CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PRELIMINARY TITLE
CHAPTER I
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

Article 1. This act shall be known as the Civil Code of the Philippines
 Called the Civil Code of the Philippines because the law expressly said it so.
 Also known as RA 386
 The main draft was prepared by the Roxas Code Commission created via EO 48 of March 29, 1947
 This is to distinguish it from the Spanish Civil Code
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.
Effectivity of the Civil Code
 Effective on August 30, 1950, one year after its publication
Amended by EO 200 dated June 18, 1987 as approved by then revolutionary president Aquino who
exercised both executive and legislative powers
 addition of the phrase either or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines
because of the Official Gazette’s erratic release and limited readership
Effectivity of Laws
 Laws shall take effect only upon the expiration of the fifteen day period after its publication
 Publication must be in full (information to be made public)
 The clause unless otherwise provided refers only to the fifteen-day period and not to the need for
publication which is intended to enable the people to become familiar with the statute
 Effectivity of laws is relevant in rendering decisions because a person may validly move for the
dismissal of a case on the ground that it is not covered by the law since the case arose after its
creation but before its effectivity. (Lara vs Del Rosario, on the provision of Article 302 of the Code
Commerce which was repealed by Article 2270 of the New Civil Code)
Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith
 the public is always put on constructive notice of the law’s existence and effectivity even if there is no
actual knowledge
 a necessary consequence of the mandatory provision requiring the publication of all laws for it would
be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which
he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one
 applies only to domestic laws
 there is already a conclusive presumption that everybody knows the law because of the requirement for
publication provided by Article II
TAÑADA VS TUVERA, 146 SCRA 446
(a petition praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the public respondents to publish

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certain orders issued by the President to render it effective)
FACTS
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and
Nationalism, Inc. [Mabini], Petitioners, versus. Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, in his capacity as Executive
Assistant to the President, Hon. Joaquin Venus, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President , Melquiades P. De La Cruz, in his capacity as director, Malacañang Records Office, and
Florendo S. Pablo, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, Respondents.
Petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground
that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question said petitioners are
without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they, not being
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to
compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to
be given due course.
ISSUE
Whether publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws
where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is submitted that since the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect;
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity
RULING
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
REASON
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
There shall be published in the Official Gazette
1.all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines;
2.all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability;
3.decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published;
4.such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and
5. such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from
time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be
published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It

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 would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
 To be construed as having only prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the
legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used
 Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligations of contracts of
affect injuriously vested rights
 Instances when a law may be given retroactive effect:
1.Express provision of the law
2.Curative or remedial law
3.Procedural law
4.Penal law in character and favorable to the accused
Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except
when the law itself authorizes their validity.
 Mandatory laws – laws enjoining the performance of certain acts
1. omission of which renders the proceeding or acts to which it relates generally illegal or void
2. non-compliance would render the act illegal or void such as the setting of prescriptive periods failure
to comply would render it void
 Prohibitory laws – laws which prohibit acts
1.contain positive prohibitions and are couched in the negative terms importing that the act required
shall not be done otherwise than designated
2.violations are void
 if the law expressly provides for the validity of acts committed in violation of a mandatory or prohibitory
provision of a statute, such act shall be considered valid and enforceable
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
Waiver
1. Intentional relinquishment of a known right an act of understanding that presupposes that a party
has knowledge of its rights but chooses not to assert them.
2. Must be exercised by a duly capacitated person actually possession an existing right to make the
waiver.
3. Must not be contrary to law, public policy, morals or good customs
Intentional relinquishment of a known right
1.Right must not be presumed but clearly and convincingly shown either by express stipulation or acts
admitting no other reasonable explanation
2.Right must be in existence at the time of the waiver

