ISLAM

Contemporary popular understandings of Islam leave much to be desired, in

terms of their biased, misinterpreted and most importantly, historically
inaccurate nature. It is important to situate the beginnings of Islam in its
economic, political, geographic and sociocultural provenance, in order to be able
to appreciate the reasons for its emergence and subsequent rise. As part of the
aforementioned process of situating Islam in the milieu that gave rise to it, we
must examine several factors: the harsh geographic setting, the political legacy
and influence of the Byzantine and Sassanid Empires, the community oriented
social organisation of pre-Islamic Arabia and the change in the same thereafter
and the disputed interlinked rise of trade and Mecca.

However, there is an obstruction as soon as the process is begun. The sources

from which pre-Islamic Arabia - the period referred to as the jahiliyya, the time of
ignorance - may be reconstructed are of disputed reliability, primarily for two
reasons. Firstly, the writing of the texts (based on oral traditions) postdate the
actual event by at least a century and secondly, scholars such as Jonathan Porter
Berkey are of the view that these sources were written down with an intention of
providing a version of Islamic history that contemporary muslims would like to
remember, rather than being historically accurate.

The Byzantine Empire of the 6th century is recorded in the Greek sources,
authored mostly in Constantinople as well as in Syriac sources authored by
Christians in Syria and Iraq. Archaeology and numismatic studies also aid our
understanding of the heir to the Roman Empire. However, the Sassanid empire,
like Pre-Islamic Arabia has negligible indigenous writing and inadequate
archaeological studies have been undertaken; although some epigraphic material
is known from Arabia. 9th and 10th century Islamic writings constitute the main
source for an understanding of the 6th and 7th century Sassanid Empire.
Pre-Islamic Arabia continues to be reconstructed using either non-Islamic
writings which are inevitably biased or later Islamic writings such as that
authored by Al-Tabari.

The political influences on the formation of Islam were the Roman (Byzantine)
and Sassanid empires and their interactions with each other and the Arab world.
Following Alexander, the Middle East was split into two parts, the western part
being subsumed into the Roman Empire and the eastern forming the Persian
Empires - the Parthians. In 224 CE, following repeated defeats at the hands of the
Romans and rebel leaders from within the empire, the Parthian Empire fell and
the Sassanids took over. They were much more aggressive than their predecessors
and inflicted defeats on the Romans, who were already reeling under severe
economic crises and threats from the Germanic tribes.

Later, from the 5th century CE onwards, Roman identity was undergoing a
qualitative change which had important political manifestations. The Empire,
which had rested on the enviable ideal of being Roman, which held all the local
elites not only within the Empire, but eager to maintain its unity. As they realised
the Empire could no longer provide security, the local elites began breaking away,
as seen especially in Palmyra and Gaul. Accompanied by the growing influence of
the Church and its officials, the citizens grew increasingly alienated from the
Empire, leading to an involuntary decentralisation.

On the other hand, the Sassanids relied, in Iraq, on the diqhans (landlords),
alongside courtiers and the army to maintain power and for revenue collection.
They also ruled together with some aristocratic remnants of the Parthian dynasty,
relying on their military support.
 Attention must also be drawn to the Byzantine-Persian Wars, and more
importantly, the involvement of Arabic tribes such as the Bedouin in them.
Although they were of scarce importance until the late third century, the
adaptation of a raiding-based strategy by the Sassanids resulted in the recruiting
of Bedouin allies on both sides. The Romans and Sassanids gained cheap security
and supplementary aid while the Bedouin Sheikhs obtained a subsidy that helped
them raise their position over the other tribal leaders in an essentially tribal and
hence, limitedly hierarchical society. In the 6th century, the Ghassanids became
an important ally of Rome, and Roman emperors such as Justinian built them up
as a counter to the threat posed by the Lakhmids, who were Persian allies.
Although this system faded in the 580s, the experience left the Bedouins, as
highlighted by Mark Whittow, richer, more organised and more militarised.

Before moving on to pre-Islamic Arabia, however, a brief discussion of the

geography of Arabia is necessary. Professor Paul Freedman terms Arabia a
“strikingly impoverished land in terms of natural resources” - an apt assessment,
given the harsh, arid climate and the consequent inability to sustain agriculture.
Largely isolated by the sea, lacking in natural harbours and perennial water
sources, only the region that is modern Yemen had both harbours and oases. It
became home to two empires, which, however, by the Prophet’s time had long
passed their zenith. North from this area was the ‘Empty Quarter’, harsh and
inhabitable desert. Further North lies cities like Mecca and Medina, which have
sufficient water for settlements but not for agriculture.

Tribes such as the Bedouin, to adapt to these harsh conditions, developed a

nomadic way of life, reliant on herding as well as domestic animals, primarily the
camel. Although each group was mostly nomadic, they had demarcated grazing
grounds for their herds that they defended. Raids were integral to their economy,
as shall be discussed later. These ‘camel-nomads’ (as Hodgson calls them)
referred to themselves as Arab. This later came to mean not only nomadic
Bedouins, but also settled communities of Bedouins. A more advanced political
organisation was rendered impossible by the lack of ability to produce and
sustain surplus, given the severe lack of resources until the discovery of oil or the
digging of artesian wells for water.

Given their tribal organisation, a sense of relative equality prevailed. They

rejected authoritarian forms of political administration. Instead, each tribe was
built and maintained through an extended and binding sense of kinship. A chief,
known as the shaykh, would be chosen on the basis of wisdom, privileged birth or
military prowess and experience. His decisions would be binding on all members
of the tribe and were to be followed unquestioningly. Apart from being a war
leader, he would also be an arbiter of disputes. On the basis of their internal
solidarity, which they termed ʿasabiyya, they were essentially sovereign units.

Bedouins, the tribe of special interest to us, derives its name from the
Arabic word badw which means desert. ‘Bedouin’ is an anglicised form of the
name badawi, of the desert. As Raphael Patai highlights, their life in the desert
was made possible only by the development of a specific social form
characterised by certain values common to all members of the tribe. In the tribal
and thus, ‘primitive’ tribal organisation of the tribes, the constant risk to the
individual was mitigated through the emphasis on group cohesion and group
values. Loyalty to the group and group solidarity were posited as ideal values,
which all must possess. Social pressures would ensure conformity. Other than
bonds of kinship real or perceived, artificial bonds such as hilf (confederacy,
mutual oaths) or jiwar (the formal granting of protection) also took place: the
former between equals and the latter in instances of power inequality.

The personality traits idealised by the Bedouins were expressed in pairs of

opposites, such as bravery-cowardice. Especially important was an understanding
of a certain kind of masculinity, meant to enforce a sort of aggressive peace, was
the muruwwa. On the other end of the spectrum was meekness. However, it is
important to qualify aggressive and peaceful natures: the former was valued only
insofar as it was essential for the protection of the group and certainly not
encouraged within the group. Similarly, while the peace-seeker was mostly valued
in society, that was a detriment if it got in the way of defending the group’s
interests. All men could depend on his khamsa - immediate male kin group - to
defend him in case he is murdered. In case the exact murderer cannot be located,
killing another man from the murderer’s khamsa is permissible. Thus, Bedouin
and the larger Arab tribal society was governed in this manner - socially, rather
than politically.

Other important Bedouin values included hospitality, idealised to the point

of starvation through folklore and tribal legends. Generosity was also
emphasised. Perhaps this was meant to prevent accumulation of wealth in the
hands of a few in an otherwise egalitarian society through redistribution, carried
out by means of generosity. Honourable behaviour, which is the behaviour
profitable for maintaining group cohesion, is encouraged; which entailed
activities such as raiding, cattle herding and a constant endeavour to ‘protect’
individual and group honour.

For economic sustenance in a region without agriculture and

yet-to-develop commerce, the tribes sustained themselves through raids. Their
raids were called ghazu in Arabic, from which the word razzia is derived. The raid
was structured to allow the raiders to capture as many of the animals of those
they were raiding without fighting directly with the men who were supposed to
tend them. Raids were strictly bound by rules: a noble or stronger tribe could
never raid a weaker one, and raids would be conducted between those of
near-equal strength.
 It is important to note that these raids were not politically or communally
motivated. Rather, their entire basis was economic. Further, raiders were very
careful not to kill anyone, since that would inevitably spiral into an overextended
blood feud. In fact, raids, although primarily for means of economic subsistence,
raids were also like a game or a sport. In the words of Hitti, “In desert land, where
the fighting mood is a chronic mental condition, raiding is one of the few manly
occupations.”

While on the subject of the background to the Rise of Islam and situating the
Prophet in provenance, it is important to also briefly look at the rise of Mecca as
an important urban settlement and the role it played in the life of the Prophet
Mohammed and Islam. Our understanding on the subject predominantly comes
from the discordant views of two scholars - Montgomery Watt and Patricia
Crone. While the former believes Mecca was an important commercial, financial
as well as socio-religious centre and thus integral to the rise of Islam, Crone
disagrees and posits that Islam grew in Northern Arabia as opposed to Mecca.

At Mecca, as Watt draws attention to, no agriculture was possible - it was

wholly commercial in nature. Its geographical location at the intersection of
trade routes and the creation of the haram (sanctuary) made its cosmopolitan
nature possible, which was an obvious prerequisite for a commercial centre.
Further, the Meccan elite were shrewd investors and creditors, they ensnared not
only other Meccans but other important individuals from neighbouring areas in
their debt trap. This created within Mecca and its neighbourhood conditions of
severe economic and consequently, social inequality which would have opened up
space for a new religion and social order, especially one as seemingly
equity-based as Islam.

Another important mode of discrimination perhaps would be the spatial

delineation between the Quraysh al-Bitāh (living near the Ka’ba) and the Quraysh
al-Zawahir (who lived in the outskirts) and in fact, there were internecine
struggles within the former as well. Another important feature of Mecca is the
emphasis on the individual, rather than the group. The individual’s prominence
was based on his inherited wealth and business prospects, elements that would
have been alien to the Bedouins.

In the rise of Mecca to wealth and power we have a movement from a nomadic
economy to a mercantile and capitalist economy. However, no social or political
developments occurred alongside that could have accommodated the changes
inevitably brought about by the former. Therefore, the need for a religion of unity
and sharing can be well understood. Watt also highlights some monotheistic
premonitions that might have appeared in mostly pagan and polytheistic Arabia
due to Judaeo-Christian influence. However, given the presence of the Ka’bah
with the daughters of Allah located at Mecca, it also became a place of
pilgrimage and spiritual centre. Thus, in Watt’s analysis of the rise of Islam, the
role of Mecca as a commercial, financial and religious centre was instrumental in
providing the Prophet, when he appeared, a foundational base of socioeconomic
inequality on which to profess his religion.

Crone, as mentioned before, disagrees with Watt’s theory on the rise of Mecca.
She posits that Mecca was not located at crossroads of trading routes, did not use
any naval modes of trade, was not located on the incense route, was too arid to
have been a centre of caravan trade or to be a place of halt in-between south
Arabia and Syria. Unlike other Islamicists, who believe Mecca traded in luxury
goods, incense etc. she believes that their trade was cheap leather and clothing.
Crone accuses all scholars of succumbing to various stereotypes regarding Mecca
and Meccan trade, stating that contemporary Islamic and Greek sources do not
corroborate such ideas. In her words, “by the time of Mecca’s rise to prominence,
there was no overland incense trade for them to take over, and no Roman market
for them to exploit.”

Instead, she posits that Meccan trade was local, and conducted within the
Arab world. All surplus goods in the Arabian economy came from the
mountaineers and nomads. In general, the goods were either necessities or ‘petty
luxuries’ and not, as mentioned above, luxury goods. She also disagrees with the
conceptualisation of Mecca as a centre for pilgrimage, stating that they would
not be able to sustain extra visitors over and above their own scare subsistence
requirements. Lastly, she argues that perhaps Meccan trade cannot be
reconstructed, given possible fallacies in the source material. In the absence of
Meccan trade, Crone’s hypothesis for the rise of Islam shall be discussed
subsequently.

Having established a sufficient background to the provenance of the Prophet,

let us now briefly look at Mohammed’s early life. Among the sources from where
his life can be reconstructed, two categories may be delineated. Firstly, those that
can be firmly placed within the theological tradition, such as the Quran itself.
Secondly, we have accounts that claim to be histories, and these include the Sirah
- his official biography, the Annals of at-Tabari etc. Apart from these, collections
of sayings regarding the Prophet’s life and habits may also be taken into account.
It is important to remember that none of these sources can be understood
uncritically, being from within the Islamic tradition as well as considerably
post-dating the Prophet and inevitably being influenced by events contemporary
to their period of writing.

The Prophet-to-be was born in a family that had once been powerful and
influential, but (according to Watt) was only one of the more prominent amidst
the poorer clans by the time of his birth. Orphaned early, he grew up in his uncle,
Abu Talib’s household and his birth and events surrounding it has been the
subject of much theological writing and folklore that is not within the scope of
this essay to discuss. The next significant event in his life was his marriage to
Khadija, who was an important trading magnate, which enabled him to initiate
trading enterprises. As famously recounted, the Prophet’s visions are said to have
begun when he was 40. The angel Gabriel (Jibreel) appeared before him and
enabled him to become the messenger of God and to recite the God’s word, the
Quran.

However, rather than going into details on the nature of his vision and the
content thereof, let us examine the factors that may have prompted or rather,
which allowed Muhammad to have such a realisation in the first place? Growing
up as an orphan amidst the increasing socio-economic stratification of Mecca
must have left a deep mark on him and prompted him to search for a solution, for
ways to reform this malaise.

At first, he restricted the discussion of his divine message to within a close

circle and only began preaching 3 years after his revelation. Ali, Abu Bakr, and
Zayd b. Harithah are said to be among the first male converts, following his wife,
Khadijah. Apart from some men of noble heritage who converted for a variety of
theological reasons, Watt draws attention to those converts who were from
among the men “considered weak.” Therefore, some men do appear to have been
convinced by politico-economic reasoning such as the hope of reforms, especially
against inequality, rather than philosophical reasonings. However, Watt is careful
to remind that Muhammed was, and remained essentially the harbinger of a new
religion, although he was not unaware of the social and political milieu of his
time and that may have influenced his formulation of the new religion.

Although initial proselytising seems to have been gaining ground in Mecca,

opposition seemed to also be gaining ground. There arose a controversy
regarding the so-called ‘satanic verses’ wherein Muhammed appears to have,
under the alleged influence of Satan, glorified the idol-worship of the three
daughters of Allah, whose idols were placed at the Ka’ba. His uttering and later,
rescinding of these verses was not received well in Mecca. There is much
scholarly speculation as to why Muhammed might have undergone this process,
but many (such as Watt) suggest that it might have initially been politically
motivated and he may have been responding to offers made by the Meccan elite.
On realising that acceptance of idolatry would undermine his position, he might
have taken them back, or corrected himself.

Other issues arose regarding the Quran’s postulation of the Last Judgement,
which appeared largely irrational to the practical Arabs who disavowed the
possibility of life after death. Certainly, Islamic principles such as insistence on
generosity, which actually harked back to earlier and simpler social codes, were
interpreted as attacks on their accumulation of economic and social capital. A
boycott was imposed on all kinds of trade with the Quraysh tribe, resulting in
devastating food shortages. Muslims, especially those in the weaker sections,
such as slaves were treated increasingly badly. The ultimate lifting of the ban did
not bring respite to the Muslim community, since Muhammed’s uncle and his
‘protector’ - a necessary safeguard against being killed without consequences -
passed away, leaving him vulnerable to alleged attacks on his life.

