(Exceptions to When Foreign Law Should Be Applied)

G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in
his capacity as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN
MAMASIG, respondents.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for petitioner.

Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for private respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

In the employment contracts of Ethelynne Farrales and M.C Mamasig with Pakistan Internatitonal
Airlines, pertinent to the topic was the excerpt from their employment contract below:

10. APPLICABLE LAW:

This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the
Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under
this agreement.

On 2 August 1980, roughly one (1) year and four (4) months prior to the expiration of the contracts of
employment, PIA, sent separate letters both dated 1 August 1980 to private respondents Farrales
and Mamasig advising both that their services as flight stewardesses would be terminated "effective
1 September 1980, conformably to clause 6 (b) of the employment agreement [they had) executed
with [PIA]."
2

private respondents for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses, against
PIA with the MOLE.

Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies,
firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for
settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement "only [in] courts of
Karachi Pakistan". The first clause of paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to prevent the application of
Philippine labor laws and regulations to the subject matter of this case, i.e., the employer-employee
relationship between petitioner PIA and private respondents.

The Court held that such relationship is imbued with public interest. .(EXCEPTION TO APPLICATION
OF FOREIGN LAW; against public policy) Neither may petitioner invoke the second clause of
paragraph 10, specifying the Karachi courts as the sole venue for the settlement of dispute; between
the contracting parties. Even a cursory scrutiny of the relevant circumstances of this case will show
the multiple and substantive contacts (GROUPING OF CONTACTS) between Philippine law and
Philippine courts, on the one hand, and the relationship between the parties, upon the other: the
contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least
partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner,
although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and
hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in
between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the
Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual
disputes between the parties.

Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so
as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law
(EXCEPTION CONTRARY TO LAW). Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake
to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be presumed that
the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of
Philippine law (PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION)

We conclude that private respondents Farrales and Mamasig were illegally dismissed and that public
respondent Deputy Minister, MOLE, had not committed any grave abuse of discretion nor any act
without or in excess of jurisdiction in ordering their reinstatement with backwages. Private
respondents are entitled to three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction. Should
their reinstatement to their former or other substantially equivalent positions not be feasible in view
of the length of time which has gone by since their services were unlawfully terminated, petitioner
should be required to pay separation pay to private respondents amounting to one (1) month's salary
for every year of service rendered by them, including the three (3) years service putatively rendered.
(REINSTATED with BACKWAGES.)

Co v Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives

199 SCRA 692 (1991)
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, (Citizenship by Birth – Jus Soli and Jus Sanguinis)
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., re

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making
that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose
Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:

1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an
alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.

There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her
marriage.

ISSUE: Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a
Filipino citizen.

election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born
status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to
ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only
was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was
only nine (9) years old.

He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be
amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his
already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine
years old.

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.

What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?

Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the
11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto
were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.

Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?

Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:

ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:

1. Persons born in Spanish territory.

2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.

3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.

 4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy.
(Emphasis supplied)

The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.
(Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])

As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895.
Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of
Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)

The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the
turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real
property.

As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4
of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers,
elected citizenship before that date.

The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against
Filipino women

G.R. No. 221697

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,(NATIONALITY AND

CITIZENSHIP)
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in
the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968.
Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano
Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and
registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In
her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando
Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. 

In a Resolution  promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that
103

petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency
requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she
declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years
and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First
Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic of
the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,

to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.

ISSUE: Was the COMELEC right?

HELD: he procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a
QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.

The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due
course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material
representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and
restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this
case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot
itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.

At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor
unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity
and Filiation.  That said, there is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents
110

and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private
respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have
shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not
shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents
were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty,
that her parents are Filipinos.

FACTUAL ISSUE: The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities
are unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)  that
111

from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total
number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born
in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner
presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there
were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos.
In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were
figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against
730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male
aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens,
or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens
or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted,
during the oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the
population in Iloilo was Filipino

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City.  She also has typical Filipino
1âwphi1

features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.

All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic
Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that
there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would
indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos.

Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the Philippines so
they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not face a situation
where the probability is such that every foundling would have a 50% chance of being a
Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly.

What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be foreigners?
Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be
Filipinos? 99.9%.

 If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher than
99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not imagine
foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those infants would
have better economic opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical paradise
suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever
considered their child excess baggage that is best left behind.

SERENO Concurring Opinion

COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled on petitioner's qualifications under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

First, Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 118, or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), does not
allow the COMELEC to rule on the qualifications of candidates. Its power to cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) is circumscribed within the confines of Section 78 of the OEC that provides for a
summary proceeding to determine the existence of the exclusive ground that any representation
made by the candidate regarding a Section 74 matter was false. Section 74 requires, among others
a statement by the candidate on his eligibility for office. To authorize the COMELEC to go beyond its
mandate and rule on the intrinsic qualification of petitioner, and henceforth, of every candidate, is an
outcome clearly prohibited by the Constitution and by the OEC.

Prior to the OEC, the power of the COMELEC in relation to the filing of CoCs had been described as
ministerial and administrative
n the deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa on what would turn out to be Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code or Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881, the lawmakers emphasized that the
fear of partisanship on the part of the COMELEC makes it imperative that it must only be for
the strongest of reasons, i.e., material misrepresentation on the face of the CoC, that the
COMELEC can reject any such certificates. 

The Summary Nature of Proceedings

under Section 78 Only Allow the
COMELEC to Rule on Patent
Material Misrepresentation of Facts
on Residency and Citizenship, not of
Conclusions of Law, and especially,
not in the Absence of Established
Legal Doctrines on the Matter

The Summary nature of Section 78 proceeding implies the simplicity of subject-matter  as it does
11

away with long drawn and complicated trial-type litigation. Considering its nature, the implication
therefore, is that Section 78 cases contemplate simple issues only. Any issue that is complex would
entail the use of discretion, the exercise of which is reserved to the appropriate election tribunal.

Section 78 Proceedings Cannot Take

the Place of a Quo Warranto
Proceeding or an Electoral Protest

justice Mendoza opined that the COMELEC has no power to disqualify candidates on the ground of
ineligibility

He then proceeded to cite the three reasons explaining the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a candidate:

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office.

