Case No.

556
ART. VII. SEC. 21. FOREIGN RELATIONS: SENATE CONCURRENCE IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary | G.R. No. 162230

FACTS: Petitioners are all members of Malaya Lolas which is an organization providing aid to victims of rape by Japanese military forces.
They have approached the DOJ, DFA, and OSG to file a claim against Japanese officials and officers, but the officials declined on the ground
that it had already been satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the bilateral reparations agreement.

ISSUE: Whether the refusal of the Executive Department to support Petitioners’ claim against Japan is justified.

RULING: YES. The Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative for such determination. The Philippines is not under any
international obligation to support Petitioners’ claim. Under international law, the only means available for individuals to bring a
claim within the international legal system is when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the
individual’s behalf. The State is the sole judge to decide whether its protection in favor of those petitioners will be granted, to
what extent it is granted, and when will it cease.

Case No. 557

Art. VII, Section 21: Foreign Relations; Senate concurrence
Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244, G.R. No. 159618

FACTS: This petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition under Rule 65 assails and seeks to nullify the Non-Surrender Agreement
concluded by and between the Philippines and USA.

Petitioner parlays the notion that the Agreement is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly
concurred in by the Senate.

ISSUE: WON the Agreement is valid and binding without the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the senate.

RULING: YES. Senate Concurrence Not Required. Executive agreements do not require legislative concurrence for their validity.
International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (2)
executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence.

Concomitant with this treaty-making power of the President is his or her prerogative to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate; or having
secured the latter’s consent to the ratification of the treaty, refuse to ratify it.  This prerogative, the Court hastened to add, is the
President’s alone and cannot be encroached upon via a writ of mandamus.

Case No. 558

Art. VII, Section 21: Other Foreign Affairs Power
Vinuya v. Romulo 619 SCRA 533 [2010] G.R. No. 162230

FACTS: Petitioners claim that they have approached the Executive Department, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. However, the
officials declined on the ground that it had already been satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the
bilateral reparations agreement between Japan and Philippines.

ISSUE: WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and
other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING: NO. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to
espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.

In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals
for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951.

The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative— the
political departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision.