Post MT 5

1.
Evidence II.
2.)
Evidence II.
7.) G.R. No. 115690 February 20, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
REY SALISON, JR.,* TIRSO ANDIENTE, RUFINO DIGNARAN and LEONILO FEDILES, accused.
REY SALISON, JR., accused-appellant.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant Rey Salison, Jr., alias "Loloy," appeals from a judgment in Criminal Case No. 21805-91 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, which imposed upon him the penalty of relusion perpetua for the
murder of one Rolando Valmoria.
The information filed against appellant and the co-accused Tirso Andiente, alias "Sano"; Rufino Dignaran, alias
"Jongjong"; and Leonilo Fediles, alias "Ondoy," alleges:
That on November 30, 1990 in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-mentioned accused, confederating and mutually helping one another, with abuse of
superior strength and with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously mauled and pummeled with hard
wood one Rolando Valmoria. Serious and fatal injuries were inflicted which subsequently caused the death
of Rolando Valmoria on December 4, 1990. 1
Upon arraignment, appellant Rey Salison, Jr., assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial then
2
proceeded only against him, because his three other co-accused were and, still are, at large. On November 26,
1993, the trial court rendered a decision with the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Rey Salison guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER
punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no modifying circumstance present, the Court
has no other alternative but to impose the proper penalty of "reclusion perpetua", the same being the
medium period within the range of the penalty imposable and to pay the cost(s); to indemnify the offended
party (in) the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P7,270.70 as actual
damages. (Corrections in parentheses ours.)
3
In the present appeal, herein appellant contends that the trial court erred (1) in finding that there was proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused conspired with his co-accused in killing the victim, (2) in not holding that accused
is only responsible for the injuries that he actually inflicted on the victim, and (3) in admitting in evidence the alleged
"dying declaration" of the victim, as well as the "agreement" between the parents of the accused and the victim. 4
During the trial, the prosecution presented seven witnesses, a picture of the pieces of wood used by the accused in
5
killing the victim, receipts of expenses incurred in the hospital for the treatment of said victim, a written declaration of
6
the victim after the incident, and a written agreement between the parents of appellant and the victim.
7 8
The evidence of record reveals that at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of November 30, 1990, witness Maria
Magdalena Ayola saw appellant Salison approach the victim, Rolando Valmoria, who was then watching television
in a store at Cory Village, Agdao, Davao City. Salison placed his arm around Valmoria's shoulder and brought him
behind a neighbor's house where there was a mango tree. There, appellant Salison boxed Valmoria in the
abdomen. 9
During the fistfight between Salison and Valmoria, the three other accused Andiente, Dignaran and Fediles
suddenly appeared and joined the fight and simultaneously attacked Valmoria. It was then when witness Emilia
Fernandez approached them that the three co-accused disappeared, leaving Salison and Valmoria behind.
Evidence II.
Fernandez was able to separate Salison from Valmoria. However, the three co-accused returned and started to
maul Valmoria again, with Salison rejoining the three in assaulting the victim.
10
When Valmoria fought back, accused Salison, Fediles and Andiente picked up pieces of wood and started to hit
Valmoria at the back on his nape, and on the rear part of his head, Valmoria fell to the ground and, upon finding a
chance to do so, he stood up and ran towards his house which was a few meters away. The assailants followed
Valmoria but failed to further hit the victim because Valmoria was able to hide inside his house. All of the accused
shouted for Valmoria to come out but the latter refused, causing his four assailants to hit the walls and windows of
the Valmoria residence. During this time, the victim remained seated inside the house. Shortly thereafter, Valmoria
started to complain of dizziness and pain in his head which was bleeding at that time. 11
Consequently, at the request of Valmoria, his parents accompanied him to the house of witness Patricia Alcoseba,
the purok leader. The victim asked Alcoseba to write down his declaration regarding the incident explaining that if
he should die and no witness would testify, his written declaration could be utilized as evidence.
At the trial of the case, Alcoseba presented the written and signed declaration of Valmoria and she affirmed what
was written in the declaration, testifying as follows:
PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
Q Mrs. Alcose(b)a, on November 30, 1990, where were you?
A I was in our house.
Q Where?
A At Gory Village.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After you heard that there was trouble in Cory Village, what happened next, if any?
A I noticed that the mother and father of Rolando Valmoria helped Rolando Valmoria in walking towards
my house.
Q When they arrived (at) your house, what happened next?
A When they arrived (at) the house, the father requested that his son be allowed to sit on our chair.
Q And what happened next after that?
A At that time Rolando Valmoria was sitting on the chair and he was so weak and his neck and head
slumped on the chair and the Valmorias requested me that he has something to say and requested it to be
written and he stuttered in talking.
Q What did you do after the victim requested you?
A I obeyed. I obeyed the request and I got a ballpen and paper.
Q Then what happened next?
A He related to me as to who started the trouble as to who struck him first, the second and the third.
Q Now Mrs. Alcose(b)a, while the victim was narrating to you, what did you observe about his condition?
Evidence II.
A I observed that he was so weak and he was in pain and I believed at that time he was dying.
Q Did the victim utter the words to that effect that he was dying?
A Yes, sir. He told me by saying "I believe that I will die".
Q What else?
A Because he said that he felt a terrible pain on his head.
Q Did he tell you the reason why he requested you to make a declaration in writing?
A He told me that if anybody will testify regarding my death this declaration of mine could be utilized as
evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Showing to you this statement, what a relation is this one (sic) to the one you said which is the
statement of the victim?
A Yes, this is the one.
xxx xxx xxx
Q There is a printed name . . . a signature over the printed name Rolando Valmoria, "ang
guibunalan/pasyente'', whose signature is this?
A That is the signature of Rolando Valmoria.
COURT:
Q When the victim signed that document, was he sitting?
A Yes, sir.
Q After the victim signed that document what happened next?
A They left and they went to the detachment.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened to this piece of paper after the victim signed this?
A I gave it to the mother.
Q So you did not keep that piece of paper?
A No, sir. I gave it to them so they will be able to use it.
Q Before they left your house you gave that piece of paper to the mother?
A At that time I did not give that declaration first to the mother because they were attending to their son.
Q When did you give that document to the mother?

Evidence II.
A When Rolando Valmoria died.
xxx xxx xxx
Q At the time you were taking this statement, from the victim did he tell you the persons who were
responsible for his injuries?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?
A Rufino Dignaran, Jr. alias Jongjong and the second is Loloy Salison and the third one is name(d) Tirso
and the fourth, I cannot remember the name of the fourth person who hit the victim . . . yes, now I
remember, it's Leonilo Fideles.
Q You wrote that statement (o)n a piece of paper?
A Yes, sir. (Corrections and emphasis supplied.)