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this
case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the
office.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166,
§ 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice President, as the
case may be.

n Romualdez-Marcos, the Court ruled that it is the fact of the qualification, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitution's qualification requirements. The statement in the certificate of candidacy
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. 45

This ruling was adopted by the Court in a long line of cases, in which it was ruled that aside from the
requirement of materiality, a petition under Section 78 must also show that there was malicious
intent to deceive the electorate as to the candidate's qualifications for public office.

CONCURRING OPINION

JARDELEZA, J.:

Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (Poe) contends that in the absence
of any matterial misrepresentation in her certificate of candidacy (COC), the public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had no jurisdiction to rule on her
eligibility. She posits that the COMELEC can only rule on whether she intended to
deceive the electorate when she indicated that she was a natural-born Filipino and that
she has been a resident for 10 years and 11 months

For the petitioner, absent such intent, all other attacks on her citizenship and residency
are premature since her qualifications can only be challenged through the post-election
remedy of a petition for quo warranto. 

On the other hand, the COMELEC argues that since citizenship and residency are
material representations in the COC affecting the qualifications for the office of
President, it necessarily had to rule on whether Poe's statements were true.

I agree with the COMELEC that it has jurisdiction over the petitions to cancel or deny
due course to a COC. As a consequence, it has the authority to determine therein the
truth or falsity of the questioned represtatations in Poe's COC.

Section 782 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) allows a person to file a verified
petition seeking to deny due course to or cancel a COC exclusively on the ground that
any of the material representations it contains, as required under Section 74, 3 is false.
The representations contemplated by Section 78 generally refer to qualifications for
elective office,4 such as age, residence and citizenship, or possession of natural-born
Filipino status.5 It is beyond question that the issues affecting the citizenship and
residence of Poe are within the purview of Section 78. There is also no dispute that the
COMELEC has jurisdiction over Section 78 petitions. 

here the parties disagree is on whether intent to deceive is a constitutive element for
the cancellation of a COC on the ground of false material representation.

The divide may be attributed to the two tracks of cases interpreting Section 78. On the
one hand, there is the line originating from Salcedo II v. COMELEC, decided in 1999,
where it was held that "[a]side from the requirement of materiality, a false
representation under section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." 6 On the
other hand, in the more recent case of Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, we stated that "the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less one's
intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the
person's declaration of a material qualification in the COC be false."

Article 14 THE HAGUE CONVENTION

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the
child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases
where the parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State
in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)

COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 473

AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY

NATURALIZATION, AND TO REPEAL ACTS NUMBERED TWENTY-NINE HUNDRED AND
TWENTY-SEVEN AND THIRTY-FOUR HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHT.

Section 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following
qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:

First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the
petition;

Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten
years;

Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the
constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living.

Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation;

Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal
Philippine languages; and
 Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public
schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education 1 of the
Philippines, where the Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as
part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines
required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.

Section 3. Special qualifications. The ten years of continuous residence required under the second
condition of the last preceding section shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner
having any of the following qualifications:

1. Having honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under that of any of
the provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof;
2. Having established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines;
3. Being married to a Filipino woman;
4. Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private school
not established for the exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular nationality
or race, in any of the branches of education or industry for a period of not less than two
years;
5. Having been born in the Philippines.

Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:

a. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of

persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
b. Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
c. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
d. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
e. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
f. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled
socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
g. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States 2and the Philippines are at war,
during the period of such war;
h. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States 3whose laws do not
grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989 (Loss of Philippine Citizenship)

JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON
CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE
ESTUYE, respondents.

J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.

Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on

January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of
Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador
Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983

Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special
and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against
President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of
survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added
that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of
democracy. (ADMITTING YET EXPLAINING WHY)

ISSUE: The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the
Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All
the other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary to this basic question.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status.

The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in
1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of
California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

the sole question presented to us is:

ISSUE: whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other
nationality laws.

We can decide this question alone as sovereign of our own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the
said Convention providing that "it is for each State to determine under its law who are its nationals."
The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his
office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner.

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the
time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once
any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.

If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission
acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the challenge to
her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been established, and
not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight months
after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.

HELD: This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in
this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country.

The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the
salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.

Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person
seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country
only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of
great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored.

This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother.
Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The
returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and
love.

G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (raul lee)

(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in
three successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be
disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to
have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections,
and upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R.
Lee, another candidate, filed a petition  with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from
4

seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the
Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled – (COMELEC grants petition)

 June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the
Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for
the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the
province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30, 1995,
Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,   praying for the annulment of the
11

June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation.

He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a
citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with
the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As such, when "the
said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received by Frivaldo on
June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the
proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . .

." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of  Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-
Governor - not Lee - should occupy said position of governor.

On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution  holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally
13

entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest
number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon

The Consolidated Issues

From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:

1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship
as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given
retroactive effect? If so, from when?

2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to
his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?

Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court  as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent
20

upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications
prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,  citizenship may be reacquired by (1) direct act of Congress, (2) by
21

naturalization or (3) by repatriation.

Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654  and during the oral argument in this case that he tried to
22

resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to
materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives"
due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt
at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural
defects.

Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the
electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and
20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee.

Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and
discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the
people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot.

Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last mode of
reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725 (PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF
FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO
ALIENS AND OF NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS), with no less than the Solicitor General himself,
who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-
respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr.).

That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30,
1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have been proclaimed as the
duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the
said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the
elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.

On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of
Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were
speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted.
After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are
they tedious and cumbersome.

In fact, P.D.725  itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to
29

implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual
since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in
repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire
his previous citizenship.

In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served
his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States -- a naturalization he
insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could
not in conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of
democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent
and services to his people.
uNder Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:

* a citizen of the Philippines;

* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he

intends to be elected;

* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election;

* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-

three (23) years of age on election day.

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one
year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of
age on election day).

But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument  to the 34

effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for
that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring
the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered
voter". And, under the law  a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could
35

not have been a voter -- much less a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the time of
such registration.

The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law
intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the
requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE
qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes
being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another
qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the
official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law
states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be
elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be
a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration -- not the actual voting
-- is the core of this "qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to
ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern -- and not
anywhere else.

