JURIDICAL CAPACITY AND CAPACITY TO ACT

Restrictions on civil capacity

1. Presumption of capacity, Art. 37 NCC

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations,
is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death.

Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and
may be lost. (n)

Catalan v. Basa, G.R. No. 159567, July 31, 2007

A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing

or right in favor of another, who accepts it. [22] Like any other contract, an agreement of
the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it
should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should
be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. [23] The parties' intention must be clear and the
attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable. [24]

In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donors capacity
to give consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that
insanity impinges on consent freely given. [25] However, the burden of proving such
incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is
presented, capacity will be presumed.[26]

A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the
evidence presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that
Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in question to
Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of the fact that, as early as 1948, Feliciano had
been found to be suffering from schizophrenia by the Board of Medical Officers of the
Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself, however, the allegation cannot prove the
incompetence of Feliciano.

According to medical references, in persons with schizophrenia, there is a

gradual onset of symptoms, with symptoms becoming increasingly bizarre as the
disease progresses. The condition improves (remission or residual stage) and worsens
(relapses) in cycles. Sometimes, sufferers may appear relatively normal, while other
patients in remission may appear strange because they speak in a monotone, have odd
speech habits, appear to have no emotional feelings and are prone to have ideas of
reference. The latter refers to the idea that random social behaviors are directed against
the sufferers.[27] It has been proven that the administration of the correct medicine helps
the patient. Antipsychotic medications help bring biochemical imbalances closer to
normal in a schizophrenic. Medications reduce delusions, hallucinations and incoherent
thoughts and reduce or eliminate chances of relapse. [28] Schizophrenia can result in a
dementing illness similar in many aspects to Alzheimers disease. However, the illness
will wax and wane over many years, with only very slow deterioration of intellect. [29]

From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering

from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently
dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia,
petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation,  June
16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties. Thus, the
lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that
this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced.
[30]
 Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give consent to contracts was only
established when the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared him an
incompetent on December 22, 1953.[31]

It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Felicianos capacity at the time
he donated the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental competence when he
entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of
donation of his other properties in their favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained
competent to execute contracts, despite his illness, is bolstered by the existence of
these other contracts. Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to
have existed in the other acts done or  contracts executed, are presumed to
continue until the contrary is shown.[32]

Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right to sell
the property to whomever she chose. [33] Not a shred of evidence has been presented to
prove the claim that Mercedes sale of the property to her children was tainted with fraud
or falsehood. It is of little bearing that the Deed of Sale was registered only after the
death of Mercedes. What is material is that the sale of the property to Delia and Jesus
Basa was legal and binding at the time of its execution. Thus, the property in question
belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa.

2. Restrictions on capacity to act - NCC 38 - 39, cf. NCC 1327

Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality
and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt
the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from
his acts or from property relations, such as easements. (32a)

Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to
act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality,
family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The
consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes,
the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account
of religious belief or political opinion.

A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil
life, except in cases specified by law. (n)

Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:

(1) Unemancipated minors;

(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.
(1263a)

(a) Minority

1. Age of majority, R.A. 6809

Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines,
is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless

otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years."

2. A.M. NO. 03-02-05-SC Rules on Guardianship

Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. – This Rule shall apply to petitions for
guardianship over the person or property, or both, of a minor.

The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the
person and property of their unemancipated common child without the necessity
of a court appointment.

In such case, this Rule shall be suppletory to the provisions of the Family Code
on guardianship.

3. Suffrage, Sec. 1 Art. V 1987 Constitution [cf. Sangguniang Kabataan]

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not

otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and in the place
wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed
on the exercise of suffrage.

4. Marriage, FC 5; 45 (1); cf. R.A. 6809

Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 1, may contract marriage. (54a)
1
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)
 5. Contracts

NCC 1327

Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:

(1) Unemancipated minors;

(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.
(1263a)

NCC 1390 (par. 1), 1403 (par. 3)

Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there
may have been no damage to the contracting parties:

(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;

(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.

These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court.
They are susceptible of ratification. (n)

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.