At this point, Muhammed chose to relocate the ummah - as the community of

Muslims had come to be known - to Yathrib, from where he had received a
request to act as an arbiter between several factions of Jewish descent. This
journey from Mecca to Yathrib, which later came to be called Medina, was an
extremely important milestone in Islam, and the marks the staring point of the
Islamic calendar. The journey itself came to be known as the hijrah or the hegira.
Upon reaching Medina, the Prophet is said to have built the first mosque, from
where he preached.
 However, rather than going into the details of Muhammed’s time in Medina,
this essay seeks to draw attention to the important steps in the conceptualisation
of Islam that come through from the Prophet’s days in Medina as well as their
interesting parallel to the social codes of tribal communities such as the Bedouin.
One of the foremost examples of the latter would be the building of a ‘supertribe’
in Medina, comprised of an unrelated collection of tribal groups, whose unity was
achieved not by blood relations, but by ideology; similar to the concept of (real
and perceived) kinship that bound together the tribes. Karen Armstrong also
draws attention to other rulings of the Prophet, such as granting women the right
to divorce as well as to inherit property.

Unfortunately, conflicts also arose in Medina, where some Jews remained

unsympathetic to the Prophet’s cause despite his modifications to Islam to make
the religion more appealing and familiar to them. They chose to disregard his
identification of himself as the last Prophet and the three main Jewish tribes -
the Qayunah, the Nadir and the Qurayzah - who, in alliance, had been the most
powerful political entity in Medina before his arrival soon rose in opposition
against him. Continued conflicts with the Jews perhaps prompted Mohammed to
change the direction in which the Muslims prayed - the qiblah - from being
towards Jerusalem to pointing towards the Ka’ba in Mecca. Mohammed,
however, cannot be accused of discrimination against Jews or Christians, who
were permitted to follow their own religions although he did unleash harsh
punishment on one of the three aforementioned tribes for their cooperation with
the Meccans in the Battle of the Trench that shall be discussed shortly.

Perhaps more importantly, economic problems dogged them in Medina too.

Their means of sustenance was limited in Medina, where they neither had land
(even if some land was available, the members of the ummah were not
agriculturalists), nor access to their earlier business enterprises. In another move
strongly reminiscent of the tribal mode of subsistence, Mohammed turned to the
ghazu - the raid. The most striking achievement of these raiding units under
Mohammed was their victory over the Meccans at Badr, taking advantage of the
latter’s lack of unity. Although this was followed by a successful retribution by
Mecca at the Battle of Uhud, the ummah soon achieved a significant victory over
them at the Battle of the Trench. Mohammed’s martial success brought the
ummah ever newer converts, resulting in a numerically strong and united
confederacy under his supervision.

Soon after, in 628 AD, Mohammed made an unprecedented move - he

undertook an unarmed, peaceful march to Mecca, since the Quraysh were duty
bound to allow pilgrims to complete the Hajj at the Ka’ba. Put in a false position
by the ummah dressed as hajjis, the Quraysh were ultimately forced to sign a
treaty with them at al-Hudaybiyah. The violation of this very treaty resulted in
Mohammed’s march on Mecca with a formidable force to which the Quryash
surrendered without bloodshed. Thus, the Prophet and the ummah had returned
to Mecca, and this time, they had the upper hand.

Two years later, in 630, Muhammad completed his triumph over Mecca. A
dispute between client tribes of Mecca and Medina broke the truce, but Meccan
leaders surrendered the city. Amnesty was granted to almost everyone by
Muhammad as well as generous gifts offered to the leading Quraysh. The idols of
the Ka'ba were 'destroyed, and it was declared the holiest shrine of Islam.

Throughtout these eight years, Muhammad tried to gain control of the tribes.
The factions loyal to him were supported and those opposed were raided and
compelled to pay allegiance. The victory over Mecca was also the culmination of
Muhammad's tribal policy.
 Ira Lapidus posits that Islamic civilization was the cultural expression of the
elites thrown up by the forces of economic and social change generated by the
Arab conquests. Within a decade the new Arab-Muslim community had
conquered much of the Middle East and created an arena for the construction of
a new form of Islamic civilization not only in the peripheral region of Arabia but
in the core areas of already developed Middle Eastern civilization. The conquests
began a process that eventually culminated in the absorption the Sasanian empire
as well as the eastern regions of the Byzantine empire into an Islamic empire,
and eventually led to the conversion of the majority of Jewish, Christian, and
Zoroastrian peoples to Islam. These conquests were partly deliberate as an
important aspect of state policy and partly accidental.

Muhammad dies in 632 AD. After that, his whole life's work was threatened.
Berkey notes that there are dozens of separate traditions which suggest that the
Prophet intended one person or another to succeed him, but as others have
pointed out, their very number, let alone their inconsistency, demonstrate that in
fact he had not made (or at least had not publicly revealed) any decision
concerning this critical question. A conglomeration of diverse elements,
threatened to break up the community. For example, the Khazraj of Medina
decided to elect their own chief. Other Muslims, especially exiled Meccans,
weaker Medinan clans, and many individuals who had abandoned their clans to
join Muhammad, saw that this would lead to the resumption of feuding.

According to the standard Sunni account, Muhammad's friend and

father-in-law Abu Bakr prevented the Medinese Muslims setting themselves up
as a separate community from Muhammad's close circle of Meccan companions,
and then was named through acclamation as the first caliph, or successor, of the
Prophet. Shi'is, however, have a different recollection, and stress a story
according to which Muhammad, sometime prior to his death, identified his
cousin Ali as his presumptive heir. Of course both the Sunni and Shi'i
recollections in fact reflect the fully formed expectations of the later sectarian
groups and political parties

Karen Armstrong notes that after the Prophet’s death, the leading Muslims
also had to decide what form the Ummah should take. Some may not have
believed that there ought to be a “state,” a polity which had no precedent in
Arabia. Some seemed to think that each tribal group should elect its own imam
(leader). But the Prophet’s companions Abu Bakr and Umar ibn al-Khattab
argued that the Ummah must be a united community, and should have a single
ruler, as it had under the Prophet.

Finally, Abu Bakr, one of Muhammad's closest associates and his

father-in-law, was elected as the first Caliph, ruling from 632-34. He was exalted
as the successor to the Prophet, but was not himself a Prophet. He was to be
regarded as a shaykh or chief, whose functions were to lead the collective,
arbitrate disputes, and follow the precedents set by Muhammad. Selected by a
minority with no special competence, Abu Bakr had his nomination ratified the
following day by the community as a whole. In the mosque Abu Bakr said simply
that he would obey the Sunna (precedent) of the Prophet and that people should
obey him as long as he obeyed it. He was chiefly preoccupied by the so-called
wars of apostasy (riddah) when various tribes tried to break away from the ummah
and reassert their former independence.

In this context Armstrong notes that it would be a mistake to regard these

circumstances as a widespread religious defection. The revolts, according to her,
were entirely political and economic. In fact, most of the Bedouin tribes who had
entered the Islamic Confederacy had little interest in the details of Muhammad’s
religion, according to Armstrong.
 Having preserved its existence, the Muslim community asserted its authority
in the rest of Arabia At Muhammad's death many of the Arabian tribes that had
been forced into his confederation sought to regain their independence, some of
them put forth prophets and religions of their own. Abu Bakr refused any
concessions to demands for relief from taxes, waged war on recalcitrant tribes,
forced them into subjection, and even expanded the sphere of Muslim power
beyond what it had been in Muhammad's time. At the Battle of al-Aqraba (633
AD) the Muslims defeated a rival tribal confederation and extended their power
over eastern Arabia.

At first the small tribal groups were mainly searching for booty, but when
Arab raids forced the Byzantine Empire to send a major expedition into southern
Palestine, the raiding parties had to concentrate their forces east of Gaza. There,
under the leadership of Khalid b. al-Walid, sent by Abu Bakr from Iraq to take the
general ship of the Arab clans, defeated a Byzantine army at the Battle of
Ajnadayn (634). This was the first battle in which the Arabs acted as an army
rather than as separate raiding parties. With this victory their ambitions became
boundless; they were no longer raiders on the soil of Syria seeking booty, but
contenders for control of the settled empires. What began as inter-tribal
skirmishing to consolidate a political confederation in Arabia ended as a
full-scale war against the two empires.

Thus, the Ummah under the leadership of Abu Bakr fought against those
tribes which considered the tribal confederation suspended and their allegiance
to it terminated, now that Muhammad was gone. The Sunni tradition casts this as
a defining moment for the Muslim state. The Muslims' victory is credited with
both preserving a unitary state, and cementing the identification of Islam with
the Arabs.
 In the wake of the battle of Ajnadayn, the Arabs moved against the
Byzantine province of Syria. They took Damascus in 636. Baalbek, Homs, and
Hama soon surrendered. The rest of the province, however, continued to resist.
Only in 638 was Jerusalem taken. Caesarea fell in 640. Finally, in 641, the Arabs
took the northern Sycin and Mesopotamian towns of Haman, Edessa, and
Nasibin. The conquest of Syria took so long because victories over Byzantine
armies did not necessarily bring about the surrender of fortified towns, which
had to be reduced one by one

During this time the Caliphate was ruled by the second caliph, Umar ibn
al-Khattab (634-644), who assumed the title of amir al-mu'minin (the commander
of the faithful). Umar reversed Abu Bakr’s exclusionary policy to include the rebel
tribes of the Riddah wars to participate in the new expansionist designs and
attacks on the Fertile Crescent. Berkey argues that on one level, Umar's decision
reincorporated the defeated Arabs into the polity as Muslims; at the same time,
however, it also acknowledged at least implicitly the continuing claims of the
tribes to the self-identities of their members, as well as the umma's need for their
participation.

Some of these tribes were  enticed back by the prospect of taking part in the
lucrative ghazu raids in the neighbouring lands, which gained dramatic
momentum under his rule. Ghazu raids have been an important part of the Arab
tribes since long. However Islam stopped this because they were now not allowed
to attack each other within the Ummah. Umar, in order to maintain the unity of
the Ummah, led a series of ghazu raids on the neighbouring countries. This
outwardly offensive not only enhanced the unity of the Ummah but also helped to
enhance the caliph’s authority as the Arabs traditionally disliked monarch style
kingship and would have rather preferred to accept the authority of a chief who
during a military campaign or while they were journeying to new pastures; which
is also a reason why Umar called himself amir al-mu'minin.

Under Umar’s leadership, the Byzantine province of Egypt fell to the Arabs.
The Arab general Amr ibn al-'As, began the conquest of the province in 641.
Within the year he had taken Heliopolis and Babylon, and the whole of the
country except Alexandria, which capitulated in 643. Because Egypt was
politically centralised and scarcely urbanised, the conquest was virtually
instantaneous. The next Arab target was North Africa Tripoli, which was
conquered in 645. However, the complete subjugation of all of North Africa took
almost another seventy-five years as in this region the wars waged to establish
Arab suzerainty turned out to be painfully prolonged.

Within a decade the Arabs had captured Syria and Egypt, but the Byzantine
empire still retained provinces like Anatolia and the Balkans, continued engaging
in border warfare on land as well as sea, always threatening to retake territories.
The survival of Byzantium left the Arabs with a contested and dangerous frontier
and a permanent barrier to their expansion.

The Sasanian empire, however, was utterly destroyed. The Persians were
defeated at the Battle of Qadisiya (637), where the capital, Ctesiphon was seized
and forced the last emperor, Yazdagird, to flee to the protection of Turkish
princes in Inner Asia. Iraq fell into Arab hands. In Iran it took decades to subdue
all the quasi independent principalities that had comprised the Sasanian empire.
From the garrison base of Kufa the Arabs moved north, occupying Mosul in 641.
Nihawand, Hamadhan, Kayy, Isfahan, and all the main cities of western Iran fell
by 614. Azerbaijan was captured about the same time.

But this period of triumph came to an abrupt end in November 644, when
Umar was stabbed in the mosque of Medina by a Persian prisoner-of-war who
had a personal grievance against him. The last years of the Rashidun were
characterised by violence. Uthman ibn Affan was elected as the third caliph by
six of the Prophet’s companions. Under the caliphate of Uthman, the "tribal
factor" continued to destabilise the umma, and now from its very core. That
caliph pursued a well known policy of favouring members of his own clan of
Umayya from within the larger tribe of Quraysh.

Uthman reversed many of Umar's policies and favoured Umayyad and other
Meccan interests and the large migrant clans — at the expense of the
companions of the Prophet and the Medinans. For this, he undertook many
measures like increased central control over provincial revenues, initiatives in
religious matters, etc. Uthman thus stood for a reassertion of the pre-Islamic
coalition of Meccan and Arabian tribal aristocrats against the new elements
produced by Islam, and claimed an enlarged authority for the Caliph to effect
social, economic, and religious changes

However, in implementing these policies, he provoked bitter opposition,

conspiracies, and, eventually, civil war. In 656 he was murdered by a party of
about five hundred Arabs from Fustat. In this situation, Ali was elected Caliph.
He opposed the centralisation of Caliphal control over provincial revenues, and
favoured an equal distribution of taxes and booty among the Arabs. As the cousin
and son-in-law of Muhammad as well as one of the earliest converts to Islam. Ali
had claimed the Caliphate on the basis of his devotion to Muhammad and Islam.
But now he compromised himself by coming to power with the support of
Uthman's assassins. Ali's accession led to factional fighting.

As a result, the Rashidun Caliphate came to an end, paving the way for the
Umayyads. The administration, taxation, economy, and even the nature of the
Ummah all saw significant changes throughout this time, and it is crucial to note
some of these developments.

When it came to the administration, The new caliphs and the aristocracy of
Meccan and Medinan merchants, who were the centrepieces of the Muslim
regime, had the responsibility for controlling the Arabian migrants and for
governing and exploiting the conquered sedentary peoples. The Medinians
decided on two fundamentals for governing the post-conquest government, these
included that the new elite would work with the chiefs and notables of the
conquered populace and that the bedouins would not harm the agricultural
community. Significant developments relating to the relationship between the
conqueror and the conquered were brought about from the period of 634-644 AD,
in the reign of Umar, the second caliph, and were continued in the reign of the
rest of the Rashidun caliphate.

To trace the developments in the administrative structure, the first thing to

be considered is the garrison towns in the newly-conquered areas. The concept of
‘garrisons’ becomes important in this context. Umar focused on transforming the
Arab conquerors into an elite military caste. These elite groups garrisoned the
subdued areas and carried on further conquests. The bedouins were relocated to
garrison cities to stop them from conducting indiscriminate raids, to prevent the
devastation of productive agricultural regions, and to keep the Arabs separate
from the conquered peoples.