There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the
date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code   gives any voter, presumably including the
38

defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate.
This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the
Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under
Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten
days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of
ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's
proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen,
having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have
been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the
immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared"
alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,   "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
39

the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions  to this general rule, such as when the
40

statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

NOTTEBOHN CASE (LICHTENSTEIN VS. GUATEMALA) Dual or Multiple Citizenship

Brief Fact Summary. A month after the start of World War II, Nottebohn (P), a German citizen
who had lived in Guatemala (D) for 34 years, applied for Liechtenstein (P) citizenship.

Facts. Nottebohn (P), a German by birth, lived in Guatemala (D) for 34 years, retaining his
German citizenship and family and business ties with it. He however applied for Liechtenstein
(P) citizenship a month after the outbreak of World War II.

Nottebohm (P) had no ties with Liechtenstein but intended to remain in Guatemala. The
naturalization application was approved by Liechtenstein and impliedly waived its three-year.
After this approval, Nottebohm (P) travelled to Liechtenstein and upon his return to Guatemala
(D), he was refused entry because he was deemed to be a German citizen. His Liechtenstein
citizenship was not honored.  Liechtenstein (P) thereby filed a suit before the International Court
to compel Guatemala (D) to recognize him as one of its national. Guatemala (D) challenged the
validity of Nottebohm’s (P) citizenship, the right of Liechtenstein (P) to bring the action and
alleged its belief that Nottebohm (P) remained a German national.

Issue. Must nationality be disregarded by other states where it is clear that it was a mere device
since the nationality conferred on a party is normally the concerns of that nation?

Held. NO. issues relating to citizenship are solely the concern of the granting nation. This is the
general rule. But it does not mean that other states will automatically accept the conferring
state’s designation unless it has acted in conformity with the general aim of forging a genuine
bond between it and its national aim. In this case, there was no relationship between
Liechtenstein (P) and Nottebohm (P). the change of nationality was merely a subterfuge
mandated by the war. Under this circumstance, Guatemala (D) was not forced to recognize it.
Dismissed.

Judgment[edit]
Although the Court stated that it is the sovereign right of all states to determine its own citizens and
criteria for becoming one in municipal law, such a process would have to be internationally
scrutinized if the question is of diplomatic protection. The Court upheld the principle of effective
nationality (the Nottebohm principle): the national must prove a meaningful connection to the state in
question. That principle had previously been applied only in cases of dual nationality to determine
the nationality that should be used in a given case. The court ruled that Nottebohm's naturalization
as a citizen of Liechtenstein had not been based on any genuine link with that country, but for the
sole purpose of enabling him to replace his status as the national of a belligerent state with that of a
neutral state in a time of war. The Court held that Liechtenstein was not entitled to take up his case
and put forward an international claim on his behalf against Guatemala

G.R. No. 195649               April 16, 2013 Dual or Multiple Citizenship (We find that although
Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act
of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively
negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. 3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado
applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on 10 July 2008.

On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in
his favor

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that
he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April
2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." 1

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on
03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

First Division reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his
Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time,
April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.

The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his
renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not
operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case
of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The
petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino,
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of
citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their
original citizenship. 

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required
to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when
he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA,
and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By
taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the
time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual
citizeN

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing
an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of
the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when,
after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his
continued possession of a foreign citizenship

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his
foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country
before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009.

ISSSUE: The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino
citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public
office
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the
date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both
countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United
States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time,
only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing
himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a
dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself
as an American citizen by using his US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to
Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an
elective local position.

Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through
a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the
certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. 39 Dual
citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify
as a candidate for public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but
by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, 40 he was not
qualified to run for a local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or
from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after
renouncing his American citizenship.

Maquiling is not a second-placer as

he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
G.R. No. L-1812             August 27, 1948 (Statelessness)

EREMES KOOKOORITCHKIN, petitioner,
vs.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, oppositor.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for appellant.
L. D. Lockwood and Manuel O. Chan for appellee.

PERFECTO, J.:

In August, 1941, appellee filed with the lower court a petition for naturalization, accompanied with
supporting affidavits of two citizens, copy of a declaration of intention sworn in July, 1940, and
proper notice of the hearing.

The petition was finally set for hearing on December 18, 1941, but it was held on that date because
the province was invaded by the Japanese forces on December 14, and the case remained pending
until the records were destroyed during the military operations for liberation in March, 1945. The
case was declared reconstituted on May 10, 1947, and the evidence was presented on August 28
and September 30, 1947.

On the same day resolution was issued granting the petition.

Although a Russian by birth he is not a citizen of Soviet Russia. He disclaims allegiance to the
present Communist Government of Russia. He is, therefore, a stateless refugee in this country,
belonging to no State, much less to the present Government of the land of his birth to which he is
uncompromisingly opposed. He is not against organized government or affiliated with any
association which upholds and teaches doctrine opposing all organized governments.

Appellant-SOLGEN alleges that no documentary or testimonial evidence was introduced to establish

the fact that appellee had lawfully been admitted into the Philippines for permanent residence.

In the reconstituted declaration (page 11, record on appeal) the following can be read:

I arrived at the Port of Manila on or about the first day of March, 1923, as shown by the
attached certificate of arrival or landing certificate of residence.

The records of the Bureau of Justice, where the declarations of intention to become a Filipino citizen
were filed, had been lost or destroyed during the battle for the liberation of Manila, and the certificate
alluded to has not been reconstituted.

Appellant's contention that attachment of the certificate of arrival is essential to the validity of a
declaration finds no support in the wordings of the law, as the above-quoted section 5 of
Commonwealth Act no. 473 uses the words "has been issued.

Appellant contends that the lower court erred in finding appellee stateless and not a Russian
citizen and in not finding that he has failed to establish that he is not disqualified for
Philippine citizenship under section 4 (h) of the Revised Naturalization Law.
We do not believe that the lower court erred in pronouncing appellee stateless. Appellee's testimony,
besides being uncontradicted, is supported by the well-known fact that the ruthlessness of modern
dictatorship has scattered throughout the world a large number of stateless refugees or displaced
persons, without country and without flag. The tyrannical intolerance of said dictatorships toward all
opposition induced them to resort to beastly oppression, concentration camps and blood purges, and
it is only natural that the not-so-fortunate ones who were able to escape to foreign countries should
feel the loss of all bonds of attachment to the hells which were formerly their fatherland's. Petitioner
belongs to that group of stateless refugees.

