, we can slowly fathom the wisdom of the revealed truths and
thus live by its principles.
For example, modern science has helped us a lot to know about the principles
of the natural world and we have prospered materially based on these princi-
ples, which are also called the law of Allah. However, modern men have almost
completely abandoned religious principles of ethics and have exploited the uni-
verse without limits – and this has disastrous consequences, based on the increase
174  Rosnani Hashim
in environmental damage and changes we are experiencing today. Our natural
resources might not last for long. I think S. H. Nasr (1997) has explained this
well in his book Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis of Modern Man.

Can you please give some examples of Islamic philosophy and how
Muslim philosophers dealt with it?
Well, for example, Islamic philosophy deals with the self in the sense of who am I?
Am I free? And how should I live? In fact one of the greatest debates among the
philosophers in early Islam was whether man has free will or everything has been
pre-determined, that is, the debates between the Jabarites and the Qadarites, with
each taking one side (Fakhry, 1970; Qadir, 1991). Both sides have their propo-
nents who used interesting arguments also drawn from the Qurán to defend their
position. This is an important matter because it deals with the issue of accounta-
bility in good and evil acts. Much later we have the scholar Abul Hasan al-Ash’ari
who attempted to perform a synthesis of these positions by accepting both and
that what was pre-determined can still be changed through supplications to God.
This then became the mainstream Sunni Muslims’ belief.
Islamic philosophy also deals with metaphysics – the nature of God, the Ulti-
mate Reality, the nature of man and the universe, the meaning of existence and
free will. Muslim philosophers dealt with the unity of God, the structure of
reality and cosmology. Similarly the idea of man’s composition of soul (ruh),
mind (aql), spiritual heart (qalb) and body (jasad) was discussed by many Mus-
lim philosophers, such as Ibn Sina and al-Ghazzali. Creationism is very much
embedded in Islamic metaphysics, as it is evidence from the creation of the
Prophet Adam.

Can we find some Muslim philosophers among ancient philosophers

who do P4C or something similar it?
We might consider Socrates and Plato as pioneers among ancient philosophers for
their method of inquiry using dialogues and for creating a community of inquiry,
especially with the Athenian youth. In the Islamic tradition, the Prophet Muham-
mad used this method when deliberating a matter with his companions. We have
a couple of his traditions that illustrate this. For example, when he wanted to
teach them the concepts of Islam (pillars of faith), Iman (articles of faith) and
Ihsan (highest level of faith), he applied the question and answer method. Simi-
larly, before he appointed Muadh as the governor of Yemen, he quizzed him on
the sources of the law and what he would do if he cannot find the principles in
the Qur’an or the Tradition of the Prophet.
Then we also know how this method was taken up by the scholars in juris-
prudence (fiqh) such al-Shafi’i (1961) in his Risala. Of course we are more
familiar with how influential Plato and Aristotle have been among the early
Muslim philosophers such as Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. However, there are no
vivid descriptions of their philosophical process with the exception of debates
 P4C in Muslim education 175
(jadal). But there are thick descriptions (Maqdisi, 1981) of how the teaching of
jurisprudence took place through discussion and debates and how, during the
Abbasid era, the palace became such a focal point for scholars. Definitely we do
not hear of it from among children. However, the study circle or halaqa, where
students sat in a semi-circle in front of the teacher, has been a primary mode of
instruction.

In your P4C stories, did you emphasize content/values, or the

process of thinking?
In the P4C programs that I conducted, I emphasize BOTH the processes of
thinking and the content and ethical values when appropriate and relevant. How-
ever, the processes of thinking would not appear in the stories, which are only
stimulus materials to help in the inquiry. The processes of thinking emerged dur-
ing the philosophical inquiry through the community of inquiry or the discussion
in the ‘halaqa’ in the Islamic tradition. In a sense, it is like giving rational reasons
for the values they believe and hold rather than just accepting it from their par-
ents through values inculcation and transmission. All the skills of critical and crea-
tive thinking, such as classifying, categorizing, discriminating, giving evidence,
giving examples, imagining the different situations, providing reasons and valid
arguments to support views and avoiding fallacies are utilized at different levels
and with different degrees depending on the materials and topics.

Please explain the term “halaqa” and its origin in the Islamic
tradition
Halaqa is the term used for a study circle that is a teaching method whereby stu-
dents sit in a semi-circle in front of the teacher. The teacher could be dictating,
having students memorize something, having a discussion or an argument. In
fact, the term was used to denote the teacher’s circle, for example Khalid’s halaqa,
or the subject circle, for example the fiqh’s halaqa.

What are your achievements in P4C in your country? Did you use
it in schools?
I had applied P4C under the title of Hikmah (Wisdom) Pedagogy for Critical,
Creative, and Ethical Thinking since 2004 when I introduced the School Holiday
Program for children of staff of the International Islamic University Malaysia dur-
ing the November–December school holidays for a period of four hours daily for
five days, Monday–Friday. The response was so encouraging that it has become
an annual program with some students coming back for another level. In this
program, we regularly have four levels for ages 9–11, 12–13, 14–15 and 16–17.
In the beginning, I used Lipman’s novels – Elfie, Pixie, Harry  and Lisa – but later
it became a potpourri of materials, including stories from Hoca Nasruddin. It is
only now that I have incorporated the stories that I have created.
176  Rosnani Hashim
In 2006, I founded the Centre for Philosophical Inquiry in Education (CPIE)
situated in the Institute of Education, of the International Islamic University
Malaysia (IIUM). It receives a small research grant from the university as a
research cluster and support from the Institute in the form of a part time gradu-
ate administrative assistant. Since then, the CPIE has been trying to promote
this program to schools. We have trained teachers, but they did not have school
support for the program – in the sense of space in the already packed curricu-
lum. Since 2009, Sekolah Rendah Islam [Islamic Primary School] Sungai Ramal,
Kajang, Selangor has been employing it as part of their English class to assist in
Grade Six students’ reading, speaking, listening and thinking skills.
Then, in 2010, we had another dedicated school system, that is, the Interna-
tional Islamic Primary and Secondary Schools in Kuala Lumpur and the Setiabudi
Primary and Secondary Schools, which offer the Hikmah Program weekly. The
International Islamic Primary and Secondary Schools and the Setiabudi Second-
ary School use the stand-alone approach, while the Setiabudi Primary is using it
as an infusion in the English teaching period. These schools have been our nurs-
ery for the future of P4C in Malaysia. In July 2016, we were allowed to pilot the
Hikmah Program in two secondary schools and one primary public school, which
involved 11 teachers whom we trained and then later supervised in schools. But
it is an infusion, and we have to train teachers on writing lesson plans, creating
or modifying texts and searching the Internet for stimulus materials to fit their
classes, and we also have to observe them in the classroom. It is our hope that the
teachers, principals and the Ministry of Education will see the strength of P4C.
In line with the education movement in the country and to be more user-friendly,
in 2014 we changed the center’s name from the Centre for Philosophical Inquiry
to the Centre for Teaching Thinking.
The Hikmah Pedagogy is also used in a few other schools by teachers whom we
have trained during pre-service training. It is carried out on a volunteer basis by
those who found it stimulating. But there is no organized P4C classroom.
Finally, we are happy that we have managed to develop a core team of P4C
academics from among our PhD students who have graduated who are active in
giving workshops, training and doing research in this field. This is very important
for sustaining the program.

Did you have some methodical offers for universities?

The Faculty of Education has offered a specialization in Master of Education in
Teaching Thinking since 2007, in which the Pedagogy of Philosophical Inquiry
or P4C is included as one of the courses. However, another course, Philosophy
in Education for Thinking, is offered as a specialized course for students special-
izing in Social Foundations of Education or as an elective for other master’s stu-
dents. In addition to these courses, I do conduct workshops on P4C or Hikmah
Pedagogy once a semester for graduate students. Some became interested to
pursue it further for their master’s or doctoral dissertations. So, I have a few PhD
students who focused on this area and have even graduated them and now a few
 P4C in Muslim education 177
become members of my current team. It will be quite difficult to grow without
having a team.
In addition, the P4C approach is taught in the undergraduate program i.e.,
Bachelor of Education (Moral Education) in its teaching methodology courses
I and II.
The following are two testimonies, first from a moral education teacher and
the second from an English language teacher who have taught using this method:

I am using the method to teach moral for form 4 and 5 students, at first they
don’t want to respond. Later they try to ask question and answer their friends’
questions. I am so happy because the worst class also try to talk and give their
point of views whether it is right or wrong. I learn more from their views. . . .
Actually Moral subject is very interesting to do inquiry especially upper forms.
They realize, learn try to practice the value in their life. The important thing
is we have to give them chance and freedom to talk and encourage them to
respond. We have to know where to stop and how to bring them to achieve our
lesson outcomes and objectives.
(Form 4 Moral Education Teacher)

So many differences from the previous class . . . Before this I was the only one
speaking or asking them questions. . . . I have to think a lot and to be ready. . . .
Really. It has changed the way I teach, much easier and it is more enjoyable. The
students are happy.
(Form 4 English Lang Teacher, 8/8/2016)

What obstacles/resistances could there possibly be against P4/

wC in Muslim countries, especially in Malaysia?
There are several obstacles that I have faced and I think will continue to face.
First, the attitudes of Muslims who felt that this pedagogy opens the Pandora’s
box to leading students to question their own faith and the Qur’an and as a result
could lead them to reject their own faith and tradition. I guess this is common
with philosophy. For the Muslims, it has occurred in their tradition, that is, the
struggle between philosophers such as al-Farabi and Ibn Sina and the theologians
such as al-Ghazali (1963), who wrote a long treatise on the incoherence of the
philosophers in the Tahafut al-Falasifah. But I believe this could be avoided if
we understand the use of this pedagogy in the context of Islamic philosophy.
I have discussed this in Hashim (2009) “Philosophy in the Islamic Tradition:
Implications for the philosophy for Children (P4C) Program”. This is why we
try to avoid the term “philosophy” in our context and use Hikmah or Wisdom
pedagogy instead.
Secondly, some school leaders and teachers resist it on the pretext of insuffi-
cient time because the curriculum is already crowded. It needs visionary teachers
to recognize that the pedagogy is a pedagogy and could be used as other teach-
ing methods. Yes, it does require a little bit of extra time but it is worth it. They
178  Rosnani Hashim
have not seen its worth, so they resist it. It is ideal if we can get it as a stand-alone
program with specialists, but the reality is that it has to be more than an infu-
sion. We still need to come up with successful teachers or successful students to
testify for it.
Third, this pedagogy requires teachers who are themselves critical, crea-
tive and ethical. Teachers with these features are hard to come by. Although
I think with constant practice, teachers do improve all these skills. Finally,
when we offer this pedagogy, we need to have the instructional materials to
accompany it and help the teachers. This takes a long time, just as we can see
how long it took Professor Lipman to come up with his series and the thick
manuals accompanying them. That is why we really need a committed team
to work on this.

How can we overcome these problems?

I think that if we can show results in a particular setting, then we can win them
over. So, we need first to train teachers and supervise them for the first month in
their school, to work at producing adequate and suitable materials, implement
the program in a school system and monitor it. It will be difficult without instruc-
tional materials. This is what we are trying to do here.
We also need to change the mindset of the Islamic Studies Education teachers
so that they will be more supportive because they wield so much influence over
the mind of Muslim children. It rests upon their shoulders whether they will be
able to produce a more open-minded or close-minded generation.
Finally, we also really need a dedicated and strong team of trainers for all the
school subjects.

Which Islamic country is more active in this era, do you think?

I am not sure what you mean here. Do you mean active in P4C? I know of a
few Muslim countries that have embarked on this program – your country, Iran,
for example, then Turkey, Pakistan and Malaysia. However, there has been not
much exchange of materials and ideas. We work in isolation. Maybe we ought
to form an international organization among Muslim countries to promote this
pedagogy, just like the ICPIC. Maybe we should approach UNESCO, which has
a special department for this purpose.

Do you have anything additional to tell us about the subject?

I think this pedagogy or P4C is here to stay because it has so much to offer and
is consistent with the needs of the contemporary period, when there is so much
cultural diversity and a need for mutual respect and tolerance and the ability to
live peacefully with others. From the Islamic perspective, this method has been
used in Islamic civilization since its beginning but was lost. So we have to revive
it and we should not give up.
 P4C in Muslim education 179

References
Abd Karim, A. H., & Hashim, R. (2014). The humor and wisdom of Nasruddin Hoca.
Kuala Lumpur: CPIE. (in Malay)
Al-Ghazali. (1963). Tahafut al-falasifah [The incoherence of the philosophers].
Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress.
Al-Shafi’i. (1961). al-Risala fi usul al-fiqh: Treatise on the foundations of Islamic juris-
prudence (Majid Khadduri, Trans.). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press.
Fakhry, M. (1970). A history of Islamic philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press.
Hashim, R. (2009). Philosophy in the Islamic tradition: Implications for the Philoso-
phy for Children (P4C) Program. In E. Marsal, T. Dobashi, & B. Weber (Eds.),
Children philosophize worldwide: Theoretical and practical concepts (pp. 655–662).
Peter-Lang: Hodos Edition.
Hashim, R. (2012). Sarah: The budding thinker. Kuala Lumpur: CPIE.
Hashim, R. (2014). Mira: Thinking stories for Muslim children series. Kuala Lumpur:
Saba Islamic Media.
The Holy Qur’an. Translation by Shakir. http://www.guidedways.com/ chapter_­
display.php?chapter=1&translator=3 (accessed 10 September 2016).
Huntington, S. P. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order.
New York: Simon & Schuster.
Maqdisi, G. (1981). The rise of colleges: Institutions of learning in Islam and the West.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Nasr, S. H. (1997). Man and nature: The spiritual crisis of modern man. Chicago:
ABC International Group.
Plato. (1952). Republic (F. M. Cornford, Trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Qadir, C. A. (1991). Philosophy and science in the Islamic world. London: Routledge.
21 Islamic tradition and
creative dialogue
Robert Fisher

As far as we can see in some of your storybooks that were

translated into Persian and especially in your book entitled
Teaching Thinking, which dedicates a chapter to P4C stories, it
seems that your view on P4C varies a bit compared to that of
Lipman and Philip Cam. For example, it is evident when you
gave an abstract of “Metamorphoses” by Kafka in your book
Stories for Thinking (1996) that this may be criticized from the
point of view of Cam and Lipman. Kindly elaborate on your
views of the principal features of stories for P4C courses. In
other words, how may one achieve philosophical adequacy?
Using stories through P4C helps develop Philosophical Intelligence (PI), and
philosophical dialogue with children is important in developing habits of intel-
ligence. ‘Philosophical adequacy’ comes through developing philosophical intel-
ligence, which is developed through the practice of P4C (Fisher, 2008). This is
summarized below.

• Philosophical Intelligence is a human capacity to wonder, question and

enquire. Gardner suggests that what he calls ‘existential intelligence’ (EI) is
a universal human ‘proclivity to pose and ponder questions about life, death,
and ultimate realities.’ This traditionally has been within the field of enquiry
known as philosophy. Whether we call them ‘intelligences,’ ‘intellectual capaci-
ties,’ ‘mental abilities’ or ‘thinking skills,’ what are referred to are common
capacities of human minds to respond to the puzzles and problems of human
existence with enquiring minds. PI is more than EI; it begins in wonder but is
more than mere questioning – it is the quest of the human mind for concep-
tual understanding and for wisdom in finding answers to human problems.
• Philosophical Intelligence arises from the human mind’s capacity to free
itself from its dependence on sensory experience and to develop knowledge
and understanding using concepts as tools for thinking. It seeks solutions to
problems, truths or knowledge by exploring, building on and creating new
concepts. It is not a single capacity but made up of many elements including
interpreting, questioning, reasoning, creative thinking and judgment.
 Islamic tradition and creative dialogue 181
• Through the exercise of PI, children can develop habits of intelligent
behavior, such as curiosity, critical and creative thinking, collaborative
enquiry, and communicative skill. It also helps children understand what
philosophy is and why it is important. ‘Philosophy is the way you sort out
problems in life when nobody knows the answer,’ says Simon, aged 10.
Philosophy is ‘a story with a puzzle’ says Kate, aged 6. Over 30 years of
research across the world in Philosophy for Children (P4C) provides strong
empirical evidence, showing that P4C enhances, for example, verbal reason-
ing, academic achievement, dialogic skills, self-esteem and social behavior
(Fisher, 2008).

