Final Thesis DOCTORATE NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT Zambia

BETTY MSIMUKO
UD2951SNA82111
COURSE NAME:
DOCTORATE NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
Research Thesis Title: Are the governance structures and approaches effective for conservation
of wildlife in Zambia: A comparative analysis of CBNRM in the Luangwa and Kafue Landscapes.
ATLANTIC INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
July, 2022
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Declaration By submitting this dissertation , I declare that the work contained in this piece of writing is my own
original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction
and publication thereof by Antlantic International University will not result in the infringement of any third party
rights. Furthermore, I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.
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Copyright © 2022 Antlantic International University All rights reserved
Table of Contents
Aknowledments .............................................................................................................................................................. 10
Abbreviations and Acronyms ........................................................................................................................................ 11
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................................................................... 13
CHAPTER ONE ................................................................................................................................................................. 15
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................ 15
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES ................................................................................................................................... 16
2. Problem Statement ............................................................................................................................................. 18
3. Purpose of the study ............................................................................................................................................ 19
4. Significance of the study ..................................................................................................................................... 19
5. General Objective ............................................................................................................................................... 20
6. Specific objectives of the study........................................................................................................................... 20
7. Research Questions ............................................................................................................................................ 20
8. Conceptual framework ....................................................................................................................................... 21
Figure 1.0: A Decision-making framework for wildlife utilization (adapted from SASUSG 1996). ......................... 24
9. Analytical Framework ......................................................................................................................................... 25
Figure 1.1: Zambian scenario CBNRM analytical framework adopted and adapted from .................................... 26
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10. Key Words used in the study .......................................................................................................................... 28
CHAPTER TWO ................................................................................................................................................................ 29
LITERATURE REVIEW ....................................................................................................................................................... 29
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................ 29
2. Governance structures and approaches for conservation of wildlife in Zambia ................................................ 30
3. Types of community structures for natural resource management................................................................... 31
4. RESULTS AND ANALYIS ........................................................................................................................................ 35
A. The current structure of CBNRM .................................................................................................................. 35
1. Community structures as legal entities ....................................................................................................... 37
2. Multiple natural resource management ...................................................................................................... 38
3. Objectives of community structures ............................................................................................................ 39
4. Benefits to communities ................................................................................................................................ 40
5. Performance of community structures........................................................................................................ 42
6. Strengths ........................................................................................................................................................ 42
8. Opportunities................................................................................................................................................. 43
9. Threats ........................................................................................................................................................... 43
5. Other Parallel Structures..................................................................................................................................... 46
CHAPTER THREE.............................................................................................................................................................. 47
1. METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................................................. 47
I. Proposed methodological approach - Data Collection – .............................................................................. 47
II. Data Analysis – .............................................................................................................................................. 47
III. Proposed research tools – ......................................................................................................................... 48
Study sites ....................................................................................................................................................................... 48
Figure 3.0: Map for Kafue Landscape ................................................................................................................... 49
Figure 3.1: Map for Luangwa Landscape ............................................................................................................... 51
CHAPTER FOUR ............................................................................................................................................................... 52
CBNRM GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES ............................................................................................................................. 52
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................... 52
2. BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................................................................... 53
I. DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................... 54
CHAPTER FIVE ................................................................................................................................................................. 55
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS .............................................................................................................................................. 55
INSTITUTION AND MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................................. 55
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 55
2. The current structure of CBNRM ................................................................................................................... 55
Figure 4.0; Current structure of CBNRM ................................................................................................................ 56
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3. Weaknesses in the governance structures ................................................................................................... 57
Figure: 4.1 Weakness in the governance structures of the CRB in Luangwa and Kafue landscapes .................. 58
Figure 4.2: Community perceptions of weakness in the governance approaches .............................................. 59
4. Governance flaws in the approaches of CBNRM .......................................................................................... 62
5. Size and Scale ................................................................................................................................................. 62
Figure: 5.0: Household Luangwa Landscapes ...................................................................................................... 64
Figure 5.2 Households for Kafue Landscape .......................................................................................................... 64
Guidelines for forming the structures ................................................................................................................... 65
1. DEVELOPING AN ENABLING ENVIROMENT FOR CBNRM .................................................................................... 66
Figure 5.3: proposed structure of CBNRM ............................................................................................................. 68
2. DISCUSION .......................................................................................................................................................... 72
FIGURE 10: people queing to vote at VAG level in Chitungulu ............................................................................. 76
Figure 11:individual casting a vote ....................................................................................................................... 76
Figure 12: Nthumbe VAG nomination of candidates ............................................................................................ 77
3. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................... 77
CHAPTER SIX ................................................................................................................................................................... 79
Benefits sharing community ....................................................................................................................................... 79
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................... 79
2. BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................................................................... 82
3. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................................... 84
I. Revenue generation ....................................................................................................................................... 84
Table 6.0 Revenue generated by FISCAL year ....................................................................................................... 84
Figure 6.0: Financial trend per ecosystem ............................................................................................................. 85
II.
Comparative analysis of the two Landscapes ............................................................................................... 86
Figure 13: GMA AREA SIZE ..................................................................................................................................... 86
III. Other benefits besides direct funds .......................................................................................................... 87
Figure 14: Types of benefits from CRB in community ........................................................................................... 88
IV. Mechanism of benefit sharing ................................................................................................................... 88
Figure 15: Have you benefited from the CRB?....................................................................................................... 88
Figure 16: Does the CRB share benefits equally? .................................................................................................. 90
Discussion.................................................................................................................................................................... 91
Summary ..................................................................................................................................................................... 94
CHAPTER SEVEN ............................................................................................................................................................. 95
Revenue sharing and its challenges ............................................................................................................................ 95
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................... 95
Figure 17: Analysis on local arrested for Poaching in Kafue and Luangwa ......................................................... 97
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2. BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................................................................... 97
TABLE 7.0: REVENUE GENERATED BY FISCAL YEAR ( ZMK ) .................................................................................. 98
Figure 18: Hunting Revenue from 2016 to 2020 ................................................................................................... 99
3. MECHANISM OF REVENUE GENERATION ........................................................................................................... 99
4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REVENUE GENERATION ...................................................................................... 103
TABLE 7.2 35%ALOCATION FROM HUNTING REVENUEU FROM 2016 TO 2021 ................................................... 103
5. DISCUSION ........................................................................................................................................................ 104
6. SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................................... 108
CHAPTER 8 .................................................................................................................................................................... 109
Capacity on law enforcement ................................................................................................................................... 109
2. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................................... 109
3. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................................... 110
I. Law enforcement capacities by Communities............................................................................................. 110
Figure 19: The number of scouts in the individual Community Resources Boards............................................ 111
II. Comparative analysis on law enforcement. ................................................................................................ 111
Table 8.0: Capacity for Law community enforcement ........................................................................................ 111
Figure 20: Cost on Lawenforcement for the two Landscapes............................................................................. 112
III. Arrests done by law enforcement ........................................................................................................... 112
Figure 21: Number of arrests affecting Local communities …………………………………………………113
Figure 22: LOCAL RESIDENTS ARRESTED FOR POACHING IN LUANGWA............................................................ 114
Figure 23: Number of arrests for Kafue in the Kafue Landscape................................................................................. 114
TABLE 8.1: TOTAL PEOPLE ARRESTED FROM 2016-2019..................................................................................... 115
2. Discussion.......................................................................................................................................................... 115
3. Summary ........................................................................................................................................................... 118
CHAPTER NINE .............................................................................................................................................................. 119
Role of chiefs ............................................................................................................................................................. 119
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................. 119
2. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................................... 120
i. The dual position of the Chief in the CRB .................................................................................................... 121
4. Benefits of chiefs............................................................................................................................................... 122
Figure 23: Percieved trusted authourity in the community ............................................................................... 124
5. DISCUSION ........................................................................................................................................................ 124
6. SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................................... 129
CHAPTER TEN................................................................................................................................................................ 131
LEGISLATION GAPS ................................................................................................................................................... 131
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1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................. 131
2. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................................... 134
Figure 10.0: Evolution of the wildlife legislation1950-2018 in Zambia adopted from Chansa et al (2010) ..... 134
I. CURRENT WILDLIFE POLICY .......................................................................................................................... 138
II. Gaps in legislation ........................................................................................................................................ 142
2. DISCUSSION....................................................................................................................................................... 146
3. SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................................... 147
CHAPTER ELEVEN .......................................................................................................................................................... 149
Trends of wildlife distribution ................................................................................................................................... 149
1. INRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................... 149
2. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................................... 149
I. ANIMAL COUNTS .......................................................................................................................................... 150
Table 11.1: Total number of species in Kafue Counts ......................................................................................... 150
Figure 24: Total number of species in Kafue Counts................................................................................................... 151
Table 11.2: Total number of species in Luangwa Counts .................................................................................... 151
Figure 25: Total number of species in Luangwa Counts...................................................................................... 152
Table 11.3 ANIMAL COUNT IN GMA`S ................................................................................................................. 152
II. Comparison between Kafue and luangwa................................................................................................... 155
Table 11.4: Comparison of the average number of species................................................................................ 155
Figure 26: Comparison of the average number of species ................................................................................. 156
III. Issues with both ecosystems ................................................................................................................... 156
4. DISCUSION ........................................................................................................................................................ 160
LINKING QUOTAS, ANIMAL COUNTS AND REVENUE ..................................................................................... 160
Figure 27: COMPARISONS OF QUOTAS BETWEEN KAFUE AND LUANGWA ...................................................... 161
Table 11.5: Animal counts .................................................................................................................................... 161
5. SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................................... 162
CHAPTER 12 .................................................................................................................................................................. 163
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................. 163
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................. 163
2. SUMMARY OF FINDNGS .................................................................................................................................... 164
FLAWS IN GOVERNANCE APPROACHES ............................................................................................................ 165
THE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE .......................................................................................................................... 165
COMMUNITY BENEFITTS ....................................................................................................................................... 167
CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH CHIEFS ........................................................................................................ 168
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CRB COMPLIANCE WITH GOOD GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES ........................................................................ 169
RECCOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................................................................... 169
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................................ 172
Appendix 1:Proposed Activity Work-Plan and Time Table ..................................................................................... 181
Appendix 2: Questionnaire (Individual Community Members) ................................................................................ 184
General questions ................................................................................................................................................ 185
Fundamental questions........................................................................................................................................ 185
Appendix 4: Questionnaire (Community Resources Boards as Focus Groups) ........................................................ 188
Preliminary data ................................................................................................................................................... 188
Demographic information .................................................................................................................................... 189
Fundamental Questions ....................................................................................................................................... 189
Appendix 3: Questionnaire (Wildlife conservation Support institutions and Partners) ..................... 192
Demographic information .................................................................................................................................... 192
Appendix 5: Persons Interviewed in relation to the Research Topic ....................................................................... 193
Appendix 6: list of tables and figures list of tables ................................................................................................... 195
List of figures ........................................................................................................................................................ 195
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Quote…..
The long-term conservation of wildlife will not be achieved by military tactics, on computer, or at
workshops, but by field conservationist who build relationships with people living with wildlife or around
our national parks.
Garth Owen - Smith
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Aknowledments
First and foremost, I would like to thank my God almighty for being by my side as I walked this voyage, for
its not by power but by grace. May your holy name be exalted. I would like to thank my tutors Cyndy
Dominguezi the support and Dr Chuma Simukonda , for there invaluable support, direction and guidance
during this whole process and for believing I could do it. I couldn’t have done it without you. I would also
like to thank, Dr Chansa Chomba, Dr Patricia Mupeta Muyamwa, Dr. Rodgers Lubilo, your guidance made
the process easier. I am indebted to you for your input. I sincerely acknowledge the AIU for the scholarship
for my tuition and for giving me an opportunity to be part of the research team in advancing knowledge
about on Natural Resources Governace and opportunities to improve CBNRM and conservation for
Zambia. I also take this opportunity to extend my sincere gratitude to the Department of National Parks, my
employers, for their logistical and financial support during my research and most importantly for granting
the time to do my studies. Partners, Their Royal Higness (Patrons) Senior Chief Nsefu, Senior Chief
Luembe, Chief Malama, Chief Kakumbi, Chief Shezongo, Chief Musungwa, Chief Mulendema, Chief
Kaingu, Chief Kahare , and Community Resources Boards in the Kafue and Luangwa Landscapes were a
cardinal part of the process, especially during data collection. I would like to acknowledge my able research
team who were very efficient during data collection: My enumerators: Christopher Bwembya, John Sakala,
Talisoni Tembo and Gabriel Malembeka.
I am grateful to my family especially my brothers ( Tennyson and Eneya) my husband and children for
their pantience i needed it. Special thanks go to Mr and Mrs Msimuko Mum and Dad, you laid a strong
foundation for my education and I am grateful to God for having such wonderful supportive parents.
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
ADC Area development committee
ADMADE Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas
AGM Annual General Meeting
BRE Barotse Royal Establishment
CAMPFIRE Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
CBO community Based Organisation
CDC Community Development Committee
CBNRM Community-Based Natural Resource Management
CS community Scout
COMACO Community market for Conservation
CRB Community Resources Boards
DEA Directorate of Environmental Affairs
DRM Directorate of Resource Management
FMA Fisheries management committee
FMC finance management committee
HCA Hunting Concession Agreement
DNPW Department of National Parks and Wildlife
NPWS National Parks and Wildife Service
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TAA Traditional Authourities Act Namibia
GMA Game Management Area
GRZ Government of the Republic of Zambia
KLS Kafue Land Scape
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature
LIRDP Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project
VAG Village Action Group
PWE private wildlife Estates
RMC Resource Management Committee
SLAMU South Luangwa Area Management Unit
WPO Wildlife Policy Officers
ZAWA Zambia Wildlife Authority
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ABSTRACT
This study was set out to understand the effective performance of governance structures and approaches for
conservation of wildlife in Zambia. This relevant problem is at the core of this thesis and was examined in a
comparative analysis of Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM.) The study uses a
pragmatic approach to research, applying both qualitative and quantitative methods. Firstly, to achieve
objective one which is the assessment of governance structures, the trends in numbers and species per
landscape and the capacity for law enforcement by the community structures.
The philosophy of CBNRM is to enrich the involvement of communities in conservation of wildlife
resources and derive benefits from them. You would envisage that the amount of revenue gone into
communities that livelihoods would be enriched, but this is not the case from observation some communities
have improved and others area declining. In the areas where community livelihoods have improved so have
the wildlife populations, meaning the conservation of wildlife resources in these area is enhanced. The major
question that we have to ask is why are there differences in the impressions of livelihoods of people and
conservation of resources in the different landscapes? This would in turn convey positive development in
improving community livelihoods and conservation of wildlife. However, it has been witnessed that
improvement in these aspects of community development and wildlife management have not been across the
landscape. The inequalities of amounts of revenue raised and the impacts of development and conservation
are initiated in the structures and approaches of governance in communities, most resources have not been
used for the envisioned tenacities.
Additionally CBNRM assumes that economic incentives will induce the performance and goods of
individuals and subsequently transform local communities into active participants in conservation. It is
further believed that communities living around Protected like Game Management Areas in Zambia are will
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be keen to conserve Wildlife. The performance of most community structures of natural resource
management in the region is affected by many different factors.
Firstly, the extent to which policy and law form a facilitating environment or provide external legitimacy
particularly in devolving authority and responsibility for natural resource management to community
structures including rights to benefit is very critical.
Secondly, the level of internal legitimacy within the community structure derived from membership
participation in decision making based on levels of accountability and transparency as well as the integrity
of leaders is also important.
Thirdly, the absence of capacity in community structures is a common problem. The extent to which
community structures are supported as part of a deliberate strategy by different stakeholders has a major
influence on their performance.
Finally Governance processes which also affects the performance of the sructures,has a critical role that the
community governance structures plays in the conservation of wildlife. However, it is very important to take
in to consideration that the community needs to work hand in hand with the relevant wildlife authorities as
well as ensure that they abide by the existing laws and policies for conservation. In order to achieve active
participation in conservation, communities need to appreciate the benefits that come with cost of living with
wildlife and lost opportunitunities.
However the core to CBNRM effectiveness and performance in wildlife conservation lies in robust of
conditions as demanded by community’ s willingness to participate, benefit, and devolvement of decision
making function which has to encoded in crafting in interpretation of legislation and the political will to be
in cooperative, while understanding communities are not homogenous and governance concepts should be
left grow and evolve according to context.
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CHAPTER ONE
1. Introduction
In pre-colonial times traditional Chiefs on behalf of the community had authority over natural resources in
the Chiefdoms. They regulated the hunting, fishing and prevented unsustainable wildlife and forest products
harvesting as well as punished wrongdoers. (Cleaver, 1999). During the colonial times Chiefs lost this
authority with the introduction of formal institutions. The shift in governance system from the Chief to the
Colonial Master posed as a beginning of a problem as a result of the alienation of local communities from
productive land to create reserves which were only accessed by the white regime (Jones and Erdmann
2013). Past the colonial era the systems continued as the law was not revised until 1975 when Game and
Fisheries Departments was enacted. The colonial principles were adopted by 1964 as Zambia government
gained full outright control of the management of natural resources. This led to enhanced law enforcement
and complete alienation of traditional practices, customs, knowledge and institutional structures (Campbell
and Shackleton 2001).This scenario, combined with high population growth often ensued in increased
pressures on natural resources, loss of productivity of the land, loss of biodiversity, and encroachment on
protected areas (PA).This steered increased illegal harvest of natural resources products, and commercial
hunting of wild animals that prompted the CBNRM initiatives in the 1980s with the birth of the Luangwa
Integrated Resource Development project (LIRDP)(Gibson 1999).The former birthed the existence of the
Administrative Management Design (ADMADE) USAID funded program, which was a narrowed version to
concentrate on the wildlife resource.(Lewis,et al,1990).
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GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
Both versions of the concepts created governance structures, for community engagement ; under the
ADAMADE programme sub authourities were formed at chiefdom level whose initial leadership were
headed by the Chief.The sub authourities were working under the revolving fund mechanism of financing
with trophy hunting revenue sharing ratios of 35% to chiefs and their communities, 40% for GMA
management retained by the revolving fund, and 25% for NPWS’s general management (Gibson, 1999).The
Luangwa Integrated Resources and Development Project(LIRDP) started as a multi-sect oral concept, which
also created governance structure called Area Development committees (ADC) composing initially of 6
chiefs in Lupande with the senior Chief being the Chairperson of the ADC. The one ADC was later
segmented to 6 chiefdom ADC and chiefs ceased to be chairperson replaced by elected
representatives.While these two structure formed earlier were similar, the ADC structure retained initially
retained 40% of trophy hunting revenue, but later shifted to 100% revenue from trophy hunting channeled
to communities and the Norwegian Government funded operation for the Luangwa Valley. (Dalal-clayton
and Child, 2003) and had sub committees called the Village Action groups.Though a the structure under the
LIRDP concept was designed and imposed on communities who had no knowledge of the neo- liberal
democratic approach, they absorbed it well, although chief did urgue on their disatifaction which could
attributed their loss of authourity and control of the membership selection to the structure.
Further to this, gentleman’s Agreement concepts of ADMADE and LIRDP it led to the creation of the
current Community Based Natural Resources Management Program. The successes of the two approaches
led to the development of the National Parks and Wildlife Policy of 1998 that officially recognised the
participation of local communities in wildlife conservation. Further to this the Zambia Wildlife Act No.12 of
1998 was enacted giving birth to the Community Resources Boards (CRB’s) as structures for community
engagement and Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) to preside over wildlife estates. The approach led to
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the promotion of grass-root level institutions called Village Action Groups (VAG’s) which would interact
with Community Resources Boards (CRB’s) to provide improved community involvement.
The Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 established the Department of National Parks and Wildlife
(DNPW) with the aim of improving the management of the wildlife sector and fostering community
engagement. While the Wildlife Act of 2015 recognises CRB’s as special purpose vehicles for community
participation in Natural resources management, inadequate engagement and participation of local
communities in natural resources management id evident. This is further supported by Ostrom 1990,
Berkes 1989 who states that it is evidence that the proper role for the government as a partner to support
local communities in establishing and enforcing management rules in natural resources management is
cardinal through legislative reforms and political will.
Since 1964, the level of degradation of natural resources has drastically increased as a consequence of
deforestation, poaching, overgrazing, resettlement and poor farming techniques. These resulted into stake
holders introducing approaches that would use natural resources sustainably, to this effect, CBNRM
evolved with the realization that for sustainable use of natural resources, people living with the resources
should be responsible for their management and benefit from using the natural resources. This theory is
parallel to the state-centered approach described above, this introduction of CBNRM begun with an
endorsement of the Acts of parliaments (Roe and Nelson 2009).
In 1994, the Zambian government adopted the National Environmental Program Action Plan for the
environmental sector, in 1995 the fisheries bill was prepared, but this is yet to be enacted by parliament.
Under the wildlife sector, in 1997 the Zambia Wildlife Authority conducted a survey to devolve some
authority to local communities. This survey revealed that communities were not ready for absolute
authourity hence collaborative management had to continue. In 1998 the Zambia wildlife Act was passed
with strong CBNRM principles which led to community participation in wildlife management.
(simasiku,et.al, 2010)
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Suspected in this paper is that the governance structure and approaches were of relevance to effective
conservation of wildlife landscapes.
2. Problem Statement
The philosophy of CBNRM is meant to enhance the participation of communities in conservation of wildlife
resources and derive benefits from them. Currently the wildlife policy of 2018 and Wildlife Act no.14 of
2015 provide for the participation of local Communities in the management of wildlife through the local
governance structures called Community Resources Boards (CRB's) in all Game Management Areas
(GMAs) in Zambia (musumali, et.al, 2007) In the past 5 years the amount of revenue raised was
K243,585,540.15 out of this 50% of the revenue has gone to Communities. The intention of the 50% share is
that the 5% has been paid to the Chief as patron and 45% to communities for management and conservation.
You would expect that with the amount of revenue gone into communities, livelihoods would be improved
(CBNRM Annual report 2019). But this is not the case from observation some communities have improved
and others area deterioration. In the areas where community livelihoods have improved so have the wildlife
populations, meaning the conservation of wildlife resources in these area is performing better.
The major question that we have to ask is why are there differences in the impacts of livelihoods of people
and conservation of resources in the different landscapes? In the initial arrangement of the CBNRM
program, the Chief was the chairperson of the Board. It was observed that decision making was unbalanced
because what the chief could not be challenged.The problem was who would disagrees with the Chief of the
Land.
Because of this, the policy was revised to change the position of the Chief to that of CRB patron, whose
thinking deduced that the Chief would take up the role of an advisor to the Board, which would be chaired
by an elected subject, assisted by other committee members. It was hoped that this would enhance debate
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and discussions in decision making pertaining to revenue accrued and development and management
purposes.
This would in turn bring about positive development in improving community livelihoods and conservation
of wildlife. However, it has been observed that improvement in these aspects of community development
and wildlife management have not been across the Country. The inequalities in the amounts of revenue
raised and the impacts on rural livelihoods and conservation are initiated in the structures and approaches of
governance in communities, most resources have not been used for the intended purposes. This paper
investigates the effectiveness of governance structures and approaches to community conservation of