.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990

MATEO CAASI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.

G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990

ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.

Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508.

Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private respondent.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

Merito Miguel stands to be disqualified for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to
which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green
card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao

These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a
permanent resident of the United States,

and (2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant
to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.

On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice
and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear
bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following
information is printed:

Alien Registration Receipt Card.

 Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and
work in the United States." (Annex A pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R. No.
84508.)

Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States
merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have
there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.
Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or
authority to reside there permanently

As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the
country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to him during the
period of his residence therein

In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants
of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the
right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and
allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our
country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion."

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of
a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the
U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should
be as indubitable as his application for it.

Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his
green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local
elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office,
hence, his election thereto was null and void.

(RESIDENCE V. DOMICILE)

[G.R. No. L-6379. September 29, 1954.]

In the matter of the petition of WILFRED UYTENGSU to be admitted a citizen of

the Philippine. WILFRED UYTENGSU, Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.

Manuel A. Zosa, for Appellee.

Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo, for appellant

DECISION
 CONCEPCION, J.:

CFI granting the application of Wilfred Uytengsu, for naturalization as citizen of the
Philippines. Solgen Appeals to the CA. SC

Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on

October 6, 1927. 

 Then, to be exact, on July 15, 1950, his present application for naturalization was filed
Section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473

Immediately afterwards, he returned to the United States and took a postgraduate

course, in chemical engineering, in another educational institution, in Fort Wayne,
Indiana. He finished this course in July 1951; but did not return to the Philippines until
October 13, 1951. Hence, the hearing of the case, originally scheduled to take place on
July 12, 1951, had to be postponed on motion of counsel for the petitioner.

ISSUE

Whether, in filing a petition for naturalization, “domicile” is substantial

compliance to the statute requiring “continuous” residence

whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the
fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did
not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof. 

(He did an Oath and Fly)

In conformity with this provision, petitioner stated in paragraph 13 of his application: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . I will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of my
petition up to the time of my admission to Philippine citizenship."

Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word "residence", as used in the
aforesaid provision of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile, which,
once acquired, is not lost by physical absence, until another domicile is obtained,
and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be domiciled in, and hence a resident of
the Philippines, his purpose in staying in the United States, at that time, being, merely
to study therein.

If the residence thus required is the actual or constructive permanent home, otherwise
known as legal residence or domicile, then the applicant must be domiciled in the
Philippines on both dates. Consequently, when section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473
imposes upon the applicant the duty to state in his sworn application "that he will
reside continuously in the Philippines" in the intervening period, it can not refer
merely to the need of an uninterrupted domicile or legal residence,
irrespective of actual residence, for said legal residence or domicile is
obligatory under the law, even in the absence of the requirement contained in
said clause, and, it is well settled that, whenever possible, a legal provision
must not be so construed as to be a useless surplusage, and, accordingly,
meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having no effect whatsoever
thereon. This consequences may be avoided only by construing the clause in question
as demanding actual residence in the Philippines from the filing of the petition
for naturalization to its determination by the court.

Indeed, although the words "residence" and "domicile" are often used interchangeably,
each has, in strict legal parlance, a meaning distinct and different from that of the
other.

 the greater or less degree of permanency contemplated or intended furnishes a clue to

the sometimes shadowy distinction between residence and domicile.

To be a resident one must be physically present in that place of a longer or shorter

period of time.

The essential distinction between residence and domicile is this: the first involves the
intent to leave when the purpose for which he has taken up his abode ceases;

the other has no such intent, the abiding is animo manendi.

One may seek a place for purposes of pleasure, of business, or of health. If his intent
be to remain it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
accomplished, it is his residence.

Perhaps the most satisfactory definition is that one is a resident of a place from which
his departure is indefinite as to time, definite as to purpose; and for this purpose he has
made the place his temporary home.

"For many legal purposes there is a clear distinction between ’residence’ and ’domicile.’
A person may hold an office or may have business or employment or other affair which
requires him to reside at a particular place. His intention is to remain there while the
office or business or employment or other concern continues; but he has no purpose to
remain beyond the time the interest exists which determines his place of abode.
Domicile is characterized by the animus manendi. . . 

"Residence indicates permanency of occupation, distinct from lodging or boarding, or

temporary occupation. It does not include as much as domicile, which requires intention
combined with residence.’ . . .’one may seek a place for purposes of pleasure, of
business, or of health. If his intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent
be to leave as soon as his purpose is accomplished, it is his residence.’
"There is a difference between domicile and residence.’Residence’ is used to indicate
the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary’ ’domicile’ denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.

In the case at bar, the Government has not had any chance whatsoever to thus keep a
watchful eye on petitioner herein. Immediately after the filing of his application — and
— notwithstanding the explicit promise therein made him, under oath, to the effect that
he would reside continuously in the Philippines "from the date of the filing of his petition
up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship" — he returned to the United
States, where he stayed, continuously, until October 13, 1951.

For this first time, on July 12, 1951, his counsel had to move for opportunity needed by
the Government to observe petitioner herein was enhanced by the fact that, having
been born in the Philippines, where he finished his primary and secondary education,
petitioner his not have to file, and did not file, a declaration of intention prior to the
filing of his petition for naturalization. Thus, the Government had no previous notice of
his intention to apply for naturalization until the filing of his petition and could not make
the requisite investigation prior thereto.

Moreover, considering that petitioner had stayed in the United States, practically
without interruption, from early 1947 to late in 1951, or for almost five (5) years, over
three years and a half of which preceded the filing of the application, it may be said
that he resided — as distinguished from domiciled — in the United States at that time
and for over a year subsequently thereto. In fact, under our laws, residence for six (6)
months suffices to entitle a person to exercise the right to suffrage in a given
municipality (section 98, Republic Act No. 180); residence for Representatives (sec. 7,
Art. VI, of the Constitution); and residence for two (2) years, to run for the Senate
(sec. 4, Art. VI, of the Constitution).