We learned from your previous letter that you are doing research
on dialogue in Islamic traditions. Please elaborate on the way
you were introduced to the Islamic tradition and your ideas on
the relation between Islamic education and P4C approaches
(e.g., community of inquiry etc.)
There is a long Islamic tradition that focuses on developing the mind through the
use of reason, as the following quotes testify:

Verily, in the creation of the heavens and of the earth, and in the succession
of night and day: and in the ships that speed through the sea with what is
useful to man: and in the waters which God sends down from the sky, giving
life thereby to the earth after it had been lifeless, and causing all manner of
living creatures to multiply thereon: and in the change of the winds, and the
clouds that run their appointed courses between sky and earth: [in all this]
there are messages indeed for people who use their reason.
(The Qur’an 2:164)

Muhammad Asad (formerly Leopold Weiss) noted in his translation of the Qur’an
that this passage is one of many in which the Qur’an appeals to “those who use
their reason” to observe the daily wonders of nature, including the evidence of
man’s own ingenuity through “the ships that speed through the sea,” as so many
indications of a conscious, creative Power pervading the universe.

Have, then, they [who reject this divine writ] journeyed about the earth and
beheld what happened in the end to those [deniers of the truth] who lived
before them? – and [do they not know that] to those who are conscious of
God the life in the hereafter is indeed better [than this world]? Will they not,
then, use their reason?
(The Qur’an 12: 109)

And in the succession of night and day, and in the means of subsistence
which God sends down from the skies, giving life thereby to the earth after
182  Robert Fisher
it had been lifeless, and in the change of the winds: [in all this] there are
­messages for people who use their reason.
(The Qur’an 45:5)

This emphasis in the use of reason is also evident from the Traditions of the
Holy Prophet Muhammad as seen below (Shaykh Fadhlalla Haeri, 1999):

‘A man is as his intellect.’

‘The intellect is the messenger of Truth.’
‘The mind makes good every affair; the fruit of the mind is correct behavior.’
‘The mind is the vessel of knowledge.’

There is also a long tradition of creative dialogue within Islamic tradition; for
example, in my latest book, Creative Dialogue, I quote many of the traditional
stories of Mulla Nasruddin to illustrate the point that dialogue is central to tradi-
tion as well as to a democratic society.

Since many of your works are translated into Persian, Iranian

students are quite familiar with your works. Is there any new
achievement and idea you would like to present briefly for their
interest?
My book Creative Dialogue is a book written for anyone interested in teaching
children how to think, to learn and to engage in creative dialogue. The message
of the book is that the key to improving children’s education is to improve the
quality of dialogue between children and their teachers or careers. It argues
that creative dialogue should feature in every lesson in school and be part of
the daily experience of children at home. It is a message that reflects worldwide
educational research into dialogic teaching and learning. The book identifies
the principles of dialogic learning with children, and offers practical guidance
to helping children of all ages and abilities learn through dialogue at home and
in the classroom.
The personalizing of learning, which means putting the student or learner
at the heart of the educative process, has always been the essence of effective
teaching and of lifelong learning. At the heart of personalized education is self-­
expression through talk. As Peter, aged 8, put it: “A good teacher is interested in
what you are thinking.” Talk is the most effective means of finding out what chil-
dren are thinking, feeling, or learning. However, research shows that the quality
of classroom talk has the power to enable or inhibit cognition and learning.
We find out what makes us individual by being in communion with ourselves
and with others. As Maria, aged 9 put it, “It is not enough to just go round and
round in your own thoughts, you need to get others to tell you what they think
or how else are you going to get more thoughts?” Personalizing learning through
dialogue is about making all students special. It recognizes that, as humans, they
are both ‘at potential’ and ‘at risk’ and need practice in communicating what they
 Islamic tradition and creative dialogue 183
think as well as in responding to the thinking of others. In short they learn best
to become themselves through dialogue with others.
Table 21.1 sums up some of the differences that might distinguish creative
dialogue from traditional teacher-pupil interaction:

Table 21.1 Creative dialogue vs. traditional teacher–pupil interaction

Creative dialogue Traditional teacher–pupil interaction

Children’s questions Teacher’s questions

Shared agenda Teacher’s agenda
Imaginative Informative
Exploratory Limited focus
Variation of viewpoint One directing view
Reflective Calculative
‘I/thou’ relationship ‘I/it’ relationship
Persuasive Authoritative
Possible answers Right answers
Co-operative enquiry Competitive answer-giving
Personalized learning Content-focused learning
Related to inner purposes Related to functional outcomes

Traditional teacher-pupil interaction is a necessary feature of learning, but it

is not sufficient nor is it the best means for maximizing the learning potential
of children. Traditional teacher talk tends to place limits on learning, whereas
research suggests that creative dialogue expands the possibilities of children’s
learning. We need to help children practice being creative through dialogue, to
think for themselves, develop the capacity to talk intelligently with others and
use dialogue to aid learning. Given the challenges children face today and the
problems they will have to face in the future, there can be no more important
task for teachers than to improve children’s capacity to both think for themselves
and benefit from the thinking of others by means of dialogue. As one teacher said
about her work in engaging children in dialogue for learning (Fisher, 2009): “It’s
very hard, but it’s by far the most satisfying part of teaching.”

Please explain your views on providing illustrations for stories

Some P4C practitioners like to use picturebooks, especially with young children
who find conceptual thinking difficult. I often use ‘pictures for thinking’ with older
students for conceptual enquiry and plan to write a book on this. However, ‘illus-
trations’ often limit children to the ‘literal level’ of interpretation, that is, ‘Who is
this?’ ‘What is happening?’ ‘What does this show?’ A good story, such as religious
or folk stories that have stood the test of time, do not need pictorial illustration.
Indeed, if a story is told in pictures, the mind does not need to work hard to make
sense of the words. In my ‘Stories’ approach, I include literal questions about the
story (which, for example, might be read from a picture) but the more important
questions are conceptual, about meanings and not merely appearances.
184  Robert Fisher

What is the role of “creative thinking” in your stories?

Leaving children to think and learn on their own does not guarantee that they
will engage in creative thinking. What they need to stimulate, challenge and
stretch their thinking is dialogue. What any mind needs to retain its flexibility, in
both young and old people, is the combination of creative thinking and dialogue.
Evidence that creative thinking is happening in a dialogue might include exam-
ples of individuals or groups engaging in one or more of the following elements
explored in this chapter:

1 Questioning and challenging

2 Making connections and seeing relationships
3 Imagining what might be
4 Exploring and extending ideas
5 Reflecting critically on ideas, actions and outcomes

These are some of the creative behaviors, or habits of intelligent behavior, that
need to be practiced through dialogue with children at home or in the classroom.
My book Creative Dialogue explores these features and suggests what needs to
be done to develop them.
It is a good idea before engaging children in philosophical discussion to begin
with a thinking game to help to activate and focus their minds. My recent book
(Fisher, 2011), Brain Games for Your Child, includes over 200 such thinking
games to help develop educational skills in young children in preparation for
philosophical enquiry. One reason why thinking games and philosophical discus-
sion with children are important is that they encourage interaction and commu-
nication with other people, rather than with the electronic screens that more and
more seem to dominate their lives.

What are the differences of your approach and Lipman’s approach

for teaching children to think?
Lipman, like Phil Cam and a number of his followers in the Philosophy for Chil-
dren movement, believe that children need a special philosophy curriculum as
part of a weekly timetable in schools. While my approach is very much inspired
by the pioneering work of Lipman and the Community of Inquiry method, and
I have taught such sessions in school, I believe teachers do not need specially
written ‘philosophical novels’ such as Lipman wrote to engage children in philo-
sophical dialogue. I believe that there is a wealth of story material in any culture
that will be more motivating to children and yet of philosophical interest that
can be used as a stimulus for philosophical enquiry. I believe that philosophical
inquiry need not be taught in special ‘Philosophy’ lessons but can be more gener-
ally used as part of the language and literature curriculum. I also believe that it is
important that philosophical discussion begins in the home between parents or
carers and their children and that classic stories and picturebooks are ideal ways
 Islamic tradition and creative dialogue 185
to begin teaching children to think, from the age of five upwards. A fuller version
of my views can be found in my book Teaching Thinking: Philosophical Enquiry
in the Classroom (Fisher, 2013).

What are the differences between your approach and Philip Cam’s
approach to thinking stories? Most of your selected fairy tales
in the book Stories for Thinking (1996) seem to have some
moral indoctrination
I do not understand quite what you mean by your comment that the stories I use
“seem to have indoctrination.” If you mean that all stories have underlying mes-
sages that might influence children’s thinking, then you are right, which is why
philosophical dialogue is so necessary to give children the courage, experience
and tools to interrogate the hidden meanings behind the words. We want them
to be able to interrogate the stories they read or hear so that they learn to think
for themselves both critically and creatively and to have the courage to question,
argue and form their own judgments. And the stories that surround them in their
culture are good ways for any teacher or parent to begin helping them in this
process, as I explain in my Stories for Thinking series.

I agree with Philip’s view about fables and fairy tales that they are
problematic. For instance, Philip says (chapter 14) “fables . . .
are usually meant to drive home a moral and, as in the
traditional presentation of Aesop’s fables, the moral may even
be explicitly drawn at the end. In any event, the structure and
intent of the story is didactic rather than being driven by a
commitment to ethical inquiry. While fairy stories may contain
things that can be cause for philosophical wonderment, they
are certainly not written with that in mind – and the same is
true of the great bulk of children’s literature.” This problem
seems to be potentially preventing philosophical reflection in
dialogue. What is your view?
For me, the power of stories resides in their ability to create possible worlds as
objects of intellectual inquiry. Stories liberate us from the here-and-now; they are
intellectual constructions, but they are also life-like. Good stories are those that
have stood the test of time, are intellectually challenging, but are also embedded
in human concerns. Such stories can provide us with a means to understand the
world and to understand ourselves. No wonder stories are the primary means of
teaching in every human society and provide an ideal starting point for philo-
sophical enquiry.
Lipman has argued against the use of conventional stories when teaching phi-
losophy to children. He distinguishes between children’s need for literal mean-
ing (scientific explanation), symbolic meaning (the kinds to be found in fairy
tales, fantasy and folklore) and philosophical meaning, which is neither literal nor
186  Robert Fisher
symbolic but is essentially metaphysical, logical or ethical. Children’s fiction is
suitable, he suggests, for literal and symbolic understanding, but not for philo-
sophical inquiry, which is best facilitated, he believes, through ‘philosophical nov-
els.’ However, I would argue that much of the best of children’s fiction includes
metaphysical themes such as time, space and human identity, as well as logical
themes to do with informal reasoning and the interpretation of meaning and also
ethical themes to do with the rightness of actions and of moral judgment. Lip-
man’s novels express these themes in a more expository way, but they lack the
motivating and imaginatively nourishing qualities of the best of traditional stories.
Not all stories are rich in meaning. Many contemporary commercial stories have
weak narratives, with story plots so simple and superficial as not to engage the
mind. What works best are complex narratives that have literary quality (and which
often have stood the test of time), not simple teaching stories like Aesop’s fables or
the dull narratives of Lipman’s ‘philosophical’ novels. The great stories of religious
and literary tradition relate to the concerns and needs of people at all stages of life.
They are multi-layered, that is, they have within them layers or levels of meaning
and significance that we become aware of only as we are helped to think more
deeply about them. We can turn to the best stories again and again, and gain fresh
insight about basic philosophical questions about knowledge and belief, about
right and wrong, about human relationships and the nature of the self.
Through interrogating a narrative, children can learn more about the story,
but through philosophical discussion mediated by a teacher they can be helped
to analyze the concepts and ideas within a story and thus learn more about the
world, about others and about themselves. Stories have the advantage of being
embedded in human concerns such as characters, events and experiences, and yet
can offer the child the chance to ‘de-center’ from the immediacy of their own
personal lives.
Stories provide good starting points for philosophical discussion through dia-
logic processes, which include:

• questioning and interrogating the narrative text or story

• interpreting the story, and seeking precise meanings
• exploring issues, ideas and concepts that arise from the story
• giving reasons for judgments and finding answers to questions that have
arisen

The philosopher Kierkegaard, writing in 1837, argued that the procedure for
story-telling to children should “as much as possible, be Socratic, one should
arouse in children a desire to ask questions” and the Community of Inquiry
method of P4C is an ideal way of getting children not only to question but, when
guided by a philosophically aware teacher, to engage in critical and conceptual
thinking.
Because stories are human constructions, they require an act of translation if
they are to be made meaningful by the hearer or reader. For a story to be mean-
ingful, it must be reconstructed in the mind. In a complex story, several elements
 Islamic tradition and creative dialogue 187
of narrative construction may be problematical and open to different kinds of
interpretation. The following are some of the problematic features of a story:
contexts, temporal order, particular events, intentions, choices, meanings and the
telling of the story. Stories can therefore make good starting points for critical
and dialogical inquiry. Many modern stories and picturebooks challenge cultural
stereotypes and conventional adult views of the world. A Community of Inquiry
provides the framework children need to encourage attention to the meanings of
words and concepts. Through discussing stories, children can be helped to search
for general principles to explain specific events in the narrative and to challenge
the stereotypes in the story. Teachers do this by asking, and encouraging children
to ask questions, about: What the story says (literal meaning), what the messages
within the story say (symbolic interpretation) and what the underlying ideas and
concepts might mean (philosophical enquiry). Traditional tales and other forms
of fiction can provide the stimulus that helps children move beyond literal under-
standing, towards becoming philosophically sensitive to the complexities of sto-
ries and of life. Or as a child put it when explaining the value of the philosophical
discussion of a story, you not only learn how to ask questions, to reason, and to
communicate your own ideas, but ‘you get a bigger brain by listening to what
others think that you would never have thought.’

References
Fisher, R. (1996). Stories for thinking. Oxford: Nash Pollock.
Fisher, R. (2008). Philosophical intelligence. In M. Hand & C. Winstanley (Eds.),
Philosophy in schools, (pp.12–19). London: Continuum.
Fisher, R. (2009). Creative dialogue: Talk for thinking in the classroom. London:
Routledge.
Fisher, R. (2011). Brain games for your child. London: Souvenir Press.
Fisher, R. (2013). Teaching thinking: Philosophical enquiry in the classroom (4th ed.).
London: Bloomsbury.
Haeri, S. F. (1999). Prophetic traditions in Islam: On the authority of the family of the
Prophet. London: The Muhammadi Trust and Zahra Publications.
22 Philosophical games for
children and thinking skills
Larisa Retyunskikh

Could you tell our readers about the games, please? Are the games
something invented, or have they already been in Russian
culture?
These games have existed in Moscow since 1992, the year the Family Club,
“Socrates’ School” was founded, which was when my methodical program of
“Philosophical games for children and adults” was realized. I obtained my doc-
torate in philosophy from Moscow State University. People from 8 to 80 years
old come here every month to philosophize together – children with parents
and grandparents, with great enthusiasm. This program has been successfully
implemented in more than 20 schools and cultural centers in Russia and the
Ukraine.