12
After making that declaration in the house of witness Alcoseba, Valmoria and his parents proceeded to the hospital
where he was X-rayed and treated for his head injuries. Subsequently, the victim was allowed to go home. However,
at 4:00 o'clock the following morning, he started to convulse and was rushed to the hospital. After three days there,
Valmoria died. 13
The prosecution likewise presented Dr. Edmundo Visitacion, Jr. who had conducted the necropsy which established
the cause of death of Valmoria indicated in the post mortem certificate. He explained that the head injury sustained
by the victim caused by a blunt external trauma probably made by a solid object and this trauma caused the
subdular hemorrhage. 14
On December 12, 1990, the parents of the victim and those of the accused Salison and Dignaran entered into a
written agreement for the refund of hospital expenses of Valmoria. However, no reinbursement was actually made.
On the other hand, the lone defense witness was appellant Salison himself who merely denied having killed the
victim. He testified that on that day, together with his friends Andiente, Dignaran, Fideles and a certain Andy, he was
visiting his girlfriend, a certain Neneng Edpalina, when he heard Valmoria and Andiente shouting at each other. He
tried to pacify the two but the victim told him not to interfere because he had nothing to do with them. Then he saw
Valmoria, Andiente, Dignaran, Fideles and a certain Andy engaged in a fistfight. He was trying to stop the group
from fighting when witness Fernandez came and told him not to interfere.
He then left and while he was on his way home, he heard somebody shout "agay," so he went back and saw
Andiente holding a piece of wood while Valmoria was running towards his house. He had just grabbed the piece of
wood from Andiente when two CAFGU's arrived and arrested him, Andiente, Dignaran and Fideles. All of them were
subsequently released after the investigation. 15
The errors imputed to the trial court may be consolidated and narrowed down to the question of credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, the existence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime, and the evidentiary weight of the
dying declaration, as well as of the written agreement of the parents of the victim and the accused.
In the instant case, the lower court held that:
The testimony of the prosecution's witnesses were clear, strong and convincing to deserve full faith and
credence. As against the pure denial of the accused of his direct participation as a conspirator, the positive,
clear and straightforward declaration of the prosecution's witnesses, must prevail. No motive or reason has
been shown, why they would falsely impute to the accused the commission of such a grave crime. The
accused Rey Salison has no quarrel or bickering with the prosecution's witnesses. In fact, two of the
prosecution's witnesses are friends of the mother of Rey Salison. These prosecution's witnesses declared
Evidence II.
that they saw (that) the accused Rey Salison together with the other accused participated in boxing and
mauling Rolando Valmoria with pieces of wood. 16
We agree with the findings of the trial court giving full faith and credit to the witnesses for the People. The
uncorroborated testimony of appellant can not prevail over the positive declaration of the prosecution's witnesses. In
fact, there were three eyewitnesses, with no ill motives whatsoever, who testified against appellant and confirmed
Salison's direct participation in the commission of the crime.
The defense did not present any evidence to support the denials of appellant. The putative girlfriend of Salison, who
was allegedly with him on that day, was not presented to confirm that fact and thereby prove that he did not
participate in the fight between his co-accused Andiente and the victim. His testimony pinpointing Andiente as the
killer was only a convenient way to avoid liability since Andiente remained at large and could not refute Salison's
testimony imputing the crime to him.
Moreover, denial is a self-serving negative evidence that can not be given greater weight than the declaration of
credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. Definitely, therefore, the case of the Government has
17
outweighed and overwhelmed the evidential ramparts of the defense.
Appellant's assertion that conspiracy has not been established is belied by the eyewitness accounts submitted by
the prosecution. The manner by which the killing was executed clearly indicated a confederacy of purpose and
concerted action on the part of the accused. Prosecution witness Magdalena Ayola, who saw the entire incident,
testified on this point, thus:
Q During that time were they alone? The two of them?
COURT:
A When Salison brought Valmoria under the mango tree, they were only 2 but later, alias Sano, Fideles
and alias Ondoy and alias Jong-jong boxed Valmoria.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR MANDALUPE:
Q In other words aside from accused Salison alias Loloy who first boxed Rolando Valmoria, other three
persons joined Salison and also boxed Rolando Valmoria?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q Did you see the 3 come from the bushes?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you during the time when these three appeared from the bushes?
A I was nearby because we were watching them.
Q Were you alone watching them or you had a companion?
A I had some neighbors with me.
Evidence II.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR MANDALUPE:
Q After alias Sano, alias Jong-jong and alias Ondoy joined Salison in boxing Rolando Valmoria, what
else did he do against the person of Rolando Valmoria?
A Valmoria fought back and there was exchange of fist(icuffs) and Loloy Salison, alias Ondoy and alias
Sano picked up some wooden pieces of wood (sic).
Q After these three persons you mentioned picked up wood, what did they do after picking up the wood?
A They struck Valmoria with the piece of wood.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that you saw these 4 persons struck Rolando Valmoria many times while still under the
mango tree. Can you tell the Honorable Court what part of the body of Rolando Valmoria was hit by the
striking of wood by the 4 accused, if you can recall?
A He was hit at his back and at the back of his head. 18
xxx xxx xxx
From the aforesaid testimony, these simultaneous attacks on the victim proved the common intent of the accused to
inflict fatal blows upon the victim.
Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy. A conspiracy may be inferred without need of showing that the
19
parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. For 20
collective responsibility among the accused to be established, it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression all of
them acted in concert each doing his part to fulfill their common purpose to kill the victim. 21
Even if there is no direct evidence showing that all of the accused had a prior agreement on how to kill Valmoria, the
doctrine is well settled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the
crime, Very seldom would such prior agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal
undertakings are only rarely documented by agreements in writing. 22
It is equally a well-accepted corollary rule that where a conspiracy has been established, evidence as to who among
the accused rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of
the intent and the character of their participation, because the act of one is the act of all.
23
What further strengthens the case of the prosecution was the declaration of Valmoria, made and signed by
him right after the incident, as to who were responsible for the injuries he sustained. Appellant, however,
maintains that said written statement, which was reduced into writing by witness Patricia Alcoseba and purporting to
be a dying declaration, is inadmissible as evidence since it was in the Cebuano regional language and was not
accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino.
However, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General:
The records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of the
declaration. Thus, the defense waived whatever infirmity the document had at the time of its
submission as evidence. The declaration can be translated into English or Pilipino as it is already
admitted in evidence and forms part of the record. 24
Evidence II.
Also, while such statement was given, as in the nature of things they are generally in oral form, they are not thereby
rendered inadmissible as they may even be communicated by means of signs. If the declarations have thereafter
been reduced to writing and signed by the declarant, the writing is generally held to be the best evidence, and it
must be produced. 25
More than once, this Court has taken into consideration documents written in a Philippine dialect, unaccompanied
by the required translation but which had been admitted in evidence without objection by the accused. In those
26
instances, the Court merely ordered official translations to be made. It is true that Section 33, Rule 132 of the
revised Rules of Court now prohibits the admission of such document in an unofficial language but we believe that
in the interest of justice, such injunction should not be taken literally here, especially since no objection thereto was
interposed by appellant, aside from the fact that appellant, the concerned parties and the judicial authorities or
personnel concerned appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable of Cebuano in which the document was written.
There was, therefore, no prejudice caused to appellant and no reversible error was committed by that lapse of the
trial court.
Also, the written declaration was duly presented during the trial and the person who reduced the victim's declaration
into writing was thoroughly questioned by the court and the prosecutor, and cross-examined by the defense
counsel. The witness was able to explain and discuss what was written in the declaration and how she came to
prepare the same. Significantly, everything written in that declaration of the victim was confirmed by the
Government's eyewitnesses. Appellant's argument regarding the inadmissibility of the declaration on a mere
technicality would mean the loss of a vital piece of evidence that could yield the true facts and give retributive justice
in the murder of Valmoria.
Appellant likewise argues that the declaration made by the victim before the purok leader can not be considered as
a dying declaration because it was not made by the deceased "under the consciousness of an impending death." As
earlier narrated, at the time the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain. He expressed a belief on his
imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be used as evidence regarding the circumstances thereof. A
person would not say so if he believes he would recover and be able to testify against his assailants. At all events,
assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as part of the res
gestae, since it was made shortly after the startling incident and, under the circumstances, the victim had no
27
opportunity to contrive.
We are in conformity with the verdict of the lower court finding appellant guilty of murder since the killing was
qualified by the circumstance of the accused having taken advantage of their superior strength. The victim was
unarmed and defenseless at the time when all of the accused mercilessly bludgeoned his back and head with big
pieces of wood. The number of assailants and the nature of the weapons used against the hapless victim show a
notorious inequality of force between the latter and the aggressors, assuring a superiority of strength advantageous
to Salison and his co-accused in the commission of the crime. The accused purposely used excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. 28
Since no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was present in the case at bar, the trial court correctly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, the same being the medium period in the range of the imposable penalty.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs
against accused-appellant Rey Salison, Jr.
Evidence II.
8.) THIRD DIVISION
[G. R. No. 112090. October 26, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. APOLINAR LAZARO y SERVANIA, Accused-

Appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 dated 1 March 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City,
Branch 24, finding accused-appellant Apolinar Lazaro y Servania guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the costs.
The information2 dated 6 May 1991, docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-3483, filed against accused-
appellant alleged:
That on or about May 5, 1991, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control one (1) handgun, Cal. 38 Revolver TM-Squires Bingham,
SN-1029315 with 6 empty shells on (sic) the chamber, said accused not having any license and/or
permit to possess and carry the same from the authorities charged with the issuance thereof. That
the aforesaid firearm has been used in shooting two persons one of whom died and the other has
(sic) serious condition at the Mother Seton Hospital.
It appears that a separate case for homicide, docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-3487, was filed
against the accused3 but was tried separately before the same judge.
Upon arraignment in Criminal Case No. 91-3483 (the illegal possession case), accused-appellant
entered a plea of not guilty and thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: Pfc. Edilberto Puncia, Sgt.
Alejandro Bonnet, Cpl. Jose Manzanero, and Major Jose A. Tuazon.
The facts as shown by the evidence of the prosecution reveal that on 05 May 1990, at around 3:30
p.m., Police Sergeant Alejandro Bonnet was on board a Mobile Patrol conducting an inspection of
traffic policemen. While cruising along Panganiban Drive in Naga City, his attention was called by
bystanders who were shouting that there was a bloodied man beside the driver of a Toyota type jeep
that was traveling south. This prompted P/Sgt. Bonnet to go after the said vehicle.4cräläwvirtualibräry
When the Toyota jeep stopped along Gen. Luna Street, Bonnet was able to see a man with blood all
over him beside the driver.
P/Sgt. Bonnet then instructed the driver to follow the mobile patrol to the Bicol Regional
Hospital.5 When they arrived at the Bicol Regional Hospital, he saw that his station commander,
Police Major Jose A. Tuazon, was waiting for them.
It appears that earlier Police Major Tuazon received a telephone call at around 4:00 a.m. informing
him that a shooting incident had occurred at Queborac, Naga City6 Major Tuazon then immediately
dispatched Capt. Guisic and Pat. Barbosa to the crime scene in order to investigate the report.
Evidence II.
Moments later, Major Tuazon received another telephone call, this time from the Naga City Hospital
informing him that a wounded man, on board a yellow colored Toyota Tamaraw jeep driven by a
person armed with a handgun, was brought for treatment at the hospital7 Thereafter, Major Tuazon,
together with Pfc. Edilberto Puncia proceeded to the Naga City Hospital. Upon their arrival, they were
informed that the Toyota jeep had already left with the injured person and was on its way to the
Bicol Regional Hospital. The police officers immediately proceeded to the said hospital. They took a
shorter route and were able to arrive ahead of the Toyota jeep. After a short wait, they saw the Naga
City Police Mobile Patrol arrive at the hospital escorting a Toyota Tamaraw jeep8 cräläwvirtualibräry
The injured person was brought inside for treatment. As he was previously informed that the driver
of the jeep was armed with a handgun, Major Tuazon ordered the said driver to step out of his jeep.
He then saw the driver with a handgun tucked in his waist, pull out the handgun9 from its
holster10 and drop it at the back of the drivers seat11. Upon seeing the gun, Major Tuazon pulled the
driver out of the vehicle, got hold of the gun which turned out to be a .38 caliber revolver bearing
Serial Number 102931512 The gun contained six empty shells.13 cräläwvirtualibräry
Major Tuazon then confronted the driver and asked him why he was carrying a gun and whether he
had a license to possess said firearm. The driver did not respond to his question14 cräläwvirtualibräry
Maj. Tuazon brought the driver to the police headquarters and turned over the firearm to the duty
investigator, Cpl. Jose Manzanero.15 At the police station, he learned that the name of the driver was
Apolinar Lazaro, herein accused-appellant.
A certification dated August 20, 1991, issued by Supt. Antonio T. Sierra, Chief of the
Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) at Camp Crame was presented in court by the public
prosecutor. The certification stated that accused-appellant is not a licensed or registered
firearm holder of any kind or caliber.16 cräläwvirtualibräry
For his part, accused-appellant recounted the circumstances which led to his capture at the Bicol
Regional Hospital. He Testified that on 5 May 1991, at around 9:00 a.m., he, together with his
nephew Manolo Lazaro and Ricardo Ronquillo went to Marupit, Camaligan, Camarines Sur for a
drinking spree.17 While drinking, accused-appellant and Ricardo Ronquillo allegedly had a little
discussion about a fishing net. They left the place at around 3:00 p.m. onboard a Toyota Tamaraw
jeepney being driven by his nephew, Manolo Lazaro.18 On the way back, Manolo Lazaro stopped the
jeep in order to urinate and while he was alighting therefrom, accused-appellant saw Ronquillo draw
a gun and point it at him (accused-appellant). Allegedly in self-defense, accused-appellant grappled
for the possession of the gun and as a result, he and Ronquillo fell to the ground.19 As they continued
grappling for the gun, accused-appellant heard several shots go off. Immediately after the shots
were fired and while still grappling for possession of the gun, he heard somebody shout that he was
hit. He realized that it was his nephew, Manolo Lazaro, who was shot and who was telling accused-
appellant to bring him to the hospital. As he was still grappling with Ronquillo, he could not
immediately do anything about his nephews cries for help. After a while, accused-appellant felt
Ronquillo weakening and stop moving. He then drove Manolo Lazaro to the hospital as he was
shouting for help. Accused-appellant claimed that he did not know what had happened to Ronquillo
after he left him at the scene of the incident. He also could not recall where he had placed the
gun.20cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellant declared that he drove the Tamaraw jeepney to the Naga City Hospital but they
were not accepted as the hospital had no facilities for emergencies.21 While driving to another
hospital, he noticed a police car trailing them. He then gave a signal to the police car to escort them
to a hospital. One of the policemen then alighted from the car and inspected the jeepney. The
policeman did not take anything from the jeepney. The policeman then signaled accused-appellant to
follow the patrol car to the Bicol Regional Hospital.22 When they reached the hospital, accused-
appellant went down from the Tamaraw jeepney and assisted in bringing down his nephew, Manolo
Evidence II.
Lazaro. Accused-appellant was then told by the policemen to ride in the police mobile car. As they
were about to leave the hospital, he saw several persons searching the jeepney. The policemen then
brought him to the City Jail where he remembered being asked why he was carrying a gun.23 When
the gun was shown to him, accused-appellant stated that he was not sure whether it was the same
gun he was grappling with Ronquillo for, as the incident happened quite fast. He also cannot
remember Major Tuazons account that accused-appellant pulled the gun and holster from his waist.
What he remembers is that after alighting from the jeepney, he went around the jeepney and
assisted Manolo because the latter was then leaning on the side of the jeepney.24 cräläwvirtualibräry
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented Dr. Joel Jurado who testified that he conducted the autopsy on
Ricardo Ronquillo. He found that the cause of death was due to loss of blood from his gunshot
wounds.25 The victim died instantaneously. In his opinion, the injuries were not inflicted accidentally
as more than one shot was inflicted on the victim.26 cräläwvirtualibräry
In sur-rebuttal, accused-appellant testified anew and stated that both he and Ronquillo fell from the
jeepney while grappling for the gun. He testified that during the struggle, there were times when the
gun was in his possession and there were also times when it was in the possession of Ronquillo.27 He
cannot recall who was holding the gun when it was fired.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dated 1 March 199328 finding accused-appellant guilty
as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Apolinar Poly Lazaro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition under Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 and hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and to pay the costs. The handgun (Exh. A) and the spent shells (Exhs. B, B-1 to B-5) are
confiscated and ordered forfeited in favor of the government.
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant raises the sole assignment of error that the trial court
erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition qualified by homicide.29 cräläwvirtualibräry
In cases involving illegal possession of firearms under P.D. 186630, as amended, the prosecution has
the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and (b)
the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or
permit to possess the same.31 cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bench, the first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearm and six empty shells
were recovered from the accused-appellant while he was alighting from the Tamaraw jeepney. Thus,
Major Tuazon testified:
Q: What did you actually do when the car stopped?
A: Being aware that the driver was then armed, I was ready to get hold of him, and when I saw the
gun tacked on his waist, he pulled it and dropped it at his back.
Q: You said he pulled a handgun from his waist, will you please indicate on what particular place was
it placed?
A: It was near, it was more in front of his waist. (The witness is pointing to the rightside middle
portion of his waistline).
Q: And, in relation to the driver, where were you then when you saw him pulled (sic) that gun?
Evidence II.
A: I was very near because I wanted to get hold of him.
Q: And, where did he dropped (sic) the said handgun, as you said?
A: Right at his back, at the back of the drivers seat.
Q: So, he just dropped it on the seat behind the drivers seat?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And, that gun has a holster?
A: Yes, Sir. Inside a holster bag tacked on his waist.
Q: When he pulled that gun---did he pull that gun alone?
A: He pulled it together with the holster.
Q: And he placed the gun inside the holster right behind the drivers seat?
A: He pulled the gun together with the holster and dropped the same at his back.
Q: By the way, what kind of gun was that? A revolver?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And, what did you do upon seeing that the gun together with the holster was dropped by the
accused at his back?
A: I pulled the driver out, and I immediately got hold of the gun.32
The subject firearm, its holster and the six empty shells were identified and offered in evidence
during the trial.
As to the second element, accused-appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove
the absence of a license to carry a firearm as the prosecution merely marked in evidence a
certification from the Firearms and Explosive Section in Camp Crame without presenting
the person who issued the certification himself, a certain Antonio Sierra. Over the objection
of accused-appellants counsel, the lower court admitted the exhibit on the ground that the same is
an official public record and because the fiscal stated that he himself saw the signatory sign the
document.
The records of the case show that the prosecution merely presented in court the certification from
the Firearms and Explosive Office before formally offering its documentary evidence. Thus:
PROS. ESTELA:
I am, Your Honor, please, formally submitting the certification issued at Camp Crame on August 20,
1991 of the firearms and explosives office, issued by the firearms and explosive office, issued by A.T.
Sierra, Service Sup. MNSA, PNB Chief firearms and explosive office to the effect which reads --- this
is to certify that Apolinar Lazaro is not a licensed or registered firearms holder of any kind or caliber
(the fiscal is reading)
Evidence II.
I would like to request that it be marked as Exhibit D, for the purpose of this is to show to the
Honorable Court that this accused is not a registered licensed holder of the subject firearm, and your
Honor, may I please be allowed to rest my case.
With the formal offer of evidence for the prosecution, with the testimonies of Pfc. Ed. Puncia, Sgt.
Alejandro Bonnet, Cpl. Jose Manzanero, and Maj. Jose Tuazon, and the following (documentary)
exhibits---
XXX
Exhibit D is the certification of the firearms explosive office to the effect that herein accused is not a
licensed or registered holder of any firearm. This is dated August 20, 1991.
Exhibit D-1 which I request to be marked as such --- the signature of Antonio A. Sierra, the issuing
officer of the firearms and explosives office. The signature was affixed in my presence when I
personally procured this certification from the Camp Crame.
With all of these evidence, testimonial, physical and documentary evidence, we close the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
XXX
We have no objection to its submarkings. We are, however, objecting to Exhibits D and D-1
being self-serving as the author of said certification was not presented for cross-
examination.
XXX
PROS. ESTELA:
XXX
And, as to Exhibit D and Exhibit D-1, this is an official document which is an exception to the hearsay
rule. This is an official public document.
COURT:
No other objections?
XXX
Exhibit D is a public document, which was procured in line of duty, and considering that
according to the Fiscal he himself was a witness to the signatory of the same.
All the exhibits are admitted.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting and relying upon the
said certification considering that the person who made the document was not presented
in court to testify. Thus, accused-appellant argues, the certification should have been
excluded for being hearsay.
Evidence II.
There is no merit in the above argument.
On several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a
certification from, the PNP Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of
any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of possession of
illegal firearms.33 Moreover, the rule on hearsay evidence admits of several exceptions.
One such exception is that provided for under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court which states
as follows:
Rule 130, Section 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance
of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specifically enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Relative to this provision, Rule 132, Section 28 of the same Rules allows the admission of the said
document. Thus:
Rule 132, Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record. - A written statement signed by an officer having custody
of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor
is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contains no such record or entry.
In the case at bench, the Certification issued by the Commanding Officer of the PNP-
Firearm and Explosives Office, which is the repository of all records regarding firearms in
the Philippines, is competent and admissible evidence to prove that accused-appellant is
not a licensed holder or possessor of a firearm of any kind or caliber. Indeed, the certificate
of a custodian that he has diligently searched for a document or an entry of a specified tenor and has
been unable to find it ought to be as satisfactory an evidence of its non-existence in his office as his
testimony on the stand to this effect would be.34 cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellant finally argues that assuming that he is guilty, he should only be convicted of the
crime of simple illegal possession not qualified by homicide. He offers two propositions in support of
this argument.
First, accused-appellant argues that the information filed against him in Criminal Case No. 91-3483
did not clearly allege the crime of homicide. Instead, he argues, it was the separate information for
homicide filed in Criminal Case No. 91-3487 which alleged all the elements of homicide. He states
further that the case for homicide, for which he was likewise convicted, is now the subject of an
appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Second, accused-appellant argues that assuming that the information in Criminal Case No. 91-3483
sufficiently alleged the said qualifying circumstance, he still could not be convicted of the crime of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition qualified by homicide as the prosecution failed to prove
the fact of homicide during the trial of Criminal Case No. 91-3483. The prosecution, he contends, did
not produce any eyewitness to the homicide. Instead, the alleged eyewitness to the homicide, Manolo
Lazaro, was only presented in Criminal Case No. 91-3487, the homicide case, which was being tried
separately.
We do not find it necessary to consider accused-appellants arguments. The enactment of Republic

Act No. 8294, which amended the provisions of P.D. 1866, has rendered said arguments moot and
academic.
Evidence II.
Accused-appellant was convicted of illegal possession of firearms under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866
which was the governing law at the time the crime was committed in 1991. Section 1 of P.D. 1866
provides:
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms, Ammunition

or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - The
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearm, part of
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall
be imposed. (Underscoring supplied)
Under the ruling in People vs. Quijada,35 violation of P.D. 1866 is an offense distinct from murder or
homicide and the accused is culpable for two separate offenses.
Republic Act No. 8294 has since amended P.D. No. 1866 by reducing the penalties for simple and
aggravated forms of illegal possession and considering the use of an unlicensed firearm simply as an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide. The law now provides:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or

Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm such as rimfire handgun,
.380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument
used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was
committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00)
shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores
bigger than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .45 and also lesser caliber firearms
but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms
with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other
crime was committed by the person arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. (underscoring supplied)
In view of these amendments introduced by R.A. 8294, this Court has recently in the case of People
vs. Molina,36 and reiterated in People vs. Feloteo,37 that there can be no separate conviction of the
crime of illegal possession of firearms under P.D. 1866. Thus in People vs. Molina, it was held:
Fortunately for appellants, however, RA 8294 has now amended the said decree and considers the
use of an unlicensed firearm simply as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not
as separate offense. The intent of Congress to treat as a single offense the illegal possession of
firearm and the commission of murder or homicide with the use of such unlicensed firearm is clear
from the following deliberations of the Senate during the process of amending Senate Bill No. 1148:
Senator Drilon. On line 18, we propose to retain the original provision of law which says, If homicide
or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm. And in order that we can shorten the
paragraph, we would suggest and move that the use of the unlicensed firearm be considered as an
Evidence II.
aggravating circumstance rather than imposing another period which may not be in consonance with
the Revised Penal Code.
So that if I may read the paragraph in order that it can be understood, may I propose an amendment
to lines 18 to 22 to read as follows: If homicide or murder is committed with the use of the
unlicensed firearm, SUCH USE OF AN UNLICENSED FIREARM SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS AN
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Santiago. Mr. President.
The president. With the permission of the two gentlemen, Senator Santiago is recognized.
Senator Santiago. Will the principal author allow me as co-author to take the [f]loor to explain, for
the information of our colleagues, the stand taken by the Supreme Court on the question of whether
aggravated illegal possession is a complex or a compound offense. May I have the [f]loor?
Senator Revilla. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. Thank you.
In 1995, the Supreme Court held that when the crime of killing another person is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, the ruling in the case of People vs. Barros was that the crime should
only be illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form. But in the later case, in May 1996, in the
case of People vs. Evangelista, the court apparently took another position and ruled that when a
person is killed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, it is possible to file two separate
information(s)-one for murder and one for illegal possession of firearms.
In other words, in two successive years, the Supreme Court issued two different ways of treating the
problem. The first is to treat it as one crime alone in the aggravated form, and the second is to treat
it as two separate crimes.
So at this point, the Senate has a choice on whether we shall follow the 1995 or the 1996 ruling. The
proposal of the gentleman, as a proposed amendment is to use the 1995 ruling and to consider the
offense as only one offense but an aggravated form. That could be acceptable also to this co-author.
The Presiding Officer [Sen. Flavier]. So, do I take it that the amendment is accepted?
Senator Revilla. Yes, it is accepted, Mr. President.
The Presiding Officer [Sen. Flavier.] Thank you. Is there any objection to the amendment? [Silence]
There being none, the amendment is approved.
Although the explanation of the legal implication of the Drilon amendment may not have been very
precise, such modification, as approved and carried in the final version enacted as RA 8294, is
unequivocal in language and meaning. The use of an unlicensed firearm in a killing is now merely an
aggravating circumstance in the crime of murder or homicide. This is clear from the very wordings of
the third paragraph of Section 1 of RA 8294, which reads:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Evidence II.
Furthermore, the preceding paragraphs, also in Section 1, state that the penalties for illegal
possession of firearms shall be imposed provided that no other crime is committed. In other words,
where murder or homicide was committed, the separate penalty for illegal possession shall no longer
be meted out since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance.38
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that accused-appellant was charged, tried and convicted for
two separate crimes of illegal possession and homicide. Accused-appellant, in his brief, refers to the
homicide case in arguing that his conviction in the illegal possession case was not proper.39 Similarly,
the Solicitor-General, in his Brief, mentioned the homicide case in justifying the sentence handed
down by the trial court.40 Finally, the records themselves show that trial in the two cases proceeded
separately.41 The two separate cases, Criminal Case No. 91-3487 (for homicide) and Criminal Case
No. 91-3483 (for illegal possession of firearm) were not tried jointly, although filed in the same trial
court. Criminal Case No. 91-3487 was appealed to the Court of Appeals.42 cräläwvirtualibräry
In view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act 8294 to Presidential Decree 1866, separate
prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of
firearms is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance in the homicide case.
R.A. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997. The crime involved in the case at bench was committed on
May 5, 1991. As a general rule, penal laws will generally have prospective application except where
the new law will be advantageous to the accused. In this case R.A. 8294 will spare accused-appellant
from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. Accordingly, said law should
be given retroactive application.
In People vs. Valdez,43 this Court stated:
Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days after its publication on June 21, 1997.
The crimes involved in the case at bar were committed on September 17, 1995. As in the case of any
penal law, the provisions of Republic Act No. 8294 will generally have prospective application. In
cases, however, where the new law will be advantageous to the accused, the law may be given
retroactive application (Article 22, Revised Penal Code). Insofar as it will spare accused-appellant in
the case at bar from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms, Republic Act
No. 8294 may be given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. U-8749 (for Illegal Possession of
Firearm) subject of this present review.
As a word of caution, however, the dismissal of the present case for illegal possession of firearm
should not be misinterpreted as meaning that there can no longer be any prosecution for the crime of
illegal possession of firearm. In general, all pending cases involving illegal possession of firearm
should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No.
8294 are involved (murder or homicide under Section 1, and rebellion, insurrection, sedition or
attempted coup detat under Section 3).
However, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar cannot be considered as a special
aggravating circumstance in Criminal Case No. U-8747 (for Complex Crime of Multiple Murder), also
under review herein, because it will unduly raise the penalty for the four counts of murder from
four reclusion perpetua to that of four-fold death. Insofar as this particular provision of Republic Act
No. 8294 is not beneficial to accused-appellant because it unduly aggravates the crime, this new law
will not be given retroactive application, lest it might acquire the character of an ex-post facto law.
Accordingly, and in line with the above ruling, the accused-appellant should be spared from a
separate conviction for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms, which is the subject of the present
review.
Evidence II.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision finding accused-appellant guilty for
violation of P.D. 1866. Accused-appellant is hereby acquitted of the said crime. Criminal Case No. 91-
3483 is DISMISSE
Evidence II.
9.)
Evidence II.
13.) ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH A.M. No. CA-05-20-P
VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT (Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-
OF APPEALS, 81-CA-P)
Complainant,
Present:

DAVIDE, JR., C.J., *
PUNO, *
PANGANIBAN,**
QUISUMBING, *
YNARES-SANTIAGO, *
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, *
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA, *
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.
CIELITO M. SALUD,
CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS, Promulgated:
Respondent.
September 9, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Evidence II.
Cielito Salud, Clerk IV, Mailing Section of the Judicial Records Division, Court of Appeals (CA)
stands charged with the following offenses:
1. Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties;

2. Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and
3. Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in an official transaction, under Section 22, paragraphs (p),
(t) and (u), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Civil Service Law. [1]
The Facts
Melchor Lagua was found guilty of homicide in Criminal Case Nos. 118032-H and 118033-H
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163. [2] On appeal, the case was assigned
to the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27423. Lagua, who
was then detained at the Bureau of Prisons National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City, filed a Very
Urgent Petition for Bail. Finding the petition well-taken, the appellate court issued a Resolution
on October 9, 2003, directing him to post a P200,000.00 bond.
Lagua's bond was approved in a Resolution [3] dated November 6, 2003, where the appellate
court also directed the issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua. The resolution was then
brought to the Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Maria Isabel M. Pattugalan-Madarang,
for promulgation.
Irma Del Rosario, Utility Worker, noticed the respondent's unusual interest in the Lagua case.
The respondent had apparently been making inquiries whether the appellate court had already
directed the issuance of an order of release in the said case and was initially told there was none
yet. Due to his persistence, the records of the case were eventually found. [4] Atty. Madarang
then directed the typing of the Order of Release Upon Bond, [5] and to notify the mailing section
that there were orders requiring personal service. [6] At around 4:00 p.m., the respondent then
Evidence II.
went to Atty. Madarang's office and assisted in arranging and stapling the papers for release. He
brought the said resolutions and other papers himself to the Mailing Section. [7]
On November 7, 2003, the respondent went to the National Penitentiary to serve the resolution
and order of release in the Lagua case. The respondent left the prison compound at around 2:30
p.m. [8]
In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a telephone call from a certain Melissa Melchor, who
introduced herself as Lagua's relative. It was about 2:00 p.m. The caller asked her how much
more they had to give to facilitate Lagua's provisional liberty. The caller also told Atty. Madarang
that they had sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig, where the criminal case originated, but were told that they still had a balance to be given
to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through the respondent. Atty. Madarang then called the
said court and asked to speak to Ms. Valdez, pretending to be Lagua's relative.
What transpired thereafter is contained in Atty. Madarang's Affidavit dated December 8, 2003,
as follows:
4. That upon telephone queries made with the office of the Clerk of Court of RTC Pasig, I learned that Rhodora Valdez is the
incumbent Process Server of RTC, [Branch] 163, Pasig City, from which the original case against accused-appellant Lagua
originated. Disguising myself as accused-appellant Lagua's relative, I dialed [Branch] 163, RTC, Pasig (6314273) but Rhodora
Valdez did not report for work that day, according to Baby (also known as Ester), her officemate (who) answered my call. She
added that Rhodora Valdez has been waiting for us (Lagua's relatives) to call. Her exact words were these: 'Wala si Rhodora.
Meron lang siyang nilakad. Pero kahapon pa nya hinihintay ang tawag nyo. May kulang pa kayo eh. Kailangan kasing i-en banc
sa Court of Appealsang kaso ni Lagua.