wildlife. To address this question a comparative analysis of the CBNRM structure and approaches in the
Luangwa and Kafue Landscapes will be conducted.
3. Purpose of the study
The research paper aims to analyse the impacts of governance approaches and structures for effectiveness to
conservation of wildlife in the Kafue and Luangwa ecosystems. Further the study aims to asses the
effectiveness of the structures as a model tool present in the achievement of attitude change in communities
supporting conservation.
4. Significance of the study
The ultimate goal is to have an effective community based natural resources management both in deeds and
practicability. The findings will be critical to the current challenges of community conservation and
ultimate solution redesigning and shaping community based conservation in Zambia.
The study will answer the question of how the governance structure for community engagement impacted
on the conservation of wildlife in Kafue and Luangwa Ecosystems.
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5. General Objective
The general objective of this study is to identify the institutional gaps, challenges, and capability to enable
local people to actively participate and make decisions in implementing effective strategies to community
conservation models. This will re-energize the need to build stronger CBNRM program in Zambia.
6. Specific objectives of the study
 To determine factors causing flaws in the governance approaches for Community based
conservation of wildlife.
 To establish the governance structures at community level and their contribution towards
effective community conservation.
 To establish major challenges in the involvement of Chiefs as Patrons/Matrons in the
Governance approach and structure for community Conservation.
 To deduce impacts derived at community level as a benefit of conservation.
 To find out how the approach and engagement in community conservation affects the
poaching levels from the local community.
 To establish if the CRB's comply to good governance principles.
 To explore options and make recommendations for relevant policy direction.
7. Research Questions
 What factors are causing flaws in the governance approaches for Community conservation?
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 What are governance structures at community level and their contribution towards effective
community conservation?
 What are major challenges in the involvement of Chiefs as patrons/Matrons in the Governance
approach and structure for community Conservation?
 What are the impacts derived at community level as a benefit of conservation?
 How has the approaches and engagement in community conservation affected the poaching
levels from the local community?
 Has the community benefited from the revenues accrued from conservation
 Does the CRB comply with good governance principles? ( transparency, accountability, decision
making)
 What options and recommendation can be drawn from the study relevant for policy direction?
8. Conceptual framework
The conceptual framework is basically highlighting the critical role that the community governance
structures play in the conservation of wildlife. However, it is very important to take in to consideration that
the community needs to work hand in hand with the relevant wildlife authorities as well as ensure that they
abide by the existing laws and policies for conservation. In order to achieve active participation in
conservation, communities need to appreciate the benefits that come with the cost of living with wildlife.
This basically entails that communities are willing to support government conservation efforts through their
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recognised governance structures. Additionally, the community requires to be prepared with information on
the guidelines and procedures that govern the Wildlife Management Regulatory Framework.(Murphree,M.
1991, Masfield, H.C, & winthdrop,D. 2000, Barrow,E. & Murphree 2001).
According to Asuma and Byamukama (2004), this process requires patience and tolerance; also calls for
transparency, and involvement of communities in decisions and community development activities at the
lowest levels (Musaasizi 2006);
Community-based conservation approaches to wildlife managements is preconditioned on its ability to alter
local behaviour and practices in ways that conform to the attainment of predetermined conservation and
community development goals (Gibson & Mark 1995; Metchalfe, 1994).
Additionally CBNRM assumes that economic enticements will affect the behaviour and goods of individuals
and subsequently transform local communities into conservationists. It is further believed that communities
living around Protected like Game Management Areas in Zambia are legally supposed to conserve Wildlife.
This is further supported by Agrawal (1999) who states that, It is sometimes vague whether community-
based Conservation programs involving buffer zones (game management areas in Zambia) built around
national parks are designed to offer appreciable economic benefits to local communities or merely to
implore for their participation in wildlife conservation programs.
Following the inception of CBNRM programs in Zambia the devolution of rights for communities to
management and benefit have not been fully surrendered by central government, which could be as a result
of political and legislative predicaments. Answering the question of how much power and responsibility
should be decentralized to local community structures and determining the optimal role of government in
CBNRM has not been clearly addressed (Samual M Bwalya 2002)
The SUSG Technical Advisory Committee have developed an analytic framework for sustainable use at a
conceptual level. The framework strongly endorses the emphasis on the importance of equity for social
sustainability, and the shift in emphasis away from technical biological functions and towards human-related
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factors, namely: Human population, socio-political and cultural, living natural resource, economic,
management, and external factors. At the time of writing, however, the framework was still undergoing
revision. This discussion is therefore structured around a modification of SASUSG’s (1996) comparative
decision-making framework (see Figure 1 ).
What we can learn from the frame work is that when applied in the context of what we are discussesing it
completely seats well, because we do a comparative analysis to at factors that each landscape is socially
sustained and how far is one from the other, we look at the population of the two landscapes both human and
wildlife in comparison to both Landscapes.On the economic aspect, we will compares which landscape
rakes in more money and how the resources managed effectively with respect to one another, conclude as to
which landscape is functioning effectively.
Our framework acknowledges the primacy of contextual factors (historical, attitudinal, political trends) as
these often create conditions where it is possible to do something, or one where the problems and
uncertainties in society are so large that they preclude action. When this is seen in terms of the communities
carried out in our study, we see how the chiefs, influence the performance of the structure and effectiveness
of the approach on the conservation of the wildlife resources. each other and in doing so we can derive
conclusions based on the theory in question
23
Figure 1.0: A Decision-making framework for wildlife utilization (adapted from SASUSG 1996).
While this theory may tend to look at wildlife utilization, we can draw some lessons from it and
apply them in terms of governance approaches and community structures. We can discuss at how
the current government approaches help to conserve wildlife, are the community structures in our
landscape efficient in the conservation and management of wildlife.
When the data is gathered it can further be related to which landscape has better performing
structures, where the government needs to do more because even as we look at the structures and
approaches we cannot completely ignore the conservation of wildlife, because oif wild life is not
conserved what exactly will be the point of community structures like the CBNRM,s and CRB’s if
there is no wildlife at all.
24
To distinguish between these two types of failures, our model suggests two possibilities for
maintaining wildlife as a land use option: A sustainable use approach and/or a protection approach.
The first takes advantage of situations where wildlife has a competitive advantage. Provided
economic ‘price’ and social distortions
9. Analytical Framework
When analysing the impacts of CBNRM governance approaches theory as an answer to effective
conservation of wildlife in Game Management Areas it is vital to understand the CBNRM
development processes in the study area (Zambia) have evolved to the point where change is
accelerating. Actions have, in general, moved it from the initiating stage to the implementing stage as
shown in the schematic diagram below. There is also substantial evidence that there is adequate
motivation throughout the process to continue to drive CBNRM to the sustaining stage.
In Zambia, CBNRM is at this implementing stage, and each effort has different characteristics,
different successes and failures, different lessons learned. It is the mobilization of the knowledge
gained in each effort combined with the enabling actions stemming from the broader context that can
propel CBNRM into the sustaining stage.
25
Figure 1.1: Zambian scenario CBNRM analytical framework adopted and adapted from (SASUSG 1996)
There are three development stages in the CBNRM governance processes; initiating, implementing
and sustaining;
The initiating stage is characterized by: an event (e.g., loss of a species), which creates awareness of
a need, problem or opportunity, which causes an infusion of ideas and information, creating
motivation to take action.The Nyamaluma workshop of 1983 was the initiating stage for the Zambian
CBNRM Philosophy, which enacted the birth of the concept. (Per.Observ)
The implementing stage is characterized by: organizing resources and structures for action (planning,
capacity building, re-structuring, etc.), followed by the infusion of technical inputs delivered through
extension and training, which create change.In the Zambia Scenario this is the 2000 enacted of the
philosophy which was supported by legislation of the Wildlife Act no. 12 of 1998, the concept was
then supported by law and re-organisation of the structures was initiated according to the provision
26
of the framework and capacity was provided for communities to participate in the appraoch through
uniform organized structures
The sustaining stage is characterized by: management of the system to assure that regular monitoring
and evaluation lead to identification of new opportunities and increased efficiency which will require
infusion of new technologies through regular and systematic information and extension leading to
higher productivity to secure a mixture of benefits which exceed the costs of the process, leading to
sustainability of the system.
We have folked CBNRM into –:
- Communities owning and earning from wildlife
- Communities deciding to cooperate because they are seeing the benefit
The devolution has a process, and we have not worked out a mechanism of how to get there.There is
no mechanism for communities to be prepared to move to the devolution stage.The process of
moving to the stage requires the structure, governance approach, distribution of resources in the
communities and investment before sharing the income.While we are running with the co-
management, we need to refine the legal framework,governance and structure for devolution to take
place.while guiding the process
The Zambian concepts seems to be stuck at the implementing stage for a long time, with a lot of
resistance to move to the sustaining stage and most flaws causing the resistance are discussed in the
on the governance and legislative gaps chapters four, five and seven of this paper.The challenges that
hinder the progression of the Zambia CBNRM programme eminate from; Lack of policy for
CBNRM, inadequate provision of legislation for devolution of rights; inaquate operationisation of
legislative provisions; Elite capture by both the Chiefs and elected members of the structures.
This framework describes a means of tracking the process of CBNRM development. It can be used at
any level of the operation (agency, district, Community Based Organisation, etc.) where inputs are
27
being made to help achieve the overall objective. As an assessment tool, it can be used to determine
broad trends and situations to identify the degree of momentum and development at the program
level. As a design tool, it could be used to chart the elements necessary in a program or project, as
well as help to estimate time and budget necessary to achieve a certain point in the process. As an
evaluative tool, it could be used to determine the comparative stages of development between
Community Based Organisations(CBO), or districts, or agencies at a specified point in time.
10. Key Words used in the study
Governance – is the formation and steward of institutions which we human manage our affairs
(child and wojcik, 2014).
Structure- Positioning of personnel, individuals or objects in the functioning of a system to achieve
set objectives, the positioning could be vertical or horizontal in a system for it to function which
could be created under relevant legislation or by prospective members which can also be
distinguished by composition of legal status by mostly composed of community members
Conservation- The management or control of human use of resources, biotic and abiotic and
activities on the planet or any other defined area in an attempt to restore, enhance, protect and sustain
the quality of a desired mix of species, and ecosystem conditions and processes for present and
future generation or conservation refers to the practice of protecting wild species and their habitats
in order to maintain healthy wildlife species or populations and to restore, protect or enhance natural
ecosystems.
Effectiveness – The ability of Community Resource Boards (CRB) to be successful and produce
their intended results.
28
Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) - an approach to the management
of land and natural resources which is relevant to, and has the potential to provide solutions to some
of the problems found within the communal lands, where the majority of people live with, and
depend on, natural resources with an adaptive approach with interfering with the needs for future
generations ( Breen et al, 2013,WWF, 2006)
CBNRM is a form of resource management is well known globally and locally. It stands for the devolution
from the state to local communities of rights to manage and reap the benefits from natural resources.
(Lubilo, 2018)
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
1. Introduction
This chapter discusses the literature related to the current studies, it highlights the different types of
community structures for natural resource management. It also examines the objectives, benefits,
membership and performance of the structures and highlights the existence of parallel structures at
community level.
29
2. Governance structures and approaches for conservation of wildlife in
Zambia
Conservation has been a state controlled facet dating back from the colonial times in most countries in the
southern Africa, however the concept of state control of protected areas did not yield much resulting into
species disappearance of wildlife populations. This called for re-institutionalisation of wildlife in community
owned areas (Child and Wojcik 2014). The belief of re-institutionalising wildlife resources is to add value,
devolve management rights to local as custodians and improve the governance of the wild resources
(Murphree, 2000).
According to Child and Wojcik 2014, governance is defined as formation and stewardship of institutions
that provide direction on political and economic life. According to International union for conservation of
Nature (IUCN) natural resources governance refers to the customs, institutions and procedures which define
how power and responsibilities over natural resources are applied in terms of decision making and benefit
sharing from the management of natural resources by local communities.
Historically, Zambia is a former British colony, during the colonial period natural resources were managed
by colonial Governments as reserves for the white elite and these methods constrained access to adjacent
communities. After independence this approach continued to prevail. Illegal and unsustainable resource use
followed and national wildlife authorities were overwhelmed. To meet the challenges a policy and
legislation regarding community inclusion to improve management, conservation and sustainable use of
natural resources, particularly wildlife. New institutions were created to implement CBNRM in park buffer
areas, namely Community Resource Boards Zambia (M.M Musumali et,al 2007).
In today’s world Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) has been regarded as the
most efficient management tool in managing common resources. (Child, 2002). CBNRM as a concept has
been defined differently from country to country. However, WWF (2006) defines CBNRM as an approach
30
to the management of land and natural resources which is relevant to, and has the potential to provide
solutions to some of the problems found within the communal lands, where the majority of people live with,
and depend on, natural resources, However, in Zambia the most common approach to natural resource
management is CBNRM, which is based upon the principle of ownership of natural resources, an option for
development of a co-management arrangement of a variety of natural resource with stakeholders, with the
emphasis on local communities. (Child, 2005)
Since early 80s, Zambia has made tremendous efforts to incorporate and work with local communities and
private sectors in realizing good conservation practices and community benefits. The early attempts include
the ADMADE and the LIRDP program and project. These two programmes and learning from regional
experiences informed the revalidation of the wildlife laws. Both the 1998 and 2015 Acts recognizes the need
for rural communities as primary beneficiaries to be involved in the management processes of the wild
resources. In order to achieve these goals, the act recognizes the role of community participation through
the recognized structures to contribute towards wildlife conservation.
Most of Rural Communities living in Game Management Areas which are buffer zones to National Parks in
Zambia have evidence of Co- existence. However this coexistence culture, has in the long run resulted in
negative attitudes towards conservation efforts.
3. Types of community structures for natural resource management
A community structure may be created under relevant legislation by an Act of Parliament or by the
prospective members. The primary purpose of the structure is to support the community in achieving the
stated objectives. The proponents and participants or intended beneficiaries must be the community
members. Community structures may be distinguished by composition or by legal status.
In terms of composition, there are those that are composed of community members only and those that have
community members with representatives of other stakeholders. Lower level structures such as Village
31
Action Groups (VAG) and Village Resource Management Committees (VRMC) are composed of
community members only while higher level structures such as Community Resource Boards (CRB), Forest
Management Committees (FMC) and Fisheries Management Committees (FMC) have other stakeholders
(Local Authority, Traditional ruler or a representative, Private Sector, Government Departments or anybody
they chose) as members partly to promote stakeholder participation and partly to improve governance.
In terms of legal status, there are FIVE main types of community structures: Committees or Boards: These
are formed under sector-specific natural resource legislation for purposes of co-management. Their
formation, membership, objectives, functions and mechanisms for benefit sharing are prescribed in the
legislation which also regulates them. Examples include Community Resources Boards (CRB) and Fisheries
Management Committees (FMC) in Zambia.
Societies, Trusts or Cooperatives: These are community based organizations (CBOs) which are legal entities
in their own right. They are required to obtain formal registration upon fulfilling stipulated conditions. By
definition CBO’s define their own membership and objectives, are self-regulating and have legal personality
to enter into formal contracts with other legal entities.
They are required to meet statutory requirements on an annual basis including audited accounts, minutes of
the Annual General Meeting and details of any changes in the name of the organization or composition of
the highest decision-making organ. Examples include Mukuni Development Trust in Livingstone, which has
entered into contracts with tour operators to give a percentage of income from tourists visiting Chief
Mukuni’s area (AWF 2006).
Forest Trusts under Joint Forestry Management (JFM) in Zambia are registered as Societies and relate to the
Forestry Department through a memorandum of understanding (PFAP II 2005). Other examples include
Community Trusts in Botswana and Conservancies in Namibia.
32
In Botswana, one of the main conditions for communities to obtain secure access to a wildlife quota, which
they can use to go into joint ventures with the private sector, is that they register as a Trust or Cooperative
(Rozemeijer & van der Jagt in Shackleton & Campbell 2000).
In Namibia groups of farmers or communities must define their boundaries and membership, show capacity
to manage funds, produce a constitution supporting sustainable management and utilization of game as well
as a benefit-sharing mechanism among the members before they can be registered and their boundaries
gazetted as a Conservancy (Jones & Mosimane in Shackleton & Campbell 2000; Child et al 2001). These
community structures are considered as legal holders of the rights for natural resource management
devolved from Central Government.
Companies: This option is mainly used for purposes of doing business and entering into business
partnerships.
Giving community structures the status to engage in business profitably and diversifying their sources of
income from natural resources is a significant step in capacity building.
This type of structure offers the option of a non-profit making organization (company limited by guarantee
under section 19 of the Companies Act), which allows the conducting of business not for distribution among
shareholders but investment in the stated objectives of the company.
The Community Markets for Conservation (COMACO) is a registered company limited by guarantee which
is a partnership involving an international NGO (Wildlife Conservation Society), the District Council and
the Community Resources Boards. At community level, COMACO establishes Conservation Trading
Centres (CTC) working with cooperatives at the grassroot, which provide stable prices and a guaranteed
market for agricultural produce for farmers complying with conservation farming techniques and a local
land use plan (WCS 2007).
33
Another example is the Mukuni Cultural Tours Limited formed under the Mukuni Development Trust in
Livingstone mentioned where communities benefit on revenues raised through scholarships for needy and
livelihood for opharns.
Traditional authorities: Although traditional authorities no longer have the same authority over resources as
they had before, they still have an influential role in society especially in land administration (Mbewe 2007;
Hansungule 2007). Traditional authorities historically owned and administered natural resources including
land on behalf of their subjects until natural resource ownership was nationalized (MENR 1999).
The Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) provides an elaborate system of community structures for natural
resource management through a representative structure, a set of rules and regulations about accessing and
using resources, a system of courts to monitor the performance of the rules and centralized ownership of all
resources in the kingdom by the Litunga on behalf of the community (Mbikusita-Lewanika undated).
The BRE demonstrates clearly how elaborate, equitable and comprehensive some traditional systems for
resource management are. The effectiveness of such systems is, however, eroded by various factors
including modernization, migration, nationalization and a breakdown of customs and of ultimate traditional
jurisdiction. However, the positive synergies of this system should be cultivated especially as traditional
authorities still play an influential role in all matters in their areas.
The poor performance of community structures is positively related to perceptions among the general
membership of poor accountability and lack of transparency among the leaders including traditional rulers
(Lubilo in Dalal-Clayton & Child 2003). Experiences in JFM in Malawi suggest that where tribal
composition is more diverse, traditional leadership is not held in high respect but in such areas community
structures tend to be more successful (Kayambazinthu in Shackleton & Campbell 2000). The lesson is that
regardless of the type of community structure, of critical concern is whether and how that structure
addresses its objectives and enhances governance in its administration and activities.
34
CBNRM is one aspect that has helped in the conservation of wild life and other natural resources, all this has
been well reached through the establishment of CBNRM.
4. RESULTS AND ANALYIS
A. The current structure of CBNRM
After the initiation of the two pilot CBNRM concepts for community engagements in the 1980s, each
GMA in the ADMADE program maintained a committee called the sub-authority. Members of the sub-
authority whose appointed was done through the local chief with adual role of being chairperson of the
sub-authority. The sub-authority decided how community revenue should be utilised, selected local residents
for employment as village scouts, and was responsible for interacting with NPWS staff on management
issues. This system of local governance was effective persuasive for traditional rulers support, a essential
component to establishing the program in an area. However, it also led to many glitches with autocratic and
non-democratic styles of governance (Alpert & DeGeorges, 1992). The two pilots mushroomed to the
current three tiered CBNRM philosophy using the Community resources Board (CRB) as vehicle for
Community Participation in wildlife conservation.The later concept is more democratic in approach,which
incorporates the local chief as Patron, building upon the 1998 Wildlife Act which devolves more control in
community based organizations. The CRB is comprised and advised by three sub- technical management
committees also composed of residents of the village action group and chiefdom namely: the financial
management committee, community development committee, and resource management committee. To
ensure equitable representation from all geographic areas within a Chiefdom, each CRB has been sub-
divided into village Action Groups (VAG’s), and representation on the CRB and management committees is
equal across VAG’s. (Ngulube et al., 1998). The CRB structure has existed for over 20 years in the Zambian
CBNRM philosophy, though democratic on paper, the practice has brought a lot of unpopularity among
35
government sector, local communities and NGO’s supporting the concept due to constrained progress in
achieving equitable social economic benefits sharing and its impact on Wildlife Conservation (Per.Obser)
Zambia’s CBNRM program has been criticized for weak governance with little accountability to the people.
Corruption, patronage, and vying interests hinder rather than promote the conventionally accepted processes
of policy discussion and formulation needed to reform and expand the wildlife sector. Consequently, one
cannot expect conventional approaches of policy reform to work. In common with the other case studies,
reform is likely to be opportunistic, following the emergence of leadership that may emanate from a number
of places, including government itself, communities, non-governmental organizations (NGO’s), civil
society, and donors.
When we break the structure to its details, the community is the simply the place or area with the resources.
In this study, i will look at the Kafue and Luangwa Landscapes were we have Mumbwa and Namwala,
Mufunta and Nkala GMA’s and Lupande, Lumimba and West Petauke GMAs.
In Zambia the CRB is the most recognised, most noticeable and established of the community structures
covered by appropriate policy and legislation . Although the CRB is created under an Act of Parliament and
therefore has legal status under the Wildlife Act No 14 of 2015, it has no legal personality of its own as it
has no recognised status outside wildlife legislation. Furthermore, the CRB does not have the same rights to
other resources as it does to wildlife. (AWF 2006; Murombedzi 2003).
And further CRB's are formed under sector-specific natural resource legislation for purposes of co-
management. Their formation, membership, objectives, functions and mechanisms for benefit sharing are
prescribed in the legislation which also regulates them.
CRB’s are divided into Village Action Groups (VAG's’). VAG’s are the “building blocks” of the CRB’s.
These are smaller groupings, where VAG committee members can more easily interact with the community
at large.
36
The CRB’s are comprised of representatives of the VAG’s. The Chairperson of each VAG will usually be
the representative on the Board. Other VAG members may be co-opted into the Technical sub-committees.
The CRB will also include a Chief’s Representative, and someone nominated by the Local Authority. CRB's
can invite anyone else to attend meetings, but they will not be able to vote. In theory CRB's will conduct
their work through the VAG's, coordinated by the committees. There will usually be at least seven and no
more than ten VAG's in each CRB. A VAG would usually have not more than 500 households in its area –
usually fewer. The committee is supported by a secretariat which currently consists of Bookeeper and a
Coordinator
1. Community structures as legal entities
Despite its short falls interms limited authourity which only exist within the Willdife sector in the creation of
the structure and lack of legal persona, the Forestry Act No. of 2015 gives the CRB additional mandate to
deal in forestry products but act as if it’s a Forestry Management Group through Recognition.To overcome Comment [BM1]: To consult
tennyson
this legal technicality, the recently created Forest Trusts for JFM in Zambia are registered as Societies
giving them full legal status and personality (PFAP II 2005). While Community Trusts as CBOs have both
legal status and legal personality and can therefore negotiate contracts with other legal entities. In Zambia
Trusts are very few and do not have any rights to any natural resources (Metcalfe 2005) except the new
Forest Trusts which have not really been tested yet. The description of the Mukuni Development Trust in
Livingstone though located in open areas provides an important model for natural resource based economic
development supported by local empowerment through acquisition of legal status and improved land and
resource tenure (AWF 2006). The Kabuwebulwe Trust in Mumbwa is the legal owner of the land and the
Kafumba Kwale Community Lodge which was built with support from DANIDA.
37
In Namibia and Botswana and recently under the new Forestry Act in Zambia, communities have to
organize themselves into legal entities before they can be granted any rights to resources in their areas
following clearly laid down procedures and stipulated requirements.
Community structures created as legal entities are better placed to acquire the necessary recognition
including rights to wild resources management and to access other types of support. Recognition of
community structures as legal entities creates opportunities for economic empowerment through
partnerships and joint ventures.
The lesson is that there are important advantages and opportunities where community structures have
acquired legal status.
2. Multiple natural resource management
Although none of the existing community structures reviewed have the official mandate as the single
community structure for multiple natural resource management, the more established community structures
under wildlife legislation in Zambia are addressing issues under forestry and fisheries already. The
combination of objectives for community structures and the context within which the objectives are set
suggest a multiple natural resource management approach by a single structure. For example, the first
function of the CRB is to promote and develop an integrated approach to the management of human and
natural resources and some community structures are even named as such e.g. Village Natural Resource
Management Committees (VNRMC).
Additionally, there is already an understanding that where a community structure for wildlife (CRB) is
present, a new structure for forestry (Forest Trust) should not be created. The opposite should also be true
provided that the community structures are legal entities and they are given the necessary management
rights or authority. A similar understanding could be reached with Fisheries where this is possible as is the
38
case on the Bangweulu Swamps where the Fisheries Management Committee works closely with Mulakwa
CRB on resource protection.
The Fisheries Amendment Act of 2007 provides for consultations with the CRB before forming a Fisheries
Management Committee where a Fisheries Management Area (FMA) is declared within an existing GMA.
The same should apply to Forest Trusts when an FMA is declared in an existing JFM area.
The lesson is that an approach that promotes multiple natural resource management by a single community
structure in a given area is already being practiced to a certain extent unofficially. Such a single community
structure for multiple natural resources management, however, must have the necessary characteristics and
capacity to perform its functions in a multiple stakeholder environment. It is cheaper and more efficient in
terms of transaction costs for all involved if there is a single community structure responsible for all natural
resources under their jurisdiction. The multiple natural resource management approach must, however, be
facilitated by an enabling policy environment.
3. Objectives of community structures
The two main objectives of the different community structures are biodiversity management and community
development. The lesson is that both of these objectives require additional capacity to achieve. Given the
difficulties that are being experienced in the running of community structures, future directions for CBNRM
suggest that there should be much more emphasis on institution building through increased and extended
engagement of the community in a process of internal capacity building (Murphree 2004). This will require
investment in the community structures so that they have access to the necessary technical services both on a
short term and long term basis.
The Zambia Wildlife Act provides for Community Resources Boards to have full time secretariats to carry
out their day to day activities. This has generally not been achieved except for a few leading to a situation
39
where board members are performing jobs that are meant for full time employees. This partly accounts for
the poor performance of most community institutions (Changa Management Consultants 2006).
4. Benefits to communities
One of the pillars of community participation in conservation of natural resource management, in policy and
practice, is the delivery of economic benefits in the form of incomes, jobs and rural development (Blaikie
2006). However, the actual availability and distribution of benefits is challenging (Murphree 2001) as
benefits are not enough, opportunities for generating them are limited, capacity for exploiting them low and
mechanisms for distributing them inadequate. Other benefits are ecological and cultural in the form of
services which communities are supposed to manage in a sustainable way. Unfortunately, unsustainable
harvesting of resources leading to general environmental degradation and natural resource depletion
continues in light of the limited benefits and capacity to address the situation.
It is this poor delivery of promised benefits to rural communities and inadequate management of natural
resources in spite of community participation that is the basis of skepticism about community conservation
(Blaikie 2006). It is also the motivation for approaches that promote economic empowerment (Child 2003)
and clear resource rights as incentives for natural resource management at local level.
One of the reasons why Community Resources Board (CRB) is the most established community structure
for natural resource management is the 50% share of hunting revenue. It is anticipated that future revisions
of this mechanism will be on account of good performance in meeting identified and mutually agreed
benchmarks ( ZAWA-Ibis workshop 2004).
Opportunities for generating benefits will differ from place to place depending on available resources,
market value of the resources, human and resource densities and accessibility (Jones & Murphree in Child
2004). The lesson is that where densities of high value resources are higher more benefits will be generated.
However, a high human population might jeopardize the impact of these benefits and their distribution.
40
Another lesson is that the distribution of benefits is likely to be easier and more equitable where membership
is well defined and a membership list exists.
Where producer or user groups are organized in small, focused, productive and self-reliant groups,
distribution of benefits and general mobilization are likely to improve. This approach has been adopted by
the DANIDA/GRZ CBNRM Mumbwa Project, the North Luangwa Wildlife Conservation and Community
Development Project (NLWCCDP), the Community Markets for Conservation (COMACO) and the Forest
Trusts for Joint Forestry Management (JFM). (WCS 2007).
A single source of benefits e.g. safari hunting is therefore doomed to failure in areas of low resource
densities (Jones & Murphree in Child 2004) unless the generation of income from other resources (e.g.
forestry, fisheries licenses, tourism) is possible under a single structure for multiple natural resource
management in that particular area. Since benefits are simply not enough to go round and influence
behaviour, priority should be given to the creation of the necessary environment for community participation
in economic activities. It’s a pr-requiste of the CBNRM Philosophy that benefits from resource
management must essentially be linked to conservation practices as transparently and as immediately as
possible for those conservation practices to become integrated into local livelihood strategies and institutions
(Child, 1996a).It is essentially the direct link that encourages community to support the CBNRM concept,
and therefore other benefits that come from central treasury as an over arking responsibility of government
can not deter negative altitudes and illegal off takes of wildlife.
Another lesson is that adopting an enterprise approach to wildlife management at various levels ranging
from producer groups targeting households to community owned business entities will combine biodiversity
management with sustainable use and increase socioeconomic, ecological and cultural benefits through
diversification. Economic activities can serve as an incentive for compliance to land husbandry practices.
Where the community structure is a legal entity and enters into partnerships, the potential for increasing the
magnitude of benefits also increases.
41
5. Performance of community structures
The performance of most community structures of wildlife management in the region is affected by many
different factors. Firstly, the extent to which policy and legislation create an enabling environment or
provide external legitimacy particularly in devolving authority and responsibility for natural resource
management to community structures including rights to benefit is very crucial.
Secondly, the level of internal legitimacy within the community structure derived from membership
participation in decision making based on levels of accountability and transparency as well as the integrity
of leaders is also important.
Thirdly, the lack of capacity in community structures is a common problem. The extent to which community
structures are supported as part of a deliberate strategy by different stakeholders has a major influence on
their performance.
In such circumstances and given the general consensus about the importance of this approach, innovative
ways of mobilizing additional resources and different stakeholders to support capacity building need to be
found. A formal or informal consortium of stakeholders with the requisite skills and experience can for
example pool resources, develop a shared vision for developing the performance of community structures
and understanding the critical issues for moving forward.
Examples of this approach include the Namibian Association of Community Based Natural Resource
Management Support Organization (NASCO); the IUCN/SNV CBNRM Support Programme in Botswana;
the Coordination Unit for the Rehabilitation of the Environment (CURE) in Malawi; and the CAMPFIRE
Collaborative Group in Zimbabwe.
The main findings of the SWOT Analysis of the community structures gave the following general picture:
6. Strengths
42
 Cooperation with Government in natural resource management interventions and decision making
processes.
 Rights to some benefits as a result of this participation
 Improved relations with stakeholders
 A direct linkage with the traditional authorities
7. Weaknesses
 Low membership participation
 Inadequate and poor distribution of benefits
 Low transparency and accountability
 Limited capacity to achieve objectives
8. Opportunities
 Empowering policy and legal frameworks
 Stakeholder willingness for partnerships with communities including the private sector and NGOs
 Training
 Formal mechanisms for recognizing community structures
9. Threats
 Absence of an integrated approach to natural resource management
 Inadequate resource rights and limited devolution

