Midterm Examination in Persons & Family Relations

20-00039
1. C
2. C
3. B
4. A
5. C
6. A
7. C
8. D
9. C
10. D
11. C
12. A
13. A
14. B
15. B
II. ESSAY

I. No, Mrs. A, can only claim for damages on her person and not for
her unborn child as provided by Article 40 of the Civil Code which states
that birth determines personality. In addition, Article 41 states that one
condition for fetus under 7 months to be considered born, should not die
within 24 hours after its complete delivery.
This decision was shown in the case of Geluz vs CA where the
Supreme Court ruled that parents cannot invoke provisional personality
of the unborn child because it was not able to meet the conditions set
forth by Article 41.

In the case at bar, although the abortion was unintentional, it

resulted to the death of the fetus, as such extinguished its presumptive
personality, thus Mrs. A could only file for damages on her own person.
II. The possible rights of the aggrieved party for a breach of promise to
marry in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code includes:

(a) When there has been carnal knowledge: Ask the other party
to recognize and support the child if there is one, provided that the
paternity of the child is proven as exhibited in the case of
Constantino v Mendez; claim for damages--moral, exemplary or
actual damages such as expenses for wedding (if any) could be
prayed; however, claims for recovery could only be granted if sexual
intercourse is proven not to be a product of mutual desire or moral
seduction is proven.

(b) If without carnal knowledge: claim for moral damages and

actual damages if applicable, when there was an intention to inflict
loss or injury to the aggrieved party that is contrary to morals or good
custom like in the case of Wassmer vs Velez, when Velez failed to
appear for their wedding ceremony when all preparation has already
been made.
III.
Under the 1987 Constitution natural-born citizen, on one hand,
are those born in the Philippines since birth without the need to
perform any action to acquire their citizenship, including those born
before January 1973 to Filipino mothers who chose Filipino
citizenship upon the age of majority.
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who acquired
their citizenship through court proceedings and governed by special
laws.
IV.
The waiver is invalid and not binding because according to
Article 6 of the Civil Code rights may only be waived if it is not
contrary to law… or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.

In application to the case at hand, the invalidity of the waiver

stemmed from the fact that it is detrimental to the subject of the
waiver, in this case, the rights of the parents to sue Brent even if their
children worked in unfavorable conditions.
V. The status of the marriages:

a. The marriage is valid because Article 5 of the Family Code

allows person of the age 18 or above to contract marriage so long
as there are no impediments mentioned for incestuous and void
marriages reasons of public policy of the same code.

In addition, Article 4 (3) of the Family Code provides that the

irregularity of the formal requisite of shall not affect the validity of
the marriage but the party/parties responsible for such irregularity
shall be civilly and administratively liable.

b. The marriage is valid, because Article 15 of the Family Code

only requires for party between the ages of 21-25 for parents’ or
guardian’s advice. In the absence of such the party only needs to
attach a sworn statement to the effect that such advice has been
sought but was refused, to their marriage license application.
Marriage license then, should only be granted three months after
the completion of the publication of such application.

c. The marriage is void ab initio because it is considered

incestuous as provided by Article 37 of the Family Code that
states marriages are void from the beginning between parties
either legitimate or illegitimate between ascendants or
descendants of any degree. Even if the marriage was celebrated
in Spain, they are bounded by Philippine laws with respect to their
family rights, duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons as provided for by Article 15 of the Civil Code.

d. The marriage is void ab initio. A notary public in Hong Kong

has no authority to solemnize marriage. Under Article 35 of the
Family Code, marriages solemnized by any person not legally
authorized to perform marriage is void from the beginning, unless
such marriages were contracted with either or both parties
believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal
authority to do so.
e. The marriage is void ab initio because Mayors could only
officiate marriages within their jurisdiction as provided by the Local
Government Code. Article 4 of the Family Code, states that the
absence of any of the formal requisite of marriage, this case the
authority of the solemnizing officer, shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2) where either or both parties
believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal
authority to do so.
VI.
Yes, Harry and Riza’s marriage is valid because Associate
Justice X has the authority to solemnize the marriage even if he
was on vacation, because he is still in active service thereby
satisfying the requisite of a solemnizing officer to be any incumbent
member within the court’s jurisdiction. As a Court of Appeals’
Judge, his jurisdiction is national in scope.