5. That I coordinated with Ms. Cecil Secarro, the Acting Chief of the Mailing Section, to inquire if it was usual/normal for her to
text her process servers on the field for an update of their deliveries, to which she answered in the affirmative. While she was
in the office, she texted Salud for his whereabouts and he replied, that he was on his way back to Quezon City. That was
before 4 p.m., adding that his deliveries were ok.
6. That I got Salud's mobile phone number from Ms. Secarro and started texting him at about the same time Ms. Secarro did. I
represented myself as Arlyn, Lagua's relative. Most of his text messages are still stored in my mobile phone. In fact, I received
one text message from him while I was at the office of Justice Magtolis, (the Chairman of the 6th Division and the ponente of
C.R. No. 27423) in the late afternoon of November 7, 2003 while reporting to her this incident. Those stored in my phone are
the following:
Evidence II.
1. bkit, C rhodora to. 639204439082. ' Nov. 2003, 15:36:15

2. CNO KAMAGANAK AT ANONG PANGALAN MO ' 639204439082, 7 Nov
2003 16:14:47

3. SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI ' 639204439082, 7 Nov 2003
16:40:21

4. TAWAG K S AKIN ' 639204439082 ' 7 Nov 2003 17:18:47

5. NARELEASE N C MR. LAGUA. NAGKITA N B KAYO ' 639204439082-7
Nov 2003 19:44:52

6. Magkano b and binigay nyo sa middle nyo. Puede bang malaman '
639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:32:05

7. Gud evening. May gusto lng akong malaman. Sana alang makaalam
kahit cino. Lito ' 6391844701117 Nov. 2003 19:54:20

8. Cno ang kausap n Rhodora. Pwede bang malaman ' 639184470111-7
Nov 2003 20:37:57

9. May landline ka. Tawagan kta bukas nang umaga ' 639184470111-7
Nov 2003 20:56:31

10. Wag s Court of Appeal. Txt na lang kta kung saan. ' 639184470111-7
Nov 2003 20:52:58

11. Gusto mo bukas nang umaga magkita tyo. 639184470111 ' 7 Nov
2003 20:57:10

12. D ba pwede bukas tyo kita. May gusto lang ako malaman '
639184470111 7 Nov 2003 21:02:41

13. D 2ngkol kay rhodora duon sa kasama ko kaninang lalakeng pinsan '
639184470111 ' 7 Nov 2003, 21:04:28

14. Ala po ako sa Lunes sa opis. Sa hapon po puede kyo ' 639184470111,
7 Nov 2003 21:07:23

15. Kay Melchor Lagua 639184470111 ' 7 Nov 2003 21:08:19

16. Kasama ko cya kanina nang lumabas ' 639184470111 ' 7 Nov. 2003
21:13:05

17. Ano m ba Melchor Lagua ' 639184470111 ' 7 Nov 2003 21:15:52

18. Between 5 and 5:30 ng hapon. Bkit. 639184470111 ' 7 Nov. 2003
21:54:24

19. 3 PM PUWEDE KB 639004039082 10 Nov 2003 12:09:32

20. Kilala mo b c rhodora. Nagkita na b kayo. Ala naman problema sa
kanya. Ok naman 639184470111 7 Nov 2003, 21:57:13

Evidence II.
21. MAGKITA N LANG TAYO ' 639204439082 ' 10 Nov. 2003, 12:20:16

22. A, OK, NAGKITA N B KAYO NG KAMAGANAK MO ' 639204439082 ' 10
Nov 2003 15:12:14

23. D TALAGA AKO DARATING DAHIL WALA AKONG KAILANGAN S IYO. '
639204439082 ' 10 Nov 2003 18:36:03

7. That Salud called me up in the morning of November 8, 2003 at around 7:33 but I purposely did not answer him. Why did
he need to call me up?

8. That I personally
called up the Bureau of Prisons for the exact time the Order of Release was delivered and when accused
appellant Lagua was released. I learned that the Order of Release was received at 9:15 A.M. and that Lagua was released
between 5-5:30 P.M. of November 7, 2003.
9. That I was able to talk to Rhodora Valdez the following Monday, November 10, 2003. Again, I introduced myself as Lagua's
relative, Arlyn and told her I only wanted to know how much more we had to pay for Lagua's release. She refused to entertain
me because according to her, 'Hindi ikaw ang kausap ko. Duda ako sa yo. Kung gusto mo, puntahan mo ako dito bukas, para
magkita tayo. Pero lumabas na si Lagua. Itinawag sa akin ni Lito Salud. Then, she [hung] up.
10. That on Tuesday, November 11, 2003, I brought Salud, accompanied by Ms. Secarro to Justice Magtolis. Out of the
confrontation, we discovered that Salud did not properly serve the copies of the Resolution and Order of Release upon the
accused-appellant and his counsel, Atty. Salvador C. Quimpo of the Quimpo Dingayan-Quimpo and Associates. He gave them
to a certain Art, allegedly Lagua's relative who he claimed approached him at the Bureau of Prisons in the morning of
November 7, 2003. He told Justice Magtolis that he gave these documents to Art, who promised to take care of them, even
before he could deliver the copy addressed to the Director of Prisons. He never mentioned that this Art was connected with the
office of accused-appellant's counsel. Because of this information from Salud himself, I did not sign the Certificate of Service,
Annex 'C.
11. That several days later, Salud accompanied by Ms. Secarro, came to my office to apologize. But before he could even say a
word, he broke down in [wails]. In between his loud cries, he uttered, 'Boss, patawad po, alang-alang sa aking mga anak. [9]
On November 11, 2003, Justice Magtolis called the respondent to her office. When confronted,
the respondent denied extorting or receiving money for Lagua's release, or in any other case.
He, however, admitted serving the copies of resolution and order of release intended for Lagua
and his counsel to Art Baluran. [10] Justice Magtolis then called the respondent to a meeting
with Clerk of Court Atty. Tessie L. Gatmaitan, who stated that she would transfer the respondent
to another office which has nothing to do with cases.
Justice Magtolis lodged the complaint against the respondent in a Letter dated November 14,
2003, containing, among others, the following allegations:
Evidence II.
The delivery of resolutions/orders to unauthorized persons and 'complete strangers'
who promised to 'take care thereof (siya na raw ang bahala') constitutes not only
neglect of duty but also conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Staying
for the whole day within the vicinity of the National Bilibid Prisons to the point of failing
to fulfill his other duties for the day constitutes inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties. On the other hand, the use of my name and that of our
Division Clerk of Court to illegally solicit financial or material benefit from parties with
pending cases before this Court is illegal per se.

In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that Cielito Salud be subjected to
an administrative investigation and disciplinary action. [11]
Attached to the complaint were the following documents to support the charges:

ANNEX 'A - Record of the cases received by Salud on November 6, 2003 for
delivery/service the following day, November 7, 2003. Please note that in each of the 3
cases assigned to him, there are several parties/counsels to be served.

ANNEX 'B - Certificate of Service signed by Salud, attested by the Acting Chief of the
Mailing Section and Division Clerk of Court Ma. Ramona L. Ledesma, showing that the
parties/counsel in SP-67586 were served only on November 10, 2003 (not on
November 7, 2003).

ANNEX 'C - Certificate of Service for CR-27423, and corresponding Delivery Receipts.

'C-1 - Delivery Receipts for Defense Counsel Salvador Quimpo signed by someone
whose signature was identified by Salud [as] 'Art ' a cousin of appellant Melchor Lagua.

'C-2 - Delivery Receipt for the accused-appellant, received by the same 'Art and not
served thru the Director of Prisons.

C-3 - Delivery Receipt for the OSG, showing that it was delivered/received by the said
office on November 10, 2003, not on November 7, 2003.

'C-4 - Delivery Receipt for the Director of Prisons showing receipt on November 7,
2003.

ANNEX 'D - Record of Resolutions in 3 other cases (SP-80241, SP-65404 and SP-
77957) received for service by Salud on November 10, 2003. The resolutions/processes
in these 3 cases were delivered/served to the parties/counsel on November 10, 2003
together with undelivered resolutions left unserved/undelivered on November 7, 2003.

ANNEX 'E - Certification signed by Salud showing service to parties/counsel in SP-65404
(received by Salud on November 10, 2003) on November 10, 2003 (same date)

ANNEX 'F', 'F-1 & 'F-2 - Delivery Receipts for parties/counsel in SP-65404, showing
service/delivery on November 10, 2003 ' in contrast to his minimal delivery/services on
November 7, 2003 only in Muntinlupa.

ANNEX 'G - Copy of the resolution dated November 6, 2003 of the 6 th Division
approving the appellant's bond and directing the issuance of an order of release.

Evidence II.
ANNEX 'H - Copy of the Order of Release upon Bond, which Salud was supposed to
deliver, among others on November 7, 2003 to the defense counsel, the appellant and
the OSG. [12]
In his counter-affidavit, [13] the respondent vehemently denied the charges. He never

demanded money from Lagua's relative; his name had been used by someone and was, thus, a
mere victim of the circumstances. Moreover, the fact that he immediately released the CA order
in question was clear proof that he had no financial interest in the transaction. His version of the
events that occurred that day is as follows:
4.1 Thaton November 6, 2003 at around 1:38 p.m. the Acting Chief of the Mailing Section gave me an assignment to
deliver the Writ of Habeas Corpus (hearing on November 26, 2003 at RTC, Zamboanga) for CA-G.R. SP No. 80238 for
delivery to NBI, PAO, Quezon City, Muntinlupa;
4.2 That I delivered a copy of the Writ of Habeas Corpus to [the National] Bureau of Investigation (NBI);
4.3 That while I was at the NBI, I received a text message from my boss, requesting me to return to the office
immediately because there is another notice of resolution coming from Atty. Ledesma which I have to serve to Quezon
City and Las Pias;
4.4 In compliance with the request, I returned to the Office and arrived at around 3:15 p.m.;
4.5 That when I received the resolution, I read the same and found out that the hearing is still scheduled on December
10, 2003 at 10:30 a.m.;
4.6 That when I was about to leave to deliver the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Notice of Hearing to the PAO, Quezon
City, my officemate Jun Vicencio told me to wait because Irma, the staff of Atty. Madarang requested me to standby
because I need to deliver the Order of Release to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa;
4.7 That because of the request I waited until 4:00 p.m.;
4.8 That because its already late, I decided to go to Atty. Madarang's office to inquire about the Order of Release which I
need to deliver to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa;
Evidence II.

