Quan Nguyen Tran (18319069) – Term paper - CADP

Political Regime and Development in Vietnam: An Application of Erik Martinez Kuhonta’s

Institutional Theoretical Framework
I. Introduction
Since the economic reform in the Sixth Party Congress in 1986, or Doi Moi in
Vietnamese, Vietnam has been one of the rare case since the rise of Northeast Asian dragons to
sustain economic growth around 6% annually since the early 1990s, leading the country from
being among the poorest to a lower-middle income in 2010 (The World Bank data). Many
scholars have attributed this development to the “gradualism” approach in economic reform of
the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), which contradicts the “shock-therapy” approach in
post-communist Eastern European countries (see Curwin & mahutga, 2014).
This paper attempts to apply Erik Martinez Kuhonta’s institutional approach to examine
the gradualist economic reform of the VCP (Erik, 2017). Before applying Erik’s framework into
explaining the economic reform and how it relates to the institutionalized goal, structure, and
mechanism of the VCP, I start with examining the rootedness of the VCP during the wartime
from the 1940s to the conclusion of the Vietnam War in 1975.
One of the consistent features of the VCP since the 1940s is factionalism, in one kind or
another. However, along with factionalism, the Party top elites manifest their ability to induce
consensus and accommodation to move forward despite factionalism. Before the Doi Moi in
1986, factionalism was associated with the disagreement on the extent to which state-socialism
and collectivization agenda should be entrenched. After 1986, factionalism was mostly the
product of competition between conservative and reformist factions on whether and the extent to
which politics should follow economic reform. Thus, “gradualism”, from Erik’s institutional
theoretical framework, can be seen as the compromise between the two factions.
Therefore, this paper proposes that in comparison with Erik’s 3 cases of study, South
Korea under Park Chung Hee, Thailand under Sarit Thanarat, and the Philippines under Marcos
dictatorship. Vietnam, under the monopoly of political power of the VCP lies in between Park’s
South Korea and Sarit’s Thailand halfway house. In terms of commitment to the established
institutionalized agenda, Vietnam, like Park’s military administration and Sarit administration,
had the institutional rootedness to pursue public interest (economic development), the
institutional mechanism (military disciplines or party’s penetrative branches) that incentivized
them for further reform and public-oriented development. Finally, related to the institutional
break, the VCP shows how factionalism works as an institutional brake via which each faction
prevents the other from deviating from the institutionalized agenda for their factional interests.
However, the VCP, while sharing similar factionalism issues with Sarit’s Thailand, was able to
form consensus between factions to move forward gradually. Thus, the case of VCP also shows
less efficiency than Park’s military administration due to the lack of cohesiveness, relatively.
II. Theoretical Framework
This paper will use the theoretical framework of Erik Martinez Kuhonta in his qualitative
study of the role of institutions in making dictatorship pursue public-oriented policies (economic
growth) over personal interests.
Vietnam’s political regime is the Leninist Party-state system under the Vietnamese
Communist party, similar to the system in China with the Chinese Communist Party. In a party-
state system, the Party’s political structure coexist, and Party apparatuses penetrate into the state
structure that most of the time the Party's position outpower that of the state (Kornai, 1992).
Thus, the General Secretary of the Party becomes the most powerful position in such political
system. While the party-state structure is not the same with dictatorship or military regime, it is
Quan Nguyen Tran (18319069) – Term paper - CADP

qualitatively, to some extent, tantamount to the cases of Park’s South Korea, Sarit’s Thailand,
and Marcos’s Philippines that the Party has maintained the monopoly of political power since the
national reunification since 1975. Moreover, each General Secretary of the Vietnamese
Communist Party (VCP), the most powerful position in the Vietnamese political system, has
exerted significant influence over the political economy landscape of Vietnam, virtually since the
economic reform in 1986.
In Erik’s theoretical framework with an institutional approach, there are three main
variables. First, an institutionalized ideological agenda and its quality of public-oriented feature
creates an ideological compass based on which the leaders choose to prioritize public interest or
personal/factional interest (Erik, 2017: 125). In the case of the VCP, one consistent
institutionalized agenda is to pursue Socialism based on Marxist views. Before the Doi Moi in
1986, the VCP pursued this agenda through a Leninist command economy. Since the Doi Moi,
the VCP elites, realized the command economy is unsuitable to promote economic prosperity,
which is a vital part to achieve socialism, promoted a different means called “Socialist-oriented
Market Economy”, or shortly Market Socialism. Under Market Socialism, the VCP liberalizes
the economy, expands the roles of the market, and hence promote the public interest of economic
growth, while maintaining “Socailist” policies such as continuing SOEs operation in strategic
sector as the Party’s “commanding heights” and redistribution policy taking portion of revenue
from richer regions to fund the underdeveloped regions. While the goal of “Socialism” is yet to
be seen and qualified, it includes the requirement for economic development which is a public
interest.
Second, there must be an institutionalized mechanism and foundation for the leaders to
pursue the institutionalized agenda effectively and forcefully. In the case of the VCP, the
mechanism has been the Party penetrative branches, from local party committees to SOEs. In the
case of Vietnam, there has been a factionalism issue throughout the VCP top leaders as well as
penetrative branches. Thus, while there has been consensus and compromise between factions to
move forward, the efficiency of the VCP in economic reform is less than Park’s military
administration thanks to its cohesiveness. This cohesiveness also relates to Erik’s note on the
crisis. Erik (2017: 125) remarks that supposedly the institutionalized is public-oriented, crises
only compel leaders to sharpen public interests if the institutional foundation gives enough
confidence for further reform and development.
Finally, Erik (2017: 126) poses a third variable of institutional brake to prevent leaders
from overextending in personal/factional interests at the expense of the public. This is most
evident during the conservative-reformist battle during the early phase of the Doi Moi over
whether and the extent to which political liberalization should follow economic liberalization.
Therefore, such factionalism led to a compromise known as “gradualism” in economic reform
with hardly any reform in the political realm in Vietnam, which can also be observed in China’s
reform.
III. The political economy landscape and institution of the VCP 1945 – 1986:
Agenda of State-socialism & self-determination, factionalism, and war as crisis: Applying
Erik Kuhonta’s theoretical framework
The political landscape of Vietnam in the period between 1945, specifically North Vietnam
under the Vietnamese Communist Parry’s rule, was full of war, namely the Independence
revolution in 1945 against Japanese colonialism, 1954 war against French’s colonial redux, and
the Vietnam War from 1961-1975. From this context of hostility, the VCP rose and led the
Quan Nguyen Tran (18319069) – Term paper - CADP

Vietnamese revolution cooperating with the “Marxist-Socialist ideology” that was attractive to
the majority of the peasant population at the time. This context has embedded the ideological
agenda of the Party, the mechanism and popular legitimacy to head for such agenda, and the
‘institutional brake’ to put check on factionalism and make factions negotiate.
First, until the economic reform (Doi Moi) in 1986, the Vietnamese Communist Party’s
institutionalized ideological agenda was to lead the Vietnamese society to “Socialism” and
elimination of challenging forces. “Challenging forces”, internally, means political parties and
social forces opposing the state-socialist institution, and “externally”, are the Japanese and
French colonialism as well as the Vietnam War. There was the formal institution of the VCP to
enforce collectivization of the means of production and nationalization of industries and
agriculture (London, 2009: 378). The Party promoted a state-socialism agenda with its belief
rooted in the Leninist view that socialism is the public-oriented policies providing equality and
prosperity under the “vanguard” of the Party.
Notwithstanding the successful leadership throughout the Vietnam War and penetrative
branches of the Party throughout the state and society, there was still factionalism during the
institution at the time. Despite the seemingly monolithic institution, factionalism exists between
top-level cadres, even in the climax of the Vietnam War against the U.S. in 1967-68 (Sophie,
2004). Nevertheless, such factionalism did not hinder the collective leadership and the
ideological agenda of leading the country to independence and socialism. One obvious reason for
the factions to move forwards together was the fierce war at the time. The war worked as a crisis
implying a “survival or demise” of their leadership, and the public goods of the population called
independence and self-determination.
This reflects Erik Kuhonta’s argument that the crisis helps bolster the established
institutionalized ideological agenda, and for public-oriented policies if it is the agenda (Erik,
2017: 125). In Erik’s framework, crisis/war cannot be seen independent from the established
institution nor can it automatically compel leaders to promote public-oriented policies as the
Tilly aphorism argues because there are many cases that elites do not respond to crisis by
promoting public interests (Erik, 2017: 122). Thus, in this case, with the institutionalized agenda
for the public goods of independence and socialism, and the institution’s resource of popular
support for furthering the agenda, the factions and top leaders within the Party can work together
on such agenda. During that climax wartime, the National Liberation Front effectively extracted
agricultural tax from peasants in the liberated regions during the Vietnam War without much
local opposition, sometimes peaking at 60% agricultural products (Talyor & Botea, 2008: 39).
The VCP also successfully launched and utilized the wartime bond which accounted for more
than half of the Liberation Front budget.
The economic institution of the VCP was operated with the Soviet-central planning style
which sees the Party as the vanguard party to lead all aspects of the society. The VCP at the time
employed the dual economy in which agricultural surplus is devoted for heavy industries
programs and public services provision rather than to sell at market (London, 2009: 381). As I
discussed, there were issues of factionalism, which was partly caused by the disagreement on the
extent to which collectivization and dual economy should entrench. However, three factors of the
institutionalized agenda, institutional foundation and prospect based on popular support, and the
crisis of war preempt any deviation from the public-oriented goal of achieving independence and
socialism caused by factionalism.
Quan Nguyen Tran (18319069) – Term paper - CADP

Post-national unification economic failure, crises, and the Economic Reform 1975-1986:
After the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, the VCP extended its institutionalized
economic agenda of dual economy and collectivization of agriculture to the Southern regions to
pursue Soviet-style industrialization. Nevertheless, the dual economic model, which was suitable
for the wartime economy, did not bring about economic prosperity during peacetime.
Collectivization in agricultural means of production and final product curbed working incentives
while the heavy industry-favored dual economy suffocated agricultural accumulation.
Consequently, after one decade of postwar pursuing state-socialism economic agenda, the war-
torn country remained one of the poorest economies with GDP valued at $14B and GDP per
capita at $231 in 1985 (The World Bank data). Worse, Vietnam, like China at the time, had
mostly rural peasant population whose life condition was retarded with poverty and food
scarcity. For example, notwithstanding an economy dominated by the agricultural sector,
Vietnam was forced to import more than 300,000 tons of cereal in 1984 (Hiep, 2012: 154). One
final blow to the economic failure was the 1985 currency crisis which peaked at 487%. Thus, in
the 1980s, collectivization programs were mostly terminated (Womack, 1993: 290).
As a result, the “Doi Moi”, or economic reform was launched at the conclusion of the
Sixth Party Congress, which terminated the Soviet-style command economy and allowed a
gradual market-oriented economy. This seemingly termination of the institutionalized agenda of
state-socialism did not imply a complete withdrawal from the current agenda. Thereby Erik’s
framework remains relevant to the case of the VCP top leaders’ attachment to the established
agenda for public goods. This relevance of the framework in the case study will be discussed in
the next section.
IV. 1986 Onwards: “Socialist-oriented Market Economy”: Applying Erik's Framework
The launch of Doi Moi (renovation) economic reform in 1986 signified a turn from the
Soviet-style command economy into one with more market-led characteristics. In the period
from 1986 to 1998, the most salient feature of the VCP is rising factionalism between the
conservatives and the reformists, revolving around the debate of whether political freedom such
as freedom of the press should follow economic reform.
