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Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxx

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Technological Forecasting & Social Change

Innovation Lodestar: The entrepreneurial university in a stellar knowledge firmament

Henry Etzkowitz
International Triple Helix Institute, 1520 Sand Hill Road, A210, Palo Alto, CA 94304, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This article analyzes the stages and phases of development of the entrepreneurial university, incorporating the
Received 27 April 2016 classic Humboldtian dualistic academic model that unites teaching and research, into a Triple Helix of
Accepted 27 April 2016 university–industry–government interactions. The MIT and Stanford cases provide empirical data for the extrap-
Available online xxxx
olation of a knowledge-based regional development model that has become increasingly widespread in the US
and globally. The societal implications of the dialectic between the ‘capitalization of knowledge’ and the
Keywords:
Entrepreneurial university
‘cogitization of capital’ are explored, in conclusion.
Triple Helix © 2016 Published by Elsevier Inc.
Capitalization of knowledge

Providing trained persons, preservation of cultural inheritance and
advancement of knowledge about nature and societies have heretofore
provided the main justifications for universities. Economic legitimating
themes are becoming as important as cultural ones as politicians, indus-
trialists, academics and ordinary citizens increasingly view universities
as focal points of technological innovation and regional development
(Peters, 1989). The original rationale for the founding of Harvard Uni-
versity in 1636 was to guarantee a source of future clergy to guide the
spiritual life of the community. Over time, this remit was extended to
other professions like law and medicine. By the early 19th century, the
academic remit in the U.S. included agriculture and was extended to in-
dustry later in the century.
As the university expands its role in society, its image as an “ivory
tower” fades and a new image is projected of a font of technological in-
novation and economic development. In the late-19th-century, MIT
followed by Stanford in the early 20th century, entered into a collabora-
tive relationship with growing science-based electrical industries. Their
industrial interactions engendered an entrepreneurial approach to
managing the practical consequences of research, including patenting
and spin-offs, while broadening the input into the creation of academic
knowledge. The progression is non-linear since entrepreneurship can
also be generated from the teaching mission of the university and hu-
manistic knowledge, even in the absence of an entrepreneurial research
tradition.
The university is a resource to create a regime of knowledge-based
economic and social development in economic and academic systems
at different stages of development. A variety of interpretations of aca-
demic entrepreneurship are thus expected rather than simple imitation
of MIT and Stanford, inspiring as their examples may be. Entrepreneur-
ial experiments, with a variety of motivations and sources of support,
E-mail address: h.etzko@gmail.com.
follow from awareness of innovation potential in the academy and at
the interface. As the entrepreneurial university model spreads, it is no
longer an outlier on the academic scene; it becomes modal and even
taken for granted. In the following we define the entrepreneurial uni-
versity and discuss its sources and impetuses.
1. The entrepreneurial university vision1
The ability to set a strategic direction is the first step towards an en-
trepreneurial university, the necessary but not the sufficient condition.
The second step is a commitment to seeing that the knowledge devel-
oped within the university is put to use, especially in its local region.
This can take a variety of forms, including developing internal capabili-
ties for technology transfer and commercialization of research as well as
playing a collaborative role, with government business and Civil Society,
in participating in establishing and implementing a strategy for
knowledge-based regional development.
The entrepreneurial university enhances the research university by
joining a reverse linear dynamic moving from problems in industry
and society, seeking solutions in academia, to the classic forward linear
model, producing serendipitous innovations from the meandering
stream of basic research. The key elements include (1) the organization
of group research, (2) the creation of a research base with commercial
potential, (3) the development of organizational mechanisms to move
research out of the university as protected intellectual property,
(4) the capacity to organize firms within the university and “graduate”
1
The growing literature on the drivers, dynamics and consequences of academic entre-
preneurship shows the global diffusion of the entrepreneurial university model. See, for
example, Bozeman, Barry Technology transfer and public policy: a review of research
and theory, Research Policy, vol. 29, issue 4–5, pages 627–655, 2000; and Rothaermel,
Frank; Shanti D. Agung and Lin Jiang, “University entrepreneurship: a taxonomy of the lit-
erature”, Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 16, Number 4, pp. 691–791, 2007.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.04.026
0040-1625/© 2016 Published by Elsevier Inc.

Please cite this article as: Etzkowitz, H., Innovation Lodestar: The entrepreneurial university in a stellar knowledge firmament, Technol. Forecast.
Soc. Change (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.04.026
2 H. Etzkowitz / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
them (5) integration of academic and business elements into new for-
mats such as university–industry research centers.
The first two elements are within the framework of the research uni-
versity; the third is part of the transition from the research to entrepre-
neurial academic models; fourth and fifth elements are special features
of the entrepreneurial university. The entrepreneurial university model
may also be expressed as four interrelated propositions:
Proposition 1. Interaction
The entrepreneurial university interacts closely with the industry
and government; it is not an ivory tower university isolated from
society.
Proposition 2. Independence
The entrepreneurial university is a relatively independent insti-
tution; it is not a dependent creature of another institutional sphere.
Proposition 3. Hybridization
The resolution of the tensions between the principles of interaction
and independence are an impetus to the creation of hybrid organiza-
tional formats to realize both objectives simultaneously.
Proposition 4. Reciprocality
There is a continuing renovation of the internal structure of the uni-
versity as its relation to industry and government changes and of indus-
try and government as their relationship to the university is revised.