43
 Inadequate capacity (finances and personnel) in Government Departments and statutory institutions
for natural resource management and for supporting community structures
 Inadequate benefit and incentives for stakeholder participation
 Absence of a deliberate policy for CBNRM
 Natural resource depletion and environmental degradation
Given that there is institutional weakness and limited capacity at many levels, this means that there are
improvements needed within the community structures (Jones & Murphree in Child 2004). More effort is
required not only in creating an enabling environment for improved performance of community structures
(Jones 2004) but deliberate and quality support to improve capacity (Child 2004).
Community members easily loose interest in the affairs of the community structure that they are supposed to
be members of as a result of not having adequate information or not being involved by their leaders.
Sometimes this is based on actual incidences of abuse of authority or lack of accountability and transparency
in financial management. The lesson is that poor accountability or transparency in the community structure
or a poor perception of the leadership by the general membership leads to apathy and affects participation
negatively. Where the opposite is the case, performance of the community structures in terms of support and
the number of projects started and completed improved (Dalal-Clayton & Child 2004). Chiundaponde CRB
was dissolved after allegations of abuse of funds and assets caused tension between the CRB, the Chief and
the community.
Attendance of VAG meetings was reported to be low in Mnkhanya CRB because members did not see any
benefit in doing so. The Wildlife Management Sub Authority (WMSA) at chiefdom level during the era of
the Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE) before CRB's was
dominated by political, civic and traditional leaders. A lack of accountability to the community in decision
making (Mbewe 2007; ADC 2000) was part of the justification for recommending that CRB leadership
positions should be through democratic elections and not by appointment or on account of position. It was
44
also on this basis that the role of traditional rulers was changed from an executive one to a ceremonial one.
Another lesson is that special attention should be given to institutional development in order for community
structures to be seen to be growing into stronger institutions with internal governance procedures providing
direction and input from the membership in decision making regarding the affairs of the community
structure.
Yet another lesson is that the creation of community structures and distribution of benefits alone is not
enough to control resource depletion unless the linkage between the benefits and wild resources
management is strong and demonstrated in livelihood terms.
This will encourage communities to see natural resource management as the land use option of choice from
an economic point of view. Otherwise, Whiteside (2000) found that communities in Sichifulo and Mulobezi
GMAs were benefiting far much more from their agricultural and informal activities for their subsistence
than from wildlife. In the South Luangwa Area Management Unit (SLAMU), high levels of snaring were
found in one community even when that community was receiving the highest level of household cash
income compared with other chiefdoms. Lewis & Phiri (1998) suggested that this may have been a result of
poor linkages between the source of the income distributed to households and wildlife conservation. They
also highlighted the need for investing in capacity building at community level.
The desired outcome of improved performance of community structures in conservation of wildlife is a long
process that requires much more effort, time, capacity and money than is presently available at all levels.
This requires a revision of the assumptions on which CBNRM programmes have been based so far
particularly regarding community mobilization and capacity building (Rozemeijer 2003). The Ministry of
Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources (2005a) has stated that the lack of incentives for community
and private sector participation in conservation and environmental management has rendered CBNRM
ineffective.
45
5. Other Parallel Structures
Districts in Zambia are divided into constituencies for purposes of electing Members of Parliament.
Constituencies are subdivided into Wards for local Government. Each of these structures has a Development
Committee with a holistic people-oriented development mandate. There are plans to strengthen these
structures under the decentralization policy.
In Malawi, community structures for natural resource management report to these peoples’ committees at
community level. They are also supported by the Forestry Department since co-management blocks are
defined as Village Forest Areas (Kayambazinthu in Shackleton & Campbell 2000) with overlaps in area of
coverage and membership between these two types of structures.
In Zambia, District Councils and the Development Committees under them do not have any mandate for
natural resource management and do not derive any benefit from them. Under the decentralization policy,
however, natural resource management is among the functions of central government to be devolved to
district and sub-district level institutions. Community structures for natural resource management should
therefore be seen to be part of the development committees as they address natural resources specifically and
have formal rights to do so. The lesson is that there are parallel structures at community level some of which
even overlap in terms of area of coverage and membership with community structures for natural resource
management.
46
CHAPTER THREE
1. METHODOLOGY
This research is a desk study employing a qualitative approach, though a case study was sought. Through
this methodological approach, the research attempts to answer the question whether governance approaches
have been effective for conservation of wildlife in the Luangwa and Kafue system. It also applies a
combination of tools for purpose of data collection.
I. Proposed methodological approach - Data Collection –
A purposive sampling will be employed; interviews will be conducted based on semi-structured and open
ended questionnaires targeting responsible Communities, Community Resources Boards, Chiefs in the two
study sites, and institutions and organizations responsible for implementing community Conservation
Approaches. This method is appropriate in collecting the primary data for understanding the situation.
Secondary data will provide information on the existing policies and institutional response. It will be
acquired from available literature (Archival review of policy document) by reviewing policies, programmes
and activities’ documents from the selected institutions and organizations linked to Community
Conservation and governance.Other sources of information and data were collected through CBNRM
workshops, internal reports on revenues for 5 years back, quotas and animal counts report and law
enforcement data.
II. Data Analysis –
Direct interpretation will be used based on presented, collected and tabulated data in tables using R-studio
and excel. The analysis will focus on categorical aggregation and formed patterns of responses established
from the respondents and reviewed documents.
47
III. Proposed research tools –
Semi-structured interviews and open ended questionnaires will be used in primary data collection,
observations in the selected sites. Notes will be taken by the researcher and recorded.
Study sites
Under the Kafue Landscape; Four Game Management Areas (GMA’s) and six community resources Boards
have been selected for the research. The two CRB's ( Mulendema and Kabulwebulwe situated in Mumbwa
Game Management Area (GMA) situated in the western side of Kafue National Park (KNP) with an
approximate size 3370 square kilometers (km2 ) and Kaingu and munyama (Shimbizi) CRB's situated in
Namwala GMA located in the southern side of Kafue National park with an approximate size of 3600 km2
square, Musungwa CRB situated in Nkala Game Management Area on the southery boundary of KNP
with an approximate size of 194 km2 and Kahare CRB located in Mufunta Game Management Area (GMA),
the buffer zone bordering (KNP) on its western boundary with an approximate size of 5,417 km2 . It is
situated in Kahare Chiefdom, located in Nkeyema and Luampa districts in the Western Province of Zambia.
The total number of community resources Boards for Kafue Land scape adds to six.
48
Figure 3.0: Map for Kafue Landscape
49
The Luangwa Landscape study site has five Community Resources Boards comprsing of three Game
Management Areas namely upper and lower Lupande,and West Petauke with the following Community
Resources Boards; Nsefu , Malama and Kakumbi CRB's located in the westerly and southerly direction of
Nsefu Park with an approximate size 4,840 km2 while Mwanya Community Resources Board situated in
Lumimba a GMA situated in the north westwards boundary of South Luangwa National Park with an
approximate size of 4500 km2 and Luembe Community Resources Board located in west petauke GMA
boardering Petauke and Serenje districts on the westerly direction of Lunsenfwa River with an approximate
50
size of 4,140 km2 . This landscape adds up to 5 CRB's namely Malama, Kakumbi, Nsefu, Mwanya, and
Luembe.
Figure 3.1: Map for Luangwa Landscape
51
CHAPTER FOUR
CBNRM GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
1. INTRODUCTION
The chapter presents the findings of the assessment of governance structures in Kafue and Luangwa
Landscapes. Governance involves decision-making and implementation of decisions made. Understanding
the two processes requires an analysis of the actors involved and institutions established for making and
implementing decisions. The study analyses how actors in CBNRM are guided by socio-political structures
as apparatus in the implementation process. Therefore, through a trans-disciplinary approach of knowledge
co-production with the research participants, the actors are identified, and the coordination arrangements
evaluated
According to UNESCO, governance refers to structures and processes that are designed to ensure
accountability transparency responsiveness, rule of law, equity and inclusiveness through which public
affairs are managed, in a broad sense governance is about culture and institutional environment for citizen
and stakeholder interaction.
In the context of community conservation governance will be defined as the leadership of local communities
in the protection of biodiversity resources through multi level governance structures in which fundendmental
rights are respected customary pratices are cocontusted among communitiesm civil society and government
(DNPW, 2018)
In the two study sites the most prevalent governance approach for the conservation of wildlife is co-
management in which the communities and government have partnered to conserve the wildlife resources,
52
co-management is a management process in which the government and resource users share power.
Everyone has specific rights and responsibilities related to information and decision-making. Co-
management recognizes the pragmatic development and progress of system choice theory in natural resource
management. This innovative concept includes a diversified management approach based on the principle of
subsidiarity and creates opportunities to coordinate competing property claims. (Conley & Moote, 2003,
(Conley & Moote, 2003)
2. BACKGROUND
Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) is an emerging international model for natural
resource management (Gruber, 2010). In this study CBNRM is analysed from the perspective of co-
management. In relation to natural resources, the term management can be understood as the right to
regulate internal use patterns and transform resources to make improvements and these activities can be
performed by single actors or jointly by groups of individuals or as a result of cooperation (Carlsson &
Berkes, 2005).
The World Bank defines co-management as the sharing of responsibilities, rights and duties between the
primary stakeholders, in particular, local communities and the government. The assessment focuses on
collaboration and coordination for improving co-management. Co-management can be improved through
coordination to enhance the collaboration strategy. In real life, comanagement systems might be described as
networks that according to their qualities can be labelled in different ways (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005).
Co-management is based on broad levels of cooperation. It relies on “the collaboration of a diverse set of
stakeholders operating at different levels, often in networks, from local users, to municipalities, to regional
and national organisations” (Olsson et al., 2004). An integrating term, “adaptive co-management”, combines
the dynamic learning characteristics of adaptive management with the collaborative networks. Research on
CBNRM has focused on resource management rather than managing the stakeholder relationships that is
crucial for effective comanagement.
53
I. DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY
Data based on this chapter was collected using different methods and it came in different forms, it was
collected through questionnaires, through guided interviews ( with Communities, partners, chiefs, Legal
Counsels, former and current government officials and other stake holders, and from already published
documentation. The collected data was then analysed statistically as well as naratively with all data sets
carefully analysed and looked upon without any form of bias
54
CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
INSTITUTION AND MANAGEMENT
1. Introduction
The institutions for community conservation in both the Luangwa and Kafue landscape that are ancored to
wildlife conservation are Community Resources Boards, and the approach for implementation of the concept
is Co- Management through the CBNRM philosophy.The institutions for CBNRM have evolved in terms
of functions and implementation from the 1980s during administrative management design (ADMADE)
and Luangwa Intergrated Rural Development Project.(LIRDP) to the current Community Based Natural
Resources Management (CBNRM) – Community Resources Boards ( CRB's) approach.
2. The current structure of CBNRM
Zambia’s CBNRM program has been criticized for weak governance with little accountability to the people.
Corruption, patronage, and vying interests hinder rather than promote the conventionally accepted processes
of policy discussion and formulation needed to reform and expand the wildlife sector. Consequently, one
cannot expect conventional approaches of policy reform to work. In common with the other case studies,
reform is likely to be a difficult topic and may not be as straight forward as we want it to be, following the
emergence of leadership that may emanate from a number of places, including government itself,
communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society, and donors.
55
The CBNRM structure in Zambia is mostly centered around the CRB, this is because in most cases the
CRB is seen as a central point, the community is in most cases organised under the CRB as a structure for
community conservation in both Game Management Areas and Open Areas, the chief as Patron can only
operate through the CRB, the same can be said when we look at it from the governments point of view and
also by the VAG, and while the VAG may only be comprised of a few house holds what is seen is they get
there direction from the CRB.
Figure 4.0; Current structure of CBNRM
When we break the structure to its details, the community is the simply the place or area with the
resources.In the case of the study, the focus is the Kafue and Luangwa Landscapes were we have Mumbwa
and Namwala, Mufunta and and Nkala GMA’s, while Luangwa site has as Lupende, Lumimba and West
Petauke GMAs.
 The Government and council are board members who have direct role to give technical guidance
on wildlife and development planning matters,
 The chief of the area is represented as a board member,
 The lack of a link between elected Board member and the general community,
56
 The restriction of sub committees to only three components.
CRB’s, are formed under sector-specific natural resource legislation for purposes of co-management. Their
formation, membership, objectives, functions and mechanisms for benefit sharing are prescribed in the
legislation which also regulates them. In Zambia the CRB is the most established, most visible and most
tested of the community structures and is covered by appropriate policy and legislation. Although the CRB
is created under an Act of Parliament and therefore has legal status under the Wildlife Act No 14 of 2015, it
has no legal personality of its own as it has no formal status outside wildlife legislation. Furthermore, the
CRB does not have the same rights to other resources as it does to wildlife.
CRB's are divided into Village Action Groups (VAG's). VAG's are the “building blocks” of the CRB's. They
are smaller areas, where VAG committee members can more easily interact with the community at large.
The CRB's are comprised of representatives of the VAG's. The Chairperson of each VAG will usually be the
representative on the CRB. Other VAG members may be co-opted into the sub-committees (Davis, 2020).
The CRB will also include a Chief’s Representative, and someone nominated by the Local Authority and a
representative of the Wildife Department . CRB's can invite anyone else to attend meetings, but they will not
be able to vote. CRB's will conduct their work through the VAG's, coordinated by the committee. There
will usually be at least seven and no more than ten VAG's in each CRB. A VAG would usually have not
more than 500 households in its area – usually fewer (DNPW, 2018).
3. Weaknesses in the governance structures
The study further sought to probe and compare the existence and extent of weaknesses in the governance
structures in the CRB's of both Luangwa and Kafue landscapes. The guidelines are a limiting factor in terms
of the descriptive guidance on who should participate in the elections. The process of conducting elections is
where the Chief is part of the electoral committee and screening process for candidates, the outcome of the
process is compromised when other committee members are not strong enough to refute demands from the
57
Chief. This dominance usually ends in having weak candidates to contest in the elections and nominates his
candidate od choice in the election process, this compels people to vote for the person the chief endorses
even if the individual is incompetent.The responses from Individual community members is presented in the
figure below.
Figure: 4.1 Weakness in the governance structures of the CRB in Luangwa and Kafue landscapes
Figure: 6, indicates perception on weaknesses in the governance structure of the CRB's in Luangwa
compared with Kafue landscape. The figure shows that 12 respondents of 33 total respondents who
attempted the question (36%) in Luangwa strongly disagree to the idea that the CRB has a weakness in its
governance structure while 21 (64%) were optimistic that there are weaknesses in its structure. On the other
hand, 30 of the 55 respondents in Kafue (55%) strongly disagree to the idea and only 25 (45%) agree to the
weakness.
The research also sought to find out the weakness in the governance approaches in the CRB's in both
Luangwa and Kafue landscapes. The figure below shows the individual community member’s views on the
matter.
58
Figure 4.2: Community perceptions of weakness in the governance approaches
44,50%
45,00%
39,60%
40,00%
35,00%
29,60%
30,00% 26,40%
25,00% 20,80%
18,50%
20,00%
13,20%
15,00%
7,40%
10,00%
5,00%
0,00%
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree
Luangwa Kafue
The figure indicates that there more respondents strongly agree to the perceptions that they are several
weaknesses in the governance approach in Kafue (20.8%) as compared to Luangwa (18.5%). More
respondents only agreed in Luangwa (44.5%) and 39.6% in Kafue. While those who disagree were more in
Luangwa (29.6%) than in Kafue (13.2%). To this end, 26.4% of respondents strongly disagree and only
7.4% from Luangwa. This shows that the governance approach in the CRB is viewed weaker in Luangwa
than it is in Kafue landscapes. This is despite the Luangwa landscape’s progressive steps which seem to
have been affected by non-reporting of elected members to the electorate for feedback and the perceptions
did indicate that planning and annual general meeting which VAG members were accustomed to were no
longer been adhered to as most budget on revenues received were done at CRB level whilst VAG were only
requested to submit proposal in which most time were never funded and no feedback was given to the
community. Another aspect that perceptions were drawn to indicate that the Luangwa landscape structures
are weak is the role the Chiefs play in the election process where most occasions they want to have a say on
who becomes the chairpersons of the CRB's.The weakenesses in the Luangwa Landscapes could attribute to
59
the intereferance the election process by Patrons, where I personally oberserved that when conducting
elections to form the structures, the following chiefdoms process were interfred with in Malama the chief
insisted on having a say on the position of chairperson, in Nsefu the same scenario happened and as well as
Kakumbi and Mnkhanya.From time in memorial the Kunda Chiefs were among the first chiefs to be
Chairpersons on community Wildlife Governance structures, that even after the structure were restructured
to make them Patron the obsolute authoirity has not been delegated.
Some interviews from the senior staff in the Department of National Parks on the structure for CBNRM
governance in Luangwa and Kafue landscapes indicated different viewpoints on the governance structures in
the CRB. Some of the views are as follows;
Governance Structure, I think that’s another important thing to look at, CBNRM structures are
not effective in my opinion in terms of governance because of the manner they are elected it
becomes political, you don’t get the best people that are able to deliver it’s like whoever is there
for three years as much as possible would want to benefit as individuals and out of office that’s
it. So I think the ways CRB's are governed is something that must be looked at so that we get the
best out of people to manage these areas because if we were to empower communities, to say
here manage your own affairs we would have right people to do that but that wouldn’t happen
at the current CBNRM structure.
An interview with the Director of Parks went on to find out the way he perceive the performance
of CBNRM structures and approaches in the two lands scape Kafue and Luangwa. The director
indicated that;
The CBNRM philosophy started in the Luangwa, the philosophy itself might have some glimpses of
community based natural resource management even in the way back as the 60s in the Kalamkonso
areas by Chief Kalindambo by then way back in the colonial time but that was not as well
blossomed as when the Luangwa integrated Resources development project(LIRDP) was initiated
60
in the Luangwa, so the comparison of the Luangwa system and the Kafue system would be
somehow has to be conscious because they started at different times. So Luangwa is earlier than
Kafue. I think we started seeing the actual CBRM philosophy put down on paper as this is how it
will work out in the late 80s and it was only after that LIRDP program that it unfolded into the
CBNRM through the advent arrangement.
So the two landscapes have had different time frames so because of that the Luangwa seems to be
more developed than the Kafue. By time of development or evolving of the philosophy Luangwa has
had more time.
The chairperson and the vice-chairpersons also had a say on the governance structure of their CRB's in both
landscapes. Some of the responses that emanated from the questionnaires are as follows:
One of the chairpersons perceive CRB's as a good governance structure of wildlife at
community level
As a CRB we do things in consultation with other stakeholders, by so doing governance
structure has improved.
Another indicated that
The CRB is able to employ community scouts
Hence, strongly agreed to the notion.
The researcher also asked for them to indicate some of the weaknesses in the CRB governance structure.
The few responses were as follows;
61
Lack of coordination between the VAG and CRB no meetings are called for annual general
meetings
Term of office does not encourage good performance and dependency on single source of
revenue stream
It becomes difficult to share resources to all VAG's and fund are not enough and all go towards
salaries for employees
The custodian of land is both state and customary, thus can raise the question of who governs: is
it the Chief or Government, this could be a ground for conflict.
By not developing and following work plans
Lack of coordination between the chiefs and CRB's has destroyed the wildlife habitat and we are
no longer prime areas that we used to be.
4. Governance flaws in the approaches of CBNRM
In terms of the approach, most of the community members indicated a lack of coordination, poor
management, election process especially when screening candidates, lack of capacity building, lack of
training and poor flow of information in the governance approach of the CRB's in both areas and called for a
need to improve in its, as 90% VAG members responded negatively to knowing information of funds
received by the CRB's and project eye marked for implementation. Where flaw are defined as mistake in the
design from the structure and the design of CBNRM, what we are able to see that;
5. Size and Scale
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In determining community participation in wildlife management, the size and scale are a cardinal component
to effective CBNRM structures in wildlife conservation, the approach is more effective with smaller groups
with similar interests, were local scale works best (Child and Wojcik, 2014).Participation of local
communities in conservation in mostly implemented through structures like the case of the Zambian
CBNRM philosophy or through direct engagement through participatory democracy.(Child and Wojock,
2014) Most of the community conservation programes are implemented through elected representatives
which leads to good governance but has some constraints as it only works best were communities are few
and are able to engage face to face.Participatory engagement does not work well with the growing human
populations. In the Zambian context’s the initial inception of the CBNRM concept, most communities in the
both landscapes only had between 200- 250 household per village action group, but as time progressed the
populations increased and number of households increased making it not only less accountable to the
electorate but the sharing of benefits, roles and responsibilities where the decision making moves from a
single village to multi villages and accountability through face to face interaction is abridged or eradicated.
With the current CBNRM structure the provision in the legislation’s in terms of membership is prescrictive
with a standard number of elected member is 7 to 10 in a particular CRB. The number of VAG's comprising
a Board will determine how feedback is taken back when decisions are made. For Example if a CRB has 5
VAG's the total number of elected members will be 2 from each VAG which is easier for the 2 to convene
meetings and give feedback than when the number of VAG is 9 or ten. The number of elected Board
members will be one from each VAG and in this case calling of meetings to plan is rarely done by the one
member.
The initial number of household per VAG was a standard 200- 250 households, but progressively
populations have increased to 500- 1000 household per VAG and the splitting of Village action groups is
restricted to the legislation of not less than 7 and not more 10 elected memberships. To show this increase
we can use the table to illustrate the following graphs
63
Figure: 5.0: Household Luangwa Landscapes
CRB LUANGWA LANDSCAPES