The period between 1986 and 1998 witnessed the rise of a reformist Party General
Secretary, and conservative backlash of two conservative general secretaries, and onwards the
conservative stumbling with the rise of technocrats. This factionalism resulted in what analysts
call “gradualism”, which was also seen in the case of China’s economic reform “Kaige Kaifang''.
Therefore, applying Erik’s theoretical framework, this paper proposes that the institution in the
VCP, since the Doi Moi, has been characterised by factionalism that requires a compromise of
“gradualism” without much political liberalization, which allows economic reform to move
forwards and results in the economic miracle of Vietnam since then.
Therefore, to contrast with the 3 cases of South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines,
Vietnam can be put between Park’s South Korea and Sarit’s Thailand. The VCP, while
resembling Sarit Thailand’s “halfway house” due to factionalism, managed to find a way forward
in a “gradualism” manner, which means slower and less efficient than Park’s South Korea.
Quan Nguyen Tran (18319069) – Term paper - CADP

Next, the concept of “Socialist-oriented Market economy” should be explained before

applying Erik Kuhonta’s theoretical framework to examine the VCP institutionalized agenda
because it is the core of the application of Erik’s theoretical framework in Vietnam’s case.
The concept of “Socialist-oriented Market economy”
The most crucial measures for the VCP to ease factionalism and to progress the Doi Moi
is the ideological concept of “Socialist-oriented Market economy”, or shortly Market Socialism.
Ultimately, applying Erik’s theoretical framework, the Market Socialism concept becomes the
core factor to explain all three theoretical variables of institutionalized agenda, institutional
mechanism and foundation, and institutional brake against any leader’s personal interests.
Thereby we can use the framework to explain the gradual economic liberalization, economic
success, and the continuing “vanguard” authoritarian rule of the VCP in Vietnam.
Market Socialism concept refers to an increasing market-led economy that is under the
line of Socialism, used as a means to achieve Socialism, and subjected to the
leadership/vanguard of the Communist Party of Vietnam. While letting the market institution
play a bigger role in enhancing economic efficiency and development, the VCP, a “communist”
Party continues its institutionalized agenda of achieving Socialism, with a different means
compared to pre-Doi Moi time. The VCP tries to continue its “vanguarding” role through the
SOEs in strategic sectors such as petroleum, telecommunication (Beresford, 2008: 226; London,
2009: 376; Womack, 1993: 290).
Essentially, the VCP’s “Socialist-oriented Market Economy” resonates with Deng
Xiaoping’s “Socialism with Chinese characteristics”, both of which were influenced by the the
East Asian developmental state, albeit the part of heading to the final goal of Socialism.
Established institutionalized agenda: a renewed commitment to public goods of socialism
After the death of Senior cadre and General Secretary (GS) Le Duan, the former National
Liberation Front and reformist Nguyen Van Linh became the new General Secretary. GS Nguyen
Van Linh came to the most powerful position in Vietnam’s political system with a steadfast
intention of “out with the old”, aiming at conservative senior cadres with the slogans ‘oppose
dogmatic aping’, ‘oppose impulsive bureaucratism’ (London, 2009). Thereby he sought to
expand a market-led economy. GS Linh and reformist cadres justified Market Socialism based
on Marxist historical Materialism rhetoric, which argues socialism can only emerge when a
society is geared with certain material conditions. Therefore, the pragmatist/reformist group
called for a “socialist-oriented” market economy as a renewed and more efficient way to firstly
guarantee prosperity for the people before reaching the final goal of socialism.
We can see that by using the variable “institutionalized agenda” in Erik’s framework, the
VCP top leaders realized that the Soviet-style top-down command economy is not suitable to
promote a prosperous and equal society as a part of socialism. Hence, a Socialist-oriented market
economy for economic growth becomes the new means to attach to the established agenda of
pursuing state-socialism, (albeit how long it would take to achieve such goal is yet to be known).