NCC 1397, 1399

Art. 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who
are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable
cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can those
who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue influence, or employed fraud, or
caused mistake base their action upon these flaws of the contract. (1302a)

Art. 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the
parties, the incapacitated person is not obliged to make any restitution except
insofar as he has been benefited by the thing or price received by him. (1304)

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other
person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. (82)
NCC 1489

Art. 1489. All persons who are authorized in this Code to obligate themselves,
may enter into a contract of sale, saving the modifications contained in the
following articles.

Where necessaries are those sold and delivered to a minor or other person
without capacity to act, he must pay a reasonable price therefor. Necessaries are
those referred to in Article 2902. (1457a)

NCC 1426 – 1427

Art. 1426. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age who has
entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, after the
annulment of the contract voluntarily returns the whole thing or price received,
notwithstanding the fact the he has not been benefited thereby, there is no right
to demand the thing or price thus returned.

Art. 1427. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age, who has
entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily
pays a sum of money or delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment of the obligation,
there shall be no right to recover the same from the obligee who has spent or
consumed it in good faith. (1160A)

Mercado v. Espiritu, 37 Phil 215

In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the deed Exhibit 3, on the
ground that on the date of its execution they were minors without legal capacity to
contract, and for the further reason that the deceased purchaser Luis Espiritu availed
himself of deceit and fraud in obtaining their consent for the execution of said deed.

The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of
real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are
not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the
fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in
pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment that
holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed
against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the
juridical rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the supreme court of
Spain, of April 27, 1860, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.) i

Bambalan v. Maramba, 51 Phil 417

As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of  Mercado and
Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped
from contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be age, is not
applicable herein. In the case now before us the plaintiff did not pretend to be of
age; his minority was well known to the purchaser, the defendant, who was the one
who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula used in the acknowledgment of the document.
2
Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance,
according to the social position of the family.

Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his education or
training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. (124a)
 Sia Suan & Chiao v. Alcantara, 85 Phil 669

In support of the contend that the deed of sale is binding on the appellee, counsel for
the appellants invokes the decision in Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215),
wherein this court held:

The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale
of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when it fact they
are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the
fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in
pursuance of the provisions of Law 6 title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment
that holds such a sale to valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint
filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property,
nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, of April 27, 1840, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.)

The Court of Appeals has refused to apply this doctrine on the ground that the
appellants did not actually pay any amount in cash to the appellee and therefore did not
suffer any detriment by reason of the deed of sale, it being stipulated that the
consideration therefore was a pre-existing indebtedness of appellee's father, Rufino
Alcantara. We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred. In the first place, in
the case cited, the consideration for sale consisted in greater part of pre-existing
obligation. In the second place, under the doctrine, to bind a minor who
represents himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually
part with cash, as long as the contract is supported by a valid consideration.
Since appellee's conveyance to the appellants was admittedly for and in virtue of a pre-
existing indebtedness (unquestionably a valid consideration), it should produce its full
force and effect in the absence of any other vice that may legally invalidate the same. It
is not here claimed that the deed of sale is null and void on any ground other than the
appellee's minority. Appellee's contract has become fully efficacious as a contract
executed by parties with full legal capacity.

The circumstance that, about one month after the date of the conveyance, the
appellee informed the appellants of his minority, is of no moment, because
appellee's previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from
disavowing the contract. Said belated information merely leads to the inference that
the appellants in fact did not know that the appellee was a minor on the date of the
contract, and somewhat emphasizes appellee's bad faith, when it is borne in mind that
no sooner had he given said information than he ratified his deed of sale upon receiving
from the appellants the sum of P500.

Braganza v. Villa-Abrille, 105 Phil 456

From the minors' failure to disclose their minority in the same promissory note they
signed, it does not follow as a legal proposition, that they will not be permitted thereafter
to assert it. They had no juridical duty to disclose their inability. In fact, according to
Corpuz Juris Secundum, 43 p. 206;

. . . . Some authorities consider that a false representation as to age including a

contract as part of the contract and accordingly hold that it cannot be the basis of
an action in tort. Other authorities hold that such misrepresentation may be the
basis of such an action, on the theory that such misrepresentation is not a part
of, and does not grow out of, the contract, or that the enforcement of liability for
such misrepresentation as tort does not constitute an indirect of enforcing liability
 on the contract. In order to hold infant liable, however, the fraud must be
actual and not constructure. It has been held that his mere silence when
making a contract as to age does not constitute a fraud which can be made
the basis of an action of decit. (Emphasis Ours.)