4.9 That Atty. Madarang told me to wait a little while because the order is about to be finished. So I waited.
4.10 That Atty. Madarang gave to me the Order of Release at 4:15 p.m.
4.11 That because I am aware that I may not reach [the] New Bilibid Prison on time, I told Atty. Madarang that I can
deliver it on November 7, 2003, early in the morning. She agreed and told me 'THANK YOU Ikaw na ang bahala;
4.12 That I informed my boss about the Order of Release that was assigned to me and she had it listed in our logbook. I
asked my boss [Cecil Secarro] if I can deliver the Notice of Hearing for SP 67586 and the others on Monday if I cannot
finish delivering them on November 7, 2003. She agreed but told me to be sure that the Order of Release will be served
first and the others be served not later than Monday, November 10, 2003. Thereafter, I went home.
4.13 That on November 7, 2003, I went straight to [the] New Bilibid Prison and arrived there before 8:00 [a.m.]
Unfortunately, all the staff wearing white uniforms and the security guards were falling in line in front of the building of
the New Bilibid Prison. So I could not enter the administration office.
4.14 That while I was standing in front of the building where the administrative office is located, a certain ART approached
me and asked me if I am the personnel of the Court of Appeals who will deliver the Order of Release.
4.15 That I said yes, and he told me his name and said that he is a relative of MELCHOR LAGUA (prisoner) and is
connected with the office of Atty. [Quimpo].
4.16 That at around 9:30 [a.m.] I was able to enter the administrative offices but because there was no staff inside ' I
went to the documentation office. The staff in the documentation office told me to submit the Order of Release to the
administrative office. He said that they will prepare the documents of MELCHOR LAGUA (prisoner) but also told me that
the prisoner might be released on Monday yet because the signatories are busy attending the ongoing 98 anniversary
celebration;
4.17 That I returned to the administrative office and was able to find Mr. JUANITO TORRES, Administrative Officer III, who
received the copy for the Director but refused to receive the copy of Mr. LAGUA. He told me to wait for his staff to receive
the copy of Mr. LAGUA;
4.18 That because the staff were not around, I went to the canteen to buy softdrinks to quench my thirst;
4.19 ThatMr. ART followed me in the canteen and told me to assist in the release of Mr. LAGUA because there were no
personnel attending to the Order of Release;
Evidence II.

4.20 That since my boss told me to insure the release of the prisoner, I waited for my staff to arrive who will attend to the
matter;
4.21 That I delivered the copy of Mr. LAGUA to the staff. But ART told them he can receive the copy of Mr. LAGUA because
he is his relative so, the staff told me to give the copy to ART.
4.22 That I gave the copy of the Order of Release for the accused to ART. ART also told me that he is authorized to receive
the copy for Atty. Quimpo because he is also the representative of the law office. Hence, I also gave the copy for Atty.
Quimpo to ART;
4.23 That I was able to finish my duty at the New Bilibid Prison at around 2:30 [p.m.] and I proceeded to Purok I, 6A
Bayanan, Muntinlupa to serve the Writ of Habeas Corpus in CA-G.R. SP No. 80238;
4.24 Thatbecause of [sic] the address of the addressee was incomplete, I found a hard time locating the address of the
addressee and when I found Purok I, 6A, the persons thereat do not know JOEL DE LA PAZ. I asked for their help but
nobody in the place knew JOEL DE LA PAZ;
4.25 That I left Muntinlupa

late in the afternoon and due to the lack of time I decided to deliver the other documents on
the next working day which is Monday, November 10, 2003;
4.26 That I delivered the other documents on Monday, November 10, 2003, without any problem;
4.27 That I was surprised when Atty. Madarang later on accused me that I used her name and the name of Justice Magtolis
to demand money from Mr. LAGUA'S relative. [14]
Considering the gravity of the charges, then Acting Presiding Justice Cancio C.
Garcia [15] referred the matter to Atty. Elisa B. Pilar-Longalong, Assistant Clerk of Court, for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
Evidence II.
The Investigation
The requisite hearings' were held from December 12, 2003 to August 4, 2004.
Atty. Madarang affirmed the contents of her Affidavit [16] dated December 8, 2003. She testified
that the respondent later came to her office along with Ms. Secarro. Amidst his cries, he
pleaded, 'Boss, patawad po, alang-alang sa aking mga anak. She replied, 'Wait, wala ka namang
kasalanan sa akin. Ikaw ang nagpasimuno ng lahat ng ito. The respondent repeated,
'Boss, patawad po alang alang sa aking mga anak, and Atty. Madarang answered, 'Okey lang,
pinatawad na kita. Hindi naman ako galit sa iyo. [17]
Justice Magtolis testified that Atty. Madarang reported having received a telephone call from the
alleged relative of Lagua. She narrated that she gave the name 'Arlyn to the caller, and,
thereafter, exchanged text messages with the respondent. Justice Magtolis instructed Atty.
Madarang to continue communicating with the respondent and, if possible, to see it through a
possible pay-off where a National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent would be asked to assist
them. However, the entrapment did not materialize. The respondent thereafter came to her
office, where he was asked why he was unable to serve all the other papers and documents that
day. [18] He also admitted that he served a copy of the resolution to the wrong person
(Baluran). Justice Magtolis also stated that she threatened to transfer the respondent, and that
the latter vehemently objected, pleaded, and cried saying, Huwag naman pong pa-transfer.
When asked why, the respondent said that he has children in school and something like, 'Dyan
po ako kumikita. [19]
Another witness was Cristy Flores, convicted of three counts of estafa who served time at the
Correctional Institute for Women in Batangas City. She testified that the respondent was
introduced to her in December 1998 by a certain Crisanta Gamil. [20] Gamil was also detained at
the correctional facility; the respondent had worked on her appeal bond papers and asked
for P20,000.00 to facilitate the issuance of the appeal bond. [21] The payment was made right in
Evidence II.
front of her, and the respondent issued a receipt. [22] The witness also testified that Gamil told
her, 'O, at least dyan mo ipalakad ang papel mo. Okay ′yan, sigurado. [23] The respondent
visited her in May 1999, as she had asked him to fix her appeal bond. During the visit, the
respondent took the pertinent documents from her. [24] The witness also stated that she gave
the respondent a partial payment of P7,000.00 [25] on May 16, 1999 and he issued a
receipt. [26] They then proceeded to the Documents Section where they secured copies of the
court decision, certificate of manifestation and her picture. She made the last payment
of P13,000.00 in June 13, 1999, and also issued a receipt. The respondent was also asking for
an additional payment of P15,000.00, which she was unable to give.
Flores narrated that she introduced another detainee to the respondent, Dalawangbayan, whom
the latter was also able to 'help. She stated that according to Dalawangbayan, the respondent
asked for P200,000.00. She further testified that she knew the respondent as Joselito M. Salud,
and not Cielito Salud. [27] After the incident, she wrote a letter to Associate Justice Conrado
Vasquez, Jr. to ask for assistance regarding her appeal bond.
Atty. Salvador Quimpo, Lagua's counsel, testified that it was Engineer Art Baluran who hired him
as counsel of the said accused. He stated that he gave an oral authorization to Baluran to get
the CA resolutions or orders; Baluran was the one who furnished him a copy of the
resolution. [28] He called Mr. Baluran to say that an order for Lagua's release had already been
issued by the appellate court. The witness stated, however, that he had never seen the
respondent before. [29]
The respondent testified that he has been a CA employee since 1991. He admitted that he knew
Flores, and met her in January 1999 when he brought Gamil's order of release in the Batangas
City Jail. He claimed that he was waiting for the relatives of Gamil as they were the ones who
would pay for his fare home, and while waiting, he talked to the jailguard/warden. Flores then
approached him and asked him if he was from the CA. When the respondent answered in the
affirmative, Flores replied that Justice Vasquez was her neighbor in Bian, Laguna.
The respondent admitted that he was in the Correctional Institute for Women in Mandaluyong
City on May 16, 1999, as he was then visiting Vilma Dalawangbayan. He also saw
Evidence II.
Flores. [30] When asked why he visited Dalawangbayan, the respondent replied that Flores had
written a letter to him (which he dubbed as 'maintrigang sulat') [31] addressed 'Lito Salud,
Mailing Section, Court of Appeals. In the said letter, Flores asked him to help Dalawangbayan,
just like he had helped Gamil. The respondent then showed the letter to then Chief of Office
Prudencio B. Aguilar, who told him, 'Puntahan mo yan, Lito at maintriga ′yang sulat na 'yan,
baka tayo mapahamak dyan. [32] Thus, he went to the Correctional Institute in Mandaluyong
City to 'sort things out with Dalawangbayan and Gamil. The respondent, however, stated that he
could not find the letter anywhere and had already been lost. [33]
During his May 16, 1999 visit to the correctional facility, Flores approached him in the visiting
hall, and said suddenly, 'Sandali lang, Kuya, then left. He then talked to Dalawangbayan about
the 'controversial letter, explaining that his job in the Court of Appeals was only to remand the
records and deliver the Orders for release, just like what he did in Gamil's case. [34] He again
visited Dalawangbayan on June 13, 1999 [35] as evidenced by the entries in the visitor's
logbook. He was no longer able to speak to Flores, but made five other such visits to
Dalawangbayan in the correctional facility.
The Findings of the Investigating Officer
In her Report dated January 21, 2005, Atty. Longalong found that the respondent was guilty as
charged, and made the following recommendation:
In view of all the foregoing, there is substantial evidence to hold respondent

liable for the offenses charged. He is liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of his official duties and for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service when he admittedly served the copies of the resolution and order of release in
the Lagua case intended for detained appellant and his counsel on Mr. Baluran whom he
admitted to have met only on that day, against the rules and normal office procedure
on personal service. His long stay in the Bureau of Prisons also caused the delay in the
service of other court processes assigned to him for service on that day. He is also
liable for having financial or material interest in an official transaction considering his
undue interest in the service of the order of release and actual release of Lagua to the
point of staying almost the whole day in the Bureau of Prisons and the aborted 'deal as
Evidence II.
can be concluded from the phone call of Melissa Melchor to Atty. Madarang and
subsequent exchange of text messages with Atty. Madarang disguising as Lagua's
relative. '

RECOMMENDATION:

1. Rule IV, Section 52 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No.
19, S. 1999, issued pursuant to Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, provides
that the penalty for the first offense of inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and for directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any official
transaction is suspension for a period of 6 months, 1 day to 1 year. Pursuant to Section
55 of the same Memorandum Circular, if the respondent is found guilty of 2 or more
charges, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious
charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances. Section 54-c of
the same Memorandum Circular provides that the maximum of the penalty shall be
imposed where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present. Since in
this case, the penalty is the same for all 3 offenses, the maximum of the penalty for the
first offense which is suspension for 1 year [may be] imposed on the respondent.

