G.R. No.

L-62114 July 5, 1983

ISIDRO BERNARDO and CAYETANO BERNARDO, petitioners,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Alberto Mala, Jr. for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

RELOVA, J.:

FIRST DIVISION

Petitioner Isidro Bernardo was a tenant of Ledda Sta. Rosa in her riceland in Plaridel, Bulacan from
October 1972 to August 1974. At the time, petitioner constructed a house therein for his family's
dwelling. His son, co-petitioner Cayetano Bernardo, was staying with him in said house as his helper
in tilling the land. Subsequently, Isidro left the landholding and transferred to San Nicolas, Bulacan
without the knowledge of the landowner Ledda Sta. Rosa. Before leaving the landholding, however,
Isidro transferred his tenancy rights to his son, co-petitioner Cayetano Bernardo, who continued to
reside in subject house. Eventually, Ledda Sta. Rosa took possession of the whole riceland, through
her overseer Dr. Patricio E. Cruz.

A case of forcible entry was filed by Ledda Sta. Rosa against herein petitioners, Isidro Bernardo and
Cayetano Bernardo, before the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Bulacan. Petitioners lost before the
inferior court as well as in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Likewise, petitioners lost in their
petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals.

Thereafter, Ledda Sta. Rosa sent a letter of demand to petitioners telling them to vacate the house
and the land. When the latter failed to leave, a criminal complaint was filed against them for violation
of Presidential Decree No. 772 with the fiscal's office. After a preliminary investigation of the case,
the provincial fiscal filed the corresponding information with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch VI, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3022-M, as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of April 1974, in the municipality of Plaridel, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Isidro Bernardo and Cayetano Bernardo, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, without the knowledge and taking advantage of the
tolerance of the owner Ledda Sta. Rosa y Cruz, succeed and/or continue in
possessing and squatting on a parcel of land of the said owner, by erecting thereon
their residential house and failing to remove the said residential house despite
demand to do so made by the said owner.

Upon arraignment, herein petitioners, father and son, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits
of the case proceeded and, after both parties have submitted their cases, herein petitioners, through
counsel, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court to entertain a case
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, inasmuch as the same applies to squatters in urban
communities only and not to agricultural lands; that in the case of People vs. Echaves, 95 SCRA
663, it was held that "Presidential Decree No. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its
preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly
to illegal construction in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals."

The motion to dismiss was denied and the trial court rendered judgment convicting herein petitioners
of the crime charged and sentencing them to pay a fine of P2,500.00 each, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Hence, this petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the
lower court on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the criminal case for alleged violation
of Presidential Decree No. 772 since the facts obtaining in the case do not constitute an offense or
violation of said law.

Indeed, in the case of People vs. Echaves, supra, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Ramon
C. Aquino, held that Presidential Decree No. 772 does not apply to pasture lands. The preamble of
the decree is quoted below:

WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of

Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of National
Defense, Public Works and Communications, Social Welfare and the Director of
Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing
and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City and
District Engineers, 'to remove all illegal constructions including buildings on and
along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without
permits on public and private property,' squatting is still a major problem in urban
communities all over the country;

WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public
and private lands belong to the affluent class;

WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against this
illegal and nefarious practice.

The intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities,
particularly to illegal constructions.

The Solicitor General in his comment to the petition manifests that "the intent and purpose of PD 772
is to prohibit and penalize squatting or similar acts on public and private lands located in urban
communities. ... ['that no person should be brought within the terms of a penal statute who is not
clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the
statute (US vs. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243). ... Consequently, the decision of the lower court in
Criminal Case No. 3022- M, convicting herein petitioners of the offense of violation of PD No. 772, is
null and void and should, therefore, be set aside."

ACCORDINGLY, this petition for certiorari is GRANTED, the judgment of conviction is SET ASIDE,
and said Criminal Case No. 3022-M is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., are on leave.

G.R. No. 157547               February 23, 2011

HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, Petitioners,

vs.
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an
unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).

Antecedents

On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon. The accusatory portion
reads:

That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply on account
or for value Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount
of ₱336,000.00 said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice
of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the amount of the check or to make
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC
in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount of ₱336,000.00, coupled with an
application for a writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00). 2 He alleged in
his complaint the following:

xxx

2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation

encashed a check dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of ₱336,000.00 to the plaintiff
assuring the latter that the check is duly funded and that he had an existing account with the
Land Bank of the Philippines, xerox copy of the said check is hereto attached as Annex "A";

3. However, when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored on the
ground that the account of the defendant with the Land Bank of the Philippines has been
closed contrary to his representation that he has an existing account with the said bank and
that the said check was duly funded and will be honored when presented for payment;

4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good the payment of the value
of the check, xerox copy of the letter of demand is hereto attached as Annex "B", but despite
 such demand defendant refused and continues to refuse to comply with plaintiff’s valid
demand;

5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the plaintiff’s valid demands,
plaintiff has been compelled to retain the services of counsel for which he agreed to pay as
reasonable attorney’s fees the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus additional amount of ₱2,000.00
per appearance.

ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER

FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation
upon which this action is brought and that there is no sufficient security for the claims sought
in this action which fraud consist in the misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an
existing account and sufficient funds to cover the check when in fact his account was already
closed at the time he issued a check;

7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is one which falls under
Section 1, sub-paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and
the amount due the plaintiff is as much as the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ of
preliminary attachment;

8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned upon the payment of
damages should it be finally found out that the plaintiff is not entitled to the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment.3

On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was
implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon. 4

On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s
attachment bond for damages,5 pertinently averring:

xxx

On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of another action
between the instant parties for the same cause before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch
X (10) entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon", docketed thereat as Criminal Case
No. 275381-CR, the instant action is dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, xxx

xxx

While the instant case is civil in nature and character as contradistinguished from the said Criminal
Case No. 915-00 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10), the basis of the instant
civil action is the herein plaintiff’s criminal complaint against defendant arising from a charge of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence of the alleged dishonor in plaintiff’s hands
upon presentment for payment with drawee bank a Land Bank Check No. 0007280 dated December
26, 1996 in the amount of ₱336,000- drawn allegedly issued to plaintiff by defendant who is the
accused in said case, a photocopy of the Criminal information filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor
of Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex "1".
It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, "when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to
institute it separately xxx.

On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge
plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages, stating:

1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint is the alleged
pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause, contending
among others that the pendency of Criminal Case No. 275381-CR entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon" renders this case dismissable;

2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the filing of the criminal action, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action which the plaintiff does not
contest; however, it is the submission of the plaintiff that an implied reservation of the right to
file a civil action has already been made, first, by the fact that the information for violation of
B.P. 22 in Criminal Case No. 2753841 does not at all make any allegation of damages
suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any claim for recovery of damages; on top of this the
plaintiff as private complainant in the criminal case, during the presentation of the
prosecution evidence was not represented at all by a private prosecutor such that no
evidence has been adduced by the prosecution on the criminal case to prove damages; all of
these we respectfully submit demonstrate an effective implied reservation of the right of the
plaintiff to file a separate civil action for damages;

3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court which mandates that after a criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action; however,
the defendant overlooks and conveniently failed to consider that under Section 2, Rule 111
which provides as follows:

In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right
is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines as it
is based on fraud, this action therefore may be prosecuted independently of the criminal
action;

4. In fact we would even venture to state that even without any reservation at all of the right
to file a separate civil action still the plaintiff is authorized to file this instant case because the
plaintiff seeks to enforce an obligation which the defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of
the negotiable instruments law. The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant to enforce his
liability as drawer in favor of the plaintiff as payee of the check. Assuming the allegation of
the defendant of the alleged circumstances relative to the issuance of the check, still when
he delivered the check payable to bearer to that certain Pedro Domingo, as it was payable to
cash, the same may be negotiated by delivery by who ever was the bearer of the check and
such negotiation was valid and effective against the drawer;
 5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant regarding the circumstances
relative to the issuance of the check it would be entirely impossible for the plaintiff to have
been aware that such check was intended only for a definite person and was not negotiable
considering that the said check was payable to bearer and was not even crossed;

6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart from the criminal case
without a reservation is a civil action arising from the criminal offense charged. However, in
this instant case since the liability of the defendant are imposed and the rights of the plaintiff
are created by the negotiable instruments law, even without any reservation at all this instant
action may still be prosecuted;

7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiff’s complaint the application for damages against
the bond is totally without any legal support and perforce should be dismissed outright. 6

On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with
application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages, 7 dismissing the complaint of Chan
because:

xxx

After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss and
the application to charge plaintiff’s bond for damages.

For "litis pendentia" to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must
concur: (a) identity of parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the
identity in the two (2) cases should be such that the judgment, which may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. xxx

A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as "Sum of Money" and the criminal case for
violation of BP Blg. 22 would readily show that the parties are not only identical but also the cause of
action being asserted, which is the recovery of the value of Landbank Check No. 0007280 in the
amount of ₱336,000.00. In both civil and criminal cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts, are identical.

Plaintiff’s claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil case owing to
the fact that there was no allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case and that there was no private
prosecutor during the presentation of prosecution evidence is unmeritorious. It is basic that when a
complaint or criminal Information is filed, even without any allegation of damages and the intention to
prove and claim them, the offended party has the right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver
or reservation is made or unless in the meantime, the offended party has instituted a separate civil
action. xxx The over-all import of the said provision conveys that the waiver which includes
indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages arising under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the
Civil Code must be both clear and express. And this must be logically so as the primordial objective
of the Rule is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused.

Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or made a reservation as to his right to
pursue the civil branch of the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the defendant herein.
To the considered view of this court, the filing of the instant complaint for sum of money is indeed
legally barred. The right to institute a separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution
starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation. xxx

Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiff’s submission that the herein case for sum of money is
one based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is
required by the Rules, to wit:

"In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence."

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:

1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of "litis pendentia";

2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on August 14, 2000;

3. Charge the plaintiff’s bond the amount of ₱336,000.00 in favor of the defendant for the
damages sustained by the latter by virtue of the implementation of the writ of attachment;

4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost dispatch to the
defendant’s physical possession the vehicle seized from him on August 16, 2000; and

5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of ₱5,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.

Chan’s motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 2000, 8 viz:

Considering that the plaintiff’s arguments appear to be a mere repetition of his previous
submissions, and which submissions this court have already passed upon; and taking into account
the inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in the Tactaquin vs. Palileo case which the plaintiff cited as
clearly in that case, the plaintiff therein expressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action,
the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chan’s
complaint, disposing:9

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for
review,10 challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.
In his comment, 11 Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in prosecuting his
alleged civil claim twice in a manner that caused him (Simon) utter embarrassment and emotional
sufferings; and that the dismissal of the civil case because of the valid ground of litis pendentia
based on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.

On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, 12 overturning the RTC, viz:

xxx

As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced
by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding
penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought
to be compensated through indemnity which is also civil in nature. Thus, "every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable."

The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the
offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action
or is separately instituted.

Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on
December 1, 2000, provides that:

(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institute the civil action prior to the
criminal action.

Rule 111, Section 2 further states:

After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed.

In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court pronounced that only the civil
liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action. Speaking through Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held:

"There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil action under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The reservation and waiver referred to
refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged.
This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately without a
reservation".

Rule 111, Section 3 reads:

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34,
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions
which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.

Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure. xxx

Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for damages on account of the fraud
committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed
independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing."

It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant suit. The complaint was also
brought on allegation of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code and committed by the respondent in
the issuance of the check which later bounced. It was filed before the trial court, despite the
pendency of the criminal case for violation of BP 22 against the respondent. While it may be true that
the changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil action
became effective on December 1, 2000, the same may be given retroactive application and may be
made to apply to the case at bench, since procedural rules may be given retroactive application.
There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.

In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to adjudge damages in favor of
the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 13, 2001 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirming the dismissal of the complaint filed by
petitioner is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simon’s motion for reconsideration. 13

Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously premised its decision on
the assessment that the civil case was an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and
2176 of the Civil Code; that the CA’s reliance on the ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative
Inc. v. Velez14 stretched the meaning and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a simple collection suit for a sum of
money, precluding the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 15

In his comment,16 Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied because the
petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of action, being based on fraud, was an
independent civil action; and that the appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case did not
preclude the filing of his separate civil action.

Issue

The lone issue is whether or not Chan’s civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check
(Civil Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.
 Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the

Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22

The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give rise to civil
liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr.,17 holding:

xxx

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended
party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the
wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of
the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA
44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal
action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing,
repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).

xxx

Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to
receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the
damage, she is entitled to recompense.

Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the
offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender,
giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a
separate civil suit. To do so may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of
the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The
protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.

xxx

However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in
contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1,
2000, which relevantly provides:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint
or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such
damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (1a)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. 18

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing
fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts
alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. – In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced
Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the
retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel
adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general
rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.19 Any new rules may validly be
made to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an
action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, 20 except that in criminal cases, the changes do
not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is
required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be
unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.21
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any assumed vested
right, because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on
November 1, 1997.

Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:

Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following rules and
guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal cases under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without
funds or credit:

1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed or recognized.22

2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay
in full the filing fees based upon the amount of the check involved which shall be considered
as the actual damages claimed, in accordance with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and
Section 8 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as last amended by Administrative Circular No.
11-94 effective August 1, 1994. Where the offended party further seeks to enforce against
the accused civil liability by way of liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, he shall pay the corresponding filing fees therefor based on the amounts thereof
as alleged either in the complaint or information. If not so alleged but any of these damages
are subsequently awarded by the court, the amount of such fees shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment.

3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court
trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with the pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 governing the
proceedings in the actions as thus consolidated.

4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take
effect on November 1, 1997.

The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing
Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation, 23 thus:

xxx

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of
B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted
under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised
Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer needed. The Rules provide:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —

(a) x x x
 (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing
fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. 1avvphi1

The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states that the
criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It
also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved.
Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil
action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the
filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P.
22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is
charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal
charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even
informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly
lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is
also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases,
one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed
that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The
Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer
file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when
separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even
then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously
observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored
checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would
further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where
petitioners’ rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a
separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing
actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the
case at bar.24

The CA’s reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez 25 to give due course to the civil
action of Chan independently and separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI
Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with this case, which is a
prosecution for a violation of BP 22. Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing
check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22, 26 the
procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different
and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right
to file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to
Article 33 of the Civil Code,27 as DMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP
22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate
civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check upon the
reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.

To repeat, Chan’s separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the
prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained under both Supreme
Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.

Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action

on the ground of litis pendentia

Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in Criminal Case No.
275381) bar the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in Pasay City on the ground of litis
pendentia?

For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following
requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the
same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that
the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of
the third becomes nil.28

A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the
elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal
Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly,
the information in Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both
alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth ₱336,000.00 payable to "cash,"
thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which
the reliefs sought were founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in
one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice
upon the same claim.

It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on the
ground of litis pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay
City did not err in affirming the MeTC.

Wherefore, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we reverse and set aside
the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision
rendered on October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.

Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION**
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD*** MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 173330               June 17, 2013

LUCILLE DOMINGO, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLINDA COLINA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution2 dated August 12, 2005 and May 26, 2006,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27090.

The facts are as follows:

In an Information dated March 8, 1999, herein petitioner was charged before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City, with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22), to wit:

That on or about February 28, 1998 in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, knowing fully well that he/she have (sic) no
funds and/or credit with the drawee bank, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously issued UCPB Check
No. 0014924 dated February 28, 1998 in the amount of ₱175,000.00 in payment of an obligation in
favor of Merlinda Dy Colina; but when the said check was presented to the drawee bank for
encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and despite notice of
dishonor and repeated demands upon him/her to make good the check, he/she failed and refused to
make payment or to deposit the face amount of the check, to the damage and prejudice of herein
complainant in the aforesaid amount. 3

The case proceeded to trial.

After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence.

On October 25, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order granting the demurrer to evidence holding that:

Taking into consideration the observations of this court that the evidence adduced in court by the
prosecution in the records of this case failed to prove elements nos. 2 and 3 of the crime of violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 charged against the accused Lucille Domingo per information in this
case, this court finds and so holds that the demurrer to the evidence adduced in court by the
prosecution in the records of this case filed by accused Lucille Domingo through her counsel with
this court is well taken. Accordingly, it is granted. Correspondingly, this case is hereby ordered
dismissed. Correlatively, the cash bond of accused Lucille Domingo in the amount of ₱20,000.00
under Official Receipt No. 11552806, dated December 2, 1999, deposited with the Office of the
Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered canceled and the herein mentioned office is hereby directed to
release the herein stated cash bond upon its receipt to accused Lucille Domingo.

SO ORDERED.4

The prosecution, through the private prosecutor, then filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Order
of Dismissal and In The Alternative To Reopen the Civil Aspect of the Case. 5 The prosecution
contended that even assuming that petitioner did not receive valuable consideration for her bounced
check, she is nonetheless liable to respondent for the face value of the check as an accommodation
party and, that petitioner's knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds in or credit with the bank is
presumed from the dishonor of her check.

On November 23, 2001, the MTCC issued another Order denying the prosecution's Motion. The
MTCC held, thus:

After a thorough reevaluation of the evidence adduced in court by the prosecution in the records of
this case in the light of the arguments proffered by the accused in support of her demurrer to the
evidence adduced in court by the prosecution in the records of this case and of the factual and legal
basis of this court in arriving at its conclusion in ordering the dismissal of this case vis-a-vis the
arguments interposed by the prosecution in its motion for reconsideration of the order issued by this
court, dated October 25, 2001, as diluted by the comments of accused Lucille Domingo, through her
counsel, of the herein stated motion for reconsideration of the prosecution, this court finds no cogent
reason to justify the reconsideration of the herein stated order. Correspondingly, the motion for
reconsideration of the order of this court dated October 25, 2001 is denied. Correlatively, the
alternate prayer of the private complainant, through her counsel, to reopen the civil aspect of this
case is likewise denied. At any rate, although the herein mentioned order did not categorically state
that the accused's act from which his civil liability in favor of the private complainant may arise does
not exist in this case, in effect, the observations and ratiocinations stated by this court in support of
its finding that the evidence adduced in court by the prosecution in the records of this case failed to
prove all the elements of the crime of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, speaks for itself.

In deference to the desire of the prosecution, let it be stated herein that the act from which the civil
liability of the accused in favor of the private complainant may arise, does not exist in this case.

SO ORDERED.6

Respondent appealed the civil aspect of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City.

On September 30, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED, ordering the accused-appellee
Lucille Domingo to pay complainant Melinda Colina the civil liability arising out of the offense
charged in the amount of ₱175,000.00, plus interest of 12% per annum counted from the filing of the
complaint and cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA.

On August 12, 2005, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dismissing petitioner's petition for review
and affirming the RTC Decision in toto.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied via the questioned CA Resolution dated May 26,
2006.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari based on the following Reasons/Arguments:
(a)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING
THAT THE RTC-BRANCH 16 OF DAVAO CITY HAS JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN AN APPEAL
INTERPOSED WHICH WAS VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 2, RULE 111 OF THE RULES ON
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHEN THE TRIAL COURT (MTCC-BRANCH 6 OF DAVAO CITY) HAD
ALREADY RULED THAT THE ACT FROM WHICH THE CIVIL LIABILITY MAY ARISE DID NOT
EXIST.

(b)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S REQUEST TO ADDUCE

EVIDENCE ON THE CIVIL ASPECT AND RULED THAT THE PETITIONER HAS WAIVED THAT
RIGHT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED WAS WITH PRIOR
LEAVE OF COURT.8

The petition lacks merit.

The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the
civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in
the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. 9

Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 of the same Rules states that:

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.10

In the instant case, the Orders of the MTCC, dated October 25, 2001 and November 23, 2001, did
not contain any such finding or determination. The Court agrees with the CA that in acquitting
petitioner in its Order dated October 25, 2001, the MTCC did not rule on the civil aspect of the case.
While it subsequently held in its November 23, 2001 Order that "the act from which the civil liability of
the accused in favor of the private complainant may arise does not exist in this case," the MTCC,
nonetheless, failed to cite evidence, factual circumstances or any discussion in its October 25, 2001
Decision which would warrant such ruling. Instead, it simply concluded that since the prosecution
failed to prove all the elements of the offense charged, then the act from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist. The MTCC held that its observations and ratiocinations in its October 25, 2001
Order justified its conclusion. However, after a careful review of the above-mentioned Orders, the
Court finds nothing therein which the MTCC could have used as a reasonable ground to arrive at its
conclusion that the act or omission from which petitioner's civil liability might arise did not exist.

On the contrary, the tenor of the Orders of the MTCC is that the dismissal of the criminal case
against petitioner was based on reasonable doubt. As may be recalled, the MTCC dismissed the
criminal case on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the second and third elements of BP
22, i.e., (2) the check is applied on account or for value and (3) the person issuing the check knows
at the time of its issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the bank for the full
payment of the check upon its presentment. This only means, therefore, that the trial court did not
convict petitioner of the offense charged, since the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases. Conversely, the lack of
evidence to prove the aforesaid elements of the offense charged does not mean that petitioner has
no existing debt with respondent, a civil aspect which is proven by another quantum of evidence, a
mere preponderance of evidence. Moreover, from the above pronouncement of the MTCC as to the
prosecution's failure to prove the second and third elements of the offense charged, it can be
deduced that the prosecution was able to establish the presence of the first and fourth elements, i.e.,
(1) a person draws and issues a check and (4) the check is dishonored by the bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit. Hence, the fact that petitioner was proven to have drawn and issued a check and
that the same was subsequently dishonored for inadequate funds leads to the logical conclusion that
the fact from which her civil liability might arise, indeed, exists. On the basis of the foregoing, the
RTC correctly entertained respondent's appeal of the civil aspect of the case. 1âwphi1

With respect to the second argument, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of
the CA in its Resolution dated May 26, 2006 that for petitioner's failure to invoke her right to present
evidence, despite the clear ruling by the RTC that she is civilly liable, she is deemed to have waived
such right. Petitioner may not argue that her right to due process was violated, because she was
given the opportunity to raise this issue a number of times both in the RTC and the CA. Petitioner
does not dispute that neither in her Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the RTC nor in her
Petition for Review, as well as in her Memorandum filed with the CA, did she raise the issue of her
right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the present case. As correctly observed by the CA, it
was only in her Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision that she brought up such matter.
Where a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to
have been denied due process of law.11 The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. 12 Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial
of due process.13 The question is not whether petitioner succeeded in defending her rights and
interests, but simply, whether she had the opportunity to present her side of the controversy. 14

In the instant case, petitioner was able to participate in all the proceedings before the lower courts,
and, in fact, obtained a favorable judgment from the MTCC. She also had a similar opportunity to
ventilate her cause in the CA. Simply because she failed to avail herself of all the remedies open to
her did not give her the justification to complain of a denial of due process. She cannot complain
because she was given the chance to defend her interest in due course, for as stated above, it was
such opportunity to be heard that was the essence of due process.

Equally settled is the rule that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in
the proceedings below.15 Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention
of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a
reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. 16 For her failure to timely
invoke her right to present evidence, petitioner is already estopped.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 12, 2005 and May 26, 2006, respectively, in CA-
G.R. CR No. 27090, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 145391            August 26, 2002

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners,

vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution 1 dated December 28, 1999
dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution2 dated August 24, 2000 denying the motion
for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special
Civil Action No. 17-C (99).

The Facts

Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya ("Laroya" for brevity) and the other
owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo ("Capitulo" for brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino
Casupanan ("Casupanan" for brevity), figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court ("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for
quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.

When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage.
Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-
shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order
of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.

On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate
civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for
reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court ("Capas RTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch
66,3 assailing the MCTC’s Order of dismissal.

The Trial Court’s Ruling

The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari for
lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order
which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal. The
Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the
civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.

Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same in
the Resolution of August 24, 2000.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:

"In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think and believe
that the accident was caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party, believing himself
to be the aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless imprudence against the
second party. On the other hand, the second party, together with his operator, believing
themselves to be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict
against the first party who is the very private complainant in the criminal case." 4

Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence
can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case.

The Court’s Ruling

Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC dismissed on the ground
of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue
that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file
the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-
delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in
a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They
maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently
of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the
independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle,
who was not a party in the criminal case.

In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real
antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the
order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there
is no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.

In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal question of whether
there is forum-shopping since they filed only one action - the independent civil action for quasi-
delict against Laroya.

Nature of the Order of Dismissal

The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of
dismissal5 that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of
dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states
it is with prejudice.6 Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed
without prejudice. Thus, the MCTC’s dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without
prejudice.

Section 1 of Rule 417 provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable.
The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41
expressly states that "where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65." Clearly, the Capas RTC’s order dismissing the
petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping

The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. 8 Forum-
shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of
action and reliefs sought.9 However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law
and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of
the criminal action.

Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the
Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they
have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the
Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:

"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."

Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence,
that he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the private
complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in
the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.

Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("2000 Rules"
for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to
wit:

"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the

criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action." (Emphasis supplied)

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate
civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.

Filing of a separate civil action

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("1985 Rules" for brevity), as amended
in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of the criminal action provided the
offended party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil
action before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from the
same act or omission were deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal case. These civil actions
referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the
recovery of damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.

Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the
offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such
civil action was deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules provided as follows:

"Section 1. – Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the accused.

x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000 and now provides as
follows:

"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

xxx

(b) x x x

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of this rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions." (Emphasis
supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only
the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The
failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal
action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and
independent of the civil action "deemed instituted" in the criminal action. 10

Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action
to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution
presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a
separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated
with the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions
arising from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. 11

Suspension of the Separate Civil Action

Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if reserved in the
criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the
separate civil action was filed before the commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still
pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final judgment was rendered in
the criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-
delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.

The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this procedure, to wit:

"SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. – After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same
may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court
trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil
action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to
the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party
in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated
criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the
civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended
shall be tolled.

x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action,
filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of
the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a
separate civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.

When civil action may proceed independently

The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in
the criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the offended party in the criminal case.
Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:

"SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action."
(Emphasis supplied)

Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows
the "offended party" to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the "offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in
the criminal action."

There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action
for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the
"offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to
the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.

Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs. Cantos12 where the Court held
that the accused therein could validly institute a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his
Answer with Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the "absence of
clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessary
consequences and implications thereof." Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court should confine
itself to the criminal aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court
further ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case against the offended party "after the
criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules which may be promulgated."
The Court explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will
only unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.

Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to
address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is barred from filing a
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision
states that "any cause of action which could have been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim
or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action." The present Rule 111 mandates
the accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil actiosn which shall proceed independently of
the criminal action, even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.

Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not
suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The
suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime,
if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal
case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a
civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can
proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the
criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases,
the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent,
necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is
accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present
Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil
action." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is
therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused
does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the
period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code,
in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal
action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to
recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the
courts, and equal protection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.
The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is
erroneous.

We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the criminal case
may vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility has
always been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent
civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the
Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action "may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter." In Azucena vs. Potenciano,13 the
Court declared:

"x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil
action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it
be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent character of the civil
action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.’"

More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of a civil action
separate and independent from the criminal action although arising from the same act or omission.
The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial
courts, one hearing the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than real. In any event, there are
sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.

One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while
the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the
rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the
well-settled rule that -

"x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent."14

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and
Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez *, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 163879               July 30, 2014

DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES RODOLFO M. PALMA and ROSARIO F.
PALMA, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 165805

DR. CLENIO YNZON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES RODOLFO M. PALMA AND ROSARIO F.
PALMA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court are appeals via Rule 45 from the Decision  dated June 4, 2004 of the Court of
1

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27293, affirming the Decision  dated February 28,2003 of the Regional
2

Trial Court (RTC), convicting appellant Dr. Antonio P. Cabugao (Dr. Cabugao) and Dr. Clenio Ynzon
(Dr. Ynzon) of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide.

The Information  alleged –

3

That on or about June 17, 2000in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, DR. ANTONIO P.CABUGAO and DR. CLENIO
YNZON, being then the attending physicians of one RODOLFO PALMA, JR., a minor 10 years old,
confederating and acting jointly with one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fail through negligence, carelessness and imprudence to perform immediate operation
upon their patient, RODOLFO PALMA, JR. of acute appendicitis, when they, the said physicians,
should have been done so considering that examinations conducted upon their patient Rodolfo
Palma, Jr. seriously manifest todo so, causing by such negligence, carelessness, and imprudence
the victim, RODOLFO PALMA JR., to die due to:

"CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST, METABOLIC ENCEPHALOPATHY, SEPTICEMIA (ACUTE

APPENDICITIS), CEREBRAL ANEURYSM RUPTURED (?)"

As per Certificate of Death issued by accused Dr. Antonio P. Cabugao, to the damage and prejudice
of the legal heirs of said deceased RODOLFO PALMA, JR. and other consequential damages
relative thereto.

CONTRARY to Article 365, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code.

Dagupan City, Philippines, January 29, 2001.

Arising from the same events, the Court resolved to consolidate these cases.  The facts, as culled
4

from the records, are as follows:

On June 14, 2000, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, ten (10)-year old Rodolfo F. Palma, Jr. (JR)
complained of abdominal pain to his mother, Rosario Palma. At 5 o’clock that sameafternoon,
Palma's mother and father, Atty. Rodolfo Palma Sr., brought JR to the clinic of accused Dr.
Cabugao. Dr. Cabugao, a general practitioner, specializing in familymedicine gave medicines for the
pain and told Palma's parents to call him up if his stomach pains continue. Due to persistent
abdominal pains, at 4:30 in the early morning of June 15, 2000, they returnedto Dr. Cabugao, who
advised them to bring JR to the Nazareth General Hospital in Dagupan City, for confinement. JR
was admitted at the said hospital at 5:30 in the morning.5

Blood samples were taken from JR for laboratory testing. The complete blood count conveyed the
following result: wbc – 27.80 x 10 9/L; lymphocytes – 0.10 and neutrophils – 0.90. Diagnostic
ultrasound was likewise conducted on the patient's lower abdomen by radiologist, Dr. Ricky V.
Querubin, with the following findings:

Normal liver, bile ducts, gallbladder, pancreas, spleen, kidneys and urinary bladder.

There is no free peritoneal fluid.

There is localized tenderness in the paraumbilical region, more so in the supra and right
paraumbilical areas.

There is a vague elongated hypoechoic focus in the right periumbilical region roughly about 47 x 18
mm surrounded by undistended gas-filled bowels. This is suggestive of an inflammatory process
wherein appendiceal or periappendiceal pathology cannot be excluded. Clinical correlation is
essential."6

Dr. Cabugao did a rectal examination noting the following: "rectal: good sphincter, negative
tenderness, negative mass." The initial impression was Acute Appendicitis,  and hence, he referred
7

the case to his co-accused, Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon.  In the later part of the morning of June 15, 2000,
8

Dr. Ynzon went to the hospital and readthe CBC and ultrasound results. The administration of
massive antibiotics and pain reliever to JRwere ordered. Thereafter, JR was placed on observation
for twenty-four (24) hours.

In the morning of June 16, 2000, JR complained again of abdominal pain and his parents noticeda
swelling in his scrotum. In the afternoon of the same day, JR vomitted out greenish stuff three (3)
times and had watery bowels also three (3) times. The nurses on-duty relayed JR's condition to Dr.
Ynzon who merely gaveorders via telephone.  Accused continued medications to alleviate JR's
9

abdominal spasms and diarrhea. By midnight, JR again vomitted twice, had loose bowel movements
and was unable to sleep. The following morning, June 17,2000, JR's condition worsened, he had a
running fever of 38°C. JR's fever remained uncontrolled and he became unconscious, he was given
Aeknil (1 ampule) and Valium (1 ampule). JR's condition continued to deteriorate that by 2 o'clock in
the afternoon, JR's temperature soared to 42°C, had convulsions and finally died.

The Death Certificate  dated June 19, 2000 prepared by Dr. Cabugao indicated the following causes
10

of death:

Immediate cause: CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST

Antecedent cause: METABOLIC ENCEPHALOPATHY

Underlying cause: SEPTICEMIA (ACUTE APPENDICITIS)

 Other significant conditionscontributing to death:

CEREBRAL ANEURYSM RUPTURED (?)

No post-mortem examination was conducted on JR. On February 1, 2001, an Information was filed
against accused for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. At their arraignment, both accused,
duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.

On February 28, 2003, in convicting both the accused, the trial court found the following
circumstances as sufficient basis to conclude that accused were indeed negligent in the
performance of their duties:

It is unquestionable that JR was under the medical care of the accused from the time of his
admission for confinement at the Nazareth General Hospital until his death. Upon his admission, the
initial working diagnosis was to consider acute appendicitis. To assist the accused in the
consideration of acute appendicitis, Dr. Cabugao requested for a complete blood count (CBC) and a
diagnostic ultrasound on JR. The findings of the CBC and ultrasound showed that an inflammatory
process or infection was going on inside the body of JR. Said inflammatory process was happening
in the periumbilical region where the appendix could be located. The initial diagnosis of acute
appendicitis appears to be a distinct possibility. x x x.

Dr. Ynzon ordered medications to treat the symptoms being manifested by JR. Thereafter, he
ordered that JR be observed for 24 hours. However, the accused, as the attending physicians, did
not personally monitor JR in order to check on subtle changes that may occur. Rather, they left the
monitoring and actual observation to resident physicians who are just on residency training and in
doing so, they substituted their own expertise, skill and competence with those of physicians who
are merely new doctors still on training. Not having personally observed JR during this 24-hour
critical period of observation, the accused relinquished their duty and thereby were unable to give
the proper and correct evaluation as to the real condition of JR. In situations where massive infection
is going on as shown by the aggressive medication of antibiotics, the condition of the patient is
serious which necessitated personal, not delegated, attention of attending physicians, namely JR
and the accused in this case.

xxxx

Throughout the course of the hospitalization and treatment of JR, the accused failed to address the
acute appendicitis which was the initial diagnosis. They did not take steps to find out if indeed acute
appendicitis was what was causing the massive infection that was ongoing inside the body of JR
even when the inflammatory process was located at the paraumbilical region where the appendix
can be located. x x x

There may have been other diseases but the records do not show that the accused took steps to
find outwhat disease exactly was plaguing JR. It was their duty to find out the disease causing the
health problem of JR, but they did not perform any process of elimination. Appendicitis, according to
expert testimonies, could be eliminated only by surgery but no surgery was done by the accused.
But the accused could not have found out the real disease of JR because they were treating merely
and exclusively the symptoms by means of the different medications to arrest the manifested
symptoms. In fact, by treating the symptoms alone, the accused were recklessly and wantonly
ignoring the same as signs of the graver health problem of JR. This gross negligence on the part of
the accused allowed the infection to spread inside the body of JR unabated. The infection obviously
spread so fastand was so massive that within a period of only two and a half (2 ½) days from the day
of admission to the hospital on June 15, 2000, JR who was otherwise healthy died [of] Septicemia
(Acute Appendicitis) on June 17, 2000. 11

On June 4, 2004, in affirming the accused' conviction, the Court of Appeals gave similar
observations, to wit:

The foregoing expert testimony clearly revealed such want of reasonable skill and care on the part of
JR's attending physicians, appellants Dr. Cabugao and Dr. Ynzon in neglecting to monitor effectively
and sufficiently the developments/changes during the observation period and act upon the situation
after said 24-hour period when his abdominal pain subsisted, his condition even worsened with the
appearance of more serious symptoms of nausea, vomiting and diarrhea. Considering the brief visit
only made on regular rounds, the records clearly show such gross negligence in failing to take
appropriate steps to determine the real cause of JR's abdominal pain so that the crucial decision to
perform surgery (appendectomy) had even been ruled out precisely because of the inexcusable
neglect to undertake suchefficient diagnosis by process of elimination, as correctly pointed out by
the trial court. As has been succinctly emphasized by Dr. Mateo, acute appendicitis was the working
diagnosis, and with the emergence of symptoms after the 24-hour observation (high fever, vomiting,
diarrhea) still, appellants ruled out surgery, not even considering exploratory laparoscopy. Dr. Mateo
also expressed the opinion that the decision to operate could have been made after the result of the
ultrasound test, considering that acute appendicitis was the initial diagnosis by Dr. Cabugao after he
had conducted a rectal examination.

Medical records buttress the trial court's finding that in treating JR, appellants have demonstrated
indifference and neglect of the patient's condition as a serious case. Indeed, appendicitis remains a
clinical emergencyand a surgical disease, as correctly underscored by Dr. Mateo, a practicing
surgeon who has already performed over a thousand appendectomy. In fact, appendectomy is the
only rational therapy for acute appendicitis; it avoids clinical deterioration and may avoid chronic or
recurrent appendicitis. Although difficult, prompt recognition and immediate treatment of the disease
prevent complications. Under the factual circumstances, the inaction, neglect and indifference of
appellants who, after the day of admission and after being apprised of the ongoing infection from the
CBC and initial diagnosis as acute appendicitis from rectal examination and ultrasound testand only
briefly visited JR once during regular rounds and gave medication orders by telephone – constitutes
gross negligenceleading to the continued deterioration of the patient, his infection having spread in
sofast a pace that he died within just two and a half (2 ½) days’ stay inthe hospital. Authorities state
that if the clinical picture is unclear a short period of 4 to 6 hours of watchful waiting and a CT scan
may improve diagnostic accuracy and help to hasten diagnosis.Even assuming that JR's case had
an atypical presentation in view of the location of his appendix, laboratory tests could have helped to
confirm diagnosis, as Dr. Mateo opined thatthe possibility of JR having a retrocecal appendicitis
should have been a strong consideration. Lamentably, however, as found by the trial court,
appellants had not taken steps towards correct diagnosis and demonstrated laxity even when JR
was already running a high fever in the morning of June 17, 2000 and continued vomiting with
diarrhea, his abdominal pain becoming more intense. This is the reason why private complainants
were not even apprised of the progress of appellants' diagnosis – appellants have nothing to report
because they did nothing towards the end and merely gave medications to address the symptoms. 12

Thus, these appeals brought beforethis Court raising the following arguments:

WHETHER THE CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AS CONTAINED IN THE INFORMATION IS "FAILURE

TO PERFORM IMMEDIATE OPERATION UPON THE PATIENT ROFOLFO PALMA JR. OF ACUTE
APPENDICITIS;
 II

WHETHER THE SUBJECT INFORMATION APPEARS TO HAVE ACCUSED BOTH ACCUSED

DOCTORS OF CONSPIRACY AND THE APPEALED DECISION SEEMS TO HAVE TREATED
BOTH ACCUSED DOCTORS TO BE IN CONSPIRACY;

III

WHETHER PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO IS A GENERAL PRACTITIONER (NOT A SURGEON)

AND HAVE EXCLUDED SURGERY FROM THE LIMITS OFHIS PRACTICE, AND IT WAS NOT
AND NEVER HIS DUTY TO OPERATE THE PATIENT RODOLFO PALMA JR., THAT WAS WHY
HE REFERRED SUBJECT PATIENT TO A SURGEON, DR. CLENIO YNZON;

IV

WHETHER THE DEFENSE NEVER STATED THAT THERE IS GUARANTEE THAT DOING
SURGERY WOULD HAVE SAVED THE PATIENT;

WHETHER THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION INCLUDING PROSECUTION'S EXPERT

WITNESSES EVER DECLARED/TESTIFIED THAT PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO HAD THE DUTY
TO PERFORM IMMEDIATE OPERATION ON RODOLFO PALMA, JR., AND THEY FAILED TO
STATE/SHOW THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH OF JR WAS ACUTE APPENDICITIS;

VI

WHETHER THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION EVER

QUESTIONED THE MANAGEMENT AND CARE APPLIED BY PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO;

VII

WHETHER THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE ARE UNANIMOUS IN

APPROVING THE METHOD OF TREATMENT APPLIED BY BOTH ACCUSED DOCTORS ON
SUBJECT PATIENT, AND THEY DECLARED/AFFIRMED THAT THEY WOULD FIRST PLACE
SUBJECT THE PATIENT UNDER OBSERVATION, AND WOULD NOT PERFORM IMMEDIATE
OPERATION;

VIII

WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DR. YNZON WAS ESTABLISHED WITH THE
REQUIRED QUANTUM OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE PATIENT WAS
SPECIFICALLY SUFFERING FROM AND DIED OF ACUTE APPENDICITIS; and

IX

WHETHER THE FAILURE TO CONDUCT THE SPECIFIC SURGICAL OPERATION KNOWN AS

APPENDECTOMY CONSTITUTED CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE.
In a nutshell, the petition brought before this Court raises the issue of whether or not petitioners'
conviction of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from analleged medical
malpractice, is supported by the evidence on record.

Worth noting is that the assigned errors are actually factual in nature, which as a general rule,
findings of factof the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusiveupon this Court,
and we will not normally disturb such factual findings unless the findings of the court are palpably
unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of
facts. Inthe instant case, we find the need to make certain exception.

AS TO DR. YNZON'S LIABILITY:

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precautionon the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act.  The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the
13

offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that
it bewithout malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there
is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place. 14

With respect to Dr. Ynzon, all the requisites of the offense have been clearly established by the
evidence on record. The court a quoand the appellate court were one in concluding that Dr. Ynzon
failed to observe the required standard of care expected from doctors.

In the instant case, it was sufficiently established that to prevent certain death, it was necessary to
perform surgery on JR immediately. Even the prosecution’s own expert witness, Dr. Antonio
Mateo,  testified during cross-examination that he would perform surgery on JR:
15

ATTY. CASTRO:

Q. Given these data soft non-tender abdomen, ambulatory, watery diarrhea, Exhibit C which is the
ultrasound result, with that laboratory would you operate the patient?

A Yes, I would do surgery.

Q And you should have done surgery with this particular case?"

A Yes, sir. 16

xxxx

COURT:

Q You stated a while ago doctor thatyou are going to [do] surgery to the patient, why doctor, if you
are notgoing to do surgery, what will happen?

A If this would be appendicitis, the usual progress would be that it would be ruptured and
generalized peritonitis and eventually septicemia, sir.

Q What do you mean by that doctor?

A That means that infection would spread throughout the body, sir.

Q If unchecked doctor, what will happen?

A It will result to death. 17

xxxx

Q And what would have you doneif you entertain other considerations from the time the patient was
admitted?

A From the time the patient was admitted until the report of the sonologist, I would have made a
decision by then.

Q And when to decide the surgery would it be a particular exact time, would it be the same for all
surgeons?

A If you are asking acute appendicitis, it would be about 24 hours because acute appendicitis is a
24-hour disease, sir.

Q. And would it be correct to say that it depends on the changes on the condition of the patient?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So, are you saying more than 24 hours when there are changes?

A. If there are changes in the patient pointing towards appendicitis then you have to decide right
there and then, sir.

Q. So if there are changes in the patient pointing to appendicitis?

A. It depends now on what you are trying to wait for in the observation period, sir.

Q. So precisely if the change is a condition which bring you in doubt that there is something else
other than appendicitis, would you extend over a period of 24 hours?

A. It depends on the emergent development, sir.

Q. That is the point, if you are the attending physician and there is a change not pointing to
appendicitis, would you extend over a period of 24 hours?

A. In 24 hours you have to decide, sir.

xxxx

Q. And that is based on the assessment of the attending physician?

A. Yes, sir. 18

Dr. Mateo further testified on cross-examination:

ATTY. CASTRO:

Q: So you will know yourself, as far as the record is concerned, because if you will agree with me,
you did not even touch the patient?

A. Yes, I based my opinion on what is put on record, sir. The records show that after the observation
period, the abdominal pain is still there plus there are already other signs and symptoms which are
not seen or noted.

Q. But insofar as you yourself not having touched the abdomen of the patient, would you give a
comment on that?

A. Yes, based on the record, after 24 hours of observation, the pain apparently was still there and
there was more vomiting and there was diarrhea. In my personal opinion, I think the condition of the
patient was deteriorating.

Q. Even though you have not touched the patient?

A. I based on what was on the record, sir. 19

From the foregoing, it is clear that if JR’s condition remained unchecked it would ultimately result in
his death, as what actually happened in the present case. Another expert witness for the defense,
Dr. Vivencio Villaflor, Jr. testified on direct examination that he would perform a personal and
thorough physical examination of the patient as frequent as every 4 to 6 hours, to wit:

ATTY. CASTRO:

Q. As an expert doctor, if you were faced with a history of abdominal pain with nausea, vomiting,
fever, anurecia (sic), elevated white blood cell count, physical examination of a positive psoas sign,
observation of the sonologist of abdominal tenderness and the ultrasound findings of the probability
of appendiceal (sic) pathology, what will you do if you have faced these problems, Doctor?

A. I will examine the patient thoroughly and it will depend on my physical examination and that
isprobably every 4 to 6 hours, sir. 20

On cross-examination, Dr. Villaflor affirmed:

Cross Exam. By Atty. Marteja:

Q. x x x However, there are corrections and admissions made at that time, your Honor, do I
understand thatT/C does not mean ruled out but rather to consider the matter?

A. Yes, now that I have seen the records of the patient, it says here, impression and T/C means to
consider the appendicitis.

Q. Isn't it that it is worth then to say that the initial working diagnosis on Rodolfo Palma, Jr.,
otherwise known as JR, to whom I shall now refer to as JR, the primary consideration then is acute
appendicitis, is that correct to say Doctor?

A. I think so, that is the impression.

Q. x x x Now if it is to be considered as the primary consideration in the initial working diagnosis, isn't
it a fact that it has tobe ruled out in order to consider it as not the disease of JR?

A. Yes. Sir.

Q. Isn't it a fact thatto rule out acute appendicitis as not the disease of JR, surgery or operation must
be done, isn't it Doctor?

A. You have to correlate all the findings.

Q. Is it yes or no, Doctor?

A. Yes.

Q. So, you are saying then that in order to rule out acute appendicitis there must be an operation,
that is right Doctor?

A. No, sir. If your diagnosis is toreally determine if it is an acute appendicitis, you have to operate. 21

xxxx

Q. Now Doctor, considering the infection, considering that there was a [symptom] that causes pain,
considering that JR likewise was feverish and that he was vomiting, does that not show a disease of
acute appendicitis Doctor?

A. Its possible.

Q. So that if that is possible, are we getting the impression then Doctor what you have earlier
mentioned that the only way to rule out the suspect which is acute appendicitis is by surgery, you
have said that earlier Doctor, I just want any confirmation of it?

A. Yes, sir. 22

Verily, whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the
treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of
courts to the expert opinions of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess
unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently
evaluating.  From the testimonies of the expert witnesses presented, it was irrefutably proven that
23

Dr. Ynzon failed to practice that degree of skill and care required in the treatment of his patient.

As correctly observed by the appellate court, Dr. Ynzon revealed want of reasonable skill and care in
attending to the needs of JR by neglecting to monitor effectively the developmentsand changes on
JR's condition during the observation period, and to act upon the situation after the 24-hour period
when his abdominal pain persisted and his condition worsened. Lamentable, Dr. Ynzon appeared to
have visited JRbriefly only during regular rounds in the mornings. He was not there during the crucial
times on June 16, 2000 when JR's condition started to deteriorate until JR's death. As the attending
surgeon, he should be primarily responsible in monitoring the condition of JR, as he is in the best
position considering his skills and experience to know if the patient's condition had deteriorated.
While the resident-doctors-onduty could likewise monitor the patient’scondition, he is the one directly
responsible for the patient as the attending surgeon. Indeed, it is reckless and gross negligence of
duty to relegate his personal responsibility to observe the condition of the patient. Again, acute
appendicitis was the working diagnosis, and with the emergence of graver symptoms after the 24-
hour observation, Dr. Ynzon ruled out surgery for no apparent reason. We, likewise, note that the
records are devoid of showing of any reasonable cause which would lead Dr. Ynzon tooverrule
appendectomy despite the initial diagnosis of appendicitis. Neitherwas there any showing that he
was entertaining another diagnosis nor he took appropriate steps towards another diagnosis.

Among the elements constitutive of reckless imprudence, what perhaps is most central to a finding
of guilt is the conclusive determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act without
malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution. It is that which supplies the criminal intent so
indispensable as tobring an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal
law. This is because a conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct is all that is
required from the standpoint of the frame of mind of the accused.  Quasioffenses penalize the
24

mental attitudeor condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, the lack of care or foresight,
the "imprudencia punible," unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act.  This is
25

precisely where this Court found Dr. Ynzon to be guilty of - his seemingly indifference to the
deteriorating condition of JR that he as a consequence, failed to exercise lack of precaution which
eventually led to JR's death.

To be sure, whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the
treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other
members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the
advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. In
accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed
by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill
in the treatment of his patients. He, therefore, has a duty to use at least the same level of care that
any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances.  Sadly, Dr. Ynzon did not display that degree of care and precaution demanded by
26

the circumstances.

AS TO DR. CABUGAO'S LIABILITY:

Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things — the fact of the crime, i.e.,
the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that
the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Based on the above disquisitions, however, the
prosecution failed to prove these two things. The Court is not convinced with moral certainty that Dr.
Cabugao isguilty of reckless imprudence as the elements thereof were not proven by the
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both the trial court and the appellate court bewail the failure to perform appendectomy on JR, or the
failure to determine the source of infection which caused the deterioration of JR's condition.
However, a review of the records fail to show that Dr. Cabugao is in any position to perform the
required appendectomy.

Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the fact that Dr. Cabugao is not a
surgeon,but a general practitioner specializing in family medicine;  thus, even if he wanted to, he
27

cannot do an operation, much less an appendectomy on JR. It is precisely for this reason why he
referred JR to Dr. Ynzon after he suspected appendicitis. Dr. Mateo, the prosecution’s expert
witness, emphasized the role of the surgeon during direct examination, to wit:

ATTY. MARTEJA:
Q. You had mentioned that under this circumstances and condition, you have mentioned that
surgery is the solution, would you have allowed then a 24 hour observation?

A. If there is a lingering doubt, inshort period of observation of 18-24 hours can be allowed provided
that there would be close monitoring of the patient, sir.

Q. Would you please tell us who would be doing the monitoring doctor?

A. The best person should be the first examiner, the best surgeon, sir.

Q. So that would you say that it is incumbent on the surgeon attending to the case to have been the
one to observe within the period of observation?

A. Yes, because he will be in the best position to observe the sudden changes in the condition of the
patient, sir.

Q. And how often would in your experience doctor, how often would the surgeon re-assist (sic) the
condition of the patient during the period of observation?

A. Most foreign authors would recommend every four (4) hours, some centers will recommend
hourly or every two hours but here in the Philippines, would recommend for 4 to 6 hours, sir. 28

Dr. Cabugao’s supervision does not cease upon his endorsement of his patient to the surgeon.
Here, Dr. Cabugao has shown to have exerted all efforts to monitor his patient and under these
circumstances he did not have any cause to doubt Dr. Ynzon’s competence and diligence. Expert
testimonies have been offered to prove the circumstances surrounding the case of JR and the need
to perform an operation. Defense witness, Dr. Villaflor, on cross examination testified, to wit:

Q. Isn't it a fact that torule out acute appendicitis as notthe disease of JR, surgery or operation
mustbe done, isn't it Doctor?

A. You have to [correlate] all the findings.

Q. Is it yes or no, Doctor?

A. Yes.

Q. So, you are saying then that in order to rule out acute appendicitis there must be an operation,
that is right Doctor?

A. No, sir. If your diagnosis is to really determine if it is an acute appendicitis, you have to operate. 29

xxxx

Q. Now Doctor, considering the infection, considering that there was a [symptom] that causes pain,
considering that JR likewise was feverish and that he was vomitting, does that not show a disease of
acute appendicitis Doctor?

A. It’s possible.
Q. So that if that is possible, are we getting the impression then Doctor what you have earlier
mentioned that the only way to rule out the suspect which is acute appendicitis is by surgery, you
have said that earlier Doctor, I just want any confirmation of it?

A. Yes, sir. 30

Neither do we find evidence that Dr. Cabugao has been negligent or lacked the necessary
precaution in his performance of his duty as a family doctor. On the contrary, a perusal ofthe medical
records would show that during the 24-hour monitoring on JR, it was Dr. Cabugao who frequently
made orders on the administration of antibiotics and pain relievers. There was also repetitive
instructions from Dr. Cabugao to refer JR to Dr. Ynzon as it appeared that he is suspecting
appendicitis. The referral of JR to Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon, is actually an exercise of precaution as he
knew that appendicitis is not within his scope of expertise. This clearly showed that he employed the
best of his knowledge and skill in attending to JR's condition, even after the referral of JR to Dr.
Ynzon. To be sure, the calculated assessment of Dr. Cabugao to refer JRto a surgeon who has
sufficient training and experience to handle JR’s case belies the finding that he displayed
inexcusable lack of precaution in handling his patient. 31

We likewise note that Dr. Cabugao was out of town when JR's condition began to deteriorate. Even
so, before he left, he made endorsement and notified the resident-doctor and nurses-on-duty that he
will be on leave.

Moreover, while both appeared to be the attending physicians of JR during his hospital confinement,
it cannot be said that the finding of guilt on Dr. Ynzon necessitates the same finding on the co-
accused Dr. Cabugao. Conspiracy is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of
culpa.  Thus, the accused-doctors to be found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, it
32

must be shown that both accused-doctors demonstratedan act executed without malice or criminal
intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence. Noteworthy, the evidence on record
clearly points to the reckless imprudence of Dr. Ynzon; however, the same cannot be said in Dr.
Cabugao's case.

AS TO CIVIL LIABILITY

While this case is pending appeal, counsel for petitioner Dr. Ynzon informed the Court that the latter
died on December 23, 2011 due to "multiorgan failure" as evidenced by a copy of death
certificate.  Thus, the effect of death, pending appeal of his conviction of petitioner Dr. Ynzon with
33

regard to his criminal and pecuniary liabilities should be in accordance to People v.

Bayotas,  wherein the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to final judgment:
34

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard,
"the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e.,civil liability
ex delictoin senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation fromwhich the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law
 b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x x x x x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either againstthe executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case, the statute of limitationson the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 35

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability. However, the recovery of civil liability subsists as the
same is not based on delictbut by contract and the reckless imprudence he was guilty of under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.  For this reason, a separate civil action may be enforced
1âwphi1

either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based,  and in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules
36

on Criminal Procedure, we quote:

Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. – The death of the accused after arraignment and during the
pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the
independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to
enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal
representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be.
The heirs of the accused may besubstituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of
an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially
provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.

If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil
action the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased. (Emphases ours)

In sum, upon the extinction of the criminal liability and the offended party desires to recover
damages from the same act or omission complained of, the party may file a separate civil action
based on the other sources of obligation in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111.  If the same act or
37

omission complained of arises from quasi-delict,as in this case, a separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator of the estate of the accused, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court: 38

Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. —
No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debtor interest thereon shall be commenced
against the executor or administrator; but to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein,
from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person
or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him. (Emphases ours)

Conversely, if the offended party desires to recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of arising from contract, the filing of a separate civil action must be filed against the
estate, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. — All claims
for money against the decent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expense for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decent, must be filed within the time limited in the
notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any
action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commencesan action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in
his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of
presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off
against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim
had been presented directly beforethe court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due,
or contingent, may be approved at their present value.

As a final note, we reiterate thatthe policy against double recovery requires that only one action be
maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is brought against the executor or
administrator, or the estate.  The heirs of JR must choose which of the available causes of action for
39

damages they will bring.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO is hereby

ACQUITTEDof the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.

Due to the death of accused Dr. Clenio Ynzon prior to the disposition of this case, his criminal
liability is extinguished; however, his civil liability subsists. A separate civil action may be filed either
against the executor/administrator, or the estateof Dr. Ynzon, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same are based.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 200030               April 18, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
NELSON BAYOT y SATINA, Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-
1 

H.C. No. 00269 affirming with modification the Decision dated 31 July 2000 of the Regional Trial
2 

Court (RTC) of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 61, in Criminal
Case No. 98-2025, finding herein appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, committed against AAA, thus, sentencing him to suffer the
3 

penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellate court increased the award of indemnity from
₱40,000.00 to ₱50,000.00. It also ordered appellant to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of
₱50,000.00.

Appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina was charged with Rape in an Information dated 29 December
4 

1997, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of September, 1997, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [appellant], by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the [AAA], 44 years old, against her will. 5

On arraignment, appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued
thereafter.

In its 31 July 2000 Decision, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rape and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of ₱40,000.00 as indemnity with
costs. In convicting appellant, the RTC ratiocinated that AAA’s testimony as regards her ordeal was
simple and straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-examination. There appeared to be no
inconsistency in her testimony. Further, AAA’s declaration that she was raped by appellant was
corroborated by a medical certificate showing contusion on her vagina at 6:00 o’clock quadrant of
the crevice, which was explained by Dr. Rodrigo Cubid to have been caused by forceful vaginal
intrusion. The RTC negates the "sweet heart" defense offered by appellant. It stated that appellant’s
claim of being AAA’s lover was a mere devise to extricate himself from the consequence of his
dastardly lust. AAA’s immediate response of reporting the rape incident carries the stamp of truth.
Moreover, if, indeed, there was such relationship between appellant and AAA, the latter would not
have pursued this case. It bears stressing that despite appellant’s repeated plea for the dismissal of
the case, AAA remained steadfast in seeking justice for the violation of her womanhood. 6

Aggrieved, appellant appealed the aforesaid RTC Decision to this Court by filing a Notice of Appeal
dated 6 September 2000. In light, however, of this Court’s pronouncement in People v. Mateo, the
7  8 

case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review per Resolution dated 4 October
9 

2004.

In a Decision dated 9 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction with the
modification increasing the award of indemnity from ₱40,000.00 to ₱50,000.00. It likewise awarded
moral damages in favor of AAA in the amount of ₱50,000.00. The Court of Appeals aptly observed
that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant committed the crime
of rape against AAA. It further held that other than the self-serving declaration of appellant that he
and AAA were sweethearts; no other evidence was ever presented to substantiate such claim. Even
the testimony of appellant’s daughter, who claimed that her father and AAA are maintaining an illicit
relationship, could not be given any considerable weight. Aside from the fact that appellant’s
daughter could not point to any other circumstance supporting her claim, except for one incident
when she allegedly saw her father and AAA holding hands during a dance at their barangay fiesta,
her testimony could not be stripped of bias and partiality considering that she is the daughter of
appellant. In the same way, her testimony that she saw her father and AAA in the act of sexual
intercourse deserves scant consideration as she was not present at the time of the commencement
of the said act. She could not, therefore, be in a position to state with certainty that there was no
struggle on the part of AAA. Hence, her testimony regarding such matter is a mere conclusion of
fact.
10

However, in a letter dated 29 May 2006, Dr. Juanito S. Leopando, Penal Superintendent IV of the
11 

New Bilibid Prison, informed the Court of Appeals that appellant died at the New Bilibid Prison
Hospital on 4 December 2004. Attached in his letter is the original copy of appellant’s Certificate of
Death. 12

Nonetheless, the Public Attorney’s Office still appealed, on behalf of appellant, the aforesaid Court of
Appeals Decision to this Court via a Notice of Appeal dated 31 May 2006, which was given due
13 

course by the Court of Appeals per Resolution dated 19 January 2007. The Court of Appeals also
14 

directed the Chief of the Judicial Records Division to forward the entire records of the case to this
Court.

Taking into consideration appellant’s death, this Court will now determine its effect to this present
appeal.

Appellant’s death on 4 December 2004, during the pendency of his appeal before the Court of
Appeals, extinguished not only his criminal liability for the crime of rape committed against AAA, but
also his civil liability solely arising from or based on said crime. 15

Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically provides the effect of death of the
accused on his criminal, as well as civil, liability. It reads thus:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; [Emphasis
supplied].

Applying the foregoing provision, this Court, in People v. Bayotas, which was cited in a catena of
16 

cases, had laid down the following guidelines:

17 

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard,
"the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of [the] accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of
the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x x x x x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with [the] provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. 18

From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The rationale, therefore, is
that the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. 19

Evidently, as this Court has pronounced in People v. Olaco and People v. Paniterce, it is already
20 

unnecessary to rule on appellant’s appeal. Appellant’s appeal was still pending and no final
judgment had been rendered against him at the time of his death. Thus, whether or not appellant
was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that appellant did
incur criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death,
following the provisions of Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and this Court’s ruling in People
v. Bayotas.

In the same breath, the appealed Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 – finding appellant guilty of the crime of rape, sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua, and ordering him to pay AAA ₱50,000.00 as indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
– had become ineffectual.
WHEREFORE, in view of the death of appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina, the Decision dated 9 May
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case
No. 98-2025 before the RTC of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, is DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 166836               September 4, 2013

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER,

vs.
SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S.
ABAD, JAMES G. BARBERS, STEPHEN N. SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M.
MARTIN, ORLANDO O. SAMSON, CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V.
AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential
subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to
deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to
suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 1 on the
ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the
resolution of the criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.

Antecedents

Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic corporation engaged in
the real estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF
Homes), then represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized
rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2 130
residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque, containing a total area of 44,345
square meters for the aggregate price of ₱106,248,000.00. The transactions were embodied in three
separate deeds of sale.3 The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were
fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a
total area of 15,565 square meters purchased under the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993
and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of ₱39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San
Miguel Properties.

On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land
purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation
receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network
Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC.4

BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on August 15, 2000, San Miguel
Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City (OCP Las
Piñas) charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation
of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957 (I.S. No. 00-2256). 5

At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB
(HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183),6 praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its
favor.
In their joint counter-affidavit submitted in I.S. No. 00-2256, 7 respondent directors and officers of BF
Homes refuted San Miguel Properties’ assertions by contending that: (a) San Miguel Properties’
claim was not legally demandable because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to sell the 130
lots in 1992 and 1993 due to his having been replaced as BF Homes’ rehabilitation receiver by the
SEC on May 17, 1989; (b) the deeds of sale conveying the lots were irregular for being undated and
unnotarized; (c) the claim should have been brought to the SEC because BF Homes was under
receivership; (d) in receivership cases, it was essential to suspend all claims against a distressed
corporation in order to enable the receiver to effectively exercise its powers free from judicial and
extra-judicial interference that could unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed company; and (e) the
lots involved were under custodia legis in view of the pending receivership proceedings, necessarily
stripping the OCP Las Piñas of the jurisdiction to proceed in the action.

On October 10, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las
Piñas,8 citing the pendency of BF Homes’ receivership case in the SEC. In its comment/opposition,
BF Homes opposed the motion to suspend. In the meantime, however, the SEC terminated BF
Homes’ receivership on September 12, 2000, prompting San Miguel Properties to file on October 27,
2000 a reply to BF Homes’ comment/opposition coupled with a motion to withdraw the sought
suspension of proceedings due to the intervening termination of the receivership. 9

On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Piñas rendered its resolution, 10 dismissing San Miguel
Properties’ criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no
action could be filed by or against a receiver without leave from the SEC that had appointed him;
that the implementation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained under
the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension
of the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first
determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no prior resort to administrative
jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents for
not being the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale.

On February 20, 2001, the OCP Las Piñas denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration
filed on November 28, 2000, holding that BF Homes’ directors and officers could not be held liable
for the non-delivery of the TCTs under Presidential Decree No. 957 without a definite ruling on the
legality of Atty. Orendain’s actions; and that the criminal liability would attach only after BF Homes
did not comply with a directive of the HLURB directing it to deliver the titles. 11

San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Piñas to the Department of Justice
(DOJ), but the DOJ Secretary denied the appeal on October 15, 2001, holding:

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the
City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. Established jurisprudence supports the position taken by the City
Prosecutor concerned.

There is no dispute that aside from the instant complaint for violation of PD 957, there is still pending
with the Housing and Land Use Resulatory Board (HLURB, for short) a complaint for specific
performance where the HLURB is called upon to inquire into, and rule on, the validity of the sales
transactions involving the lots in question and entered into by Atty. Orendain for and in behalf of BF
Homes.

As early as in the case of Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, the Supreme Court had
ruled that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and
practices under PD 957. This is reiterated in the subsequent cases of Union Bank of the Philippines
versus HLURB, G.R. [No.] 953364, June 29, 1992 and C.T. Torres Enterprises vs. Hilionada, 191
SCRA 286.

The said ruling simply means that unless and until the HLURB rules on the validity of the
transactions involving the lands in question with specific reference to the capacity of Atty. Orendain
to bind BF Homes in the said transactions, there is as yet no basis to charge criminally respondents
for non-delivery of the subject land titles. In other words, complainant cannot invoke the penal
provision of PD 957 until such time that the HLURB shall have ruled and decided on the validity of
the transactions involving the lots in question.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)

The DOJ eventually denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration. 13

Ruling of the CA

Undaunted, San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJ’s resolutions to the CA on certiorari and
mandamus (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008), contending that respondent DOJ Secretary had acted with
grave abuse in denying their appeal and in refusing to charge the directors and officers of BF Homes
with the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. San Miguel Properties submitted the issue of
whether or not HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183 presented a prejudicial question that called for
the suspension of the criminal action for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957.

In its assailed decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008, 14 the CA
dismissed San Miguel Properties’ petition, holding and ruling as follows:

From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on prejudicial question
generally applies to civil and criminal actions only.

However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by the respondents. In
this case, an issue in an administrative case was considered a prejudicial question to the resolution
of a civil case which, consequently, warranted the suspension of the latter until after termination of
the administrative proceedings.

Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme Court relaxed the application of the
rule on prejudicial question.

In Tamin vs. CA involving two (2) civil actions, the Highest Court similarly applied the rule on
prejudicial question when it directed petitioner therein to put up a bond for just compensation should
the demolition of private respondents’ building proved to be illegal as a result of a pending cadastral
suit in another tribunal.

City of Pasig vs. COMELEC is yet another exception where a civil action involving a boundary
dispute was considered a prejudicial question which must be resolved prior to an administrative
proceeding for the holding of a plebiscite on the affected areas.

In fact, in Vidad vs. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, it was ruled that in the interest of good order,
courts can suspend action in one case pending determination of another case closely interrelated or
interlinked with it.
It thus appears that public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion x x x when he
applied the rule on prejudicial question to the instant proceedings considering that the issue on the
validity of the sale transactions x x x by x x x Orendain in behalf of BF Homes, Inc., is closely
intertwined with the purported criminal culpability of private respondents, as officers/directors of BF
Homes, Inc., arising from their failure to deliver the titles of the parcels of land included in the
questioned conveyance.

All told, to sustain the petitioner’s theory that the result of the HLURB proceedings is not
determinative of the criminal liability of private respondents under PD 957 would be to espouse an
absurdity. If we were to assume that the HLURB finds BFHI under no obligation to delve the subject
titles, it would be highly irregular and contrary to the ends of justice to pursue a criminal case against
private respondents for the non-delivery of certificates of title which they are not under any legal
obligation to turn over in the first place. (Bold emphasis supplied)

On a final note, absent grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutorial arm of the
government as represented by herein public respondent, courts will not interfere with the discretion
of a public prosecutor in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before him. A public prosecutor,
by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal
justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been
established by the complaining party.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby
DENIED. The Resolutions dated 15 October 2001 and 12 July 2002 of the Department of Justice are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 15

The CA denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2005. 16

Issues

Aggrieved, San Miguel Properties is now on appeal, raising the following for consideration and
resolution, to wit:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS WHEN
IT DISMISSED PETITIONER’S CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS PETITION TO ORDER AND
DIRECT RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 25, PD. 957 IN THAT:

THE OBLIGATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE TITLES TO

20 FULLY-PAID LOTS IS MANDATED BY SECTION 25, PD 957. IN FACT, THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT HAD DULY CONFIRMED THE SAME PER ITS DECISION DATED 27 JANUARY 2005
IN O.P. CASE NO. 03-E-203, ENTITLED "SMPI V. BF HOMES, INC.".

A FORTIORI, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ FAILURE AND/OR REFUSAL TO DELIVER TO

PETITIONER THE SUBJECT TITLES CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL OFFENSE PER SECTIONS 25
AND 39, PD 957 FOR WHICH IT IS THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF RESPONDENT SECRETARY
TO INDICT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THEREFOR.

IN ANY EVENT, THE HLURB CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" TO THE
SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE SINCE THE FORMER INVOLVES AN ISSUE SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT FROM THE ISSUE INVOLVED IN THE LATTER. CONSEQUENTLY, THE HLURB CASE
HAS NO CORRELATION, TIE NOR LINKAGE TO THE PRESENT CRIMINAL CASE WHICH CAN
PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY THEREOF.

IN FACT, THE CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS EMANATE FROM THEIR

MALA PROHIBITA NON-DELIVERY OF THE TITLES TO TWENTY (20) FULLY-PAID PARCELS
OF LAND TO PETITIONER, AND NOT FROM THEIR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE HLURB’S
RULING IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE.

NONETHELESS, BY DECREEING THAT PETITIONER’S CRIMINAL COMPLAINT IS

PREMATURE, BOTH THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RESPONDENT SECRETARY HAD
IMPLIEDLY ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.17

It is relevant at this juncture to mention the outcome of the action for specific performance and
damages that San Miguel Properties instituted in the HLURB simultaneously with its filing of the
complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. On January 25, 2002, the HLURB Arbiter
ruled that the HLURB was inclined to suspend the proceedings until the SEC resolved the issue of
Atty. Orendain’s authority to enter into the transactions in BF Homes’ behalf, because the final
resolution by the SEC was a logical antecedent to the determination of the issue involved in the
complaint before the HLURB. Upon appeal, the HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board),
citing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, affirmed the HLURB Arbiter’s decision, holding that
although no prejudicial question could arise, strictly speaking, if one case was civil and the other
administrative, it nonetheless opted to suspend its action on the cases pending the final outcome of
the administrative proceeding in the interest of good order. 18

Not content with the outcome, San Miguel Properties appealed to the Office of the President (OP),
arguing that the HLURB erred in suspending the proceedings. On January 27, 2004, the OP
reversed the HLURB Board’s ruling, holding thusly:

The basic complaint in this case is one for specific performance under Section 25 of the Presidential
Decree (PD) 957 – "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective."

As early as August 1987, the Supreme Court already recognized the authority of the HLURB, as
successor agency of the National Housing Authority (NHA), to regulate, pursuant to PD 957, in
relation to PD 1344, the real estate trade, with exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases "involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligation filed by buyers of
subdivision lots … against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman," the HLURB, in the
exercise of its adjudicatory powers and functions, "must interpret and apply contracts, determine the
rights of the parties under these contracts and award[s] damages whenever appropriate."

Given its clear statutory mandate, the HLURB’s decision to await for some forum to decide – if ever
one is forthcoming – the issue on the authority of Orendain to dispose of subject lots before it
peremptorily resolves the basic complaint is unwarranted, the issues thereon having been joined and
the respective position papers and the evidence of the parties having been submitted. To us, it
behooved the HLURB to adjudicate, with the usual dispatch, the right and obligation of the parties in
line with its own appreciation of the obtaining facts and applicable law. To borrow from Mabubha
Textile Mills Corporation vs. Ongpin, it does not have to rely on the finding of others to discharge this
adjudicatory functions.19

After its motion for reconsideration was denied, BF Homes appealed to the CA (C.A.-G.R. SP No.
83631), raising as issues: (a) whether or not the HLURB had the jurisdiction to decide with finality
the question of Atty. Orendain’s authority to enter into the transaction with San Miguel Properties in
BF Homes’ behalf, and rule on the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract; and (b)
whether or not the HLURB properly suspended the proceedings until the SEC resolved with finality
the matter regarding such authority of Atty. Orendain.

The CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631, 20 decreeing that the HLURB, not the
SEC, had jurisdiction over San Miguel Properties’ complaint. It affirmed the OP’s decision and
ordered the remand of the case to the HLURB for further proceedings on the ground that the case
involved matters within the HLURB’s competence and expertise pursuant to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, viz:

[T]he High Court has consistently ruled that the NHA or the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints
arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at
compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.

Hence, the HLURB should take jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint because it pertains to
matters within the HLURB’s competence and expertise. The proceedings before the HLURB should
not be suspended.

While We sustain the Office of the President, the case must be remanded to the HLURB. This is in
recognition of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The fairest and most equitable course to take
under the circumstances is to remand the case to the HLURB for the proper presentation of
evidence.21

Did the Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the dismissal of San
Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 for lack of probable
cause and for reason of a prejudicial question?

The question boils down to whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery
of the TCTs could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation
of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.

Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

1.

Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a
prejudicial question BF Homes’ posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the
HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case for
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is
a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so
intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 22 The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. 23 The essential
elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.

The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San
Miguel Properties’ submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no
civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in
the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the
charge for the criminal violation of Section 2524 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply
because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted
elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original. 25

The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial

question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance
case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of Presidential
Decree No. 957, such that the resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the
question of guilt in the criminal case. An examination of the nature of the two cases involved is thus
necessary.

An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract in
the specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party
bound to fulfill it.26 Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there must first
be a breach of the contract.27 The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the
obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the
payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen
fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific performance or rescission with
damages. As presently worded, Article 1191 speaks of the remedy of rescission in reciprocal
obligations within the context of Article 1124 of the former Civil Code which used the term resolution.
The remedy of resolution applied only to reciprocal obligations, such that a party’s breach of the
contract equated to a tacit resolutory condition that entitled the injured party to rescission. The
present article, as in the former one, contemplates alternative remedies for the injured party who is
granted the option to pursue, as principal actions, either the rescission or the specific performance of
the obligation, with payment of damages in either case.28

On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots
and condominiums in view of the increasing number of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision
owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations
to provide and maintain properly" the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of
alarming magnitude of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous
subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, 29 such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or
titles free from liens and encumbrances. Presidential Decree No. 957 authorizes the suspension and
revocation of the registration and license of the real estate subdivision owners, developers,
operators, and/or sellers in certain instances, as well as provides the procedure to be observed in
such instances; it prescribes administrative fines and other penalties in case of violation of, or non-
compliance with its provisions.
Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine
whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20
TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were
criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously precede
that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery
of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale
due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need
to proceed with the criminal case.

Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the
allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party
who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential
elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the
Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have
rested its case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question
is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit. 30

2.

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable

That the action for specific performance was an administrative case pending in the HLURB, instead
of in a court of law, was of no consequence at all. As earlier mentioned, the action for specific
performance, although civil in nature, could be brought only in the HLURB. This situation conforms
to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. There has been of late a proliferation of administrative
agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor of these agencies that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to defeat the resort to the judicial adjudication of controversies
but to rely on the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of such agencies in their resolution.
The Court has observed that one thrust of the proliferation is that the interpretation of contracts and
the determination of private rights under contracts are no longer a uniquely judicial function
exercisable only by the regular courts.31

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the
special competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the same time within the
jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills,
and knowledge of some administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or
intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding
before a remedy will be supplied by the courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of
the courts. The application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but
only for its suspension until after the matters within the competence of the administrative body are
threshed out and determined.32

To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not determine a
controversy involving a question within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy
having been so placed within the special competence of the administrative tribunal under a
regulatory scheme. In that instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the
administrative body for its view on the matter in dispute. Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a
question that is within the legal competence of an administrative body prior to the resolution of that
question by the latter, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative agency to
ascertain technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with
the purposes of the regulatory statute administered, suspension or dismissal of the action is proper. 33

3.

Other submissions of petitioner are unwarranted

It is not tenable for San Miguel Properties to argue that the character of a violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 as malum prohibitum, by which criminal liability attached to BF Homes’
directors and officers by the mere failure to deliver the TCTs, already rendered the suspension
unsustainable.34 The mere fact that an act or omission was malum prohibitum did not do away with
the initiative inherent in every court to avoid an absurd result by means of rendering a reasonable
interpretation and application of the procedural law. Indeed, the procedural law must always be
given a reasonable construction to preclude absurdity in its application. 35 Hence, a literal application
of the principle governing prejudicial questions is to be eschewed if such application would produce
unjust and absurd results or unreasonable consequences.

San Miguel Properties further submits that respondents could not validly raise the prejudicial
question as a reason to suspend the criminal proceedings because respondents had not themselves
initiated either the action for specific performance or the criminal action.  It contends that the defense
1âwphi1

of a prejudicial question arising from the filing of a related case could only be raised by the party who
filed or initiated said related case.

The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no distinction as to who is
allowed to raise the defense. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law
makes no distinction, we ought not to distinguish. 36

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 73008; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 172060               September 13, 2010

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, promulgated
on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

The Antecedent Facts

The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for
frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-
130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC
Quezon City).

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria
Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since
the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of
Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC
Quezon City.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 20053 holding that the pendency of the case
before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal
case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the
injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of
petitioner’s marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground]
of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order, 5 the RTC Quezon City
denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August
2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals
ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced
the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the
other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals
ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would
be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts
constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals
ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the
commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against
petitioner.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Civil Case Must be Instituted

Before the Criminal Case

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure 6 provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In
this case, the Information7 for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC
Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC
Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005.
Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005. 8 Respondent’s
petition9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004.
Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question

in Criminal Case for Parricide

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as:

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined. 11

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide,12 which punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse." 13 The relationship between
the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder 14 or homicide.15 However,
the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal
case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative
of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue
in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have
killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioner’s will.16 At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil
Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time
of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent
is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, he was still married to respondent. 1avvphi1

We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals17 that "the judicial declaration
of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x." First,
the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no
issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that "[t]here is x x x a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences."18 In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the
State’s penal laws are concerned." 19

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal
Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.**

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
G.R. No. 145823. March 31, 2005

OSCAR MACCAY and ADELAIDA POTENCIANO, Petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES PRUDENCIO NOBELA and SERLINA NOBELA, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review1 seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 25 September 2000
and its Resolution dated 7 November 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 49822. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70 ("trial court"), dated 26 January 1995,
dismissing the case for Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents filed by petitioner Oscar
Maccay ("Maccay") against respondent spouses Prudencio Nobela ("Prudencio") and Serlina Nobela
("Serlina") in Criminal Case No. 85961.

Antecedent Facts

The facts, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, are as follows:

In the first week of May, 1990, Adelaida E. Potenciano went to the public market of Pasig, Metro
Manila, to look for a prospective buyer or mortgagee of a parcel of land belonging to Oscar Maccay.
She was introduced by a vendor, Lydia Reyes, to the spouses Prudencio and Serlina Nobela who
were engaged in lending money to market vendors on a daily basis.

Potenciano introduced herself as Angelita N. Barba, wife of Oscar Maccay, who desired to sell or
mortgage any of his two parcels of land, one in Guadalupe and one in Antipolo. She went to the
Nobelas’ at 145 Buayang Bato at Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. She brought with her many titles. She
became friendly with the spouses. Potenciano went on to brag about her connections, that she is
related to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos; and that the PCGG is after her so she has to
dispose of her properties.

After two (2) days, she called Oscar Maccay, who came. They comported themselves as husband
and wife. Maccay was in uniform. He is a police colonel who had jurisdiction over Mandaluyong,
according to Potenciano. The Nobelas were impressed. They were pleased when the couple
became very close to them. They confided their family problems. They even went to the office of
Maccay in Fort Bonifacio.

In this setting, the relationship flourished. Potenciano persuaded the spouses that they should be the
ones to buy the property because it will only cost ₱300,000.00. They would be able to make a profit
because the current price was ₱1,500.00 per square meter.
Potenciano used to call Maccay to join her in the Nobela residence. They partook of the hospitality of
the accused spouses almost two to three times a week. Potenciano was treated like a queen. She
was fanned and massaged. She was served her meals in the sala.

After pooling together their savings, the Nobelas decided to purchase the property. They advised
Maccay and Potenciano that they were ready to buy the property.

On May 17, 1990, Potenciano with Serlina went to Barba’s lawyer, Atty. Alfonso Jimenez, at Las
Piñas where she had the Deed of Sale (Exh. "1") prepared and notarized. She signed it there. They
were riding in the jeep of the Nobelas and passed by the office of Maccay ar (sic) Fort Bonifacio.
Potenciano went alone to his office and returned with him. They then proceeded to the house of both
accused at Buayang Bato, Mandaluyong. Serlina paid the ₱300,000.00 to the couple and in turn she
was given the Deed of Sale, TCT No. 473584, the tax declaration, the tax receipt and other
documents. When she offered to take them, they declined saying they were going home to their
Magallanes house.

Maccay and Potenciano continued to frequent the house of the accused spouses where they were
given VIP treatment. Potenciano slept, bathed and was allowed to use the phone for her
transactions and to drive the couple’s jeep.

xxx

On June 19, 1990, the taxes to the purchased property had to be paid. The title had not been
transferred to the names of the Nobelas. Serlina and Potenciano with the latter driving, rode the
Nobela jeep to Antipolo. On the way to town, the jeep broke down. The engine fell off. Potenciano
volunteered to go to Antipolo herself, pay the taxes and bring a mechanic to repair the jeep. The
taxes had been paid.

The good relationship continued until June 30, 1990, Prudencio Nobela suffered a stroke. He was
brought to the Polymedic Hospital. That same afternoon, Potenciano called and talked to
Prudencio’s doctor. She had Prudencio transferred to a suite and confided to Serlina that she is also
known as Adelaida Potenciano; that the owners of the hospital are her mother and father. Serlina
need not worry about the bill. Potenciano started sleeping in the hospital.

After one week, Prudencio was to be discharged, Potenciano went to the accounting department.
She tried to pay with her dollars and yens but the hospital would not accept. She asked Serlina to go
with her to a money changer at Kalentong to change the money to pesos but the foreign exchange
dealer refused saying the foreign currency was fake.

Serlina had to go back to the house to borrow from the son of her husband by his first marriage.
Maccay drove the sick man and two women home in the Nobela jeep.

At this time, the trust and confidence on the Maccay couple by the Nobelas was beginning to slip off.
The Polymedic Hospital incident was a letdown. It was then that Potenciano, who has boasted of
being not only wealthy but also influential, invited Serlina to engage in the buy and sell of appliances
which she claimed were brought by her nephew from Japan. To Serlina’s dismay, she was only
brought to a store in the pier where she had to pay for the appliances herself. She had receipts from
De Lara Merchandising (Exhs. "15" to "15-C") showing her payments. The last receipt is dated July
29, 1990. Serlina brought the appliances home. Naturally, when Potenciano saw Serlina selling the
appliances herself, her pretensions having been exposed, the relationship began to sour.
Before the last purchase of appliances, without the knowledge of the accused couple, Potenciano
executed an Affidavit of Loss (Exh. "3-B"). She related that when she went to Antipolo on June 19,
1990 in her stainless steel jeep, the jeep broke down. She got a mechanic and when she returned
the jeep was gone or carnapped.

In the meantime, Serlina was beginning to doubt Potenciano. She heard that Potenciano was trying
to sell their jeep. She inquired at the NBI and was told that Potenciano had a string of cases against
her.

On July 30, 1993, Potenciano went to the Eastern Police District Headquarters and executed an
affidavit-complaint (Exh. 4) against the accused spouses before P/Lt. Col. Nestor E. Cruz relating
that she was fooled by Prudencio and Serlina Nobela on July 14, 1990. She related how the
accused spouses cheated her by stealing TCT No. 473584 and her appliances. Her affidavit related
how she was prayed over and mesmerized by Serlina. She stated that ‘ginawa panloloko sa akin at
pagnanakaw ng Transfer Certificate of [T]itle’ (par. 12, p. 1, Exh. 4) and the TCT ho ay maaring
nawala noong pecha 25 ng Hunyo, 1990 natuklasan ko nawala ito noong 27 ng Hunyo, nang itong
nasabing TCT, ay aking ipa-seserox’ (par. 16, p. 1. Exh. 4).

xxx

In the meantime, Prudencio and Serlina, who had not been able to register the sale to them because
of the ailment of Prudencio asked a real estate agent, Anita de la Vega, to help them in the
registration of Deed of Sale (Exh. 1, Exh. B.). They knew de la Vega as she used to frequent a real
estate agent living in their place. When they were told that for the ₱300,000.00 consideration, they
would need around ₱20,000.00 to include capital gains taxes, she gave ₱21,000.00. The mother of
de la Vega was supposed to know many people in the Register of Deeds. The new title (Exh. "C")
was delivered on August 10, 1990 to Serlina. She had to give an additional "2,000.00 to de la Vega
for other expenses.

Prudencio and Serlina Nobela were surprised to receive an invitation from Col. Nestor E. Cruz (Exh.
"5") on August 17, 1990, to go to his office regarding the complaint of Potenciano for Estafa and
Theft.

When they went to Col. Cruz nothing happened but they were shocked to receive a subpoena from
the Fiscal’s Office. Maccay was not there and Prudencio was quite sick.

Serlina went to the Register of Deeds of Marikina to find out why they were accused and she was
astonished to discover (Exh. "6") as the Deed of Sale registered by de la Vega under the name of
Linda Cruz. She also found the payments of the capital gains tax as only ₱1,000.00 plus. Then she
realized the reason for the alleged falsification charge of Potenciano alias Angelita Barba and Oscar
Maccay. The deed of sale given to them (Exh. "1") for ₱300,000.00 which they paid the Maccays
was not the one registered but one which obviously was forged by de la Vega and her mother
Juanita Magcaling in order to make more money from the registration transaction. They filed a
complaint against de la Vega and Juanita Magcaling which is still pending in court at Judge Alfredo
Flores’ sala.2

Petitioner Maccay filed the criminal complaint against respondent spouses for Estafa through
Falsification of Public Document before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. The
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed the Information for Estafa with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig,
Branch 70, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85961.
After trial, the trial court found respondent spouses innocent and ordered petitioners to reimburse
respondent spouses ₱300,000 and to pay damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioners appealed the
civil aspect of the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied petitioners’ appeal and
affirmed the trial court’s Decision. The appellate court also denied petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

The Rulings of the Trial and Appellate Courts

The trial court acquitted respondent spouses and found that petitioners swindled respondent
spouses. The trial court declared that petitioner Maccay filed the Estafa charge against respondent
spouses to turn the tables on respondent spouses, the victims of the swindling. The trial court
ordered petitioners to pay respondent spouses ₱390,000 as damages, to wit:

In view of the foregoing, this court finds that the prosecution has not proven the Accused Prudencio
Nobela and Serlina Nobela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby acquits
them. The complainants Oscar Maccay and Adelaida E. Potenciano are hereby ordered to
reimburse Prudencio Nobela and Serlina Nobela the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱300,000.00) paid to them by the accused spouses in the sale of the litigated property. Further the
complainants Oscar Maccay and Adelaida Potenciano are hereby ordered to pay ₱50,000.00 to
Prudencio Nobela and Serlina Nobela as moral damages and ₱40,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.3

The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court reasoned that the award
of damages was justified because it was "in the nature of a counterclaim and as the very defense put
up by the accused [respondents] in the criminal proceedings x x x."4

The Issues

Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for resolution:

1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT MAY RULE ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF COMPLAINANT IN A
CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE CIVIL ACTION WAS NOT RESERVED OR FILED SEPARATELY;

2. WHETHER A WITNESS, WHO IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CASE, MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR
DAMAGES.

The third issue raised by the petitioners, assailing the appellate court’s affirmation of the trial court’s
factual findings, deserves no consideration. A Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of
law.5 Findings of fact are not reviewable, except in clearly meritorious instances. 6 This Court is not a
trier of facts.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

A court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the accused. The task of the trial
court is limited to determining the guilt of the accused and if proper, to determine his civil liability. A
criminal case is not the proper proceedings to determine the private complainant’s civil liability, if
any.

The trial court erred in ordering complainant petitioner Maccay and prosecution witness Potenciano,
as part of the judgment in the criminal case, to reimburse the ₱300,000 and pay damages to the
accused respondent spouses. This Court ruled in Cabaero v. Hon. Cantos7 that a court trying a
criminal case should limit itself to the criminal and civil liability of the accused, thus:

[Thus,] the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect and the possible civil liability of the
accused arising out of the crime. The counterclaim (and cross-claim or third-party complaint, if any)
should be set aside or refused cognizance without prejudice to their filing in separate proceedings at
the proper time.

The Court recently reiterated this ruling in Casupanan v. Laroya8 and Republic v. Court of

Appeals.9

The appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s award of damages by justifying it as a
counterclaim. Nothing in the records shows that respondent spouses filed or attempted to file a
counterclaim. The 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure prohibit counterclaims in criminal cases.
Section 1 of Rule 111 provides:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —

(a) x x x

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action.

This paragraph addresses the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero on the "absence of clear-cut rules
governing the prosecution of impliedly instituted civil action and the necessary consequences and
implications thereof." In the present case, the civil liability of petitioners for swindling respondent
spouses and for maliciously filing a baseless suit must be litigated in a separate proceeding.

The trial court also erred in holding prosecution witness petitioner Potenciano, together with
complainant petitioner Maccay, liable for damages to respondent spouses. A judgment cannot bind
persons who are not parties to the action. 10 A decision of a court cannot operate to divest the rights
of a person who is not a party to the case.11 The records clearly show that petitioner Potenciano is
not a party to this case. The Information filed by the prosecutor had only petitioner Maccay as its
complainant.12 The Verification attached to the Information had only petitioner Maccay signing as
complainant. Nothing in the records shows that petitioner Potenciano played a role other than being
a witness for the prosecution. To rule otherwise would violate petitioner Potenciano’s constitutional
right to due process.