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Prohibition against waiver
1.Cannot be made if they are contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law
2.Waiver is void if the same is contrary to public interest and morals
CUI VS ARELLANO, 2 SCRA 205 (1961)
(action for recovery of sum of money on the ground of prohibited waiver of right – waiver of the right
to transfer to another school without refunding the cash equivalent of the scholarship grant was held
invalid for being contrary to public morals for depleting its purpose of giving rewards based on
merits)
FACTS
Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, absolving
defendant Arellano University from plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the plaintiff, and
dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of proof thereon.
In the language of the decision appealed from:
The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established by the agreement of facts
Exhibits X and by the respective oral and documentary evidence introduced by the parties, it appears
conclusive that plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949 took up preparatory law course in the
defendant University. After finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law
of the defendant from the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant
university up to and including the first semester of the fourth year.
During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R.
Capistrano, brother of the mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law and legal counsel
of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his law studies in the defendant
university but failed to pay his tuition fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having
severed his connection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the
College of Law of Abad Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law college and enrolled for
the last semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating
from the college of law of the latter university.
Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying law in defendant university was awarded scholarship
grants, for scholastic merit, that his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the end of each
semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees
paid by plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and
including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or the fourth year, is in total
P1,033.87.
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to sign
the following contract covenant and agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right to
transfer to another school without having refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent
of my scholarship cash.
(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".
After graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar examination. To
secure permission to take the bar, he needed the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano
University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue him the needed transcripts. The defendant refused
until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he
could not take the bar examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid defendant the said sum
under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case.

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 The complaint was dismissed by the lower court on the ground that the memorandum of the Director
of Private Schools is not a law. That the provisions thereof are advisory, not mandatory in nature;
and that, although the contractual provision "may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff
to quit studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply because he wanted to follow
the example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its brief that the aforementioned
memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void because said officer had no authority
to issue it, and because it had been neither approved by the corresponding department head nor
published in the official gazette.
ISSUE
whether the above quoted provision of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the
former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of
his scholarships in cash, is valid or not
RULING
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered
sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the
legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and
dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.
REASON
The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy. Scholarships are awarded in
recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the
understanding of that university scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase the
business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound
policy but also good morals. But what are morals? Manresa has this definition. It is good customs;
those generally accepted principles of morality which have received some kind of social and practical
confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is
not good customs nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some
private institutions as in Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which implements
Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted
children, does not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if they
transfer to other schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the United States after
which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions scholarships are
granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to
reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws or the Constitution.
Repeal
1.Legislative act of abrogating through a subsequent law the effects of a previous statute or portions
thereof.
2.It may be express or implied, however implied repeals are not favored
Express repeal
 Literally declared by a new law, either in specific terms as where particular laws and provisions are

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 named and identified and declared in general terms, as where a provision in a new law declares all
laws and parts inconsistent therewith to be repealed (those which are literally declared by new law)
Implied repeal
 A new law contains provisions contrary to or inconsistent with those of a former without expressly
repealing them (those inconsistent with the former without expressly repealing them)
Unconstitutional statute
1.has no effect, no ordinary statute can override the Constitution being the supreme law of the land
constitutionality
 every presumption favors the validity of the same whenever possible, statute should be given a
meaning that will not bring them in conflict wit the Constitution
 depends upon factors other than those existing at the time of the enactment thereof
 unaffected by the acts or omissions of law enforcing agencies particularly those that take place
subsequently to the passage or approval of the law
partial unconstitutionality
 parts will be separated and constitutional portion shall be upheld
 parts which are dependent on an unconstitutional provisions must fall with them
 if the valid part is separable from the valid, it may stand and be enforced
Rules and Regulations/Administrative and Executive Acts
1.Rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its
scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature even if the courts are not in
agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom
2.Regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with
the provisions of the law and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions
 Invalid if it is violative of the law and the constitution
Chapter 5 Book I of EO 292 (Administrative Code of the Philippines, 1987)
1.Section 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.- When a law which expressly repeals a prior law
itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided.
2.Section 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. - When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is
itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise.
Chapter 2 Book VII of EO 292 Administrative Code of the Philippines, 1987)
Section 3. Filing. -
1.Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of
every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed
within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any
party or persons.
2.The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of
this section under pain of disciplinary action.
3.A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public
inspection
Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.

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Judicial construction and interpretation
Principal functions of the Judiciary
1.resolving legal controversies
2.interpreting and construing vague provision of law relative to a particular dispute
3.construction is the act or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of law with respect to its application to a given case
Effect of judicial decision (pertains to SC decisions only)
1.judicial decisions (SC decisions only) applying and interpreting the law shall form part of the legal
system
2.assume the same authority as the statute itself and until authoritatively abandoned necessarily become
to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those
called upon to abide thereby but also those duty bound to enforce obedience thereto
3.authoritative and precedent-setting while those of the inferior courts and the CA are merely persuasive
4.constitute as evidence of what the law means
When judicial decisions deemed part of the law
 Application and interpretation placed by the SC upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the
enactment of the said law since SC’s application and interpretation merely established the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect
Construction – act or process of discovering or expounding the meaning and intention of authors with
respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful among others
Interpretation - act of interpreting or construing vague provisions relative to a particular dispute
PEOPLE VS JABINAL, 55 SCRA 407
(appeal from the judgment of the lower court based on a previous ruling of the Supreme Court which
was deemed part of the law)
FACTS
Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal
Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition
and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to
two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of
his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa.
The complaint filed against the accused reads:
That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality
of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German
Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary
permit or license to possess the same.
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial
was accordingly held.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to
be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as
Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from

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 the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to
possess and carry the firearm in question.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de
oficio.
REASON
Considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and
authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and
Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the
absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be
punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the laws.
Duty of judges
1.Dispensation of justice in accordance with the constitutional precept that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty and property without due process of law
2.Must not evade performance of this responsibility just because of an apparent no-existence of any law
governing a particular legal dispute or because the law involved is vague or inadequate
3.Must be guided by equity, fairness and sense of justice in these situations
Judicial legislation
1.Each department of the government cannot encroach into the respective domain of the other
2.In the absence of any law that would resolve an actual controversy, the court may resort to judicial
legislation
3.“Do and must legislate” to fill in the gaps in the law, because the mind of the legislator like all human
beings is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply. Nor has
the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations
Note: the Civil Code recognizes that in certain cases, the Court must “do and must legislate” to fill in
the gaps, because the mind of the legislators, like all human beings is finite and therefore cannot
envisage all possible cases to which law may apply.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS CATOLICO, 68 SCRA 62
(administrative complaints filed for the alleged serious misconduct and gross disregard of law by a
judge in rendering his decisions)
FACTS
Two administrative complaints with four charges, the first three of them formulated by the Secretary of
Justice, against Judge Alfredo Catolico of Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Cavite charging
him with “serious misconduct and gross disregard of law.”
The first complaint arose out of the actuations in October of 1965 of respondent, then acting as Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, relative to the naturalization cases of over fifty
naturalized citizens wherein said respondent not only declared motu proprio, without any corresponding
petition of the Republic of the Philippines, null and void the oath taking of therein petitioners, with the
aggravating circumstance that, without priorly hearing the petitioner concerned, “the respondent
delivered in open court a lengthy dissertation reflecting on the honesty and integrity of provincial and
city fiscals appearing in naturalization cases, and venting his spleen particularly on Chua Tuan, referred
to him as a Chinese who had become a multi-millionaire by making over shipments of copra, who was

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 “untouchable because he could buy his way out in Malacañang, in the Army, in the Foreign Affairs, in
the Immigration, in the Bureau of Internal Revenue and in the Courts of Justice,” of which the
respondent said he would take judicial notice. The respondent further castigated Chua Tuan with the
following epithets: “balasubas;” ingrate; “hambug;” animalistic; a danger and a disgrace to the
community; a dishonor to the Filipino people.” (Pars. 5 & 6, p. 2 of complaint.)
The second and third complaints relate to the insistence of respondent to consider himself as without
jurisdiction to continue trying every case, civil and criminal, which he found had not been tried for more
than thirty days since the respective previous hearings therein, for which reason, he ordered their
dismissal, with aggravating circumstance, that he refused to recognize not only the authority of the
Court to authorize the continuation of the corresponding proceedings but also the personality of the
Clerk of this Court to transmit to him the pertinent resolutions of the Court in the usual form in which
parties have always been notified in all cases of resolutions of the Court.
The fourth complaint was filed by the widow of the victim, Mrs. Fermina Olaes, in a case of homicide in
which the arraignment was held on October 3, 1973 and the hearings were set on October 15,
November 23 and 27, December 6, 12, 17, 18, 20, 21 and 26, 1973 and January 2, 3 and 4, 1974 and
the decision acquitting the accused was promulgated by respondent on January 10, 1974, two days
before he reached the age of 70 years, the complainant charging that respondent hurried, in
preference to other cases in his sala which deserved earlier attention, the trial with the intention of
being able to finish and decide the same favorably to the accused before he (the judge) could retire
RULING
Premises considered, and in line with the established policy regarding similar situations wherein the
President has accepted resignations without prejudice to the grant of legally possible retirement
benefits thus rendering administrative cases pending against the official concerned, moot and
academic, the Court resolved to DISMISS above-entitled cases.
REASON
While the Court was awaiting said report, however, in a letter dated April 17, 1975, respondent
informed the Court that His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos had accepted his resignation
effective January 11, 1974, “without prejudice to his receiving whatever rights he may be entitled to
under the retirement and other existing laws.”
Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
Doubtful statutes
1.Where the law is clear, it must be applied according to its unambiguous provisions
2.If there is ambiguity in the law, interpretation of the law requires fidelity to the legislative purpose
Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.
Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.
Custom
1.A rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed or practiced as a social rule, legally
binding and obligatory
2.Even if proven cannot prevail over a statutory rule or even a legal rule enunciated by the SC
Requisites of customs, uniformity and juridical intent
IN RE: OZAETA, ROMULO, ETC. 92 SCRA 1
(a petition asking for the continuance of using the old firm name based on custom however said custom
was not proven as a fact – authority to continue the use of the firm name as a custom must proved as a

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fact)
FACTS
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip,
who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on
February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the
names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions
were ordered consolidated.
RULING
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP"
and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of
individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such.
REASON
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been
defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a
social rule, legally binding and obligatory. Courts take no judicial notice of custom . A custom must
be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence . A local custom as a source of right cannot
be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent
evidence like any other fact. We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the
elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a
matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of
adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The
former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with
the latter.
Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are
of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights
from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they
respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.
On year
GARVIDA VS SALES, 82 SCRA 188
(on the term “not more than 21 years old” – when the law speaks of years in age, the age of the person
involved should be exact)
FACTS
Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc suspending her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman
of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent's votes of 76.
In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not
proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position
of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The proclamation was "without prejudice to
any further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested party." On July 5, 1996,
petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected officials of the

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Pederasyon.
ISSUE
Petitioner raises two (2) significant issues: the first concerns the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to
act on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy; the second, the cancellation of her
certificate of candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective
official of the SK.
RULING
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for
being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan,
and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan member voted by simple majority by and from
among the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte
shall assume the office of Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte for the unexpired portion of the term
REASON
The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21
365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that
would be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22
years old," contrary to petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22
years on election day.
NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION VS TECSON, 29 SCRA 70
(distinguishing a year with 365 days as provided in Article 13 of the Civil Code from calendar year – year
refers to the whole year regardless of it being a leap year)
FACTS
This appeal has been certified to us by the Court of Appeals only one question of law being involved
therein.
On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, in Civil Case No. 20520
thereof, entitled "Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance Co.,
Inc.," the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
For the foregoing consideration, the Court decides this case:
(a) Ordering the defendants Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety Insurance Co., Inc. to pay jointly and
severally plaintiff PRATRA the sum of P7,200.00 plus 7% interest from May 25, 1960 until the amount is
fully paid, plus P500.00 for attorney's fees, and plus costs;
(b) ordering defendant Miguel D. Tecson to indemnify his co-defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.
on the cross-claim for all the amounts it would be made to pay in this decision, in case defendant Alto
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. pay the amount adjudged to plaintiff in this decision. From the date of such
payment defendant Miguel D. Tecson would pay the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., interest at 12%
per annum until Miguel D. Tecson has fully reimbursed plaintiff of the said amount.
Copy of this decision was, on November 21, 1955, served upon the defendants in said case. On
December 21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as successor to all the properties, assets, rights,
and chose in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as plaintiff in that case and judgment creditor
therein, filed, with the same court, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63701 thereof, against the
same defendants, for the revival of the judgment rendered in said Case No. 20520. Defendant Miguel D.
Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
thereof and prescription of action. Acting upon the motion and plaintiff's opposition thereto, said Court
issued, on February 14, 1966, an order reading:

11
Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
prescription. As for lack of jurisdiction, as the amount involved is less than P10,000 as actually these
proceedings are a revival of a decision issued by this same court, the matter of jurisdiction must be
admitted. But as for prescription. Plaintiffs admit the decision of this Court became final on December 21,
1955. This case was filed exactly on December 21, 1965 — but more than ten years have passed a year
is a period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964 were both leap years so that when
this present case was filed it was filed two days too late.
The complaint insofar as Miguel Tecson is concerned is, therefore, dismissed as having prescribed.
ISSUE
The National Marketing Corporation appealed from such order to the Court of Appeals, which, on March
20, 1969 certified the case to this Court, upon the ground that the only question therein raised is one of
law, namely, whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute of
limitations.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, without costs. It is so ordered.
REASON
The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit provision of
Art. 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, limiting the connotation of each "year" — as the term is used
in our laws — to 365 days.
Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not realistic, for failure to
conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-appellant herein cannot be upheld
without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of our Civil Code, and reviving Section 13 of the Revised
Administrative Code, thereby engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act of Congress.
If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative Code, this
may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree.
Months and leap years
GUZMAN VS LICHAUCO, 42 PHIL 291
(on setting the day of the month – when the period of payment was designated on the 10th of each
month, it means the 10th day of each month, regardless of the number of days in each mont)
FACTS
The respondent, Faustino Lichauco, is at present prosecuting two actions of unlawful detainer to recover
the possession of certain properties located on Rizal Avenue, in the city of Manila. In one of these actions
Luis Guzman is named as defendant, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Doña Eriberta
Sanchez de Guzman. In the other action Jose Guzman is the person named as defendant, but Luis
Guzman has intervened in his capacity as administrator; and all the property in question appears to be in
his possession. The plaintiff was successful in both these actions before the justice of the peace, who
assessed the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the respective premises, in the one case at
P250, and in the other at P300, per month.
The unsuccessful defendants having appealed in both cases upon December 9, 1920, to the Court of First
Instance of Manila, it became their duty, in conformity with the provisions of section 88 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2588, in case they desired to avoid the immediate execution of
the judgment pending the appeal, to pay to the plaintiffs, or into court, "on or before the tenth day of
each calendar month," the sums of money respectively fixed by the justice of the peace as the
reasonable value of the use and occupation; and such payments have in fact been made by the
defendants each month, though in most instances later than the tenth of the month, that is to say,
respectively on February 14, March 18, April 11, May 10, June 10, July 11, August 11.

12
Considering these payments to be dilatory, under the provision of law above referred to, and being
further desirous of obtaining the possession of the premises at once the plaintiff, through his attorneys,
on August 16, 1921, moved the Court of First Instance to execute the judgment, for failure of the
defendants — appellants in that court — to make payment on or before the tenth of the month then
current. To this motion his Honor, Judge Carlos Imperial, acceded, and an order was accordingly entered
for the immediate execution of the judgment. The present petition was thereupon filed in this court by
Luis Guzman, administrator, as aforesaid, against the respondents named in the caption hereof, for the
purpose of obtaining relief from said order; and the respondents have duly demurred.
The petition purports to be an application for the writ of mandamus but the facts stated show that proper
remedy — supposing any remedy at all to be here available — is by petition for the writ of certiorari, to
quash the order complained of; and in conformity with the constant practice of this court always to
entertain an original petition for relief in the aspect most conformable with the facts presented, we shall
consider this petition in the character of an application for the writ of certiorari. We may state in passing
that the petition contains a request for a preliminary injunction to restrain the court from executing the
order referred to, but this application was refused by us.
ISSUE
For the respondent it is contended that payment should be made for each entire month in the calendar
on or before the tenth day of the succeeding month,
RULING
From what has been said it is apparent that the payment effected on August 11, 1921, was one day late.
The action of the respondent judge in awarding immediate execution was therefore in conformity with
law. The demurrer must accordingly be sustained, and unless within five days after notification hereof the
petitioner shall so amend his petition as to show a sufficient cause of action, an order absolute will be
entered, dismissing the same, with costs. So ordered.
REASON
Clearly the mode of computation intended in section 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended. This
we consider true whether reference is had to the English expression "on or before the tenth day of each
calendar month," used in Acts Nos. 1778 and 2588, or to the Spanish expression " el dia diez de cada mes
civil, o antes," used in the Spanish text. The word "tenth," used in connection with "month," indubitable
identifies the day of payment as the tenth in sequence of the days of which the respective calendar
months are comprised. The English text of the law does not admit of doubt upon this point; and if the
Spanish were in any degree ambiguous, its meaning would be determined by the English.
GUTIERREZ VS LICHAUCO, 60 PHIL 334
(determination of which kind of month should apply, calendar or civil month)
FACTS
The litigants herein compromised a civil case on July 13, 1928, agreeing that if within one month from
the date thereof the plaintiffs failed to repurchase certain land, its ownership would vest in the
defendant.
ISSUE
When did the stipulated month terminate? This is the first point in controversy, the determination of
which depends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties, and on the day from its should be
counted.
RULING
The judgment appealed from is modified, and it is hereby ordered that the plaintiffs may, within ten days
from the date on which this judgment becomes final, repurchase the land, the subject matter of these
proceedings, through the delivery to the defendant at the latter's residence in the municipality of Santa