2. Considering that the prescribed penalty for the offense exceeds one month
suspension, the case may now be referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action,
pursuant to Circular No. 30-91 of the Office of the Court Administrator. [36]
The Ruling of the Court
On the charge of inefficiency, the respondent is clearly administratively liable. After serving
Lagua's copy of the resolution and order of release to the prison Director, he should have
immediately returned to his station or served the other resolutions and documents for personal
service. As an officer of the court, the respondent plays an essential part in the administration of
justice. He is required to live up to the stringent standards of his office, and his conduct must, at
all times, be above reproach and suspicion. He must steer clear of any act which would tend to
undermine his integrity, or erode somehow the people's faith and trust in the courts. [37] As the
respondent himself admitted, he stayed on until 2:30 p.m. without any valid reason, despite the
fact that he knew he still had to serve several orders and resolutions. As pointed out by the
Investigating Officer, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties' is

Evidence II.
classified as a grave offense, and is punishable by suspension for six months and one day to one
year. [38]
Indeed, the complainant in administrative proceedings has the burden of proving the allegations
in the complaint by substantial evidence. If a court employee is to be disciplined for a grave
offense, the evidence against him must be competent and derived from direct knowledge; as
such, charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence. Thus, if the
complainant fails to substantiate a claim of corruption and bribery, relying on mere conjectures
and suppositions, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of
merit. [39] However, in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish
malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required. [40] The findings of investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are given
great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses
as they testified. [41]
To determine the credibility and probative weight of the testimony of a witness, such testimony
must be considered in its entirety and not in truncated parts. To determine which contradicting
statements of a witness is to prevail as to the truth, the other evidence received must be
considered. [42] Thus, while it is true that there is no direct evidence that the respondent
received any money to 'facilitate the release of detained Lagua, the following circumstances
must be taken as contrary to the respondent's plea of innocence:
First. The respondent admitted that he was the sender of the first three text messages in Atty.
Madarang's cellphone: 'bkit, C rhodora to; 'CNO KAMAGANAK AT ANONG PANGALAN MO; and
'SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI. The respondent's testimony on the matter is as follows:

Q: In the hearing of December 2, 2003, in the TSN on page 32 onwards '

ATTY. ROSERO:

Is that the testimony of Atty. Madarang, Justice?

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Oo. I will just refer to your admission through your counsel that Cellphone
No. 6392044390[8]2 is yours. You admitted that?

ATTY. ROSERO:

I think we made an admission as to that matter, Justice. Well just check the
affidavit of Atty. Madarang.
Evidence II.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Here, admitted. Basahin mo.

ATTY. ROSERO:

Yes, Justice, admitted but not the cellphone number '

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Sige, ulitin natin, 6392044390[9]2.

ATTY. ROSERO:
Yes, admitted. That is his cellphone.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

This cellphone is yours.

Q: Do you also admit that you called Atty. Madarang several times on November 7,
2003?

ATTY. ROSERO:

November 7 is' a Friday. Tumawag ka daw several times kay Atty. Madarang,
November 7?

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Texted, Im sorry I will correct that, texted.

A: Nauna po siyang magtext sa akin, Justice, hindi po ako nagtext sa kanya.
Nagtext po siya sa akin sumagot po ako sa kanya.

Q: There was an exchange several times?
A: Nuong pong text niya sa akin ' hindi po several times dahil ' kung makita ′nyo po
dyan.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Let me see the affidavit of Atty. Madarang. After this question, may I ask for a
continuance?

ATTY. ROSERO:

No objection, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Evidence II.
All these text messages were checked by us with your counsel in the
cellphone of Atty. Madarang which were preserved until we allowed her to
erase these. There are exchanges here: 6392044390[8]2, November 7.
When she texted she answered, 'Bkit c Rhodora 2 and then second was,
'Cnong kamaganak anong pangalan mo? This is addressed to you, this is
your telephone?
A: Opo.

Q: But the one who answered is Rhodora?
A: Ako po ′yun.

Q: Ikaw ang sumasagot. Why did you say that you are Rhodora?
A: Justice, nung ma-receive ko po ′yong text niya apat na beses ko pong na-
receive ang text ni Arlene.

INVESTIGATOR:

Who is Arlene?

A: Atty. Madarang. Arlene, sa text po niya sa akin, 'Sir Lito, kamaganak po ito ni
Mr. Lagua. Magkano pa po ba ang kakulangang pera para ibigay ko sa inyo.
Si Rhodora ba kasama? Hindi ko po sinagot yon. Pangalawa, ′yun din po ang
message nya. Ano ito? Sa akin pong kuan, sa pag-iisip ko lang po, bakit dahil
si Mr. Art Baluran kamag-anak na, ano ito? Text pa ulit pa sya ng pangatlo.
Nang-iintriga na ′to. Pang-apat, intriga ′to. Text ko nga rin ′to, lokohan lang
tayo. 'Bkit si Rhodora ′to yun po ang sagot ko sa kanya.

Q: So at that time you already knew about Rhodora?
A: Hindi po, dun, duon po sa text niya nakalagay po dun eh, 'Si Rhodora kasama
ba? So ikinuan ko po na si Rhodora ′to, dun po sa text nya.

Q: Nakipaglokohan ka?
A: Sa text niya nakalagay dun na 'Si Rhodora ba kasama kaya po ako
nakipaglokohan dun. [43]
As pointed out by the Investigating Officer, the respondent's claim of 'joking around
(nakipaglokohan') with an unknown sender of a text message by replying thereto is contrary to a
normal person's reaction. This is made even more apparent by the fact that the respondent even
admitted that he called Atty. Madarang twice, and when asked why, gave a vague answer, and,
when further questioned, even broke down in tears. [44]
The respondent's claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him
constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as
Evidence II.
ephemeral electronic communication under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, [45] and 'shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or
has personal knowledge thereof. Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now
moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he
was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang's cell phone.
This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao. [46] In
that case, the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the complainant asking for a million pesos
in exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending before the CA. The Court had the occasion
to state:

The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are
now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which
provides:

Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone conversations,
text messages ' and other electronic forms of communication the evidence
of which is not recorded or retained.

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the [said rules], 'Ephemeral electronic communications
shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who
has personal knowledge thereof ' . In this case, complainant who was the recipient
of the said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on
their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number
reflected in complainant's cellphone from which the messages originated was hers.
Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text
messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to
the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to
remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text
messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this
case.
Second. The respondent's testimony during the hearings held before Investigating Officer Atty.
Longalong is replete with inconsistencies and 'loopholes. He claimed that he made inquiries from
other CA staff and learned that there was indeed a deal between someone in the criminal section
Evidence II.
and a certain Rhodora of the RTC, Pasig. He further claimed that the said parties wanted to get
back at him for 'immediately serving the release order which prevented them from demanding
the balance of the deal from Lagua's relative. However, this bare claim was not corroborated by
any witness. Moreover, the respondent alleged that two anonymous callers claimed to know
something about the case against him; when asked about it, he stated that he no longer exerted
efforts to find out who they were as they did not give out their names:
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Q: On page 5 of your affidavit, you said in paragraph 8 'That I made some inquiry
and some personnel of the Court of Appeals told me that there is indeed a
deal between a staff in the Criminal Section and Rhodora of RTC, Pasig. Can
you tell us who is this staff?
A: Ah dito po Justice, hindi po siya nagpakilala, sa telephono po.

INVESTIGATOR:

Sino siya?

A: Hindi po siya ' ′yong tawag po niya sa akin sa telepono nang malaman po dito sa
CA na ako ay kinasuhan ninyo tumawag po siya sa Personnel.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Q: Who is siya?
A: Ay hindi po siya nagpakilala.

INVESTIGATOR:

Lalaki o babae?

A: Una po babae tapos ′yong pangalawa po lalaki.

INVESTIGATOR:

Sinong kinakausap?

A: Ako po.

INVESTIGATOR:

Hinahanap ka?

A: Hinahanap po nila ako.

Evidence II.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Q: What did he tell you? He, lalaki, ano?
A: Sa babae muna po?

Q: Oo, babaet lalake ba?
A: Opo.

Q: Who was the first caller, the lady or the gentleman?
A: Babae po.

Q: Were you the one who answered the phone?
A: Hindi po.

INVESTIGATOR:

Hinahanap daw siya.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Q: Hinahanap ka, okay, when you answered the phone, what did you say?
A: Ang sabi ko po sa kanya, 'pupuwede mo ba akong matulungan sa paggawa ng
affidavit dahil kinasuhan nga ako ni Justice Magtolis.

Q: But you do not know who you were talking to?

A: Tinanong ko nga po kung sino siya eh tumutulong lang daw siya sa akin dahil
ang naririnig niyang tsismis din dyan eh baka po si Rhodora ang may ka-
kuan sa Criminal.

Q: Saan ′yong ka-kuan?
A: Ang may kausap sa Criminal.

Q: Who said na baka si Rhodora ang may kausap sa Criminal?
A: ′Yon pong kausap ko sa kabilang linya.

Q: The name you do not know?
A: Eh tinanong ko naman po kung sino siya ayaw naman po niyang magpakilala.
Matutulungan mo ba ako, ibinaba na po ang telepono.

INVESTIGATOR:

Anonymous caller.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

You are very fond of answering calls. You dont even know the name.