In some states of the United States, a residence of several weeks or months is enough
to establish a domicile for purpose of divorce. Although in these cases the word
"residence" has been construed, generally, to mean "domicile" — that is to say, actual
residence, coupled with the intention to stay permanently, at least at the time of the
acquisition of said domicile - it would seem apparent from the foregoing that the length
justifies the conclusion that he was residing abroad when his application for
naturalization was filed and for fifteen (15) months thereafter, and that this is precisely
the situation sought to be forestalled by the law in enjoining the applicant to "reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time
of his admission to Philippine citizenship," unless this legal mandate — which did not
exist under Act No. 2927, and was advisely inserted, therefore, by section 7 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 — were to be regarded as pure verbiage, devoid, not only,
of any force or effect, but, also, of any intent or purpose, as it would, to our mind, turn
out to be, were we to adopt petitioner’s pretense.

in short, we are of the opinion that petitioner herein has not complied with the
requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and with the
aforementioned promise made by him in his application, and, accordingly, is not
entitled, in the present proceedings, to a judgment in his favor.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995(RESIDENCE V. DOMICILE)

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"  with the
5

Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner-imelda did not meet the constitutional requirement
for residency.

In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year
residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of
declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772  and in her Certificate
6

of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling
the certificate of candidacy."
7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the
entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.  On the same
8

day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on

the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having
already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy
should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.

Petitioner-imelda averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy
was the result of an "honest misinterpretation"   which she sought to rectify by adding the words
10

"since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.

2nd DIVISION COMELEC (DID NOT BELIEVE IMELDA)

Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced
that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District.
However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to
allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim
and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.

This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the
Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was
quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why
she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. (SHE WAS THINKING TOLOSA
LUSOT NYA)

Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is
not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item
no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I
seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to
be persuasive.

Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by
choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to
remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must
basically be animus manendi  with animus non revertendi.

The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte
for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

ISSUES: Whether a candidate’s declarations in his/her COC be a ground for disqualification?

WHETHER petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by
Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution?

HELD:

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be

decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's
residency qualification requirement. (COC IS NOT MATERIAL FOR DISQUALIFICATION)

The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It
would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification. (FRAUD OR BAD FAITH)

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word
"seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading
to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted
petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte (7 months) instead of her
period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has
lived and maintained residences in different places.
Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes.

The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other
things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.

Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City
since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident
of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made
distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition
that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her
domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the
deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code 

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that
petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these
purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her
parents.

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin
because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in
1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her
domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents.

As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of
petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This
domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to
private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate:  37

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing

a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952.

For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and
"residence."   The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation
39

of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the
Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr.
Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and

residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in
residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical,
independent of the necessity of physical presence.  40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the
service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence

as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the
female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of
residence upon marriage.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was
obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of
residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of
residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which
of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed
any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-22041. May 19, 1966.]

MELECIO CLARINIO UJANO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellee.

Tagayuna, Arce & Tabaino for petitioner and Appellant.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor F. C. Zaballero and

Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason, for oppositor and appellee.

Petitioner-UJANO seeks to reacquire his Philippine citizenship in a petition filed

before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.

Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal, Ilocos Sur. He is
married to Maxima O. Ujano with whom he has one son, Prospero, who is now of legal
age. He left the Philippines for the United States of America in 1927 where after a
residence of more than 20 years he acquired American citizenship by naturalization.
He returned to the Philippines on November 10, 1960 to which he was
admitted merely for a temporary stay.

He owns an agricultural land and a residential house situated in Magsingal, Ilocos Sur
worth not less than P5,000.00. He receives a monthly pension of $115.00 from the
Social Security Administration of the United States of America. He has no record of
conviction and it is his intention to renounce his allegiance to the U.S.A.

After hearing, the court a quo rendered decision denying the petition on the ground
that petitioner did not have the residence required by law six months before he filed
his petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Hence the present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether a permit for temporary residence is sufficient compliance with the
residence requirement under the law? If not, whether applicant is entitled to
reacquisition of citizenship?

We can hardly add to the foregoing comment of the court a quo. We find it to be a
correct interpretation of Section 3(1) of Commonwealth Act No. 63 which requires that
before a person may reacquire his Philippine citizenship he "shall have resided
in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization."

The word "residence" used therein imports not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention (Yen v. Republic, L-18885, January 31, 1964; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil., 645).

Indeed, that term cannot refer to the presence in this country of a person who
has been admitted only on the strength of a permit for temporary residence.

In other words, the term residence used in said Act should have the same
connotation as that used in Commonwealth Act No. 473, the Revised
Naturalization Law, even if in approving the law permitting the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship our Congress has liberalized its requirement by foregoing the
qualifications and special disqualifications prescribed therein.

The only way by which petitioner can reacquire his lost Philippine citizenship
is by securing a quota for permanent residence so that he may come within the
purview of the residence requirement of Commonwealth Act No. 63.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

In Re Dorrance’s Estate case brief summary

309 Pa. 151

CASE SYNOPSIS: Appellant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania seeking review of a

decision of the Orphans' Court of Delaware County (Pennsylvania), which set aside an
appraisement of a decedent's estate for inheritance transfer tax purposes.
(COMMONWEALTH WANTS TO LEVY INHERITANCE TAX ON THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEDENT)

CASE FACTS: The Commonwealth conceded that the decedent was domiciled in
another state until five years prior to his death, and appellee executors contended
that the decedent was a domiciliary of the other state at the time of death.

DISCUSSION
 In determining which of two residences was the decedent's domicile, the court
considered continuity of residence; relative number of rooms, servants,
expenditures, and acreage; location of social events; church affiliation; and address
used on merchants' accounts. 
 The court concluded that the decedent's frequent expressions of retaining
the former domicile, colored by tax considerations and post-mortem planning,
could not prevail over his actual conduct. 
 The court held that after the Commonwealth established that the decedent
had actual in-state residence at time of death, the executors failed to prove actual
out-of-state residence, or that in-state residence was temporary. 
 The court held that the decedent's legal domicile at death was in-state, and
that an inheritance transfer tax, based upon agreed value of his estate at time of
death, was due to the Commonwealth.

CONCLUSION: The judgment of the trial court was reversed. In determining domicile,
decedent's expressed intention did not supersede the effect of his conduct.

Appraisement of the estate was reinstated, with an inheritance transfer tax due to
the Commonwealth.
[G.R. No. 43314. December 19, 1935.]