2000 2021
8000
7000
NIUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
Nsefu kakumbi Luembe Malama
Figure 5.2 Households for Kafue Landscape
CRB HOUSEHOLDS KAFUE LANDSCAPE

2000 2021
25000 23400
21200
20000
15000
10000
5621 5856
4900
5000 2877 2545 2445
1505 1935 2135
1238
0
KABULWEBULWE MULENDEMA SHEZONGO MUSUNGWA KAINGU KAHARE
The graph for Kafue tells us that the number of households in the Kafue landscape increased from 3,302
households to 9,636 households showing a 191.8% increase over a period of twenty one years, while the
Luangwa Landscape increased by 43% in terms of households which is from 31,066 to 44,589 households
over the same period. What the graphs show is an exorbitant increase in the number of households, this in
64
turn leading to have very complicated CBNRM systems in terms of the approach and its impact of benfits
and accountability, as the scale and size does affect the intervals with which a community can meet to plan
and discuss matters pertaining to their welfare and holding their representatives accountable.
Guidelines for forming the structures
The guidelines are a limiting factor in terms describing who should participate in the elections. The process
of conducting elections is where the Chief is part of the electrol committee and screening process for
candidates, the outcome of the process is compromised when other committee members are not strong
enough to refute demands from the Chief. This dominance usually ends in having weak camdidates to
contest in the elections.nominates his candidate in the election process, this compels people to vote for the
person the chief endorses even if he endorses a person whom is incompetent,
Integration of resources management which is affected by the caliber of elected individuals in the Board,
whose selection process in most cases determined by the relationship with Patron not display of capabilities
to serve the community interest. The relationship and family ties of an individual in the community to the
chief will determine whether the individual will stand for nominations, this happens despite the descriptive
guidelines of the election process. The electoral committee will most time get defeated by the demands of
the Patron and most cases if when committee insist on otherwise the electoral process is halted. Electoral
process where the is Chief party in the screening of members to stand in the board compromises the
quality and calibre of whose is to be elected
Negotiation of Co-management agreements and collaboration with private sector, the wildlife Act no. 14 of
2015 clearly provides that communities shall negotiate co-management agreements with the Department of
National Parks and Wildlife, however this process is often times dominated by the Chiefs and elected
members. It’s from this point that elite captures begins up to the point of financial management
65
Management at the higher-level CRB is more problematic with slower progress and more misappropriation
of funds and the dominance of Chiefs and elite capture at this level by virtue of their patronage and
positions. Customarily, chiefs cannot be held accountable, a situation that is not suited to modern financial
management systems, as a result of power and authority where by Chiefs being custodians and members in
the structure, their subjects do not have to urgue against the Chief when issues become contentious even
when the law provides for a decision to be resolved through a ballot. The actual authority is not in the
member of the CRB but the Chief who is defined as Patron with non-Executive Powers by legislation.(
Daal-clayton & Child, 2003)
Reporting, the development and livelihood improvements target is at VAG level but the authority for
decision making is CRB level which the legally recognize structure who do not consult the VAG's.
Secondment of a Technical Officer to the Board, whilst the Act prompts the Minister to appoint a Technical
person to advise CRB's does not provide for a mechanism of engagement. Primarily the CBNRM Technical
advisor could be link to all the CRB and their Secretariats.
In the relationship between government and communities the partnerships is not equal as one is is the
master over the other, despite the predicament the question still remains unanswered whether the resources
(wildlife) be left completely in the custodianship of the communities without the hand of government.
Financial expenditure, where the finances meant to flow to the grassroots do not reach the intended
communities ( the invisible hand of elite capture)
1. DEVELOPING AN ENABLING ENVIROMENT FOR CBNRM
In order for CBNRM to be successful and produce the intended results, we need to closely look at the
structure and ridesign it in such a way that it solves the needs and problems which everyone faces in the
implementation as well a full devolution of ownership of wild resources (DeGorges, 2009) The CBNRM
66
model as an approach and concept is enacted to improve biodiversity conservation and as an end product
create benefits to improve rural livelihoods and rural development.How ever the approach comes with its
weaknesses such (elite capture, social differenciation and in most cases dualism) (Jones, 2010; Suich, 2009,
Boudreaux and Nelson, 2011; Collomb et al., 2008). and faces many challenges. Jones and Murphree
(2004:86) argue that CBNRM performance “has rarely approximated promises and in some cases has been
abysmal”.It is further contended that despite how CBNRM is structured, low incomes for hosehold and
rising population in rural communities contributes to its failures and its part of the larger plan as part of
urbanisation through transformation of wild resources which will inturn take the pressure off these rural
areas, which also calls for political will other than government transformation approaches for their interests (
DeGorges 2009, 2017)
67
Figure 5.3: proposed structure of CBNRM
 The chief moves out as a board members through his representative in the ideal structure but rather
becomes strictly a patron to guide, advise and resolve conflicts arising in the board
 The Government and council representatives are not board members who have an indirect role to
give technical guidance on wildlife and development planning matters
 Reporting and accountability arrow and chiefs and other members from Government have a dotted
line meaning they should not be members but have an advisory role.
 The Creation of a link between elected Board member and the general community the elected
members have to accountable to the electorates as a Board not just through VAG members
 The restriction of sub committees to only three components restrict the CRB’s mandate by definition
where natural resources include forest, fisheries and sand.
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The proposed structure takes away the duo role of the chief (Patron) by not making him to be both a
Patron and a member of the Board with a doted line.The shift in the position will have less influence in the
approach and functionality of the CRB.When we look at the current structure we see that chief doesn’t just
act as a patron but is indeed a member of the board and him being chief most of what he/she says goes. The
above structure provides openness and in doing so we can see an in-flax of new ideas which are debated in
good faith and not just imposed.
The role of Government becomes that of regulatory, monitoring and advisory where the Board can still
make decision and seek advise when needed.
CBNRM despite have many flaws in Zambia may be improved. Some responses showed to say,
I think we need to be honest with each other and the success and failure of CBNRM are
future of game management areas lies with government taking a board step looking at
what has failed and then put in place legislation that will empower communities.
Participation is one thing but empowering and building capacity is another where they will
be able to make or take ownership of wildlife and the management of GMAs. Of course
there are policies in place for example decentralization but of course that the management
of GMAs hasn’t been looked at in terms of aligning this with the policy
The researcher went on to assess if there exist some of the governance flaws in the CRB philosophy. It was
made clear that:
Governance flaws, I can say exist in the way CRB’s are elected, you are able to get good
individuals and when you are unlucky you get wrong characters because there is no good agency
done. If you have a CRB standing or seems to be working against the patron. But the structure of
the board is effective in terms of decision making but of course there is need to have a secretariat
69
that the board can decide over because it seems the board has taken management into their hands
which should not be the case.
It was then recommended that:
The board needs to be representatives of the stakeholders in that landscape so that government
themselves and the communities and other stakeholders at district level should also be represented
and then also possibly bringing private sector. Private sector are key, private sectors such as the
NGOs that support conservation in our landscape could also be cooperated as members in board
and also depending on the support that they provide.
CBNRM should not be seen as charity, they are there working to receive support from
philanthropies, begging for fair share from government. So let them take a lead in managing
resources because clearly it’s been said everywhere else out there in the world where community
run programs if they take full ownership in terms of managing their own resources.
Another interview with Directors Parks went on to find out the way they perceive the performance of
CBRM structure and approach in the two landscape Kafue and Luangwa. The director indicated that;
The CBNRM philosophy started in the Luangwa, the philosophy itself might have some glimpses of
community based natural resource management even in the way back as the 60s in the
Kalamkonso areas by chief Kalindambo by then way back in the colonial time but that was not as
well blossomed as when the LIRDP was initiated in the Luangwa, so the comparison of the
Luangwa system and the Kafue system would be somehow has to be conscious because they
started at different times. So Luangwa is earlier than Kafue. I think we started seeing the actual
CBRM philosophy put down on paper as this is how it will work out in the late 80s and it was only
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after that LIRDP program that it unfolded into the CBRM through the advent arrangement.
So the two landscapes have had different time frames so because of that the Luangwa seems to be
more developed than the Kafue. By time of development or evolving of the philosophy Luangwa
has had more time.
The chairperson and the vice-chairpersons also had a say on the governance structure of their CRB’s in both
landscapes. Some of the responses that emanated from the questionnaires are as follows:
One of the chairperson perceive CRB’s as a good governance structure of wildlife at community level in
kafue landscape. They indicated that;
As a CRB we do things in consultation with other stakeholders, by so doing governance
structure has improved.
Another indicated that
The CRB is able to employ community scouts
Hence, strongly agreed to the notion.
The researcher also asked for them to indicate some of the weaknesses in the CRB
governance structure. The few responses were as follows;
Lack policy which will enhance active involvement by government and community, of
which without that policy the wildlife sector structures will continue to struggle because its
highly politicized, we see a struggle between the state and the community, this similar to
Tanzania as government and other entities aren’t in agreement
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It becomes difficult to share resources to VAG’s and lack of sharing information as the
community is not seeing the benefit flow, and they refuse to attend VAG meetings
Government has always maintained ownership regardless of whose in power, no wonder
wildlife and its community governance structure are collapsing, so the resource is mostly
dwindling all because of government strict ownership.
Planning is mostly done at CRB level and implementation follows the same route VAG’s
only receive what come to them as a community.
The employment structure is not well organized as the money involved is so large to be
handled by an unqualified accountants. The CRB needs good technocrats to monitor
constructions and payout monies.
In terms of the approach, most of the community members indicated a lack of coordination, poor
management, and lack of capacity building, lack of training and poor flow of information in the governance
approach of the CRB’s in both areas and called for a need to improve in its governance.
2. DISCUSION
We can discuss our findings in relation to what has being prevalent on the ground in relation to prevailing
issues on the ground. In Zambia, Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) as a
conservation and rural development strategy came into force in 1980s from realization that natural resources
were degrading at more rapid rates than was acceptable. It was perceived by stakeholders that local
communities were a significant factor to the natural resource management. Therefore, since 1980s when
CBNRM was initiated the people centered programme has been implemented varied from one natural
sector to
72
Another (Tom & Homer, 2020).
The merits of CBNRM programme so far have been the relegation of rights from government to
local communities in natural resources utilization in their respective areas, to their benefit in
community development and livelihood enhancement while taking responsibility to effectively manage
the resource base, and this has being confirmed when we look into the data as we have seen both landscapes
having a certain number of active VAG’s, CRB as well as other forms of community participation.
CBNRM has not only expanded by spatial coverage but also scope. It started from Lupande Game
Management Area (GMA) in 1980s and has grown to cover 36 GMA’s in Zambia. In addition, it has
expanded into open areas. In scope, where as it started with focus to wildlife resources, it has now been
mainstreamed in other resource sectors such as fisheries, forestry and water. Other sectors such as gemstone
sectors were also working to fully integrate CBNRM. Some of the key areas where impacts for the local
communities have been noted to be significant include job creation, livelihood enhancement, rural
development projects, legitimization of management power structures for natural resource
management, participation in resource protection, monitoring and resource quota setting (Nkhata, 2010).
The main issue in these structures is representation and decision making. Over the years the institutional
transformations took place in CBNRM programme. The formation of CBO’s such as CRB’s largely
followed guidelines with regards to selection of representatives. Members of the CBO’s for natural resource
management (i.e. wildlife, forestry, fisheries or water) were elected by wider constituencies to serve
and be accountable to them. Representation to higher bodies would start with lower organs, through
representative democracy.
At lower levels such as Village Action Groups (VAG’s) in wildlife management, Village Resources
Management Committees (VRMC) in forestry management and Village Management Committee (VMC),
participatory democracy took place, where widespread local community participation was encouraged in
making key decisions. Such decisions were in relation to, for instance, project selection. Policy approvals
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were executed at higher organs as CRB's, JFMCs and FMCs where such issues as financial audited reports;
quota setting; recruitments; wildlife management plans; budget and allocation of funds; and development
projects would be conducted. In the past, local institutions had great influence from traditional leadership
but “elite capture” was also very rampant. Of late, widespread participation in the election of leaders
tended to reduce the elite capture phenomenon to some extent (Jones, CBNRM, poverty reduction and
sustainable livelihoods, 2004).
Policy making bodies convene at Annual General Meetings (AGM’s) to make policy decisions on key
matters. AGM’s were conducted on annual basis in the past in most of the natural sectors, except in
wildlife sector. In the year 2008, most of the CRB’s could not hold their AGMs and other meetings,
though this undertaking was crucial, due to financial constraints and the increase in numbers of VAG
households and this information has being reflected even in the data which was on the ground (Jones,
CBNRM, poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods, 2004)
The figue shows one of CRB's (Kahare CRB) holding a meeting. CRB's dealt with other natural
resources available in their respective areas other than wildlife.
A wide representation at the AGM’s included representatives of Village Committees, Management
Committees, private sector (e.g. Concessionaires), government departmental representatives and local
74
authorities. At the AGM’s approvals or disapproval's on such matters as audited reports, budgets,
project proposals, annual operations plans, business plans and quotas proposals were given by the
representative constituencies. Government agencies and other actors provided guidance on the conduct
of the AGM’s. Convening of AGM’s was considered as a crucial governance activity of functional local
institution. In some areas, transparent and open discussions during the AGM’s led to greater
accountability in, for instance, financial management. Some members of local institutions were
replaced in subsequent elections, resulting in a high number of turnovers which also called for
issues of institutional memory and continuity (Nyerenda M. , 2012).
CBNRM is one project which communities if lead properly can lead to the full potemtial and development,
this can be seen with the commitment in which is shown when leaders are being chosen, the pictures below
give us a glimpse of what occurs
75
FIGURE 10: people queing to vote at VAG level in Chitungulu
Figure 11:individual casting a vote
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Figure 12: Nthumbe VAG nomination of candidates
The above pictures are evident enough that even at VAG level members are commited to the cause of the
CBNRM policy.
3. Conclusion
This chapter summarized the structure and the flaws in the structure of CBNRM for both kafue and
Luangwa landscapes. Through the understanding of the study context the actor’s responsibilities and roles
can be assigned and interactions better understood. Furthermore, the governance structures that are linked to
the micro governance structure should be explored to improve the coordination for CBNRM
The study has illustrated that the coordination arrangements in the study area are weak due to lack of
understanding of the concept and a fragmented governance Policy. Coordination can be improved by
understanding the context of application of the governance models, evaluating the links between actors and
structures to improve understanding of the coordination arrangement, and applying the outcomes of the
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evaluation process in the local setting. The study acknowledges that there are no simple answers to
achieving collaborative governance to wildlife resources governance. However, we are inductively
compelled due to the results of the study to propose an equilibrium model for CBNRM for Luangwa and
Kafue landscapes. Using the adaptive Bottom-Up and Top-down model approach may help in getting the
balance right in ensuring coordination between government and non-government actors.It could also be
deduced that among other weaknesses discussed in this chapter the interference in the election process by
chiefs weakens the quality of elected individuals to run the office, which in turn affects the performance of
the governance system resulting into a weak approach of community governance for effective wildlife
conservation.
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CHAPTER SIX
Benefits sharing community
1. INTRODUCTION
When we talk about revenue sharing, we literally take it as gas between government and communities and
that in itself has not been a complete picture, while the philosophy is driven by what happens to revenues
that go to communities has not really been articulated interms of how revenue is spread out to trickle to the
individual, it has been noticed that this being captured in the hands of very few people, largely the
leadership in the community (Chief) and a few CRB members because it has been individualized as it
requires a solution.
They are two levels of revenue sharing; communities and government and within communities themselves,
the percentages of revenue sharing have evolved over time and currently its 50- 50 for animal fees though
there is a proposal that other streams be shared as provided for in the legislation, it is know that before
2015 the concession fees were shared at 80-20 but after change of institution into government this was not
articulated in the law and has not been able to be administered, though the proposal is 50 – 50 but that has
not been approved as law.
One may wonder as to what is prompting communities to feel that the sharing ratios are insufficient and
being disputed. The flow of benefits has been centralised not only at Government level but also at
community level where the CRB has become the recipient and implementer of revenue proceed, were
community members have not had benefits flow in a manner that was intended at household level, further
to this it’s evident that even if you gave the 100% as long the sharing mechanism at community level is not
balanced even 100% will be seen as not significant. The revenues that go to communities have usually hand
79
up with chiefdom level and structures around the chief not even headmen have benefited. Though the
intention is that these monies whether it is in cash form and non-monetary must trickle to the individual
because the philosophy does not target the community in general but the individual to have the mindset
change and yet the practice seem to target the whole community which results into flaws in the approach
and the result is that mind-set does not change, this has brought about ‘othering’ within the community as
there is the ‘ we and them’ kind of thing. The general membership is on one side and the Chief and CRB
leadership on the other side, while government stands on one side.
The observations are that there is a disproportion in the manner revenues have gone to communities, the use
and its distribution and this is being deduced as a failure and we may ask why this has been a failure? The
CBNRM practice has gone through phases interchangeably with mammoth changes in the Institution that is
supposed to lead philosophy, the concept was born in the late 80s and practice itself began to take shape in
the late 90s and kind of settled in the 2000s.However when it settled the institution changed to semi
government autonomy as Zambia Wildlife Authority, an institution with monetary and financial challenges
and following the challenges it failed to fulfil its obligation post the revenues to CRB's. Communities have
actually never seen the philosophy or the practice run the way it is supposed to perform, it has been rocked
with late payments or non-payments , change in policy and a heavy hand of political interference. In 2010
the late President Rupiya Banda came to pay-out communities non-payment of arrears worth of K10,000
million as government did realise that the non-payment would dwindle the participation of communities and
affect the philosophy which would affect the resource. But not long after the arrear settlement hunting was
suspended in 2012- 2014 and soon after that the institution changed again to Department of National Parks
and wildlife were the posting on revenues was further recentralised to central treasury resulting into a halt in
disbursement and accruing between 2016- 2019.The disbanding/disbundling of the 19million arrears of 2019
took chiefs and community members came to make some radical lobbying with Secretary to treasury to
release the funds..
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People misjudge that philosophy has not worked with considering the context and environment it has
evolved itself in Zambian context. The policy makes and government official that are supposed to drive the
philosophy do not understand it, which make it even more difficult for its intention to be conceptualized in
its unsettled form. You will see that even the intention has not been agreed and because it has not been
understood at all level its being mishandled, where the streams of sharing are denied to communities will
result into the capital (wildlife) itself being destroyed. At community the sharing has been understood but
has not been practiced. (Per. Observation)
The CBNRM philosophy has two main pillars; uplift the livelihood of local communities and bring the
communities members into conservation of wildlife. The uplifting of livelihoods is at two levels, household
and community .The sharing of revenues between communities and government, secondly sharing of
revenues within and among communities. The revenue that goes to communities has been articulated into;
45% - wildlife protection
35%- community development
20% - administration (ill defined)
The above sharing ratios are defined from the 45% vault for the community share which is regarded as
100% once it reaches the CRB account. In the percentages the 35% only looks at communal projects it does
not speak to the household benefits, while the 20% is ill defined just like the 5% that goes to the chief that is
used as personal allowance instead of it working for that palace as an institution. The community
development vault has done few, police posts, schools boreholes with very little household livelihood
improvement resulting into communities living in GMA’s being poorer than when the CBNRM concept
came into being Simasiku, et al (2010)
Rural livelihoods are made up of different assets, such as natural, social, physical, human and financial that
make up a living. Therefore, this chapter will establish the link between community wildlife conservation,
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governance and rural livelihood by focusing on the gatekeeper role of governance in making these assets
accessible. The importance of wildlife to livelihoods explains the dependency of households on these
resources. Research recognises that the poor are particularly dependent on natural capital and this has given
rise to increased empirical attempts to capture its importance (Sjaastad, Vedeld & Bojo, 2005; Mamo et al.,
2007).However the sustainability and growth of a CBNRM programme is largely dependent on how
benefits are passed on to the community as it will incentivize communities to participate, often times
neglected by central agencies and institutions in CBNRM. (Child and Wojocik 2014)
The benefits linked to wildlife are usually captured earlier by other stakeholder such government, safari and
photographic operators, with communities being at the bottom of the food chain receiving even fraction of
what is accrued. This implies that benefits that come with the CBNRM approach are negligible at the
household levels who mostly benefit from common property projects such as schools, clinics, boreholes etc.
Observations are that these communal benefits will not deter the illegal off take and utilization of wild
resources as long the household food security and needs are not met. (DeGorges, 2020)
2. BACKGROUND
The practice has gone through a number of phases with changes in the Institution incharge to lead the
process of the CBNRM philosophy, since the philosophy’ inception in the 1980s, you can see how policy
associated with revenue sharing and community participation has affected its structure’ performance towards
wildlife conservation. Nelosn 2010, states the locus of financial decision making and the configuration of
power between levels in the community and government has affected the sector in the Zambian context of
CBNRM. The recentralisation phase in early 2000 when the philosophy was supposedly settling where
governance was re-personalised when revenues were scaled to ZAWA itself with more empowerment to
chiefs while disempowering CRB's. Further to this VAG were eliminated as recipients and implementer as
grass root and this exacerbated the performance of the structure and participation of communities when
benefit and information flows were shifted and most time revenue disbursements were not honoured. In
2010 it took the government of the day to bail out ZAWA with a payment on approximately 10 million
82
Kwacha towards arrears that ZAWA owned communities through Mr Rupia Bwezani Banda, as government
realised that without the evidence flow of benefits the philosophy would collapse.
In 2014 the institution charged with implementing the CBNRM philosophy changed to a government body,
where recentralisation was brought to a highest level and central treasury came into being. The inception of
DNPW as a government department has resulted into arrears of owing communities from 2016 – 2019.It
took negotiations and lobbying by communities for government to clear arrears amounting to
approximately 19million animal fees exclusive of concession fees which money was being shared between
communities and ZAWA, however the change of institution did not align the legislation to include
concession fees as one of the revenue streams to be shared to date.
One of the pillars of community participation in wildlife management, in policy and practice, is the delivery
of economic benefits in the form of incomes, jobs and rural development (Blaikie 2006). However, the
actual availability and distribution of benefits is challenging (Murphree 2001) as benefits are not enough,
opportunities for generating them are limited, capacity for exploiting them low and mechanisms for
distributing them inadequate. Other benefits are ecological and cultural in the form of services which
communities are supposed to manage in a sustainable way. Unfortunately, unsustainable harvesting of
resources leading to general environmental degradation and natural resource depletion continues in light of
the limited benefits and capacity to address the situation.
It is this poor delivery of promised benefits to rural communities and inadequate management of wildlife
resources in spite of community participation that is the basis of scepticism about community based natural
resource management (Blaikie 2006). It is also the motivation for approaches that promote economic
empowerment (Child 2003) and clear resource rights as incentives for wild resource management at local
level.
The issue of community benefit has only sparked more debate when looked at from the international
community. This is so because the international community and its organisations are so much involved in
83
the communities as they want to dictate what africa can do with its species and what it cant without even
involving africa in the negotiation, this was brought about in May 2021 when the director of wildlife and
national parks Dr Chuma questioned the international community on the same matter.
The statement by the director was further cemented by the current minister of green economy Mr Nzovu
when he emphasised the ban of trophy hunting will only hurt the locals as they will have no benefit from a
resource which is very much there and at there disposal. According to the minister local communities are the
ones housing and is responsible for the resource hence its only fitting that they have some form of benefit.
The researcher sought to find out if the members of the community have benefited from accrued benefits
through the CRB. Individual community members responded using questionnaires as shown in the figure
below. The results are in comparison between Luangwa and Kafue CRB's.
3. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
I. Revenue generation
The Benefits flow being looked at are monetary value interms of amounts received by game management
areas as two Landscape.
Table 6.0 Revenue generated by FISCAL year
REVENUE GENERATED BY FISCAL YEAR ( ZMK )
GMA 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
LUPANDE 837042.42 308185.48 335911.35 803435 630681.1
NKALA 337081.8 128538.58 28142.61 303810 180000
NAMWALA 215283.29 101507.48 209935805 574857.14 254441.89
MUMBWA 1795480.72 30000 33411.3 584954.1 280000
LUMIMBA 1329522.59 192717.2 431999.76 574457.81 180000
WEST PETAUKE 584858.3 7043100 384910.86 674457.81 481920.34
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TOTALS 5099269.12 7804048.74 211150180.9 3515971.86 2007043.33
Figure 6.0: Financial trend per ecosystem
FINANCIAL TREND PER ECOSYSTEM

16 000 000,00
14 000 000,00
12 000 000,00
REVENUE GENERATED
10 000 000,00
8 000 000,00
6 000 000,00
4 000 000,00
2 000 000,00
0,00
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
FISCAL YEAR
Luangwa Ecosystem Kafue Ecosystem

Expon. (Luangwa Ecosystem) Poly. (Kafue Ecosystem)
The above table shows the revenue generated in the two ecosystems thus; Luangwa and Kafue ecosystems
and specifically focusing on the Game Management Areas namely; Lumimba, West Petauke, Upper and
Lower Lupande, over the period of five years. The findings revealed that Luangwa Landscape consisting of
Lupande, West Petauke and Lumimba GMAs generated K42,250,587.74 more revenue in the period under
review especially in the fiscal year 2019 compared to Kafue ecosystem comprising Nkala, Namwala
Mumbwa , Kahare and GMAs which generated K11.865,357.38. The attributes to the generation of more
revenue in Luangwa ecosystem were among others, diversity of species on the hunting quota, enhanced
resource protection, wider community participation, improved marketing of tourism products, reduced
poaching, strengthened institutions and management.
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II.
Comparative analysis of the two Landscapes
Figure 13: GMA AREA SIZE
GMA AREA SIZE (KM SQUARED)
4140 4840
Luangwa Ecosystem - Lupande
Kafue Ecosystem - Mufunta

3082
Kafue Ecosystem - Nkala
5417
Kafue Ecosystem - Mumbwa
4500 Luangwa ecosystem - Lumimba
3370 194 Kafue ecosystem - Namwala
Luangwa ecosystem - West

Petauke
The chart above shows the area size of the two ecosystems thus Luangwa and Kafue. Luangwa Landscape
(Lupande, Lumimba and West Petauke GMAs) is located in the eastern part of Zambia and covers a total
land landscape of 13,480km2 while Kafue ecosystem (with a focus on Nkala, Namwala Mumbwa, Kahare
and Lunga Luswishi GMAs) is situated in the southern part of Zambia and covers a total land mass of
12,063km2. Imperative to note that, despite the two selected areas being relatively of the same size, the
Luangwa ecosystem has a healthy habitat hence having good numbers of wildlife populations compared to
the area of focus under Kafue ecosystem which has more diversity with low numbers which could be
accelerated by encroachments and poor markeiting
This comparative study focused on revenue generation, wildlife population, wildlife species and size of the
landscape for the two ecosystems thus Luangwa and Kafue with a particular focus on Mumbwa, Namwala,
Nkhala, Lumimba, Lupande and West Petauke GMAs over the period of five years. The quantitative data
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established that there is generally a firm nexus among the landscape’s diversity of wildlife species, wildlife
population and revenue generation. This has been empirically confirmed by the findings of this study where
Luangwa ecosystem comprising Lupande, Lumimba and West Petauke GMAs (in this study) generated
more revenue throughout the period under observation. It could be implied that because of the healthy
ecosystem ( Forest) couple with a diversity of hunt-able species for wildlife and enhance resource
protection is what gives the Luangwa Landscape higher revenue ratios. Other attributes contributing to the
generation of more revenue in Luangwa ecosystem included; the absence of human encroachment, enhanced
community conservation through strengthened community institutions such as Village Action Groups
(VAG's) and Community Resources Boards (CRB's), availability of infrastructural facilities such as airport,
airstrips, lodges and tourism loops, reduced poaching and other anthropogenic activities.
Kafue ecosystem with a focus on the three GMAs thus Mumbwa, Nkala, Namwala, Kahare and Lunga
luswishi covering a total land size of 13,480km2 has more diversity in terms species and populations. Their
total revenue generation was comparatively lower over the period of five years to the revenue generated in
Luangwa ecosystem. The parameters that were taken into account in comparing the two ecosystems revealed
that size of the landscape, availability of wildlife species and populations have a bearing on the revenue
generation and tourism activities of a particular ecosystem. Birner et al. (2006) identified size of an area and
biodiversity as integral driving forces of a healthy protected area.
III. Other benefits besides direct funds
Benefits my not just be monetary or direct but may come in many other forms, from projects, meat and
other aspects.
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Figure 14: Types of benefits from CRB in community
Kafue Luangwa
None;
12% None ; Employm
Employm Meat; 0% 18% ent; 15%
Meat; ent ; 30%
13% Income ;
5%
Income ;
3%
Projects; Projects;
42% 62%
The chats above indicates that the types of benefits community members in Kafue and Luangwa Landscapes
include; employment, projects, income and meat. From the data collected it can be reviewed that in
Luangwa only 15% of the respondents employment through CRB while Kafue has a high score of 30%.
Most of the benefits community members receive are projects, highly in Luangwa with 62% while 42%
from kafue have benefited from projects. While income benefits most from luangwa with 5% and only 3%
from Kafue. Meat is also been seen as a one of the benefits for community member soremnly with 13% of
respondents while none (0%) in Luangwa.From personal obersavation in the Laungwa Landscape the
influence of the chief with safari operators id very high than in most cases when meat is hunted, the 1 st
recipients are the palaces and ‘by tradition when goods go in the palace they do not come out’ resulting into
the 0% percentage of meat being perceived as a benefit being by communities members in the Luangwa
Landscape ( perso.Obser)
IV. Mechanism of benefit sharing
A question of whether or not the CRB share these benefits equally was required from individual community
members. The chat below shows their responses in Luangwa and Kafue.
Figure 15: Have you benefited from the CRB?
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78,80%
80,00%
67%
70,00%
60,00%
50,00%
33%
40,00%
30,00% 21,20%
20,00%
10,00%
0,00%
Yes No
Luangwa Kafue
The figure above clearly shows the percentage of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in Luangwa and Kafue
landscapes. It is clear that more community members in Luangwa have benefited from the CRB with 78.8%
of the respondents compared with 67% from Kafue. While only a few (21.2%) indicated that they did not
benefit from the CRB in any way from Luangwa and 33% from Kafue.
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Figure 16: Does the CRB share benefits equally?
Yes; 35% No; 65%

Kafue
Yes; 68% No; 32%

Luangwa
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
The figure clearly illustrates that benefits more equally distributed among community members in Luangwa
with 68% score and less in Kafue with 35% of respondents indicating a fair distribution of benefits.
Some of the reasons for sharing and not sharing benefits equally among community members came out as
follows:
Diversion of funds by the board members, eye marked for VAG projects
Benefits are shared equally according to the limited resources available
Sometimes other VAG's will benefit for community projects and others not
Not equally because sometimes the VAG can have a share but the funds are diverted.
No equal sharing of benefit, previously local communities use to receive meat from hunting outfitter
but not nowadays the distribution ends at he palace or CRB office
We just hear that the money for community was paid to scouts
There are not benefits at all
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I don’t really know whether benefits are shared equally or not as I have not seen any
They have only sunk a borehole in my area but we hear there is a lot of money.
We are involved as villagers in CRB operations, and we have at least witnessed projects in every
VAG.
It is clear that most of the respondents feel the benefits in communities are not equally shared as it can be
depicted from the comments above and from the statistical figure 4.5 or figure 16. Comment [BM2]: Prince can you
pleae clarify which is figure 4.5
Comment [BM3]: To check

Discussion formating
CBNRM is one way of bringing about empowerment of the people especially at grassroots level. Steelman
and Asher (1997) and Bradshaw (2003) cited in Aslinet al., (2009) stress that CBNRM may empower local
communities to take greater responsibilities for natural resource and environmental management.
Empowerment is a social process that helps people to have control over their own lives. It is a process of
enabling communities to act on issues they consider important. In the context of CBNRM, empowerment
involves the transfer of management responsibilities and benefits to the people at the grassroots level.
This is actually the backbone of the initiative because CBNRM is based on the principle that land and wild
resources should be managed by those who live with and depend on them (UNDP, 2001, as cited in World
Resources Institute,2002). CBNRM is one of the most important manifestations of true decentralization as it
relates to control of natural resources. CBNRM if successful can be a model of local empowerment imbuing
communities with greater authority over the use of natural resources.This is actually an effective tool of
helping people construct a solid foundation on which they can build a sustainable future for both themselves
and for wildlife on which they depend for their livelihoods. CBNRM is a decentralized approach.
Decentralization creates opportunities for local people to have a say in decisions that affect their lives.
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Decentralizing the management of natural resources can contribute significantly to poverty reduction. Poor
people can express their needs more clearly and local authorities can target services more effectively. It is a
process that increases resource use participation in NRM decisions and benefits by restructuring the power
relations between central state and communities through the transfer of management authority to local level
people (ODI, 2002). Schuerholz and Baldus (2007) point out that community empowerment which
manifests itself through providing communities with legal rights to the sustainable use of wildlife on
communal land would gradually lead to community ownership in wildlife conservation. Ownership is very
important as far as proper use of any property is concerned. Thus, this feeling of ownership will inturn make
the communities manage and conserve the natural resources in their community.
The overriding benefit and perhaps the objective on which CBNRM initiatives are built on is that of
conservation of wildlife. This is actually imbedded in what Thakadu (2005) calls the three key assumptions
that state that locals are better placed to conserve wild resources, people will conserve a natural resource
only if benefits exceed the cost of conservation and that people will conserve wildlife that is linked to their
quality of life. Thus excluding the locals from the utilization of natural resources can cause them to engage
in illegal activities and to exploit resources within protected areas and put pressure on non-protected land
and resources (Jaeger, 2001, as cited in Rozwadowska, 2011).
Thus, as a people centred approach, CBNRM allows for human occupation and sustainable use of wild
resources. By so doing, a balance is struck in that the local people will be able to derive benefits from the
environment, hence giving them an incentive to use it sustainably. When communities recognize the
financial and non-financial value of wildlife and other natural resources, they will become more interested in
taking part and ultimately leading to sustainable use and conservation of such resources, hence its structures
and management should be in a way that the local community benefits.
We can link this to a situation in other countries where revenue is shared in a different way, Small micro-
enterprises as income generating projects at community level can contribute significantly to local job
creation, at least in theory. They are intended to reduce poverty, provide alternative sources of income and
92
livelihood for the rural communities. Financing for micro-projects like hammer mills, gardening,
procurement of transport and other forms of business entities has been tried with limited success in many
CBNRM programmes (Child et al., 2014; Lubilo and Child, 2010; Muyengwa et al., 2014). However,
examples from Kenya and elsewhere show that low level investment can create employment opportunities
that lead to increased participation of indigenous people in the economy.
They use mainly local resources, promote the creation and use of local technologies and provide skills
training at a low cost to society (ILO, 1989). A study conducted in Kisumu city by the Kenyan National
Bureau of Statistics, 2007 on the performance of micro-projects indicates that 3 out of 5 micro-projects fail
within the first few months of being in operation. Several reasons can be attributed to this state of affairs.
Most problems are related to inadequate managerial and technical skills, low level of education, low
participation, technology and elitism (Harper 1974; House et al., 1991; ILO 1989). Several reasons have
been cited for poor implementation of micro enterprises and these include lack of planning, improper
financing, poor management and limited skills within these communities (Longenecker et al., 2006)
When we bring it back to the Zambian perspective, we see some strides when the aspect of revenue sharing
is brought up. This is seen when the current minister of green economy Collins Njovu confirmed in an
article that indeed the local community do benefit from these natural resources as much as the government
and international community benefits.
In a statement by the minister, it was stated that local communities benefit at a “50-50” rate when it comes
to the aspect of trophy hunting. Not only that but he stressed that communities benefits from cooperate
social responsibility as communities have schools being built on there behalf, not only that he confirmed that
hunting companies give employment to the locals alongside providing business to local business people.
According to him without trophy hunting and other wildlife based revenue generation there would be no
value for the God given resource.
93
Comment [BM4]: To check
Summary formating
The livelihood profile of a household is determined by the resources that they can access. Contextual, social
and economic factors influence the variations in livelihood strategies and outcomes. Livelihoods in the study
area are highly dependent on the natural resources base. Environmental income contribution to total
household income is an indicator of natural resources dependency. Furthermore, wildlife act as a safety net
during months of food shortages. Governance structures, however, have put in place institutions that limit
livelihood diversification. These institutions affect the ability of households to access natural resources
94
CHAPTER SEVEN
Revenue sharing and its challenges
1. INTRODUCTION
The wildlife sectors’ potential for wildlife driven economy has never bben fulfilled, Zambia earn far much
less compared to other countries within the region from wildlife.The CBNRM concept was initiated to allow
communities also benefit from the wildlife economy, which resulted in to the devolution of revenues from
wildlife at different levels, with 80% of revenue being controlled within the local communities in the case of
the Lupande project.Despite the relative success of this approach, all revenues were centralised in 2003 upon
change of government to multi- party rule which continues to this date, where sharing of revenues from
wildlife with communities is done through control 99 which central treasury.( Nelson, 2010)
Wildlife conservation generates a lot if revenue per year, which is derives from hunting, tourism,
photography and many other ways. For proper development it is only imminent that a proper structure is set
up to enable funding is to enable everyone involved benefits. This chapter seeks to discuss revenue sharing
and the challenges associated with it.Deficiencies in transparency and misuse of revenue intended for the
rural communities by local governments and community elites, Majority of revenue seized by stakeholders
other than the rural communities encompassing directly by central/local governments and safari/tour
operators, as well as, Indirectly by non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) captivating enormous sums of
donor funds with very little realization to rural communities.Though rural communities depend on wildlife
resources for their substance livelihoods, it becomes difficult to make them buy in to the CBNRM
philosophy if benefits are not reaching the intended target, resulting into the opposite of what the concept
ought to be driving towards actually the contrary, i.e ‘’uncontrolled poaching for bush meat and elephant
95
ivory, etc. where corrupt middlemen capture the majority of value from the wildlife as opposed to the
people living with the wildlife. This makes CBNRM tied to the concept of sustainable use impossible. It is
further contested that, modern attempts at sharing benefits from conservation with rural communities will
fail due to the low rural resource to population ratio regardless of the model, combined with the uneven
distribution of profits from safari hunting that drives most CBNRM programs, unless these ratios are
changed. ( DeGorges, 2009, 2017) This is a scenario with the Zambian CBNRM approach where the
principle legislation provides for streams on revenue sharing the central government is deliberately failing to
operationalise the law on ratios and streams of revenue to go to communities. (Lubilo, per.comm).
Despite the legislative incentives provided; sharing of revenues, private sector pledges, sharing of meat,
provision of resident hunting, the differential pricing system favoring local people benefits from wildlife
have hardly touched local people at household level.Most of the benefits sighted in the two study site are
communal benefits such infrastructure projects,(schools,health centres, houses for staff).Whilst its
appreciated that communities are taking their children to this facilities, its not enough to deter a household
from from poaching when there is still no food on the table and no money to take the child to school.This
has resulted into the Department still having a high turn out on locals being arrested for poaching see
Diagram no. below ; Comment [BM5]: To include sub

chapter on arrests and benefits from
conservation
Comment [D6]: Guide
96
Figure 17: Analysis on local arrested for Poaching in Kafue and Luangwa
Comparative analysis of arrests between Kafue and

Luangwa
136; 49% 142; 51%
kafue Luangwa
The thrust of CBNRM is in two fold, the aspect of conservation of the resource and Livelohood of the local
communities looking after the resource as the two have to speak to each other for CBNRM to be
succeseful.We would expect therefore that where CBNRM is succeseful villiants would be once in a while if
you were to sweep around, but we would be quick to mentioned that it would not always be indicative, as
sometimes it’s the reduced effort of law enforcement by officers to curtail the poachers.
When we compare for each Landscape because this being a comparative analysis, from the differences in the
lawenforcement capacities and revenues, we are able to deduce that benefits to communities from
conservation act as a pivot for deterance, this may be a thin line,however the benefits trickling to local
communities acts as a pivote for deterance
2. BACKGROUND
Wildlife has the potential to generate enough income to significantly help even in the aspect of wild life
conservation. Despite this the wildlife sector is struggling in the implementation and running its day to day
97
to day businesses. In order to aid operations, a fund from the revenues realized from wildlife utilization
need to be created to enhance economic and social well-being of the community within the GMA’s.
One of the reasons why the CRB is the most established community structure for natural resource
management is the 50% share of hunting revenue and not donor dependant. It is anticipated that future
revisions of this mechanism will be on account of good performance in meeting identified and mutually
agreed benchmarks.
During the years 2008, 2009, and 2010 ZAWA collected a total amount of K42,865,000,000,
K53,359,000,000 and K51,444,000,000 respectively as revenue through the issuance of hunting licences,
park entry fees, lease fees from various Area Management Units (AMU); and received total amounts of
K29,082,419,116, K12,615,413,188 and K16,131,754,605 for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively
from GRZ and cooperating partners as tabulated below
To understand the challenges associated with revenue sharing, we need to go back to see how the GMA’s in
our area of specialization have faired in terms of generating revenue, only then can bring our the issues
associated with revenue (Davis, 2020).
TABLE 7.0: REVENUE GENERATED BY FISCAL YEAR ( ZMK )
GMA 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
LUPANDE 837042.42 308185.48 335911.35 803435 630681.1
NKALA 337081.8 128538.58 28142.61 303810 180000
NAMWALA 215283.29 101507.48 209935805 574857.14 254441.89
MUMBWA 1795480.72 30000 33411.3 584954.1 280000
LUMIMBA 1329522.59 192717.2 431999.76 574457.81 180000
WEST PETAUKE 584858.3 7043100 384910.86 674457.81 481920.34
TOTALS 5099269.12 7804048.74 211150180.9 3515971.86 2007043.33
98
Figure 18: Hunting Revenue from 2016 to 2020
FINANCIAL TREND PER ECOSYSTEM

16 000 000,00
14 000 000,00
12 000 000,00
REVENUE GENERATED
10 000 000,00
8 000 000,00
6 000 000,00
4 000 000,00
2 000 000,00
0,00
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
FISCAL YEAR
Luangwa Ecosystem Kafue Ecosystem

Expon. (Luangwa Ecosystem) Poly. (Kafue Ecosystem)
Table 4.1 above shows the average amount of revenue that reached GMAs from 2016 to 2020. The trend of
data indicate that the revenue has been increasing in terms of the amounts with highest in 2019 and a sudden
drop in 2020. The generation clearly indicates that the Luangwa ecosystem generated more money has been
performing better with each passing year.
3. MECHANISM OF REVENUE GENERATION
In line with the requirements of the UN convention, the Zambia Wildlife Act No 12 of 1998 was repealed
and the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 enacted. The Act resulted in the creation of the Department of
National and Wildlife which was mandated to establish, control and manage National Parks and Game
Management Areas for the conservation and enhancement of wildlife ecosystems and bio-diversity.
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To do this according to the wild life act and Statutory Instrument no. 89 of 2004, The revenues Animal fees
50% is retained by Government to , 45% to CRB’s, 5% to local Chiefs, while concession, land-user and
capture fees is not shared with communities despite the legislatve provisions. The 45% is regarded as 100%
once it reaches the community accounts and allocated as follows, 45% of revenue on wildlife protection,
35% on community projects and 20% on administration
7.3.3 REVENUE SHARING RELATED CHALLENGES
Revenue sharing has a mechanism, despite this fact, there has been claims that these revenues does not
benefit most of the community members in these landscapes who are prime targets. Further it was stated
even if the sharing is done in accordance with regulation, the percentages been received by some sectors
raises more questions than it actually answers, therefore it was stated that:
It doesn’t seem to be working well because the philosophy does not really describe
the pathway of benefit flow, the flow of benefits doesn’t reach the grassroots. The
flow of benefits hangs in government, in chiefs and the CRB board. How it filters
down there, to that woman who is widowed, no one has actually defined it. Even
when we monitor these resources we don’t question the question of ‘when it came,
where did it go?’ we only monitor at the point of the legality of how this was spent
but we don’t follow with the philosophy. The objective of the philosophy is that the
benefit must flow to the ordinary person. Which we have not followed. This is the
second aspect to why the CBNRM has not really worked well.(Dr Simukonda ,
personal communication)
In the mechanism of releasing the financial benefits from the authorities i.e
government 50% goes to government and 50% goes to communities… the other
50% which is supposedly should go to community is once held by central treasury
as it was or by government and then it is released. The disbursements have been so
100
poorly handled such that community has wondered whether they are a partner or
a partner but with a lesser authourity and responisbility. Is it really true that these
are our resources? What do we do in the meantime? That has actually crashed even
the little understanding of CBNRM in the communities because it has not really
flowed. Even the mechanism of community resources board to say this board can
do conservation work, can employ youth’s in the community, and can also engage
in the community development work, it has crumbled because what is due to them
has been withheld.
So you can see that in itself, even if they truly understood the ownership, even if it
was in perfect state, just the aspect of flow of benefit to communities is enough to
kill the whole concept. The distribution itself is really poor.
The above views from the respondents clearly shows that revenues does not reach community members to
benefit as they are supposed to. It was observed that revenues released by the government with conditions
and when they are finally released, there are middle beneficiaries who largely benefit before they reach
community members who are core beneficiaries to the revenues. These includes the Chiefs and CRB’s in
these different communities in both Luangwa and Kafue Landscapes. It was further stated that:
So it is what gets to the pocket, this is why, the sharing is not correctly been done.
At all levels. It is shared too quickly the dividend from the resource should be
invested and a certain level of income is supposed to be invested so that when
income grows that’s when you can share, then you can talk about livelihood
101
change, for now having a nice road does not define a livelihood change, having a
clinic will not define a livelihood change. Only a clinic will be fully packed of
patients with malnutrition talk of Chibolya surrounded by very nice roads, but look
at the households, they are literally starving. So it’s not the roads, are there no
clinics in Chibolya? They are there. So wouldn’t they go into illicit activity,
because there is no income? So you will find that it is exactly even in the village. So
even if you have a good clinic, good school or roads, good bridges if it doesn’t get
to the pocket a person will still have to find a way of making his children have food
and go to school.
Not as though that is not enough there is that capture of projects, the money are not
flowing to people as such. As though that is not enough what we find is that
government is withholding its money, instead of releasing it, its withholding this
money. Withholding the 50%, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020 that’s when
they were giving their lot, 4years passed with nothing, there are still communities
that don’t have up to now, so it flops, it makes the whole thing to flop. We need to
make sure that it gets there. In order for household to benefit, we need to have
investment. Those corporative it is still the CRB's that gets that money it doesn’t get
to the people. It’s like am taking my maize to this rich man and I pay and his money
is his and yet that money is supposed to be my money it’s supposed to come back to
my pocket in a way.
So we have not led this communities grow this income to a level that it will be
substantial to give dividend to the people. That’s when they will stop pouching. So
government should not withhold this money, it’s for the people.
102
4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REVENUE GENERATION
When we look at revenue generation from the previous years we are able to make a comparative analysis,
we can look at the following GMA’s
TABLE 7.2 35%ALOCATION FROM HUNTING REVENUEU FROM 2016 TO 2021
YEAR
KAFUE 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Total
KABULWEBULWE 0 0 31,166.70 44,011.16 46,905.54 56,256.86 178,340.26
MULENDEMA 58,470.34 0 37,121.64 38,112.69 90,300.84 56,256.86 280,262.37
KAHARE 0 55,119.00 27,555.00 72,000.00 172,000.00 143,000.00 469.674.00
MUSUNGWA 49,244.49 18,994.23 50,309.08 34,115.49 150,653.49 11,668.86 314,985.64
SHEZONGO 53,200.00 78,750.00 60,976.87 38,500 142,082.50 19,355.00 392,864.37
KAINGU 18,084.80 14,901.25 28,346.56 16,458.63 36,619.36 44,439.73 158,850.33
1,794,976.97
LUANGWA
NSEFU 0 0 284,141.00 284,141.00 284,141.00 284,141.00 1,136,564.00
MALAMA 0 34,234.97 48,000.00 240,000.00 48,000.00 160,000.00 496,000.00
KAKUMBI 0 0 14,456.08 222,310.00 0 14,000.00 236,310.00
LUEMBE 0 50,000.00 45,000.00 154,890.76 46,665.89 70,568.89 367,125.54
2,285,690.59
103
When we look at the table above, we can be able to deduce that Luangwa boasts a significant amount when
compared to Kafue, many factors can be blamed due to this, we can speak of how long Luangwa has been
established in comparison to kafue, as we are able to see that Luangwa has existed for a longer time, hence it
can be said it have more footing.
5. DISCUSION
To understand the challenges associated with revenue sharing can be explained well when referred to it in
the past. In the past, local communities were alienated from managing and benefiting from wildlife,
including land. The origin of CBNRM in Zambia owes much to a program that came to be known as the
Administrative Management Design Program for Game Management Areas (ADMADE), and which
commenced in 1987. In addition, Lewis (1993) noted that the foundation of CBNRM in Zambia can be
attributed to the joint Lupande Research Project (1979-1984), initiated by the New York Zoological Society
and the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS), which focused on elephant management and
associated interactions with humans. The research was conducted in areas inhabited by local communities,
i.e., in the Lupande Game Management Area (GMA).
In September 1983, a multi-stakeholder, Lupande Development Workshop was convened and recommended
sustainable management of natural resources via the involvement of local producer communities who should
be allowed to sufficiently benefit from the natural resources in their areas. Representatives included
researchers, government departments, non-governmental organizations (NGO), community and traditional
leaders, and the private sector. According to Kalyocha (2000), several concerns were raised during the
workshop. Comment [BM7]: To read the

document
Based on the successes of Lupande project, in 1987, the revenue sharing model was expanded to eight
additional GMAs in Zambia (Lewis, 1993). Later, the program was implemented in 26 GMAs (Hachileka et
al. 1999). In the ADMADE areas, revenue sharing from wildlife hunting offered hope for livelihoods in arid
and semi-arid areas where agriculture and livestock rearing were largely for subsistence and unsustainable.
104
Revenues that accrued to the local communities were used to cover resource management costs such as
recruitment of village scouts and convening management and public meetings. A number of projects such as
building schools and health centers were also undertaken by the local communities with these funds. Local
communities were free to decide on which projects to undertake with the revenues received.
The revenue allocation from GMA wildlife management activities were formalized by the Wildlife
Conservation revolving fund (WCRF as follows:
i) 40% to local communities for wildlife management activities (e.g., resource protection and meetings).
ii) 35% for local community development projects (e.g., construction of schools, clinics, feeder roads, and
grinding mills).
iii) 15% to NPWS for administrative costs (e.g., supervisory costs, meetings, and overhead).
iv) 10% for projects at the District Council level (e.g. wildlife-related projects and activities such as land use
planning)
The rights to benefit from CBNRM, under wildlife has improved over the past years due to a 50% - 50% on
licence fees and 20% - 80% on concession fees ratio between communities and Government.The sharing of
concession was only implemented in the ZAWA era, as a way of attempting to address issues of rural
poverty and unemployment in order to gain local support for wildlife conservation. The birth of the new
legislation introduced rights for local communities to benefit from wildlife, through Zambia Wildlife Act
No. 12 of 1998 and later Zambia Willdife Act No 14 of 2015, which allows greater participation of local
communities,
thus establishing their rights to use and manage natural resources in GMAs and Open Areas;
to benefit from wildlife a way of building their lost social capital; This includes provisions for participation
in the developed management plans and creation of Community Partnehsip Parks.
105
The onus is on the CRB to equitably distribute benefits to the local communities located within its
management area. However, the responsibility for wildlife management lies with Department of National
Parks (DNPW) and, as such, DNPW contributes to the overall performance of the CRB's.There are currently
30 hunting concessions within the 36 GMAs, dating from 2015. From the revenues generated , members of
local communities have been employed by CRB's as community scouts for protection and monitoring of
wildlife resources and secretariat for the day to day running of affairs of the CRB
There are an additional 1200 support staff employed by CRB's across Zambia. Local communities obtain
and access social amenities from various rural development projects funded by revenues gained from
wildlife resources. The projects span from construction of water holes, schools, clinics, and feeder roads, as
well as crop damage counter-measures including solar and chili pepper fences. More residents benefit
indirectly from participating in wildlife management and accessing the resource, depending on the ability of
the wildlife industry to generate funds and create employment.
106
Policy and legislation have played a key role in shaping CBNRM in Zambia, there has been a need to
regularly review the pertinent laws and policy so that they can remain relevant to the dynamic nature of the
wildlife resource base and local communities. In general, the policy and legal transformation engendered a
CBNRM program that established functional, local institutions for natural resource management. The policy
and legislation not only formalized rights for access to natural resources for wealth creation, but also
established local institutions that were charged with co-management, participatory, or collaborative natural
resource management (Davis, 2020, Child and Wojcik 2014). Comment [BM8]: Eidt the ‘P’ in t
citation
Comment [D9]: DONE
The legal framework for benefit sharing is inadequate with respect to willdife resources; benefits for local
communities are insufficient, as they are only receiving one stream of revenue from animal licences, while
other stream such as concession, landuser and animal capture fees have not been operationalised by the
Government though provided for in the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015. .(Dr. Rodgers Lubilo, Comment [BM10]: Prince to inse
citation from clip
Personal communication or KBN TV Newsz Machalunda Machalunda 2022). The disbursements of Comment [BM11]: Clip sent.
revenues to communities from control 99 which the central account to receive all revenues for government
disburses funds into community accounts quarterly.The disbursemet is however a theory as its does not
happen on time despite the reconsilitaions being time due constraining yellow book provisions that are
inadequate compared to the revenues accrued.The CRB guidelines define that stipulates that when these
revenues are received they are regarded as a 100%. The community then allocates the revenues according
to the following vaults 45% wildlife mgt, 35% community development and 20% admninstration.Though
the reconciliation is done quarterly the disbursement take longer to reach communities because the yellow
book budget is limited to accomaodate the revenue accrued by communities.The constraint come in when
the provision of the yellow book surpasses the revenue accrued to communities.
The other constraint is in the monitoring of the disbursed funds to determine what has gone and when next
payment should be determined, as well as tools to verify if the intended recipients have received the
revenue. Comment [BM12]: To be copied

new document
107
Advocacy by civil society will play a critical role in strengthening the policy and legal framework.In order
to cure the literacy and numeracy inadquance by communities to negotiate for equitable partnership can be
very serious challenge, which results into poor inflow of revenues into communities.(USAID, 2012).For
example during hunting concession negotiations communities are usually on the weaker side to bargain,
with business partners (Operators) and revnue coming from obligations are on the lower side to
accommodate the nature of business.(Pers.Obser).
The management and benefits associated with CBNRM need to be clearly defined at governance structure Comment [BM13]: To clarify with
Prince, thedefination is iin the CRB
financial guidelines, that stipulates
and community level, where devolution to the grassroot (Village Action Group) as implementation stage, to
that when these revenues are
received on a quarterly basis the ar
promote delegation of rights where the top structure (CRB) is coordinating mechnism and when rights and regarded as 100% and split into 45%
wildlifemgt, 35% comm dev and 20
admn.Though the reconciliation is
power is mishandled it be withdrawn.
done quarterly the disbursement ta
longer to reach communities becau
the yellow book budget is limited to
To further look at this issue, ADMADE did expand formal participation in wildlife management through the accomaodate the revenue accrued
communities.The constraint comein
village scout program. ADMADE intended village scouts to pursue three objectives: to eliminate all illegal when the provision of the yellow bo
surpasses the revenue accrued to
communities.
hunting, to monitor wildlife populations and to develop links with the community to foster a more positive The other constraint is in the
monitoring of the disbursed funds t
attitude towards wildlife conservation through benefits from the accrued revenues (Mwenya, Lewis and determine what has gone and when
next payment should be determine
as well as tools to verify if the
Kaweche, 1990). intended recipients have received
revenue.
Comment [D14]: Then we can
6. SUMMARY simply remove the paragraph entire
The above statements have shown a number of challenges that are encountered in terms of revenue sharing
in CBNRM. Firstly is the government releasing the funds takes long, followed by a number of middle men
that includes CRB's and Chiefs who capture the revenues as individuals and structures of governance
excersabated by poor monitoring of these resource if they benefit the prime beneficiaries who are
community members. Comment [BM15]: To copied in t

next doc
108
CHAPTER 8
Capacity on law enforcement
1. INTRODUCTION
Wildlife crimes are among the major threats to continued existence and supply of environmental goods and
services in general and especially the conservation of wildlife across diverse landscapes of protected areas
(PA’s), communal lands and private wildlife estates (PWE’s) such as game ranches and conservancies.
These crimes are therefore, a serious ecological and social-economic cost with huge negative multiplier
effects on biodiversity conservation and nature-based tourism and subsequently on human welfare. It is,
however, this broader context of the impacts of wildlife crimes that is slowly being glossed over by most
stakeholders, especially the general public who ironically are the owners of the resource as wildlife in
Zambia is held by the State President on behalf of the people of Zambia.
It is because of this that this chapter seeks to discuss the capacity of law enforcement in the management in
enabling that the Luangwa and the Kafue landscapes are protected. To see how they are fairing as well as
there challenges.The participation of community in the management of wildlife is what determines the co-
management relation with government and the sharing of revenues as well as functions
2. BACKGROUND
Historically, management of wildlife has been based on active enforcement of wildlife regulations using a
cadre of semi-paramilitary trained wildlife police officers, previously known as game guards or wildlife
police officers. Escalating levels of poaching in the 1980’s forced the Government of the Republic of
109
Zambia (GRZ) to adopt community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) programme in the
wildlife sector as a complementary effort in an attempt to address the drivers of wildlife crimes were two
CBNRM programmes were initiated namely Administrative Management Design for Game Management
Areas (ADMADE) and Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDP). A combination of the
two approaches i.e. law enforcement and CBNRM programmes was envisaged to be the panacea to wildlife
crimes for the time being and the near future as they have proved effective within specific spatial contexts
within sub-saharan Africa. Their full contribution to securing protected areas and transforming local
communities into environmental stewards however require detailed investigation.
Despite the long history of wildlife crimes in the country, the actual direct and indirect costs of this vice on
wildlife conservation programmes is unknown (MTENR, 1994). In the case of Kafue National Park (KNP),
the core PA in the Kafue ecosystem is known to have driven certain wildlife species to threatened levels as
in the case of the African elephant (Loxodonta africana) and local decimation of the black rhino (Diceros
bicornis minor). At one time, in the 1990’s, KNP was almost a haven of poachers usually heavily armed
with military weapons. In the recent past, as observed by McNeely et al. (1994) and Hockings (2003) most
of the cooperating partners have placed emphasis on the effectiveness of the protection of wildlife resources.
I. Law enforcement capacities by Communities
Scouts involved in the CRB operation are presented in figure 4.6 be in line with the chiefdoms.
110
Figure 19: The number of scouts in the individual Community Resources Boards
LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY
39% Kafue
KAFUE
LUANGWA
61% Luangwa
Figure: 19 From the data we are able to see that Luangwa has more scouts than Kafue with a difference of
76 scouts. Interview show that more money is paid to scouts in Luangwa than those in Kafue. We see that
most landscapes in Kafue pay between K1,000 and K2,000 while those in Luangwa get about K2,500.
II. Comparative analysis on law enforcement.
When we look at both landscapes, we can see significant differences in terms of numbers as well as
remuneration. We can see that with the aid of the table below.
Table 8.0: Capacity for Law community enforcement
Landscape Community Paged Salary Cost towards Annual Wildlife
Scouts rate law performance police
enforcement Officers
staff
Luangwa 238 2500 221,940 66
111
Kafue 154 1500 195,000 34
392 100
We are able to see that Luangwa boasts of more scouts than kafue, we are able to see that it has more police
officers and the cost is equally above for kafue, when we look at the money from a pie chart, we are able to
not that
Figure 20: Cost on Lawenforcement for the two Landscapes
PERCENTAGE COST OF LAW ENFORCMENT
47% Kafue
53%
LUANGWA
KAFUE
The above chart indicates that Luangwa has more money spent on law reinforcement, meaning it is worth
noting that it does more than Kafue, hence its performance in terms of law enforcement, revenues accruing
and species diversity.
III. Arrests done by law enforcement
ADMADE’s designers hoped that local residents would trust village scouts - who had been selected from
local communities - more than regular Department forces. Despite the intentions of ADMADE to make the
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relationship between residents and Department staff more congenial, village scouts became unpopular in
many communities. In those areas without effective unit leaders, village scouts’ commitment waned and
residents indicated scouts for their poaching, stealing, lighting, witchcraft and drunkenness. Where unit
leaders closely supervised the scouts, zealous enforcement of wildlife regulations quickly estranged the
village scout from his or her community. The invigorated pursuit of poachers led to an increase in villager
complaints about scout’s harassment, just as enforcement activities had done for decades go. Comment [BM16]: To be copied
the new document
Despite the implementation of CBNRM, fotress conservation is still part of management to reduce illegal
offtake of the resource, through arrests of offenders, the review of data from report dating back from 2016
to 2021 indicative that poaching of wildlife in both landscapes is being practiced by local communities and
looking at the species, the main poaching happening within the community is subsitance for the pot. Data
from the year 2016 to 2021 shows the following.
Figure 21: Number of arrests affecting Local communities
NUMBER OF LOCAL ARRESTS IN POACHING IN

LUANGWA
21
18
15
13 13
12
11
7 7 7
1 3 0 4 4
MWANYA NSEFU KAKUMBU MALAMA LWEMBE
2019 2020 2021
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Figure 22: LOCAL RESIDENTS ARRESTED FOR POACHING IN LUANGWA
Comment [BM17]: Change the