Karen Armstrong emphasises the qualities of Umar, as a Caliph, in which

she specifies his determination to maintain good discipline. For this, he asserted
that the Arab soldiers were not to enjoy the fruits of victory; the conquered lands
were not to be divided among the generals but left to the existing cultivators, who
paid rent to the Muslim state. Muslims were not allowed to settle in the cities-
instead, they had to settle in the amsars, or the garrison towns.
 The three most important cities were founded in Iraq and Egypt and
included Basra, at the head of the Persian Gulf, which was strategically located
for easy communication with Medina and Arab expeditions into southern Iran.
Kufa, on the Euphrates River to the north of the marshes near Al-Hira, became
the administrative capital of northern Iraq, Mesopotamia, and northern and
eastern Iran. Fustat, the new capital of Egypt, was located just below the delta of
the Nile and served as the base for Arab expansion into North Africa until
Qayrawan (in Tunisia) was founded in 670. The Arabs did not typically build new
cities in neighbouring provinces; instead, they settled in the towns, suburbs, and
villages that surrounded already-existing cities. Important Arab bases in Iran
were Hamaclhan, Isfahan, and Rayy. A new eastern garrison was established at
Marw in 670.

Armstrong mentions Umar's emphasis on family values, strict stance against

intoxication, and promotion of the Prophet's ascetic virtues, who, like the caliph
himself, had always lived simply while discussing the amsar. These garrisons were
Arab enclaves as well, where those customs that fit the Quranic worldview were
upheld on foreign soil. Mosques were built in each of the amsar and the Muslim
troops had to attend Friday prayers. The soldiers were being taught how to live
an Islamic life.

The next caliph, Uthman had received a great deal of suspicion in regards
to his nepotistic ways as he often favoured the members of his own Umayyad
family. John Joseph Saunders, in A history of Medieval Islam points out that in his
reign, the soldiers and their families were quartered according to their tribes, so
that the tribal system continued to prevail even when, by mingling all the
elements which flowed in from Arabia (a measure not taken until later) it would
have been possible to eliminate some of its disadvantages, to the benefit of
Islamic unity. The tribal system was, however, useful to the governors, who
employed heads of tribes to transmit their orders, and see that they were obeyed.
He too, just like Umar, had maintained a strict stance about not owning property
in the conquered territories by the Arabs, and this had made him unpopular. The
commanders spent the summer fighting and winter far from home in the
garrison towns. The distances were now so vast that the campaigns were more
exhausting, and they were taking less plunder than before.

The second concept about the administration of the newly conquered areas
was the treatment of the conquered non-muslim subjects. Umar believed that
there should be minimum intervention in the lives of the conquered population.
This meant that, in contrast to popular belief, Arab Muslims did not make an
effort to convert conquered people to Islam. Muhammad had established a
precedent by allowing Jews and Christians in Arabia to practise their religions in
exchange for tribute; the Caliphate extended the same privilege to Jews,
Christians, and Zoroastrians in the Middle East, whom they considered protected
peoples or dhimmis, "Peoples of the Book," the followers of earlier written
revelations. Another reason was that Islam was intended to be the religion of the
Arabs at the time of the conquest, signifying caste superiority and unification.
Conversions, when they happened, were embarrassing since they brought about
issues with status and triggered demands for financial benefits.

Apart from this, the Arabs also had no interest in disturbing the social and
administrative order. The Caliphate sent governors to oversee the collecting of
tributes and taxes, monitor the distribution of tax proceeds as paid to the
military, and guide the Arabs in war and prayer, but otherwise, local affairs were
left in the hands of locals. The existing elites and the bureaucracy of the Sasanian
and Byzantine empires were absorbed into the new government. Scribes and
accountants from Iran, Aram, Coptic, and Greek laboured for their new masters
just as they had for the previous ones. In the villages, the old landowners, chiefs,
and headmen maintained their power and helped with tax collection. The entire
former social and religious structure remained in place.

Armstrong tells us that the non-muslim subjects were not coerced into
becoming Muslims, until the middle of the eighth century, conversion was not
promoted. Muslims believed that Islam was the faith of Ismail's descendants in
the same way that Judaism was the religion of Isaac's sons. Arab tribesmen had
always provided stronger customers with protection (mawali). After becoming
dhimmis (protected subjects) in their new empire, Jews, Christians, and
Zoroastrians were no longer subject to raids or other forms of violence. Arabs
had traditionally considered it an act of honour to treat their customers well,
assist them, or exact revenge for the harm they had suffered.

It is also important to consider the relationship between the Arab elites and
local elites in this context. The relationship between the Arabs and the local
elites varied from region to region. Several provinces remained autonomous,
while others came under direct bureaucratic control. Arab conquerors were
forced to make favourable concessions in exchange for local agreement in places
that had steadfastly resisted their control. Numerous formal agreements were
made with chiefs and princes of small provinces or notables of towns, promising
to maintain the old elites' positions of power and demanding their right to their
property and religion in exchange for the payment of a tribute—typically a set
amount that the notables could continue to collect from their subjects. In these
cases, the Arabs simply collected taxes from sub­-rulers who were their vassals. In
the cities of upper Mesopotamia and Syria, in Khurasan and elsewhere, the Arabs
were remote suzerains.

The arrangements put in place after the conquests, meanwhile, were not
long-term. The Arabs aspired to exert more influence over local affairs as they
built up their dominance. They put the former regime's bureaucracy to work for
the new in Iraq and Egypt. The Sasanian emperor's former lands in Iraq, as well
as the estates of notables who had fled with him, were taken over by the Caliph of
Umar and added to the Caliphal territories. By eliminating municipalities as
separate administrative entities and fiscally autonomous estates (autopragia) in
Egypt, the Arabs consolidated the country's administrative structure. The Arabs
refused to renegotiate tribute and insisted on paying taxes in direct proportion to
the populations and resources of the regions, so in Mesopotamia and Syria,
standard administration prevailed over specific treaties.

The Arab regime also distinguished town and rural administration. The
Mediterranean region had been separated into autonomous city-states since
classical antiquity. The city-state and its surrounding rural territory had survived
as a fundamental part of Roman administration, even though the municipalities
finally became cogs in the machine of the Roman bureaucracy. The city-state was
now abolished by the Arabs as a political structure, and Syria and Mesopotamia
were governed by a territorial bureaucracy. However, in Khurasan and other
regions of Iran, only the loosest suzerainty and tributes were imposed, and local
people were given almost unlimited sovereignty.

When it comes to the economy, significant developments were made. The

economic history of the Arab caliphate is still in its infancy. Much of what has
been written falls within the realm of fiqh or jurisprudence and cultural and
social history. The available sources were recorded many years after the events
based on information transmitted from memory.

Abu Bakr’s reign was dominated by the so-called wars of riddah (apostasy)
when various tribes tried to break away from the Ummah and reassert their
former independence. Armstrong writes that this, however, was not a sign of
religious defection. It was merely political and economic. The ghazu raids became
an important source of revenue in the period of Abu Bakr.
 As mentioned before, the Arabs were not interested in the conversion of the
conquered subjects to Islam. The dhimmis, protected subjects of the Arabs, paid a
poll tax in return for military protection and were permitted to practise their
faith, as the Quran enjoined. Umar was the first caliph to encourage the dhimmis
to convert to Islam, and they were eager to join this dynamic new faith, but since
they no longer had to pay the poll tax (jizyah), the new policy resulted in a drastic
loss of revenue.

In the case of the conquered territories, the Arabs adopted the system of
taxes already in use. In Iraq, they adopted the Sasanian system of collecting both
a land tax (kharaj) and a poll tax (fizya). The land was measured and a tax was fixed
for every jarib (2,400 square metres). The actual rate of taxation per jarib varied
with the quality of land, the crop, the expected productivity, and the estimated
value of the produce. The rates also varied with distance from the market,
availability of water, type of irrigation, transportation, and so on.

In addition, everyone was expected to pay a poll tax on gold coins. In Syria
and Mesopotamia, land taxes were levied based on the iugum, or the amount of
land that could be worked by one man and a team of animals in a day. A special
poll tax was levied on urban, non-farming populations. In Egypt too there were
both land and poll taxes but the poll tax was assessed on the whole village
population and then divided up internally by the villagers. For provinces such as
Khurasan, where there was no centralised administration, and taxation and
tribute payments were left in the hands of local notables, we have no conclusive
information about the nature of the tax system.

There were certain repercussions of taxation as well. Taxes on peasants often

reached 50 per cent of the value of their produce, and at such levels, the incidence
of taxation determined whether life for the mass of the people would be tolerable.
The level of investment made to sustain productivity and the attention paid to the
soil were both impacted by taxes. It affected the selection of crops. It dictated
whether or not the peasants would emigrate, leaving their homes and farms to
deteriorate, or remain in the communities and work the land. In addition, taxes
shaped societal structure. Taxes were collected against certain groups of people
to help others. Taxes were paid by workers, merchants, and peasants. They were
gathered by landowners, managers, monks, soldiers, and emperors. Therefore, as
Ira Lapidus puts it, it was not just an economic burden, it was a sign of social
inferiority.

The Arab conquests thus followed a pattern familiar to past nomadic

conquests of settled regions. The conquering peoples became the military elite,
and the settled societies were exploited to support them. The governing
arrangements were a compromise between the elites of the conquering peoples
and those of the conquered or settled peoples, in which the interests of the
former in military power and adequate revenues were assured in exchange for
permitting the latter to retain their local political, religious, and financial
autonomy. Both, of course, leaned on the tax-paying peasantry.

The conquests had a great impact on the patterns of international trade as

well. Political and strategic barriers to trade were removed with the union of the
old Sasanian and Byzantine regions of the Middle East into one state, laying the
groundwork for a significant commercial renaissance. Transoxania was absorbed
into a Middle Eastern empire for the first time in history as the Euphrates
boundary between the Persian and Roman kingdoms vanished. But between Syria
and Anatolia, which had previously been a single state, a new border was
established. Arab urbanisation in northern Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Transoxania was
motivated by commercial interests, as was Arab growth in Inner Asia and India.
Basra and (later) Baghdad rose to prominence as two of the world's major
commerce hubs. Bukhara, Nishapur, and Samarqand all grew prosperous.
 The conquests also had negative effects on agriculture and regional
development. Iraq, on the eve of the Arab conquests, suffered from neglect of
irrigation, exploitative taxation, and severe wars with the Roman empire.
Agricultural production also declined seriously in the Diyala region, which
depended upon state-maintained irrigation.

While the conquests had led to some deep economic impacts, Arab rule,
however, provided a stable government and encouraged recovery. At places like
Basra, Kulfa, Mosul, Al-wasit and other places where the Arabs stationed their
garrison towns, efforts were made to stimulate cultural output and develop fresh
sources of food for the new cities. These investments were highly selective and
favoured new areas over old areas of production. The net effect was to restore
regions that had Arab settlements and allow others to decay.

The Arab conquest and migrations in Iran were also advantageous for urban
and agricultural growth. Economic expansion was boosted by security, trade, a
new population, and Arab policies for settlement, city development, and
irrigation. The Arabs did not find any new cities in Iran; instead, they settled in
pre-existing locations. Arab garrisons were stationed in significant locations like
Hamaclhan, Isfahan, Qazvin, Rayy, Nishapur, and Maiw. These were typically
housed in recently built apartments and villages outside of the town centres.

Moreover, in Iran, construction and settlement continued beyond the initial

conquest. Caliphs and administrators expanded the old cities during the seventh
and ninth centuries. Each prominent governor established new residences,
palaces, mosques, barracks, gardens, and canals while importing his clientele of
guards, soldiers, and administrators. They began cultivating the nearby
agricultural lands. Later, the Caliphs expanded cities from clusters of quarters
and villages by building walls and establishing governmental jurisdictions.
Isfahan, Rayy, and Qazvin all grew into sizable cities as a result. Qum developed
into a significant town from a straightforward collection of farming settlements.

Whole areas flourished, notably the areas around Samarqand and Bukhara,
which were favoured with new settlements and villages, irrigation systems, and
fortifications to protect them against Turkish nomads. Before the Arab invasions,
Khwarizm, the Oxus River delta, comprised small hamlets and farmsteads dotted
with feudal castles, but it later became extremely urbanised and densely
populated.

However, it is also important to note that not all the provinces flourished.
The Arab conquest negatively impacted the long-term prospects for economic
development in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt. For a while, Syria's wealth was
boosted by the Caliphate's position in Damascus, but the establishment of a new
border with Anatolia severely hindered its economy. Formerly famous for
growing olives, the region north of Aleppo was abandoned due to Syria’s cut-off
from its market in Anatolia. The region east of the line from Raqqa to Damascus
to Aqaba, famous for making wine, similarly declined due to the loss of markets.

In most places, Arab migrants had been forced to settle in cities, quarters, or
villages, but in this region, bedouins were allowed to occupy unused steppe lands.
The nomads quickly started attacking towns and communities. Pastoralism
severely hampered trade and agriculture. In Egypt, exploitation of the tax system
sparked major peasant uprisings in 697, 712, and 725-26, which reflected Coptic
hostility to Muslim rulers as well as economic discontent.

Therefore, in conclusion, we can say, as put articulately by Ira Lapidus, that

the net effect of the Arab conquests and empire was prosperity in Iran, a
redistribution of the pattern of development in Iraq, and the economic decline of
Mesopotamia, Syria and Egypt.
 While considering various developments under the administration and
taxation regime of the Rashidun caliphate, the questions about the treatment of
the conquered non-muslim and the Arab muslims, and the social organisation in
general , becomes a significant one.

The strict differences between the Arab and non-Arab populations proved to
be untenable under the pressure of war, migration, and intensive economic
change. There was mutual assimilation of conquered and conquering peoples
based on a new community and a new Islamic identity. Increased sedentarization
itself created pressures for the assimilation of Arabs into the surrounding
societies.

The Arab garrisons at Isfahan, Marw, Nishapur, and Balkh quickly settled in
villages and rose to the status of landlords or peasants. Only 15,000 of the 50,000
families who had originally migrated to Marw in 670 were still serving in the
military by 730. By that time, the majority of the Arab army had quit its active
duty to pursue civilian careers. Parties of Arabs from Basra and Kufa occupied
Azerbaijan's farms and settlements, establishing themselves as the region's
landowner nobility. Arab immigrants established new settlements, reclaimed
abandoned land, and settled as a peasant community in Kirman.

Furthermore, in Iran occupational assimilation was accompanied by social

assimilation. While some Persians were converted to Islam, the Arabs by and
large assimilated to the Persian milieu. Arabs spoke Persian, dressed like
Persians, celebrated Persian holidays, and married Persian women.

Additionally, the garrison towns themselves became focal points of societal

development. A more socially stratified, occupationally diversified, and
communally organised Arab urban society emerged from the matrix of Arabian
family and lineage societies. This society was integrated into non-Arab
communities to create a new kind of cosmopolitan community. For instance,
Basra, which was first built as a camp city for migratory Bedouin soldiers, turned
out to be a melting pot of ethnicities.

The military and administrative systems also generated profound changes.

They required that the natural units of Arabian society be rearranged into
artificial groups. To make uniform regiments and pay units of about a thousand
men, big clans were subdivided and smaller ones combined

Chiefs and common tribesmen were segregated by class. The presence of

privately held palaces and agricultural estates implies that the leaders were living
a life that was far different from that of the majority of their clansmen in terms of
wealth, privileges, and way of life. The separation between the chiefs and their
subjects grew wider due to military and administrative duties. A new class layer
made up of the military elites started to emerge, strengthened by marital
relationships. Tribal society was disintegrating and being replaced with a society
that was stratified according to wealth and power.

The settlement also entailed the transformation of bedouins and soldiers

into an economically differentiated working population.

Basra developed as an important administrative capital and centre of cloth

manufacturing and as a trading city connected with Iran, India, China, and
Arabia, Arab settlers became merchants, traders, artisans, and workers,
supplementing their meagre military allotments with new incomes. Similarly, the
new religion of Islam offered opportunities for social mobil­ity through careers in
teaching, scholarship, and legal administration.