Propositions One and Two may also be basic principles of a research
and teaching university; it is the confluence of all four elements that
make for a full-fledged entrepreneurial university. The Ivory Tower
and entrepreneurial university models may be used to analyze “actually
existing universities” as occupying a point on a continually shifting
spectrum. Table 1 shows the extreme endpoints. Of course, most uni-
versities are in between.
1.1. Impetuses of entrepreneurial academic transition
We explain the entrepreneurial university's emergence, recognizing
its creative and cost effective role as inventor and transfer agent of
knowledge and technology. To be a strategic actor, a university has to
have a considerable degree of independence from the state and industry
but also a high degree of interaction with these stakeholders. As knowl-
edge assumes increased significance as a factor of production, in both
high tech and older manufacturing industries, universities are invited
to participate in regional growth coalitions (Feldman, 1994). Industry
typically becomes active and takes the lead during economic crises in
Table 1
Contrast between Ivory Tower and entrepreneurial university.
No. Ivory Tower University
1 Isolated from the society
2 Teaching on campus
3 Knowledge production for own sake
4 Meandering stream of basic research
5 Useful knowledge as accident
6 No organizational technology transfer capability and no firm formation
7 Discipline-based departments as primary units
8 Single internal stakeholder
9 University administration only from academia
10 Funding as matter of right
11 Operation for self sustainability
12 Only academic mind-set
Please cite this article as: Etzkowitz, H., Innovation Lodestar: The entrepreneurial university in a stellar knowledge firmament, Technol. Forecast.
Soc. Change (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.04.026
working with university and government partners to renew regional
and sectoral economies.
Universities assume an entrepreneurial role and identity due to
perception of opportunity, civic duty and external pressures (OECD,
2012). The first step towards an entrepreneurial academic ethos is
increased sensitivity to the economic potential of knowledge,
whether scientific or humanistic, followed by a willingness to realize
this potential. When a university first essays entrepreneurship, it
may be inspired by an important discovery that was not patented,
like a significant advance in Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Imaging
Technology at Stony Brook University, a proverbial, “big fish that
got away” according to John Marberger, the University's then presi-
dent. A technology transfer office may then be created to protect in-
tellectual property and market inventions.
The university's potential as a generator of discontinuous innovation
opens the way to policy initiatives encouraging academic institutions to
realize economic value from their research. Impetuses also include loss
of industry as in New England, Singapore and Finland. On the demand
side, a local firm, industry association or government may request assis-
tance in solving a production or governance problem. On the supply
side, devolution of the academic enterprise includes change from
block funding as a matter of right in academic systems based on this
principle to competitive research grants. Paradoxically, expanded re-
search funding as well as financial stringency increases uncertainty for
existing players as teaching universities, incentivized by regional au-
thorities, aspire to get into the game. Less research-intensive regions
press for funding increase, recognizing its salience to economic growth,
while research-intensive regions struggle to maintain pre-eminence.
Demand for knowledge to promote disease cures and technological
fixes for environmental crises create a hypercompetitive struggle
for resources. An academic “steady state” envisioned by John Ziman
(1994), following significant post-war expansion, is unlikely as con-
traction and expansionary forces oscillate, disrupting traditional ac-
ademic structures. A turbulent environment encourages academic
researchers to manage risk by fund raising from multiple sources, in-
troducing an entrepreneurial element into the faculty role as a mat-
ter of academic survival. There is also a shift in the center of academic
gravity from departments of individual scholars to networks of re-
search groups and centers to capture larger funds, often only avail-
able to such collaborations.
1.2. From informal to formal technology transfer
The first step is the development of organizational capacities to work
with firms in solving their specific problems, through consultation
arrangements that may be formalized in longer–term contracts. This
phase typically winds down when formal arrangements offer little
beyond what individual faculty members informally provide. Ar-
chives of letters of intent, Memoranda of Understanding are created,
and payments may be made, but too often content is missing in these
Entrepreneurial university
Open and serve to the external society
Teaching on/off campus
Polyvalent knowledge produced
Multiple sources of input into research direction
Useful knowledge sought
TTO, Incubator integrated into innovation strategy to foster start-ups
Departments and inter-disciplinary centers have equal status
Multiple stakeholders –internal and external
University administration from multiple sources, including industry and government
Funding as matter of exchange, something to be earned
Make significant contribution to regional development as well
With entrepreneurial ethos
 H. Etzkowitz / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
general arrangements. Nevertheless, The MIT “Technology Plan” ini-
tiated during the 1920's, Mexico's UNAM Center for Technological
Innovation in the 1980's and the Pontifical Catholic University of
Rio de Janeiro effort in Brazil in the 1990's to develop contracts
with firms provided a learning platform for more targeted initiatives.
A second step, the development of organizational capacity for university
technology transfer, is based on research that produces useful results as an
unexpected outcome. Results were traditionally conveyed through infor-
mal ties between professors and former students working in industry.
However, a gap emerges when a firm is not interested and the inventor
is unable to carry the commercialization process forward or find some-
one to do it on his or her behalf. University technology transfer offices,
are Janus-faced search mechanisms that winnow candidates for protec-
tion, identify licensees and negotiate agreements. Originating as
intermediaries, they have been internalized within the university's ad-
ministrative infrastructure and diffused globally (Breznitz, 2015).
A third step is the encouragement of start-ups based upon technologies
that do not find a fit within existing firms or have greater potential for
growth as an independent entity. Incubation candidates are drawn from
both advanced technologies in emerging industries or to replicate
existing firms and fill gaps in expanding traditional industrial clusters.