LOCAL RESIDENTS ARRESTED FOR POACHING IN spelling on Lwembe to Luembe
LUANGWA
25
20
NUMBER OF ARRESTS
15
10
0
mwanya nsefu kakumbu malama lwembe
Axis Title
2019 2020 2021
When we look at the chiefdoms in kafue, they too have raked in several arrests, the comparison below clealy
shws that from the year 2016 Nkala recorded more arrests almost in every year, this can be attricbuted to
several factors among others the above discussed capacities of law enforcement.
Figure 23: Number of arrests for Kafue in the Kafue Landscape
Number of arrests in kafue chiefdoms
19
17
11 11
9
8 8 8
7
6
5 5 5
2 0 1 3 4 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 3 2 0 0 1
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
mulendema kabulwebulwe chibuluma Shezongo musungwa namwala
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The above data suggests that Kafue from the selected chiefdoms has arrested more people than Luangwa,
this is a clear signal that it needs more help in preventing poaching than its Luangwa counterpart.The other
aspect increasing arrests in the Kafue Landscape could be attributed to number of enroachers that have come
in to the areas and are at logaheads with the Communities as well as the government.The revenues in table
…. going into Kafue Landscape is also much less compared to Luangwa, hence the philosophy of benefits to
individuals for the change of the mindset is not being applied
When we look at the total number of arrests, we can see and appreciate the role which law-enforcement is
playing, the willife sector is affected by many delinquencies among them illegal hunting,
TABLE 8.1: TOTAL PEOPLE ARRESTED FROM 2016-2019
S/NO ORIGIN OF SUSPECTED ARRES 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 GRAND
1 From within the GMA'S 13 16 8 16 20 73
2 From out side the surrounding 6 13 2 15 12 48
areas
3 From within the national park 18 29 18 30 34 129
4 From other countries 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 37 38 28 61 66 250
2. Discussion
CBNRM encompasses natural resources, on which local communities depend upon for their livelihoods
include water, forests, fisheries, range-land, and wildlife.The Land in GMA’s is held under customary rights
which is exercised by the traditional authourities. (Lewis and Alpert, 1997; simasiku et al, 2008), whereas
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the rest of natural resources on the land wildlife, Forests, Fish and mineral are all vested in the name of the
President, whose implication is that the state has a say in planning and implementation of Land use plan
through the General Management Plans that stipulates activities to take place in the Game Management
Area.This implies that there should be rules or regulations governing how, when, or in what quantity the
resource can be used. These rules must be understood and agreed to by community members, and
recognized and respected beyond the community, no wonder we can not over stress on the role that law
enforcement plays in making sure resources are effectively managed (USAID, 2012).
One of the major issues we see in the data is the aspect of community scouts, Community scouts are
appointed and paid by the CRB according to the prescribed procedures in the HR manual. The CRB has the
overall responsibility for initiating, implementing and making future updates to the CRB HR policies,
processes and procedures in consultation with the Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) and
relevant stakeholders on any non-compliance by CRB employees and this responsibility can not be
delegated.
The Department in consultation with the CRB is also responsible for defining broad guidelines to ensure
compliance with HR policies as a function provided for in the Legislation to provide oversight in
monitoring and regulation of CRB affairs. The CRB shall adopt fair and consistent methods of recruitment
and selection so as to select the most suitable candidate to meet the requirements of the job. The methods for
recruitment shall be based either on merit or experience as well as period one has lived in the chiefdom.
Where equally qualified candidates are being considered, the CRB shall give preference to hiring residents
of the same community or chiefdom over non-residents with the minimum experience requirements may be
waved in exceptional circumstances when hiring residents (DNPW, 2019).
While giving preference to local residents for community scout positions ensures there is compliance with
legislation which provides for a CRB to operate within its jurisdiction and also create employment for its
local community, however the arrangement poses a constraint for law enforcement activities where a
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community scout’ familiarity deters him from investigating of making an arrest to a relative who is
suspected of illegal activities.
While a community scout is appointed by the CRB, the responsibility of his welfare lies with the individual
CRB, but he reports and is supervised on a day-to-day basis by the DNPW- wildlife police officer. The
Community scout is described in the wildlife Act no 14 of 2015 as an authourised officer entrusted by law
to carry out duties of a wildlife police officer as conferred in the legislation. The fundamental duties of a
Community Scout include serving the community, conserving community natural resources, safeguarding
lives and property, keeping peace and ensuring the rights of all to liberty, equality and justice.”
The training of community scouts is usually the responsibility of DNPW and in some CRB's logistical
support for training for community scouts is also provided by support organizations and non-governmental
organizations. While responsibility for the appointment and payment is with the CRB's.The handling
discipline, non compliance and non-performance, resolved through the Board in conjunction with the
Department of National Parks. This set-up is awkward from a governance perspective. It is extremely
difficult for CRB's to hold staff members responsible and report on their activities and performance when
they are trained and managed by another entity DNPW, Despite the setback, the majority of Law
enforcement cadre in GMAs is coming from the community side where the ratio is 1-6 for Wildlife Police
officer visavi community scout.( CRB association annual report, 2021).
Responses on poaching incidences within Chiefdoms
Most poachers are descret as they use snares to get the animals, therefore its difficult to cacth
them
Community scouts fail to arrest their own relatives even when they know them as that can
result into being chased from the village
Some people that poach have very bad juju, if we report them they can bewitch us.
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3. Summary
Participation of CRB in Law enforcement is a provision of the law as a mechanism for communities to take
part in the management of Wildlife, but the aspect has had a gaps, where CRB's will employ community
scouts, but other logistics such as firearms, camping equipment, fuels and transport is provided by the
Department of National Parks.Though communities currently have the highest figures in terms of personal
with a ratio of 1-6 , we see many areas’ re-numeration being very low with an average of 1200 give the very
little to encouragement for them to do there work, these low salaries makes them even more susceptible to
compromising there jobs, despite the law forcement efforts being maintained by communities in all the study
sites.
We can also look at the aspect of payments, we find to see that Luangwa has much more to boost in terms
of numbers, it lags a bit when it comes to salaries. Even though Luangwa doesn’t pay as well, the CRB
under the Luangwa Landscape have invested in a number of equipment such as 4x4 Vehicles, motor bike for
HWC deployments computers and office blocks with a full blown secretariat for the Community structures
which is significant step, unlike the Kafue Landscape were non has equipment only 3 of CRB's have office
blocks.
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CHAPTER NINE
Role of chiefs
1. INTRODUCTION
In precolonial times the traditional Chiefs on behalf of the community had authority over natural resources
in the Chiefdom s. They would regulate the hunting, fishing and prevented unsustainable wildlife and forest
products harvesting as well as punish wrongdoers.(Corbett and Daniels 1996;Cousins,2000; Corbett and
Jones, 2000; Nelson 2010) During the colonial times Chiefs lost this authority with the introduction of
formal institutions. This led to increased illegal harvest of natural resources products, and commercial
hunting of wild animals that prompted the CBNRM initiatives. Further to this, colonisation and
formalisation of policies led to creation of fragmented natural resources subsectors leading to uncoordinated
efforts in sustainable management.
Prior to the formal engagement with communities, wildlife management was done through traditional
structures. At independence, the management of wildlife resources continued to be in state control through a
department of wildlife and Tsetse control. Due to increased poaching in the 70s and 80s that led to
extinction of black rhinos, the government had to reconsider its approach to wildlife management. ( Nelson,
2010) Comment [BM18]: To enter to

Bibiligraphy
Zambia has gone through several approaches in guiding CBNRM. The first approaches were the
Administrative Management Design Programme (ADMADE) and the Luangwa Integrated Resources
Development Project (LIRDP) implemented in the 1980s. The objectives of the two approaches were to
raise and improve the welfare of communities living in Game Management Areas (GMAs), while at the
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same time promoting wildlife conservation. The successes of the two approaches led to the development of
the National Parks and Wildlife Policy of 1998 that officially recognised the participation of local
communities in wildlife conservation. Further to this the Zambia Wildlife Act No.12 of 1998 was enacted
giving birth to the Community Resources Boards (CRB's) as structures for community engagement and
Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) to preside over wildlife estates. The approach led to the promotion of
grassroot level institutions called Village Action Groups (VAG's) which would interact with Community
Resources Boards (CRB's) to provide improved community governance.
The Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 established the Department of National Parks and Wildlife
(DNPW) with the aim of improving the management of the wildlife sector and fostering community
engagement. While the Wildlife Act of 2015 recognizes CRB’s as special purpose vehicles for community
participation in Natural resources management, there has continued to be inadequate engagement and
participation of local communities in natural resources management.
This topic goes on to discuss the role chiefs play in the progression of the CBNRM structure and
approach.A number of responses, positive and negative were brought through to indicate what Chiefs do
and what is expected of them on their position as patrons. This can be echoed by the words of former
Tourism and Arts minister who stated that the wildlife sector cannot succeed without the involvement of
traditional Leaders and their subjects.(Chitotela 2020 AGM golden Peacork, Personal communication)
2. BACKGROUND
Chiefs authorize land allocations and have a broad role in establishing customary rules for communal
grazing and use of wetland areas, as well as charcoal production, brick making, and timber collection for
personal use as well as other aspects related to land use in their area. These decisions result in conversion of
wildlife area to smallholder agricultural land, though the actual conversion is overseen at the local level by
village head persons.
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Until the establishment of CRB’s Chiefs had a lot of authority as both Chairpersons and Chiefs in the
CBNRM structure and Approach because of the Dual authority.They were responsible for almost all
decisions at community level, this led to a lot of financial mismanagement.The mismanagement of finances
let to reforms in the structure and approach with some powers shifting to elected members as chairperson of
the Community Governance structure. While sub-authority was autonomous with no other structure to
facilitate community engagement and the chief of the Area was the chairperson, the revolving fund was
facilitating in terms of finances, e.g chief Nabwalya chiefdom was an authority and all money sent to them
was there potion for development planning and implementation.The sub-authority reporting structure was
done through the Unit Leader who was the government contact person at chiefdom level and would report to
Government at National level through the Coordinator at the revolving fund.The unit leaders would the be
coordinated through the Area Warden’s office.This prevented an overlap of activity execution as they
focused on anti-poaching activities.
i. The dual position of the Chief in the CRB
When we look at the CBNRM structure we see that the chief seats on the CRB board as both a member
through his representative and as a patron. The researcher sought to find out the role of Chiefs as patrons in
both the structure and approach in CBNRM, does it interfere with CBNRM or they are doing their best to
facilitate the implementation of the apparoach.
One respondents indicated to say;
I think the idea of patrons is okay in the case were you have a good chief, a reasonable
chief who take such role seriously and provides leadership or guidance, it will work if
you have the right chiefs, certain chiefs of course without mentioning any have
interfered in the affairs of CRB and want to centralize the authority under the patron-
ship which should not be the case, so it depends, the idea is good but it depends on the
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individual chief, for example they can bull doze the election process where they have
differed with individual vying for a position.
Other CRB's who responded from questionnaires indicated the challenges they encounter in working with
chiefs as patrons.
Some chiefs want to use their power, and it’s a challenge to CRB's because they
can not speak against the chief by virtue of the position in society.
They bulldoze the process, only what they think is right should stand.
Interference and lack of understanding and self-interest on community issues.
Sometimes the chiefs overrule to have more benefits and mostly do not understand
the role of CRB’s
4. Benefits of chiefs
While there has being a valid case on the issues that have accompanied the role of chiefs, it is not all bad as
some responses paved the way for new ideas. Some respondents said
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The chief being a patron creates some form of organization towards land use, because not
anyone can just come and start using land as they will need to first get permission from the
chiefs, further it is observed that meeting s are more productive when the chief is involved
Chiefs provide very good support as far as policy implementation is concerned, for example if
a chief says no hunting then no hunting will take place and this will be obeyed even by the
people who don’t know the chiefs
Chiefs know about the natural resources more than most other CRB’s, chiefs are always in
office even after a new board is sworn in, hence they work with different people from different
boards over a long period hence they know as much about CBNRM as most educated people
in there particular area
The responses from these few responses gave an idea into what exactly is it that chiefs do in the
implementation of CBNRM, and while the current structure has a mountain of its issues its only worth
noting that these chiefs are pivotal in CBRM
Further data indicated that the chief in these landscape is trusted than any other authority by at least 20% as
the data below suggests
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Figure 23: Percieved trusted authourity in the community
Who is your most trusted authority
10%
chief
government
30%
private sector
60%
The importance of the chief is seen to be twice that of the governments and this is a distinction shows that
indeed chiefs are very important to their subjects.They stand as pillars in conflict resolution within an
outside their community, and also a point of engagement between government, private sector and other
institution working within the Chiefdom even before they reach out to the CRB.
5. DISCUSION
In Zambia a total size of 22.7% lies in the category of Protected falling under the Game Management Areas
(GMAS) which has a duo ownership under customary and state tenure. This entails that management and
use rights in these areas are contested and overlapping, with traditional authorities, local governments, and
national government all holding various rights. .According to Muphree 2004, the failure for CBNRM
approaches has not been in the performance of the operational principles which have rarely been put into
practice, but in the recognition of the nature and depth of resistance to reforms by the political angles,
central government maintannce the status quo over control natural resources.(Gibson, 1999, Nelson and
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Agrawal, 2008) also state that the external influence of resistance on reforms has largely been brought about
by the commercial interests and incentives that central angencies and private sector have over these
resources, that tend to make them think they are too valuable to be owned by ordinary communities, which
is exacerbated by the rapidly growing financial interests on Africa’s natural driven by global patterns of
commerce and capital interacting with national and local governments. Although rights and responsibilities
are defined in law, they often are not enforced and create perverse incentives for effective community
conservation Traditional authorities have an established role in allocating and administering customary land.
Chiefs authorize land allocations and have a broad role in establishing customary rules for communal
grazing and use of wetland areas, as well as charcoal production, brick making, and timber collection for
personal use.
These decisions result in conversion of forest to smallholder agricultural land, though the actual conversion
is overseen at the local level by village head persons. While customary leaders have responsibility for
management of forests for subsistence purposes on customary land, the Government departments
responsible manages all commercial use of the same forested land. This can result in conflicting roles and
overlapping mandates, which create inefficiencies and insecure rights, resulting in an environment that
supports unregulated, unsustainable, and illicit harvesting of forest resources (Tom & Homer, 2020).
When we further analyse the role of Chiefs on the CBNRM approach, we see that as most of the CRB's have
gone through a round of elections with some slight improvements in governance, and voicing out for their
communities. However, a challenge is that a three-year term is not long to enhance governance capacity, and
turnover following elections leads to institutional memory loss. Other challenges at the CRB level can be the
excessive influence of the chief (patron) in decision-making, elite capture, and attempts by the CRB to block
access to the VAG's in accessing information and projects which most time is centralised at the CRB Base.
(Tom & Homer, 2020).This results in to information flowing only within the executive of the Board and the
Patron when the owners of the money and information are kept in the Dark, which is different from the
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Luangwa Project meetings were held every 3 months by the Chiefs and their ADC committees.(Pers.
Communication Chief Malama of the Kunda People)
To further understand the influence and role of these chiefs, the Luangwa Integrated Rural Development
Project (LIRDP) was initiated in the Lupande GMA in the Luangwa Valley in 1988 and funded by the
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. The initial CBNRM design was similar to ADMADE and
was implemented through six chiefs, with few benefits reaching ordinary local people. The aim of linking
wildlife revenues with integrated rural development that included roads, water, credit, and agricultural
extension was generally unsuccessful. The project was changed in 1996 to focus on wildlife and to introduce
a greater share of income to communities and village level decision-making (Lubilo & Child, 2010).
From the beginning, ADMADE identified chiefs, the “traditional rulers” in GMAs, as its link with rural
communities and gave practical and historic reasons for this choice. Gaining the support of chiefs, in the
department’s opinion, would overcome the alienation between Wildlife Department staff and rural residents
over rights to wildlife. The Department’s strategy was to reinvest chiefs with some of their former symbolic
functions and distributive powers over wildlife (Lewis, Kaweche and Mwenya, 1988). ADMADE and
LIRDP Pilots gave two important powers to the chiefs, first, the chief chaired the Wildlife Management
Sub- Authority and Area Development Committee and appointed some of its members. Among the Sub-
Authority’s duties was the oversight of local wildlife and development projects which resulted from the
community’s share of revenue. Members of this committee also received a sitting allowance. Second, the
chief selected the individuals who were to be trained and employed as village scouts, the backbone of the
new enforcement strategy. (Pers.Comm.Ackim Mwenya- Former Director National Parks and Wildlife
service)
Despite the promise of these powers, the initial discussions with chiefs had to overcome deep suspicion as
changes in wildlife policies had historically meant greater restrictions. Chiefs quickly realized the potential
for their position in the new scheme and those initially not involved in ADMADE later clamored to join.
What we see is that although ADMADE and its consultants regarded this enthusiasm as acceptance for
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locally oriented conservation practices, another perspective suggest chiefs were acting out of self-interest.
Chiefs used these initiatives to secure more power and resources for themselves rather than to facilitate local
participation or wildlife conservation. (Lubilo & Child, 2010).
Gibson (1995), further continues that, “because ADMADE policy did not stipulate clearly the composition
or operation of the Sub-Authority, Chiefs generally controlled its agenda and membership. Chief’s ideas
dominated the list of development projects, which were often situated within or near chiefs’ compounds.
Chiefs’ relatives and loyalists obtained many of the new salaried positions, resulting in charges of nepotism.
As the person responsible for selecting village scouts, the chief became the gate-keeper for access to a
valuable commodity - a salaried position with law-enforcement powers. Given the value of employment in
rural areas, chiefs vastly increased their potential for surveillance over the activities of others; chiefs were
not timid in using these scouts when disputes arose. Some observers claimed the scouts felt more loyalty to
their patron chief than to their employers, the Wildlife Department. Predictably, villagers accused chiefs of
favoritism in their selection of scouts and in the enforcement of wildlife laws”.
The implication of this being to say that when it comes to development of village scouts only the people
connected to chiefs get the best opportunities, and this is in line with what the data said as the chiefs
bulldoze the process and this was indeed confirmed by the data from both landscapes.
Further it was discovered that chiefs contended with ADMADE on several levels in the same study done by
Gibson, but their concern with their own position and resources dominated their complaints. It was
discovered that they protested the authority’s control over the community portion of the ADMADE bank
account, its ability to veto the Sub- Authority’s choices for development projects and its time-consuming
routines for project approval. Chiefs asked for a higher proportion of ADMADE revenues to be allocated to
their communities, while questioning the Wildlife Department’s delays in delivering funds and lack of
financial accountability. On the local level, some chiefs used their powers to enhance the fortunes of their
kin, to dismiss some arrests, and to organize their own illegal hunting gangs.
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In more one case headman who failed to get elected to a CRB have fought the good intention of the
Board, but when the Chief is elighted of the behaviours he plays a very positive role to come to aid the
election facilitation team, in removing such cartels (Pers.Observ.)
In the Luangwa and Kafue Landscapes, traditional leadership is still strong and comprises of headmen,
respondents emergance is that headmen are viewed as eyes and watchdog of the Chief and well respected.
Institutionally, this strengthens the committee as it derives authority not only from the central government,
but also local traditional leadership which is so much agreed and confirmed by the respondents in our study
to ascertain the power of traditional leaders.
In the North West Namibia where traditional leadership is weaker (perhaps reflecting more dispersed
settlement patterns) a different model has emerged. Traditional leaders are viewed as patrons of the
conservancy and act as watchdogs for the community. (Jones 2000b, Jones 1999b). As in many rural
African communities, local people are organized in social groupings linked to their tribal or cultural lineage.
Local communities are grouped into clans, tribal ethnicities and have cultural bonds that socially connect
them and their environment. In African societies and rural communities Chiefs or Traditional Authorities
enjoy the power of a monarch, where they rule over their people and exert great control over land and other
resources on it (Corbett and Daniels, 1996; Cousins, 2000; Corbett and Jones, 2000)These powers are often
inherited within the family and kinship group. Usually, each tribe has its own chief or king. People pay them
homage and they enjoy uncontested power within the communities. The inheritance of chiefs in Zambezi,
specific to the Siyeyi and Mafwe, follows a patrilineal system and is aligned to a specific family tree that
produces chiefs. These families have also got their elders that they appoint as indunas that run sub-khutas on
behalf of the chiefs.
Further in the study we see that in Namibia as is the case in Zambia, Traditional Authorities are recognised
by the state and their powers, as outlined in Law, are also supplemented by the customary tenure system that
has been enjoyed over time. It is this customary practice that gives the TAs power and authority over their
subjects. Each traditional community has its own traditional leadership: the Traditional Authorities Act
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(TAA) of 1995 defines what constitutes traditional community and Authority. A ‘traditional community’ is
defined as “an indigenous, homogeneous, endogamous social grouping of persons comprising of families
deriving from exogamous clans which share a common ancestry, language, cultural heritage, customs and
traditions, recognise a common traditional authority, inhabit a common communal area and include the
members of the community residing outside the common communal area. Such a traditional community is
entitled to a chief or a senior traditional councillor” ( Chief’s Act, 1994, TAA, 1995, ).
In Zambia, the powers, roles and privileges of the chiefs are contained in the Chiefs Act no.13 of 1994.This
piece of legislation establishes and recognises the immense role of Traditional Authorities in the leadership
of their communities and the safeguarding of their environment and considers them as crucial partners in
national development. (Burmeister and Partners 1998) conclude that “TAs play an important role in the rural Comment [BM19]: Prince Can w
stick to one kind of referencing
areas of Africa. Along with community based Conservation organisations, they play a major role as a Comment [D20]: Done
cultural asset when it comes to managing the environment and natural resources, including land and local
people”. Thus, the involvement of the chiefs is crucial for the natural resources ownership of communities.
This broad description of the TAs gives them an superiority over elected structures, though that is not the
intention of the law. Local customary practices are already entrenched and local subjects play to the gallery
of their leadership. (Chief’ Act no. 13 of 1994). Because of this portico by institutions by Government
Institutions even when a board makes a decision on community interest or against it can easily be over
turned by the Chief.
6. SUMMARY
From the data it was clear to say that the chief seating as a patron and a member has brought more problems
than it has solved. This is because as a patron his job is only to guide and advise, but being the chief he has
more power by virtue of his position not as patron but as chief and in most chiefdoms than not, whatever the
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chief says goes unquestioned.The removal of the Chief from the role of being chairperson was only done
theoretically, but practically the Chiefs has givenup their powers to the elected members in most cases,
despite this change in the legislation, the jacket was changed has not been removed completely and can be
won when it suits them.(pers.observ.)
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CHAPTER TEN
LEGISLATION GAPS
1. INTRODUCTION
Legislation and policy frameworks have been and continues to play key role in modeling effective CBNRM
approach. In Zambia CRB's have been used as community structures providing pathway and guidance for
CBNRM implementation despite complexities that come with the Concept. This chapter seeks to discuss
the legislation provisions of community governanance in the wildlife sectot in the Kafue and Luannga
Landscapes, alongside the gaps in the provisions.
Prior to the formal engagement with communities, wildlife management was done through traditional
structures. From the colonial era,the Game Ordinance Chapter 106 of the Law of 1950 of Northern
Rhodesia was the primary piece of legislation prominent to the establishment of national parks. The Fauna
Conservation Ordinance enacted in 1954 flagged the way for the establishment of Game Reserves, Private
Game Areas, Game Management Areas and Controlled Hunting Areas (Chomba et al., 2011). However, this
law, though enacted for the creation of GMAs, nevertheless by design it did not provide for the CBNRM
approach.
At independence in 1964, the management of wildlife resources continued to be in state control through a
department of wildlife and Tsetse control. Due to increased poaching in the 70s and 80s that led to the
extinction of black rhinos, the government had to rethink its approach to wildlife management. A study in
Lupande Game Management Area (GMA) established that poaching increased due to non-involvement of
local communities in its management and beneficiation. As a result a CBNRM model was developed by
Government as a strategy to involve local communities.
131
Zambia has gone through several approaches in guiding CBNRM. The first approaches were the
Administrative Management Design Programme (ADMADE) and the Luangwa Integrated Resources
Development Project (LIRDP) implemented in the 1980s. The objectives of the two approaches were to
raise and improve the welfare of communities living in Game Management Areas (GMAs), while at the
same time promoting wildlife conservation. Though the approaches had their own successes and failures, the
legislative framework to support the implementation was on a gentlemans’ agreeement as a pilot. The
successes of the two approaches led to the development of the National Parks and Wildlife Policy of 1998
that officially recognised the participation of local communities in wildlife conservation. Further to this the Comment [A121]: What about th
National Parks and Wildlife Act 197
Zambia Wildlife Act No.12 of 1998, the Act recognised the ADMADE concept and officially recognised to what did it provide for the CBNRM
approach or luck off.
the Community Resources Boards (CRB's) as structures for community engagement and mandated the
Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) to preside over wildlife estates. The CBNRM approach and the Zambia
Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 led to the promotion of grassroot level institutions called Village Action
Groups (VAG's) which would interact with Community Resources Boards (CRB's) to provide improved
community involvement.
In 1998, the National Parks and Wildlife Act (1971) was repealed and replaced with the Zambia Wildlife
Act (No. 12 of 1998). A key element of the 1998 legislation was the transformation of the Department of
National Parks and Wildlife Service into ZAWA, designed to be a semi-autonomous, revenue-generating
body of the type similar in other countries in the region (such as Kenya Wildlife Service, South African
National Parks, and Tanzania National Parks). In addition to these institutional reforms, the new legislation
formalized CBNRM, and established CRB's as local democratic institutions to work in partnership with
Zmabia Wildlife Authourity (ZAWA) within GMAs. The Wildlife act of 1998 gave communities
responsibilities to participate in wildlife management through a devolved function to employ a uniformed
cadre for community law enforcement activities.After 1998 the formal enagmenet with communities saw the
devolution of rights for community participation in negotiating for co-management agreements in the Game
Management Areas with the wildlife Authourity.The position of the Chief was formerly recognised as
132
Patrons of the Community Resources Boards, while the Executive was cohenced to employ qualified
secretariat to carry out the day to day activities of the Board and also act as memory for the elected
executive who had a defined term of office.The new legislation further gave communities some right to
participate in the development of general management Plans and proposed hunting quotas for approval by
ZAWA
Subsequently the 1998 Act was repealed and replaced by the 2015 Act. At inception of the wildlife
institution as a Government Department. Act No. 2015 saw the inception of a contemporary version of
legislation that considered the role of the private sector and the paradigm shift where the private sector is
expected to play a major role through Private Public Partnerships (PPP) as a away of tapping into the skills
and financial resources of the private sector. The 2015 Act also provides for the additional categories of
protected areas to permit active participation of the private sector, consolidate the latest gains made in
Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) and management of the impacts of global
climate change on wildlife. The Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 also established the Department of
National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) under the Ministry of Tourism as part of mainstream Government
with the aim of improving the management of the wildlife sector and fostering community engagement.
While the Wildlife Act of 2015 recognises CRB's as special purpose vehicles for community participation in
natural resources management, there has continued inadequate engagement and participation of local
communities in wildlife Management. For instance in as much as Part V of the Act provides for negotiation
of Concession Agreement, Community participation in quota setting, in practice the involvement of the
Communities in these processes in minimal at best they only participate on two level of the evaluation
process for the tendering of the Concession Agreement. Further the benefit sharing mechanism is not well
tabulated in the Act. These provisions need to be enhanced for the Communities to effectively participate
and benefit from the management of the resources.
According to the provision of the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 the Government and communities are
supposed to share hunting concession fees, live capture, animal fees, and land-user fees in GMAs. However,
133
from the current co-management approach, only the animal fees are currently being shared at 50-50 % ratio
this position is supported by subsidiary legislation (SI No 49 of 2004).Despite the provisions in the
principle legislation to share other streams of revenue with communities operationalisation does not seem to
have support and political will from the government.The current legislation lacks predictability,
transparency and adequate guidelines. The lack of adequate subsidiary legislation for sharing of other
revenue streams such as Concession Fees, Land User Fees and Live Capture Fees has resulted into .
inadequate to incentivization of benefits at household or village level, or even to meet administrative and
operational expenses of the CRB's. Other problems are harmonisation of activities across sectors, traditional
succession disputes and boundary disputes. The continued centralised wildlife management is against the
intention of decentralisation and devolution of functions to local authorities and communities. This
centralisation has resulted in unclear ownership of wildlife resources at community level.
2. BACKGROUND
Figure 10.0: Evolution of the wildlife legislation1950-2018 in Zambia adopted from Chansa et al (2010)
Year Institution Main Policy Title of Policy
focus and Legislation
1950 Department of Management and Game Ordinance
Game and law enforcement Chapter106of
Tsetse with control the law
(main Human (establishment of
wildlife conflict the national
mitigation) parks)
especially with
134
disease control.
Provided for the
declaration:
Creation of
Fauna
Game Reserves,
Conservation
Private Game
ordinance
Areas, Game
enacted 1954
Management
Areas and
Controlled
hunting Areas
and recognition
Native
authourities in
issuance of
licenses
1963 Department of The birth of Game Ordinance
Game and Tourism and Chapter 106 0f
Fisheries Conservation the law
approach to
wildlife
conservation
1963 Department of Wildlife and Game Ordinance
Wildlife , fisheries Chapter 106 0f
Fisheries and Management the law
National Parks
135
1968 National Parks Creation of National Parks
and Wildlife GMAs for and wildlife Act
Services licences hunting chapter 316 of
(NPWS) and completely 1968
centralized
control and
management of
wildlife in the
country by
vesting the
absolute
ownership of
wildlife in the
President on
behalf of the
public with
policy was
inclining towards
protection and
restriction
1991 National Parks Brought National Parks
and Wildlife legislative and Wildlife Act
Service reforms upto date No. 10 of 1991,
(NPWS) with post Wildlife Policy
independence era 1993
and
reintroduction of
136
private owned
game farmes
1999 Zambia enhancement of Wildlife Act No.
Wildlife the benefits to 12 of 1998 and
Authority local wildlife policy
(ZAWA) communities in 1998
GMAs
Comanagement;
the development
and
implementation
of Management
Plans
2016 Department of Though Wildlife Act No.
National Parks developed 14 of 2015 and
and Wildlife outside the wildlife policy
(DNPW) policy 2018
provisions.It
focused enhance
Law enforcement
and co-
management
through
CBNRM.
Emphasis place
on collaboration
with other
137
relevant actors
In Zambia, the first chronicled piece of legislation recitation to wildlife conservation was enacted 100 years
ago in 1912 when the Ostrich Export Prohibition, Chapter 115 of the Laws came into force on 16th March
1912 (NRG, 1948a). Later on, the Plumage Birds Protection, Chapter 117 of the Laws came into force on
27th November 1915. In 1941 Ordinance number 41 was enacted but this was far along substituted by the
Game Ordinance Chapter 106 of the Laws on 1st January 1943 (NRG, 1948a). Part II, Section 3 of the
Game Ordinance had a provision for establishing a National Park. It identified, the Governor’s
proclamation with the consent of the Legislative Council signified by resolution declared any area of land to
be a National Park and may in like manner, define or alter the limits of any such areas. It was during this
period that the Governor educed powers vested on him under Section 3 of CAP 106 to declare Kafue
National Park under Government Notice 108 of 1950 (NRG, 1948a) (Chomba et al 2011)
When the former British colony of Northern Rhodesia became an independent state in 1964. The new
government of the Republic of Zambia repealed and replaced the two Ordinances with the National Parks
and Wildlife Act Chapter 316 in 1968, which turn out to be operational in 1971. Two decades later, the
National Parks and Wildlife Act was repealed and replaced by the National Parks and Wildlife Act No. 10 of
1991. In 1998, the National Parks and Wildlife Act No. 10 of 1991 was repealed and replaced by the Zambia
Wildlife Act No. 12 of 1998, (Chomba, 2011).
I. CURRENT WILDLIFE POLICY
The Wildlife Act No 14 of 2015, was written in the absence of an approved overarching policy, which was
in a draft during the period 2010 – 2017. However, the National Parks and Wildlife Policy (finally issued in
August 2018) does form the basis of much of what is contained in the 2015 legislation.
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The policy recognizes that the wildlife sector has not performed as expected, stating that: “from its
establishment, the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) faced a myriad of problems that affected wildlife
management and threatened the country’s vast wildlife estate” (GRZ, 2018a). These problems included poor
funding, weak human and institutional capacity, and high rate of staff turnover. The policy recognizes that
weak cross-sectoral cooperation with other agencies, ministries and policies has meant that wildlife
protection has operated in a silo and has not been well supported by other law enforcement bodies.
In order to address these constraints, the wildlife policy of 2018 commits, among other things, to:
• Create enabling conditions for effective conservation of wildlife and sustainable growth of the sector;
• Devolve wildlife user rights, costs and benefits to community and private land owners;
• Unlock the economic potential of wildlife and performance of the sector; and
• Promote private sector and community participation in wildlife conservation.
Key strategies relevant to this review that the 2018 policy puts forth include to:
• Decentralize the management of protected areas other than national parks to appropriate local community
institutions;
• Design relevant guidelines that facilitate the creation of wildlife-based economies; and
• Facilitate and promote public-private-partnerships that are specific to the wildlife sector in the
management of protected areas and customary lands.
In GMAs, the policy commits to:
• Foster the management of GMAs based on the principles of CBNRM and other innovative approaches that
will enhance the conservation of wildlife and its habitat and improve the socioeconomic welfare of local
communities;
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• Promote management of natural resources on customary lands using principles of integrated natural
resources management; and
• Facilitate the formation of appropriate community-based institutions.
With regard to devolving wildlife user rights, the policy commits to:
• Develop clear guidelines on the devolution of wildlife management and user rights; costs and benefits to
land owners;
• Design mechanisms of accountability and compliance by land owners to whom devolution of wildlife
management has been conferred by the State;
• Design and provide appropriate incentives to land owners to invest in wildlife-based land use practices;
• Develop guidelines and facilitate the transfer of ownership of wildlife to community and landowners;
• Facilitate the formation of appropriate community-based institutions in the wildlife sector in line with
established legal guidelines; and
• Promote and facilitate the development of community eco-tourism and other wildlife-based enterprises on
customary lands.
Overall, as detailed above, the policy provides clear commitments to devolution of wildlife management,
improved accountability arrangements, and the development of incentives for local level management.
However, as discussed below, these policy provisions were not actually translated into legislation with the
passing of the 2015 Wildlife Act.
The main focus of the 2015 Wildlife Act was to dissolve ZAWA and transfer responsibilities to a new
Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) under the Ministry of Tourism and Arts, in line with
the criticisms of performance to date described in the Policy for National Parks and Wildlife.
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Section 12 of the Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 incorporated a new provision, which enables communities to
apply for the protection of an area of “environmental, ecological or scientific value or significance” as
Community Partnership Parks (CPPs). The Act provides the opportunity for traditional user rights to be
permitted within these areas, and for communities to enter into agreements with other service providers.
This would seem to offer an interesting opportunity for partnerships to emerge similar to those that are
developing under community forestry and carbon areas. To date these partnership have not developed,
perhaps because the model has not been clearly defined or due to limited areas of wildlife outside of
protected areas.
As with earlier legislation, the 2015 Wildlife Act reaffirms the right of local communities living in GMAs to
apply to the government for registration as a CRB. The committee of the board must have elected
community members, a representative of the council in the area, a representative of the area chief, and a
government official to serve as part of the board’s secretariat.
The functions of a CRB are to promote and develop an “integrated approach to the management of human
and natural resources in the area falling under its jurisdiction” (GRZ, 2015b). The CRB may pursuant to
section 33 of the Zambia Wildlife Act No.14 of 2015:
• Negotiate, in conjunction with the DNPW, co-management agreements with hunting outfitters and
photographic tour operators;
• Manage the wildlife under its jurisdiction within quotas specified by the DNPW;
• Appoint community scouts to exercise and perform the duties of a wildlife police officer under the
supervision of a wildlife police officer in the area falling under the board’s jurisdiction; and
• In consultation with the director, develop and implement management plans which reconcile the various
uses of land in areas falling under the board’s jurisdiction.
Despite the promising text in the Wildlife Policy and the reference to CPPs, the fundamental challenges
inherent in previous legislation was carried forward and remains unaltered. The extant Wildlife Act fails to
141
recognize communities living in GMAs as the rightful owners and managers of wildlife or land (under
customary law). Being subject to significant in-migration, pressure on natural resources is high and effective
land use planning is almost impossible. Furthermore, licensing of hunting rights and setting of hunting quota
are the sole responsibility of central government with little imput from communities despite the legislative
provisions (Lindsey et al., 2014).
New proposed regulations under development under the 2015 Act around private wildlife estates, GMAs,
and wildlife veterinary issues have the potential to bring new clarity to the sector in the coming years, and
represent an important opportunity to strengthen and advance community wildlife management in the face of
long-term and chronic institutional challenges.
II. Gaps in legislation
Until recently, Zambia’s approach to CBNRM in the wildlife sector has long been based on principles of
sharing of benefits, rather than devolution of rights and tenure. Under the Wildlife Act, communities are
presented as somewhat passive recipients of hunting revenues paid by the government , rather than as
active managers of wildlife. Companies are selected by the government, with limited involvement of
Communities (just consent from the chief and participation on the tender committees and negotiations), and
no real accountability exists between concession holders and local communities, or enhancement of
enforcement in Hunting Concessions agreements obligations in the case of abrogations by either party.
The rights of private companies appear to be stronger than those allocated to CRB's, in terms of long-term
management contracts for sport (trophy) hunting operators. Despite the limited rights passed down to CRB's,
the Wildlife Act provides clear descriptions of CRB responsibilities – including wildlife protection (through
village game scouts), developing and implementing wildlife management plans, and “perform[ing] such
other functions as the Minister or Director may direct or delegate to it” (GRZ, 2015b). Similarly, there are
some gaps in terms of revenue sharing, for example revenues are not shared with communities from
concessions and photographic safari operations, only from hunting. The government has failed to
operationalize the sharing of the four streams of revenues despite the provisons by the principle Act no. 14
142
of 2015.(Dr. Rodgers Lubilo, Personal communication or KBN TV Newsz Machalunda Machalunda
2022).Further to this the comanagement arrangement regards CRB's as structures to carry some mandate of Comment [BM22]: Clip sent.
the Government and not as Partners in the business of the Wildlife sector, where they could legally be
allowed to partner with the operator as a business persona in a joint venture arrangement . Comment [BM23]: To consult
tennyson
A key challenge noted in previous reviews (e.g. Lindsey et al., 2014) has been the mechanism through
which revenues are shared. Concession fees are paid directly to central government and then – in theory, at
least – the prescribed share is forwarded to the respective CRB. In reality, funds have often been retained
within government to cover budget shortfalls at national level (when under ZAWA in particular), and often
communities have been promised funds at a later date, often never to materialize. And even when its shared
its at the mercy of the government, from 2016 -2019 communities revenues were only disbursed in 2019 in
arears after some pressure beng exerted on the government.
Poor levels of transparency and disclosure have meant that communities are often left in the dark with
regard to funds payable to them. In recent years, there is increasing experimentation at the local level with
new ways of engaging communities in wildlife management, beyond the status quo of benefit-sharing to
CRB's in GMAs.
On the issue of legal provisions, the researcher requested if there are observed gaps in the current act that
could improve the performance in terms of the approach and the structure of CBRM philosophy. It was
stated that:
The CRB's are also restricted interms of what they are able to benefit or form companies to become share
holders and benefit from the profits made by made by tour operators and not just from licences. Comment [BM24]: To discuss the
issue shareholding by communities
form companies and use land and
I think there are certain gaps that are there, we talk of the act of rights for the wildlife as shares
community resource boards but there is need to create maybe an SI that will add
more meat to the act in terms of some of the things that we have just discussed.
143
Yes CRB's are there but maybe looking at provisions that will empower them I think
to some extent in managing their own affairs but in doing so we must do it with
caution.
Certainly it’s not just a matter of giving them that we divorce that here now we are
done, its strengthening the partnership, the model that will strengthen the
partnership beyond what it is. It’s not that government will hand over to say now
you are on your own, that will certainly fail and will create confusion, and so it is
to strengthen the partnership. If you look at it, we are actually stakeholders, we are
equal partners in terms of revenue, in terms of partnership because they own the
land, we own the animals, so we are equal partners, 50-50, so we are equal
partners or shareholders if you talk about it from the corporate point of view, while
the principle Act provides for sharing of all revenue streams, the Government has
not operationalised regulation for other streams such concession, landusers and
game capture licences.
The legal provisions that provide the framework for the CBNRM in the Zambia Wildlife
Act No. 14 of 2015 are adequate. However, there is need to regulations to generally
provide guidance of how the CRB should operate. The CRB should have a Constitution
144
that governs the CRB which particular details so that there is room for flexibility for
change in the event that the provision of the Constitution are not working.
Prescribing the composition by statute is limiting the capacity of the CRB. There is
need to re-evaluate whether the composition is relevant to the needs of CRB's in
contemporary CBNRM model, and possibly give a robust composition for CRB's that
are very active and another composition for intermediate and those that are just being
formed..
Weak provisions in the Act which are also not coordinated among the various pieces of
Legislation with other sectors such forestry, mines and Fisheries. A coordinated
approach is proposed
The Current law is merely providing for registration of a CRB. The Act should provide
for recognition and outline the process of registration of a CRB. The Act should
provide for a circumstances for defective registration and the whole process for the
registration of a CRB.
Legislation must have a thrust towards devolution of rights to communities, to form
companies and use their Land and Wildlife as colatral where the government become a
monitoring. The policy must shift to empowering communities by insisting that companies
must coopt local communities as partners on hunting companies
145
The other flaw which was observed when it comes to legislation of CRB's as CBNRM structures is tenure
of office for the CRB board, The tenure of the CRB, the composition of the members of the CRB focuses on
the Management team of the CRB. The tenure of the Board is short and does not give the Board a duration
to perform to the expectations.
2. DISCUSSION
The drafting and approval of policy and legislation is normally carried out by centrally based policy
planners, senior government officials and politicians. Those involved at this stage of the policy cycle
(hopefully) have a clear vision of what the policy and legislation are intended to achieve. They will have
their own vision of how the policy and legislation will be implemented in practice. However, it is usually a
different set of actors who are responsible for implementing the policy directives and the legal instruments
deriving therefrom.
When we look at data from other countries in relation to ours, as in the case of the conservancy policy and
legislation of the Namibian Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) it was formulated following
participatory community level surveys. However, the process was driven by a policy and planning
directorate in the MET, the Directorate of Environmental Affairs (DEA). The DEA has no regional or field
staff, and within the MET, the Directorate responsible for implementation is the Directorate of Resource
Management (DRM). Other actors involved in implementing the conservancy approach are NGO’s and the
communities themselves. In an attempt to ensure that the different actors would share an understanding of
the intentions of the policy and legislation, MET produced a Toolbox for Communal Area Conservancies
(DEA undated). Containing the relevant policies and legislation and some notes on interpreting aspects of
these, it was hoped that the toolbox would help guide the establishment of conservancies.
146
However, after nearly five years of conservancy implementation a number of gaps have emerged between
the intentions of the policy and legislation and what is being implemented on the ground.
The reasons for these gaps are varied. They include a natural propensity for policy to be reformulated and
even forged by action and implementation. Individuals will have different interpretations of specific
provisions and implement policy according to these interpretations. Another reason could be the fact that
one Ministry directorate took the leading role in formulating policy and legislation, while another was
expected to implement it. Bureaucratic conservatism and the desire to hold on to control also play a role and
another factor could be a lack of confidence amongst officials that rural communities can manage wildlife
sustainably (Jones 1999a).
Whatever the reasons, the cumulative effect of the gap between policy intention and implementation is an
increasing tendency towards what has been called aborted devolution. This is where governments have
introduced policy and legislation with the intent of devolving authority over natural resources to local
communities, but in practice this devolution is not taking place. A well-known example is Zimbabwe where
the original intent of the CAMPFIRE project was for local communities to gain rights over wildlife.
However mostly the devolution of rights has stopped at the level of the Rural District Councils .
If aborted devolution takes place, then communities will believe they are being cheated. They will realise
that the rhetoric of community ownership and control does not match the reality and will return to the way
they viewed wildlife before policy changes were made they will view game as belonging to the state and
return to poaching. As a result the incentives for sustainable use of wildlife contained in policy and
legislation will not work, undermining the whole CBNRM approach.
3. SUMMARY
147
The core historic challenge and chronic barrier to CBNRM in Zambia during the past 30 to 40 years has
been lack of community rights to make management decisions and capture benefits from wildlife,
particularly in the GMAs that comprise 24 percent of the country’s total land area. These challenges were
documented in the 1990s during the early experiments with CBNRM in Zambia such as ADMADE (Gibson
& Marks, 1995), and more recently by Lindsey et al. (2014) and others, who conclude that continued
centralized control over wildlife and trophy hunting revenues has prevented “devolution of user-rights over
wildlife to communities,” contributing to “on-going marginalization of communities from legal benefits
from wildlife.”
Significant forest loss and degradation has taken place in and around GMA’s, and adjacent undesignated
customary lands especially in the Kafue Landscape, as a result of open access exploitation and the lack of
clear legal provisions to provide for community-level management and sustainable harvesting of forest
products.(Pers. Obser) While this forest loss and degradation may not be as dramatic as expansion around
urban areas, human expansion in GMAs has a large impact on wildlife populations. It is against this
backdrop of chronic institutional barriers to CBNRM in both the wildlife and forestry sectors in Zambia that
the reforms of the past five years need to be understood. Comment [A125]: this summary
should focus on the legal Gaps, this
general, it can start with the 1971 A
1998 Act and 2015 Act and what
should be contained in the law.
Comment [BM26]: Prince I agree
with above
148
CHAPTER ELEVEN:
Trends of wildlife distribution
1. INRODUCTION
The research looked at the trends of wildlife in the two landscapes, Luangwa and Kafue by analyzing the
number of animal trends from 2016 to 2020 in different areas of the landscapes. The analysis shows they are
differences between the two landscapes in terms of numbers, species variation.
2. BACKGROUND
In the early part of the 20th century most of Zambia's rural areas supported wildlife at levels similar to that
seen in national parks today, and the 'big five' game animals were widespread outside reserves and parks. Of
them today, the rhinoceros is almost extinct, the elephant and lion are found almost exclusively in parks, the
African buffalo is found in or close to parks. Of the other large animals, only the spotted hyena, Nile
crocodile, hippopotamus, and lechwe are found in numbers outside parks, the former from its success as a
scavenger, the latter three since their aquatic habit has less overlap with human activities.
When we look at the Luangwa and kafue landscape we are able to see that, the kafue is one of the world’s
largest protected ecological networks and home to the world’s largest population of African wild dog and a
high density of cheetah. South Luangwa National Park, along with the rest of the Luangwa Valley, hosts
Zambia’s largest population of lion and leopard, and its second largest population of wild dog.(Pers. Obser)
149
I. ANIMAL COUNTS
The figures below shows data from the areas.
Table 11.1: Total number of species in Kafue Counts
Kafue Counts
Species Buffalo Lion Eleph Kudu Puku Impala Zebra Leop
2016 12 8 0 4 20 37 10 9
2017 10 8 0 4 20 37 15 9
2018 12 8 0 4 16 37 15 11
2019 12 8 0 3 16 39 15 11
2020 14 12 0 5 16 37 18 10
150
Figure 24: Total number of species in Kafue Counts
Kafue Counts
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Buffalo Lion Elephant Kudu Puku Impala Zebra Leopard
Table 11.2: Total number of species in Luangwa Counts
Luangwa Counts
Species Buffalo Lion Eleph kudu Puki Impala Zebra Leop
2016 28 27 16 17 24 27 11 6
2017 27 26 11 18 21 27 14 10
2018 24 27 13 18 22 27 13 10
2019 27 28 14 18 17 29 13 10
2020 23 27 13 17 16 29 12 8
151
Figure 25: Total number of species in Luangwa Counts
Luangwa Counts
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Buffalo Lion Elephant kudu Puku Impala Zebra Leopard
When we look at various GMA’s in each landscapes, the numbers can further be broken down to further
understand what exactly is found where.
Table 11.3 ANIMAL COUNT IN GMA`S
ANIMAL COUNT IN GMA`S
SPECIES /YEAR GMA NAMES
2016 NKALA LUPANDE WEST
MUMBWA NAMWALA LUMIMBA PETAUKE
BUFFALO 12 25 2 4 3 3
LION 8 25 1 1 2 0
ELEPHANT BULL 0 3 1 0 1 5
ELEPHANT 0 10 1 0 2 5
152
FAMAILY
KUDU 4 15 2 3 2 6
PUKU 0 10 12 8 12 7
ZEBRA 8 10 0 2 14 3
IMPALA 8 15 15 14 1 12
LEOPARD 3 4 4 2 2 4
Totals 55 127 38 34 44 45
2017
BUFFALO 10 25 2 4 2 5
LION 8 25 1 0 1 0
ELEPHANT 0 7 0 0 0 0
FAMAILY
KUDU 4 15 4 3 3 0
PUKU 0 7 12 8 12 3
ZEBRA 8 8 5 2 14 4
IMPALA 8 15 15 14 6 1
LEOPARD 2 5 4 2 5 4
tOTALS 40 111 43 33 43 17
2018
BUFFALO 12 23 2 4 2 4
LION 8 25 2 1 2 7
FAMAILY
153
KUDU 3 15 4 3 3 8
PUKU 0 9 8 8 13 4
ZEBRA 8 7 5 2 6 2
IMPALA 10 15 15 14 12 14
LEOPARD 4 5 6 3 5 2
TOTALS 45 112 42 35 40 51
2019
BUFFALO 12 25 2 4 2 5
LION 8 25 1 1 1 3
FAMAILY
KUDU 3 15 4 3 4 5
PUKU 0 9 8 8 8 6
ZEBRA 8 7 5 2 5 2
IMPALA 10 15 15 14 15 7
LEOPARD 4 5 4 3 4 2
TOTALS 45 113 39 32 39 36
2020
BUFFALO 14 20 2 4 2 6
LION 12 25 1 1 1 3
FAMAILY
KUDU 5 13 4 3 4 6
154
PUKU 0 8 8 8 8 7
ZEBRA 12 6 5 1 5 4
IMPALA 10 13 15 12 15 15
LEOPARD 4 4 3 3 3 1
TOTALS 67 101 38 32 38 Comment