The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who contracts with
him in the belief that he is of full age must be actual not constructive, and
mere failure of the infant to disclose his age is not sufficient. (27 American
Jurisprudence, p. 819.)

The Mecado case1 cited in the decision under review is different because the document
signed therein by the minor specifically stated he was of age; here Exhibit A contained
no such statement. In other words, in the Mercado case, the minor was guilty of active
misrepresentation; whereas in this case, if the minors were guilty at all, which we doubt
it is of passive (or constructive) misrepresentation. Indeed, there is a growing sentiment
in favor of limiting the scope of the application of the Mercado ruling, what with the
consideration that the very minority which incapacitated from contracting should likewise
exempt them from the results of misrepresentation.

We hold, on this point, that being minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza could not be
legally bound by their signatures in Exhibit A.

It is argued, nevertheless, by respondent that inasmuch as this defense was interposed

only in 1951, and inasmuch as Rodolfo reached the age of majority in 1947, it was too
late to invoke it because more than 4 years had elapsed after he had become
emancipated upon reaching the age of majority. The provisions of Article 1301 of the
Civil Code are quoted to the effect that "an action to annul a contract by reason of
majority must be filed within 4 years" after the minor has reached majority age. The
parties do not specify the exact date of Rodolfo's birth. It is undenied, however, that in
October 1944, he was 18 years old. On the basis of such datum, it should be held that
in October 1947, he was 21 years old, and in October 1951, he was 25 years old. So
that when this defense was interposed in June 1951, four years had not yet completely
elapsed from October 1947.

Furthermore, there is reason to doubt the pertinency of the 4-years period fixed by
Article 1301 of the Civil Code where minority is set up only as a defense to an action,
without the minors asking for any positive relief from the contract. For one thing, they
have not filed in this case an action for annulment.2 They merely interposed an excuse
from liability.

Upon the other hand, these minors may not be entirely absolved from monetary
responsibility. In accordance with the provisions of Civil Code, even if their written
contact is unenforceable because of non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent
that they have profited by the money they received. (Art. 1340) There is testimony that
the funds delivered to them by Villa Abrille were used for their support during the
Japanese occupation. Such being the case, it is but fair to hold that they had profited to
the extent of the value of such money, which value has been authoritatively established
in the so-called Ballantine Schedule: in October 1944, P40.00 Japanese notes were
equivalent to P1 of current Philippine money.

Wherefore, as the share of these minors was 2/3 of P70,000 of P46,666.66, they should
now return P1,166.67.3Their promise to pay P10,000 in Philippine currency, (Exhibit A)
can not be enforced, as already stated, since they were minors incapable of binding
themselves. Their liability, to repeat, is presently declared without regard of said Exhibit
A, but solely in pursuance of Article 1304 of the Civil Code.

6. Criminal liability
RPC 12 (2) - (3);

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — the following are
exempt from criminal liability:

2. A person under nine years of age.

3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in
accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code.

RPC 13 (2);

Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances;

2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over seventy years. In the
case of the minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the
provisions of Art. 80.

PD 603 Secs. 189 – 204

Article 189. Youthful Offender Defined. - A youthful offender is one who is over nine
years but under twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.

A child nine years of age or under at the time of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability and shall be committed to the care of his or her father or mother, or
nearest relative or family friend in the discretion of the court and subject to its
supervision. The same shall be done for a child over nine years and under fifteen years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense, unless he acted with discernment,
in which case he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Article 192.

The provisions of Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code shall be deemed modified by the
provisions of this Chapter.

Article 190. Physical and Mental Examination. - It shall be the duty of the law-
enforcement agency concerned to take the youthful offender, immediately after his
apprehension, to the proper medical or health officer for a thorough physical and mental
examination. Whenever treatment for any physical or mental defect is indicated, steps
shall be immediately undertaken to provide the same.

The examination and treatment papers shall form part of the record of the case of the
youthful offender.