What are the aims behind the philosophical games? What kind of
intellectual and moral skills can be learned by children through
playing games?
Philosophy, in my view, contains not only intellectual, but also huge moral
potential; therefore, thought development with the help of philosophy isn’t
the only benefit. Perhaps an even more important result of early familiar-
ity with philosophy is an expansion of possibilities and intensity of mold-
ing moral consciousness, value orientations of personality. My procedure is
directed not as much towards the formation of cognitive habits, but rather
the stimulation of conscious moral search, selection of the living sense ori-
entations, etc. The aim of the game is to give for children their parents the
opportunity to open their souls and minds. Sometimes adults don’t want to
talk with kids seriously because they feel that kids can’t understand anything.
We help the kids and adults be more clever and to understand each other. We
want to show them the value common to all mankind’s moral norms, which
exist in all religions. But we never say about any of them that it is bad or it is
good; rather, we give them the possibility to choose for themselves – between
what is good or bad.
 Philosophical games 189

I could not understand the conception of the game exactly. Could

you explain one of the games as an example, and elaborate on
how the game is played? And discuss its rules and how it can
lead to the purposes that you intend.
Rules are only forms of the game, but not the essence of the tasks that lead to
the intended purpose. Every game has a topic: love, truth, goodness, culture,
understanding, etc.
Rules are very simple – there are three rounds of the game, each of them has
a task, each of them is a competition and participants need to fulfill the task. For
example: we give a quote from the 19th-century Russian philosopher V. Solovyev
(1988, p. 1): “Good, Truth and Beautiful are different views of Unity . . . their
inner unity is Love.” The task: Comment on this idea and make up a new legend
about Love, using it. The time given for preparing the task is 10 minutes.
There are about 50–60 members present in our meeting usually, but only 8 (4 fam-
ily teams) can take part in such a kind of competition in the first and second round. To
choose them, we organize a short selection competition for kids. For example, who
can give more synonyms for a word, the topic of a game, or who knows more poems
about it. Only four of the participants can be winners, and they can play together with
elders (parents or teachers). Other people make other short tasks or talk with a leader
during these 10 minutes. Then the four teams present their legends, and another
participant can discuss it. The jury comments on the legends and gives marks in the
form of game’s money – “flysiki.” After the game, everybody can “buy” sweets, toys,
books etc. from the game’s shop using the money he or she has collected.

What instruments are used in it?

Nothing special. Materials instruments are boards, microphones, paper, etc.
Intellectual instruments are talking and giving creativity tasks.

Can we find something about the games on the Internet?

It’s a pity, only in Russian: www.mdoo-fid.ru ; www.cdri.ru.
I will give an example for you now.

Examples of exercises for role games

Game 1. “In the Country of Justice”

Questions for discussion:

• How can you identify – what is just and what is not?

• For example, a man has stolen a loaf of bread and was imprisoned – is it just?
• What if he has stolen the bread because he could not afford to buy it to feed
a hungry child?
• Can one and the same thing be just and unjust simultaneously?
190  Larisa Retyunskikh
• If we fight a war – is it just? “Just” and “right” – do these notions define one
and the same?
• What do you think? Who lives in the Country of Justice?

Exercise 1: A meeting with Socrates

Socrates: Tell me, please, what do you feel is just: to tell the truth or to lie?
A friend: Of course, to tell the truth.
Socrates: Then what is just: to mislead or to avoid it?
A friend: For sure, to avoid misleading is just.
Socrates: Later on, what is just – to cause harm or be helpful.
A friend: To be helpful.
Socrates: Consequently, to tell the truth, to avoid misleading and to be helpful
is just, but to lie, cause harm and mislead is unjust?
A friend: Undoubtedly! Honest to Zeus!
Socrates: Does the same apply to the enemies?

The task: Please continue this dialogue in the roles of Socrates and his friend and
give the answer to Socrates’s question.
As usual, I ask more than one pair of participants to do it. After that, we discuss all
the reasons that were suggested. As usual, there are some differences in the continu-
ation of the dialogue. We deal with the same situation, but different identities and
personalities. The exercise helps us to understand justice in the space of our own
meanings, to see many contradictions of justice, to start answering the question “Who
am I?” in the discourse of justice. When we answer this question we think: “What will
I do?” In fact we try to answer I. Kant’s (1964) question: “What must I do?” There
are possibly many answers, according to the different strategies of identification.
 Philosophical games 191

Exercise 2: A just court or a meeting with King Solomon

• Two women came to King Solomon, and one of them said: O, my Lord, this
woman and me, we are living in one and the same house.
• She witnessed my giving birth to a child . . .
• Three days later she also gave birth to a child . . .
• The son of that woman died that night . . .
• She woke up in the middle of the night, took my very son with her and left
her dead son with me. . . .
• In the morning I woke up to feed my son, but he was dead. I looked carefully
at him – he was not my son . . .
• However, the other woman pronounced: no, it’s my son, who is alive, and
hers who is dead . . .
• Then King Solomon ordered a sword to be brought. And the sword was
given to him.
• The King pronounced: cut this child who is alive into two parts: one part
shall be given to this woman, the second – to the other.
• Then the first woman replied: let this child be given to this woman alive,
don’t kill him! But the other woman said: let the child be cut so he shall not
belong to any of us.
• The King replied: Give the child to the one who asked not to kill him, she is
his mother (The Holy Bible, 1988)
192  Larisa Retyunskikh
The question for discussion:

Was his decision just? Was the decision kind? Was it wise?
What it just?
The task: Please, suggest another decision based on the advice of his counselors and
explain why that decision is just.
Examples of children’s decisions:

• It is possible to suggest that the women choose gold or the child. The real
mother will choose the child. Volodkov Ivan, 10 years old
• I think it is possible to suggest to the women to die for the child. For exam-
ple, to tell them that he decided to sell the child in slavery. But he can refuse
this decision if any of the women is ready to die. The mother will be ready.
Naumenko Evgeny, 10 years old
• Let them raise the child together. He will have not one, but two mothers. He
will feel himself later, who is his real mother. Only she will be full of love to
him. He will choose the mother himself. Polyakova Polina, 9 years old

Where can we find some of your games? Any specific books or

journals?
Most of the books and articles are in Russian. I will give you a short summary of
my book in English: Philosophical Games for Children and Adults. (2003), 208
pp. It will help you to understand my conception of the “Socrates’ School.”

Table of contents
Preface
Part One. Philosophical Games: Why and What for?
1.1. Notes from a psychologist (Vasilieva E.)
Part Two. Philosophical Games: Description of Methods
2.1. The Aim and Functions of the Games
2.2. Techniques of the Games
2.3. Council of the Wisest
2.4. The Choice of Participants
2.5. Arranging the Games: Place and Properties
2.6. Money in the Games
2.7. Interplay with the Audience
2.8. The Auction of Ideas
Part Three. Philosophical Games: Scripts and Methods

The Scripts:
 1. “Universe”   4.  “The Good: Learn to Be Kind”
  2. “A Human Being, or Discover Yourself”   5. “Beauty: In Search of the
 3. “The Truth” Beautiful”
 Philosophical games 193

The Scripts:
  6.  “A Human Being and Nature” 24. “Freedom”
 7. “Life” 25. “Responsibility”
 8. “Chance” 26. “Care”
 9. “Idea” 27. “Moral”
10.  “The Russian Idea” 28. “Duty”
11.  “Of the Spirit and Soul” 29. “Forgiveness”
12.  “The Language” 30. “Consciences”
13.  “Meeting Socrates” 31. “Fear”
14. “Desire” 32. “Laughter”
15. “Pleasure” 33. “Mystery”
16. “Love” 34. “Knowledge”
17.  “Love for One’s Neighbor” 35. “Mind”
18.  “Faith and Hope” 36. “Creativity”
19. “Wonder” 37. “Culture”
20.  “Looking For Justice” 38. ”Art”
21. “Society” 39.  “The Woman”
22. “Power” 40. “Tradition”
23.  “Ideal State”

Philosophical Games for Children and Adults is a new method of exploring

Philosophy for Children. In the first part of the book, the theoretical grounds
of the method are presented. Its major feature is that it is not a school program,
and could be used as extra-class activities – at school, clubs, places of rest, fam-
ily gatherings, etc. The method is based on playing. The game has two main
aspects: ontological (that of the existence, where the game is looked upon as a
phenomenon) and functional (technological, the game is treated as a method);
combined, these aspects make it possible to arrange the lesson in such a way, that
the emotional and intellectual potential of a person, his/her creativity are liber-
ated, regardless of the age. The game as a mechanism exists only because it is a
part of human nature: there is the need for the game and the ability to perform
it. Thus, game techniques appear especially effective in any educational process.
Childhood is the world of games. Therefore, the best way to involve the child in
the process of philosophizing is a game. Following the experience of the family club
“Socrates’ School” in Moscow, we came to the conclusion that including parents in
this process makes it more effective both in terms of education and upbringing. Every
child is a spontaneous philosopher; thus, the need for philosophizing is a feature of his
age; but for an adult it is a vital necessity. The game is designed in such a way that it
requires both: a child’s curiosity and an adult’s reason, which allows all the potential
players to express themselves, mark, restate or even form the attitude toward life.
The game was primarily intended for family experiences, with an active partici-
pation of adults, which contributes not only to the overall development of the
child, but also to the general establishment of child-parent relations. The offered
program objectively contributes to the following:

• formation of the main values, including cognitive, moral, aesthetic, and

many other;
• introducing the culture of dialogue and discussion;
194  Larisa Retyunskikh
• forming respect for other opinions;
• forming mechanisms for independent decision-making.

The set of exercises is based on the problem-solving principle and includes all
the major trends of philosophical studies (ontology, epistemology, anthropology,
ethics, aesthetics, etc.).
The key principles of the proposed method are:

A) Principle of dialogic
B) Reliance on primary sources
C) Principle of creative problem-solving.

The principle of dialogic is based on maieutics (method of Socrates) and is meant

to activate cognitive processes, stimulate their development with the help of spe-
cially arranged conversation.
Reliance on primary sources of information makes possible an easy introduction
to salient philosophical studies, as the participants are presented not with some
adapted material, but with excerpts from original philosophical texts of all times.
The principle of creative problem-solving is realized through the process of task
development, which requires not the demonstration of one’s erudition, but
rather independent analysis, one’s own understanding of a problem. It includes
the principle of improvised creativity, which assumes the construction of tasks
in such a way that they would stimulate the tendency toward improvised self-
expression, which in its turn increases the emotional feeling of the very event of
the “game.” This section contains also set of examples of children’s statements,
the texts created by children and adults together, and the results of psychological
researches.
In the second part of the book, the technique of the organization of the game
is described. The game has specific rules, which can change depending on the
audience. Everyone present could become a participant; then all the participants
have to break into four teams, though the total number of people in one team
should not exceed five–seven members.
The participants of the game could also be selected. It is common practice in
the club to have players split into pairs (an adult and a child) after a competitive
selection from the audience (usually 60 to 80 people) takes place. Four pairs of
participants are selected; in the next 10 minutes they have to cope with the task
that is given to them. In the meantime, the leader has a discussion or carries out
mini-games with the audience, after which he attentively listens to answers of
the players.
The role of the jury in the game is played by the Council of the Wisest, which
estimates and analyzes performances (statements) of participants, awarding them
with “money.” The “money” may be spent in a special shop, which opens after
the performance is over. Use of the “money” is the most democratic way of
rewarding of winners. The “money” in the game is called “Flysiki.”
 Philosophical games 195
The third part of the book contains 40 [sample] scripts of games devoted to
different themes. Usually, every game has three or four parts with its own logic
and special tasks. All of them are quite different. Here’s an excerpt from the script
“Consciences,” which gives you an idea of the rest of the games:

Questions: What is conscience? How does it sound? Does conscience have

relatives? Who are they? What are the relations between conscience and
duty? Conscience and justice: are they the same?
Contest: “Visiting I. Kant.”

Task –

1) to perform a mute scene from a known literary work (selected by partici-

pants), which illustrates the given idea in such a way, that others could
understand the represented work;
2) to explain why that particular piece was selected and how it illustrates
Kant’s idea.

Preparation time: 10 minutes

Text: “The consciousness of an internal court of a person (before which “his
thoughts accuse or excuse one another”) is CONSCIENCE.
“Everybody has conscience, and finds himself observed by an inner judge
which threatens and keeps him in awe . . . It follows him like a shadow, when he
thinks of escape.” I. Kant (1964).
You can try to do it yourself or with your child together. It helps you to under-
stand the essence of this method of philosophy with children.

How can the games lead to moral and intellectual skills?

I am sure that thinking and moral consciousness are related. If you remember,
Socrates said that a person needs to know what goodness means to be kind. The
games help us to think about goodness, justice, happiness etc. When we think
about it and discuss it with other people, we become more kind, more just. For
example, some weeks ago the children in our club decided that an unkind man
couldn’t be happy.

Would you please explain the status of thinking skills in your

method? How will thinking skills be learned through playing
games with family members?
Thinking skills are the aim of the games, because the quality of thinking improves
objectively, but thinking is also a way of moral development.
196  Larisa Retyunskikh

Your program, as you say, presents itself as a form of leisure,

specif­ically, family leisure. But concerning family leisure, appar­
ently there is no guarantee of it, given the cultural achievements
of the modern world. What is your view about this?
I don’t understand this question; what achievements do you mean – computer,
technology or anything else? I think that philosophizing is always modern,
because it deals with eternal problems: life and death, time and moving, love and
beauty etc.

It seems the achievements of the modern world, with its media,

no longer permit us to have any leisure, even family leisure. TV,
Internet and other media capture all of the children’s time. And
parents always are after money and more leisure for themselves.
There is not even time for cooking, so we cannot find leisure
in human life, especially in developing countries. Now you say
that the most important condition for participation in these
games is the presence of family members (parents and children
alike). How can we overcome the problem? Is there a paradox
in this area?
You are right. But family values are the basic values of our life. We must under-
stand these values and give it all the times we have. Our rules for playing with
family members are one of the ways of doing that. Leisure is the time for us; we
can choose how to spend it. To play together and discuss the problems of human
life may be interesting for both children and adults. It is a kind of reflection and
that is why the families choose that. If it will be more interesting than TV or any-
thing else; it becomes a form of leisure. In my experience, families prefer partici-
pating in our meetings, which is another form of leisure, because it is interesting
for them. They can know and understand each other better; it is very important
for them.

How do you evaluate P4C’s development and achievements (or

related programs, including yours) in Ukraine and Russia?
Philosophy for Children started in Russia in the beginning of the 1990s. In
1991, a program for elementary school was initiated by Lipman in Yekaterin-
burg, the leader was Professor Margarita Dudina from Ural University. Lipman
visited Moscow, in 1992 where Yulina and Mr. A. Margolis, who graduated from
Montclair State University (USA), organized a seminar for teacher trainers (45
trainings). Around the same time, the Russian program for elementary school
based on the American program was created. This concept differs from the widely
known program “Philosophy for the Children” by Lipman, but complements it.
In 1994–95, S. Borisov started the program “Philosophic Talks” in Chelyabinsk,
and N. Kiyashenko offered the course “Aesthetic of life” in Moscow. There are
 Philosophical games 197
more than 10 original P4C programs existing in Russia now. There is a new
­generation of teachers already. P4C has developed into many various programs
and courses. The aim of the Interregional Children’s Fund (2013) is “Philosophy
For Children” communication to all who are interested in it.

What components of your theory are different from Lipman’s

method?
You know the key principles of the proposed method are:

a) Principle of dialogic
b) Reliance on primary sources
c) Principle of creative problem-solving.