Petitioners admit that title to the lot is now in the name of respondent spouses. Petitioners admit the
validity of the cancellation of TCT No. 473584 and the issuance of TCT No. 188289 in favor of
respondent spouses. Petitioners argue that since respondent spouses already acquired the lot in
exchange for ₱300,000, there is no basis for the order requiring petitioners to reimburse respondent
spouses the ₱300,000.13
However, petitioners also argue that respondent spouses acquired their title through fraud.
Petitioners must decide which version they want to advance. Petitioners cannot argue that the title of
respondent spouses is valid to avoid reimbursing respondent spouses, at the same time claim that
respondent spouses acquired their title through fraud to turn the tables on respondent spouses who
might sue petitioners for swindling. Petitioners’ inconsistent arguments reveal their dishonesty even
to the courts. Petitioners should not forget that the trial and appellate courts found that petitioners
perpetrated a vicious scam on respondent spouses who are clearly the hapless victims here.

Respondent spouses have suffered enough. Respondent Prudencio died while trying to defend their
property. Respondent Serlina is ailing and suffering from severe complications due to the strain of
litigation. While this Court is constrained to grant the instant petition due to the trial court’s
procedural error, we stress that the trial court adjudicated correctly the substantive matter of the
case. Petitioners unconscionably used their intelligence and position to swindle the respondent
spouses of their life savings, abusing their hospitality and kindness in the process. Petitioners have
the temerity to turn the tables on the poor couple by abusing the legal processes. This Court will not
allow the legal processes to serve as tool for swindlers. We promulgate this Decision without
prejudice to the filing by respondent Serlina of a claim for damages against petitioners.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig,
Branch 70 dated 26 January 1995 in Criminal Case No. 85961 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:

1. The order to reimburse the ₱300,000 to respondent spouses Prudencio and Serlina Nobela is
deleted;

2. The award of ₱50,000 as moral damages and the award of ₱40,000 as attorney’s fees are
likewise deleted.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 171644               November 23, 2011

DELIA D. ROMERO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ROMULO pADLAN and ARTURO SIAPNO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated March 25, 2006 of petitioner Delia D.
Romero assailing the Decision2 dated July 18, 2005 and Resolution3 dated February 13, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), affirming the Decision4 dated February 24, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 44, Dagupan City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Illegal Recruitment as defined in paragraph (a) of Article 38 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 2018.

The records contain the following antecedent facts:

Private respondent Romulo Padlan (Romulo) was a former classmate of petitioner in college.
Sometime in September 2000 Romulo went to petitioner's stall (wedding gown rentals) at W. A.
Jones St., Calasiao, Pangasinan to inquire about securing a job in Israel. Convinced by petitioner's
words of encouragement and inspired by the potential salary of US$700.00 to US$1,200.00 a month,
Romulo asked petitioner the amount of money required in order for him to be able to go to Israel.
Petitioner informed him that as soon as he could give her US$3,600.00, his papers would be
immediately processed. To raise the amount, Romulo secured a loan from a bank and borrowed
some more from his friends. When he was able to raise the amount, Romulo went back to petitioner
and handed her the money. Petitioner contacted Jonney Erez Mokra who instructed Romulo to
attend a briefing at his (Jonney's) house in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Romulo was able to leave
for Israel on October 26, 2000 and was able to secure a job with a monthly salary of US$650.00.
Unfortunately, after two and a half months, he was caught by Israel's immigration police and
detained for 25 days. He was subsequently deported because he did not possess a working visa. On
his return, Romulo demanded from petitioner the return of his money, but the latter refused and
failed to do so.

On the other hand, private respondent Arturo Siapno is petitioner's nephew. Sometime in August
2000, he went to petitioner's stall. He was convinced by the petitioner that if he could give her
US$3,600.00 for the processing of his papers, he could leave the country within 1 to 2 weeks for a
job placement in Israel. Arturo contacted a relative in the U.S. to ask the latter to cover the expenses
for the former's overseas job placement. The relative sent the US$3,000.00 to Teresita D. Visperas,
petitioner's sister in Israel. Petitioner processed Arturo's papers and contacted Jonney Erez Mokra.
Jonney instructed Arturo to attend a briefing in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Afterwards, Arturo left
for Israel sometime in September 2000. He was able to work and receive US$800.00 salary per
month. After three months of stay in Israel, he was caught by the immigration officials, incarcerated
for ten days and was eventually deported. After arriving in the country, Arturo immediately sought
the petitioner. Petitioner promised him that she would send him back to Israel, which did not happen.

Arturo, after learning that Romulo suffered the same fate, checked with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Dagupan District Office whether petitioner, Teresita D. Visperas and Jonney
Erez Mokra had any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment. Finding that
petitioner and the others were not authorized to recruit for overseas employment, Arturo and Romulo
filed a complaint against petitioner, Teresita and Jonney before the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI).

Consequently, an Information dated June 18, 2001 was filed against petitioner and Jonney Erez
Mokra for the crime of Illegal Recruitment which reads as follows:

That sometime in the month of August and September 2000 in the Municipality of Calasiao, Province
of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being licensee or holder of authority, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously undertake and perform
recruitment activity by recruiting ARTURO SIAPNO and ROMULO PADLAN to a supposed job
abroad particularly in Israel, for a fee, without first securing the necessary license and permit to do
the same.

CONTRARY to Art. 38 (a) of P.D. 442, as amended by P.D. 2018.

Upon arraignment on August 20, 2001, petitioner, with the assistance of her counsel pleaded not
guilty, whereas accused Jonney Erez Mokra was and is still at-large. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.

To establish the facts earlier mentioned, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Romulo
Padlan and Arturo Siapno. Petitioner, on the other hand, offered her own testimony, as well as
Satchi Co Pontace’s to prove that petitioner did not recruit the private respondents. According to
petitioner, private respondents went to her to inquire about the working status of her sister in Israel.
She told them that her sister was doing well. When private respondents asked her how her sister
was able to go to Israel, petitioner told them that she does not know and that she will have to ask her
sister about that matter. Petitioner then called her sister and told her that the private respondents
wanted to ask for her help in going to Israel. It was petitioner's sister and the private respondents
who communicated with each other, and the petitioner had no knowledge as to the content of the
former's conversations and agreements.

The RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of its decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Delia Romero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Illegal Recruitment as defined in paragraph (a) of Article 38 of Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 2018, and pursuant to law hereby sentences accused Delia
Romero to suffer the penalty of Eight (8) Years and a fine of ₱100,000.00 plus costs.

Accused Delia Romero is directed to return the amount of $3,600.00 or its equivalent to complainant
Romulo Padlan and the amount of $3,600.00 or its equivalent to Arturo Siapno.
The case as against Jonney Mokra aka Erez, is hereby ordered archived subject to reinstatement
upon his arrest.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC, the fallo of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present petition after petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA.
Petitioner enumerates the following assignment of errors:

First Assignment of Error

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of the accused of the offense charged
(Illegal Recruitment) for said finding is contrary to law and evidence in record.

Second Assignment of Error

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of the accused in interpreting the
gesture of good faith of the petitioner as referral in the guise of illegal recruitment.

Third Assignment of Error

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of the accused based merely on a
certification from the DOLE-Dagupan District Office without said certification being properly
identified and testified thereto.

Fourth Assignment of Error

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of accused based on speculations and
probabilities and not on the evidence on record.

Fifth Assignment of Error

The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Illegal recruitment is defined in Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended, as follows:

ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. - (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of
authority, shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The [Department] of
Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.

(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a
group.

Article 13 (b) of the same Code defines, "recruitment and placement" as: "any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee,
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."

The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely: (1) the offender
has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment
and placement" defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34
of the Labor Code.5

In disputing the absence of the first element, petitioner offers her opinion that the CA erred in
affirming the trial court's reliance on a mere certification from the DOLE Dagupan District Office that
she does not have the necessary licence to recruit workers for abroad. She claims that the
prosecution committed a procedural lapse in not procuring a certification from the agency primarily
involved, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). The said argument, however,
is flawed.

Under the first element, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority is any person, corporation or entity
which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the
Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the
POEA or the Secretary.6 Clearly, the creation of the POEA did not divest the Secretary of Labor of
his/her jurisdiction over recruitment and placement of activities. The governing rule is still Article
357 of the Labor Code. This is further discussed in this Court's ruling in Trans Action Overseas Corp.
v. Secretary of Labor,8 wherein it was ruled that:

In the case of Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, we held that:

The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for violations of
the above-quoted provisions, among others. And the Secretary of Labor has the power under
Section 35 of the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not
only to "restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies," but also to
"promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions"
governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor
gave the POEA, on its own initiative or upon a filing of a complaint or report or upon request for
investigation by any aggrieved person, "xxx (authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the
suspension or cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity" for certain enumerated
offenses including -

1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or

services, or any fee or bond in excess of what is prescribed by the Administration, and

2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules
and regulations.
The Administrator was also given the power to "order the dismissal of the case or the suspension of
the license or authority of the respondent agency or contractor or recommend to the Minister the
cancellation thereof."

This power conferred upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment was echoed in People v. Diaz,
viz.:

A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity which has not
been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of
Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the
Secretary.9

Thus, the trial court did not err in considering the certification from the DOLE-Dagupan District Office
stating that petitioner has not been issued any license by the POEA nor is a holder of an authority to
engage in recruitment and placement activities. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its
Comment10 dated October 9, 2006, also gives a valid observation as to the admissibility of the
certification as evidence for the prosecution, thus:

x x x Notably, there is nothing on record to show that petitioner objected to the admissibility of the
certification for the purpose for which it was offered. Thus, petitioner's argument that the certification
was inadmissible because it was not properly identified by the issuing officer should be rejected. It is
well-settled that "[e]very objections to the admissibility of evidence shall be made at the time such
evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the ground for objection shall have become apparent,
otherwise the objection shall be considered waived." Accordingly, the certification has been
accepted as admissible by the trial court and properly considered as evidence for the party who
submitted it.11

Anent the second element, petitioner insists that the CA was wrong in affirming the factual findings
of the trial court. According to her, the accommodation extended by the petitioner to the private
respondents is far from the referral as contemplated in Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code.

It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses'
credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by the Supreme Court, particularly when the CA
affirmed such findings.12 After all, the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and
weight of the testimonies of witnesses.13

Nevertheless, the testimonies of the private respondents clearly establish the fact that petitioner's
conduct falls within the term recruitment as defined by law. As testified by Romulo Padlan, petitioner
convinced him and Arturo Siapno to give her US$3,600.00 for the processing of their papers, thus:

Q: In September 2000, did you see the accused?

A: There was, sir.

Q: Where did you see each other?

A: At her stall, sir.

xxxx

Q: What was your purpose in going to her stall?

A: My purpose is to inquire about my application to Israel, sir.

Q: What happened when you inquired from her about your application in going to Israel?

A: I inquired from her and she responded with me with sweet words, sir.

Q: What did you ask her when you first met her in her stall [in] September 2000?

A: I asked her about the possible placement and the condition about the job in Israel.

Q: And what was her response?

A: Her response was positive and very encouraging, sir.

Q: What was the very good and very encouraging response of the accused?

A: Regarding the salary amounting to $700.00 to $1,000.00 dollars a month, sir.

Q: When you were informed that the salary is quite good in Israel, what did you do, if any?

A: I planned to produce money so that I can apply for Israel, sir.

Q: And what transpired next after that?

A: She told me that, "If you can produce $3,600.00 dollars then I will begin to process your
papers.

Q: After telling you that, what did you do, if any?

A: So I planned to have a loan [from] Rural Bank of Central Pangasinan and borrow some
money [from] my other friends, sir.

xxxx

Q: After producing that money, what did you do?

xxxx

A: I [went] to her stall [in] September 26 around 10:00 P.M. and handed the money to Mrs.
Delia Romero, sir.

xxxx

Q: How much money did you give to the accused [in] September 2000?

A: [In] September 2000, I gave her $1,500.00 US dollars, sir.14

Arturo Siapno also testified as to how petitioner convinced him to apply for a job in Israel and
offered her services for a fee, thus:
 Q: [I]n August 2000, where were you?

A: I was residing in Puelay-Carangalaan. Dagupan City.

Q: On the same month, did you have any transaction with the accused?

A: Yes sir[.] I met the accused at the appliance store which is located at Puelay and she
offered me a job in Israel.

Q: [When] she offered you a job in Israel, what did you do?

A: I went to their stall which is located [in] Calasiao, and in the same place I also met several
applicants.

Q: When did you go to the stall of the accused?

A: The following day, sir.

xxxx

Q: And what did you do at the stall of the accused in Calasiao, Pangasinan?

A: When I went to the stall of the accused, since I saw other applicants, I was convinced to
apply and I called up my aunt and asked for help.

Q: Since you were at the stall of the accused in Calasiao, what transpired next?

A: When I talked to her, she told me if I have a money of ₱3,600.00 I could easily depart
within one (1) week or two (2) weeks.15

From the above testimonies, it is apparent that petitioner was able to convince the private
respondents to apply for work in Israel after parting with their money in exchange for the services
she would render. The said act of the petitioner, without a doubt, falls within the meaning of
recruitment and placement as defined in Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code.

As to petitioner's contention that the testimony of Arturo Siapno that the latter paid a certain amount
of money to the former must not be given any credence due to the absence of any receipt or any
other documentary evidence proving such, the same is without any merit. In People v. Alvarez,16 this
Court ruled that in illegal recruitment cases, the failure to present receipts for money that was paid in
connection with the recruitment process will not affect the strength of the evidence presented by the
prosecution as long as the payment can be proved through clear and convincing testimonies of
credible witnesses. It was discussed that:

In illegal recruitment, mere failure of the complainant to present written receipts for money paid for
acts constituting recruitment activities is not fatal to the prosecution, provided the payment can be
proved by clear and convincing testimonies of credible witnesses.

xxxx
x x x The Court has already ruled that the absence of receipts in a case for illegal recruitment is not
fatal, as long as the prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonial evidence that
accused-appellant has engaged in illegal recruitment. Such case is made, not by the issuance or the
signing of receipts for placement fees, but by engagement in recruitment activities without the
necessary license or authority.

In People v. Pabalan, the Court held that the absence of receipts for some of the amounts delivered
to the accused did not mean that the appellant did not accept or receive such payments. Neither in
the Statute of Frauds nor in the rules of evidence is the presentation of receipts required in order to
prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment
cases. Such proof may come from the testimonies of witnesses.17

With regard to the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, this Court finds it to be
inappropriate. The trial court imposed the penalty of eight (8) years imprisonment and a fine of
₱100,000.00 plus cost and ordered petitioner to return the amount of US$3,600.00 or its equivalent
to Romulo Padlan and the amount of US$3,600.00 or its equivalent to Arturo Siapno. Under Article
39 (c) of the Labor Code, which prescribes the penalty for illegal recruitment, any person who is
neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under the law and found violating any provision thereof or
its implementing rules and regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than four (4) years but not more than eight (8) years or a fine of not less
than ₱20,000.00 nor more than ₱100,000.00 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of
the court. Clearly, the trial court, by imposing a straight penalty, disregarded the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.18 In Argoncillo v. Court of Appeals,19 this Court ruled that the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory to both the Revised Penal Code and
the special laws, and in the same ruling, this Court summarized the application and non-application
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to wit:

x x x It is basic law that x x x the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory where
imprisonment exceeds one (1) year, except only in the following cases:

a. Offenses punished by death or life imprisonment.

b. Those convicted of treason (Art. 114) conspiracy or proposal to commit treason (Art. 115).

c. Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion (Art. 134), sedition (Art. 139)
or espionage (Art. 117).

d. Those convicted of piracy (Art. 122).

e. Habitual delinquents (Art. 62, par. 5).

Recidivists are entitled to an Indeterminate sentence. (People v. Jaramilla, L-28547,

February 22, 1974) Offender is not disqualified to avail of the benefits of the law even if the
crime is committed while he is on parole. (People v. Calreon, CA 78 O. G. 6701, November
19, 1982).

f. Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded sentence.

g. Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of the same. (People v.
Corral, 74 Phil. 359).
 h. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one (1) year.

Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one (1) year, the accused cannot avail
himself of the benefits of the law, the application of which is based upon the penalty actually
imposed in accordance with law and not upon that which may be imposed in the discretion of
the court. (People v. Hidalgo, [CA] G.R. No. 00452-CR, January 22, 1962).

i. Those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.

The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to
prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic
usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending
upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of imposing an
indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by
special laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal
range of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory. 20 1âwphi1

The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that if, as in this case, the offense is punished by a law
other than the Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. The imposable penalty is
imprisonment of not less than four (4) years but not more than eight (8) years; hence, the proper
penalty imposed should be within the range of four (4) years to eight (8) years. Thus, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court can impose the minimum and maximum terms of the penalty
of imprisonment within the range of four (4) years to eight (8) years.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated March 25, 2006 of petitioner Delia D.
Romero is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated July 18, 2005 and Resolution dated
February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision dated February 24, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment as defined in paragraph (a) of Article 38 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 2018, are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed should be imprisonment of
four (4) years, as minimum, to seven (7) years, as maximum, and a fine of ₱100,000.00 plus cost
and for petitioner to return the amount of $3,600.00 or its equivalent to Romulo Padlan and the
amount of $3,600.00 or its equivalent to Arturo Siapno.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 166038             December 4, 2007

WILFREDO M. TRINIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN THRU THE OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V. MARCELO AND DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN VICTOR C. FERNANDEZ, ASIA’S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION, AND
THE SANDIGANBAYAN PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Challenged via petition for certiorari and prohibition are the Resolution of September 16, 2004 and
Order of November 9, 2004 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB L-C-03-0786-F 1 which found
probable cause to hale into court petitioner Wilfredo M. Trinidad, inter alia, for violation of Section
3(j) and Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act2 in connection with the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III Project (NAIA IPT III Project) of the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC).

The Office of the Ombudsman in fact filed two Informations against petitioner with the
Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 28089 and 28093.

In Criminal Case No. 28089, petitioner, as DOTC Assistant Secretary and member of the DOTC Pre-
qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee for the NAIA IPT III Project (PBAC), was charged with
knowingly pre-qualifying Paircargo Consortium3 (later incorporated into Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. or PIATCO) on September 24, 1996 despite its failure to meet the financial
capability standards set by law.