At the same time, the settlement also helped to break down the barriers
between Arab and non-Arab populations. As the capital and commercial centre,
Basra attracted non-Arab settlers. These non-Arab settlers were extremely
diverse. The city was flooded by Slaves - captured and purchased - itinerant
construc­ on workers, and fugitive peasants and migrant labourers, seeking
employment and relief from the harshness of the countryside.

This non-Arab population's integration into Arab society has significant

effects. The Arabs attempted to incorporate the immigrants as clients into the
previous clan system (mawali, sing, mawla ). A client was a subordinate member of
an Arab clan in pre-Islamic Arabia, where the idea of clientship originated.
Although many people were adopted immediately into the status, he was
frequently a former slave who was set free before being promoted to the position
of a client.

The client and his successors were practically members of the clan. Mawali
could count on assistance with marriage arrangements as well as support and
protection. The subordinates' devotion was swapped for the powerful's
protection. Arab clans, on the other hand, stopped being kin groupings as they
absorbed mawali and instead evolved into tiered political and economic entities
with a familial core. The distance between the noble and peasant clans grew. For
instance, in the Tamim tribe, the noble clans were able to secure the services of
former Persian cavalry units, while other clans owned slaves who worked as
weavers and slave labourers. Clientage also generated class conflicts between the
mawali and their overlords.

As a result, within fifty years, the emergence of new cities and the
distribution of political and economic power to new populations and geographic
areas sparked the interaction of Arab and non-Arab peoples. Arabs became
landlords, traders, and settlers while non-Arabs permeated the Arab-Muslim
military caste as converts and companions.
 The social change took cultural expression through conversions to Islam and
acceptance of Arabic or Persian as shared languages. Conversion, however, was a
very slow process. Though the original assumption of Muslim and Western
writers was that the Middle East was quickly and massively converted to Islam,
nowhere in the Arab sources is there explicit information about the conversion of
large numbers of people, and certainly not of whole villages, towns, and regions.

Along with conversions, even common languages emerged. Arabic spread and
became the language of written communication in administration, literature and
religion. The spread of Arabic was faster than the diffusion of Islam, but this is
not to say that the process was rapid or complete. For example, Coptic was still
spoken in Fustat in the eighth century.

Thus, a century after Arab-Muslim conquests, the fundamental ideas that

guided the empire's structure were no longer relevant. Arabian peoples were to
be a "nation in arms," settled in garrison centres, separated from the subject
peoples, limited to military pursuits, and forbidden from commerce and
cultivation under the nomadic kingdom established by the Caliph Umar. Their
right was to become Muslims. Non-Arab peoples were expected to maintain their
religious and communal affiliations as well as the productive employment that
allowed them to support the governing class.

However, throughout the course of the first century of Islam, the Arabs
transformed from a clan or tribal people to an "urban" population; they
interacted with non-Arab peoples, gave up their armed pursuits, took up civilian
professions, and lost their hold on Islam. As a result, non-Arab peoples joined the
military and the government, embraced Islam, learned Arabic, and demanded a
seat in the administration of the empire they had been initially a part of. The
future society, no longer divided between Arab conquerors and conquered
peoples but united based on their commitment to Islam and sharing an Arabic
and/or Persian linguistic identity, was made possible by economic and social
change in the garrison centres, conversions, and shared languages.

It is also important to note that the formation of Islamic Middle Eastern

communities and the reciprocal absorption of peoples, however, only happened
in a small number of garrison centres. The cosmopolitan communities set the
tone for Middle Eastern politics and culture for generations to come, even as the
remainder of the Middle Eastern population remained outside the influence of
the new civilizations and still beholden to their more ancient heritage. Lastly, the
nature of the Ummah increasingly changed in the reign of Ali and especially after
his death.

Ali was chosen as the Caliph in 656, following the passing of Uthman. His
policies diverged significantly from those of Uthman; he supported an equitable
division of taxes and loot among the Arabs and opposed the Caliphal's
consolidation of power over regional income. Ali claimed the Caliphate based on
his devotion to Muhammad and Islam as well as his status as one of the early
converts to Islam. However, by gaining control alongside 'Uthman's murderers,
he undermined his claim to the Caliphate. Armstrong writes that Ali was in a
difficult position when it came to the death of Uthman. He must himself have
been shocked by Uthman's murder, which, as a devout man, he could not
condone. But his supporters insisted that Uthman deserved death since he had
not ruled justly, according to the Quranic ideal. Ali could not disown his
partisans and took refuge in Kufah, where he made his capital.

Ali’s accession led to factional fighting. The Prophet's beloved wife, Aisha,
and a group commanded by the Meccan aristocrats Talha and Zubayr initially
opposed him. He defeated them in the Battle of the Camel in 656, though. The
governor of Syria and Uthman's cousin Mu'awiya then opposed Ali, rejecting his
demands for allegiance and demanding vengeance for Uthman's death and the
punishment of his assassins. There was also the Battle of Siffin in 657 between
Ali and Muahwiyah, the governor of Syria, who wanted to avenge the death of
his cousin brother, Uthman.

Armstrong points out that the spectacle of the Prophet's relatives and
companions poised to attack one another was profoundly disturbing.
Muhammad's mission had been to promote unity among Muslims and to
integrate the Ummah so that it reflected the unity of God. To prevent the
appalling possibility of further conflict, the two sides tried to negotiate a
settlement at 657, which proved inconclusive. After months of desultory
confrontation and negotiations, the moderates forced an agreement to arbitrate
the question of whether Uthman’s murder was justified. Some of Ali’s supporters,
called the Kharijis (secessionists), saw his willingness to submit to the arbitration
as a defeat for their own hopes of his Caliphate and a violation of religious
principles.

For the Kharijites, the killing of Uthman was justified. They viewed
submission to an arbitration by Ali as a defeat for their hopes of his Caliphate
and a violation of religious principles. These were called Kharijites (secessionists)
by Ali. Ali suppressed these extremists, but the movement gained adherents
throughout the empire. Many people desired to implement the egalitarian spirit
of the Quran because they had been disturbed by the nepotism of Uthman's
reign. The Kharijites were always a small minority, but their viewpoint was
significant because it marked the beginning of a significant Muslim trend in
which politics that had an impact on the Ummah's morality gave rise to new
theological developments. The Kharijites believed that the caliph should not be a
power-seeker like Muawiyyah but rather the most devout Muslim, not the most
powerful Muslim. They believed that human beings have free will, and as God is
just, he will punish evildoers like Muawiyah, Uthman, and Ali who turned away
from Islam and became apostates. Although the Kharijites were extremists, they
made Muslims think about who was and wasn't a Muslim. The political
leadership had such a significant role as a theological concept that it sparked debates
about the nature of God, predestination, and human freedom.

Many Arabs remained neutral as Muawiyyah steadily gained ground. The

arbitrators met at Adhruh in January 659, and agreed that the murder of Uthman
was unjustified, and that a shura, or council, should be called to elect a new
Caliph. Ali rejected the outcome, but his coalition disintegrated. Moreover, the
protracted struggle had begun to threaten the security of the empire and the flow
of revenues. As rebellions in eastern Iran cut off the payment of taxes to the
tribesmen of Basra and Kufa, Arab opinion favored the succession of Muahwyiya
to the Caliphate because he was backed by disciplined forces, and because it
seemed that he could maintain order within the Arab-Muslim elite and Arab
control over the empire. After 'Ali’s assassination by a Khariji, Muawiyyah
declared himself Caliph and was accepted by the dominant interests. He was the
founder of the Umayyad dynasty.

In the course of these events, the nature of Ummah changed significantly

. A new capital was established by Muawiyyah at Damascus. The civil war created
permanent divisions within the Muslim community. Hence, Muslims were
divided over who had the legitimate right to occupy the Caliphate. Muslims who
accepted the succession of Muawiyah and the historical sequence of Caliphs after
him are called the Sunnis. Those who held that Ali was the only rightful Caliph
and that only his descendants should succeed him are called the Shi’a. The Shi’a
tended to stress the religious functions of the Caliphate and deplore its political
compromises, while the Sunnis were inclined to circumscribe its religious role
and to be more tolerant of its political involvements. The Kharijites held that the
Caliphate should not be determined by descent, but that the Caliph should be
elected by the community of Muslims at large and hold his position only so long
as he was sinless in the conduct of his office. As these early differences were
vested with ever-widening religious importance, Sunnis, Shi’a, and Kharijites
developed separate versions of Islam and formed distinct religious bodies within
the community as a whole.

Rival parties now referred to the tragic events of the first fitnah as a symbol
as they attempted to understand their Islamic mission. But everyone concurred
that the move to Umayyad Damascus from Medina, the capital of the Rashidun
and the Prophet, was more than merely politically expedient. The Ummah
appeared to be drifting away from the Prophet's reality and was at risk of losing
sight of its purpose. Muslims who were more devout and concerned sought new
solutions to get things back on track.

The rise of Muawiyah led to the emergence of the Umayyad caliphate in 661
AD. The first fitnah and lethal civil wars left deep scars in the minds of the
Muslims and they wanted peace restored by a stable, strong and centralised
government. Muawiyyah was an able ruler and a very successful politician who
was able to provide the Arabs what they wanted from a leader.

After coming to power, he began a cycle of efforts to reconstruct both the

authority and power of the Caliphate and to deal with the factionalism within the
ruling elite. He already had the affections of the Syrians, but now he had to
assert the credibility of a Caliph and work to unify the Muslim community which
had been so badly damaged in the preceding years. Some opposition that he faced
was not just from people who resented his assumption of power but people who
resented the whole idea of a strong and efficient government. He revived Umar’s
system of segregating the Arab Muslims from the population. He discouraged
conversion and was able to build an efficient administration. He gradually
transformed the disparate regions conquered by Muslim armies into a unified
Empire, with a common ideology. He possessed a very important virtue which
many Arab sources described as hilm. It meant possessing the shrewdness,
moderation and self-control that the situation demanded. He had a talent of
dealing with his followers in a way that they cooperated without feeling that their
dignity had been offended.

He had the loyalty and support of the Syrian army but he did not use this
military power as an instrument to keep control over other provinces. He used it
to attack the Byzantines on land and sea. He ruled by making agreements with
those who were powerful in the provinces by building up the power of those who
were prepared to cooperate with him and by attaching as many influential figures
to his cause as possible. The Umayyad dynasty did not possess the character of an
absolute government with a central authority. It was like a confederation of
different leaders acknowledging one overall authority.

The caliph demanded acceptance of his authority from the provincial

governors. In some cases, they were also required to forward revenues to the
central government. Beyond that, the governors were allowed to establish their
own power bases and assure the fortunes of their families and friends. He also
sought to build up revenues from private incomes, from confiscated Byzantine
and Sasanian crown lands and from investments in reclamation and irrigation.
He supplemented the limited income derived from provincial taxation in two
ways: by the frontier warfare and the booty and tribute also helped in securing
the loyalty of the Syrians.

The second way was large scale agricultural developments. If Muawiyyah

caliphate was decentralised politically, it was decentralised administratively as
well. There was no attempt made to introduce a general, Arabic-speaking
administrative system for the whole Muslim world. Each province continued
with the local traditions of the previous rulers. This local autonomy was typified
by the coinage. There was no Islamic coinage as such and each province used and
supplemented where necessary the existing money supply, the gold dinar of the
Byzantine areas and the silver dirham of the Sasanian countries. Thus, taxation
systems differed and there was no uniformity in the dues paid by the native
inhabitants of different areas. These were determined by local tradition and the
circumstances of the conquest rather than by government policy.

His emphasis on the patriarchal aspects of the Caliphate can be seen from the
policies and measures he undertook. His growing police and financial powers
were cloaked by the traditional Arab virtues of conciliation, consultation,
generosity and respect for the forms of tribal relation. As Umayyads further rose
to power, the court naturally began to develop a rich culture and luxurious
lifestyle. It started to acquire the same character as other ruling classes. Karen
Armstrong writes that it would be wrong to think of the Umayyads as “secular”
rulers. Muawiyyah was a religious man and a devout Muslim, according to the
prevailing notion of Islam. He was devoted to the sanctity of Jerusalem, the first
Muslim qiblah and the home of so many of the great prophets of the past. He
worked hard to maintain the unity of the ummah. His rule was based on the
Quranic insistence that all Muslims were brothers and must not fight one
another. He accorded the dhimmis religious freedom and personal rights on the
basis of Quranic teaching.

The one serious problem which disturbed the later years of Muawiyyah’s reign
was the ordering of succession. He had already realised that he must depart from
Arab traditions in order to secure the succession, and before he died he arranged
the accession of his son, Yazid I. But there was an immediate outcry. In Kufah,
loyal Alids called for the rule of Ali's second son, Husain, who set out from
Medina to Iraq with a small band of followers, together with their wives and
children. The local Umayyad governor intimidated the Kufans and raised troops
to suppress this outcry. Husain refused to surrender, however, convinced that the
sight of the Prophet's family on the march in quest for true Islamic values would
remind the ummah of its prime duty.

On the plain of Karbala, just outside Kufah, he and his followers were
surrounded by the Umayyad troops and massacred. This is known as the Battle of
Karbala. Though the battle was one-sided and ended with a decisive victory of
the Umayyads, the fallen soldiers of the Husaynid faction, including Husain
himself have ever since been venerated as martyrs of Islam. All Muslims lament
this tragic death of the Prophet's grandson, but Husain's fate focused the
attention of those who regarded themselves as the Shiah i-Ali even more
intensely on the Prophet's descendants. Like the murder of Ali, the Kerbala
tragedy became a symbol for Shii Muslims of the chronic injustice that seems to
pervade human life; it also seemed to show the impossibility of integrating the
religious imperative in the harsh world of politics, which seemed murderously
antagonistic to it.

Even more serious was the revolt in the Hijaz led by Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr,
the son of one of the rebels against Ali at the Battle of the Camel; this was also an
attempt to return to the pristine values of the first ummah , by wresting power
away from the Umayyads and restoring it to Mecca and Medina. In 683, Umayyad
troops took Medina, but lifted their siege of Mecca in the confusion that followed
the premature death of Yazid I and his infant son Muawiyyah II that year. Yet
again the ummah was ripped apart by civil war. Ibn al-Zubayr achieved
widespread recognition as caliph, but he was isolated in the Hijaz when Kharijite
rebels established an independent state in central Arabia in 684; there were other
Kharijite uprisings in Iraq and Iran; Shiis rose up in Kufah to avenge the death of
Husain, and to promote the candidature of another of Ali's sons.

The rebels all asserted the egalitarian ideals of the Quran, but it was the Syrian
forces who carried the day in the name of Manvan, an Umayyad cousin of
Muawiyyah I, and his son Abd al-Malik. By 691 they had disposed of all their
rivals, and the following year had defeated and killed Ibn al-Zubayr himself.

Muawiyyah’s death in AD 680 led to the second fitnah (civil war) which lasted
from 680-692 AD. The causes that had led to the first fitnah had not really been
done away with in Muawiyyah’s reign and the Arab nobles continued their
attempts to take control of the Caliphate. The opposition to Muawiyyah’s
appointment of his son, Yazid, was one of the main issues behind the second civil
war. It was during the latter’s reign that the Shi’ites sought to place the Prophet’s
son Al-Husayn at the head of the Caliphate, as the Khalifa.