Despite being gradual, Doi Moi’s Market Socialism has so far promoted economic growth in
Vietnam consistently around 6% annually (The World Bank data) and reduced the absolute
poverty rate ($1.90/day PPP) from 52.3% in 1992 to 1.8% in 2018. Therefore, through Doi Moi
as the commitment to the institutionalized agenda of socialism, the VCP also improves the
Quan Nguyen Tran (18319069) – Term paper - CADP

socioeconomic life of the Vietnamese significantly, which is clearly a public-oriented goal rather
than any personal or factional goals. Gorbachev’s glasnost agenda with the Soviet’s collapse is
another case with a different outcome but validating Erik’s framework on institutionalized
agenda. Rather than mistrusting socialism, Gorbachev launched the glasnost with his ideological
belief in Socialism, and that glasnost regain people’s trust in socialism to smooth the way to
socialism (Krastev, 2011: 12)
Institutionalized mechanism, crisis, rootedness, and foundation for further reform towards
public interests.
Erik (2017: 125) argues that crisis only sharpens the institutionalized agenda, and thus
only urges political elites to realize the public interest only if the established agenda is a public-
oriented one. Besides an agenda, the institutional structure must provide a viable mechanism,
institutional rootedness, and prospect for further development are all required to guarantee that
elites will pursue the public interests over personal or factional ones.
First, regarding Erik’s variable of “institutional mechanism”, the mechanism of the
Party's penetrative branch deteriorated during the economic failure period of 1975-1985. There
was a lot of deviation from the central’s collectivization agenda at the local level. Local cadres
and local penetrative branches, especially in the Southern regions, tried to form patron-client
relationships based on their non-collective ownership of the means of production (Womack,
1993: 290). Meanwhile, corruption and theft of state assets in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by
political elites playing manager roles was pervasive (London, 2009: 385).
Seemingly, Erik’s framework would be challenged if the patron-client network became a
systemic issue that curbed the institutional foundation for further public-oriented policies.
However, there comes the second, which is institutional rootedness that eases the impacts of
clientelism and maintains the ideological compass of the institution. In this case, the institutional
rootedness is the state-society relation between the VCP and the Vietnamese population dating
back since the 1940s. Womack (1993: 288 & 290) when examining the post-communist states,
categorized Vietnam and China as the rural revolutionary countries led by domestic
revolutionary parties which have more coherent state-society relations than those with
externally-imposed regimes in Eastern Europe bloc. Vietnam with the majority of rural peasant
population, through nearly four decades of rural revolution and wars for independence, has
developed an intimate state-society relation. However, after the establishment of the monopoly
of power, the relationship got distanced and then worsened due to the VCP's economic failure.
Despite state-society relationship deterioration, institutional rootedness of state-society
relation cannot be fully overhauled. Thus, such institutional rootedness encouraged the VCP
elites to believe in a prospect of reform for further development towards the institutionalized
agenda of socialism. Thereby, they transcended their leadership into top-down reform and
renewed the penetrative branches of SOEs and local party committees. An example is the SOEs
[partly] equitisation (privatization) program started in the early 1990s. SOEs, not only in
Vietnam, but in Southeast Asia (except Singapore) generally, are seen as dependent on
clientelism, state-favoritism and subsidies without any working incentive to boost productivity
(Teik & Tsunekawa, 2017: 11 & 15). Therefore, the VCP allowed SOEs in non-strategic sectors
to be partly privatized, thus diversifying shareholders, improving salaries and working
incentives. Notwithstanding privatization, the partly-privatized SOEs directors and managers
were forced to continue the report-and-consult culture, on important decisions, with controlling
Quan Nguyen Tran (18319069) – Term paper - CADP

institutions, which is the penetrative branch of the VCP (Gainsborough, 2009: 266). In this case,
the state-society of the VCP and the Vietnamese population relation dated back since the 1940s
helps the VCP elites renew the Party’s penetrative branches, which is the SOEs and the local
party committee.