In Criminal Case No. 28093, petitioner, as DOTC Secretary in an officer-in-charge capacity, was
charged with having granted PIATCO undue benefit and advantage through the execution of the
June 22, 2001 Third Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement 4 covering
the NAIA IPT III Project.

In compliance with this Court’s Resolution of December 14, 2004, private respondent Asia’s
Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC), and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of
public respondents, respectively filed on February 24, 2005 and April 20, 2005 their comments 5 on
the petition, to which petitioner filed a reply.6

During the pendency of the petition, the Sandiganbayan found no probable cause to proceed with
the trial in, and thus dismissed Criminal Case No. 28093 by Resolution of September 7, 2006, and
denied the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration by Resolution of February 28, 2007. 7 The
petition insofar as it concerns Criminal Case No. 28093 is thus effectively mooted, the issues raised
therein having ceased to present a justiciable controversy such that a determination thereof would
be of no practical use and value.

What is thus left for resolution is only that part of the petition affecting Criminal Case No. 28089
which this Court finds to be bereft of merit.

In Criminal Case No. 28089, petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(j) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act which punishes the act of "[k]nowingly approving or granting any license,
permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such
license, permit, privilege or advantage x x x." In finding that probable cause lies against petitioner,
the Office of the Ombudsman discoursed:

xxxx

The benefit granted to PIATCO is its pre-qualification as bidder and the subsequent award,
in its favor, of the contract to build the NAIA IPT III.

Respondent PBAC Chairman Primitivo Cal, Vice-Chairman Francisco Atayde, and Member

Wilfredo Trinidad and Technical Committee Chairman Pantaleon Alvarez knowingly pre-
qualified PAIRCARGO despite its obvious failure to meet the financial capability standards
set by Paragraph c, Section 5.4 of the 1994 Implementing Rules of the BOT Law in relation
to PBAC Bulletin No. 3, as they relate to other applicable laws and rules.

Succinctly, Paragraph c, Section 5.4 of the Implementing Rules mandates that the project
proponent must have the financial capability to sustain the project which capability is
measured in terms of, among others, proof of the ability of the project proponent and/or the
consortium to provide a minimum amount of equity to the project. Pursuant thereto, PBAC
Bulletin No. 3 dated 16 August 1996 was issued, defining such minimum amount of equity as
thirty percent (30%) of the project cost, which percentage is consistent with the required
debt-to-equity ratio of 70:30 in Section 2.01 (a) of the Draft Concession Agreement.

Translated in figures, the project proponent must show to the satisfaction of the PBAC that it
had the ability to provide minimum equity for the project in the amount of at least Php
2,755,095,000.00.

In the PBAC Bulletin No. 5, Undersecretary Cal stated that the total financial capability of all
the members companies of the PAIRCARGO Consortium, to be established by submitting
the respective companies’ audited financial statements, would be acceptable.

Thus, in assessing the financial capability of the PAIRCARGO Consortium, and in declaring
such as pre-qualified, the PBAC used the entire net worth of companies comprising the
PAIRCARGO Consortium, including Security Bank. In so doing, the PBAC deliberately
closed its eyes on, and consciously disregarded, the provisions of the General Banking Act
 and the Manual of Regulations for Banks which set a limitation on the amount which certain
types of banks can invest in any one enterprise.

In particular, per [sic] Section 21-B of R.A. No. 337, otherwise known as The General
Banking Act and Section X 383 of the 1993 Manual of Regulations for Banks set a limitation
on the amount which certain types of banks may invest, that is, the equity investment in any
one enterprise whether allied or non-allied shall not exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the net
worth of the bank.

Thus, the Supreme Court in the Agan cases, noted that the total net worth of the
PAIRCARGO Consortium, after considering only the maximum amounts that may be validly
invested by each of its members, is only Php 558,3[84],871.55 of the project cost, or
only 6[.0]8% of the project cost which falls short of the Php 2,755,095,000-prescribed
minimum equity investment required for the NAIA IPT III Project.8

x x x x (Emphasis and Underscoring supplied)

The Office of the Ombudsman is vested with the sole power to investigate and prosecute, motu
proprio or on complaint of any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. 9 In
discharging its responsibility, it may request any government agency for assistance and information,
and examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents. 10

In the absence of grave abuse of discretion the Court has, generally adopted a policy of non-
interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers, not only
out of respect for these constitutionally mandated powers but also upon considerations of practicality
owing to the myriad functions of the courts.11 A review of the records of the case does not yield any
compelling reasons12 to deviate from this policy.

Petitioner’s arguments – that res judicata applies since the Office of the Ombudsman twice found no
sufficient basis to indict him in similar cases13 earlier filed against him, and that
the Agan cases14 cannot be a supervening event or evidence per se to warrant a reinvestigation on
the same set of facts and circumstances – do not lie.

Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal proceedings. 15

But even if petitioner’s argument were to be expanded to contemplate "res judicata in prison
grey"16 or the criminal law concept of double jeopardy, this Court still finds it inapplicable to bar the
reinvestigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. For the dismissal of a case during
preliminary investigation does not constitute double jeopardy, preliminary investigation not being part
of the trial.17

Insisting that the case should be barred by the prior Joint Resolution of the Ombudsman, petitioner
posits that repeated investigations are oppressive since he as respondent and other respondents
would be made to suffer interminable prosecution since resolutions dismissing complaints would
perpetually be subject to reopening at any time and by any party. Petitioner particularly points out
that no new evidence was presented at the reinvestigation.

Petitioner’s position fails to impress.

The Ombudsman is not precluded from ordering another review of a complaint, for he or she may
revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of a predecessor in office. 18 And Roxas v.
Hon. Vasquez19 teaches that new matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation,
which is simply a chance for the prosecutor, or in this case the Office of the Ombudsman, to review
and re-evaluate its findings and the evidence already submitted. 20

This Court, in MIAA-NAIA Association of Service Operators v. Ombudsman21 which is also an

offshoot of Agan, found the Office of the Ombudsman to have gravely abused its discretion when, by
the therein assailed resolution, it dismissed the therein petitioner’s complaint and effectively ruled
that the PIATCO contracts are valid, despite this Court’s ruling in Agan. The Ombudsman was thus
directed to conduct anew a preliminary investigation of the case.

That the discretionary power of the Ombudsman has been exercised in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, petitioner has not shown.

Reyes v. Court of Appeals22 cited by petitioner wherein this Court accorded finality to an erroneous
resolution of the Secretary of Justice is unavailing because it was therein emphasized that its
pronouncement applied only pro hac vice. In that case, the Court found the therein petitioner guilty of
laches to bar her from seeking relief. Estoppel does not, however, apply as against the People in
criminal prosecutions.

Violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, like attempted murder, is a public offense.
Social and public interests demand the punishment of the offender, hence, criminal actions for public
offenses can not be waived or condoned, much less barred by the rules of estoppel. 23

Petitioner contends, however, that AEDC is barred from filing a criminal complaint against him due to
the dismissal on April 30, 1999 by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 261 of Civil Case
No. 66213, a case filed by the AEDC for declaration of nullity of proceedings, mandamus, and
injunction which sought to disqualify the Paircargo Consortium and to award the NAIA IPT III Project
to AEDC. The case was dismissed upon the parties’ joint motion with a mutual quitclaim and
waiver.24

It is a firmly recognized rule, however, that criminal liability cannot be the subject of a
compromise.25 For a criminal case is committed against the People, and the offended party may not
waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for its commission. And that explains
why a compromise is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
extinction of criminal liability.26

Even a complaint for misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance against a public officer or employee
cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the complainant. This is because there is a need to maintain
the faith and confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and instrumentalities. 27

The ineluctable conclusion, therefore, is that the order dismissing the above-mentioned civil case
does not bar petitioner’s criminal prosecution.

Petitioner’s reliance on Republic v. Sandiganbayan28 is misplaced. In that case, the Court dismissed
the criminal case following the forging of a compromise agreement by the accused and the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) which gave the accused absolute immunity
from criminal and civil prosecutions. As correctly distinguished by the OSG, that case involved the
PCGG which, unlike AEDC, is a government agency expressly authorized by law to grant civil and
criminal immunity.29
As for petitioner’s objection to the admissibility of documents culled from various proceedings like
the legislative hearings before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the arbitration proceedings
before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Court of Arbitration in ICC Case
No. 12610/TE/MW, it is premature to raise the same.

First, there is no showing from the above-quoted pertinent portion of its assailed Resolution that the
Office of the Ombudsman relied on those documents in support of its findings. At the preliminary
investigation, determination of probable cause merely entails weighing of facts and circumstances,
relying on the calculus of common sense, without resorting to the calibrations of technical rules of
evidence.30 It is not the proper forum to determine the alleged breach by the OSG of the rule on
confidentiality of arbitration proceedings as provided under the ICC Internal Rules and Republic Act
No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004).

As for the issue of prejudicial question, the Court finds nothing that warrants the suspension of the
criminal action.

The essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 31 A prejudicial
question arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent to the issue involved in said
case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. 32 In other words, the jurisdiction to try
and resolve the prejudicial question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. 33

As reflected in the elements of a prejudicial question, the concept involves a civil and a criminal
case.34 There is here no prejudicial question to speak of for, technically, no civil case pends.

Petitioner cites, however, Quiambao v. Osorio.35 In that case, this Court held that the more prudent
course for the trial court to have taken was to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after
a determination was made by the Land Authority in an administrative case pending before it which
involved the same parties and the same parcel of land. The suggested move was based on the
following rule:

The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon
proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome
of another pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the
same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes
[sic] on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined
until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second action should be
stayed.36 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Although the rule is properly applicable to instances involving two court actions, the peculiar
circumstances in Quiambao warranted the application of the rule by analogy.37 The principle was
reiterated in Abacan, Jr. v. Northwestern University, Inc. 38 where the Court held that the presence or
absence of liability for allowing the withdrawal of money from the university’s bank account is reliant
on the findings of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as to which of the two factions is
the de jure board of directors.

In sum, while there have been instances where suspension of proceedings was effectively obtained
in pending cases which technically were not criminal and civil in nature, such action was based on
the court’s discretionary power to stay proceedings. A judicial order issued pursuant to the court’s
discretionary authority is not subject to reversal on review unless it constitutes grave abuse of
discretion,39 a trace of which is wanting herein.

The Ombudsman thus correctly found no justification to stay the proceedings.

Even if the Court takes cognizance of the criminal case subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan,
application by analogy may not be made. Unlike in Quiambao and Abacan, the arbitration tribunal is
not an administrative agency that could assume primary jurisdiction over matters within a particular
sphere of competence,40 particularly over any issue the resolution of which is determinative juris et
de jure of the guilt or innocence of petitioner.

After examining the legal landscape thus far availing, the Court sees nothing incongruous except
that petitioner still refuses to see the light in Agan which removed that jaundiced legal interpretation
to which the eyes of the supposed scrutinizers were hitherto overly fixated. Agan has precisely
excised that legal cataract that blinded one too many. Now, the lingering question of whether those
afflicted with it is symptomatic of "probable cause" is within the province of the Ombudsman who, in
this case, issued the following prognosis to which the Court accords deference:

We do not kowtow to respondents’ defense that the matter of the financial capability of the
proponent involves a difficult question of law, and as such, an honest mistake in its
interpretation cannot be the basis of criminal indictment.

First, the provisions of the General Banking Act and the 1993 Manual of Regulations for the
Banks are clear, and in this case, where a bank (Security Bank) is involved, there is no
reason why the limitation set by said laws should not apply. Further, it is plain common
sense that only the maximum amount which the Consortium or any of its component
companies can legally invest which should be considered in assessing the project
proponent’s financial capability. It would be ludicrous to include that which the proponent
cannot legally invest, since factoring in the same definitely presents a distorted picture, and
leads to an erroneous assessment, of the proponent’s ability to sustain the project, the very
issue which the process of pre-qualification seeks to address. So elementary is this principle
that it is incredible for the PBAC members to be unaware of such.41

Finally, petitioner’s argument that he was deprived of due process does not lie too. The records
show that the amplest opportunity was afforded him to controvert the prima facie finding against him
and to move for a reconsideration thereof.42

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on official leave.
G.R. No. 140777. April 8, 2005

ANTONIO ABACAN, JR., RUFO C. VENUS, JR., ENRIQUETO I. MAGPANTAY and MARIETA Y.
PALANCA, Petitioners,
vs.
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the annulment of the Court of Appeals (CA’s)
Decision dated July 22, 1999 and the Resolution dated November 12, 1999, denying the motion for
1  2 

reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

Two opposing factions within respondent Northwestern University, Inc. (NUI), the "Castro" and the
"Nicolas" factions, seek control as the legitimate board thereof. These two factions are parties to
3 

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Case No. 12-96-5469 which is an action filed by the
4 

"Nicolas faction" to nullify the election of the directors of NUI belonging to the "Castro faction" and
SEC Case No. 12-96-5511 which is a counter-suit initiated by the "Castro faction" seeking the
5 

nullification of several board resolutions passed by the "Nicolas faction." On December 19, 1996,
6 

SEC Hearing Officer Rolando G. Andaya, Jr., pursuant to SEC Case No. 12-96-5511, issued an
Order authorizing the "Castro faction" and the Metropolitan Bank (Metrobank) Laoag City branch to
withdraw the amount of ₱2,555,274.99 from the account of NUI with said bank. Metrobank complied
7 

and released ₱1.4 M in favor of the "Castro faction." The "Nicolas faction" then initiated a criminal
8 

complaint for estafa against the "Castro faction" as well as the petitioners herein who are officers of
Metrobank, to wit: Antonio Abacan, Jr., President; Rufo C. Venus, Jr. and Enriqueto I. Magpantay,
legal officers; and Marieta Y. Palanca, assistant branch manager of its Laoag City branch. The
criminal case was later dismissed insofar as petitioners are concerned. 9
On July 16, 1997, NUI, through Roy A. Nicolas of the "Nicolas faction," filed a complaint, docketed
as Civil Case No. 11296-14, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag, for damages with
application for attachment against petitioners together with the employees of NUI belonging to the
"Castro faction," namely: Jose G. Castro, Ernesto B. Asuncion, Gervacio A. Velasco, Mariel S.
Hernando and Virginio C. Rasos as well as their counsel, Edgar S. Asuncion, and SEC Hearing
Officer Rolando G. Andaya, Jr. NUI claims that between December 16 and December 20, 1996,
defendants from the "Castro faction," acting together, and helping one another, with herein
petitioners taking undue and unlawful advantage of their respective positions in Metrobank, withdrew
and released to themselves, for their own personal gain and benefit, corporate funds of NUI
deposited with said bank in the sum of ₱1.4 M without the knowledge, consent or approval of NUI to
the grave and serious damage and prejudice of the latter. NUI also claims that defendants have not
accounted for the said amount despite several demands for them to do so. 10

On September 15, 1997, defendant, herein petitioner, Marieta Y. Palanca filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that: (1) the complaint fails to state a cause of action against her since she is not a real party
in interest; (2) plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; and (3) the complaint is dismissible under
Section 5, Rule 7 of the New Rules of Civil Procedure on the certification against forum
shopping. She likewise pointed out that SEC Case No. 12-96-5469 must take precedence over the
11 

civil case since it is a logical antecedent to the issue of standing in said case. 12

On April 28, 1998, the RTC issued an Order, denying Palanca’s motion and ordering her and her co-
defendants to file their respective answers. Pertinent portions of the Order read as follows:
13 

At first impression, the controversy commenced by the complaint appears to be one involving an
intra-corporate dispute. A closer scrutiny of the allegations in the complaint, however, shows
otherwise. Considering the doctrine that a motion to dismiss hypothetically admits the allegations in
the complaint, what is admitted is that the action is one for a sum of money. The Court examined
Exhibit "C" of movant and found out that it refers to a case in the Securities and Exchange
Commission docketed as Sec. Case No. 12-96-5511 where the petitioners in said SEC case (some
are defendants in the instant case) were "authorized to withdraw from Metrobank (Laoag City
Branch) the amount of ₱2,555,274.99 from the Bank account of Northwestern University, Inc. . . ."
On the other hand, the herein complaint avers that plaintiff Northwestern University, Inc. seeks
recovery of the amount of ₱1,600,000.00 allegedly withdrawn by the herein defendants during the
14 

period from December 16 to December 20, 1996 from the corporate funds of plaintiff deposited with
Metrobank Laoag City Branch under Current Account No. 7-140-525096 and Savings Account No.
3-140-52509. The SEC Order (Exhibit "C") was issued December 19, 1996. There is, therefore, an
inference that the withdrawal referred to in the complaint as having been effected between
December 16 to 20, 1996, could possibly be the withdrawal in consequence of the SEC Order of
December 19, 1996. However, the inference remains as such and cannot ripen to a legal conclusion
because the evidence on hand does not sufficiently preponderate to warrant such a conclusion. In
the first place, there is no evidence adduced that the purported withdrawal, if ever made, was drawn
against the current/savings accounts mentioned in the complaint. In the second place, the amount
authorized to be withdrawn was ₱2,555,274.99 while the amount sought to be recovered is
₱1,600,000.00. The Court cannot rely on inference or speculation to cogently resolve a matter.
15 

While it appears that movants are invoking the issue of forum-shopping, they cannot overcome the
issues raised in the complaint, which as earlier stated, have been hypothetically admitted, and which
issues have to be joined by the filing of the answer by the defendants. The Court notes that in the
instant case, plaintiff is a corporation and is not a respondent in SEC Case No. 12-96-5511.
Moreover, the issues raised therein and in the instant case are entirely different. There is also no
showing that there is legal basis to pierce the veil of corporate fiction. In the other case (SEC Case
No. 12-96-5469), while it appears that Northwestern University, Inc. is one of the plaintiffs therein,
the complaint refers to a declaration of nullity of the special stockholders meeting of 3 October 1996
of the election of directors and of the October 3, 1996 amended by-laws, and is essentially an action
for damages. The complaint in this case, for a sum of money, is also far removed from the nature of
the action in the said SEC Case. Thus, it is clear that there are genuine issues to be tried in this
case, which calls for a trial on the merits. The motion to dismiss must, perforce, be denied.
(Emphasis supplied)

...