Q: That anonymous caller told you that there must be some deals between Rhodora
and someone from the Criminal Section?
A: ′Yun din daw po ang naririnig niyang tsismis dyan sa labas.
Evidence II.

Q: Tsismis, that was that the caller told you?
A: Opo.

Q: And she wanted to help you?
A: Kaya po sinabi din sa akin na tsismis eh hindi pa po pwedeng '

Q: What did you answer her?

INVESTIGATOR:

Anong sagot mo raw?

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Q: Anong sagot niya sa tulungan kasi nakakarinig siyang tsismis?

INVESTIGATOR:

Q Ano ang sagot mo?
A: Eh iyon nga ang gusto kong malaman, ang katotohanan. Baka naman pupuwede
mo akong matulungan. Sino ba ′to?

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Q: Di ba she was the one who offered to help?
A: Ay ayaw daw po naman niyang masabit po ang pangalan niya.

Q: But she was the one who called you?
A: Opo.
Q: Okay. How did your talk end with this girl or lady?
A: Nung pagsalita ko nga pong baka pupuwede akong tulungan, wala na.

Q: How about the man, the gentleman or the boy who called?
A: Same kuan din po ang kanilang kuan e.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Dont use kuan.

ATTY. ROSERO:

Sige, Lito, ipaliwanag mo.

A: Same kuento rin po, sinabi niya na ganuon din po na narinig din po niya sa
labas.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Q: Alright, you were not the one who answered the call?
A: Hindi po.

Evidence II.
Q: Somebody called you that there's a phone call?
A: Opo.

Q: When you answered, what was your first word?
A: Hello!

Q: What was the answer at the other end of the line?
A: Hello rin po.

Q: What next?
A: Alam mo, ang sabi po niya sa akin ganito po '

Q: Who was the first one who said something other than hello?
A: Siya po ang nauna.

Q: What did she say, the exact words?
A: Exact words, sa naalala kong sinabi niya 'Alam mo, Mr. Salud, Salud po ang
kuan niya sa akin, 'narinig ko sa labas, istoryahan dyan sa labas na baka si
Rhodora ang may ka-kuan dito sa Criminal. Ang sabi ko po sa kanya 'Iyan
din ang itinawag sa akin kahapon. Eh dalawa na kayo eh baka naman
pupuwede nyo akong matulungan. Puede ko bang malaman ang pangalan
mo? Ganun din po, ayaw na pong magsalita ibinaba na [ang] telepono.

Q: Do you know Rhodora?
A: Hindi po.

Q: You never met her?
A: Hindi po.

Q: You never talked to her?
A: Nung pong ipinakiusap nyo sa akin sa telepono po nung tayo poy '

Q: After the conversation with the lady and that gentleman who called you to offer
some help and afterwards did not help at all, what happened?
A: Wala na po.

Q: Did you not check with Rhodora, 'What is this they are talking about that it
might be between you and someone in the Criminal Section? You never
asked her that?
A: Hindi ko na rin po '

Q: You did not. But I thought you wanted help from those people who can help
you?
A: Eh hindi na nga po sila nagbanggit po ng pangalan dahil po sabi ng unang babae
ayaw nga rin po niyang sumabit sa kaso. [47]
Evidence II.
This respondent's actuation on this matter, if at all true, is again contrary to the normal reaction
of one who has been administratively charged, and wants to clear his name of any wrongdoing.
The respondent also admitted visiting an inmate (Vilma Dalawangbayan) at the correctional
facility eight times for no apparent reason. This admission lends some credence to the testimony
of Flores, that she was the one who introduced him to Dalawangbayan, the person he was
visiting. When asked why he frequently visited, he stated that he found her beautiful (Maganda
po siya, Justice'), and was on the verge of courting her (Para na nga po akong nanliligaw). The
Court believes that this allegation was concocted by the respondent as a mere afterthought, to
cover up for his misdeeds.
The Investigating Officer also found that the respondent was 'high-strung during his testimony,
and this finding must be accorded respect. Indeed, when the issue is the credibility of witnesses,
the function of evaluating it is primarily lodged in the investigating judge. The rule which
concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of the credibility of witnesses by trial
judges in civil and criminal cases where preponderance of evidence and proof beyond reasonable
doubt, respectively, are required, applies a fortiori in administrative cases where the quantum of
proof required is only substantial evidence. The investigating judge is in a better position to pass
judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them when they testified, and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying. [48] Thus, the following findings of Atty.
Longalong are well taken:
However, respondent denied receiving P20,000 from Gamil and P15,000

from Flores and signing 'LM Salud on Flores' notebooks (Exhibits E-1 and F-1) but
admitted visiting Vilma at the Correctional Institute for Women 8 times from May to
August 1999. Respondent's denial here appears self-serving and incredible
considering his admission of going to the Correctional Institute for Women several
times for no valid official reason. Moreover, although Flores is a convict for estafa,
her
testimony on the matter was more consistent and credible. Likewise, respondent
admitted seeing Flores at the Correctional Institute for Women and that Flores
mailed her letter to him on May 16, 1999 which he called 'maintriga. He also
admitted that he told Flores to seek the help of Justice Vasquez on her case. The
foregoing, plus the fact that Flores eventually wrote Justice Vasquez, confirms the
truth of Flores' testimony on the matter.

Evidence II.
With the aforecited admissions by respondent, the substantial evidence
presented by the complainant and her witnesses with their positive and forthright
testimonies deserve more credence than respondent's self-serving denial and
inconsistent and vague testimony. Even the demeanor of complainant and her
witnesses give credence to their testimonies than the nervous and [high-strung]
demeanor of respondent during his testimony. Moreover, complainant and her
witnesses, including the superiors of respondent, have no reason or motive
whatsoever to testify falsely against him. Respondent's defense of denial is
inherently a weak defense. It is well settled that denial, to be believed, must be
buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability, otherwise the denial is purely self-
serving and with nil evidentiary value (People of the Philippines v. Arlee, 323 SCRA
201). Like the defense of alibi, denial crumbles in the light of positive declarations
(People of the Philippines vs. Ricafranca, 323 SCRA 652).
Indeed, the Court is looked upon by people with high respect, a sacred place where litigants are
heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed with. Misbehavior within or
around the vicinity diminishes its sanctity and dignity. The conduct and behavior required of
every court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond
reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must, at all
times, be characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep
the public's respect and confidence in the judicial service. [49] Public service requires the utmost
integrity and strictest discipline. Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest
sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his official duties but in his
personal and private dealings with other people. [50]
While there is no direct evidence to suggest that he actually extorted money to 'facilitate the
issuance of the appeal bond and release order which he himself served, the surrounding
circumstances, as well as the inconsistencies in his testimony, point towards administrative
culpability. The respondent's actuations fall short of the standard required of a public servant. He
is guilty of gross or grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, willful in
character, improper or wrong behavior, [51] while 'gross, has been defined as 'out of all
measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be
excused. [52] Under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave misconduct is
punishable by dismissal from the service even for the first offense, as it is classified as a grave
offense. However, considering that the respondent has not been previously charged nor
administratively sanctioned, the Court finds that a penalty of suspension for one year and six
months will serve the purpose of disciplining the respondent.
Court personnel, from the lowliest employee to the clerk of court or any position lower than that
of a judge or justice, are involved in the dispensation of justice, and parties seeking redress
from the courts for grievances look upon them as part of the Judiciary. They serve as sentinels
of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affect the honor and dignity of
Evidence II.
the Judiciary and the people's confidence in it. [53] Thus, any conduct which tends to diminish
the image of the Judiciary cannot be countenanced.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING , respondent Cielito M. Salud is found GUILTY of

inefficiency and gross misconduct. He is SUSPENDED for a period of One (1) Year and Six (6)
Months, effective immediately. He is further DIRECTED to inform the Court as to the date of his
receipt of this Decision to determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.
The Office of the Court Administrator is also DIRECTED to conduct a discreet investigation on

the possible involvement of Rhodora Valdez (Utility Worker), and other personnel of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163.
Evidence II.

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1.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

REY SALISON, JR., accused-appellant.

PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:

Q Mrs. Alcose(b)a, on November 30, 1990, where were you?

A I was in our house.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When they arrived (at) your house, what happened next?

Q And what happened next after that?

Q What did you do after the victim requested you?

A I obeyed. I obeyed the request and I got a ballpen and paper.

Q Then what happened next?

A Yes, sir. He told me by saying "I believe that I will die".

A Because he said that he felt a terrible pain on his head.

xxx xxx xxx

A Yes, this is the one.

xxx xxx xxx

A That is the signature of Rolando Valmoria.

Q When the victim signed that document, was he sitting?

Q After the victim signed that document what happened next?

A They left and they went to the detachment.

xxx xxx xxx

A I gave it to the mother.

Q So you did not keep that piece of paper?

A No, sir. I gave it to them so they will be able to use it.

Q When did you give that document to the mother?

xxx xxx xxx

Q You wrote that statement (o)n a piece of paper?

A Yes, sir. (Corrections and emphasis supplied.)

In the instant case, the lower court held that:

outweighed and overwhelmed the evidential ramparts of the defense.

Q During that time were they alone? The two of them?

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Q Did you see the 3 come from the bushes?

A I was nearby because we were watching them.

Q Were you alone watching them or you had a companion?

A I had some neighbors with me.

A They struck Valmoria with the piece of wood.

xxx xxx xxx

A He was hit at his back and at the back of his head. 18

xxx xxx xxx

However, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General:

[G. R. No. 112090. October 26, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. APOLINAR LAZARO y SERVANIA, Accused-

Q: What did you actually do when the car stopped?

A: Right at his back, at the back of the drivers seat.

Q: So, he just dropped it on the seat behind the drivers seat?

Q: And, that gun has a holster?

A: Yes, Sir. Inside a holster bag tacked on his waist.

Q: When he pulled that gun---did he pull that gun alone?

A: He pulled it together with the holster.

Q: By the way, what kind of gun was that? A revolver?

All the exhibits are admitted.

We do not find it necessary to consider accused-appellants arguments. The enactment of Republic

Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms, Ammunition

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or

xxx xxx xxx