Now that all the puzzles are in their places. Against the internal crisis of economic failure
and the external crisis of international embargo following Vietnam’s intervention into Polpot
Cambodia in 1979, the penetrative branches of the VCP were mostly halted. Crisis, as Erik
argues, would lead to more commitment to the established agenda, via the old or new means, like
Doi Moi in Vietnam, Glasnost in Russia, and Kaige Kaifang in China. However, it was the
rootedness in deep state-society relations that incentivized the Party elites to believe in a
workable reform, led by GS Nguyen Van Linh who was a reformist. Thus, the penetrative
branches of the VCP, through the SOEs into the economy and through local party committees
into the society were reformed. In the analysis of Womack (1993: 290), beyonds the prospect for
further reform re-enabling the institutionalized agenda of socialism, any attempt “that repudiated
the current structure would be more threatening than in a weaker party-state”. He was right that
later, despite being gradual and certain inefficiency, the Party has been providing economic
growth to Vietnam, consistently over 6% since the early 1990s.
Institutional brake on factionalism, factionalism and the resultant “gradualism” in reform.
Since Doi Moi, the new kind of factionalism was born, between the conservatives and the
reformists. Originally, the factional disputes were on whether the reform should transcend from
the economic sphere into the political one. Each faction, de facto, works as the institutional brake
preventing the other from overstretching based on their factional interest. As a result, what
emerged was “gradualism” in reform which allows more and more liberalization in the economic
sphere as the reformist wants, but preempts any efforts in political liberalization as the
conservative seeks. Thus, in the end, the VCP maintains its monopoly of political power in
Vietnam to lead the country into economic development via its agenda to “vanguard” the society
to “socialism”. What emerged was a factionalism that can negotiate the way forward, enabling
gradual step by step forwards, which is less efficient than the cohesive Park’s Korea military
administration, but slightly progressive than Sarit’s Thailand halfway house.
First, the institutional brake took place when reformist General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh
sought to go beyond economic reform into political liberalization. For example, his reformist
faction launched an amnesty in 1988 to rehabilitate most political prisoners from the demised
South Vietnam regime (London, 2009: 386). His reform eventually led to the criticism on official
incompetence and government failure via relaxing press control and creating a group of reformist
war veterans with reformist political aims (Thayer, 1992; Marr, 2003). This was when the
conservative backlash from senior elites took place, marking the step down of GS Linh in 1991
after just one term. Here, Erik’s theoretical framework remains relevant that whilst political
liberalization can be seen as public interests, it deviates from the institutionalized agenda of
Socialist-oriented economic reform. Thus, institutional brake from the conservative faction put
the reform on track again. This institutional brake was also impelled by the collapse of the
Eastern European communist bloc and the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the time.
Parallely, in China, there was also a similar conservative backlash, but more violently, embodied
in the crackdown on protesting students and workers in the June 4th incident.
Quan Nguyen Tran (18319069) – Term paper - CADP

Second, witnessing the bloody crackdown in China in 1989, the new conservative General
secretary Do Muoi wanted to reverse the political reform efforts under GS Linh’s term. The task
was more urgent when the Soviet officially collapsed in December 1991. Therefore, under Do
Muoi reform, he and his conservative factions tried to slow down, but continue the economic
reform. The embodiment of GS Do Muoi gradual economic reform eventually helped the VCP
rejoin the global economy with Vietnam ascendancy into ASEAN and the normalization of
Vietnam-US relationship. This allowed international aid inflow, mostly from Japan, and later
from South Korea. In 1994, ODA accounted for one-fifth of government expenditure, and the
figure rose to 27% in 1999 (Gainsborough, 2009: 273). As the economic growth took off and aid
inflow exceeded the account deficit, the VCP started to devote a portion of East Asian aid inflow
to accumulate international reserves, enabling it to decline aid with conditionalities that urge
faster reform (Kin & Stallings, 2017: 232). Applying Erik’s theoretical framework, the VCP at
the time, after stalling the reformist faction, was compelled by the global communist collapse
crisis at the time to follow a gradual reform approach (see Curwin & Mahutga, 2014).
