MACARIOLA VS.

JUDGE ASUNCION, 114 SCRA 77

Topic – Political Law

The provision in the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges, justices, and public officers from
engaging in business within the territorial jurisdiction of their courts is political in nature and therefore, said
provision was deemed abrogated when there was a change of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States at the turn of the century. Political laws are deemed abrogated if there is a change of sovereignty
and unless re-enacted under the new sovereign, the same is without force and effect.

FACTS:
Macariola and her step sister (Reyes) had a dispute over their inheritance involving parcels. A trial
ensued and Judge Asuncion rendered a decision in the civil case.

Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Galapon, who later sold the property to judge Asuncion.

Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with “acts unbecoming a judge” on the ground
that he bought a property (formerly owned by Macariola) which was involved in a civil case decided by
him. This act by Asuncion is averred by Macariola to be against Art. 1491, par 5 of the Civil Code which
provides:

"Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action,
either in person or through the mediation of another:

"(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers
and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by
virtue of their profession".

Respondent and his wife were also members of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.
to which their shares and interests in said property were conveyed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said provision paragraph 5, art 1491 of the civil code.

Whether or not respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.

RULING:

No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The judge bought the property
after his decision became final. Further, Asuncion did not buy the property directly from any of the parties
since the property was directly bought by Galapon, who then sold the property to Asuncion.
No. It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations,
administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of
certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence.

No. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United
States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have
been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign,
whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are
expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign

The Supreme Court however admonished Judge Asuncion to be more discreet in his personal
transactions.

Case – Aquino v. Enrile, G.R. No. L-35546, September 17, 1974

Topic – petition for habeas corpus

Facts

The case is petition for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained by the
military by virtue of Proclamation 1081 (Martial Law).
The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order No. 2 of the President for being
participants to take over the Government by force.
It was issued by the President in the exercise of the power he assumed by virtue of Proclamation
1081 placing the entire country under Martial Law.

Issue

Whether the detention of the petitioners is legal in accordance with the declaration of Martial law.

Ruling
Yes. Five (5) Justices held that the issue is a political question, not subject to judicial inquiry. While the
other four (4) Justices held that the issue was a justiciable one.
Yet, any inquiry by the Supreme Court in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of
the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has become moot and academic.
Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation,
which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion , or to safeguard public safety against imminent
danger thereof.

The court held that the issue is a justiciable one.

Case – Javellana v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. L-36142, March 31, 1973

Facts
Petitioner filed a case to the Supreme Court to restrain respondents from implementing any of the
provisions of the Proposed Constitution not found in the present Constitution referring to that of 1935.
Javellana alleged that the President is without authority and jurisdiction in implementing the said
proposed Constitution and that the election held was not a free election, hence, null and void.

Issue
Whether the Constitution proposed by the 1973 Constitutional is being considered in force and
effect.

Ruling
Yes. Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Concepcion, or six (6)
members of the Court also held that :
The Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in
accordance with Article XV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution which provides only one way for
ratification in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified
and duly registered voters.
However, it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions that a new
Constitution once accepted and acquired by the people must be recognize by the Court.

All the cases are dismissed.

Cases – Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as his Vice President.

An impeachment case was filed against Estrada.

There were a series of protest continued to grow at EDSA against Estrada

The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and
joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not
resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him
from office.

The Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned
his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.

Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation.
Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a petition for prohibition
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting
any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
“confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable
to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office
of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

ISSUE:

1.)    Whether the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada was a
president-on-leave or did he truly resign.

2.)    Whether or not petitioner may invoke immunity from suits.

HELD:

Justicial Issue. The question of whether the previous president Estrada truly resigned subjects it to judicial
review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment.  It is important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his
leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s
implied resignation. On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-
taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat
for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the  totality test:  prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longer
entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life
to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim
executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President.  From the
deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent
only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during
which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another).

In Re: Letter of Justice Puno, A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA, June 29, 1992

Facts:

         Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (CA), wrote a letter dated Nov. 14, 1990
addressed to the Supreme Court about the correction of his seniority ranking in the CA. It appears from the records
that petitioner was first appointed as associate justice of the CA on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of office on Nov.
29, 1982.. In Edsa Revolution in Feb. 1986 brought about reorganization of the entire government including the
judiciary. A Screening Committee was created. When Pres. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, as an
exercise of her legislative power, the Screening Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11 from being the
assoc. justice of the NEW CA. However, the petitioner’s ranking changed from no. 11, he now ranked as no. 26. He
alleges that the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the provisions of issued order of Pres. Aquino.
The court en banc ranted Justice Puno’s request. A motion for consideration was later filed by Campos and
Javelliano who were affected by the change of ranking. They contend that the petitioner cannot claim such
reappointment because the court he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.
Issue:

        Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that would negate any
claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to said EO No. 33.
Held:
        The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was created in the wake of
the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the people power. A
revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by
those who were previously subject to it as as sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or political
system, usually effected with violence.  A government as a result of people’s revolution is considered de jure if it is
already accepted by the family of nations or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others. In the
new government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct exercise of the Filipino power. Therefore, it is
the present CA that would negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.