47 [BM27]: Prince can we
shrink this table
The two figures above shows the total number of animal species from the CRB the researcher reviewed in
both Kafue and Luangwa Landscapes. The figures clearly indicates the comparison of the number of heads
of animals found in each count. The data was analyzed from three Kafue counts and two Luangwa counts in
a range of five years starting from 2016 to 2020, despite that fact, it can still be noticed that Luangwa has
had more animal heads than Kafue.
The accompanying table and figure below shows the comparison of the average number of each species
from 2016 to 2020 between Luangwa and Kafue Landscapes.
II. Comparison between Kafue and luangwa
Table 11.4: Comparison of the average number of species
Species Buffalo Lion Elephant Kudu Puku Impala Zebra Leopard
Luangwa 26.2 27 13.4 17.6 20 27.8 12.6 8.8
Kafue 12 8.8 0 4 17.6 37.4 14.6 10
155
Figure 26: Comparison of the average number of species
Kafue
Luangwa
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Leopard Zebra Impala Puki Kudu Elephant Lion Buffalo 40
The data above indicate on average a high number species in Luangwa, and Kafue counts show high
diversity. The small number of species in Kafue than Luangwa has been attributed to a number of factors
that has led to the disturbance of the ecosystem in the Kafue Landscape. Some of the outlined factors
include; encroachment, poaching and poor protection mechanisms in the kafue landscape refered diagram
no.(……) on the analysis of lawenforcement personel
III. Issues with both ecosystems
As indicated from the Director of parks, stating that;
The damage to ecosystem has been much more in the Kafue that in Luangwa. When
you talk about encroachment, you remember there is Chifulwe encroachment, I
think it was massive. Mulobezi has not had as much as Chifulwe, now we are
talking about Mumbwa, Mumbwa east was already damaged by the 1990s,
Mumbwa has been primed because it is closer to the national park than the east
156
though the classification needs to be relooked..
Namwala has a lot more encroachment. So the ecosystem itself has had more
human footprint, if we talk of encroachment in the Luangwa it is only maybe
growth of population but it hasn’t been really very sensitive to habitant. So
habitants are still secured and therefore the numbers are more. That is comparing
now on the systems, in terms of past, Luangwa has always had better numbers than
Kafue, if you go by species, you will find there are more species with greater
numbers than in Luangwa, if you go by buffalos, elephants… in terms of numbers
you will find there are 18,000 elephants in Luangwa and 6000 in Kafue. So there
are those differences, so if you are to tabulate and compare there too you’ll find
Puki, Impala, Elephants, Lions, all these species are in greater numbers in
Luangwa. In the Kafue, there are more of Sable. So even when you say Mulobeszi
was prime, yes they were prime, and they were doing well but in relation to
Luangwa, Luangwa systems was still intact.
So diversity is higher in Kafue but in terms of numbers they are not doing fine. You
can actually see that naturally, the Kafue systems would be suited for the non-
consumptive utilization because there is more diversity because people want to
search and have surprise and because of that it gives greater safari in the Kafue
system, the consumptive would be for the Luangwa system because there you have
greater numbers to harvest from and the off take also is very easy to achieve so
really that is how it has been that Luangwa is more than. So if you compare the two
systems, CBNRM in the two landscapes seem to be more developed in the Luangwa
system than Kafue and communities seems to earn much more in the Luangwa than
Kafue. So even the governance structures I suppose in the way they are grown or
157
evolved.
It was also stated indicating the differences between Kafue and Luangwa that;
The Kafue landscape I think there is a huge problem there, I would call it a
fragmented area because we have chiefs giving out land, areas depleted, not so
much hunting happening, little revenue to talk about. So I think Luangwa is
performing better.
Consumptive in the short region term brings in return if you invested in that areas,
for protection and the like so you aspect animal return and the like, photographic
you would have attractive areas, scenic areas but you may not have wildlife.
Certain areas like the Luangwa they may not have scenic areas but they have
wildlife.
I think the will to manage these areas is there in the Luangwa chiefs because
wildlife and hunting is part and parcel of our culture even through the traditional
ceremonies. Also wildlife numbers play an important role in preventing
encroachment, you wouldn’t suddenly go and set up a farm in the middle of
elephants and lions. In the case of Kafue chiefs, in the absence of benefits, you are
looking at other competing land uses and where a chief has control over land, what
would stop them from taking money and giving out land.
The other respondents indicated that:
In Luangwa the chiefs has more will to manage this system, also wildlife numbers
do protect land from being encroached. In Kafue we look at the benefit, we see
more benefit in selling land than actually preserving it for wildlife.
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The researcher further sort to find out if the encroachment, the poaching and doing other illegal activities by
community members was because they feel there is no ownership or they feel there are no benefits enough.
It indicated that:
The sense of ownership is not in them as much as the ownership would Intel. The
sense of responsibility is not in them because if they are left alone with a dog they
would run to the neighbor if the dog bites them. The situation is different in our
communities, they are left with a dog and an elephant harass them, they run to the
government say come and see your elephant. The law says “it should not be you, it
should be us” the communities together with the government. That is a distortion
that we need to revisit.
On the causes of encroachment, it was further stated that
It is due to legislature, in the sense that the current legislation does not empower
community, government has a lot of control, even though GMA is communal but
government has more control, while we involve community but how much are they
involved in decision making, we also see a system where revenue sharing is mostly
centered towards government than the community.
Another respondents indicated that:
I think its legislation in the sense that because the current legislation empower the
communities. The ways I see it I think government through departments of course
has a lot of control. Of course GMA is a communal lands, government still has
control over wildlife. Yes we involve them in terms or through community resource
boards, but do they have decision making in terms of courter setting, in terms of
revenue retention, all those aspects that communities talk about. When you look at
revenue sharing itself, I think its bias towards government. So that has a bearing on
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the benefits because ownership and benefits are intellect.
So the handout or charity approach of CBNRM I think which seem to be the case
where the government behold a fair share of revenue and hold it for four years, so
government are still held on to revenue, as well as drugs and rights.
4. DISCUSION
Zambia is endowed with abundant natural resources and a fairly rich biological diversity. Like other
developing countries, Zambia is highly dependent on the exploitation of its biological resources for the
livelihood of the majority of its people especially those living in rural areas. The importance of biodiversity
for Zambia lies mainly in its contribution to the provision of ecosystem goods and services for national
economic development and livelihoods as seen from the 2 ecosystems under study
To get a bit of context, we can see that Most of the large mammal species are well represented in the
national parks except for Giraffe (Girriffa camelopardelis angolensis), Black lechwe (Kobus leche
smithemani), Kafue lechwe (Kobus leche kafuensis) and Black Rhinoceros (Diceros bicornis).
Similarly the Kafue Flats lechwe population, seasonally move in and out of the Lochinvar and Blue Lagoon
National Parks, as the bulk of the population range remains outside the two Protected Areas. Black
rhinoceros is represented in North Luangwa NP but its original range included most of the National Parks in
Zambia. The numbers in North Luangwa NP are still low (G.R.Z, 2015).
LINKING QUOTAS, ANIMAL COUNTS AND REVENUE
Quota’s provide provide the closest link between animal count and revenue generated from different species.
Quotas provide a number of species which where used in what particular aspects by these two landscapes.
160
Figure 27: COMPARISONS OF QUOTAS BETWEEN KAFUE AND LUANGWA
COMPARISONS OF QUOTAS BETWEEN KAFUE AND LUANGWA