Entrepreneurship training programs, translational research and univer-
sity venture capital initiatives are coupled with regional initiatives such
as Technopoles and science parks, with incubator facilities sponsored by
both sides. Just as a research ethos was universalized throughout acade-
mia, so is an economic role that was formerly limited to specialized ac-
ademic sectors such as the US land grant universities and European
polytechnics (Veysey, 1965; Artz, 1966).
1.3. Variations on an entrepreneurial academic theme
There are several variants of the entrepreneurial university model,
including but not limited to direct involvement in economic activities
(Etzkowitz, 1983). Industrial research funding and receipts from licens-
ing of intellectual property rights are small in absolute terms in compar-
ison to government funding sources. Nevertheless, academic patenting,
technology transfer and spin-offs are a long-term growth trajectory
(AUTM, 2015). Following a venture capital model enterprises were
spun-off from Boston's unique concentration of academic institutions
in the early post-war, becoming members of the Fortune 500, like
EG&G, DEC and Ionics, before their merger or decline.
A civic university model promotes enhanced university engagement
in society, but is largely limited to an extension of existing teaching and
research roles, keeping traditional boundaries intact (Goddard, 2009).
John Goddard's concept of the “civic university” signals that the
university's role in society should not be seen solely through the lens
of economic development, but should include cultural activities and
the transfer of social innovations that may not have an immediately ob-
servable economic impact (2009, 11). Other scholarship on the “en-
gaged campus” similarly points to activities such as service learning
(placing students in volunteer roles for class credit) and other kinds of
community partnerships as examples of the social impact universities
can have on their surrounding region (Healey and Gelmon, 1998).
Such partnerships are not just adjuncts to the university's primary
goals of teaching and research, but are increasingly integrated with
them as knowledge production becomes more multidisciplinary, collab-
orative, and problem-oriented (Hall and Tandon, 2014; Healey, 2005;
Gibbons et.al, 1994).
Finally, there is the sense in which “entrepreneurial university is
used by Burton Clark in his analysis of European universities extracting
themselves from virtually total Ministry control down, to the number of
students that may be recruited in each discipline, in order to achieve a
modicum of autonomy and self-direction. Clark developed his analysis
of the “entrepreneurial university” through a study of five European
universities in the 1990s (later expanded internationally). Significantly,
the entrepreneurial university refers to deliberate changes in the
Please cite this article as: Etzkowitz, H., Innovation Lodestar: The entrepreneurial university in a stellar knowledge firmament, Technol. Forecast.
Soc. Change (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.04.026
3
organization and operation of the university as an institution that ac-
tively and intentionally responds to societal changes. Positing an entre-
preneurial university as a non-economic format, Clark focuses on the
transition of the government-sponsored university to a more indepen-
dent status (Clark, 1998).
The entrepreneurial university requires an enhanced capability
for intelligence, monitoring and negotiation with other institutional
spheres, especially industry and government. The academic entre-
preneurial transition paradoxically includes both increased universi-
ty autonomy and greater involvement of external stakeholders.
Governments that have managed universities through a Ministry
may wish to grant at least partial autonomy while retaining signifi-
cant influence. Firms that have maintained consulting relationships
with individual professors may wish to participate in a university
center that also includes their competitors in precompetitive re-
search collaborations. The objective is to encourage universities to
play a creative role in economic and social development from an in-
dependent perspective while still being responsive to government
and industry priorities.
The increased independence of the university is based on its en-
hanced relevance to government and industry in the transition to a
knowledge-based society. The university's ability to identify and protect
its essential interests is enhanced under these conditions. The domi-
nance of industry over university, feared in industrial society, is super-
seded in knowledge-based societies, as knowledge embedded in
intellectual property gives its holder significant bargaining power in set-
ting the terms of its utilization. The question of who influences whom in
university–industry interactions is always an empirical one, with the
answer weighted towards the actor with the most highly valued good
under varying societal conditions.
1.4. Stages and phases of academic entrepreneurship
These different conceptions of the university within the larger socio-
economic system may also be viewed as stages and phases in the devel-
opment of the university as an entrepreneur, with each modality build-
ing upon the other, in a usual but by no means necessary order. In an
initial phase (University Entrepreneur One) the academic institution
takes a strategic view of its direction and gains some ability to set its
own priorities, either by raising its own resources through donations,
tuition fees and grant income or through negotiations with resource
providers. European universities, that formerly received almost their
entire income by government subvention, are undergoing the painful
process of diversification, forming alumni associations to connect with
their graduates and establishing fund raising offices, long a staple of
US academia.
A prerequisite for the university taking the role of entrepreneur is
the ability to set its own strategic direction. If a university system
operates as it formerly did in Sweden where the Ministry of Higher Ed-
ucation decided how many students would be admitted each year to
each discipline, there is hardly a possibility to have sufficient autonomy
on which to base an entrepreneurial university. Universities in France
did not have an independent existence until the 1970's devolution
that occurred as a side effect of reforms made in response to the student
protest movements of the 1960's. Until quite recently, the various facul-
ties were directly linked to the National Ministry and universities hardly
had an organizational framework, let alone autonomy (Musselin, 2001).
A facilitative legal framework is a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion of creating an entrepreneurial university. France changed its laws in
1999, legalizing academic entrepreneurship. Previously it was illegal for
a faculty member to participate in spinning off an enterprise from their
research. Indeed, the Innovation law went much further and provided
significant resources to encourage technology transfer and firm forma-
tion. However, a study of a new university, established in a declining in-
dustrial region found that these incentives were insufficient to create an
entrepreneurial university in an inhospitable setting (Laperche, 2002).