A. L. VELILLA, administrator of the estate of Arthur Graydon Moody, Plaintiff-

Appellant, v. JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, Defendant-
Appellee.

Ohnick & Opisso for Appellant.

Solicitor-General Hilado for Appellee.

Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931.

"II. He left a will made in the Philippines, IN WHICH he bequeathed all his property to
his only sister, Ida M. Palmer, who then was and still is a citizen and resident of the
State of New York, United States of America.

That subsequently or on April 10, 1931, a petition was filed by Ida M. Palmer, asking
for the probate of said will of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody

That on July 14, 1931, Ida M. Palmer was declared to be the sole and only heiress of
the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody by virtue of an order issued by the court 

That the property left by the late Arthur Graydon Moody consisted principally of
bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the
Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other personal properties, as are more fully shown
in the inventory of April 17, 1931, filed by the special administrator with the court 

That on July 22, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue prepared for the estate of the
late Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance tax return, 

That the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest the sum of
P50,000 on July 22, 1931, and the other sum of P40,019,75 on January 19, 1932,
making a total of P90,019,75, of which P77,018.39 covers the assessment for
inheritance tax and the sum of P13,001.41 covers the assessment for income tax
against said estate.

All of said property at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the
Philippine Islands. So far as this record shows, he left no property of any kind located
anywhere else. In his will, Exhibit AA, executed without date in Manila in accordance
with the formalities of the Philippine law, in which he bequeathed all his property to his
sister, Ida M. Palmer, he stated: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I, Arthur G. Moody, a citizen of the United States of America, residing in the Philippine
Islands, hereby publish and declare the following as my last Will and Testament . . . ." cral

The substance of the plaintiff’s cause of action is stated in paragraph 7 of his complaint
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That there is no valid law or regulation of the Government of the Philippine Islands
under or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be levied, assessed or collected
upon transfer, by death and succession, of intangible personal properties of a person
not domiciled in the Philippine Islands, and the levy and collection by defendant of
inheritance tax computed upon the value of said stocks, bonds, credits and other
intangible properties as aforesaid constituted and constitutes the taking and deprivation
of property without due process of law contrary to the Bill of Rights and organic law of
the Philippine Islands."
cralaw virtua1aw library

It is alleged in the complaint that at the time of his death, Arthur G. Moody was a
"non-resident of the Philippine Islands."

The answer (BIR), besides the general denial, sets up as a special defense that "Arthur
G. Moody, now deceased, was and prior to the date of his death, a resident in the City
of Manila, Philippine Islands, where he was engaged actively in business."

ISSUE: Where was the legal domicile of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death?

Moody was never married and there is no doubt that he had his legal domicile in the
Philippine Islands from 1902 or 1903 forward during which time he accumulated a
fortune from his business in the Philippine Islands.

He lived in the Elks’ Club in Manila for many years and was living there up to the date
he left Manila the latter part of February, 1928, under the following circumstances: He
was afflicted with leprosy in an advanced stage and had been informed by Dr. Wade
that he would be reported to the Philippine authorities for confinement in the Culion
Leper Colony as required by the law

There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had adopted a
new domicile while he was absent from Manila. 

Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place of their
usual residence." The record before us leaves no doubt in our minds that the "usual
residence" of this unfortunate man, whom appellant describes as a "fugitive" and
"outcast", was in Manila where he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a
century, rather than in any foreign country he visited during his wanderings up
to the date of his death in Calcutta.

To effect the abandonment of one’s domicile, there must be a deliberate and

provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place
chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be one’s fixed and
permanent place of abode, one’s home.

There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record that Moody ever established a
new domicile in a foreign country.

Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the appellant, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court, first, because the property in the estate of Arthur G. Moody
at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands and,
second, because his legal domicile up to the time of his death was within the Philippine
Islands.
FACTS
Michael White moved his home from West Virginia to Pennsylvania, but the same day
crossed back to take care of his wife who was sick with typhoid. He then caught the
disease and died in West Virginia. The question arose concerning which state would be
considered his domicile for purposes of intestate succession.

Rule of Law
The succession and distribution of a decedent’s personal estate is controlled by the law
of the state where the decedent was domiciled at the time of death.

Facts
Michael White was legally domiciled in West Virginia where he had lived his entire
life and owned a farm. Michael had made an agreement with his mother, brothers and
sisters to sell his farm and occupy a house on 40 acres of land in Pennsylvania ,
just across the West Virginia state line.

Michael and his wife brought their possessions and livestock to their new home.
However, the house was cold and damp and Michael’s wife was not feeling well, so he
accepted an invitation to spend the night in the West Virginia mansion-house.

 They unloaded their possessions first and then left.   It turned out that Michael’s wife
had typhoid fever. He took care of her at the mansion-house, and also went into
Pennsylvania daily to care for his stock.   Two weeks later, Michael caught typhoid and
died in West Virginia. His wife recovered and her father, Tennant (Defendant), was
appointed administrator of Michael’s estate. Under the law of West Virginia,
Michael’s wife would receive all her husband’s personal property by intestate
succession. Under Pennsylvania law, she would receive only half, and his
immediate family would get the other half. White (Plaintiff), the brothers and sisters of
Michael, sought to set aside the West Virginia distribution of his estate, claiming he was
domiciled in Pennsylvania.

Issue
Will the succession and distribution of a decedent’s personal estate be controlled by the
law of the state where the decedent was domiciled at the time of death?

Held
  Yes. The succession and distribution of a decedent’s personal estate is controlled by
the law of the state where the decedent was domiciled at the time of death.  A domicile
is a residence, actual or developing, with the lack of any intent to make a domicile
elsewhere. These two elements must exist together. One domicile cannot be lost until
another is acquired.

The facts reveal that Michael left his West Virginia residence with no plans to return and
with the intent and purpose of making his permanent home in Pennsylvania.
  Therefore, at the moment he and his wife arrived at their new home, their domicile
became Pennsylvania. His leaving there, under the circumstances, with the intention of
returning there did not change that fact. He did not revive his domicile in West Virginia
as he had already sold his residence and left it with no intent to return. Accordingly, the
decree must be reversed and remanded.

G.R. No. L-13982             July 31, 1920

DIEGO DE LA VIÑA, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO VILLAREAL, as Auxiliary Judge of First Instance, and NARCISA
GEOPANO, respondents.