In Re: Saturnino v. Bermudez, G.R. No. 76180, October 24, 1986

Who was in indicated as President and Vice President in the 1986 proposed constitution

Facts:

In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of
Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides
in full as... follows:

"Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is,
for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

"The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992."

Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer the
question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and
Vice President Salvador Laurel and the... elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M.
Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, x x x."

The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the
aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that
the Constitutional Commission refers therein to... incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for
purposes of synchronization of elections.

The petitioner asks the Court to declare who are "the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February
7, 1986 elections" as stated in Article XVIII, Section 5 of the Draft Constitution adopted by the Constitutional
Commission of 1986.

As to lack of cause of action, the petitioner's prayer for a declaration as to who were elected President and Vice
President in the February 7, 1986 elections should be addressed not to this Court but to other departments of
government constitutionally burdened with the task of... making that declaration.

The 1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution as amended, and the 1986 Draft Constitution uniformly provide that
boards of canvassers in each province and city shall certify who were elected President and Vice President in their
respective areas.

In the absence of a legislature, we cannot assume the function of stating, and neither do we have any factual or
legal... capacity to officially declare, who were elected President and Vice President in the February 7, 1986
elections.

Issues:

The legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino

Ruling:

As to who are the incumbent President and Vice President referred to in the 1986 Draft Constitution, the court agree
that there is no doubt the 1986 Constitutional Commission referred to President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice
President Salvador H. Laurel.

De Leon v. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987

FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain together with other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Pronice of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Barangay Election
Act of 1982. 

Petitioner received a Memorandum from OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra which provided the designation of
respondent Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of the same barangay and the other respondents as members of
the barangay Council of the same barangay and municipality. Petitioners maintain that Sec 3 of the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 provides that the terms of office shall be six (6) years which shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and qualified. Also, in accordance with the recent ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
it seems that respindent OIC Governor no longer had the authority to replace them as well as designate successors. 

Petitioner prayed that the Memorandum be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited from taking
over their positions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year
period which ended on February 25, 1987.

HELD: 
No. SC declared that the Memorandum issued by respondent OIC Governor designating respondents as
Barangay Captain and Councilmen of Barangay Dolores has no legal force and effect. Contrary to the stand of
respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the
1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date therefore, the provisional
constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Effectivity of the Constitution is also immediately upon its
ratification.

Case – Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985

FACTS:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question said petitioners are
without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest
for their petition to be given due course.

ISSUES:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.
.

RULING:
YES. The Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
Article 2 of the Civil Code states that. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.

The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws.
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without publication, there would be no basis
for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat.

Executive Order No. 200, June 18, 1987

Executive Order No. 200, s. 1987

Signed on June 18, 1987
MALACAÑANG
MANILA

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200

PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A

NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR
THEIR EFFECTIVITY.

WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided x x x;”

WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the Official Gazette will
suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in Tañada, et al. vs. Tuvera, et al.
(G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986), when it observed that “[t]here is much to be said of the view that the
publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited readership;”

WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that “[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform
the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly;” and

WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be amended so
the laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by the Constitution, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

SEC. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the “Civil Code of the Philippines,” and all
other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.

(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO

President of the Philippines

By the President:

(Sgd.) JOKER P. ARROYO

Executive Secretary

Case – Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

FACTS:

On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three
per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article
VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article
XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

ISSUES:

Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;

HELD:

1.       The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)

The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment”
should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal.

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on
their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the
full text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that
the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a
signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11
October 2006.

IMBONG V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. L-32432, SEPTEMBER 11, 1970

FACTS:

Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong interested in running as candidate for delegates to the Constitutional
Convention filed a petitions for declaratory relief pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 questioning
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132 “1971 Constitutional Convention Act”.

Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, passed

Resolution No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments’

After the adoption of said Res. No. 2, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted RA 4914 an
act providing for the election of delegates to, and the holding of, the constitutional convention
implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed
Res No. 4.

Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted RA 6132, implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4,
and expressly repealing RA 4914.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Congress acting as a legislative body enacts R.A.6132 to implement the
resolution passed by it in its capacity as a Constituent Assembly?

HELD:

Yes. The Congress acting as a legislative body in the exercise of its aw-making authority, and not
as a Constituent Assembly;

1. Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly has authority to propose Constitutional

amendments or to call a convention for the purpose were passed by the required three-fourths vote.

2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such authority to call a constitutional

convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the
effective exercise including the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself.

3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested exclusively in Congress acting as
a Constituent Assembly and the power to enact the implementing details in R.A. No. 6132, does not
exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly but such implementing details are
matters of Congress in the exercise of its legislative power.

4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such
implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can
enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps.

Case – Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

Facts:

Delfin alleged in his petition that... he and the members of the Movement and other... volunteers intend to exercise
the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at
least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the
COMELEC.

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein -- Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
Isabel Ongpin -- filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to
be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed;

(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on
statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in
the other modes of initiative, which... are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate
omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.

(5)The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of
term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other
government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.

Issues:

Issue No. 1

Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating
Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the
Act, as worded, adequately covers... such initiative

Ruling:

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining
or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law
shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no
longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not
tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right
of the people under that system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).