4 H. Etzkowitz / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
1.4.1. Valorization of research
In a second phase (University Entrepreneur Two) the academic in-
stitution takes an active role in commercializing the intellectual
property arising from the activities of its faculty, staff and students.
In this phase, a university typically establishes its own technology
transfer capabilities, in-sourcing them from firms to which they
may have been contracted, such as the Research Corporation in the
US, or through devolution of system-wide offices as in the State Uni-
versity of New York and the University of California to individual
campuses. Universities with significant intellectual property poten-
tial, like Stanford, received an immediate boost in income from hav-
ing their own staff in more direct contact with the faculty.
Similarly, research powerhouses, like Oxford, Cambridge and Impe-
rial in the UK and Johns Hopkins, Yale and Columbia in the US quickly
became leaders in technology transfer and once they turned their
minds to it and opened their pocketbooks (Breznitz, 2015). Universities
with fewer research resources to commercialize, not surprisingly, take a
longer time to ramp up. However, schools like Arizona State and the
University of Utah, that have made tech transfer and entrepreneurship
an equal priority with education and research, have achieved higher
rates of valorization than many of their resource rich competitors.
Whereas the research university has its primary external focus the na-
tion state; the entrepreneurial university is first and foremost a regional
actor.
Just as the university has become key to regional development; re-
gional development has become the basis of a university advancement
strategy. For example, George Mason University's rise is attributed to
its involvement with regional business and political actors in the emerg-
ing high tech offshoot of the Pentagon in northern Virginia whose firms
lacked an academic interlocutor (Ceruzzi, 2008). President Johnson saw
the opportunity to develop IT and systems engineering programs, inter-
facing with firms meeting US government systems engineering needs.
Becoming active in the Chamber of Commerce, he gained the support
of technology industry leaders and local developers for the university,
and in alliance with them played a key role in the region's governance,
while raising the university's research level and academic profile.
1.4.2. The university's unique contribution to regional renewal
In a third phase (University Entrepreneur Three), academic insti-
tutions play a broader governance role, interacting with industry and
government in formulating and enacting regional development
strategy (Shaw and Allison, 1999; Chatterton and Goddard, 2000;
Boucher et al., 2003). The university takes a proactive role in enhanc-
ing the innovation capabilities of the region where it is located, often
in collaboration with industry and government actors. This process
typically begins with local leadership coming together, at the initia-
tive of a respected person or group with convening power, to formu-
late a strategy to promote knowledge-based regional development.
Brainstorming may then be followed by an organizational initiative,
representing the various institutional spheres, to carry out an imple-
mentation phase via a “High-tech Council” or “Knowledge Circle,” sup-
ported by government programs and novel forms of private capital.
Although skepticism of fostering knowledge-based innovation persists,
universities and governments have become increasingly skillful in
enacting new roles, iterating policy learning and achieving mission
enhancement.
In recent decades, Boston and Silicon Valley have suffered down-
turns and been renewed through follow-on cooperative efforts, creating
successive waves of firm-formation based on emerging technological
paradigms (Bathelt, 2001). Explicit transfer mechanisms and informal
networks linking emerging entrepreneurs with previously successful
mentors enhance a culture of entrepreneurship within academia.
Emerging technology regions emulate these characteristics through
programmatic intervention even as organizational entrepreneurs, such
as founders of angel networks in successful regions, franchise their
models to other regions.
Please cite this article as: Etzkowitz, H., Innovation Lodestar: The entrepreneurial university in a stellar knowledge firmament, Technol. Forecast.
Soc. Change (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.04.026
1.4.3. Regional innovation capacity
In contrast to firm absorptive capacity that is held to be a function of
prior related knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990); developing re-
gional absorptive capacity often entails breaking with previous practice
(Saxenian, 1994; Huffman, Quigley, 2002). Regional absorptive capacity
is operationalized as an entrepreneurial support structure of angel net-
works, venture capital opportunities, public relations and law firms ori-
ented to support firm formation and cluster development but may take
various forms. (Cooke, 2001; Norman, 2005). As an observer of the rise
of Google noted, “The presence of venture capitalists in the neighbor-
hood made it easier for students and professors at Stanford to get
funding and advice than for their peers at any other university” (Vise,
2005).2 On the other hand, when capacities are weak, new organiza-
tional formats may be invented such as the venture firm in early post-
war New England or the “Courtyard for Agro-experts” in contemporary
China (Tu, Gu and Wu 2005). In a region lacking a university, regional
authorities developed a model of joint living and lab spaces to allow ac-
ademics to visit for a limited time period, conduct research and consult
on local agricultural problems.
University technology transfer strategies adjust to regional cir-
cumstances. A relatively low-key approach can work in a “thick” re-
gion, with strong entrepreneurial support capabilities while a more
pro-active approach is indicated in a “thin” region, where absorptive
capacity is weak. In the latter case, a TTO may take a leadership role
to promote the creation of an external support structure and may
also have to fill internal gaps when inventor interest is limited. Con-
versely an office may take a relatively passive stance when regional
absorptive capacity and inventor interest is strong but this may re-
sult in untapped potential among moderately entrepreneurially ori-
ented faculty. This suggests the applicability of support structures,
commonplace in aspiring universities, to success cases as well.
While the transfer of intellectual property in the form of patent
licenses represents the most well known mode of engagement, patents
usually account for only a small fraction of the total revenue universities
receive from entrepreneurial activity, and also represent only a fraction
of overall knowledge flow and even technology transfer (Mowery et al.