13
Rita, Pampanga, of the sum of fourteen thousand six hundred forty three pesos and forty-three centavos
(P14,643.43), Philippine currency (in coin or paper money). The judgment appealed from is affirmed in all
other respects, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
REASON
As to the kind of month, it is to be noted that, according to the ruling in the case of Guzman vs. Lichauco
(42 Phil., 291), article 7 of the Civil Code had been modified by section 13 of the Administrative Code,
according to which "month" now means the civil or calendar month and not the regular thirty-day month.
And the civil or calendar month is defined as follows :
The civil or solar month is that which agrees with the Gregorian calendar; and these months are known
by the names of January, February, March, etc. They are composed of unequal portions of time . . .
(Bouvier's Law Dictionary.)
A calendar month is a month as designated in the calendar, without regard to the number of days it may
contain. In commercial transactions it means a month ending on the day in the succeeding month
corresponding to the day in the preceding month from which the computation began, and if the last
month have not so many days, then on the last day of that month
Day, night and period
1.Days of 24 hours
2.Nights from sunset to sunrise
3.In counting a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day will be included
Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or
sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty
stipulations.
Obligatory force of penal laws
1.Citizens and foreigners are subject to all penal laws and all other laws designed to maintain public
security and safety, any liability arising from the violation of such will even attach regardless of whether
or not a foreigner is merely sojourning in Philippine territory
2.Territoriality rule - undertake to punish crimes committed within the Philippine territory as defined in
Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution (applies in penal laws and those of public security and safety - twelve
nautical miles from the shore or baseline of the Philippines is covered by the Philippine territory and
referred to as territorial seas)
Exceptions
1.Foreigners may be immune from the suit and cannot be criminally prosecuted in the Philippines in
certain cases wherein the Philippine government has waived its criminal jurisdiction over them on the
basis of the principles of public international law and treaty stipulations
2.Except as provided in treaties and laws of preferential application (Article 2, RPC)
3.Heads of states who are officially visiting here in the Philippines are immune from Philippine criminal
jurisdiction, a consul is not exempted from the “territoriality rule”
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Nationality rule
1.lex nationali
2.citizenship is the basis of a person’s right

14
3.Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might, be he or she will be governed by Philippines
laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties or to his or her status, condition and legal
capacity
TENCHAVEZ VS ESCANO, 15 SCRA 355
(a Filipino spouse seeking legal separation from a Filipino spouse who got a divorce decree prior to
obtaining American citizenship, remarried and co-habited with foreigner same was granted with
payment of damages because the naturalized-alien spouse secured an invalid divorce decree)
Note: this case was filed before the effectivity of the Family Code
FACTS
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-
appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena, all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, defendant applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and
that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United
States.
On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second
Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said
tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of
her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives
with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8
August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and
Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its
Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to
her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced
their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of
P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his
wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.

15
REASON
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither
is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign
decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
GARCIA VS RECIO, 366 SCRA 437
(a Filipino who became a naturalized Australian citizen married to a Filipino, no question on the
capacity to remarry or the validity of the divorce decree provided that sufficient evidence is presented)
FACTS
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7,
1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch
28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now
remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on
March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of
divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian
Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were married
on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a
marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16,
1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo,
on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married
her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only
in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen
had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989; thus, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration
of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no
cause of action. The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. The court marked and

16
admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. After they submitted their respective memoranda,
the case was submitted for resolution.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was
valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any
defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to
remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian
divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUES
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2 The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal
capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the
respondent.
"3 The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4 The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of
the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5 The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the
divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry,
without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal
ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether
respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these
two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
RULING
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the
court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity
to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy,
as above discussed. No costs.
REASON
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity
to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the
ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to
marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious
course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal
capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties'
marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates,