The eldest son, Al-Hassan had given up his claim earlier, but Al-Husayn was
prepared to make the claim; this however, ended in the disastrous conflict at
Karbala where Al-Husayn and his infant son were killed along with most of his
supporters, as has been mentioned above. The Karbala tragedy is remembered by
Shi’a Muslims on the day of Muharram. There was intense fighting amongst the
factions, a conflict which continued from the sectarian divisions that had
emerged in the first fitnah. The most serious of the crises of this period was the
Hijaz revolt led by Abdallah ibn-al-Zubayr, who was one of the many claimants to
the Caliphate. The Kharijis succeeded in controlling a large extent of territory,
although this did not include any of the major garrison towns, and gained a
considerable amount of support from the rural population. In Kufah, the Shi'a
uprising was actively supported and enlarged by those who wanted revenge for
the massacre of Al-Husayn. Eventually, Marwan and his son Abd al-Malik, from
the Umayyad house, supported by the Syrian Yemeni armies, succeeded in
deposing the various rebels and established the Marwanid Caliphate in Syria, at
Damascus.

The Marwanid (under the Umayyads itself) Caliphate was established in 685
AD under Marwan, who was a cousin of Muawiyya and suppressed the revolt led
by Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr. Marwan’s successor was Abd al-Malik (685-705 AD),
who, as Lapidus points out, had introduced wide-ranging changes that led to a
new form of the Middle-eastern empire, different from the earlier coalition of
nomadic conquerors. Al-Malik, along with his lieutenant Al-Hajjaj, set into
motion processes that essentially reinvented the Caliphate. Al-Hajjaj was
instrumental in suppressing the Khariji revolts as well as the uprisings in Kufa
and Basra in Iraq.

The emphasis of the socio-economic changes was on an intensive

centralisation of power and control of the Caliphate over tribal autonomies.
Al-Malik further sought to re-affirm his power, especially in the garrisons of Iraq
such as Kufa and Basra where the Arabs were demilitarised; a new garrison city
was built at Al-Wasit and the Syrian army was given authority over the Iraqi
subjects. Gradually, the Arab population was becoming a part of the subjects of
the empire than rulers and the difference between the Arabs and the non-Arabs
became more a matter of social privileges than political dominance.

The essence of Arabism was maintained, however, in a new form. Arabic was
made the official language of the state, thereby replacing Greek and Pahlavi. A
new currency was also issued in Arabic wherein the coins were minted with
phrases from the Quran. Within civilian and military life, therefore, supremacy
was based on Arab ways of life. The new coinage was significant in that it was
perhaps a gesture against the dominant gold standards of the Byzantine empire
in Syria and Hijaz, and it further asserted that Muslim rule was permanent and
independent, as Hodgson has pointed out.
 Another change was in the reorganisation of the court of the Caliphate; earlier
there had been a predominance of the Arab chiefs around the Khalifa, now a
managing officer was in charge of the visitors and the daily business. The
important positions such as governorships were still given to Arab chiefs but the
government business employed both Arab and non-Arab administrators. Roads
were rebuilt and the postal service was also reorganised. Uniform tax seals were
issued in large numbers and the tax records were maintained and translated in
Arabic. The Greek and Persian-speaking bureaucracy was also gradually replaced
by Arabic-speaking officials which continued till about the tenth century. With
these new officials, censuses and land surveys were carried out extensively
throughout the empire as part of Marwanid administrative policies.

Conquests as a part of foreign policy still continued, albeit in a different

fashion than the earlier tribal migrations and campaigns by the Arabs. Abd
al-Malik’s conquests were carried out with the aim of imperial domination and in
the form of planned attacks with the support of non-Arabs. As a result of the
Marwanid conquests, North Africa, Spain, Transoxania and Sind came under the
Islamic empire. Expeditions to Constantinople were also carried out but these
met with failure on three separate attempts.

Abd al-Malik was perhaps more pious than his Umayyad predecessors, and
was aware of a new Islamic movement in Arabia. He claimed that his policies and
reforms were supported by the Quran itself and thus, he sought divine legitimacy.
As Marshal Hodgson points out, the principle of jama’ah is important here in the
context of Abd- al-Malik’s relations with the Arabs; it encouraged the unity of all
Arabs under Islam, rather than the tribal factions. It also served as an
administrative unifier within the empire. This was also the period when the
Dome of Rock was completed (in 691 AD) in the city of Jerusalem that was
predominantly Christian and hence, was a symbol of Islamic supremacy. The
monument represents some of the primary architectural styles of the Islamic
world, such as the towering dome, absence of figurative art and the presence of
Quranic verses in its place, all of which were unique to the Islamic visual arts.

Throughout the socio-economic reforms, there was an attempt to maintain the

supremacy of Islam. There were appointments of special judges called the qais,
who were tasked with settling disputes among the Muslims on the basis of the
Islamic tenets. There was a hesitation to allow converts from the subject
population (peasants) to Islam; this was a popular view among all the Muslims.
Abd al-Malik discouraged conversions, partly because the subject converts then
claimed the right to be exempted from the taxes among the non-Muslims. Those
in command were to be guided by Islam, and these commanding leaders were to
be Arabs.

However, as was seen, by the time of Abd al-Malik, social intermingling

between the privileged and the subjects was already underway. So for instance,
many of the Arabs bought land and became landlords and thereby, began to have
direct contact with the sources of revenue in the countryside. On the other hand,
officials converted to Islam to maintain their positions; merchants and peasants
also found work in the towns and converted to settle alongside the Arabs.
Therefore, the administration of the conquered lands and the governance of the
privileged Arabs could not be kept separate for long, as has been argued by
Hodgson.

In the east, al-Hajjaj utilised his resources in restoring the irrigation of the
Mesopotamian basin. This proved to be a profitable investment and magnified
the economic role of Iraq. In addition, Al-Malik restored the Hijaz-Syria axis
which was a significant outgrowth of the Meccan mercantile system in the Hijaz.
 Abd al-Malik had left a well-established empire to his successor, Al-Walid I.
After Al-Malik, a hereditary succession was also adopted without conflict from
the Arab nobles for the first time, except perhaps from the extremely devout.
This hereditary succession without any contestations, set the Caliphate firmly in
the direction of an absolute monarchy.

The two fitnahs before the Marwanid Caliphate raised significant questions on
various aspects of the Islamic Caliphate and spiritual life. These civil wars also
came to influence the way people saw the Caliphate and the role of the Quran in
the community. Here, we see the various factions that existed within the
community- the Kharajites who believed that the Khalifa should be the most
pious Muslim and the Shi'is who supported the direct descendants of the Prophet
as leaders of the ummah and the supporters of the Umayyad Caliphate. These
political debates set the space for the discussions on the religion and piety within
Islam. The emphasis in all these debates was on placing the Islamic identity
before the Arabic identity of the community. The basis for this was taken from
the Quran which spoke of the unification (tawhid) of all aspects of human life,
which includes the actions of the individual as well as the state.

Alongside these factions, several schools of thought emerged within the Sunni
tradition as a result of the intense spiritual and political debates within the
ummah and Islam. The Qadarites were one of them; they studied the decrees
(qadr) of God and believed that humans had free will and were responsible for
their actions. Therefore, the Caliph was accountable for his deeds. The
Qadarriyah theology accepted the Umayyad rule since it seemed to preserve the
unity of the ummah. The most supreme example of the Qadariyyah theology was
Hasan al-Basri (d. 728 AD), who taught his followers to deeply meditate on the
Quran. He supported the Umayyad Caliphate, but also criticised them if their
actions were against the Quranic tenets.
 The Mutazilites developed a rationalistic theology (kalam) which laid emphasis
on unity and simplicity of God. They were political activists on the whole but
refrained from choosing between Ali and Muawiyyah, although some supported
the Shi'i rebellions.

Another school, the Murjites also refused to judge between Ali and
Muawiyyah, since they focused on a person's interior disposition and argued that
Muslims must defer from judgement (arja) as according to the Quran. The
Umayyads must not be condemned unless their actions went against the tenets of
Islam as in the scriptures. The Shi'is also saw the same kind of diversities within
themselves and were fragmented into numerous sects.

The policies of the Umayyad caliphate brought attention to the question of

who had the authority to define Muslim beliefs, practices, and symbols. With the
minting of Muslim slogans on coinage and the construction of the Dome of the
Rock and other mosques, the Caliphs (beginning with Abd al-Malik) declared
their patronage of Islam and claimed a more exalted status for themselves as
rulers with divine legitimacy.

An important aspect of the early Muslim ideas of spirituality and religion was
the veneration of the Prophet. It remains, along with the Quran, a significant
feature of Islam. The image of the prophet appropriated two major themes: one
was of Muhammad as a lawgiver and the leader of the community, he was the
model for the ritual and social behaviour to be followed by all Muslims. The other
presented Muhammad as a miraculous being bearing divine qualities as well as
being blessed by the angels of God. The biographies which were produced show
the Prophet as performing miraculous works.

Furthermore, there was an attempt on the part of Islamic jurists such as Abu
Hanifah (699-767 AD), to establish legal norms for the interpretation of the Quran
and for governing the society according to Islamic principles. In cities such as
Kufah, Basrah, Medina and Damascus, these early jurists or faqihs set out legal
systems for the particular regions. In its most rudimentary form, Islamic law
developed out of a need to set out norms for everyday functioning of society. One
precedent for this was the customary laws of the Arabian tribes as well as the
Roman, Persian, Jewish and Christian legal traditions. Quranic interpretations
only added to these ongoing processes in jurisprudence. This legal elaboration
will be discussed in the next section.

The new discipline of jurisprudence (fiqh), had a significant impact on islam

piety and became the main discipline of higher education in the Islam world.
Fiqh originated from the overwhelming unhappiness following the civil wars.
Men often gathered in each other's houses to discuss the inadequacies of the
Umayyad government. They discussed issues like how the society could be run
according to islamic principles. Their goal was to establish a just society that
surrendered wholly to God's will and were intent on drafting legal codes that
would make such a society a reality.

In Basra, Kufa, Medina and Damascus these early jurists (faqihs) worked out a
legal system for their particular locality. They faced a problem in that the Quran
consists of very little legislation and whatever laws it had was meant for a simple
society. They tried to solve this by collecting news or reports about the Prophet
and his companions to find out how they had behaved in a given situation. These
reports were called the ahadith. Others approached this in the opposite manner-
by first finding out the customary practice (sunnah) of muslims in their city. Then
they traced it back to one of the companions who had settled there in the early
days. This way they believed they would be able to gain true ilm, a knowledge of
what was right and how to behave.
 Abu Hanifah was the greatest legal expert of the period. The foundation of the
madhhab, a school of jurisprudence which muslims still follow to this day is
credited to him. As new legal theories were developed, different madhabs started
emerging.

The history writing of Islam also emerged from a similar kind of discussion. It
stemmed from the belief that the solution to their current difficulties lay in the
past, particularly in the period of the Prophet and the rashidun. The decision to
document their history also sparked an intense debate within the Islam circles as
to what should be included- For instance should the Caliph be considered a
member of the tribe of Quraysh, or as a descendant of one of the ansar? What
was the Prophet’s view on this?

Historians such as Muhammed ibn Ishaq, started to collect ahadith which

explained some of the passages of the Quran by relating them to the historical
circumstances in which the prophet had received a particular revelation. He
wrote a detailed biography of Muhammed and inclined towards the Shii position
that Muslims should be ruled by the descendants of Muhammed and not the
descendants of Abu Sufyan . In this way, History became a means to justify the
opposition to the regime.

Abd al-Malik was able to ensure that his son al-Walid I succeeded him and this
marked the first instance where dynastic succession was accepted without any
problems. Al- Walid reigns was in many ways a continuation of his fathers and
was a period of prosperity and peace in many parts of the empire. He instituted a
system of poor relief and public charity in Syria and began many building
projects, notably the Umayyad mosque in Damascus. al-Walid attempted to strike
a balance between the different groups in the Syrian elite and keep a check on the
rivalry for power between the Qaysi and Yamani leaders.
 The Umayyad dynasty peaked during his reign. The Ummayads continued the
Muslim conquests, incorporating the Transoxiana, Sindh, Maghreb and Iberian
Peninsula( Al- Andalus) into the Muslim world. At its greatest extent, the
Umayyad Caliphate covered 11,100,000 sq. kilometres and 33 million people,
making it one of the largest empires in history both in terms of area and
proportion of the world's population. Under al-Walid, the muslim armies
continued the conquest of North Africa and established a kingdon in Spain. This
marked the limit of the western expansion of Islam.

The administrative and military decisions of the Caliphate during this period
were also firmly rooted in an ideological policy as opposed to the early reigns
which were dependent on the personal religious or patriarchal qualities of the
Caliphs. The new system did away with Christian and Zoroastrian symbolism,
and introduced gold and silver coins with Arabic script to assert the sovereignty
of the state - and its independent form, and superiority to - the previous empires.
The state also affirmed its sovereignty by undertaking monumental
constructions. Under Abd al-Malik, Jerusalem was appropriated as a holy place
for Islam, and the Dome of the Rock was built on the site of the ancient Hebrew
Temple. He also built new mosques in Medina and Damascus. Their decoration
symbolized the glory of the Arabs, the primacy of the state and its
indispensability to Islam.

However, assertion of Arab power in this means did not allay the political and
social unrest. The mawalis, i.e non-arab muslims who served as soldiers in the
armies and as administrators in the government bureaucracy demanded equality
of status and privilege with the Arabs. Among the Arabs, bitter factional
struggles continued,including the civil war between Yemenis and Qays. After the
second civil war, the Yemenis came to represent those demilitarised Arabs who
were incorporated to civilian pursuits, and took up trade in the city or became
village landowners or cultivators. They accepted the assimilation of Arab and
non-Arab populations. They desired peace rather than continued wars of
expansion, financial equality for Arabs and converts, and the decentralisation of
Caliphate power. They tended to stress Islamic rather than purely Arab
identifications.

By contrast, the Qays represented those Arabs who were actively engaged in
the army and who depended for their incomes on conquests, government
administration, and tax revenues. They pushed for centralized political power,
military expansion, and the preservation of Arab privileges at the expense of
sedentarized Arabs, converts, and non-Muslim interests. They accepted the
assimilation of Arab and non-Arab populations. They demanded financial parity
between Arabs and converts, the decentralisation of Caliphate power, and peace
rather than more wars. They tended to place more emphasis on Islamic than just
Arab identifications. The Qays, on the other hand, represented those Arabs who
actively participated in the military and derived their salaries from conquests,
government administration, and taxation. At the cost of the peace mongering
Arabs, converts, and non-Muslim interests, they pushed for the consolidation of
political authority, military expansion, and the protection of Arab privileges.

The Shiite believers were also not in favourable terms with the Umayyads.
They viewed the takeover of the empire from Abd-al Malik to al-Walid as the
transformation of the Caliphate into a Mulk, i.e hereditary kingship and that this
way the Umayyads were guilty of abandoning and corrupting the Islamic polity.
They had also fallen out with the Quraysh of Arabia, who wanted Medina to be
the capital region rather than Damascus, which was the capital of the Umayyads.
Umayyads had to grapple with rival forces in Iraq and the Byzantine empire as
well.
 It was in the midst of this social unrest that al-Walid I passed away in 715, and
as per Abd al-Malik’s dictum was succeeded by his brother Sulayman. Sulayman
was a generous and easy going prince who had served as the governor of
Palestine. Unlike Abd al-Malik, who attempted to strike a balance between Qaysi
and Yamani’s, Sulayman prioritised the Yamani’s which was evident from his
government appointments. The major event under his reign was the Holy war,
and he died on the way while leading the expedition against the Syrian frontier.
This marked the end of his short reign of two years.