Moreover, the marriage was celebrated in a public place (kiosk

of the public plaza near the residence of Harry’s parents) with many
visitors around who can publicly attend or witness the ceremony
satisfying Article 8 of the Family Code requiring marriages to be
solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, or
in a church, a temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul, or
vice-consul.
VII.
Rody and Leni’s marriage is not valid in the Philippines.
Marriage by proxy is void because of Rody’s non-attendance in
the marriage ceremony.
Article 2 (2) of the Family Code reiterates that the
absence of the essential requisite of marriage invalidates the
marriage. In the instant case, Rody’s consent was not freely
given in the presence of a solemnizing officer.
VIII.
No, Gemma’s suit in seeking for annulment of marriage on the
ground of Arnell’s psychological incapacity based from the given facts
alone cannot prosper.
Although psychological incapacity is ground for rendering a marriage
void, the facts given in this case are still limited to substantiate the claim of
psychological incapacity. In a similar case of Santos vs CA, the Supreme
Court held that marriage is a lifetime commitment emphasizing Article 1 of
the Family Code that states the marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for
the establishment of conjugal and family life.
IX.
(a) No, there is no legal ground for the approval of Silverio’s
petition for correction of entries in his birth certificate on the ground
of his sex reassignment. In the case of Silverio vs Republic, the
Supreme Court denied a similar petition on correction of entries,
specifically, a change of name and gender in the birth certificate
due to sex reassigmnet. The court contends that the issue in the
instant case is a matter of public policy under the jurisdiction of the
legislature, as such the court has no right to address the issue.

(b) No, Sharon’s petition has legal grounds as proven in

jurisprudence in the case of Republic vs Cagandahan, where the
court found merit in the change of gender and name due to the
facts established that Cagandahan indeed has congenital
hyperplasia (CAH).

(c) Yes, the marriage will be validly recognized in the

Philippines because Article 1 of the Family Code precisely states
that marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman. In the instant case, no judicial decree has
been presented to prove that they are of the same sex when they
married. Their marriage is valid in the Philippines.

XI. On the parents’ contention that:

 a. The marriage was void ab initio because they have not given
consent to the marriage of their son.

The marriage is valid because both parties were of the

age of maturity that is required in Article 5 of the Family Code.

b. There was no marriage license.

The marriage was solemnized in articulo mortis, as

presented in the given facts of the case, exempting it from the
requirements of marriage license where parental consent is a
requisite for issuance of the same.

c. The solemnizing officer had no authority to perform the marriage.

The marriage is void in the absence of the formal requisite
of marriage, in this case, the authority of the solemnizing officer
as provided in Article 4 of the Family Code, except for the
provision in Article 35 that provides that if the marriage was
solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform
marriages, was contracted in good faith by either or both of the
parties believing that the solemnizing officer had the legal
authority to do.
d. The solemnizing officer did not file an affidavit of marriage with the
proper civil registrar.
Article 4 (3) of the Family Code provides that the
irregularity of the formal requisite of shall not affect the validity of
the marriage but the party/parties responsible for such irregularity
shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

XII.
 a. The marriage is valid as supported by Article 4(3) stipulating
that an irregularity in the formal requisite, in this case the marriage
license, shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.

b. Yes, because only the formal requisite of a valid marriage

license is shown to have irregularity as presented in the instant
case.

XIII.
 The marriage between Michael and Anna is void ab initio not
having satisfied the second essential requisite of marriage of consent
freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer as stipulated in
Article 4(1) of the Family Code. Moreover, Article 6 further provides,
that while there is no prescribed form or religious rite required for the
solemnization of the marriage, it is necessary for the contracting
parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and
declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age
that they take each other as husband and wife.

XIV.
 Junior and Gemma’s marriage is void ab initio because the
Philippine Consul General has no authority in solemnizing the
marriage since the marriage is being celebrated in the Philippines.
A consul general is only authorized to solemnize marriages
between Filipino citizens abroad as stipulated in Article 10 of the
Family Code.

XV.
 Rody and Leni’s marriage is not valid in the Philippines
because Rody and his first wife were both bound by the nationality
rule in laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity even if they are living abroad as stated in
Article 15.
The divorce obtained in Australia by a Filipino citizen is not
recognized in the Philippines.
As her lawyer, I would advise her to have Rudy seek for the
annulment of his previous marriage otherwise he could be sued for
concubinage or Leni can be sued for adultery.