2004: 5; Perkmann et al., 2013: 424). However, academic involvement
in regional development has taken a broader entrepreneurial focus be-
yond legal transfer of intellectual property rights to firms. Various coop-
erative programs, supported by government at various levels point the
way to reflexively link academia and industry.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Competitiveness Center of SRI
International advised Midwestern states, suffering industrial decline,
how to organize regional cooperative groups to revive their economies.
When the early 90's economic downturn hit Silicon Valley these policy
researchers brought their model home and established an organization,
Joint Venture Silicon Valley (JVSV), bringing together high-tech compa-
ny executives, local government officials and academics for a series of
public meetings. Some ideas that came out of these discussions were
then put into practice to develop new high-tech industry. One project,
Smart Valley, for computer networks and information resources to
help develop the next level of technology for the region, formalized
some of the informal networks that have been found to be crucial to
the development of high-tech industry in the region.
1.5. The entrepreneurial university and “Mode 2” knowledge production
The university is the quintessential ‘hybrid’ organization, spanning
the medieval and post-industrial eras as well as intervening periods,
retaining features of each: the feudal master-apprentice relationship
in its Ph.D. programs, the industrial lecture hall of mass undergraduate
education and the pre-industrial seminar. Although Mode 2 proponents
2
Indeed, a venture capital firm advertised in the student newspaper in 2005, offering
any Stanford student a 15 min appointment.
 H. Etzkowitz / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
predict that the university will be superseded by think tanks and
consulting firms as knowledge is increasingly produced in the con-
text of application, this is unlikely given an even greater need in a
knowledge-based society for a multi-faceted institution of reproduc-
tion and generation of knowledge and skill, combined with innova-
tion and entrepreneurship. A new PhD program in the biological
sciences, at the University of California Irvine includes training in in-
tellectual property and business development, provided by the
university's business and law faculties.
Rather than Mode 2 of interdisciplinary fields displacing Mode 1
of disciplinary science, the two modes co-exist symbiotically as a hy-
brid format for academic knowledge production, dissemination, and
valorization (Gibbons et al. 1994; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000).
Indeed, the university is playing a more fundamental role in innova-
tion by encouraging start-ups. Although they have funded significant
alliances, firms such as Novartis have largely failed to appropriate
the results (Innovation Matters, 2004). Although large firms use
their relations with universities as a window on advanced research;
they are ambivalent about academia spinning-off future competi-
tors, even recognizing their ability to acquire many of these firms
(University–Industry–Government Roundtable, 1999).
Indeed, Mode 2 may have preceded Mode 1. Prior to the formation of
well defined academic disciplines and the invention of the role of “sci-
entist”, natural philosophers spanned broad areas of knowledge and
like naturalist Alexander Von Humboldt, sought useful and theoretical
knowledge, traveled broadly, and was part of an international virtual
thought collective. Mode 2 is best understood as intellectual platform
of the entrepreneurial university, populated by fields like computer sci-
ence and biotechnology with dual academic/industrial roles such as
half-time Professor of Practice and virtual entities of research groups
and their spin-offs that are hotspots of co-authorship.
1.6. The Triple Helix
The Triple Helix model attempts to capture this transformation of
roles and relationships among the emerging primary institutional
triad of university–industry–government. University, industry and
government are conceptualized as intertwined spirals with different
relations to each other in the classic innovation regimes. In a laissez
faire one Triple Helix regime, industry is the driving force, with the
other two spirals as ancillary supporting structures; in a statist re-
gime government plays the lead role, driving academia and industry.
Spirals are rarely equal; one usually serves as a motive force, the in-
novation organizer (IO) around which the others rotate. The institu-
tion that acts as the core spiral changes over time as one spiral
replaces the other as the driving force in a Triple Helix configuration.
The Triple Helix of innovation is shaped by the contrasting role of
government in different societies and the need to reconceptualize its re-
lation to academia and industry. Different state capacities affect both the
trajectory and visibility of a Triple Helix, whether it is organized openly
and transparently or is routed through hidden channels. In “high state”
societies, where Triple Helix relationships have traditionally been di-
rected top down, bottom-up initiatives appear in conjunction with the
emergence of regions and the growth of civil society. In “low state” so-
cieties with a laissez-faire tradition, the emergence of the Triple Helix
is associated with a strengthening of the role of the state, acting together
with university and industry. A common Triple Helix format, mixing top
down and bottom up approaches can be projected, arising from oppo-
site starting points in laissez faire and statist societies.
The Triple Helix integrates forward and reverse linearity between
university science push and industry science pull. Squaring the circle be-
tween US federal and state science and technology policies an innova-
tion policy is created that is perhaps the world's strongest industrial
policy. Science-based regional development is a “virtual policy,” arising
through the synthesis of a variety of initiatives undertaken by different
actors. There is no federal agency with responsibility for the integration
Please cite this article as: Etzkowitz, H., Innovation Lodestar: The entrepreneurial university in a stellar knowledge firmament, Technol. Forecast.
Soc. Change (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.04.026
5
of science with regional development in the US (Eisinger, 1997). Never-
theless, translating the science-base of federally supported research at
universities into economic activity has become the quintessential US re-
gional development strategy.
An interactive flow displaces an isolated stance. A Triple Helix of
university–industry–government interactions, with the university
co-equal with industry and government, and the three spheres tak-
ing the role of the other, as necessary when one is weak expressing
collaborative innovation and entrepreneurship, is an optimum inno-
vation model. Triple Helix thinking, with initiatives arising laterally
as well as bottom up and top down, is infusing other innovation
models, as well. For example, cluster analysis, formerly an industrial
phenomenon, based on division of labor among family owned firms,
now includes government programs to foster cluster development
and participation of universities and other research institutions in
raising their technological level so as to remain competitive. The
key economic actor is expected to be a cluster of firms emanating
from or at least closely associated with a university or other knowl-
edge producing institution (Porter, 1998).
Triadic formats have become an increasingly a commonplace part
of innovation strategy in both advanced industrial and developing
societies. “Brainport” of Eindhoven, Aachen and Leuven in Europe
explicitly bases itself on a Triple Helix concept while Research Trian-
gle in the US has recognized its helical elements. Significantly, the
Triple Helix model conceptualizes the interactions between these re-
gional entities (universities, local industry, and governments) not as
a linear flow (where knowledge production is handed off from univer-
sities to industry for economic development) but as recursive networks
of interaction, where individuals may take on roles in each sector, and
the roles of each sector overlap (Gunasekara, 2006:141).
1.6.1. Entrepreneurial scientists
The model was derived from comparative analysis of scientific roles.
Having interviewed the scientists in a California start-up developing
solar cell technology during the energy crisis of the late 1970's, as an or-
ganizational consultant, I found that they did not fit the previous models
of academic or corporate scientist. They said, ‘we don't write articles, we
go for patents.’ On the other hand they were not part of a large corporate
bureaucracy, tailoring their scientific objectives to a firm's goals. Instead,
these physicists, having made money from stock options in the semi-
conductor industry, were among the funders of the firm and had a say
in its course and direction.
I defined them as “entrepreneurial scientists” in recognition of their
distinctive identity. The academic consultants to the firm from UCLA's
chemistry department seemed no less entrepreneurial, seeking funds
from various governmental and industry sources to support their re-
search groups. Academics fund raising for their research had been de-
fined as academic entrepreneurship (Vollmer, 1962). Expanding the
concept to include involvement in spin-off firms took academic entre-
preneurship across the university–industry border. I obtained research
funds from the U.S. National Science Foundation to study entrepreneur-
ial science in its various forms, interviewing academic scientists and ad-
ministrators, both proponents and opponents of the commercialization
of research.
After I submitted a paper to present the results to a session at the
American Sociological Association annual meetings organized by Joseph
Ben David, the distinguished sociologist and historian of science at the
University of Chicago and Hebrew University, he wrote a letter saying,
“Your paper is fine. I accept it. But how can you study university–indus-
try relations without looking at the history of MIT?” Given its prominent
role, I had to agree. I sought funds from the National Endowment for the
Humanities to research the MIT archives from a base at the History of
Science Department at Harvard. During my stay at Harvard, a colleague
asked, “Why are you always going to MIT; you are at Harvard now!” The
answer was in MIT President Compton's Depression Era correspon-
dence with New England's Governors about the New England Council.
6 H. Etzkowitz / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
1.6.2. MIT and the rise of entrepreneurial science
Founded in the 1920s by the Governors of the six New England
states, the Council brought together university, industry and govern-
ment leaders to address the economic decline of the region from the
early 20th century. The unique concentration of universities in the re-
gion included, not only Harvard and MIT, but also many other schools
like Boston University, Boston College and Northeastern University
that have since attained academic distinction. It was unthinkable to or-
ganize a New England regional leadership group without including its
universities; they were too significant a feature of the region's institu-
tional landscape to ignore.
More typically, when such a leadership group is convened it re-
sults in a “public private” partnership, a dyadic framework with all
the strengths and weaknesses of that format, amplifying both agree-
ment and disagreement. The social properties of the triad, with its
“tertius gaudens” mediation, divide and conquer, and other triadic
properties transformed a dualistic arrangement into a “Triple
Helix” of university–industry–government interactions. Whereas
two sided relations tend to polarize, negatively or positively, triadic
interactions display more subtle possibilities of negotiation, compro-
mise and production of novel ideas. Indeed, the Councils Board of Di-
rectors divided virtually equally into governmental, business and
academic members, sealing the triadic deal!
The New England Council developed its knowledge-based strategy
though brainstorming, study and experimentation early in the 20th
century. Starting from a focus on “New Products” that might be devel-
oped by existing firms, the members of the Council gradually came to
consider the broader context for innovation. They carefully examined
transferability of existing strategies for their applicability to the region
before committing resources to them. Thus, they were less likely to
waste resources on a fruitless strategy in contrast to regions that com-
mit to the fashionable strategy of the day, without first analyzing and
addressing gaps that will have to be filled to increase chances of success.
The Council concluded that the creation of support structures to
facilitate entrepreneurship from academia is the basis for producing
spin-off firms as a systematic activity. MIT President Karl Compton
was part of a circle of the school's administrators that envisioned a
“Research Row” of science-based firms in Cambridge, Massachusetts
extending from the MIT campus along the banks of the Charles River.
As a science advisor to President Roosevelt, Compton had advocated
using science to create new economic activity to cure the great de-
pression. However, this idea had found scant support in an era
when science, as source of labor-saving inventions, was often be-
lieved to be the cause of the depression. Indeed, some prominent
personages at the time called for a “moratorium on science” to ad-
dress this supposed root cause.