The first one is the same in mine and Lipman’s program. The second is differ-
ent. The American program is based on text, which includes the philosophical
ideas of Socrates or Descartes, but their names are not disclosed. I am sure that
it is very important to talk about philosophical problems using original texts and
the names of the philosophers concerned, because all of us live in a culture, and
philosophy is part of the culture. Philosophizing is a way of socialization, which
means, for me, to make the person a cultured being.

We are familiar with Socrates’s maieutic method, but combining

games with the Socratic method seems to be so interesting.
Would you please discuss your ideas in this regard?
As you might already know, Socrates’s maieutic method is based on questions and
answers. Our technique uses a similar question-answer principle in role-­playing
environment.

Could you tell our readers about the principle of creative problem-
solving, please?
Apart from Socrates’s discussions, my program uses special tasks based on the
principle of games. The main idea of these tasks is not necessary to show one’s
knowledge, but to show one’s creativity. For example, we may ask participants
to draw a picture, compose a poem, write a folk story, make a performance, etc.

You have mentioned that the program of philosophical games for

children and adults has been around for more than 10 years.
How do you evaluate the interest of children and especially
adults in the program?
The Philosophical Games for Children and Adults have been designed for children
aged 8–13 and their parents. On average, each family participates in our program
198  Larisa Retyunskikh
for a period of 5–6 years. During the past 13 years, our club has changed several
membership groups. Besides, each program features a different topic, which is
never redundant; therefore, we were able to sustain our members’ interest in the
games.
My methodology, including 44 scenarios of games, has been described in detail
in my book (2003) titled “Socrates’ School,” I am ready to discuss the possibility
of translating and publishing my book in your language.

References
Holy Bible. (1988). Moscow: Publishing house of the Moscow Patriarchate.
Kant, I. (1964). Collected works in 6 volumes (Vol. 3). Moscow: Think.
Retyunskikh, L. (2003). Socrates’ school: Philosophical games for children and adults.
Moscow: Publishing house of Moscow Psychologikal and Pedagogical Institute.
Retyunskikh, L. (2008). Looking for wisdom. Moscow: Interregional Fund Philosophy
for Children.
Solovyev, V. (1988). Collected Works in 2 volumes (p. 1). Moscow: Think.
23 Philosophy of childhood
from a Latin American
perspective
Walter Kohan

How widespread is P4C in Brazil and the rest of South America?

There are quite a good number of programs. It all started in the late 1980s and
it is alive and different experiences are developed all along this big land. In places
like Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina or Chile, for example, lots of different
projects are happening.

What adaptations of the Lipman/Sharp materials and methods

have been made?
A lot. Lipman and Sharp were here more influential in terms of their general
approach than in terms of their curriculum, as founders of a movement more
than as creators of a specific curriculum. Due to the different reality and context,
the novels and manuals are not very appropriate to practice with our children
and teachers. In many cases, new materials have been created. In our case, at the
Center of Philosophies and Infancies (NEFI) at the State University of Rio de
Janeiro (UERJ) we prefer not to work with any fixed program so as to give more
space to the teacher’s position and invention.
We are very sensitive to thinkers like the Venezuelan Simón Rodríguez, the teacher
of Simón Bolivar, who called him the “Socrates of Caracas” (Rodríguez, 2001,
p. 122). Rodríguez is the creator of a philosophical popular school in the 19th cen-
tury. In this institution, all traditionally excluded black, indigenous and other mar-
ginalized children were admitted and treated as equals. Rodríguez is famous for his
dictum: “we invent or we err” (Rodríguez, 2001, p. 185). This means that inven-
tion is, educationally and politically, a criterion for truth. Politically, the emergent
new Latin American Independent States need to invent their own political path,
and Rodríguez maintains that no notion of “republic” will emerge if old notions of
“republic” are just copied. Educationally, Rodríguez affirms that a teacher should
invent the “why,” the “for what,” the “how,” and the “what” of her practice of
teaching (Kohan, 2015b). Above and beyond anything else, she must invent herself
as a teacher, a position for herself as a teacher in her material situation with her
concrete students and context. Rodríguez demands that a teacher be an artisan and
artist of her work: a self-inventor, an inventor of herself.
200  Walter Kohan
This is very inspiring to us and, in order to teach philosophy or whatever,
i.e., to engage with other in educational experiences, we prefer not to follow a
method. This is why we do not apply methods or programs like Lipman’s, and
this is also why we think that to be a teacher means, first and foremost, to be an
inventive thinker.

What new materials, or approaches, have been tried?

In NEFI, for more than 10 years, both theoretically and practically, and mainly in
public school settings, we have been working on the decolonization of our own
thinking, especially thinking concerning the relationships between infancy and
philosophy (Kohan, 2014). This infinite task, which seems to be always begin-
ning, problematizes the concepts of philosophy, infancy, and school, thus reveal-
ing the other worlds that are also worlds in the world we inhabit, mainly the
other educational worlds that inhabit the world of school. From this perspective,
we foster teachers and children, young and adolescents to practice philosophical
experiences together, based on ideas like cooperation, questioning, ignorance,
improvisation and invention.

What theoretical or practical insights have occurred in South

America that would be of use to others around the P4C world?
There are so many different projects, styles and perspectives. I think that any
interesting approach could work in any other context where there is need for phi-
losophy, for questioning, for dialogue. In South America, we are very sensitive to
the colonizing processes, so we are also very interested in decolonizing practices.
For me, doing philosophy with children is mainly a decolonizing project. And
also a place not only for an intellectual or rationalist enterprise but for a project of
feeling and thinking together, integrating our bodies and our lives, a space open
to transformation, to other worlds . . . in the concrete practice in schools and also
in non-institutional contexts. But, of course, our land is a very diverse land and
many other approaches are out there.

In the essay “Childhood and Education in Plato,” you mentioned

that “[childhood] would not have been thought as such by
the ancients,” could you please explain its transmission in the
history of education. What is the difference between the new
concept of childhood and the old one?
In that essay, I present the idea that in Ancient Greek there is no word for the
abstract noun derived from the thematic roots that means “childhood.” In Greek,
the logic of the language would indicate something like paidia, but this term is
encountered only in rare cases and it has another connotation also related to
nurturing (culture, education). In Latin there exists infantia, but it is rather late
and literally designates the absence of speech. How can this absence be explained?
 A Latin American perspective 201
Perhaps the absence of the word can suggest a perception of human life, at least
in the dominant literature that we are familiar with, as a non-dissociable totality,
or maybe, a unity that privileges the common, and total, over its fragments or
differentiated parts.
In any case, to many Greek philosophers a concept of childhood could be
reconstructed, in spite of the absence of the abstract noun. For Plato, in the
Republic, childhood is a privileged object of his pedagogical utopia (Plato, 1989).
In Book II of that treatise, Socrates suggests that the education of the guard-
ians of the pólis is essential in order to guarantee a just community, and that the
genesis or cause (aitía) of justice or injustice lies in education or its absence (II,
376d). When discussing which stories should replace the traditional Homeric
and Hesiodic ones, Socrates affirms (II, 376e-377b) that the first years of life are
the most important, because all that comes later will depend on those first steps.
This is what makes childhood extraordinarily important for Plato, because of the
indelible marks that are received in those first moments of the human life cycle
(II 378e). For this reason, special attention will be given to those first stages by
the designers of the Republic, not so much for what children are but for what
they will become. So that, for Plato, childhood is the object of a utopian educa-
tion. In a contemporary context, there is still much of this concept of childhood
in many pedagogical and philosophical discourses but also some other concepts
as the ones presented above.

As a philosopher who is working on the “philosophy of childhood,”

please explain for our readers what issues are included in this
branch of knowledge
Traditionally understood, philosophy of childhood is the branch of philosophy
that takes “childhood” as a privileged object of philosophical thinking. Usu-
ally, childhood has been understood in chronological terms as the first stage in
human life, but many contemporary philosophers have offered us new elements
and vocabularies with which to think about non-chronological concepts of child-
hood. The French Gilles Deleuze (1980), for example, proposes an impersonal
notion, a non-subjective form to which he gives names like “becoming-child”
or “block of childhood.” “Becoming-child” is not a matter of age but of flux,
intensity. It is a revolutionary space of transformation. It is not that a given sub-
ject becomes a child, transforms herself into a child or lives a childlike life; rather,
she occupies a space of transformation. In effect, “becoming-child” has the form
of escape lines – “lines of flight” that cannot be incorporated or coopted by the
system: disrupted movements, changes of rhythm, segments that interrupt the
logic of the state of affairs and intersect and divide it, with different roots and tar-
gets. According to another French philosopher, Jean-François Lyotard (1991),
childhood represents the difference between what can and what cannot be said –
infantia (literally “absence of speech”) is for him the unsayable, or, as he puts it,
“what is not said.” This childhood has nothing to do with a stage of life either,
nor with something that is formed, corrected or overcome over the course of a
202  Walter Kohan
life. Rather it inhabits, imperceptibly, the sayable as its condition, its shadow, or
remainder. Lyotard (1988) also develops a concept of philosophy as the child-
hood of thinking. These are just a couple of examples of a very productive field.
Inspired in these and other philosophical approaches to childhood, I have been
developing a work to try to decolonize our thinking concerning the relationships
between philosophy, childhood and education. It is not only or not mainly taking
childhood as a philosophical object of reflection but finding a childhood of our
own thinking, new beginnings for it . . . as we do in philosophy.

According to your definition of philosophy, do the children have

the ability to do philosophy or to philosophize?
The question “what is philosophy?” is a controversial one, not easy to define. The
issue is complex enough to resist resolution in a few lines, but a few observations
may at least point to the path you are questioning. One may, for example, distin-
guish between two dimensions of philosophy, the process and the product – or, it
might be said, the verb and the noun. The product is constituted in the powerful
discursive constructs of iconic texts, well-established institutions, and preferred
methods, built up at least since the Pre-Socratics into what is called the Western
philosophical tradition. As a verb, philosophy is the movement through which
thinking enters a path along which there is no opportunity to return to the point
of departure. It entails a kind of radical affectivity, in that our truths and fixed
points are disturbed, problematized, questioned.
Is philosophy a noun or a verb? Should it be considered a cognitive activity
or more broadly a way of life? Even though Matthew Lipman also identified
philosophy as a form of inquiry and thinking, in one of the first books in which
he presented his tentative, he makes it explicit the Socratic inspiration of Phi-
losophy for Children, for which philosophy is something that is practiced and
not learned or applied, as demonstrated in Socratic conversations with children
(Lipman, 1988, pp. 3–12). In identifying philosophy as a form of life and not
a path to true knowledge, Lipman is much closer to Socrates than to Plato. He
argues that Socrates’s stress on philosophical inquiry as “following the argument
where it leads” should not be confused with the mere technique of dialectical
argumentation – the technique that Plato urges be excluded from the education
of the young in Republic VII. He concludes that to deny children entrance to
the realm of philosophy based on Plato´s critique is a mistake, in that what Plato
denies to children is not philosophy itself but its reduction to eristic argumenta-
tion (Lipman, 1988, p. 15).
At least this second dimension of philosophy seems to be very close to a child-
ish experience of life. Not only children but any human being seems to be capable
of doing philosophy as the exercise of putting his/her own thinking into ques-
tion. To sum it up, yes, children are at least as capable as adults of philosophizing,
and through philosophizing children can open themselves to a new relationship
to childhood and to adulthood and adults can open themselves to a new relation-
ship to childhood and adulthood.
 A Latin American perspective 203

What conclusions can we draw about children’s abilities from the

fact that children can philosophize? How reliable are Piaget’s
theories in this area at present?
Piaget’s theory, as any other theory that takes childhood as an object, relies on
its own assumptions about what it means to think and what a child is and a
human being and how to approach it. Piaget’s concept of thinking might be
considered under G. Deleuze’s critique of the idea of representation and what
he calls the “dogmatic image of thinking” (Deleuze, 1994). We do not need to
accept Piaget’s image of thinking or his image of the child in order to unfold
all the potentialities of children’s philosophical thinking. Definitely, I am not a
Piagetian. I do not feel well with any hierarchical or moralistic order in the realm
of thinking. On the contrary, if we move from an image of thinking as represen-
tation or recognition to an image of thinking as an encounter with the external
signs that call it to our attention, then children are as capable of thinking and
philosophizing as adults. Moreover, in order to include children in the realm of
thinking, a deconstructive movement of the Piagetian image of thinking is first
needed, in order to override this kind of naturalized developmental image and
to, as much as possible, render us sensitive to what is “outside” us. Thinking is
not opposed to sensitivity; quite the contrary, it is nurtured by it; it originates in
it. Even more, thinking is a passion – immanent, spontaneous, self-caused, and
not the result of some external will. Children usually show us this very clearly in
their thinking together. To sum up, I would prefer a Ranciere (1991) assumption
to do philosophy with children: the assumption that any human being, no matter
her age, race, gender or social class, is equally capable of thinking. This is clearly
an anti-Piagetian assumption.

Is there a final definition of childhood at present? Can we find

something like this?
There is no exact definition of any philosophical concept. Childhood is a philo-
sophical concept and as such is contestable, controversial. There are as many
concepts of childhood as philosophies of childhood, and it is very difficult and
inconvenient to try to get an exact definition. I would rather say that there are
some definitions more powerful or interesting than others.
Education has been dominantly considered and practiced only under the logic
of the formation of childhood, but it might be thought otherwise. This complex
issue calls for a redefinition not only of philosophy and education, but of child-
hood itself. The Platonic paradigm of the education of childhood that I have just
described is constructed in keeping with a conception of childhood as a stage of
human life. But the history of pedagogical ideas reveals different images of the
child, some more interesting, some less. Any definition of childhood presupposes
a definition of time. In other words, the question “what is childhood?” presup-
poses the question “what is time?” Plato, as well as Piaget, presupposes a chrono-
logical understanding of time to consider what is childhood. But we can move
204  Walter Kohan
from chronos to aion, kairos or other notions of time and other notions of child-
hood would emerge. Childhood could be not only something to be educated but
something that educates; we could move from the education of a childhood to a
childhood of education. I have presented this project with some detail in Educa-
tion, Childhood & Philosophy (Kohan, 2015a).

Since we are not informed of children’s mentality directly and

often children are unable to explain it, how can we be sure
about the new theories in this area?
We can never be sure. Childhood has been a privileged object of knowledge in
Modern times. But childhood goes beyond our pretention of knowledge. For-
tunately, we´ll never exactly know, and the mystery of childhood will overcome
any tentative explanation of it. It would even be interesting if we suspend this
pretention of knowing childhood and introduce another relationship to child-
hood: if we pay attention to childhood, nurture childhood, care childhood, listen
to childhood. Certainly, we can never be sure, and the mystery of childhood will
overcome some pretensions to dominate and control it. Childhood is not the
absence of voice but the presence of another voice and, fortunately, we’ll never
be sure about childhood as we can never be sure about the other.