Sulayman was succeeded by Umar. Umar’s reign saw the failed attempt to
conquer Constantinople, which resulted in a huge loss of manpower and
equipment. The struggle amongst the various factions came to a head in his
reign. Umar tried to counter the domination of the Arabs over the other castes
and believed that the people who filled the armies and staffed the administration,
the merchants and artisans were all equal participants in the empire. The empire
had to move from being a predominantly Arab-dominated one to one which
served as the imperium of all the muslims in the world. He thus stood for the
conversion of all the people of West Asia to Islam and their acceptance as equals
of the Arabs.

In accordance with this principle he accepted the long-standing demand of the

mawali that all active Muslim soldiers, Arabs or not, were entitled to equal pay
and he also accepted the tax equality of all the muslims. The tax reforms in this
direction and the reduced scope of Jizya due to widespread conversion to Islam
resulted in a huge loss of revenue for the state. Umar was a devout man, who
tried to model his behaviour on that of the rashidun, but his policies were not
good for the economy of the empire.

In the first decades of the Arab empire, administration had been carried on by
Greek- and Persian-speaking officials inherited from the older empires.
Umayyads in their administration heavily depended on the existing Byzantine
precedent, so prominent Syrian christians were incorporated and absorbed into
the institutions of administration. These officials were replaced by Arab officials
during Umar II’s reign.

Umar II was succeeded by caliphs like Yazid II( 720-24) and Hisham I ( 724-43 ),
whose reigns were marred by revolts and simmering discontent. Hisham was a
strong and effective caliph, who was able to stage an economic revival. But this
came at the cost of the state becoming more centralised and autocratic. Such a
polity was unacceptable to the Shia muslims, who viewed it as un-Islamic.
Throughout the late Umayyad period the interest in reconciliation and justice
conflicted with the maintenance of the status quo, and Caliphal policy oscillated
between tax concessions and cancellation of concessions.

The policy of the later Umayyad period, inspired by policies in the similar vein
enacted by Umar II, had attempted to balance reconciliation and justice. They
attempted to balance such programmes with the maintenance of status quo and
as a result the Caliphal policy oscillated between tax concessions and
cancellation of concessions. While supporting the regime in theory as the
expression of the Muslim community, many Sunni religious leaders were
alienated by the military and administrative policies of the regime, by its evident
assumption of a royal authority, and its intervention in religious affairs. The
non-religious also felt alienated under Shia rule and the converts to Islam
objected to their second-class status.

These circumstances provoked opposition, and snowballed into the third civil
war. The Shia’s had for long been harbouring a desire for the family of Ali to
become the caliph. They claimed that the Caliphate rightly belonged to the
members of this family, chosen by God to spread Islam and to rule the Islamic
community. They capitalised on the hopes of many disgruntled Arabs and
converts, that out of them a mahdi, a saviour, would come. Various members of
the family of the prophet were diligently organising underground conspiracies
against the Umayyads. Members of the family had for a long time been actively
organising underground conspiracies against the Umayyads. Between 736 and
740, Shi'i agitation finally broke out in Kufa, and a number of Kufans were seized
by the police and executed.

In 740 Zayd b. 'Ali, a grandson of Husayn, rebelled and was swiftly defeated.
Meanwhile, another branch of the Banu Hashim, which was a clan to which
Muhammed belonged - the 'Abbasids, were biding their time. The 'Abbasids, like
the Alids ( those who claim descent from Ali) were descended from an uncle of
Muhammad, named 'Abbas; but their immediate claim to the Caliphate rested
upon the allegation that a great-grandson of 'Ali, Abu Hashim, had bequeathed
them leadership of the family and of the opposition movement. While the 'Alid
branch of the family concentrated on Kufa with little or no success, the 'Abbasid
branch congregated in Khurasan, sending a litany of missionary or revolutionary
organisers to rally a popular front of all opponents of the Umayyads. 'Abbasid
agents agitated for revenge for 'Ali, for the overthrow of the Umayyads, and for a
new era of peace and justice. Over time, the leading 'Abbasid agent, Abu Muslim,
built up an elaborate underground movement and organized military support in
Khurasan.

At the death of the Caliph Hisham in 743 the Umayyad regime collapsed, and
'Alids, 'Abbasids, Kharijis, tribal factions, and disgruntled governors all entered
the fray. The reasons for this collapse lay in the military exhaustion of the Syrian
state. The late Umayyad Caliphs had increasingly used the military power of
Syria to exert dominance over the Arabs and to strengthen the armies fighting on
the frontiers of the empire with professional, battle-hardened troops. Garrison
duties exposed Syrian troops in these areas to the brunt of warfare precisely at a
time when the Arabs were suffering temporary setbacks. These defeats brought
an end to the imperial phase of Arab empire building and left Syria militarily
depleted. Having based a century of rule on the ever-increasing power of the
Syrian state, the Umayyad dynasty now found itself deprived of the military basis
for effective central government. Lapidus posits this to be the major reason for
the decline of the empire.

The Shi'as, Kharijis, and tribal factions struggled to seize the throne. By 747,
the 'Abbasids were ready to move. In the villages of Khurasan, especially around
Marw, Abu Muslim, the 'Abbasid agent, found the support he needed. These
villages had been settled by the initial Arab conquerors of Khurasan who had
become agriculturists, only to find themselves burdened with taxes and treated as
a subject population. These were the people who had been promised tax reform
by the Umayyads and had been betrayed. Now they were ready to fight. Khurasan
was in a fever of political agitation and eschatological expectation. Popular
apocryphal writings called Jafr and al-Malahim foretold fateful battles, the
imminent end of the world, the coming of the mahdi, and the beginning of a new
era of universal justice.

In this atmosphere Abu Muslim rallied peoples aggrieved by loss of status and
by unjust taxes, and, with only about three thousand fighting men, defeated rival
factions and seized the Caliphate. The 'Abbasid revolt was supported largely by
Arabs, mainly the aggrieved settlers of Marw, with the addition of the Yemeni
faction and their mawali. Further support came from Shi'as who were confused
as to the identity of the 'Abbasid leadership and took up the cause as their own.
They were later to be bitterly disappointed by the proclamation of Abu al-(
Abbas, the head of the 'Abbasid house, as the new Caliph. Representing just one
of a number of factions that had competed for the office, the 'Abbasids, on
coming to power, would have to face the Umayyad problem of translating the
title of Caliph into institutions of effective dynastic rule. How they would do this
was still an open question in 750. The answer amounted to a revolution.

The Shia’s, Kharjis and tribal factions fought for control of the crown. Having
found much needed support among the villages of Khurasan, the Abbasids were
prepared to advance forward. The inhabitants of Khurasan were a bunch of
agriculturalists who were subject to heavy taxation and felt betrayed when the
Umayyads backtracked on their promise of tax reform. These agriculturalists of
Khurasan and other groups who similarly felt disgruntled under Umayyad rule
formed the major support base of the Abbasids.

With only approximately three thousand military men, Abu Muslim united
people who were resentful of their second hand treatment and unfair taxation, to
overcome other factions and conquer the Caliphate. Arabs played a significant
role in the 'Abbasid revolution, especially the displeased Marwian settlers, who
were later joined by the Yemeni group and their mawali. Further support came
from the Shi'as who were confused as to the identity of the Abbasid leadership
and adopted the cause as their own. The Abbasids, who represented only one of
several groups who had contested for the position of Caliph, would have to deal
with the Umayyad challenge of converting the title of Caliph into structures of
effective dynastic authority once in power.

The Abbasid Movement was initiated in response to the religious turmoil

th
which was prevailing in the country in mid – 8 century but it didn’t seemed to
affect the religious and political terrain of that area as many Abbasid caliphs and
supporters adjusted to the new changed circumstances as they constructed new
justifications for their rule. The city of Baghdad rapidly transcended the
intentions of its founders and grew from an administrative and military center
into a major city, the decision to build the administrative center called the City of
peace generated two large settlements in the vicinity, one was the extensive camp
of the Abbasid army in the districts to the north of the palace complex named Al
– Harbiya and to the south was Al – Karkh and Madinat Al – Salaam the
administrative city itself. The Abbasid administration was divided among the
Central and Provincial Government.

The creation of Baghdad was part of the Abbasid strategy to cope with the
problems that had destroyed the Ummayad dynasty by building effective
governing institutions and mobilising adequate political support from Arab
Muslims and from the non – muslim communities that paid the empire’s taxes.
The new dynasty had to secure the loyalty and obedience of its subjects for a
rebel regime and justify itself in muslim terms. Under the Abbasids the empire
no longer belonged to the Arabs, though they had conquered its territories but to
all those people who would share in Islam and in the emerging networks of
political and cultural loyalties that defined a new cosmopolitan Middle – Eastern
Society. The new regime organised a new army and fresh administrative cadres.

The Abbasids abolished the military privileges of the Arabs but built – up new
forces which though partly Arab were recruited and organized so that they would
be loyal to the dynasty, alone and not to tribal or caste interests. while the
'Abbasicls continued to use Arab troops in Yemen, India, Armenia, and on the
Byzantine frontiers, the end of the conquests meant that Arabs in Iraq, Khurasan,
Syria, and Egypt could be retired from military service. The 'Abbasids no longer
needed vast reserves of manpower. Rather, they required only limited frontier
forces, and a central army to make occasional expeditions against the Byzantines,
and to suppress internal opposition. For this purpose they used the army with
which they had captured the state - the Khurasanian Arabs and their clients and
descendants, a professional force loyal to the Caliphs who paid them.

The Provincial Government :- The directly controlled provinces were Iraq,

Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt, Western Iran and Khuzistan provinces which were
physically closest to the capital. These provinces were organised to maximise the
obedience of officials to the will of the central government and to assure the
remittance of tax revenues from the provinces to the centre. Governors
appointments were limited to a very short term so that their careers would be
entirely at the mercy of the caliphs. The powers of the provincial government
were often divided among several officials, the governor was usually the military
commander and a different man was appointed by the Central treasury to be in
charge of taxation and financial affairs yet another official headed the judiciary.

In some peripheral provinces the Caliphs appointed a supervising military

governor and assigned a garrison to see to the collection of taxes and payment to
the tribute. Iraq was divided into a hierarchy of districts called Kura, Tassuj, and
Rustaq. The Rustaq was the bottom unit in the hierarchy and consisted of a
market and administrative town surrounded by a number of villages. The same
hierarchy and even the same names were used in parts of Khurasan and Western
Iran, in Egypt the structure of administration was similar, local government was
organised by taxation, surveys were taken in the villages to determine the amount
of land under cultivation the crops were grown and their expected yield and
information was passed to the central administration, taxes for the whole regions
would be estimated the sums divided for each district and the demand notices
sent out describing the responsibilities of each sub – division. The Abbasid
imperial organisation was a complex bureaucracy highly elaborate at the centre
and in touch with provincial and local forces throughout the empire.

Local government was similarly varied. Iraq was divided into a hierarchy of
districts, called kura, tassuj, and rustaq. The rustaq was the bottom unit in the
hierarchy and consisted of a market and administrative town surrounded by a
number of villages. The same hierarchy and even the same names were used in
parts of Khurasan and western Iran. In Egypt the structure of administration was
similar. The local government was organised for taxation. Surveys were taken in
the villages to determine the amount of land under cultivation, the crops grown,
and their expected yield, and the information was passed up to the central
administration. The taxes for whole regions would be estimated, the sums
divided up for- each district, and the demand notices sent out describing the
responsibilities of each subdivision.

Each sub-unit received its bill and divided it among the smaller units. At
the next stage, taxes were collected, local expenses deducted, and the balance
passed upwards until the surplus eventually reached Baghdad. This hierarchical
administration did not encompass all cultivated lands. The crown lands, which
included the estates of older Middle Eastern empires, church properties,
reclaimed wastelands , and lands purchased or confiscated by the Caliphate,
were not part of the usual provincial tax administration. Such lands were very
extensive in Iraq and western Iran.

Other lands, called iqta(, were also cut off from regular provincial
administration. One type of iqta', iqta' tamlik, was frequently, though not always,
ceded out of wastelands, for the sake of stimulating agricultural investment.

So as we speak of the Abbasids origins, it was a title given to the family

who took its name from Al Abbas, who was the paternal uncle of Muhammad,
but they had claimed their leadership from the oldest surviving relative of the
Prophet, at the time of his death it had delayed accession to the Caliphate by
several decades. The Abbasid Movement started from the son of Abdallah ibn al –
Abbas, Ali, who was also the cousin of the Prophet. He had a son called
Muhammad, and it was said that he had become close with Abu Hashim who was
the son of Muhammad Ibn Al – Hanafiyya.
 There were some of the surviving supporters of Al – Mukhtar who had
recognised Abu Hashim as leader/Imam after his father’s demise, Abu Hashim
introduced Muhammad Ibn Ali to them. According to later texts which justify
the Abbasids’ claim, Abu Hashim had no son that’s why he recognised and
appointed Muhammad Ibn Ali as his heir. The Muhammad’s family claimed that
they were the ultimate rulers of the Abbasid community. After the death of
Muhammad his son Ibrahim ( also known as Imam Ibrahim) came to throne his
movement had received a huge success, Abu Salama who was his principal
exponent who was recruited by Bukayr ( Abu Salama was his successor), had
already been in the service of secret Kaysani movement, he also worked for the
successors for the Muhammad al – Hanafiyya.

It was believed that the way Abu Muslim addressed to the people of Kufa,
when he accessed the caliphate, said that he was the most suitable representative
of the Hashimite family. The seizure of power of the Abbasids had been regarded
as an actual revolution in the history of Islam. Then came Al Mansur, the brother
of Abu I–‘Abbas’-who, in order to consolidate his authority did not let his uncles
hold their important offices; he also ordered the execution of the most competent
secretary, Ibn al Muqaffa. He was also a bold thinker who wrote an Arabic
adaption of the tales of the Kalila – Wa – Dimna, which honoured him with
literary fame. Al Rashid, after he lead the Iraqi army to Tus, died there in Jumada,
while ruler Al – Mamun established himself and took control over the
government of Khurasan, after the title of caliph was held by Al Amin in
Baghdad. The army of Al Mamun was small but despite this fact, the army
achieved victory in their first encounter against the Iraqi forces, under the
command of Tahir. They then occupied the region of Jibal.

The people who supported the Caliphs, also defended themselves and they
were helped by the militia, although the militia were at a shortage of arms
themselves; despite this, they fought fiercely against the forces with great
courage and valour. It was said that the population of Baghdad who wanted peace
were apprehensive by the victory of Al – Mamun, later after becoming the caliph
at his wish Al – Amin was killed. In Iraq, the military was engaged among
Baghdad, Kufa and Wasit, which brought Al – Mamun’s forces to the supporters
of anti – caliph who were harassed by financial difficulties and problems, but the
fact was kept a secret from Al – Mamun, as his uncle took the throne after he left
Baghdad in the hand of his trustees and shifted to Merv.