Although artists, playwrights and actors were supported by the
job creation activities of the Federal Works Progress Administration,
an agency largely oriented to “pick and shovel” construction projects
to quickly create employment, Compton and the his colleagues, the
directors of the nations scientific societies, failed to persuade Interior
Secretary Ickes, who had responsibility for the program, to include
scientists. Ickes held that scientific work was beyond the purview
of the National Industrial Recovery Act. Moreover, the President's
Science Advisory Committee did not support Compton's long-term
‘end the depression strategy’ of “putting science to work” to create
new industries and disbanded in 1935. Back home, the President of
MIT received a more respectful hearing for his analysis that science
was the source of much of the past half-century's industrial advance
in the automotive and electrical industries and could play a similar
role in the creation of future industries (Compton, 1935).
The New England Council was open to a new approach after trying
and failing to implement existing innovation strategies that included
attracting branch plants of existing firms and raising the technological
level of local small and medium sized firms. In this case, they were
found to be too far behind the technological curve to be amenable to
Please cite this article as: Etzkowitz, H., Innovation Lodestar: The entrepreneurial university in a stellar knowledge firmament, Technol. Forecast.
Soc. Change (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.04.026
renewal. Compton tailored his knowledge-based economic develop-
ment proposal to the experience of New England, generalizing the spo-
radic creation of firms from academic research at MIT and Harvard from
the late 19th century, initially in industrial consulting and scientific in-
strumentation and then radio in the 1920's (Shimshoni, 1970).
Intrigued by the idea, the Council began an exploration process that
today would be called a SWOT analysis, an examination of strengths,
weaknesses and opportunities. The expression of this dynamic is typi-
cally a hybrid organization, synthesizing elements from academia, busi-
ness and government–the Triple Helix. Thus, just after the Second
World War, a coalition of New England academic institutions and finan-
cial interests invented the venture capital firm, drawing upon academic
and business resources. The strength of the region with respect to the
envisioned strategy was its universities and significant financial re-
sources from previous industrial and commercial success. The weakness
was the relative lack of support structures and seed financing for new
venture creation. The discussion process among the Triple Helix actors
culminated in the invention of the venture capital firm to fill the gap.
Venture capital is one element of a “start-up” model of economic
development that can be substituted for by a variety of public and
private initiatives such as angel networks and state and federal gov-
ernment programs. The American Research and Development Cor-
poration (ARD), a novel firm, organized as a public corporation
with pro-bono aims for regional development, was structured to
take a long-term perspective. Indeed it was more than a decade be-
fore it had its first significant success in founding a firm from a re-
search project to develop an aircraft simulator left behind from the
World War II R&D effort but that had finally run out of government
support.
1.6.3. Academic entrepreneurship as a development strategy
In the mentoring model that was created, “… Doriot [the Harvard
Business School Professor with entrepreneurial experience, who direct-
ed the first venture capital firm] compensated for Olsen's (founder of
Digital Equipment Corporation] lack of business experience by raising
funds and sending directors to DEC's board meeting, providing a ground
for Olsen to have experience in managerial work” (Takase and Ito,
2014). In this early instance the venture firm provided an eco-system
for firm growth, playing a much broader role than financing and advice,
the narrower remit of most contemporary venture firms. The mini-
computer industry that grew from this initial effort failed to move to
the next generation of personal computers and disappeared. However,
what was left behind was an infrastructure for knowledge-based firm
formation, government agencies and venture capital firms that were
available to respond to the potential of biotechnology.
Originating in Boston to assist firm formation from MIT, the venture
capital industry spread to northern California, where it played a key
role in facilitating firm formation from Stanford. The early 20th cen-
tury transfer of the Poulsen arc technology from Denmark that was
the basis for the proto Silicon Valley Federal Telegraph company
has become a global steady stream as Silicon Valley's gravitational
field intensifies. An entrepreneurial teaching dynamic had already
been institutionalized based on interaction with local technology
firms, often founded by Stanford graduates to transfer existing tech-
nology to the region (Lecuyer, 2006).
1.6.4. Hybridization of academic models
Entrepreneurial academic role models like Fred Terman at Stanford
and Vannevar Bush at MIT, his PhD supervisor, created nuclei of tech-
nology commercialization in electrical engineering at these universities
in the pre-war. At Stanford, Frederick Terman, dean of engineering pro-
vided some of the funds to help two of his former students, Hewlett and
Packard, to form their firm just prior to the Second World War.
As Dean of Engineering and then Provost of Stanford during the early
post-war, Terman selected academic fields, like steroid chemistry, for
development that had conjoint theoretical and practical potential,
 H. Etzkowitz / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
creating a critical mass of faculty around each topic before moving on to
the next as resources became available. Called, “the father of Silicon Val-
ley,” Terman was an early advocate of university industry interaction as
an educational experience for students beyond the classroom (Gilmor,
2004). It has been suggested that Frederick Terman, son of Louis
Terman, the Stanford psychologist who was one of the originators of
IQ testing, transmuted some of his fathers' ideas on gifted children
into an elite academic development strategy.
Starting from within his own research group in electrical engineer-
ing, Terman spread an entrepreneurial education and faculty develop-
ment model of recruiting groups of related experts, so-called “steeples
of excellence,” throughout the engineering school and then to the med-
ical school and beyond. Nevertheless, it was not too long ago, that Andy
Groves, then President of Intel, approached the Business School with an
offer to teach. Renown in the social sciences, the Business School at the
time had little connection to Silicon Valley. Now the school is deeply
embedded in the Valley, with prominent executives, many of whom
graduated from Stanford, co-teaching entrepreneurship courses with
regular faculty, expanding upon the collaborative model begun by CEO
Groves with Professor Brugelman.