17
which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and
the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
ROEHR VS RODRIGUEZ, 404 SCRA 495
(alien spouse seeking the dismissal of the nullity of marriage filed Filipino spouse, no question on the
capacity to remarry but on the custody, support and separation of properties)
FACTS
At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed
by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in matters that spring from a
divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner.
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order1 dated September 30, 1999 of
public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati Regional Trial Court,2
Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b) the order3 dated
March 31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration. The assailed orders partially set aside the trial
court’s order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of resolving issues relating to the
property settlement of the spouses and the custody of their children.
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent
Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was
subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.4 Out of their union were born
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its order7 dated May 28, 1997.
On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an order8 dated
August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition and remanded the case to the
RTC.
Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.
The decree provides in part:
[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge van Buiren of
the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:
The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of Hamburg-
Altona is hereby dissolved.
The parental custody for the children
Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981
Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987
is granted to the father.
The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9
Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999 filed by petitioner
thru counsel which was opposed by respondent and considering that the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code was included as an amendment thru Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd
situation of a Filipino as being still married to his or her alien spouse though the latter is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized by
his/her national law, and considering further the effects of the termination of the marriage under Article

18
43 in relation to Article 50 and 52 of the same Code, which include the dissolution of the property
relations of the spouses, and the support and custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is
partially set aside with respect to these matters which may be ventilated in this Court.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by
respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.12
RULING
WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30,
1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial
court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the
care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the
records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate
proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
REASON
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts.23 Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment,
such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule
39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO, GR 154380 (October 5, 2005)
(the Republic seeking for a review of judgment, but was more appropriately treated as petition for
declaratory relief on the provision of Article 26 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code arising from the
recognition of foreign decree of divorce allegedly obtained by a naturalized American citizen spouse and
subsequently remarried)
FACTS
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution dated July 4, 2002
denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano
Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by
reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the
capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut
Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted

19
 the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant
case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for
legal separation. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The
OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when
his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise
capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
RULING
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
REASON
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O.
No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is
now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature
of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)
Law governing real properties
The law of the country where the real property is situated shall be the governing law over
such real property
National law shall govern the following:
 Order of succession
 Amount of successional rights
 Validity of the provisions of the will

20
 Capacity to succeed
AZNAR VS GARCIA, 7 SCRA 95 (January 31, 1963)
The estate of an American citizen who died testate estate should be governed by the national law of
America. However, the said national law of the citizen particularly of California provided that the law of
the country where their citizen died should govern his property or estate.
BELLIS VS BELLIS
The estate of an American citizen who died testate estate should be governed his national law. Being a
citizen of Texas, the law of Texas which provided that there are no forced heirs or legitimes therefore
what was stated in the will shall be applied.
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed
by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
Lex celebraciones – rule of the country in which they are executed except those executed in the
Philippine Embassy and those concerning prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and properties
shall be applied.
Article 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency
shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code. (16a)
Matters concerning commerce shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and the New Civil Code shall
be suppletory to its deficiencies.
CHAPTER 2
Human Relations (n)
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Rule of Conduct
 Give everyone his due
 Observe honesty
 Observe good faith
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Willful, negligent acts contrary to law shall indemnify the aggrieved parties for the damages
done
Willful act contrary to morals, good customs and policy shall be compensated for the
damages it caused
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires
or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall

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return the same to him.
Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to the fault or
negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was
benefited.
Article 22 & 23 refer to unjust enrichment
Article 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage
on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other
handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Court vigilance - protection of the parties who are at a disadvantage on account of his ignorance,
indulgence, mental weakness, tender age or handicap.
Article 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public
want or emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or private
charitable institution.
Prohibition of extravagance during an emergency
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal
offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,
physical defect, or other personal condition.
Protection of human dignity – damages, prevention and other relief may be sought even if
the said acts do not constitute a criminal offense.
Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or
neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief
against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
Damage and other reliefs for refusal or negligence of a public servant to render service.
Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the
use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method
shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.
Damages for unfair competition.
Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare.
In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether
or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Civil action may still be instituted after the acquittal of the accused for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal

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offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a
preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Only preponderance of evidence is required to prove civil liability arising from a criminal
offense.
Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
Civil action may be litigated independently of the criminal action.
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess
guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when
the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or
inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

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The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Basically, moral and exemplary damages may be sought for violation of the Bill of Rights
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Separate civil action for damages arising from defamation, fraud and physical injuries only
preponderance of the evidence is required
Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection
to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for
damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein
recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall
suffice to support such action.
Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same,
for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the
peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting
attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for
damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of
evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the
defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting
attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
Article 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate
and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.

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