References
Deleuze, G. (1994). Difference and repetition. New York: Columbia University Press.
Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1980). Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme et Schizophrénie.
Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit.
Kohan, W. (2014). Philosophy and childhood: Critical perspectives and affirmative prac-
tices. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kohan, W. (2015a). Childhood, education and philosophy. New ideas for an old rela-
tionship. New York: Routledge.
Kohan, W. (2015b). The inventive schoolmaster: Simón Rodríguez (V. Jones &
J. T. Wozniak, Trans.). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
Lipman, M. (1988). Philosophy goes to school. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Lyotard, J.-F. (1988). Le Postmoderne expliqué aux enfants. Paris: Gallimard.
Lyotard, J.-F. (1991). Lectures d’ enfance. Paris: Galilée.
Plato. (1989). The dialogues of Plato (B. Jowett, Trans.). New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Rancière, J. (1991). The ignorant schoolmaster (K. Ross, Trans.). Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Rodríguez, S. (2001). Cartas. [Letters] Caracas: Ediciones del Rectorado de la
UNISER.
Part V

Conclusion
24 Philosophy for children
Where are we now?
Maughn Gregory

We know that, after several decades, P4C has been introduced

in most parts of the world. As you are informed of the major
activities in P4C, please tell us how you describe its development
Matthew Lipman (1985) wrote his first philosophical novel for children, Harry
Stottlemeier’s Discovery, in 1969. The fascinating story of how he conceived the
idea of bringing philosophy and children into mutual encounter, how he gave
up a professorship at Columbia University to cross the Hudson River and pursue
this idea at Montclair State College (now University), and how he established
the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC) there with
Ann Margaret Sharp, is recounted in his autobiography, A Life Teaching Think-
ing (2008). Today the IAPC has affiliate centers and/or fellows in about 50
countries, Harry and the other philosophical children’s novels Lipman and Sharp
authored have been translated into scores of languages and dialects and Philoso-
phy for Children, or “P4C,” has become a world-wide movement encompassing
diverse approaches, some of which did not originate from the IAPC.
I would characterize this movement as a network of philosophers, scholars in
education, graduate students, schoolteachers and administrators, education pol-
icy makers, publishers, parents, children and teenagers working to establish and
improve the practice of intergenerational philosophical inquiry. These constitu-
ents engage in many kinds of collaboration, including newsletters, workshops,
conferences, grant writing, research, and meetings for philosophical inquiry. By
many measures, this movement has been extraordinarily successful. The Interna-
tional Council of Philosophical Inquiry with Children (ICPIC), inaugurated in
Elsinore, Denmark, in 1985, has grown from having member organizations in
just over 20 countries to over 60 countries today. The body of empirical research
into the nature and the benefits of children’s philosophical practice has become
increasingly wide-ranging, rigorous and methodologically diverse. Philosophy
of childhood has become an established, inter-disciplinary field. Scholarship
in P4C is regularly published in top-ranked journals and by university presses
in philosophy, education and other academic disciplines. Curriculum materials
(pre-school through college) for children, teachers and parents have prolifer-
ated, in scores of languages. University courses and graduate degree programs in
208  Maughn Gregory
P4C are run in many places around the world. Local, regional and international
conferences are held annually and bi-annually all over the world. National and
regional-­international federations of P4C centers have standardized multiple lev-
els of professional development in P4C. And over the years, P4C has received
increasing levels of recognition and financial support from national and interna-
tional philosophical and educational professional associations, from governmen-
tal authorities and from non-governmental agencies.
Of course, children and adults have always pursued philosophical questions
together, and the practice of philosophical dialogue between adults and youth is
at least as old as Socrates. Philosophy has been a high school subject in numerous
countries for centuries. But it is only since the 1970s that philosophy programs
have been established in pre-secondary schools and other settings for children
and young adults around the world. Many who work in this field aspire to make
philosophy a standard school subject for all age groups (see Cam 2006; Splitter
and Sharp 1995).

What have been the major obstacles to the work and to the
dissemination of P4C?
In spite of the institutional and professional success of P4C and the growing
empirical evidence of its benefits, the idea of children conducting their own phil-
osophical inquiries still strikes many as odd and in need of special justification.
I know of only a small number of schools in which P4C is conducted in all class-
rooms, at every grade level; and of school systems in which philosophy is a stand-
ard subject in pre-secondary schools. One of the most common questions I’m
asked about Philosophy for Children is, Why isn’t it more prevalent in schools?
As I see it there are three broad answers: cultural, professional and educational.
First, philosophy is not a significant aspect of cultural heritage in every part of
the world. This is true in the U.S. (in spite of there being notable philosophers
in every era of U.S. history), owing to factors such as the practical/economic
mindset of U.S. settlers and immigrants, the religious orientation of early U.S.
universities, and the populist, at times anti-intellectual bent of some U.S. political
leaders. As Martha Nussbaum recently observed, “There’s just something about
our [U.S.] public culture that’s not that friendly to philosophy. I think religion is
thought to be where you go with your big questions” (Solomon, 2009). Second,
professional philosophers in the U.S. and elsewhere have kept and talked mostly
to themselves, avoiding the role of public intellectual and considering philosophi-
cal discourse to be too difficult for non-philosophers, especially children. Third,
education in many parts of the world tends to focus more on preparation for
employment and values reinforcement than on capacities for reflection and well-
being, and, at least in the U.S., has lately become narrowly focused on short- and
long-term test preparation.
However, recent developments in each of these areas, in the U.S. and else-
where, signify a growing appreciation of Philosophy for Children and of pre-
college philosophy more generally. Culturally, there has been a growing interest
 Where are we now? 209
outside the academy in programs of practical and applied philosophy ­including
philosophical counseling (See Ellis, 1999; Marinoff, 1999; Raabe, 2001; Cohen,
2003), the philosophy café (See Phillips, 2001, 2007),1 Socratic dialogue
retreats, philosophy in schools, and numerous trade books (See Baggini, 2005;
De ­Botton, 2000; Eagleton, 2007; Vernon, 2008, Gopnik, 2010), philosophy
radio programs and podcasts,2 web logs,3 and public symposia that engage non-
philosophers in philosophical reflection and inquiry. Professional philosophy
has been increasingly responsive to this trend. In 2009, a new organization was
founded in the U.S. to coordinate and support pre-college philosophy programs:
PLATO: Philosophy Learning and Teaching Organization. Recently the Ameri-
can Philosophical Association (APA) amended its bylaws to create a new category
of K-12 Teacher membership for “persons employed or seeking employment as
teachers in primary or secondary schools, who teach or are preparing to teach
philosophy in a primary or secondary school.”4 The APA Committees on Pre-
College Instruction in Philosophy and on Teaching Philosophy recently pro-
duced “The Philosophy Toolbox (http://philosophy-toolbox.org), an online
resource for pre-college philosophy featuring several IAPC resources. This year,
Routledge will publish an International Handbook on Philosophy for Children in
its prestigious handbook series.
In the last decade, there has also been a dramatic increase in both interest
in, and support for P4C by educational theorists and researchers. A 2008 study
funded by the U.S. Department of Education conducted between the Universi-
ties of Ohio and Pennsylvania on nine programs for classroom dialogue evalu-
ated P4C as a highly effective method of engaging students in critical-analytic
dialogue (Soter, Wilkinson et al. 2008). Yale psychology professor and former
American Psychological Association president Robert J. Sternberg has cited Lip-
man’s Philosophy for Children as one of three educational programs that “seem
particularly related to the goals of . . . teaching for wisdom” (Sternberg, 2003, p.
163). Harvard psychologist and originator of multiple intelligence theory How-
ard Gardner has identified seven approaches or “entry points” to teaching school
subjects that map onto multiple intelligences, one being the “foundational (or
existential) entry point [which] examines the philosophical and terminological
facets” of a subject and provides the opportunity for students “to pose funda-
mental questions of the ‘why’ sort associated with young children and philoso-
phers.” Not surprisingly, Gardner recommends Philosophy for Children for this
approach (Gardner, 2006).
More recently, the pedagogical knowledge about facilitating classroom dia-
logue developed by P4C practitioners and scholars was used as a basis for a pro-
ject on professional development in Dialogic Teaching. This project is conducted
by Montclair State University in partnership with the Ohio State University, and
it is funded by the Institute of Educational Sciences, U.S. Department of Educa-
tion. The goal of the project is to help elementary school teachers engage in dia-
logic teaching to support the development of students’ argument skills. During
the project, colleagues from both universities worked collaboratively with upper
elementary school teachers to design curriculum materials and activities that
210  Maughn Gregory
support teacher learning. A total of 49 teachers and 935 students from public
schools in Ohio and New Jersey participated in this research. (See Reznitskaya &
Wilkinson, 2015 and Wilkinson et al., in press).

How do you evaluate the fact that we can find diverse and
divergent approaches to P4C throughout the world?
Today there are numerous approaches to engaging children in philosophical
inquiry, many of which are not derived from the work of the IAPC. The IAPC
welcomes this diversity and encourages cooperation among colleagues practicing
different approaches. However, this diversity presents several challenges to the
P4C movement, perhaps the most important of which is the difficulty of compar-
ing the relative merits of different approaches. In fact, the diversity of curriculum
materials, pedagogical protocols, and grounding theories the P4C movement has
spawned signifies not merely different approaches to, but different conceptions
of what it means to teach philosophy to children or to engage with children in
philosophical practices. There has been confusion and unfairness in comparing
and criticizing programs with widely different objectives, such as improving chil-
dren’s thinking skills, social skills, and ethical judgment.
I recently delivered a paper in which I used Shaun Gallagher’s (1992) four cat-
egories of hermeneutics – conservative, critical, radical and moderate – to analyze
approaches to P4C I believe are in real tension with each other. Conservative her-
meneutics sees interpretation as a method for discovering unbiased truth or origi-
nal meaning. Gallagher identifies teaching for critical thinking as a conservative
hermeneutical agenda and there are those in P4C who value it primarily as a think-
ing skills program. Critical hermeneutics sees interpretation as the work of liberat-
ing the reader from ideological biases such as white supremacy and patriarchy, and
there are those who see P4C as a means of waking students up to the power of
such ideological forces in their lives. Radical Hermeneutics sees interpretation as
expanding the plurality of meanings and resisting attempts to reach objectivity or
consensus, and there are those in P4C who practice it as a pedagogy of disruption.
These theoretical differences are being discussed in the philosophical and
research literature around P4C, but there is another phenomenon relevant to the
diversity of programs that is not being discussed, and that is the new phenom-
enon of “branding,” in which individuals and organizations advertise new and
supposedly unique approaches to P4C, in the marketplace of academic confer-
ences, contracts with schools, professional development programs, and curricu-
lum sales. For the most part, these new programs are uninformed by the past four
decades of theoretical and empirical research on P4C. That work now amounts
to thousands of academic books, articles, and doctoral dissertations, from scores
of countries. I have great respect for approaches to P4C that are widely different
from the Lipman/Sharp approach, if they are grounded in philosophical and/
or educational theory and by empirical research. But I find it both professionally
and ethically irresponsible when newcomers pretend to be unaware of this field
of scholarship, or are simply unwilling to participate in it.5
 Where are we now? 211

Given such divergent approaches to P4C, what will become, or

should become, of Lipman and Sharp’s original version?
First we must clarify what distinguishes Lipman and Sharp’s version of P4C from
other approaches to pre-college philosophy, and then we must ask whether and
how that approach is worth continuing. There are three aspects of Lipman and
Sharp’s approach that remain distinctive: its aims, its method and its materials.

Aims
The central aim of Lipman and Sharp’s program is that children of all ages learn to
make good “ethical, social, political, and aesthetic judgments . . . applied directly
to life situations” (Lipman, 2003, p. 279). Philosophy for Children builds on
John Dewey’s insight that “ethical,” “aesthetic,” “political,” and many other
philosophical categories describe meaningful dimensions of ordinary human
experience. (See Dewey, 1934, p. 17.) Young children’s experience is already
replete with philosophical meaning. They have strong, even visceral intuitions of
what is beautiful and ugly, fair and unfair, right and wrong. They enjoy playing
with language and are intrigued by logical puzzles. They are given to metaphysi-
cal speculation and frequently engage in epistemology: asking how we know what
we think we know. Indeed, many professional philosophers date their interest in
philosophy to their early childhoods. And as children approach adolescence, they
begin to confront existential questions such as, What does it all mean? Is life ever
fair? Does my life have a purpose? P4C aims to make children (and those of us
who work with them) more sensitive to these dimensions of our experience and
more skillful in our responses to them.
In order to achieve this central aim, P4C has developed two sets of auxiliary
aims: preparing children and adults in the procedures of philosophical inquiry, and
helping us become more sensitive to philosophical content. Of course, the content
of P4C is not the canonical philosophical problems, concepts, arguments, and key
figures that are the stuff of high school and college philosophy courses. Instead,
P4C draws our attention to concepts like fairness, person, mind, beauty, cause,
time, number, truth, citizen, good and right – concepts that are foundational to
the arts and sciences and are already implicated in children’s experience. Split-
ter and Sharp (1995, p. 130) characterize such concepts as central to human
experience (rather than trivial), common to most people’s experience (rather than
esoteric), yet contestable, or essentially problematic. An important objective of
Lipman and Sharp’s program is therefore to help children and adults become
conversant with philosophical concepts, and to discern them wherever they arise –
sometimes referred to as developing “a philosophical ear.”
The procedure that P4C teaches is collaborative inquiry that incorporates
careful thinking. The study and promotion of skillful thinking has been the
cornerstone of Lipman’s work, as exemplified in both editions of his most
important book, Thinking in Education (1991, 2003), and as indicated by the
subtitle of his autobiography – A Life Teaching Thinking (2008). The advent
212  Maughn Gregory
of Philosophy for Children coincided with the critical thinking movement in
education, but Lipman uses the phrase “multidimensional thinking” to refer
to his famous tripartite of critical, creative and caring thinking (see Lipman,
2003, chs. 11–13) – all of which children practice extensively in P4C. P4C
incorporates multidimensional thinking into a broader method of dialogi-
cal inquiry patterned on the pragmatist notion of the community of inquiry
(Fisher, 2008; Gregory, 2008; Kennedy, 2004). Dialogue is one of the most
ancient, the most effective and the most widespread methods of philosophi-
cal inquiry. In P4C dialogue is conducted as a conversation centered on a
particular question or problem, in which the participants share diverse views
about it, clarify each other’s thinking, offer multiple possible answers, and
test those answers by coming up with reasons for and against them. The goal
of dialogue is not complete consensus, but that each participant be able to
decide what is most reasonable, valuable or meaningful, whether that judg-
ment puts her in league with a majority of her peers, with a minority, or by
herself.
Dialogue also provides an opportunity for us to practice important commu-
nicative and social skills, such as attentive listening, mindful speech, helping
another person express his idea, building on the ideas of others, offering and
accepting criticism respectfully, sharing important but unpopular opinions, and
self-­correcting. Many philosophers and educators have noted the pedagogical
benefits of dialogue, which brings its own ethical and rational discipline. On
the one hand, a successful dialogue has energy and a sense of adventure – some-
thing even young children avidly enjoy; on the other hand, a successful dialogue
requires rigorous thinking, wide-ranging participation and the coordination of
the participants’ various communicative strengths and points of view. This, of
course, has implications not only for philosophical inquiry but for democratic
community and citizenship – as philosophers and educators have also noted.
For these reasons, helping children learn to participate in disciplined dialogue is
another important objective of Lipman and Sharp’s program.
In my estimation, these aims of P4C – helping children to become familiar with
philosophical concepts and issues relevant to their experience, to become fluid in
habits of skillful thinking, and to become accustomed to collaborative dialogue –
continue to be exemplary among precollege philosophy programs.

Method
The Community of Inquiry method developed by Lipman and Sharp for engag-
ing children in philosophical inquiry consists of five stages (Lipman, 2003,
pp. 101–103):

1. The offering of the text [Students read or enact a philosophical story

together.]
2. The construction of the agenda [Students raise questions for discussion and
organize them into an agenda.]
 Where are we now? 213
3. Solidifying the community [Students dialogue about the questions as a com-
munity of inquiry facilitated by an adult with philosophical training. Discus-
sion continues over subsequent philosophy sessions until the agenda for the
reading is finished, or until the students agree to move on to next reading.]
4. Using exercises and discussion plans [The philosophical facilitator introduces
relevant activities to deepen and expand the students’ inquiry.]
5. Encouraging further responses [These include, e.g., self-assessment of phi-
losophy practice, and the expression and further exploration of philosophical
judgments in art projects, creative writing, dramatic role play, etc.]

Though often embellished and varied in practice, this method has endured
mostly intact since the early 1970s – a kind of natural selection that demonstrates
its fitness for doing philosophy. One innovation that has been discussed in the
past several years, and that I have recommended (Gregory, 2007), is helping
children learn how to experiment with, and apply the philosophical judgments
they reach in dialogue, in action: in their personal lives and in the communities
they belong to, especially the classrooms in which they practice philosophy. The
extent to which acting on our judgments is part of the practice of philosophy, and
the extent to which children should be allowed or encouraged to do so remains
controversial. Another innovation I would recommend, perhaps in stage 4, is the
opportunity for individual, private philosophical reflection, e.g., in contempla-
tion, journaling or essay writing.

Materials
The philosophy curriculum materials written by Lipman and Sharp include novels
for students and manuals for teachers, for use in grades P-12. The novels model
children having their own philosophical dialogues, with and without adults, and
are designed to make philosophical concepts and issues easy to identify. The man-
uals contain conceptual explanations for teachers as well as thinking exercises,
discussion plans and other activities that can be used to supplement the students’
inquiry. The Lipman/Sharp curriculum was the first systematic pre-college phi-
losophy curriculum to ever be attempted, and they have been translated and
culturally adapted all over the world. Darryl DeMarzio (2011) has written about
the genre of philosophical fiction for children that Lipman inaugurated, and of
how Lipman’s novels were designed to perform an ascetic, rather than exposi-
tory function (drawing on Foucault’s distinction). A few years ago Darryl led
a symposium for the IAPC at the American Philosophical Association, on the
theoretical and pedagogical significance of the philosophical novel in Philosophy
for Children, and then edited the papers for a special edition of Childhood &
Philosophy (2015). David Kennedy has written the most recent novel in this ­tradition
(2012a).
Today, there are many kinds of materials being published for pre-college phi-
losophy programs. However, it seems that many of these have been developed
by simply taking standardized scholastic workbooks and adding philosophical
214  Maughn Gregory
content, rather than by considering what unique objectives a philosophy for
children program ought to have, what methods of instruction would be most
conducive to those objectives, and what materials would support such methods,
as Lipman and Sharp spent several years doing (Lipman, 2008). Although the
Lipman/Sharp curriculum is continually in need of being up-dated, several of
its features are uniquely beneficial for teachers and students new to philosophy:
it makes philosophical themes easy to recognize; it portrays children engaged in
complex philosophical dialogue; it includes reasoning exercises and conceptual
exploration activities; it attempts to reconstruct important historical philosophi-
cal positions and arguments at the level of young children’s discourse so that
children can be acquainted with these, both as resources for their own inquiries,
and as a means of learning about their cultural heritage.
Many people who follow some version of the Lipman/Sharp approach to P4C
use picturebooks and children’s literature as philosophical texts – an approach
pioneered by Gareth Matthews (1976). Though this was something Lipman and
Sharp initially resisted, they both came to see its value, and in fact Lipman invited
Matthews to write a column “Thinking in Stories” for the IAPC journal Think-
ing, in which Matthews discussed the philosophical content of picturebooks and
children’s literature. Matthews was a contributing editor for Thinking and his
column ran from the journal’s first issue in 1979 through 2006, with a total of
58 pieces. In the last several years, Joanna Haynes and Karin Murris have done
some important work theorizing about the use of picturebooks and children’s
literature in P4C (see Haynes & Murris, 2012). Darren Chetty (2013) has con-
tributed to this area by analyzing how racism and white privilege can find their
way into children’s books and into the community of philosophical inquiry.

Since philosophical short stories are being authored in many

countries, can these be useful too, in your view?
Most definitely yes. In fact, when we ran the IAPC Advanced Summer Seminar
in Philosophy for Children each May, we studied the art of writing philosophical
stories, and each participant wrote a story with some accompanying philosophical
exercises. Most participants found that this was not as easy as it might have seemed
at first. If a philosophical story is meant to be used in the Lipman/Sharp tradition,
to prompt readers into their own, original philosophical inquiries, it is important
that the story not only present one or more philosophical themes, but present them
as contestable – as something that provokes questioning and doubt. The story
should also represent a variety of perspectives on the theme, or at least indicate that
a variety exists. It should also model dialogue, however brief, that is both thought-
ful and open-ended, i.e., that does not steer the reader toward a particular perspec-
tive. Finally, it should incorporate important ideas from the history of philosophy
relevant to the theme. The philosophical exercises that accompany the story should
help the children explore the contestable concepts found in the story, and practice
relevant inquiry strategies (see Lipman, 1996). Teachers and students with greater
sensitivity to philosophical themes, and with some skill at reasoning and dialogue
 Where are we now? 215
may use all manner of materials to stimulate a philosophical inquiry, e.g., film clips,
stories the children bring to the classroom, current events, and children’s literature.
However, such materials should be selected carefully, for the same criteria.

In your opinion, how can the traditional, non-reflective educa­

tional paradigm current in most schools be changed to the
reflective paradigm presented by Lipman and others?
Most of the teachers and school administrators I have worked with have been
dedicated, idealistic, innovative, curious, and tireless. However, I agree with your
assessment of the current paradigm. I believe the non-reflective educational para-
digm is a result of two, broad cultural phenomena that have to be confronted if
that paradigm is going to change. The first is that education in many parts of the
world has tended to focus almost exclusively on student’s economic viability or
job readiness. As educational theorist Mike Rose remarked, “To be sure, a major
goal of education is to prepare the young to make a living. But parents send their
kids to school for many other reasons as well: intellectual, social, civic, ethical,
aesthetic. Historically, these justifications for schooling have held more impor-
tance. Not today” (2009, p. 4). Underlying this dismal status quo is a largely
unarticulated view that the primary purpose of education is to prepare students to
be successful at pursuing relatively unexamined desires in a free-market economy.
As educational psychologist Robert J. Sternberg has observed, this view is some-
times promoted deliberately by educational stakeholders:

Education is seen more as an access route . . . not so much toward the
enhancement of . . . learning and thinking as toward obtaining through edu-
cation the best possible credentials for individual socioeconomic advance-
ment. Education is seen not so much as a means of helping society but of
helping one obtain the best that society has to offer socially, economically,
and culturally.
(1999, p. 62)

The antidote to this phenomenon is to expand the purposes of education to

include students’ intellectual, aesthetic, civic and moral development and self-
awareness. I believe there are many resources for this effort in philosophy, par-
ticularly in some of the ancient, Asian and Western schools, which were focused
on wisdom as the study and practice of a worthwhile life. This has been a focus of
my work (Gregory, 2009a, 2009b; Gregory and Laverty, 2009).
The second cultural phenomenon is a narrow understanding of human intel-
ligence, caused both by the economic motive just described, and by the mech-
anisms developed in the last century for measuring human intelligence and
scholastic performance. As Rose observes, in the U.S., “We’ve reduced our def-
inition of human development and achievement – that miraculous growth of
intelligence, sensibility, and the discovery of the world – to a test score” (Rose,
2009, p. x). Teaching as test preparation is largely incompatible with teaching
216  Maughn Gregory
for thinking and inquiry. This reflects a cultural misunderstanding that human
intelligence is mostly a capacity for acquiring and storing information. The anti-
dote to this phenomenon is to somehow effect a cultural change of mind, to see
knowledge in all fields as the product of inquiry, and to see education as initiation
into a number of fields of inquiry. That initiation must, of course, make students
conversant with each discipline’s fund of knowledge, but also with its particular
methods of inquiry. This is how most educators think of science education today:
that learning to do science is as important as learning scientific facts. The same
should be true for education in mathematics, history, literature and the arts. Of
course, teaching inquiry across the disciplines means covering less information in
a given school year, but I believe it’s more important – for children and adults –
that we hold our knowledge critically, evidentially and tentatively, than that we
hold more of it superficially.

Does P4C rely on particular theories of children’s psychological

and moral development, and does it challenge stage theories
such as those of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, which
have been so influential in educational psychology?
Though philosophers and educators disagree about psychological theories of chil-
dren’s development, it is undeniable that children’s cognitive and social capacities
are in a process of development and habit formation, and that children in any
given elementary school classroom are likely to display a wide range of cogni-
tive and social development, and of academic and cultural literacy. P4C does not
directly rely on particular theories of educational psychology, though a number
of educational psychologists have studied the program. The work of Piaget and
Kohlberg have been used to criticize some aspects of P4C – especially that it
expects too much of children too soon – but the same work has been used to sup-
port P4C (Gazzard, 1983). Many stage theories of childhood development have
been challenged by philosophers of childhood (Matthews, 2009), by the social
learning theory of, e.g., Mead, Vygotsky and Bruner, who were also influential
for Lipman (1991, 1996), by empirical research into children’s cognitive capaci-
ties (especially as “scaffolded” by more advanced peers) and by the emerging
science of neuroplasticity. I believe the most important recent development in
relation to P4C and educational psychology is Alina Reznitskaya’s integration of
schema-theoretic and sociocultural perspectives on learning to explain how stu-
dents develop epistemological understanding, argument skills, and disciplinary
knowledge through engaging in dialogue (Reznitskaya & Gregory, 2013). Alina
is a professor at Montclair and Director of Research for the IAPC.
The question is often asked, “At what age are children capable of doing philoso-
phy?” While no definitive answer to this question has emerged, a number of inno-
vative pre-school and kindergarten programs have demonstrated that even very
young children are capable of meeting the three fundamental aims at some level:
working with philosophical concepts, practicing careful thinking, and cooperating
with others in dialogue. With proper support, preschool children are able to take
 Where are we now? 217
turns giving each other reasons they find different insects ugly, scary or beautiful,
and to alter their judgments as a result of the conversation. Of course, the objec-
tives and contours of any program of elementary school philosophy should reflect
the children’s age and sociocultural context. Some youngsters may need several
months of practice in order to understand the difference between a question, an
answer and a reason, or to be comfortable taking turns talking in a group.
Most importantly, the work of Lipman, Sharp and hundreds of colleagues
around the world over the past forty-odd years has established the fundamental
premise of Philosophy for Children: that children and adults without philosophi-
cal training are capable of discerning ethical, aesthetic, political and other philo-
sophical dimensions of their own experience, of recognizing problematic aspects
of that experience, and through a process of rigorous and conscientious dialogue,
of inquiring toward judgment and action capable of resolving what was problem-
atic. That is the experience we aim for when we sit on the rug with a group of
children to do philosophy for an hour or so.

In P4C, classroom environments become more democratic. What

is Lipman’s opinion (and yours) about the political ramifications
of sharing power with children?
My perspective here derives largely from pragmatist social and political theory
(see Gregory, 2005), according to which, communities are democratic if they
respond to significant troubles and opportunities with a practice of collabora-
tive inquiry and are willing to reconstruct their habits and their environments in
order to realize the most important kinds of value and growth available to them.
So democracy is as much about shared intelligence as about shared power, and
education for democracy should give us practice in both. Philosophy for Chil-
dren certainly does that, as Lipman (1997, 1998) and Sharp (1991) were eager
to point out. It facilitates dialogue and open-ended inquiry, cognitive and social
skills, and shared authority.
However, in my opinion, certain factors in how P4C is typically conducted
limit the program’s effectiveness for citizenship education. Many P4C practition-
ers tend to construe social and political issues in strictly discursive terms – ques-
tions to tackle through dialogue. They do not encourage empirical experiment
with students’ political judgments and they do not extend the shared governance
of the dialogue to other aspects of social life in the classroom or the school.
Of course there are some wonderful exceptions, in which classrooms and even
schools have used the community of philosophical inquiry as a mechanism for
shared decision-making at every level of school governance. David Kennedy
(2012b) has done some fascinating theoretical work around this last idea from
the perspective of philosophy of childhood.
Darren Chetty’s work on racism and the community of philosophical inquiry
is also an important cautionary note against a too-easy assumption that P4C is
necessarily democratic. Race, class and gender constitute intersecting dynamics of
unequal power relationships that invade group habits, procedures and institutions
218  Maughn Gregory
that otherwise seem to be equitable. P4C pretty directly confronts the prejudice
against letting children speak and share power with adults, but that kind of preju-
dice is only one among others with which it intersects.

The final question is about art as a provocation for philosophical

inquiry. Is there a role for art in encouraging children to think
in P4C?
Yes, without a doubt. The notion that the standard categories of philosophy
(ethics, politics, aesthetics, etc.) describe dimensions of most people’s ordinary
experience comes from Dewey’s classic work on aesthetics: Art as Experience
(1934). There Dewey argues that aesthetic experience can be had in the garden
and the work space as well as in the museum or concert hall, and that we should
stop trying to segregate aesthetic experiences from the rest of experience, but
rather to learn how to discern aesthetic qualities in ordinary experience and then
inquire about how to cultivate them. Lipman wrote his dissertation at Columbia
as an extension of Dewey’s argument in that book, and Dewey himself read it and
complimented Lipman on his work.
Aesthetics is a theme that runs throughout the Lipman/Sharp curriculum,
and it is the focus of the program Suki (novel, 1978) and Writing: How and Why
(manual, 1980). The characters in these works read and write poetry, visit an art
museum and discuss music. A number of others have experimented with, and
written about using P4C to focus on aesthetic inquiry (Hamrick, 1989; Santi,
2007; Turgeon, 2000).
Lipman’s Suki incorporates a number of poems by noted authors, which func-
tion as “texts within a text” that prompt and support inquiry into many areas
of philosophy, including but not limited to aesthetics. Similarly, other P4C cur-
riculum programs, such as Ecodialogo6 incorporate paintings and musical works as
supplemental “texts” to deepen philosophical inquiry. Others in P4C have used
works of art and music as the primary texts that prompt philosophical questions
and inquiry (see Liptai, 2005). For the past few years the IAPC has conducted
P4C sessions at the Montclair Art Museum. Joe Oyler, Ariel Sykes and Natalie
Fletcher have developed a philosophy and art programs that combine philosophi-
cal inquiry with viewing and creating art (see Fletcher & Oyler, 2016).
Finally, Ann Sharp (1997, 2009) has drawn attention to the aesthetic and rit-
ualistic/spiritual dimensions of the community of philosophical inquiry itself,
which returns us to the Deweyan agenda of waking up to philosophically salient
aspects of our everyday experience.