As a university that has combined Ivory Tower and entrepreneurial
modes from its inception, at the highest levels of achievement, Stanford
is proof that an entrepreneurial mode does not necessarily supersede a
liberal arts tradition. Science, Technology and Society (STS), an interdis-
ciplinary field that treats the value issues that emerge in consequence of
technological innovation is one of Stanford's fastest growing majors,
perhaps exceeded only by Computer Science in its rate of increase. In-
deed, it is not unusual for a student to double major in the two fields.
Robert McGinn, an engineering professor concerned with the ethical
implications of technology, founded Stanford's STS program. It subsisted
as a relatively small program with volunteer teachers for many years. Its
recent efflorescence, and campus experiments in the digital humanities,
indicates a relatively untapped entrepreneurial potential within the
humanities.
The global post-war expansion of academia, creating new universi-
ties and expanding existing ones, opened up opportunities for higher
education more broadly. In Sweden new universities, like Umea and
Linkoping and university colleges, like Orebro were spread across the
country, especially into sparsely populated regions. In New York, a
branch of the State University or community college can be found in
every region. Economic benefits were expected, in a general way, by
raising the educational and skill level of the population. Now, a more fo-
cused effect is desired, with Stanford as a model, exemplified by the
founding of Aalto University in Helsinki. In the wake of Nokia's downfall,
Finland is looking to academia as a source of new technologies and inno-
vative ideas that may be made into new industries and firms, as are
other countries and regions.
1.7. The capitalization of knowledge and the “cogitization” of capital
Science has emerged as an alternative engine of economic growth to
the classic triumvirate of land, labor and capital, the traditional sources
of wealth. In forming new firms, scientists and engineers have become
capitalists even as science and technology becomes a more central ele-
ment of capital as the institutional spheres of university and industry,
hitherto relatively separate and distinct converge. Capital is infused
with knowledge as some of its individual holders are successful techni-
cal entrepreneurs and others are various forms of public and private
venture capital organizations with the ability to evaluate technological
and commercial potential.
The “capitalization of knowledge” is at the heart of the entrepre-
neurial academic mission, linking universities to users of knowledge
more tightly and establishing the university as an economic actor in
its own right. The production of knowledge has become an economic
as well as an epistemological enterprise even as the economy increas-
ingly operates on a knowledge resource base (Machlup, 1962). The
Please cite this article as: Etzkowitz, H., Innovation Lodestar: The entrepreneurial university in a stellar knowledge firmament, Technol. Forecast.
Soc. Change (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.04.026
7
translation of academic knowledge into economic growth prior to the
1970s occurred primarily through relationships between existing
firms and universities or in house R&D; after this point, the creation of
new firms became the preferred method (Carlsson et.al. 2009).
The transformation of the role of knowledge in society was ap-
parent by the 1970's when Daniel Bell conceptualized it as the
emergence of post-industrial society, characterized by a shift from
manufacturing to services, rise of science-based industries and
growth of technical elites (1974). The departure of manufacturing
to low waged countries, the rise of the rust belt and shrinkage of
employment opportunities for persons lacking higher education
was concomitant with post-industrialism. An enhanced role for
the university in regional renewal strategy is one response to indus-
trial decline. Regional absorptive capacity is operationalized as an
entrepreneurial support structure of angel networks, venture capi-
tal opportunities, public relations and law firms oriented to support
firm formation and cluster development but may take various forms
(Cooke, 2001; Norman, 2005).
The contemporary research university has taken on some of the
characteristics of a high tech firm even as such firms earlier adopted
some academic attributes, like campuses, sabbaticals, and a proportion
of time devoted to self-generated projects. The capitalization of knowl-
edge involves sectors of the university, such as basic science depart-
ments, heretofore relatively uninvolved with industry. Moreover, the
university's participation in the economic development of its region
has changed the nature of the relationship between industry and the
university and of the university to government. Leading research uni-
versities that until relatively recently viewed external engagement as
involvement with the highest levels of national government have, with-
out losing this focus, developed a renewed focus on their neighborhood
and its local authorities.
In the early 20th century, Harvard invited MIT to become its subsid-
iary engineering school but despite facing financial crisis the Institute
decided to maintain its independence and distinct academic focus. Nev-
ertheless, some observers expected MIT to follow the Harvard model of
a general liberal arts research university and interpreted foundation
support for expansion of the Institute's physics department in the
1930's as an augur of academic evolution. However, the physicists that
MIT President Karl Compton hired from Princeton were a special subset
of their profession, patenting as well as publishing. In securing their ac-
ademic services the institute also obtained their intellectual property
rights from their former employer. In recent years a converse trend
has emerged as Harvard emulates MIT. Although delayed by the 2008
economic downturn and consequent decline in its endowment invest-
ment portfolio, Harvard's new Allston science and engineering campus
is intended to outdo MIT's entrepreneurial output. Although much has
seemingly changed since its 1636 founding, Harvard University's prima-
ry obligation is still to meet its stakeholders most pressing needs,
whether for spiritual counsel or renewal of society's productive base.
Three modalities of “university entanglement”
• Commercialization via start-ups and technology transfer
• Engagement via assistance to public agencies, NGO's and citizens
• Effect of university spend on local economy
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Henry Etzkowitz Prof. Etzkowitz is a scholar of international reputation in innovation
studies as the originator of the ‘Entrepreneurial University’ and ‘Triple Helix’ concepts that
link university with industry and government. As President of the Triple Helix Association,
he is at the centre of a unique international network of several hundred scholars.