Do you agree with Prof. Duffy that human rights law can protect
war victims? If your answer is “yes”, why do you agree with her?
Give one additional argument why human rights law can protect
war victims. If your answer is “no”, why do you not agree with her?
Mention two arguments.

Yes, I agree with Prof. Duffy that human rights law can protect war victims.

In armed conflict situations, the relationship between IHL and international human
rights law is crucial. In situations of armed conflict, IHL is the principal applicable
legal regime, i.e. the lex specialis, governing hostilities and the protection of
persons. There must be a nexus between particular activities or treatments and any
ongoing conflict. In cases where such a nexus cannot be established, normal
peacetime criminal justice approaches apply. As long as armed conflict exists,
human rights law continues to apply, but the modalities of the joint application of
legal regimes remain unclear. Despite this, IHL and human rights law share basic
and fundamental values. There are already fundamental, non-negotiable human
rights standards reflected in International Humanitarian Law. International human
rights law permits some human rights to be derogated during times of public
emergency, including in times of armed conflict, International human rights law
and international humanitarian law share "a common nucleus of non-derogable
rights". Both legal regimes often apply simultaneously, governing issues such as
fair trials, humane detention, and torture prohibition. However, in situations of
armed conflict, international human rights law generally provides broader and
more extensive protection (e.g., in relation to abusive or arbitrary treatment by
state authorities). It is significant to note that the two legal regimes differ
conceptually in several significant ways. Firstly, international human rights law is
linked to the jurisdiction of states, which is normally their physical territory;
however, in some cases, if certain criteria are met, its obligations may extend
extraterritorially.
 Tensions between the two legal systems are occasionally possible as a result of
significant conceptual and legal disparities. One illustration that is particularly
pertinent to counterterrorism measures is the right to life. IHL seeks to strike a
balance between military necessity and humane concerns by allowing individuals
actively involved in hostilities, such as non-State armed actors, to be deprived of
this privilege. As a result, all of IHL's principles are said to embody the right to life
since they take into account the necessity to shield people from the horrors of war.
For instance, the principle of difference protects civilians in armed conflict by
stating that humans and civilian objects cannot be directly targeted during armed
conflict. It is forbidden to directly attack people, and several additional standards
equally safeguard civilian life (and, to a lesser extent, combatant life) in times of
conflict. In contrast, regardless of a person's status, even under IHL, international
human rights law attempts to preserve life by forbidding any "arbitrary" and
unjustified deprivation of life. When such conflicts emerge between two or more
legal systems, the lex specialis principle is typically used to resolve the matter.
This enables a specialized legal system, like IHL, to take precedence over any
incongruous, more broad law ( lex generalis). As a result, even while the
internment or imprisonment of a civilian or a prisoner of war theoretically violates
the principles of liberty and security under international human rights law, it is
legal under IHL's lex specialis.

The inclusion of children in armed conflict is another important linked topic that
worries the international community. Recognizing that children need special
protection, especially as both international human rights law (IHL) and IHL
demand specific protection against damage for children. This is owing to the
detrimental and extensive effects that armed conflict may have on children. Even
when children are directly participating in hostilities as fighters or as civilians and
constitute a very serious threat, there are understandably numerous sensitive issues
surrounding the targeting of child soldiers. Provost has stated that the legal position
is likely that targeting such children should be considered acceptable as a last
resort when military necessity dictates it and there is no effective alternative
reaction. Any assault on a kid that falls short of this stricter criterion when
compared to comparable adult attacks is likely to be in violation of treaty and
customary laws that forbid needless pain and harm.