Notes
1 See also the Society for Philosophical Inquiry at www.philosopher.org/en/
Socrates_Cafe.html, accessed 11/20/09.
2 See, e.g., Jack Russell Weinstein’s philosophical radio program “Why?” from the
University of North Dakota, airing on Prairie Public Radio: www.whyradioshow.
org, accessed 11/20/09.
 Where are we now? 219
3 See, e.g., www.maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher and www.
markvernon.com/friendshiponline/dotclear, both accessed 02/15/09.
4 See www.apaonline.org/governance/constitution/bylaws.aspx, at 4.7, accessed
11/20/09.
5 Some of this section was published previously in Gregory, M., (2009b, Spring).
Wisdom and other aims for pre-college philosophy education. Farhang Journal
(Iranian Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies), 22(69).
6 See http://www.grupiref.org/philosophy-for-children/ecodialogo

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De Botton, A. (2000). The consolations of philosophy. Pantheon Books.
DeMarzio, D. (2011). What happens in philosophical texts: Matthew Lipman’s the-
ory and practice of the philosophical text as model. Childhood & Philosophy, 7(13),
29–47.
Dewey, J. (1934). Art as experience. Carbondale, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Eagleton, T. (2007). The meaning of life. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ellis, A., Harper, R. A., & Powers, M. (1999). A new guide to rational living. ­Prentice-
Hall, 1975.
Fisher, R. (2008). Philosophical intelligence: Why philosophical dialogue is important
in educating the mind. In M. Hand (Ed.), Philosophy in schools (pp. 96–104). New
York: Continuum International.
Fletcher, N. M., & Oyler, J. M. (2016). Curating an aesthetic space for inquiry. In
M. Gregory, J. Hyanes, & K. Murris (Eds.), The Routledge international handbook
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Gallagher, S. (1992). Hermeneutics and education. New York: SUNY Press.
Gardner, H. (2006). Multiple intelligences: New horizons. New York: Basic Books.
Gazzard, A. (1983). Philosophy for children and the Piagetian framework. Thinking:
The Journal of Philosophy for Children, 5(1), 10–13.
Gopnik, A. (2010). The philosophical baby: What children’s minds tell us about truth,
love, and the meaning of life. New York: Picador.
Gregory, M. (2005). Practicing democracy: Social intelligence and philosophical
practice. The International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 16(1), 161–174.
Gregory, M. (2007a). A framework for facilitating classroom dialogue. Teaching Phi-
losophy, 30(1), 59–84.
Gregory, M. (2007b). Thirty years of philosophical and empirical research in philoso-
phy for children: An overview. Diotime: Revue Internationale de Didactique de la
Philosophie, 34.
220  Maughn Gregory
Gregory, M. (Ed.). (2008). Philosophy for children practitioner handbook. Montclair,
NJ: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children.
Gregory, M. (2009a). Ethics education and the practice of wisdom. Teaching Ethics,
9(2), 105–130.
Gregory, M. (2009b). Wisdom and other aims for pre-college philosophy education.
Farhang Journal, 22(69).
Gregory, M. R., & Laverty, M. J. (2009). Philosophy and education for wisdom.
In A. Kenkman (Ed.), Teaching philosophy (pp. 155–173). New York: Continuum
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Hamrick, W. S. (1989). Philosophy for children and aesthetic education. Journal of
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25 Postscript
Saeed Naji

In high school, due to the transition period of the 1979 Iranian revolution,
I always dreamt of an ideal society or environment for my friends and other chil-
dren. During my university years, particularly when I was studying Philosophy of
Science at Sharif University, an industrial university, I was disturbed by the same
problem that had worried me in high school and that was the necessity of essen-
tial life lessons that we students never had the opportunity to learn. Scientology
hits a climax at the universities. The students did not pay any attention to the
issues in human sciences due to their unfamiliarity with it and their ignorance.
Their main concern was to solve problems through engaging mathematical, basic
scientific and engineering knowledge. Discussion about the non-physical issues,
including the human and social issues, among my friends in the university seemed
very difficult for them to comprehend. Losing the joy of their company, I have
been left with no choice but to enjoy myself listening to the audio book of The
Little Prince (De Saint-Exupery, 1943), the Pleasures of Philosophy by Will Durant
(1953) and the Masnavi Ma’navi by Muhammad Balkhı̄ Rumi (1258–1273). In
the meantime, I always wished to communicate and talk with my classmates more
actively on issues that I considered essential for living in the modern age.
When I was engaged in research, I began to translate the work of Michael
Poole (2007), A Guide to Science and Belief. The book basically aims to teach
the issues related to science and religion to teenagers. I was looking for similar
books in various fields when Professor Dell Cannon introduced the Philosophy
for Children Program to me. When I got acquainted with this program, I became
so surprised and excited that I couldn’t wait to introduce it to my compatriots.
Checking the website of the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for
Children (IAPC), Montclair University, I found that some good work has been
done in this area. I noticed that the P4C Program (Philosophy for Children) was
exactly what I was looking for. I thought that this is the way through which I can
fulfill my longtime desires. I was so motivated to help children to think and protect
themselves against potential harms in their surrounding environment or caused by
adults, and also to learn to have a purposeful life. This thinking had a special place
in our culture and tradition but has been neglected in our schools and education.
I also felt that this program is greatly compatible with the Islamic tradition
and culture. Islam’s holy book, the Qur’an, has invited mankind to think and
 Postscript 223
reflect much more than other religions and other isms. According to the Qur’an,
everyone is responsible for his/her own life. Therefore, children should be able
to make the right and influential decisions in order to properly build their lives.
So, the proper adjudication, including critical and creative thinking, is among the
main goals of training in this tradition. Listening to speeches, as well as analyz-
ing and evaluating them and then following the best ideas, is what can lead to
wisdom and guidance. Paying attention to humans and other creatures of the
universe, as well as paying respect to them, has been highly regarded. This makes
the attention to “caring thinking” reach a climax. The other issue that should
not be disregarded is that Iran has always been a land of philosophy, and it has
also influenced the development of philosophical thinking in Europe in certain
periods of its development.
Due to the importance of thinking accorded in our culture, when I began
to learn the idea of P4C, I was very surprised by its wide span. I regretted the
fact that we were very late in starting thinking training and education reforms.
I thought that the idea should have sprouted from within my country and then
spread to the rest of the world. Therefore, I did my best to ensure that the
philosophers, thinkers, education authorities and the community of my country
became familiar with this program. So I proceeded to interview Lipman and Ann
Sharp, the founder and co-founder, respectively, and I continued my interviews
with other pioneers around the globe. I felt that we needed to identify the differ-
ent versions of P4C throughout the world in order to offer an appropriate version
for my country.

Why choose the methods of interview

Some of the best methods were to start a direct dialogue with the founders of
the program and to introduce the idea to people who might be interested. There
were a lot of questions in my mind. Following my conversation with Dell Can-
non, I had corresponded with Matthew Lipman via email. After a period of study
in this area, he accepted my interview request. The conversation was so informa-
tive that it motivated me to continue the interviews in the same style.
When I started these interviews, I felt that they could sincerely communicate
with the audience and introduce the issues in an effective way. I also realized that
interviews have more readership. Whatever is said in response to a question can
directly address the unknown side of them. Bryan Magee’s (1978) book Men of
Ideas: Some Creators of Contemporary Philosophy and his book The Great Philoso-
phers are good examples of this style, despite the fact that he had a different kind
of interview meant for a television program. The advantage of these interviews
was that the subjects, which were not found in other books (or the readers could
not understand them even if they could be found), were presented and under-
stood by people.
Another advantage of an interview is that, if a reader has the same question
as the interviewer, he/she will follow the answers like a person who wants to
quench his/her thirst. The reader has the freedom to address some of these
224  Saeed Naji
questions and ignore the rest. Interviews (if the questions are according to the
reader’s ­interest) are not only appealing but have an exploratory format. Accord-
ing to Martha Nussbaum (1985), these interviews as dialogues are more alive
than other texts and look to be more compatible with the human brain in search-
ing for and discovering knowledge. You do not need to read the additional and
irrelevant issues when reading an interview. The knowledge gaps of the mind can
be focused directly and selectively. Therefore, in my opinion, the framework of
the interview is more relevant and meaningful for readers. When the reader finds
his/her questions in the interview, he/she is eager to follow the inquiry that is
discussed in the interview. Otherwise, he will easily disregard it and stop wasting
his/her time.
Later, after reading Martha Nussbaum’s (1985) Philosophical Texts vs. Philo-
sophical Dialogue, I found out that my conception was correct in this area. If
schoolbooks were prepared in the form of dialogue, most likely they would be
more interesting and would attract students’ attention. Fictionalization of the
books in the P4C program has the same goal, which turns out to be more com-
plex and more efficient. Furthermore, these books provide more opportunities
for training. In addition to their expository features, these stories are the bridges
to the individuals’ own queries and issues in life. Therefore, using them in educa-
tion can make the training focused on individuals’ current needs and not their
future probable ones.

Presenting the interviews to interested people

I had some problems publishing and introducing the topics of Philosophy for
Children due to the media owners’ unfamiliarity with this topic and their opinion
that philosophy is not something that can be taught to children. However, my
goal was to provide these efficient research topics and subjects for a wide range of
people. Books and journals were not able to achieve this purpose as they are read
only by the specialists. I had to find another way. I tried to publish some articles
in the newspaper, but it was so difficult. I was introduced by a friend to a news-
paper so that I could write or publish some topics in the Ideas page. It has made
me familiar with journalism for two years, but it had its own limitations. With the
spread of the Internet and websites, I found that having a website is one of the
best ways to promote knowledge and awareness in Iran. Therefore, I launched
the first website of P4C Program in Iran to bring together the professors and
students who were interested in the new paradigm of education.
Through publication of English and Persian texts of Lipman and Sharp’s inter-
views, I realized that these interviews were much more popular in foreign coun-
tries. Several magazines from different countries asked me to translate them into
various languages. If I’m not mistaken, it was requested by people in Mexico or
Argentina, Norway and several other countries. This made me think that inform-
ing people of this subject is more important than ever. Therefore, I did numerous
additional interviews with Lipman, Sharp and Roger Sutcliffe, who was the head
of International Council for Philosophy in Childhood (ICPIC).
 Postscript 225
Following these interviews, I gradually realized the diversity of opinions in the
various countries. I decided to specify the reasons for these distinctions. My main
question was why some people call this program P4C and others PWC. I asked
Lipman, Sharp, Sutcliffe, Jespersen, etc. to have an interview to discover the
mystery of this difference. These interviews gradually determined the distinctions
as well as the similarities. They led to another result, which was pleasant for me,
that is, when one of the interviewees told me that the interviews make a kind of
convergence among philosophy for/with children among interested people.
It was impressive and significant that people who were asked to participate in
the interviews agreed with such affability that, even in the most difficult condi-
tions in the hospital or at the side of their dying husband, they answered my emails
and helped me complete these discussions. This was evidence of the extraordi-
nary research spirit of P4C interested people and doubled my responsibility. The
openness to criticism and the patience of these thinkers was praiseworthy.
Before the start of the interviews with Matthew Lipman and Ann Sharp and
afterwards, numerous emails have been exchanged between me and them. My
email contained a lot of questions about P4C and its foundation. Almost every
week, I was sending some questions to them, which were generally critical. They
patiently answered my questions usually no more than a week later. Their respect
for questions, which has remained from the Socratic tradition in philosophy, as
well as their philosophical humility, was another characteristic of all P4C philoso-
phers that was reflected in their answers.

The relevance of P4C in the contemporary world

I consider the P4C Program as a way to overcome some of the challenges of the
modern world. Therefore, this book may be a small work in order to introduce
this program to the world. I think if modern technology or whatever else, accord-
ing to some philosophers, leads us inevitably to regress, then the P4C Program
can be a way of rescue.
I think the world is now in a more serious and critical situation than in previ-
ous periods. Given the dominance of modern technology, the dizzying speed of
technological development, globalization, media domination, the challenges of
postmodernism in philosophy and culture and the development of new drugs
in various forms, the new era is experiencing a great challenge. We have seen a
decrease and a reduction of rationality in human activities practically and theo-
retically, which, in its turn, leads human beings into confusion and decadence in
areas such as ethics and identity.
The major part of this phenomenon is due to failures of educational systems. these
failures are closely related to twentieth century psychological theories on children’s
mind and achievement of knowledge, which require a fundamental transformation.
The approach provided by 20th-century educational psychology has transformed
the education system into a tool for adults to change children in any way they
want. In this way, the authorities asserted the interests of children and country into
the education agenda without any consultation with them. Accordingly, children
226  Saeed Naji
must be confined in a room to be trained for the benefit of themselves and their
­community, even if they do not have any idea about this benefit.
The educational dominance over children is more common in developing coun-
tries, in which authorities give more credence to achievements in science and edu-
cational psychology because of their belief in the credit and authority of science;
and also children’s rights are less obvious for people (including parents and those
involved in education). This dominance wastes twelve years of children’s lives.

The reduction of rationality in theoretical fields of human activity

If I am not mistaken, some fallacies and presuppositions in some philosophical
or epistemological bases provided some measures to ignore evidence, reasons and
arguments. Removing these fallacies can help the reasons, arguments and evidence
find their real position. It seems that some of these fallacies are generated from the
replacement of the necessary condition rather than the sufficient condition. If com-
munities have a major contribution in shaping thoughts, it can be concluded that
all human thoughts are the result of communities. If human senses are effective
in forming opinions, it is concluded that all human thoughts are generated from
sensation. If the human mind plays a crucial role in the formation of knowledge,
it is concluded that all knowledge is constructed by the human mind. If emotions
are effective in shaping human behavior, it is concluded that all human behavior is
based on emotions. There is such a generalization in epistemology: if we cannot be
sure about the shape and nature of something, this does not imply that there will be
no knowledge about it. And it cannot be concluded that that thing does not exist.
The basic principle of fallibilism is the lack of certainty about scientific knowl-
edge and knowledge about science. This makes it impossible to distinguish the
better theories and the superior scientific methodologies, which seems to be a
kind of a paradoxical claim. If this principle is true and there are no reliable
claims, how can human beings trust those claims that lead to the collapse of the
entire system of their rationality?
One of the strangest events of our age is that some people argue that argu-
ments have no place in communication since people and human groups may be
quite different in their paradigms and epistemic bases. Those who deny the value
of arguments actually accept it at least in epistemological aspects.
It may be perceived that doubts and ambiguities can be the sufficient condition
for absence (of some knowledge). Perhaps it is thought that ambiguities cannot
be clarified and concluded that knowledge is impossible in that area. What is for-
gotten is that all our behaviors are based on the assumption (and indicate) that
we have some knowledge in this area, more or less. At least, we remove the errors
and inconsistencies from our thoughts.

Overcoming the problems

In these circumstances, the task of education is more serious and difficult than
ever. Because, in addition to issues of knowledge and education, children are
 Postscript 227
experiencing the crisis of societies and culture more than in all periods of history
and they need to learn decision-making skills, to improve their ability in order to
resolve the existing problems and to protect their privacy.
This transformation has already been initiated by the experts of P4C, although
the context of the societies has imposed a special laziness toward the thinking
process, because of habits and lack of encouragement for thinking. This will
impose an additional burden on leading trainers and thinkers. However, it can
be seen that this intellectual movement finds more advocates and reveals more
activities and achievements. Educational psychology, children’s literature and
attitudes toward philosophy and education are completely evolving.
In my country, thinking is closely associated with our tradition and culture
in their pure definition. In this respect, I regretted the fact that this movement
of bringing thinking to the society and schools did not begin from my coun-
try. As I said, our tradition has emphasized the intellect and reason more than
any other traditions, isms and ideologies. According to a saying (Hadith), “one
hour of thinking [/reflecting]” is considered better than “seventy years praying.”
Human freedom, awareness, responsibility for actions and choices and care for
the development of human virtues necessitate a proper thinking and decision-
making process.
Therefore, I am sure that this program will grow increasingly in my country
and it will flourish and become operational faster than in other countries. We
have done a lot in this area, for example, in terms of materials and methodol-
ogy. We have trained teachers of P4C and story writers to produce P4C books
and manuals. We have also organized informational sessions and workshops for
school administrators, university students and professors. Now we have a master’s
degree, a peer review journal and several official research groups in this area.
I hope the day will come when we will be able introduce one of the most com-
plete versions of the P4C program to other countries.