As a result, from 1991 to 1997, only 15% of SOEs was partially or fully privatized, with a lot
of “insider” privatization involving the party cadres buying shares (London, 2009: 258). This
trend has a two-fold implication. On the one hand, it helps delegate ownership to private
shareholders to improve working wage and productivity. On the other hand, there were reported
cases of corruption, rent-seeking emanating from the licensing process. Taking Erik’s
institutional approach with more focus on the sociopolitico aspect, the party was trying to slow
down SOEs restructure until there has been enough FDI and private firms to fill the employment
vacancy once SOEs restructure happens fully-blown (Ngo & Tarko, 2018). This became the case
when the VCP adopted Resolution 12 in 2017, disinvesting much more underperformed SOEs in
non-strategic sectors to boost employment in non-state sectors (Shakata, 2019: 5).
Third, the conservative backlash ended with the step-down of the next conservative GS Le
Kha Phieu who became Party General Secretary in 1997, which can also be explained using
Erik's institutional perspective. Even against the crisis of capital flight after the 1997 Asian
Financial crisis, GS Le Kha Phieu kept devoted most efforts in his conservative virtue of “self-
criticism” and made other cadres follow to remain ideologically pure (London, 2009: 389), Thus,
the institutional brake to GS Phieu was put forth by the technocrat cadres led by Prime Ministers
Vo Van Kiet (1988-1991, 1991-1998) and Phan Van Khai (1998-2006), which marked the step-
down of GS Phieu. Those two main architects of the reform were the embodiment of the
“gradualist” way forward, reconciled by both conservative and reformist factions within the
VCP.
Thus, the institutional brake within the party was employed by factionalism, urged by
contemporary global and domestic crises, to prevent either conservative or reformist factions
from overextending their interest. Thus, the final output was gradual economic reform &
development with hardly any political reform. The former was a public interest, part of the
institutionalized agenda of socialism, embraced in the narrative of the “Socialist-oriented”
market economy of the Doi Moi. The latter, which implies political monopoly of the VCP, while
not always the public interest (i.e. press freedom), was also a part of the institutionalized agenda
of socialism, embraced in the continuing “vanguard” role of the VCP in leading the country
through extensive developments.
V. Conclusion
Quan Nguyen Tran (18319069) – Term paper - CADP

This paper attempts to apply Erik Martinez Kuhonta’s institutional approach to examine
the Vietnamese economic reform of the VCP (Erik, 2017). This paper proposes that in
comparison with Erik’s 3 cases of study, South Korea under Park Chung Hee, Thailand under
Sarit Thanarat, and the Philippines under Marcos dictatorship. Vietnam, under the monopoly of
political power of the VCP lies in between Park’s South Korea and Sarit’s Thailand halfway
house. In terms of commitment to the established institutionalized agenda, Vietnam, like Park’s
military administration and Sarit administration, had the institutional rootedness to pursue public
interest (economic development), the institutional mechanism (military disciplines or party’s
penetrative branches) that incentivized them for further reform and public-oriented development.
Finally, related to the institutional break, the VCP shows how factionalism works as an
institutional brake via which each faction prevents the other from deviating from the
institutionalized agenda for their factional interests. However, the VCP, while sharing similar
factionalism issues with Sarit’s Thailand, was able to form consensus between factions to move
forward gradually. That compromise between factions is eventually coined as “gradualism”
which is popularly known in the economic reform in two post-communist countries of Vietnam
and China. Thus, the case of VCP also shows less efficiency than Park’s military administration
due to the lack of cohesiveness, relatively. Thus, the case of VCP also shows less efficiency than
Park’s military administration due to the lack of cohesiveness, relatively.
Quan Nguyen Tran (18319069) – Term paper - CADP

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