As above shown, the alleged fraud is stated in generalities. In this jurisdiction, fraud is never
presumed (Benitez vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 41).

Instead of filing their answers or a motion for reconsideration of the said Order, herein petitioners
Abacan, Magpantay, Venus and Palanca went to the CA on a petition for certiorari and prohibition
raising the same issues. 16

On July 22, 1999, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision which dismissed the petition
explaining thus:

A careful review and consideration of the records of the case, reveal that petitioner failed to comply
with a condition sine qua non for the filing of the Petition, which is to file a motion for reconsideration.
In Tan vs. CA, 275 SCRA 568 the Supreme Court specifically ruled that: The special civil action
of certiorari will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to
allow it an opportunity to correct its errors.

In filing this instant petition before Us, petitioners in its petition, while admitting failure to file a Motion
for Reconsideration, justified the same, when it alleged thus:

13.01 Under the circumstances, the filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with. All
issues are essentially legal and have been squarely raised and passed upon by the lower court.
[Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. vs. Palmos, 232 SCRA 448.]

Regrettably, however, the case relied upon by petitioner, a 1994 decision, is the exception to the
rule, and not applicable to the case at Bench. In the said case the Supreme Court said and We
quote "a prior Motion for Reconsideration is not indispensable for commencement
of certiorari proceedings if the errors sought to be corrected in said proceedings had been duly
heard and passed upon or were similar to the issue/s resolved by the tribunal or agency below."
(underlining for emphasis) A reading of the Order of public respondent clearly shows that no hearing
on the issues was had. The penultimate paragraph of the Order of public respondent judge states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby denies:

1. The motion to dismiss;

2. The application for a writ of preliminary attachment; and

3. The appointment of a special sheriff.

Defendant Jose G. Castro is hereby given eleven (11) days from receipt of a copy of this denial
within which to file his answer; defendant Marietta [sic] Young Palanca and the other defendants
who have not filed their answer are given five (5) days from receipt of the Order to file their
respective answers.
SO ORDERED.

As it was, the only thing resolved by the court a quo was in relation to the motion to dismiss the
application for a writ of preliminary attachment and the appointment of a special sheriff. Petitioner
has not filed any answer which would outline the issues that he would want the court a quo to
resolve.

Under such situation, therefore, since no proceedings were done to hear and pass upon the issues
to be raised by petitioner, then the general rule that a motion for reconsideration must first be filed
before a petition under Sec. 1 of Rule 65 must be applied. Having failed to do so, petitioners’ petition
must be, as it is hereby DENIED. 17

A motion for reconsideration was thereafter filed by petitioners but was denied by the CA on
November 12, 1999. 18

Hence the present petition.

Petitioners argue that: (1) following the case of Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. vs. Palmos, prior 19 

resort to a motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari or prohibition is not a
mandatory rule and may be dispensed with in this case since the issues involved herein are purely
legal and have already been passed upon; (2) it is contrary to the policy against judicial delay and
multiplicity of suits for a higher court to remand the case to the trial court when the former is in a
position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it; (3) the impleaded bank officers are not
real parties-in-interest since they are not privy to the contract of deposit between NUI and
Metrobank, and they merely complied with the SEC Order authorizing the release of funds from the
account of NUI with Metrobank; (4) the "Nicolas faction" has no legal capacity to sue in behalf of NUI
not being the de jure board of trustees; and (5) intra-corporate case No. 12-96-5469, lodged before
the SEC, must take precedence over the damage suit pending before the trial court. 20

Petitioners then prayed for the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 11296-14 against them,
or in the alternative, to hold in abeyance the proceedings therein until after the final determination of
SEC Case No. 12-96-5469. 21

NUI in its Comment contends that: the Klaveness case does not apply in the case at bar since the
issues raised herein are dependent upon facts the proof of which have neither been entered into the
records of the case nor admitted by the parties; petitioners cannot, on their bare and self-serving
representation that reconsideration is unnecessary, unilaterally disregard what the law requires and
deny the trial court its right to review its pronouncements before being hailed to a higher court to
account therefor; and contrary to petitioners’ assertion, no hearing for the presentation of evidence
was had before the trial court on the factual matters raised in petitioners’ motion to dismiss. 22

NUI further argues: it did not fail to state a cause of action; the complaint alleged that petitioners
acted in connivance with their co-defendants and as joint tortfeasors, are solidarily liable with their
principal for the wrongful act; as officers and employees of the bank, they are also considered
agents thereof who are liable for fraud and negligence; the complaint charged the perpetration of the
unlawful and unjust deprivation by the petitioners of NUI’s right to its property for which petitioners
may be held liable for damages making them real parties-in-interest; petitioners, as officers and
employees of Metrobank had an obligation to protect the funds of NUI and it was the petitioners’ act
of conniving to unlawfully withdraw NUI’s funds which violated NUI’s legal right, thus entitling the
latter to sue for such tortuous act; it is also not true that petitioners could not be held liable for
damages since they merely complied with the order of the SEC; as pointed out in the Order dated
April 28, 1998, the amount allegedly authorized to be withdrawn was ₱2,555,274.99 while the
amount sought to be recovered in the complaint was ₱1.6 M; it cannot be inferred conclusively
therefore that the amount subject of the complaint refers to the same amount authorized by the SEC
to be withdrawn; in any case, such argument is more a subject of defense rather than a proper
ground for a motion to dismiss. 23

NUI disagrees with the contention of petitioners that it has no legal capacity to sue, stating that NUI
had already conducted subsequent elections wherein Roy A. Nicolas was elected as member of the
board of directors and concurrently the administrator of NUI. 24

NUI further avers that: there is no merit to the claim of petitioners that there exists a prejudicial
question which should prompt the trial court to suspend its proceedings; the rule on prejudicial
question finds no application between the civil complaint below and the case before the SEC as the
rule presupposes the pendency of a civil action and a criminal action; and even
assuming arguendo that the issues pending before the SEC bear a similarity to the cause of action
below, the complaint of NUI can stand and proceed separately from the SEC case inasmuch as
there is no identity in the reliefs prayed for.
25

Evaluating the issues raised, it is clear that the only questions that need to be answered in order to
resolve the present petition are the following: (1) Whether the complaint states a cause of action; (2)
Whether a motion for reconsideration of the order of the RTC dismissing a motion to dismiss prior to
the filing of a petition for certiorari before the CA is dispensable; and (3) Whether the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 11296-14 must be held in abeyance pending resolution of SEC Case No. 12-96-5469.

First issue. Whether the complaint states a cause of action against petitioners. We rule in the
affirmative.

It is settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.
In resolving a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged
in the complaint must be considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on
the complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer asked for. Indeed, the elementary test for
26 

failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the
relief demanded. Only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, which should not
be alleged in the complaint in the first place, are considered for purposes of applying the test. 27

In this case the complaint alleges that:

...

10. Between December 16 and December 20, 1996, the defendants, acting together and helping
one another, with defendants Andaya, Abacan, Magpantay, Venus and Palanca taking undue and
unlawful advantage of their respective positions, withdrew and released to themselves, for their own
personal gain and benefit, the corporate funds of plaintiff deposited with Metrobank Laoag City
Branch under Current Account No. 7-140-525096 and Savings Account No. 3 140 52509 in the sum
of ₱1,400,000.00 without the knowledge, consent or approval of plaintiff to the grave and serious
damage and prejudice of the latter. 28

From this statement alone, it is clear that a cause of action is present in the complaint filed a quo.
NUI has specifically alleged an act, that is, the undue withdrawal of funds from its account with
Metrobank, which the petitioners and the other defendants committed, to the prejudice of NUI’s
rights.
Petitioners argue that as mere officers and employees of Metrobank, they are not privy to the
contract of deposit between their bank and NUI, thus they cannot be held liable for any erroneous
withdrawal made in NUI’s account with their bank. They also do not stand to be benefited or injured
by the judgment, i.e., they are not real parties-in-interest, thus the complaint a quo is dismissible on
the ground of failure to state a cause of action.

We are not persuaded.

As aptly explained by respondent NUI in its comment, petitioners are being sued and held liable for
their alleged participation in the wrongdoing of the other defendants. The complaint is not based on
the contract of deposit between Metrobank and NUI but on the alleged tortuous act of defendants of
wrongfully withdrawing NUI’s funds. As contracts are not the only sources of obligations, petitioners
cannot escape responsibility on the bare assertion that the have no contract with NUI.

Second issue. Whether a motion for reconsideration is dispensable in the case at bar. We rule in the
affirmative.

Indeed, it is settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of a
special civil action for certiorari. This is to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself. It is
29 

also the rule that since an order denying a motion to dismiss is only interlocutory, which is neither
appealable until final judgment nor could it generally be assailed on certiorari, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is to file an answer and interpose as defenses the objections raised in his motion to
dismiss.30

However, the following have been recognized as exceptions to the general rule:

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;

(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court;

(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable;

(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;

(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by
the trial court is improbable;

(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;

(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and

(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. (Emphasis
31 

supplied)

Circumstances (b) and (d) above are present in this case.

In Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. vs. Palmos, which is being invoked by petitioners, we held that:
32 

…A prior motion for reconsideration is not indispensable for commencement

of certiorari proceedings if the errors sought to be corrected in such proceedings had been duly
heard and passed upon, or were similar to the issues already resolved by the tribunal or agency
below. Accordingly, the Court has excused the non-filing of a motion for reconsideration when such
a motion would be basically pro forma in nature and content, and where, as in the present Petition,
the questions raised are essentially legal in nature. 33

We agree with the argument of petitioners that a motion for reconsideration of the order of the trial
court, prior to the filing of their petition for certiorari before the CA, was dispensable since the
questions involved are essentially legal in nature and the errors sought to be corrected had already
been heard and passed upon. One of the errors sought to be corrected is the ruling of the trial court
that there exists a cause of action against petitioners. This issue that was raised in the motion to
dismiss has been heard and passed upon by the trial court.

The other crucial issue that has been raised in the motion to dismiss and duly passed upon by the
trial court is the question whether the case before the trial court should be held in abeyance until
resolution of SEC Case No. 12-96-5469. Palanca pointed out in her motion that said SEC case,
which is an action to nullify the election of the directors of NUI belonging to the "Castro faction," must
take precedence over Civil Case No. 11296-14 before the trial court since it is determinative of
whether or not Roy Nicolas has the legal standing to file the suit in behalf of NUI. The trial court ruled
in the negative and held that the civil and the SEC cases can proceed independently of each other
since they involve different parties and issues. Thus, inasmuch as this issue has already been raised
and passed upon in the trial court, we agree with petitioners that motion for reconsideration in this
instance may be dispensed with.

Third issue. Whether the proceedings in Civil Case No. 11296-14 must be held in abeyance pending
resolution of SEC Case No. 12-96-5469. We rule in the affirmative.

Petitioners argue that SEC Case No. 12-96-5469, which is an action to nullify the election of the
directors of NUI belonging to the "Castro faction," is a necessary and logical antecedent of the issue
of whether the withdrawal of ₱1.4 M or ₱1.6 M, as the case may be, as well as the institution of this
suit for the recovery thereof was authorized by the NUI.

Technically, there would be no prejudicial question to speak of in this case, if we are to consider the
general rule that a prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. However, considering the rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question, being
34 

to avoid two conflicting decisions, prudence dictates that we apply the principle underlying the
35 

doctrine to the case at bar.

A prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial
36 

question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it
must be lodged in another court or tribunal. 37

In the present case, the question of which between the Castro and the Nicolas factions are the de
jure board of directors of NUI is lodged before the SEC. The complaint before the RTC of Laoag
meanwhile alleges that petitioners, together with their co-defendants, comprised of the "Castro
faction," wrongfully withdrew the amount of ₱1.4 M from the account of NUI with Metrobank.
Moreover, whether or not Roy Nicolas of the "Nicolas faction" is a duly elected member of the Board
of NUI and thus with capacity to institute the herein complaint in behalf of the NUI depends on the
findings of the SEC in the case pending before it. It would finally determine whether Castro, et al.
legally withdrew the subject amount from the bank and whether Nicolas lawfully initiated the
complaint in behalf of herein respondent NUI. It is petitioners’ claim, and we agree, that the presence
or absence of their liability for allowing the withdrawal of ₱1.4 M from the account of NUI with
Metrobank in favor of the "Castro faction" is reliant on the findings of the SEC as to which of the two
factions is the de jure board. Since the determination of the SEC as to which of the two factions is
the de jure board of NUI is crucial to the resolution of the case before the RTC, we find that the trial
court should suspend its proceedings until the SEC comes out with its findings.

We apply by analogy our pronouncement in Quiambao vs. Osorio, to wit: 38 

Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial court to have taken is to
hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the administrative case.
Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such move. To allow the parties to
undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner’s right of possession being upheld in the
pending administrative case is to needlessly require not only the parties but the court as well to
expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to be a sheer exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am
Jur 2d tells us:

The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper
application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another
pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is
power inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes on its dockets with economy of
time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action
cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second
action should be stayed.

While this rule is properly applicable to instances involving two [2] court actions, the existence in the
instant case of the same considerations of identities of parties and issues, economy of time and
effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as well as the need to resolve the parties’ right of
possession before the ejectment case may be properly determined, justifies the rule’s analogous
application to the case at bar.39

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 22, 1999 and
Resolution dated November 12, 1999 are SET ASIDE. The RTC of Laoag City, Branch 14, is hereby
DIRECTED to suspend further proceedings in Civil Case No. 11296-14 until after a final
determination is made in SEC Case No. 12-96-5469.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 126746               November 29, 2000

ARTHUR TE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of
Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 and CA-G.R. SP No.
1 

26178 and the Resolution dated October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
2 

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14,
1988. They did not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly.
Not long after private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting
her.3

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a
second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).4

On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when she
learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy was
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990. This case was docketed
5 

as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409. 6

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment
of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that
private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that
she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 7
On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective
engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and
subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the time of their marriage,
petitioner was already married to private respondent. With respect to petitioner, private respondent
added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that
he was still single. 8

After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to
evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and
animosity towards petitioner’s counsel during the hearings of said case.

The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November 28, 1990 which
stated that the same could not be granted because the prosecution had sufficiently established
a prima facie case against the accused. The RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for lack of
9 

legal basis.
10

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism
and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process by denying
petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even before the filing of the same;
(3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by the
Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only "prima facie evidence" is sufficient for
conviction of an accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971. 11

Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the
administrative case for the revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend
the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to
private respondent and criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of
Quezon City. When the Board denied the said motion in its Order dated July 16, 1991, petitioner
12  13 

filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending that the Board gravely
abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to
the outcome of the administrative case pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of
proceedings in the administrative case could render nugatory petitioner’s right against self-
incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping
interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding before the PRC Board
despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the same respondent
involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 26178. 14

The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of facts.

On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision in the
consolidated petitions. The appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to
petitioner’s failure to show any concrete evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and
had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend the
proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law. The Court of Appeals
15 

likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set
forth persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution was able to adduce
evidence showing the existence of the elements of bigamy. 16
Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board’s Order
denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the ground of
prejudicial question. Respondent court held that no prejudicial question existed since the action
sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a civil case. 17

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but the
same was denied. 18

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND

THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE
PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN

ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING

THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF. 19

The petition has no merit.

While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent has rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy
before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of petitioner’s
engineering license before the PRC Board moot and academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of
prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts and rules. 20

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it
to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related
to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial
21 

question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 22

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of
marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which
would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his
23 
marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal
proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would
necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs.
Mendoza and People vs. Aragon cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish
24  25 

the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to
private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable,
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In Landicho vs. Relova, we
26  27 

held that:

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage
exists.
28

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s
marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged
commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative
proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question
involves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question
where one case is administrative and the other is civil.29

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it
shall not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the
respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case:

The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in
another judicial body against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as in
the administrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the
proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the
case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or
quasi-judicial body.

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are
not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella.
Petitioner is also charged with immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as
husband to private respondent and as father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without
the benefit of marriage. The existence of these other charges justified the continuation of the
30 

proceedings before the PRC Board.

Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of his
demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish
the existence of both the first and second marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that
the original copy of marriage contract between him and private respondent was not presented, the
signatures therein were not properly identified and there was no showing that the requisites of a
valid marriage were complied with. He alleges further that the original copy of the marriage contract
between him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said contract was
adduced, and that there was no witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony
participated in by him ever took place. 31

We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion
of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse
of such discretion. In this case, the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on
32 

the part of the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the
prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second,
petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been
held that the appellate court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecution’s
evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. In view of the trial court’s finding that a prima facie case against
33 

petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense. 34

The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by denying his demurrer
to evidence in view of the existence of a prima facie case against him, the trial court was already
making a pronouncement that he is liable for the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits but
merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to determine whether or not a
full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case. The RTC’s observation that there was
35 

a prima facie case against petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient
evidence to sustain its proposition that petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless
petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion. Said declaration by
36 

the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely because
of such finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present evidence
in his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the evidence adduced by both
parties.

Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409
should have been granted since said judge exhibited partiality and bias against him in several
instances. First, when petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the
denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the judge said such motion was
dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for reconsideration had not yet been filed.
Second, when petitioner’s counsel manifested that he had just recovered from an accident and was
not physically fit for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case and
required said counsel to produce a medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when
petitioner manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the
same as dilatory and declared that he would deny the same. According to petitioner, the judge’s
hostile attitude towards petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant of
his motion to inhibit.

We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did
not conclusively show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case. In People of the
37 

Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that while bias and prejudice have been recognized
38 

as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary
rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and
convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. 39

Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those
expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit
himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or
his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed
by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for
just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.

This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s motion
to inhibit. The test for determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was
deprived a fair and impartial trial. The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited
40 

antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a fair and
impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to suspend the
criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither
was there anything unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner’s counsel submit a medical
certificate to support his claim that he suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial.
Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioner’s counsel to ensure that the resolution of
the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judge’s duty
to disposing of the court’s business promptly. 41

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.