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Muhammad Balkhı̄ Rumi, Jalāl ad-Dı̄ n. (1258–1273). Masnavi-I Ma’navi.
Nussbaum, M. (1985). Philosophical books vs. philosophical dialogue. Thinking: The
Journal of Philosophy for Children, 6, 13–14.
Poole, M. (2007). A guide to science and belief. London: Lion Books.
Index

aesthetics 15, 123, 130, 138, 145, 218 chance 95, 121, 124, 126, 177,
ahistoricism 136 186, 193
aim: education 32, 54, 104, 105; childhood 193, 200, 201, 203, 204;
manual 31; of P4C 4, 9, 13, 16, 37, philosophy of 134, 199, 207, 217
39, 50, 56, 60, 99 children’s rights 47, 226; literature 83,
al-Farabi 174, 177 120 – 2, 129, 158, 185, 214, 227
al-Ghazzali 174 coherence theory of truth 109, 111
al-Shafi’i 174 collaborative thinking 32, 59, 61, 62
Alternative Education Resource Collaborative Virtual Observatory 92
Organization (AERO) 135 Communality 6
applied philosophy 40, 49, 129, 209 community: of inquiry (CPI) 6, 13, 24,
Aristotle 3, 14, 25, 69, 138, 151, 26 – 8, 38, 44, 47, 49, 51, 57, 58, 59,
154, 174 60, 61, 68; of philosophical inquiry
artworks 70, 84 41, 43, 71, 93, 100, 125, 131, 134,
Asad, M. 181 137, 214, 217, 218
assessment 159, 167; compassion 6, 23, 28
self-assessment 213 concept formation 4, 15, 21, 34, 38,
Australasian Association of Philosophy 48, 94, 124
(AAP) 159 Connecting Concepts 105
Australian Council for Educational correspondence theory of truth 109, 111
Research (ACER) 70, 159 creative: dialogue xiv, 180, 182, 183;
Australian Curriculum, Assessment and thinking 14, 50, 58, 82, 99, 12,
Reporting Authority (ACARA) 159 184, 223
autonomy 45, 112, 135 criteria 7, 12, 14, 24, 36, 44, 83,
90, 131
beauty 19, 22, 27, 44, 59, 192, critical thinking 4 – 6, 13, 21, 37, 50, 62,
196, 211 78, 114, 210
Black philosophy 40 criticism 8, 31, 39, 54, 78, 124, 150,
Bloom, B. 59 212, 249
Brazil 199 cultural elements 148, 150 – 1
Bruner, J. 98, 124, 216 culture 25, 39 – 40, 45, 57, 123, 127,
Buber, M. 51 134, 144, 162, 193, 200, 208, 222;
Buchler, J. 7 American 150; Korean 145; Persian
50; Russian 188
Cam, Phil 74, 158, 184 curriculum 5, 10, 30, 33, 35, 50,
Canada 23, 37 75 – 6, 98, 103, 137, 138, 163, 184;
caring thinking 6, 19, 20, 23, 50, 61, Curriculum Council in Western
133, 152, 212, 223 Australia 73, 79; Lipman/Sharp
Categorical Imperative 112 213, 214, 218; national 75, 76, 159;
Centre for Philosophical Inquiry in philosophy for children 57, 150, 151,
Education (CPIE) 176 157, 210, 213

debates 51, 120, 121, 167, 168, 169,
174, 175
decentralization 126
decision-making 34, 125, 163, 194,
217, 227
democracy 6, 78, 125, 133, 163, 217
democratic classroom 27
democratic dispositions 163
Denmark 123, 143 – 8
De Saint-Exupéry, Antoine 222, 227
Descartes 55, 131, 197
developmental psychologists 53, 54, 55
Dewey, J. 3, 6, 12, 18, 39, 43, 45, 51,
54, 114, 118, 119, 125, 136, 157,
162, 211, 218
didactic 16, 21, 73, 120, 131
discovery 38, 49, 51, 125, 215
discussion plan 8, 21, 26 – 7, 30, 33, 35,
70, 213
Doll Hospital 22 – 4,  29
Dubuc, Frank 70
Durant, W. 222
Durkheim, E. 12
duty 192, 195
educational reform 160, 161
Elfie 10, 24, 70, 131, 172
emancipatory 133, 135
emotion 20, 34, 43, 45, 48, 50, 69,
167, 226
empathy 26
English 67, 73, 75 – 7, 123, 154,
176 – 7,  224
enlightenment 12, 43, 47, 153
environment 8, 20, 26, 28, 103, 136,
161, 163, 197, 217, 222
epic 6, 13
epistemology 7, 15, 123, 130, 136,
173, 194, 211, 226
equilibrium 6, 13, 27, 105
ethical values see values
ethics 7, 15, 40, 47, 71, 75, 84, 110,
111, 138, 145, 168
Europe 57, 136, 157, 223
European 77, 150
experimentalism 6
experimental method 127
facilitator 20, 30, 32, 83, 91, 94, 97,
126, 129, 132, 164, 213
Fadhlalla, Haeri 182
fair 14, 82, 110, 123, 211
fairness 31, 72, 210, 211
fairy tales 120, 146, 185
faith 16, 155, 170, 172, 174, 177, 193
Index  229
Fakhry, M. 174
fallibilism 28, 30, 32, 112, 226
false 53, 78, 103, 104, 107 – 9, 167
Federation of Australasian Philosophy in
Schools Association (FAPSA) 159
Fisher, R. 120, 180, 183, 212
freedom 37, 78, 81, 90, 97, 107, 114,
116, 143, 172, 177, 193, 223, 227
Freire, P. 162
friendship 8, 23, 28, 31, 49, 51, 90, 96
fundamentalist 146
Gaarder, J. 22
game 60, 71, 96, 104 – 5, 151, 184,
188 – 98; computer 51; linguistic 24;
thinking 184
genre 21, 121, 123, 131, 132, 138, 213
geography 76, 162
God 109, 113, 151, 170, 13 – 14, 181
goodness 6, 28, 31, 44, 48, 189, 195
Greek 13, 200, 201
halaqa 172, 175
Hannah 22 – 3
Hans Christian Andersen 120, 146, 148
happiness 45, 49, 55, 15, 171, 195
happy 14, 44, 55
Harry Stottlemeier 3, 10, 15, 24, 31, 46,
123, 172, 175, 207
Hegel 131
Heidegger 119
hermeneutics 210
Hikmah (Wisdom) Pedagogy 175, 176
history 35, 36, 162, 164, 216
Hoca, Nasruddin 173, 175
Holy Bible 191
Hume, D. 125
Huntington, S. 170
IAPC curriculum 33, 35, 150, 151;
materials 17, 148, 158; program 3,
118, 120, 151
Ibn Sina 174, 177
impartiality 104, 110, 112, 113
inquiry: ethical 8, 69, 71, 91, 110, 185;
scientific 36
intelligence 7, 76, 131, 180, 209,
215 – 17
interest 5, 49, 61, 82, 112, 121, 132,
145, 153, 160, 187
International Council of Philosophical
Inquiry with Children (ICPIC) 17,
56, 57, 178, 207
International Democratic Education
Network (IDEC) 135
230 Index
Internet-based 72 methodology 3, 51, 70, 98, 137, 158,
interview 61, 136, 223 – 5 177, 198, 227
Iran 10, 17, 77, 178 Middle East 136
Iranian 9, 10, 77, 182, 222 mind 4, 5, 10, 26, 31
irrationality 43, 44 modus ponens 74
Islamic Traditions 181 Montaigne 12
Montclair State University 3, 10,
Japan 167, 169 196, 209
Japanese 168 – 9 moral 69, 109, 112, 113, 134, 185,
Journal of Thinking 75, 155 188, 193; consciousness 95, 188;
judgment of value 39 development 195, 215, 216;
justice 6, 28, 47, 90, 130, 135, 52, judgment 7, 71, 125, 186; reason 10;
189 – 90, 195,  201 skills 188
moral education 19, 69, 71, 158, 167,
Kant, I. 12, 45, 47, 110, 112, 113, 114, 168, 177
160, 190, 195 moral imagination 134
kindergartens 41, 137, 152, 216 morality 67, 69, 112, 127, 167
Kio and Gus 10, 24 Muhammad 174, 181 – 2
Kirovgrad State Pedagogical music 151, 218
University 10 Muslim education 170
Kohlberg 216
Kuhnian paradigm 54 Nakeesha and Jesse 20, 22 – 4
Nasr, S.H. 174
Latin America 199 nature 21, 23, 193, 207
Laval University 89, 90, 91, 98 Nussbaum, M. 18, 19, 208, 224
law 38, 112, 143, 168, 169, 173 – 4
life 18, 111, 116, 124, 126, 130, 144, objective 32, 37, 98, 103, 108, 110,
148, 154, 157, 170 – 2, 177, 180 – 1, 112 – 13, 177, 210, 212, 214, 217
186, 193, 196, 201 – 3, 211, 215 open-minded 124, 178
Lipman, M. 184 – 6, 196 – 7, 202, 209, openness 20, 164, 225
211 – 18 Oslo University College 153
Lisa 3, 31, 172, 175
literature 21, 33 – 6, 76, 79, 118, 124, P4c Stories 118, 120, 123 – 6, 175, 180
131, 133, 150, 163, 167, 210 paradigm 12, 32, 42, 134, 146, 162,
Little Prince 222 224; alternative 162; Dewey 54;
Locke, J. 123 dialogic 138; epistemological 138;
logic: formal 5, 137; informal 13 maieutic 13; ontological 138; Platonic
logical fallacies 17, 23 203; reflective 6, 12, 118, 119, 146,
love 23 – 5, 28, 31, 90, 145, 189, 192 – 3 162, 215; traditional 12, 118, 119,
162, 215
maieutic 6, 13, 194, 197 peace 135, 155, 170
Malaysia 175 – 8 pedagogy 3, 6, 81, 85, 92, 127, 132,
manual 143, 145 – 8, 157, 159, 178, 157 – 60, 164, 169, 171, 175 – 8, 210
199, 213, 218, 227 Peirce, C. 112 – 14, 120, 163
Marx, K. 25 Per Jespersen 120, 123, 143, 150
Masnavi Ma’navi 222 philosophical: dialogue 19, 20, 26, 27,
mathematical proof 125 35, 40, 51, 52, 82, 137, 153, 169,
mathematics 35, 36, 78, 138 – 9, 154, 180, 184, 208, 214, 224; discussion
162, 164, 167, 216 8, 21, 34, 41, 69, 120, 126, 148,
Matthews, G. 81, 121, 124, 136, 147, 158, 184, 187; games 188, 183,
214, 216 197; inquiry 144, 158, 160 – 1,
Mead, G. 7, 12, 216 175 – 6, 184, 186, 202, 207, 210 – 12,
Mental Act 9, 15 214 – 15, 217 – 18; novel 3, 14, 18, 20,
Merleau-Ponty 133 23, 85, 129, 132, 184, 186, 207, 213

philosophical inquiry 8, 12, 17 – 22,
30, 33 – 5, 37 – 41, 43, 57 – 8, 71,
76, 78, 90, 93 – 4, 100, 102, 120 – 1,
125, 131, 133 – 4, 137 – 8, 145, 158,
160 – 1, 175 – 6, 184, 186, 202, 207,
210 – 12, 214, 217 – 18
philosophy: café 209; of childhood 134,
139, 199, 201, 207, 217; club 152,
154; Islamic 172, 174, 177, 179;
summer camp 152, 154; teaching 16,
72 – 3, 77 – 9, 81, 106, 160, 167, 185,
209; toolbox 209
philosophy in the classroom 8, 17, 35,
43, 47, 97, 145, 147
philosophy of: language 123;
mathematics 33; psychology 4;
science 4, 33, 68, 131, 137 – 8,
154, 222
Piaget, J. 7, 14, 36, 53 – 5, 89, 93, 124,
136 – 7, 203,  216
picturebooks 70, 81 – 4, 94, 121, 132,
158, 161, 183, 184, 187, 214
Pixie 10, 11, 15, 44, 49, 101, 172, 175
Plato 81, 130, 151, 154, 157, 173, 174,
200 – 3,  209
Popper, K. 107, 125
postmodernism 43, 127, 225
Potter, B. 132
pragmatism 62, 103 – 4, 112, 137
Prophet 49, 173, 174, 182
psychology 4, 9, 23, 52, 54, 73, 98,
136, 209, 216, 225 – 7
PwC 30, 56 – 9, 61, 145 – 8, 152 – 5,  225
Quebec 23, 37, 89 – 91, 98
Queensland 159 – 61
Qur’an 171 – 4, 177, 181 – 2, 222 – 3
rational 43, 112 – 3, 127, 135, 151, 173,
175, 212
rationality 43 – 7, 49, 51, 102, 112 – 4,
133, 136, 225 – 6
Rawls, J. 6, 13, 110
reasonableness 6, 22, 25, 30, 43 – 6, 102
reconstruction 22, 27, 30 – 1, 39, 46,
127, 130, 13 – 14, 136, 138, 158
relationship 9, 97, 136, 184, 186, 200,
202, 217
relativism 103 – 5, 127, 155
relativists 103, 111, 114
religious values 17
Republic 46, 130, 199, 201 – 2
responsibility 30, 47, 106, 144, 193,
225, 227
Index  231
revolution 46, 55, 163, 170, 201, 222
rules 6, 17, 23, 44, 71, 105, 132, 172,
189, 194, 196
Rumi, Jalāl ad-Dīn 130, 222
Russia 188 – 9, 196 – 7
Ryle, G. 7, 13
Scandinavian 147
science 35, 138, 162 – 4; teaching 39,
67, 98
self 23, 25, 31, 47, 113, 136,
174, 186
self- correction 8, 19, 21, 24 – 6, 30, 32,
41, 50, 97, 100
self- criticism 8
self-paced 72
Sharp, A.M. 89, 91, 100, 120, 122,
132, 145, 157, 162, 199, 207, 211
Shintoists 169
Singapore 119, 172
Skoletorget Project 154, 155
Socrates 13, 46, 59, 93, 154, 174, 188,
190, 193 – 7, 199, 201, 202, 208
Socratic 93, 95, 143 – 4, 151, 157 – 8,
165, 186, 197, 202, 209, 225
Sophie’s World 22
South America 136, 145, 199, 200
Spinoza 25
Sprod, T. 67, 125, 158
stimulus material 158, 160
storybooks 82, 84, 180
strategies 21 – 4, 33 – 4, 79, 105, 159,
161, 190, 214
subjective 104, 112, 134, 139, 143, 201
Sweden 147
syllabus 74, 79, 158 – 9, 161
teacher education 9, 32, 41, 137, 161
technology 28, 119, 133, 170,
196, 225
television 37, 48, 55, 89 – 92, 119,
146, 223
theories 7, 44, 53, 76, 108 – 9, 127,
137, 203 – 4, 210, 216, 225 – 6
thinking: dialogical 25, 61; dimensions
of 61; exercises 15, 213; guide 58,
60; moods of 16; move 62; skills 4,
9 – 10, 15, 24, 28, 33, 40, 62, 82, 94,
96 – 7, 103, 119, 151, 159, 176, 180,
188, 195, 210; types of 15
Thinking In Education 6, 12, 13, 36,
41, 211
thinking school 13, 103
Topping 75, 118, 160
232 Index
tradition 21, 33, 49, 57, 74, 121, values: approach 5; economic 119;
132 – 3, 137, 157, 169, 171, 174 – 5, ethical 17 – 19, 25, 175; family 196;
177, 180 – 3, 186, 193, 202, 213 – 14, freedom of thought 78; inculcation
222 – 3, 225,  227 175; new 27, 49; reinforcement 208
traditional: education 32, 40, 53 – 4, video clips 84; tapes 37
129, 162; textbook 18 Vygotsky, L. 3, 7, 73, 89, 93, 98, 101,
Trickey 75, 118, 160 126, 216
truth 6, 12, 22 – 3, 44, 48, 70, 81,
104 – 16, 181 – 2, 189 – 90, 192, 199, Walden 43
210, 221 Wilde, Oscar 151
Wittgenstein, L. 7, 113
UK 57, 157 woman 143, 191, 193
Ukraine 10, 188, 196 wonder 8, 20, 25, 36, 41, 56, 89, 97,
unconscious 137 100, 101, 144, 147, 180, 185, 193
UNESCO 75, 78, 178 wondering 15, 28, 36, 48, 89
universalism 137 world view 137
universalizability test 113
University of Queensland 160 – 1 Zeus 190
Utilitarianism 55 zone of proximal development 126