September 17, 1917, Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Iloilo against Diego de la Viña, alleging: (1) That she was a resident of the municipality of
Iloilo, Province of Iloilo, and that the defendant was a resident of the municipality of Vallehermoso,
Province of Oriental Negros; (2) that she was the legitimate wife of the defendant, having been
married to him in the municipality of Guijulñgan, Province of Negros Oriental, in the year 1888; (3)
that since their said marriage plaintiff and defendant had lived as husband and wife and had nine
children, three of whom were living and were already of age; (4) that during their marriage plaintiff
and defendant had acquired property, real and personal, the value of which was about P300,000
and all of which was under the administration of the defendant; (5) that since the year 1913 and up
to the date of the complaint, the defendant had been committing acts of adultery with one
Ana Calog, sustaining illicit relations with her and having her as his concubine, with public
scandal and in disgrace of the plaintiff; (6) that because of said illicit relations, the defendant
ejected the plaintiff from the conjugal home, for which reason she was obliged to live in the
city of Iloilo, where she had since established her habitual residence; and (7) that the plaintiff,
scorned by her husband, the defendant, had no means of support and was living only at the expense
of one of her daughters. Upon said allegations she prayed for (a) a decree of divorce, (b) the
partition of the conjugal property, and (c) alimony  pendente lite  in the sum of P400 per
month.

The questions arising out of the foregoing facts are as follows:

1. May a married woman ever acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her
husband during the existence of the marriage?

Held: General and old rule was that the wife follows the husband’s choice of residence an
exception being:

"Where the husband has given cause for divorce, the wife may acquire another and seperate
domicile from that of her husband."
 2. In an action for divorce, brought by the wife against her husband, in which the partition of the
conjugal property is also prayed for, may the wife obtain a preliminary injunction against the
husband restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the
conjugal property during the pendency of the action?
HELD: the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband, prohibiting the latter
from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the
action.

Under modern laws it is clear that many exceptions to the rule that the domicile from of the wife is
determined by that of her husband must obtain. Accordingly, the wife may acquire another and
seperate domicile from that of her husband where the theorical unity of husband and wife is is
dissolved, as it is by the institution of divorce proceedings; or where the husband has given cause
for divorce; or where there is a separation of the parties by agreement, or a permanent separation
due to desertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to cruel treatment on the part of the
husband; or where there has been a forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of the husband's domicile."

The case of Narcisa Geopano comes under one of the many exceptions above-mentioned, to wit:
"Where the husband has given cause for divorce, the wife may acquire another and seperate
domicile from that of her husband."

(1) Although the law fixes the domicile of the wife as being that of her husband, universal
jurisprudence recognizes an exception to the rule in the case where the husband's conduct
has been such as to furnish lawful ground for a divorce, which justifies her in leaving him,
and, therefore, necessarily authorities her to live elsewhere and to acquire a separate
domicile. 
(2) The matrimonial domicile of the wife is usually that of the husband, but if she is justified in
leaving him because his conduct has been such as to entitle her to a divorce, and she
thereupon does leave him and go into another state for the purpose of there permanently
residing, she acquires a domicile in the latter state.

It is clear, therefore, that a married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from
that of her husband, during the existence of the marriage, where the husband has given
cause for divorce.

We conclude, therefore, that in an action for divorce brought by the wife against the husband, in
which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for, the wife may obtain a preliminary
injunction against the husband, prohibiting the latter from alienating or encumbering any part of the
conjugal property during the pendency of the action.

Recto v Harden 100 PHIL 427 (1959) PERSONAL STATUS AND CAPACITY

[G.R. No. L-6897.  November 29, 1956.]

In the Matter of the Claim for Attorney’s Fees. CLARO M. RECTO, claimant-Appellee, vs. ESPERANZA P.
DE HARDEN and FRED M. HARDEN, Defendants-Appellants.
“The contingent fee to which the claimant-RECTO is entitled under paragraph 3 of the contract, Exhibit
JJJ or 20, is 20% of P1,920,554.85 or the sum of P384,110.97.

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the recommendation of the Commissioner with the above-
stated modification, and finds that Attorney Claro M. Recto is entitled to the sum of THREE HUNDRED
EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED AND TEN PESOS AND NINETY-SEVEN CENTAVOS
(P384,110.97), representing 20% of Esperanza P. de Harden’s share in the conjugal properties owned by
her and her husband, Fred M. Harden (20% in the WIFE-ESPERANZA’S share.)

“CONTRACT OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES -- That I, ESPERANZA PEREZ DE HARDEN, of age, married to

Fred M. Harden, and temporarily residing in the Philippines, with address at 534 Sales Street, Manila,
have engaged the services of Attorney Claro M. Recto to appear and act as my counsel

Thereafter, the proceedings were resumed and, in due course, the Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered, on or about October 31, 1949, a decision the dispositive part of which we quote: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“In view of the foregoing considerations, this court finds and so holds that —
“(a)  Fred M. Harden abandoned his domicile of origin in New Jersey and established a domicile of
choice in Manila, Philippines, since 1901;

“(b)  The matrimonial domicile of Fred M. Harden and Esperanza P. de Harden was established in
Manila, Philippines, from the date of their marriage on December 14, 1917;

In compliance with said resolution, the records of this case were remanded to the lower court, which, on
September 2, 1952, designated a commissioner to receive evidence on the amount of the fees
collectible by herein Appellee and to report thereon. After due hearing, said commissioner submitted,
on February 6, 1953, a report of about one hundred (100) pages of the printed record on appeal, setting
forth, in detail, the evidence introduced by both parties, and his findings of fact, with the following
conclusion and recommendation: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“Taking into consideration the value of the properties involved in this litigation, the length of time in
which claimant had handled the same for Esperanza Harden, the volume and quality of the work
performed, the complicated legal questions involved, the responsibility assumed by the claimant as
counsel, his reputation in the bar, the difficulties encountered by him while handling the same in which
he had to work hard every inch of the way because of the stiff oppositions filed by adverse counsel, the
diligence he employed not only in the preservation of the records in his possession during the days of
enemy occupation but also in the protection of the interests of Esperanza Harden, his successful
handling of said case and those cases growing out of it which reached the Supreme Court, and the extra
services he rendered in her behalf in the tax and other court cases, the undersigned Commissioner
concludes that claimant is entitled to the full amount of 20% of Esperanza Harden’s share of the
conjugal properties, as provided in paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services, Exhibit J JJ.
“WHEREFORE, the undersigned Commissioner respectfully recommends that Atty. Claro M. Recto be
paid the equivalent amount of 20% of Esperanza P. de Harden’s share of the conjugal properties or the
sum of P369,410.04 as his contingent fee for services rendered in her behalf.”

After appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendered a decision dated April 30, 1953, adopting
substantially said report of the commissioner, but increasing the contingent fee of Appellee herein from
P369,410.04, the sum recommended in the report, to P384,110.97. Hence, this appeal taken by Mr. and
Mrs. Harden.

ISSUE: The first question for determination therein is the validity of the above-quoted contract of
services, which the Appellants assail as void, mainly, upon the ground:  (1) that Mrs. Harden cannot chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

bind the conjugal partnership without her husband’s consent;  (2) that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

the Philippines in effect prohibits contingent fees;  (3) that the contract in question has for its purpose
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

to secure a decree of divorce, allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines;  and (4) that the terms of said contract are harsh, inequitable and oppressive.
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract in dispute does not seek to bind the
conjugal partnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely bound herself   — or assumed the
personal obligation — to pay, by way of contingent fees, 20% of her share in said partnership.
The contract neither gives, nor purports to give, to the Appellee any right whatsoever, personal or real,
in and to her aforesaid share. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees.
For the same reason, the second objection is, likewise, untenable. Moreover, it has already been held
that contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines and are impliedly sanctioned by our Cannons
(No. 13) of Professional Ethics. (see, also, Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554.) Such is,
likewise, the rule in the United State

Needless to say, there is absolutely nothing in the records before us to show that Appellee herein had, in
any manner, taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client Mrs. Harden.

The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the contract between them, or by the
intent of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a divorce, or to facilitate or promote the
procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the interest of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal
partnership, during the pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United States. 

Subject to this qualification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,

G.R. No. L-16439             July 20, 1961 (CIVIL PERSONALITY, article 40)

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.

Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.

A.P. Salvador for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo,
the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the
complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and
against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (DOC-ABORTIONIST Antonio Geluz) for the first time
in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband
before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on
the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. (FIRST ABORTION BEFORE
MARRIAGE)

After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became
pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter
Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila,
where the three met the defendant and his wife.

Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos,
Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his
election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's-husband’S basis in filing this action
and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to
the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of
the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs.

In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished
by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked
juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to
invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40
of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing
the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the
condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was
dead when separated from its mother's womb.

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages
must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of
the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity.

Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they
would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of
the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss,
and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary
damages, if the circumstances should warrant them 

But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for
an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions
of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the
frustration of his parental hopes and affections. (ESTOPPEL)

 The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict
it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise
aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no
steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the
abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be
highminded rather than mercenary;

The decision appealed from is reversed, in favor of GELUZ – the abortionist.

.R. No. L-770             April 27, 1948

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, 

Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and
operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that the evidence therein
showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner
"by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half (2-½) tons in
the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at
the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed
service". (COMMISSION APPROVES THE APPLICATION OF THE DYING MAN FRAGANTE)

The commission, therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the
provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public
convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said
Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two
and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant
in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon
City", subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).

Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:

1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.

2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by evidence.

3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage
Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the
increased demand.
 4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from its
announced policy with respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2,
petitioner's brief.)

In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the
substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party
applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said
estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.

ISSUE: Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante
is a "person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act.

Whether the Comission was wrong in allowing the substitution of the legal rep of FRAGANTES
estate, subsequently granting the certificate.

Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in the jurisdiction of
the State of Indiana:

As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed after
the death of the man whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may be
prosecuted as with the intent to defraud the estate. Billings vs. State,

The estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. 

In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is
considered a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would
entail prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not
counting the expenses and disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have
occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter. 

G.R. No. L-2935             March 23, 1909 (Absence 3. Name 4. Age of Majority 5. Capacity)

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GEORGE I. FRANK, defendant-appellant.

Bishop and O'Brien for appellant.

Attorney-General Wilfley for appellee.

Contract entered into by GPH with George Frank from Chicago Illinois who will work as a
stenographer.

Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of the
defendant, he should become liable to the plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by
way of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and one-half salary paid during such
period.
The defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon the 30th day of April, 1903, and
was paid half-salary from that date until June 4, 1903, the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands.

That on the 11th day of February, 1904, the defendant left the service of the plaintiff and refused to
make further compliance with the terms of the contract.

It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should
constitute a part of said contract.

To the complaint of the plaintiff the defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging
in his special defense that the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and
No. 224 and had thereby materially altered the said contract, and also that he was a minor at
the time the contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible under the law.

the lower court rendered a judgment against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of
265.90 dollars. The lower court found that at the time the defendant quit the service of the plaintiff
there was due him from the said plaintiff the sum of 3.33 dollars, leaving a balance due the plaintiff in
the sum of 265.90 dollars.

From this judgment the defendant appealed and made the following assignments of error:

ISSUE:

1. Did the PH Legislature’s passing a new law materially alter the contract?

No. With reference to the above assignments of error, it may be said that the mere fact that the
legislative department of the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80
and No. 224 by the Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the
contract made between the plaintiff and the defendant. The legislative department of the
Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from altering or
changing the terms of the contract. The right which the defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No.
80 and No. 224 had not been changed in any respect by the fact that said laws had been amended

Hence the contract is enforceable and therefore defendant must pay.

2. Was the defendant a minor? What Law will apply?

 No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and
validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made
(CHICAGO) wherein he was of the age of majority.

Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of
performance (PHILIPPIPNES, wherein he says he is a minor). Matters respecting a remedy, such as
the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the
place where the suit is brought.

The plaintiff [defendant] being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time the
contract was made(CHICAGO), he can not plead infancy(MINORITY) as a defense at the place
where the contract is being enforced.(PHILIPPINES)
The defendant's claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived at
Manila; that he was an adult at the time he made the contract but was a minor at the time the plaintiff
attempted to enforce the contract, more than a year later, is not tenable.