Due to some circumstances, a civil war broke out between Al – Amin and Al –
Mamun for which the caliph needed an armed force and for that, Al – Mamun
formed his own army which consisted of 4000 Turks guards, and soon added
more slaves from Transoxiana who were quite skilled in horse – riding and
archery and by this inclusion, the army’s count increased to 70,000, now the
slaves who were in the army were often rewarded of their services like they got
promoted to many sectors of the government or they were recruited in the palace
of the caliph. Al – Mutasim explored some sites in the North part of the Tigris
river near Baghdad and chose the site of Samarra (which was 60 miles away from
the old capital) for his army, the dignitaries of the court, ministries of central
administration and a royal residence designed for himself and his family. The
position of the caliph seemed to be decreasing as the competition between many
officers and bureaucrats gradually interfered in the affairs.

Then came the ruler Mutawakkil who took his designation very carefully. He
was very authoritarian, but unfortunately on Shawwal/ December, this strong
ruler was assassinated by the Turkish forces, and thus, the position was acquired
by Turkish chiefs at the court; this period lasted for around 10 years. The Arab
influence was taken over by the Persian bureaucracy. It was said that the
Abbasids imperial structure was adopted from Umayyad who also strengthened
the religious status and function of Caliphates. Further, the Abbasids demanded
that people in the army and bureaucracy should be adopted from non – tribal
backgrounds, hence, tribal people were not able to join these services.

The Abbasid Caliphate, which ruled the Islamic world, oversaw the golden age
of Islamic culture. The dynasty ruled the Islamic Caliphate from 750 to 1258 AD,
making it one of the longest and most influential Islamic dynasties. For most of
its early history, it was the largest empire in the world, and this meant that it had
contact with distant neighbours such as the Chinese and Indians in the East, and
the Byzantines in the West, allowing it to adopt and synthesise ideas from these
cultures.

One of the earliest, and most important, changes the Abbasids had made was
to move the capital of the Islamic empire from the old Umayyad power base of
Damascus to a new city—Baghdad. Baghdad was founded in 762 by Al-Mansur on
the banks of the Tigris River. The city was round in shape, and designed from the
beginning to be a great capital and the centre of the Islamic world. It was built
not far from the old Persian capital of Ctesiphon, and its location reveals the
desire of the dynasty to connect itself to Persian culture.

Baghdad grew quickly with encouragement from the Abbasid state, and it was
soon the largest city in the world. At Baghdad, the Persian culture that the
Umayyads had attempted to suppress, was now allowed to thrive. Art, poetry, and
science flourished. The Abbasids learned from the Chinese (allegedly from
Chinese soldiers captured in battle) the art of making paper. Cheap and durable,
paper became an important material for spreading literature and knowledge.

The fifth caliph of the Abbasid dynasty, Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809), is
remembered as one of history’s greatest patrons of the arts and sciences. Under
his rule, Baghdad became the world’s most important centre for science,
philosophy, medicine, and education. The massive size of the caliphate meant
that it had contact and shared borders with many distant empires, so scholars at
Baghdad could collect, translate, and expand upon the knowledge of other
civilizations, such as the Egyptians, Persians, Indians, Chinese, Greeks, Romans,
and Byzantines. The successors of Harun al-Rashid, especially his son al-Ma’mun
(r. 813–833), continued his policies of supporting artists, scientists, and scholars.

Al-Ma’mun founded the Bayt al-Hikma, the House of Wisdom, in Baghdad. A

library, an institute for translators, and in many ways an early form of university,
the House of Wisdom hosted Muslim and non-Muslim scholars who sought to
translate and gather the cumulative knowledge of human history in one place,
and in one language—Arabic.

At the House of Wisdom, important ideas from around the world came
together. The introduction of Indian numerals, which have become standard in
the Islamic and Western worlds, greatly aided in mathematical and scientific
discovery. Scholars, such as Al-Kindi, revolutionised mathematics and
synthesised Greek philosophy with Islamic thought. Al-Biruni and Abu Nasr
Mansur—among many other scholars—made important contributions to
geometry and astronomy. Al-Khwarizmi, expanding upon Greek mathematical
concepts, developed Algebra. Ibn al-Haytham made important contributions to
the field of optics, and is generally held to have developed the concept of the
scientific method.

A number of very practical innovations took place, especially in the field of

agriculture. Improved methods of irrigation allowed more land to be cultivated,
and new types of mills and turbines were used to reduce the need for labor
(though slavery was still very common in both the countryside and cities). Crops
and farming techniques were adopted from far-flung neighbouring cultures. Rice,
cotton, and sugar were taken from India, citrus fruits from China, and sorghum
from Africa. Thanks to Islamic famers, these crops eventually made their way to
the West. Such Islamic innovations would continue, even as the Abbasid
government fell into chaos.

The court of the Umayyad Caliphs became a theatre enacting the drama of
royalty. The caliph’s residence was approached by ceremonial gates which is a
longitudinal hall culminating in an apsidal or domed room as its central feature,
which is a pattern found at Damascus, al-Wasit, Mushatta, and latter Baghdad,
derived from Hellenistic, Roman, Byzantine, and Sasanian patterns for the
emperor’s court. The caliph held the audience, dressed in crown and royal robes,
seated on a throne, and veiled from the rest of his audience by a curtain. Caliph
courtiers stood or sat on each side of the long hall and his day mostly included
consultations and receptions, prayer, and private entertainment like hunting,
music, dancing girls, wine drinking, and poetry reading. The chamberlain
controlled the access to the royal person and everyone addressed him in
submissive tone and with panegyric greetings.

The decorations of the court mirrored the royal way of life, as the Caliph is
depicted with majesty and power. Just like that in the desert palace at Qasr
al-Khayr, the Caliph appears to be a formal, frontal pose, and at Khirbat al-Mafjar
he is assumed as a martial figure, and at Qusayr ‘Amra, the Caliph is portrayed in
a hieratic manner derived from Byzantium depictions of the Christ as
Pantocrator. At Qusayr ‘Amra, his majesty also appears in its full triumph in the
paintings of Shah of Iran, the Emperor of Byzantium, Roderic of Spain, the Negus
of Abyssinia, the Emperor of China and the Emperor of Turks greeting the
Caliph as their master. The family of kings is portrayed as deriving their
authority from its new suzerain, the Islamic Caliph, whose power not only
embraces the Islam, but the whole world. There are others scenes too depicting
hunting and gardens, birds and animals, banquets,
 The Caliph, as conqueror and endower, treated religion as an intrinsic aspect
of his own identity, and the mosque as a symbol of the compact union of the
political and religious aspects of his rule. Before entering the mosque, the Caliph
al-Walid would change from perfumed and multicoloured clothes to pure white
garments. On returning to the palace he would again put on the worldly and
splendid garb of the court. While the Caliphate took Islam into its political
majesty, Islam absorbed the Caliph into the service of religion as its domed room
was the center of the universe and its decoration signifies the gathering of the
living cosmos to glorify the Caliph. Thus art becomes the mirror of a narcissistic
affirmation of royalty.

The array of court symbols conveyed the august majesty and unique rank of the
Caliph among men. He was entitled to dress and furnishings for ceremonies and
amusements, and get the gestures of respect that no other humans enjoyed. Court
poetry glorified the ruler and surrounded him with a divine aura and addressed
the Caliph as khalifat allah (the deputy of God). The panegyrics sometimes
imputed supernatural powers to him, like the time when his intercession brought
rain. The bay‘a, or oath of allegiance, became a gesture of the humble servitude of
the courtier and subject before his overlord. Obedience and fidelity to an adored
majestic personage was a leading theme in Umayyad court life.

By contrast, the public art of the Umayyad Caliphs emphasised Islamic

themes. The reign of ‘Abd al-Malik inaugurated public displays with the
construction of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem which was built in the most
sacred city of Judaism and Christianity in order to signify the political and
religious appropriation of the past by a new faith embodied in a new empire. It
asserted the sovereignty of the Caliph as the conqueror of old religions and
empires and the benefactor of Islam.
 The Dome of the Rock was built on the legendary site of Abraham’s intended
sacrifice of Ishmael, the favoured son in Muslim tradition, for the Muslims
meant to forge a direct connection to the common ancestor of monotheism,
thereby rendering Islam as venerable as the other religions. To appropriate and
modify the Jewish temple area was to assert the primacy of Islam and its
supersession of the previous monotheistic religions. The Islamic triumph was
further celebrated in the decoration of the building. Its ornamental motifs were
borrowed from Byzantine and Persian forms, which expressed holiness and
power, but were now used to show the sovereignty of Islam. Inscriptions
proclaimed the mission of Islam, the truth of the new faith, and the surpassing of
the old.

The Umayyad Mosque of Damascus expressed different themes. The mosque

itself was built by the absorption of a pagan sanctuary, with its classical, Roman,
Hellenistic motifs, and a Christian church, into a new and distinctly Muslim
architecture. The mosaics showed idyllic buildings and landscapes which may
represent heaven or may imply the subjection of the whole world to the new
Caliphs and the new faith. Moreover, in constructing the mosque and its
decorations, the Umayyads employed Greek craftsmen whom they solicited from
the emperor of Constantinople. To the Greeks, this implied the cultural and
political superiority of Byzantium; the Muslims, however, construed it as an
appropriation of Byzantine culture and power, a submission of Greek vassals to
Muslim masters, and an exhibition of the ambition, triumph, and supersession of
Byzantium by a Muslim imperium.

Similarly, the mosque of Medina bore witness to the victories of Islam.

Umayyad Caliphs furnished this sacred place with the most exotic and luxurious
spoils. They sent necklaces, ruby-encrusted crescents, cups, and thrones to
emphasize the submission of non-Muslim peoples to Islam. The very structure of
the mosque evoked the Caliph’s glory. It was built in Hellenistic royal
architectural design, and contained a longitudinal hall, apsidal niche, and a
minbar (pulpit) from which the official Friday sermon recognizing the sovereignty
of the Caliph and important political announcements were made. The mosque
also contained a box (maqsura) to seclude the Caliph from his subjects, much as he
was secluded at court. These architectural features identified the faith of Islam
with the Caliph and made the mosque itself a symbol of his prestige. In design,
decoration, inscriptions, and ceremonial usage the mosque became a public
version of the private court of the Caliph, witness to his triumphs and his
primacy in Islam.

The Caliph, as conqueror and endower, treated religion as an intrinsic aspect

of his own identity, and the mosque as a symbol of the compact union of the
political and religious aspects of his rule. Before entering the mosque, the Caliph
al-Walid would change from perfumed and multicoloured clothes to pure white
garments. On returning to the palace, he would again put on the worldly and
splendid garb of the court. While the Caliphate took Islam into its political
majesty, Islam absorbed the Caliph into the service of religion.

The 'Abbasid dynasty accepted this exalted position. Like its predecessor, it
adopted the court ceremony, protocol, and decorations depicting the majesty of
the ruler, and the architectural monuments that expressed the semi-divine,
cosmic, and universal importance of his person. The Caliphal conception of itself
was further legitimised in non-Islamic Persian, Hellenistic, and other Middle
Eastern terms. The Caliph was the vice-regent of God on earth. By his magical
powers, he upheld the order of the cosmos, providing for the rain and the
harvests, keeping all persons in their places and seeing to it that they fulfilled
their functions in society. He was the symbol of civilization: agriculture, cities,
arts, and learning depended on his blessings. The poets approximated this awe as
best they could. Court poets and court protocol elevated the Caliphs above angels
and prophets, calling them the chosen of God, God’s shadow on earth, a refuge
for all of his lesser creatures. In the middle of the tenth century, a court
chronicler reports that an unsophisticated provincial soldier, overcome by the
splendour of the Caliph’s appearance, momentarily thought he was in the
presence of God.

Palaces and palace-cities also manifested the majesty of the Caliphate.

Baghdad incorporated materials taken from the ruins of Sasanian palaces. Its
design had symbolic implications. The Madinat al-Salam was a round city
divided into quadrants by axial streets running from east to west and north to
south, with the palace in the very centre. The structure of the city reproduced the
symmetry and hierarchy of society and the central position of the Caliph within
it. It also symbolised the cosmic and heavenly world; the central placement of the
Caliph signified his sovereignty over the four quarters of the world. Since ancient
times the founding of a city had signified the creation of order out of chaos in the
geographic, social, and cosmic levels of the universe. By the construction of a
new city the Caliph became not only the upholder but also the creator of order in
the otherwise formless, boundless, and threatening experience of mankind.

The early Islamic empire's fall and transition were caused by the very same
forces that produced its elites and cultural forms. Even as it was consolidating,
the 'Abbasid kingdom started to fall. While the government supported a thriving
economy and culture, strengthened its military, and administrative institutions,
other factors were in action that would ultimately bring the 'Abbasid empire to
an end.

The succession issues were already grave by the time of Harun al-Rashid
(786–809). Al-Amin, Harun's eldest son, received the Caliphate as a legacy, and
al-Ma'mun, his younger son, received both the governorship of Khurasan and the
chance to replace his brother. Al-Amin tried to replace his brother in favour of
his own son after Harun's death. There was a civil war. Al-Amin received support
from the Baghdad-based 'Abbasid army, but al-Ma'mun sought the help of the
autonomous Khurasanian warriors. Al-Ma'mun overthrew his brother in a bloody
civil war and took control of the Caliphate in 813.

Once in power, al-Ma'mun tried to use a double criteria to deal with his
unsatisfied subjects and opponents. One intention was to reestablish the
Caliphate's legitimacy through influencing Shi'i allegiances and Mu'tazili beliefs
to grant the Caliphate authority over religious matters.

Due to the failure of this programme, the Caliphate lost a significant amount
of support from the general populace. Al-Ma'mun changed his military strategy
as well. He had to rely on the help of a Khurasanian prince named Tahir to gain
control of the Caliphate. In exchange, Tahir was appointed governor of Khurasan
(820–822) and general of the 'Abbasid forces across the empire, with the promise
that the positions would be passed down to his descendants. Despite the
temporary effectiveness of the arrangement, the Caliphal goal of integrating
provincial notables into the central government was defeated by the concession
of a hereditary governorship. Now, the Caliph and the most powerful provincial
lord would form an alliance to rule the empire.

The Caliphs were keen to build up new military troops in order to counteract
the Tahirids' influence and retake direct control of the provinces. As a result,
al-Ma'mun and al-Muftasim(833-42) raised two different types of forces. The first
came from Transoxania, Armenia, and North Africa in the form of shakiriya,
whole troops commanded by their regional rulers. Despite the fact that the
troops were not directly answerable to the Caliphs, they acted as a check on the
Tahirids. The second type of army was made up of the Turkish slaves, known as
ghilman (pi), who were bought individually but organised into regiments. Each
regiment lived in its own neighbourhood, had its own mosque and markets, and
was trained, supplied, and paid by its commander for the sake of efficiency,
morale, and a balance of power amongst the regiments. As a result, slave
regiments also developed into independent groups with officers as their major
allies rather than the Caliphs.

A significant development in Middle Eastern history was the systematic

recruitment, training, and employing of slaves as warriors. This was also the
birth of an institution that would be a defining feature of many later Muslim
administrations. The Caliphs' attention must have been drawn to long-standing
precedents for the use of armed personnel from marginal populations and
peripheral regions by the urgent military and political necessity for loyal soldiers.
The Caliphs and governors of the Arab-Muslim empire have relied on servile,
client, and even slave troops as their personal bodyguards since the Umayyad era.
They have raised more armies in eastern Iran. The Abbasid military structure was
centred on the new system of slave regiments, which was a rationalisation of
prior methods.