80
70
60
NUMBER OF SPECIES
50
40
30
20
10
0
LUANGWA KAFUE LUANGWA KAFUE LUANGWA KAFUE
SAFARI UTILIZATION HUNTING
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
When we look at this graph, we clear see that that Lungwa has more species in the safari aspect as well as in
the hunting area, and this has continued to be the case from the year 2017 all upto until 2021. To undersand
we need to look at the animal counts in both lanscapes,
Table 11.5: Animal counts
Species Buffalo Lion Elephant Kudu Puku Impala Zebra Leopard
Luangwa 26.2 27 13.4 17.6 20 27.8 12.6 8.8
Kafue 12 8.8 0 4 17.6 37.4 14.6 10
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We see that on average per year the Luangwa has about 150 animals and when compared to kafue we see it
has 104 on average per year, we are able to see Luangwa has a 30% lead over Kafue hence the quotas
mostly move in favour of them as they have more.
This is perfectly seen much especially when we look at it from the finances perspective, the finding of this
study did review that because of this study suggests that Luangwa has made k42,250,587 and kafue making
k11,865,357. All these diffrerence come from the number and diversity of species, because the more diverse
we are the more money we make this coupled with the amount of quotas.
5. SUMMARY
Most of the respondents had a view that the result of encroachment are as a consequence of legislation
because the current legislation empowers communities and gives them power to decide what they pleased of
doing. In addition to that, the communities do not get their share of benefits adequately and on time, hence
they opt to use the land for their own benefit.
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CHAPTER 12
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a summary of the study based on all the information which was gathered. It further
goes ahead and gives recommendation to the problem, research must not only identify a problem but it must
go a step further and provide the needed and feasible intervations and recommendations required to solve the
problem at hand. The effectiveness of structures on the Luangwa, we found that the Luangwa was more
enchrenched than Kafue while Kafue is secondary interms of CBNRM as the concept started way after
Luangawa was already initiated and running making Luangwa to be the source of the Concept by both
LIRDP and ADMADE.It is therefore deduced that CBNRM has more grounded structures and improved
wildlife populations which are visibly seen evidently in Luangwa than Kafue.
Despite the gaps and flaws in the governance approach in both areas, performance of the structures has been
affected largely due to interference in the electoral proceses and dual role of the chiefs in the structure and
elite capture, this coupled with inadequate capacity of the elected members and high turn over due the
legislative provision of the 3 year term of office.
When it came to the quotas and wildlife populations, the Kafue biodiversity appears to narrower whereas the
Luangwa is richer, the Kafue Landscape looks to favour more of photographic tourism whle the Luangwa
favours more of consumptive, but numbers in the Luangwa can also sustain photographic.
Whilst we agree that the CBNRM philosophy has been stuck on one stage in Zambia, where we have not
moved from co-management for rights to be fully devolved to communities , however any attempt to
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remodel or resuscitate the CBNRM approach necessitates to refine and understand what constitutes a
CBNRM approaches and structures.The refining should consider on the conditions of the global innetias
and conservation agendas but also the local polictics broader governance conditions. The Zambia CBNRM
philosophy’ structure and approaches demands dealing with the discourses and arguments from a ‘local’
perspective with interactions between ‘global’ and ‘local’ benefits while having in mind the welfare of the
local communities.
The philosophy should have a framework to develop with its own apathy as the concept is not consistent
to all rural communities and communities vary even within and among themselves in the same ecostytem
and geographical area, enough capacity for communities structures to be able evolve without the heavy hand
of structured laws and policy frameworks. Moving beyond current CBNRM structure and approaches
demands dealing with the contestations of ‘local’ interactions between ‘global’ and ‘local’ interests and
discourse they bring about.
It is valid to state that is CBNRM complex demanding process of approaches that bring togather devolution
of rights and functions with collective rural community voice and action for the betterment of the wildlife
resource.
2. SUMMARY OF FINDNGS
The study focussed on the governance structures and approaches’ effective for conservation of wildlife in
Zambia, its specifics goal is to provide a comparative analysis of CBNRM in the Lungawa and Kafue
landscapes. However not every part of this landscape was tackled as the study only focused on areas the
Luangwa Landscape namely Nsefu, Malama and Kakumbi, Mwanya and Luembe Community Resources
Boards.In the Kafue Landscape the areas covered were Chiubuluma, Kabulwebulwe, Kahare, Musungwa,
Mulila nama(Shimbizi) and shezongo Community Resources Boards.
Having the study area at the back of our mind, we can pursued issues among others, institutional gaps
within the DNPW, as it has changed shape and policy on many occasion.The Zambia CBNRM philosophy
164
has had stunted growth brought about by this institution changes which has caused the comanagement phase
not to evolve to the devolution stage where more management rights could have been handed over to
communities.
This is followed by flaws in capacity for law enforcement challenges and capabilities to enable local people
actively participate in decision making and effective community conservation models. The findings will be
broken down as per objective.
FLAWS IN GOVERNANCE APPROACHES
When we look at the current structures, most of them are based on the legislation as provided and guidelines
for formation of the structures.The prescriptiveness of selecting individual hunters their Literacy and
expertise interactions which pose as athreat to the capabities to perform as well negotiate with stronger
partners for the entities to run the business componet
While we see that the current Act sets up an approach in which the Chief does act as a Patron, deducing
from the study the role of the Chief as Patron is a hindrance in the performance of the structure as the dual
role with legislative and traditional authourity terns to be abused by the holder, as it creates the power
struggle.
Further we see insitutions like ZAWA and ministry of Tourism always speaking different languages, one
tends to follow the legal provisions of the policy with the other speaking the language which is best
convenient at the time. What we can see from the data is that the structure itself has flaws which regulatory
institution and individuals tend to ignore, while some things have being stressed on the current legislation,
such a clearly defined role of the chiefs and devolvement of rights.
THE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
165
Despite the change of governance structure which evolved from the Subauthourity in the ADMADE's
system of administration at the GMA Management, where the Chief was the appointing authourity and
Chairperson of the Committee. The involvement to a more democratic structure where the chief still remains
Patron has not changed the performance of the Structure in CBNRM.Despite winning the support of the
traditional leadership in the implementation of the philosphy, similar bottle necks such elite capture,
autocratic and non-democratic governance styles are still popping up in many of the committees as
observed and implied.
The constraints that were faces by level evolved over its first ten years. From 1989 to 1998, each GMA in
the ADMADE program maintained a committee called the sub-authority. Members of the sub-authority
were appointed by the local chief, 18 who also served as the sub-authority chairman. The sub-authority
decided how community revenue should be used, selected local residents for employment as village scouts,
and was responsible for interacting with NPWS staff on management issues. This system of local
governance was effective in winning the support of influential traditional rulers, a necessary ingredient to
establish the program in an area. However, it also led to many problems with autocratic and non-democratic
styles of governance (Alpert & DeGeorges),
When we look at the current structure we see it is headed by board members which comprise of government
representative, a chief representative, and elected members from the community, with this equivalence we
are able to see that for the two landscapes we have different people running the landscapes and the only
thing which is central is the government representation as representatives are sent by the same ministry
hence are expected to have almost the same language.
When we look at the community level, there we have VAG house holds, these house holds are expected to
be 200 to about 250, but what is prevailing is that in Luangwa most house holds are have exceeded this
number. However, this is not the case for kafue as most house holds are able to have a decent VAG meeting
and because of such numbers the data showed a consistency in the number of meetings in Luangwa, of
166
course the issue being that having too many members might pose an issue even in simply just organising a
meeting.
What happens at VAG level is that each group chooses a representative(s) which later proceed to represent
them at another level. Just above VAG level we have CRB level which is mainly comprised of finance,
natural resources and community development committee, thees are representatives are selected from the
community and their tenure is 3years. The reporting structure with this is better done for Kafue than with
Luangwa.
Further issues associated with such structures are that we see there is more of a weakness in Luangwa than
kafue Landscape. This was deduced as lack of coordination between VAG and CRB committees, in
Luangwa VAG committees are not regarded much in terms of decision making and participation in project
implementation while in kafue they seem to be some level of coordination though they committees seem not
to be very active in decision making but rather are on the receiving end of decisions made by government
departments, which also attributes to how individual were brought to the position in the CRB.What is
observed is that the Chief has an influence in the nominations of individual to contest at VAG and CRB
Level, and due to the perceived the authourity of the Chiefs as shown in (Diagram 3 ) the individual with the
Chiefs endorsement has high support, however tern to weaken the structure and he becomes the puppet.
COMMUNITY BENEFITTS
Wildlife in the country is beneficial, the data suggested that the Luangwa ecosystem generated above 40
million kwacha in the year 2020, with Kafue bringing in above 12 million kwacha in the same fiscal year,
these amounts have being gradually increasing and it can be assumed with inflation they will keep
increasing each passing year. These numbers differ as the area for Luangwa which was under study boasted
of larger areas by about more than a thousand kilometer squared. The other aspect is the history of these
landscapes, Luangwa has existed longer than the Kafue landscape, adding to the diversity of species where
Luangwa seems to richer and more diverse for hunting business, than Kafue Landscape hence it is better
rooted in revenue generation and is more popular than kafue.

167
Even as the revenue is shared it is important to take note of the following guides of the 50% share of
revenue going to Communities, regarded as 100%
i) 45% is ear marked wildlife management activities (e.g., resource protection, rations fuels salaries for law
enforcement cadre).
ii) 35% for local community development projects (e.g., construction of schools, clinics, feeder roads, and
grinding mills).
iii) 20% for CRB administration
The benefits at community level include go beyond communal benefit in terms of job creation, we see
Luangwa benefiting in this front more than Kafue in terms of employment for Community Scouts and
communities in the Luangwa seem to be very appreciative of the recipes of carcass from the safari operator.
When benefits come in the issue changes from benefits to how they are shared, it was perceived from the
data that Luangwa shares its benefits more equally when done in comparison Kafue where respondent
seemed that benefits aren’t shared as equal as they should be shared.
The legal framework for benefit sharing is inadequate with respect to resources; benefits for local
communities are insufficient. Strengthening the legal framework for sharing mechanism is cardinal to cure
the elite capture by committee members.
CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH CHIEFS
Despite the dual role of the in the design of the approach acting as a flaw, this design was set up initially
because in not just these landscapes, the chiefs preside over these areas so its only fitting that they have a
role in the governance structure. The chiefs are not only chosen because of there position but the chiefs
provide wisdom and leadership in wildlife management. Further we see that data suggest people in the
landscapes, both landscapes respect and obey the chief more than the government and the private sector
combined.
168
When we look at the chief themselves, while they are noble and respected they are part of the problem,
because of the respect they receive, whatever they recommend goes and if they recommend something
which isn’t helpful or isn’t effective, even if the government t has a better idea, its impossible to change the
idea because who dare argues with a chief.
CRB COMPLIANCE WITH GOOD GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES
When we look at the CRB’s we see to say to say that sometimes how are the CRB compliant with the
government. To see the compliance we see it in terms legislation, what we can derive from the scenario is
that CRB is in mostly in compliant with the legislation, from the setting up of the CRB to the election of
leaders even to the sharing the revenue, all CRB’s falls in compliant with the policy and principles of the
government.
When we look at the gaps in legislation, we see issues In the structure, in the management and the reporting
of these CRB’s and CBNRM programs, when we look at it at a comparative form, we begin to see kafue
flourishing and coming up despite them being new, they have more VAG meeting, they have community
programs and projects under way, this may not be the case with Luangwa which has less VAG meetings
with crowded members, it has more people with less productivity.
RECCOMMENDATIONS
 Formalize the Government’ commitment and support to overcome institutional or sector lines,
barriers and other inconsistencies through a CBNRM policy that will strengthen existing community
institutions to enable local communities development,management, acquisition of benefits from the
conservation of wildlife; where Legislation must have a push towards devolution of rights to
communities, forcommunities to form companies and use their Land and Wildlife as colatral where
the government become a monitoring entinty only. The policy must shift to empowering
169
communities by insisting that companies must coopt local communities as partners on hunting
companies in pratctice and theory, while reworking the governance structure.
 Develop a policy that will efficiently articulate political rights for effective community
conservation and take cognisance of the historical and cultural aspects of community wildlife
conservation users when developing guidelines for implementation of legal frameworks for
community governance , so that the necessary provisions are included.
 Shorten the process between policy writing and enacting policy guidelines through passing legislation should
be minimized to ensure alignment and implementation of policy goals to avoid misplaced relevance of policy
components
Devise a mechanism of how to prepare communities for devolution in terms of;
1. Structure at three level; Grass root, substructures, and National with proper sectoral linkages to
feed into different government sectoral mandates.
2. Governance
3. Distribution of resources in the Communities
4. Investment before sharing revenue
 Development of an all-inclusive definition in the wildlife policy for Game Management Areas
encompassing wildlife and associated habitats is essential to counter the challenge of
institutional, structure and resource fragmentation as the survival of wildlife is dependant on its
habitat
 Strengthen wildlife resource rights for local communities to curbe degradation and community
disenchantment bordering on disenfranchisement.
170
 Formalize the Government’ commitment and support to overcome institutional or sector lines,
barriers and other inconsistencies.
 Inact reforms to give the CBNRM philosophy a thrust to incentivize not institutionalize
community conservation as a critical social economic tool for effective empowerment
 CBNRM is transdisciplinary in nature and the study demonstrates the linkages between governance,
livelihoods and conservation. Therefore, future research for CBNRM should engage teams with Public
Administration, social-economic and conservation experts in order to understand the implementation of
CBNRM and its implication from a broader perspective.
 DNPW needs capacity-building and restructuring of the organisational structure of the extension
department by separating GMA’s from National Parks to improve allocation of revenues from central
treasury or letting the GMA’s run independently.
 The duo/Dual Land ownership in GMA’s should be clarified or separated so that it clearly defines the
ownership to one category, tackle the challenge of legal pluralism where resources are vested in the president,
while in practice resource use is determined by traditional leaders, as it is with PA on customary land. which
will also make clear issues of resource rights, management and planning responsibilities between the
community, local and central government, to further give guidance on rights to access, withdraw, manage,
exclude and alienate as these have repercussions for benefit sharing.
• Policy should be clear regarding cost and benefiting sharing, and the levels and type of participation by the local
communities in CBNRM.
Develop a deliberate policy to encompass guidelines on poverty allivaition, governance and conservation in GMA’s.
171
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Appendix 1:Proposed Activity Work-Plan and Time Table
Period Activity Time Frame Resp. Verifiable Target/Quantity Expected Output
Indicators
September 14/09/21 Fifty (50) individuals’
2021 questionnaires, Ten (10)

to
Developing Research # of research tools Unstructured interviews
Tools 14/10/21 Researcher developed guide. All tools required to be ready before last day
Meetings with 8 chiefs
in the Luangwa and
Kafue system, to
17/10/21
discuss the research # of meetings The Chiefs to be aware of the programme
programme To 30/10/21 Researcher conducted Eight (08) Meetings before start
Training of the research 30/10/21 # of research
assistants and pre- assistants trained

to
testing of the research and signed Eight (08) Research All Research assistants to be familiar with the
tools 5/11/21 Researcher attendance registers assistants to be trained tools before actual work in the field
181
Eight (08) Meeting with
6/11/21
Preparatory meetings Local Based Hunters and
with CRB's and local to # of meetings 1 meeting with
communities 15/11/21 Researcher conducted Headmen At least 8 meetings to be held.
20/12/21 Research
Assistants # of questionnaires All forms to be

to
Data Collection in the and filled, # focus group completed unless At least 80 percent of the planned data sets to
Dec, 2021
field 20/03/22 Researcher meetings captured otherwise be filled in.
# of forms received
21/03/22 from the field,
March 2022 completed, unfilled

to
Collection of Data forms and those with All the forms given out At least 80 percent of the work to be of good
from the field 20/05/22 Researcher errors to be collected back quality.
1/06/22
to
Summaries To be completed by Summaries to capture relevant data on each
June 2022
Data Analysis 1/07/22 Researcher generated 10/07/22 theme
Preparation of the
10/07/22
report and submission One full report to be
of the report to Researcher Report ready Submission of the report by 20/08/2022
182
August 2022 10/08/22
183
Are the Governance structures and approaches effective for conservation of wildlife in
Zambia? A comparative analysis of CBNRM in Luangwa and Kafue landscapes.
Appendix 2: Questionnaire (Individual Community Members)
Preliminary Data
Questionnaire no….
Date of interview ………………… Time…………………………..
District……………………………… Land scape/CRB…………………………….
VAG…………………………………. Village ………………………..
Demographic information
Name of respondent
Sex of respondent
a) Female b) male
184
Age group 18-25 25- 45 45 -65 65 - 85
Tribe …………………………..
Date……………………………..
General questions
What is your Occupation?
What is you source of income
a) Small scale farming b) Fishing c) Trading d) Civil servant e) Others Specify
Fundamental questions
What do you perceive as governance structure in this Area? Pre independence and post-
independence
......................................................................................................................................................
.............
185
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………
Is the chief still having authority allocating wildlife resources for local people? If not why has
it stopped/ if yes how is it done?
What conservation governance structure exist in the Area?
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………
What are your expectations from the CRB structure?
………………………………………………………………………………………………
Do you know your VAG/CRB constitution? Yes/NO
How have you benefited from the CRB?
…………………………………………………………………………………………...……
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
186
What kind of Resources do you benefit from the CRB ( a) employment (b) projects (c)
income (d) Meat (e) None
The CRB distributes resources equitably. (a) Strongly agree (b) Agree (c) strongly disagree
For each choice state reason
Do you agree with the statement that they are weaknesses in governance structure and
approaches in the CRB?
a) Strongly agree b) Agree c) strongly disagree
Do you agree that resources management have at community level through the CRB has
improved.
Do you agree that management of wildlife through the CRB has created more benefits at
VAG and household level?
How do you rate your CRB in terms of compliance with good governance principles?
(Transparency, accountability, decision making) (1) Very poor (2) moderate and (3) excellent
187
Do you agree that management of wildlife through the CRB should be changed and go back
to the VAG as a planning and implementation stage
What is the abundance of wildlife in your Area? Rare…….. Frequent ………….. Abundant
………………
What are the frequencies of Human wildlife conflicts and what spp…………..none……
less……….. More………..
What project have you benefited at VAG level from CRB revenue………………………….
Are the Governance structures and approaches effective for conservation of wildlife in Zambia?: A
comparative analysis of CBNRM in Luangwa and Kafue landscapes.
Appendix 4: Questionnaire (Community Resources Boards as

Focus Groups)
Preliminary data
188
District……………………………… CRB…………………………….
Name/s of respondent /group
Landscape Name:
1) Are you an elected member(s) of the CRB? What is your position in the CRB?
2) What do you understand as the role of the CRB?
……………………………………………………………………………………
Fundamental Questions
3) Do you have a constitution? Yes/no
4) Do you plan annually, if yes how is it done?
5) Do you have equipment to support Conservation?
If yes list ……………………………………………..
6) Do you have community scouts? Yes/No
7) Are they trained ………………
189
8) How do you Plan? (a) annually (b) Quarterly (c) Monthly (d) when funds are available
9) What was the role of the Chief in conservation precolonial…………………………………..
10) What has changed in current time ………………………………………………..
11) What is the role of the chief in the current conservation structure ………………………………….
12) What is the role does the Patron/ matron play in the governance approach?
……………………………………………………………………………
13) Is the role effective? 1 – 5 (one is Poor and five is excellent)
14) What are the major challenges in the involvement of chief in the governance approaches for
Community conservation? ..............................................................................................
15) What are major challenges in the involvement of Chiefs as patrons/Matrons in the Governance
structure for community conservation? .................................................................................................
16) What are the weaknesses of the CRB as Governance structure
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
17) Is the chief still have authority allocating animals for local people to Hunt? ……………
18) Who allocates Land in the community ………………..
19) What impacts have you had as a CRB on the conservation of Wildlife………………………………
20) What kind of Resources does the CRB bring for local communities (a) employment (b) projects
(c) income (d) Meat (e) None?
21) Do you agree with the statement that there are good benefits flows through the CRB?
b) Strongly agree b) Agree c) strongly disagree
22) Do you agree that working with the Chief as patron of the Board has improved Governance at
CRB level?
190
23) Do you agree that management of wildlife through the CRB has created more benefits at VAG
and household level?
For each choice state reason………………………..
24) Do you agree that management of wildlife through the CRB should be changed and go back
to the VAG as a planning and implementation stage
For each choice state reason……………………………………..
25) Do perceive your CRB as a good Governance structure for Conservation of Wildlife
For each choice state reason…………………..
26) Is the CBNRM as a good approach for Conservation of Wildlife at Community Level?
27) How do you compare the poaching levels as of 2000? High Low Medium
28) How much had your CRB received revenue from Wildlife revenue
2015 ( ) 2016 ( ) 2017 ( ) 2018 ( ) 2019 ( ) 2020 ( )
2021 ( )
29) How many project have you implemented for VAG's from wildlife revenue………………………….
List/Name
30) What is the population of wild animals as of 2000?
a) Increasing b) decreasing c) stable d) low
191
31) What is the population of wildlife in your project site as of 2000?
b) Increasing b) decreasing c) stable d) low
32) What would you perceive as a reason for the change in wildlife population?
If increasing ……….. Tick appropriate
(a) Good governance (b) low poaching (c) change in perception by communities due revenue
flow from wildlife (d) change in policy and legislation
(a) Has the establishment of your CRB improved conservation of Wildlife at Community Level
Are the Governance structures and approaches effective for conservation of wildlife in Zambia? A comparative
analysis of CBNRM in Luangwa and Kafue landscapes.
Appendix 3: Questionnaire (Wildlife conservation Support institutions and Partners)
Town……………………………… Institution…………………………….
Name of respondent ………………………………………….
What is your position in the Institution? …………………………………
What do you understand as the role of the CRB?
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………
1) What are governance structures at community level?
2) What impacts do the community Conservation approaches have on wildlife in your project
area
3) What impact does the CRB structure have on conservation of Wildlife ………………….
192
4) What flaws exist in the CBNRM governance for community wildlife conservation?
…………………………………………………………………………………………….
structure for community Conservation?
approach for community Conservation?
7) How do you rate your CRB in terms of compliance with good governance principles?
(Transparency, accountability, decision making) (1) Very poor (2) moderate and (3) excellent
8) Do you agree with the statement that they are good benefits flows through the CRB?
c) Strongly agree b) Agree c) strongly disagree
For each choice state reason………………………………..
9) Are there benefits for having a CRB , give reasons for your answer
What kind of benefits…………………………..
10) Has the establishment of the CRB improved the conservation of Wildlife at community level
11) Do you agree that management of wildlife through the CRB require some change?
For each choice state change
12) How do you compare the poaching levels in your project site of 2000?
13) Has the Department shared information of animal populations?
If yes what is the status
c) Increasing b) decreasing c) stable d) low
Appendix 5: Persons Interviewed in relation to the Research Topic
1. Dr Chabwela – Former Director Game and Fisheries

193
2. Ackim Mwenya – Former Director National Parks and wildlife service
3. Dr. Siamudaala – Former Country Director TNC
4. Flavian Mupemo – Former Manager Extension Services ZAWA
5. Gershom Chilukusha – Former Director GMAs – ZAWA
6. Professor Brian Child – University of Florida (African studies)
7. Dr. Simukonda – Director National Parks and Wildlife
8. Andrew K. Kombe – Legal Counsel
9. Dr. Dale Lewis - CEO COMACO
10. Watson Chisulo – Former Revolving Fund Coordinator
11. Karen FZS
12. Dr. Rodgers Lubilo – Community Leaders Network
13. Misozi Ngulube – Legal Counsel
14. Goerge Tembo – CRB Association
15. Dr Patricia Mupeta – Muyamwa
16. Snr Chief Nsefu
17. Snr Chief Mukuni
18. Chief Malama
194
Appendix 6: list of tables and figures list of tables
Table 6.0 revenue generated by fiscal year
Table 7.0: revenue generated by fiscal year
Table 7.1: hunting revenue from 2016 to 2020
Table 7.2: 35%alocation from hunting revenueu from 2016 to 2021
Table 8.0: capacity for law community enforcement
Table 8.1: total people arrested from 2016-2019
List of figures
Figure 1: a decision-making framework for wildlife utilization (adapted from sasusg 1996).
Figure 1.0: zambian scenario cbnrm analytical framework adopted and adapted from (sasusg
1996)
Figure 3.0: map for luangwa landscape
Figure 3.1: map for luangwa landscape
Figure 4.0: current structure of cbnrm
Figure: 4.1:weakness in the governance structures of the crb in luangwa and kafue landscapes
Figure 4.2: community perceptions of weakness in the governance approaches
Figure: 5.0: household luangwa landscapes
Figure 5.2 households for kafue landscape
195
Figure 5.3: proposed structure of cbnrm
Figure 6.0: financial trend per ecosystem
Figure 6.1: gma area size
Figure 6.2: types of benefits from crb in community
Figure 6.3: have you benefited from the crb?
Figure 6.5: does the crb share benefits equally?
Figure 8.0: the number of scouts in the individual community resources boards
Figure 8.1 number of local arrests in poaching in luangwa
Figure 8.2 number of local arrests in poaching in luangwa
Figure 8.3 number of local arrests in kafue
Figure 8.4 comparative analysis of arrests
Figure 8.5 arrests per chiefdom in kafue
Figure 10.0: evolution of the wildlife legislation1950-2018 in Zambia.
Table 11.1: total number of species in kafue counts
Figure 11.0: total number of species in kafue counts
Table 11.2: total number of species in luangwa counts
Figure 11.2: total number of species in luangwa counts
Table 11.3: animal count in gma`s
Table 11.4: comparison of the average number of species
196
Figure 11.3: comparison of the average number of species
Figure 11.4: comparisons of quotas between kafue and luangwa
Table 11.5: animal counts
197
198

Final Thesis DOCTORATE NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT Zambia

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Final Thesis DOCTORATE NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT Zambia

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BETTY MSIMUKO

DOCTORATE NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

ATLANTIC INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

our national parks.

Garth Owen - Smith

Talisoni Tembo and Gabriel Malembeka.

ADC Area development committee

ADMADE Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas

AGM Annual General Meeting

BRE Barotse Royal Establishment

CAMPFIRE Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources

CBO community Based Organisation

CDC Community Development Committee

CBNRM Community-Based Natural Resource Management

COMACO Community market for Conservation

CRB Community Resources Boards

DEA Directorate of Environmental Affairs

DRM Directorate of Resource Management

FMA Fisheries management committee

FMC finance management committee

HCA Hunting Concession Agreement

DNPW Department of National Parks and Wildlife

NPWS National Parks and Wildife Service

GMA Game Management Area

GRZ Government of the Republic of Zambia

KLS Kafue Land Scape

IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature

LIRDP Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project

VAG Village Action Group

PWE private wildlife Estates

RMC Resource Management Committee

SLAMU South Luangwa Area Management Unit

WPO Wildlife Policy Officers

ZAWA Zambia Wildlife Authority

The philosophy of CBNRM is to enrich the involvement of communities in conservation of wildlife

used for the envisioned tenacities.

management in the region is affected by many different factors.

structures including rights to benefit is very critical.

of leaders is also important.

influence on their performance.

wildlife and lost opportunitunities.

conditions as demanded by community’ s willingness to participate, benefit, and devolvement of decision

left grow and evolve according to context.

concentrate on the wildlife resource.(Lewis,et al,1990).

segmented to 6 chiefdom ADC and chiefs ceased to be chairperson replaced by elected

with Community Resources Boards (CRB’s) to provide improved community involvement.

participation in Natural resources management, inadequate engagement and participation of local

cardinal through legislative reforms and political will.

endorsement of the Acts of parliaments (Roe and Nelson 2009).

conservation of wildlife landscapes.

investigates the effectiveness of governance structures and approaches to community conservation of

Luangwa and Kafue Landscapes will be conducted.

3. Purpose of the study

4. Significance of the study

ultimate solution redesigning and shaping community based conservation in Zambia.

on the conservation of wildlife in Kafue and Luangwa Ecosystems.

6. Specific objectives of the study

effective community conservation.

 To establish major challenges in the involvement of Chiefs as Patrons/Matrons in the

Governance approach and structure for community Conservation.

 To deduce impacts derived at community level as a benefit of conservation.

poaching levels from the local community.

 To establish if the CRB's comply to good governance principles.

 To explore options and make recommendations for relevant policy direction.