The Transoxanian and Turkish soldiers soon came into conflict with the
Baghdadi people as well as the former Arab soldiers in the Baghdadi army, which
led to brutal clashes and enhanced the Caliphs' position. In order to separate the
army from the populace, the Caliph al-Mu'tasim eventually constructed a new
capital, Samarra, about 70 miles north of Baghdad. Samarra served as the
Caliphate's military and administrative centre from 836 to 870, although Baghdad
continued to be the region's cultural and commercial centre. The new metropolis,
however, simply made things more difficult. Instead of preventing confrontations
between the people and the army as the Caliphs had anticipated, they got caught
up in rivalries among the various guard regiments.
 The officers patronised civilian bureaucrats, gained control of provincial
governorships, and eventually made an effort to manage the Caliphate's
succession. Regimental conflicts caused chaos. All the senior officers perished
between 861 and 870, which caused the troops to lose authority and turn to
banditry. The Caliphate's use of slave warriors further distanced it from the
people it oversaw. The late Abbasid empire attempted to rule its people using
foreign warriors, whereas the early Abbasid empire had relied on the military
backing of its own inhabitants.

Changes in administrative structure during this time period also affected how
well the central authority could rule the empire. These administrative reforms
were a result of a number of factors, including the army's interference, the
emergence of independent provincial powers, and the intense internal pressures
that come with running a bureaucracy on a daily basis. All senior officials in the
'Abbasid government used their own followers to carry out staff duties. Young
men had to join the service of a master, live in his home, and dedicate themselves
to become devoted personal servants in order to learn the trade of being an
accountant or scribe.

He had a lifetime obligation to respect and obey his master, and the patron not
only had to train him but also to look out for him and progress his career. Over
time, cliques and factions among the bureaucrats began to dominate the
bureaucracy with the primary goal of abusing the position for personal benefit.
The bureaucracy started acting on behalf of the scribes' personal and
faction-based interests rather than the interests of the monarch and the empire.

The numerous tiny cliques that were affiliated with numerous prominent
officials by the end of the ninth century had split into two enormous factions
known as the Banu Furat and the Banu Jarrah. Each of these groups was founded
around a wazir, his kin, and patrons. Based on their shared social and ideological
stances, the families also attracted a bigger audience. The majority of the Banu
Jarrah faction, though not solely, consisted of Nestorian Christians or Christian
converts who frequently received their education at the Dayr Qunna monastery in
southern Iraq.

This group had become sufficiently influential by the middle of the ninth
century to affect state policy. Al-Mutawakkil (847–61) was persuaded to grant the
Nestorian Catholicos full authority over all Christians in 852 in exchange for
ensuring Christians' freedom of religion, exemption from military duty, and
permission to erect churches. Although Muslim law forbade such transfers, the
Caliph also agreed that converts had the right to inherit their parents' assets if
they were still Christians. But these concessions were soon withdrawn. The Banu
Furat, the other significant group, consisted primarily of Baghdadi Shi'a.

Eventually, the chiefs of these factions took over the entire government
service. All of the administrative departments were given to the wazirs to oversee
during the reign of al-Mutawakkil. Although the Caliph had the authority to
appoint and dismiss them at pleasure, in actuality, the Caliphs hardly ever
interfered with the bureaucracy's daily activities. A wazir and his faction would
take control through scheming and paying off the Caliph and other powerful
courtiers. The main focus of their efforts would then be to take advantage of their
positions, recoup the bribes, and plan for tough times in the future by
committing a variety of scams, including bloated payrolls, fake bookkeeping,
unlawful speculations, and accepting bribes.

The officials saw their positions as a commodity that they could buy, sell, and
use for their own financial advantage. The Caliph and the rival faction would be
keen to capture the wealth accumulated by the occupants when their faction had
been in control and was known to have become wealthy. After the Caliph
appointed a new wazir, the defeated party's assets would be seized by the newly
elected rival party. Some of the funds would be sent to the Caliph and returned to
the treasury, while some went directly to the winning faction's wallets. The diiuan
al-musadarat for confiscated estates and the diiuan al-marafiq for confiscated
bribes were created as special departments to manage the reclaimed funds. By
switching the top-ranking factions in charge and utilising each change of
leadership as an opportunity to extort the riches taken by the faction that had
been in control the most, the Caliphate could only sustain a minimal amount of
influence. However, the cost was very high because the central government was
obliged to resort to new administrative methods to make up for the political and
monetary losses brought on by a dishonest bureaucracy. One strategy was giving
or selling iqtas to soldiers, courtiers, and other officials so they could collect the
taxes that would otherwise be owed by peasants and pay a portion of it to the
central government.

Iqtas, while generating income in the near term, decreased long-term earnings
and disrupted the regular running of province and local government. Iqtas also
served as crystals to gather and combine tiny estates. Under pressure from the tax
authorities, peasants would petition the powerful iqta holders for protection and
sign away their property. The procedure was known as himaya or taljia
(commendation and protection). The regions under regular administration were
further reduced by the establishment of substantial landed estates. The
government found itself dealing more and more with influential local landowner
notables, who reduced the burden of administration to the collection of
agreed-upon fees, rather than taxing peasants in a relatively straightforward
manner.

The central government also started tax farming in western Iran and Iraq in
addition to selling iqtas. The government sold tax-farmers the right to collect
taxes in order to get money up front. Tax-farms were either sold at an estimate of
the probable yields based on prior experience, or they were put up for auction
each year. The tax-farmers made money by collecting more taxes than they had to
pay the state, and the state was guaranteed a predetermined amount of money a
year before it could be usually collected. To make this work strict scrutiny was
required.

But tax farming was more than just a business arrangement—it was a different
kind of administration. The tax-farmer committed to support local law
enforcement, maintain local administration, pay for all local government
expenses, invest in irrigation, and pay a fee to collect taxes. Even while
government inspectors made an effort to safeguard peasants from mistreatment,
private governments gradually replaced the fundamental elements of local
government. The government effectively lost control of the agrarian areas that
generated revenue through the distribution of iqtas and the sale of tax farms.

The provinces grew more independent as the central government's military

and financial resources declined. Many of the core provinces, formerly directly
managed by Baghdad, became peripheral provinces under the jurisdiction of
governors with a degree of independence as the tributary rulers in the peripheral
provinces completely liberated themselves from their servitude to the empire.
Provincial authority was transferred in two basic ways. Turkish guardsmen have
occasionally taken over regional governorships and established their own
sovereign states. Governors in other regions gradually reduced the powers of the
federal government. Some stopped sending in tax payments. Others agreed to a
set fee in exchange for their responsibilities.

In other places, the loss of centralised control paved the way for public
opposition to it. A protracted insurrection of Zanj slave labourers took place in
Iraq. The Saffarids led a large-scale insurrection of ghazis (border troops) in
Sijistan (southeastern Iran) in the middle of the ninth century. The Saffarids
overthrew the Tahirids in Khurasan and grabbed control of Sijistan, Kirrnan, and
northern India. They subsequently conquered western Iran and invaded Iraq. The
Caliphate was forced to admit that they controlled most of western Iran and
Khurasan while being routed in Iraq. With Ghazi leadership, the Saffarid triumph
replaced the earlier landowner and administrative elites.

Egypt and Iran were lost, yet the Caliphate was still able to assert itself.
Transoxania's Samanid emperors overthrew the Saffarids in 900. The Samanid
victory was a huge win for the Abbasids since it brought back collaboration
between a powerful independent provincial dynasty and the Abbasid central
government. The Samanids also represented the same notable landowners and
administrators who ruled the Abbasid empire. The Caliphs also succeeded in
overthrowing the Tulunid dynasty in Egypt and Syria in 905. But the return of
centralised power was just momentary. The Caliphate was unable to restructure
the empire using its fleeting military wins because the bureaucracy was in
turmoil. These triumphs merely represented a break in a declining trajectory that
accelerated between 905 and 945.

A series of rebellions known as the Qarmatian movement were the result of

Isma'ili religio-political unrest. Peasant uprisings took place in Iraq around 900,
as well as bedouin uprisings in Syria and northeastern Arabia, which resulted in
the formation of a Qarmatian state in Bahrain. The Qarmatians stormed Basra,
Kufa, and Baghdad in the 920s, cut off the pilgrimage routes, pillaged Mecca, and
stole the black stone from the Ka'ba. They also threatened Baghdad. In North
Africa, a different branch of the Isma'ili movement established the Fatimid
dynasty (909) that, by 969, had ruled over all of North Africa and Egypt. For the
entire Muslim world, not just their own provinces, the Fatimids asserted that
they were the Prophet's legitimate successors.They even took up the title of
Caliph, shattering the Muslim community's symbolic unity. As a result, the title,
reputation, and validity of the 'Abbasid dynasty were degraded by the Umayyad
dynasty in Spain and other North African states.

Shi'ism served as a catalyst for opposition to the 'Abbasids in Mesopotamia,

where Arab bedouins led by the Hamdanid dynasty expanded their sphere of
influence from Mosul to Baghdad in the south, through northern Syria on the
west, and into Armenia on the north. Shi'i immigrants fleeing 'Abbasid
oppression converted the locals to Islam in the Caspian province of Daylam. The
Daylam Shi'a declared their independence from the Caliphate in 864, overthrew
the governor of the 'Abbasid empire, and founded their own state. A Daylamite
ruler from the area named Mardawij b. Ziyar ruled over most of western Iran in
the early 10 century. The Daylamite mercenaries in his service, led by the
Buwayhid brothers, acquired his empire after his death in 937, and they
established their reign in the area.

Various warlords and governors also captured sizable areas. Except for the
area around Baghdad, the Caliphate had lost control of almost all of its provinces
by 935. The Caliphs were administratively and militarily helpless; their only
options were to appeal to one or more of the regional forces for protection or pit
them against one another.

In order to fend off the enemy closing in on Baghdad, the Caliphs created the
position of amir al-umara' (general-in-chief) in 936 and relinquished all actual
power except from the ceremonial authority to choose the most able member of
their subjects as head of state. The Buwayhids conquered Baghdad in 945 after a
protracted conflict with numerous sides. The Caliphs were permitted to retain
their position of nominal power; in fact, the 'Abbasid dynasty persisted until
1258; however, they were no longer in charge as the 'Abbasid empire had
collapsed. The 'Abbasid empire's breakup into a variety of autonomous provincial
administrations entailed significant changes in the way society was structured. In
addition to ensuring the fall of the empire, the formation of a slave military elite
and the new iqta' system of government also ensured the transfer of power from
the old to the new elites. The foundation of the early ‘Abbasid government’ was a
coalition of central government employees and prominent families and
landowners in the provinces. The scions of provincial houses were recruited by
the empire to work for the central government, where their connections and
goodwill helped to unite the empire and make the central administration
effective in the provinces. However, as time went on, it became more common for
the central administration's staff to be made up of former scribes' offspring
rather than those from local families.

The bureaucracy evolved into a city-based structure with little connection to

the provinces as successive generations of scribes succeeded one another. It
ceased to represent the various ethnic groups that made up the empire.
Additionally, the introduction of tax-farming, which required substantial
investments, suited the interests of businesspeople who were rich through their
engagement in the foreign, grain, and slave trades. Political importance increased
for bankers who could raise the required funds and direct them toward
investments in the state. As a result, the scribal class, with its connections in the
provinces, started to lose influence as the political foundation of the central
government to a merchant elite, the product of the empire's fiscal centralization
and tax-collection methods as well as a product of the opportunities it provided
for international trade.

The provincial prominent landowners who had first backed the 'Abbasid
empire were ultimately destroyed as a result of the central government's
downfall. In order to compete with the old provincial notables, a new elite was
brought to the countryside thanks to the rise of military warlords, a new financial
and administrative elite based in the capital city, and the development of new
forms of land tenure like iqta' assignments and tax-farms. This elite was
supported by the central government's waning but still sizable power. The
small-scale landholding notables of the villages were displaced in many regions
by a new class of large land controllers and landowners imposed upon the
countryside by central government policies.

Widespread economic reversal followed these profound political and social

shifts. Iraq's economy collapsed throughout the late ninth and early 10th
centuries. The Caliphate had neglected to invest in irrigation and reclamation
projects for more than a century. Due to the nearly constant fighting, the
irrigation in the Tigris valley was severely destroyed, and extensive districts were
left uninhabited.

The construction of tax farms and the distribution of iqtas eliminated all
incentives to keep rural productivity high. Slave uprisings in southern Iraq also
caused losses in the agricultural sector. Early Buwayhid kings attempted to repair
canals and regain abandoned territories, but the landscape was destroyed by
political unrest and financial exploitation. Iraq, once the most rich region in the
Middle East, is now among the poorest and won't regain its former agricultural
success until the 20th century.

Iraq also experienced a decline in world trade. The Persian Gulf and trade
between Arabia and Iraq were negatively impacted by the Qarmatian rebellions.
The Caliphate's collapse disrupted the trade lines that transported products from
the Far East and South Asia to Baghdad for conversion into Mediterranean
shipments. The Fatimid dynasty assisted in promoting a different international
route through the Red Sea and Cairo in the late tenth century, which also hurt
Iraq's commercial development.
 Similar declines were occurring in other provinces. Mesopotamia, which had
been colonised by numerous Bedouins in the seventh century, suffered
economically as a result of pastoralism's encroachment on agriculture. Peasants
who were subjected to bedouin raids and heavy taxes started to leave the area in
the latter part of the eighth century.

The rise of the Hamdanid dynasty confirmed the superiority of pastoral

peoples over settled ones. The exploitation of the peasantry was responsible for
Egypt's collapse. The high levels of urban and agricultural development in Iran,
however, persisted long into the eleventh century.

As a result, the collapse of the 'Abbasid empire involved simultaneous

political, social, and economic change. Small states were eventually replaced by a
single, cohesive empire as a result of this. Large-scale landowners and military
lords, who resisted centralised authority, took the place of the bureaucratic and
small-land elites. The empire became more vulnerable as a result of the general
economic downturn. Last but not least, the empire's own military, administrative,
and cultural policies contributed to its fall and the eventual emergence of a
different style of Middle Eastern state and civilization.

The Ghaznavid sultanate was established by Alptegin (961) and it was

consolidated by Mahmud of Ghazni. Ghaznavids were a military dynasty with a
professional army of Turks and Indians.

The Abbasid caliphs were not rivals but a source of legitimacy for Ghaznavids.
Mahmud of Ghazni was conscious of being the son of a slave and was especially
eager to receive the title of Sultan from the caliph.

The caliph was willing to support the Sunni Ghaznavid as a counterweight to

Shi’ite power. The Saljuq Turks entered Turan as soldiers in the armies of the
Samanids and Qarakhanids. They later established themselves as a powerful
group under the leadership of two brothers, Tughril and Chaghri Beg. Taking
advantage of the chaos following the death of Mahmud of Ghazni, the Saljuq
Turks conquered Khurasan in 1037 and made Nishapur their first capital. The
Saljuqs next turned their attention to western Persia and Iraq (ruled by the
Buyids) and in 1055, restored Baghdad to Sunni rule.

The caliph, al-Qaim, conferred on Tughril Beg the title of Sultan in a move
that marked the separation of religious and political authority. The two Saljuq
brothers ruled together in accordance with the tribal notion of rule by the family
as a whole.
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