Article 191. Care of Youthful Offender Held for Examination or Trial. - A youthful

offender held for physical and mental examination or trial or pending appeal, if unable to
furnish bail, shall from the time of his arrest be committed to the care of the Department
of Social Welfare or the local rehabilitation center or a detention home in the province or
city which shall be responsible for his appearance in court whenever required: Provided,
That in the absence of any such center or agency within a reasonable distance from the
venue of the trial, the provincial, city and municipal jail shall provide quarters for youthful
offenders separate from other detainees. The court may, in its discretion, upon
recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare or other agency or agencies
authorized by the Court, release a youthful offender on recognizance, to the custody of
his parents or other suitable person who shall be responsible for his appearance
whenever required.

Article 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. - If after

hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful
offender has committed the acts charged against him the court shall determine the
imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead
of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings
and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare,
or to any training institution operated by the government, or duly licensed agencies or
any other responsible person, until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age or,
for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and
recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the agency or responsible
individual under whose care he has been committed.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by a representative
of the Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed agency or such other officer as
the Court may designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.

Article 193. Appeal. - The youthful offender whose sentence is suspended can appeal
from the order of the court in the same manner as appeals in criminal cases.

Article 194. Care and Maintenance of Youthful Offender. - The expenses for the care
and maintenance of the youthful offender whose sentence has been suspended shall be
borne by his parents or those persons liable to support him: Provided, That in case his
parents or those persons liable to support him can not pay all or part of said expenses,
the municipality in which the offense was committed shall pay one-third of said
expenses or part thereof; the province to which the municipality belongs shall pay one-
third; and the remaining one-third shall be borne by the National Government.
Chartered cities shall pay two-thirds of said expenses; and in case a chartered city
cannot pay said expenses, part of the internal revenue allotments applicable to the
unpaid portion shall be withheld and applied to the settlement of said indebtedness.

All city and provincial governments must exert efforts for the immediate establishment of
local detention homes for youthful offenders.

Article 195. Report on Conduct of Child. - The Department of Social Welfare or its

representative or duly licensed agency or individual under whose care the youthful
offender has been committed shall submit to the court every four months or oftener as
may be required in special cases, a written report on the conduct of said youthful
offender as well as the intellectual, physical, moral, social and emotional progress made
by him.

Article 196. Dismissal of the Case. - If it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the
youthful offender whose sentence has been suspended, has behaved properly and has
shown his capability to be a useful member of the community, even before reaching the
age of majority, upon recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare, it shall
dismiss the case and order his final discharge.

Article 197. Return of the Youth Offender to Court. - Whenever the youthful offender
has been found incorrigible or has wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his
rehabilitation programs, or should his continued stay in the training institution be
inadvisable, he shall be returned to the committing court for the pronouncement of
judgment.

When the youthful offender has reached the age of twenty-one while in commitment, the
court shall determine whether to dismiss the case in accordance with the next preceding
article or to pronounce the judgment of conviction.

In any case covered by this article, the youthful offender shall be credited in the service
of his sentence with the full time spent in actual commitment and detention effected
under the provisions of this Chapter.
Article 198. Effect of Release of Child Based on Good Conduct. - The final release of a
child pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter shall not obliterate his civil liability for
damages. Such release shall be without prejudice to the right for a writ of execution for
the recovery of civil damages.

Article 199. Living Quarters for Youthful Offenders Sentence. - When a judgment of

conviction is pronounced in accordance with the provisions of Article 197, and at the
time of said pronouncement the youthful offender is still under twenty-one, he shall be
committed to the proper penal institution to serve the remaining period of his sentence:
Provided, That penal institutions shall provide youthful offenders with separate quarters
and, as far as practicable, group them according to appropriate age levels or other
criteria as will insure their speedy rehabilitation: Provided, further, That the Bureau of
Prisons shall maintain agricultural and forestry camps where youthful offenders may
serve their sentence in lieu of confinement in regular penitentiaries.

Article 200. Records of Proceedings. - Where a youthful offender has been charged

before any city or provincial fiscal or before any municipal judge and the charges have
been ordered dropped, all the records of the case shall be destroyed immediately
thereafter.

Where a youthful offender has been charged and the court acquits him, or dismisses
the case or commits him to an institution and subsequently releases him pursuant to
this Chapter, all the records of his case shall be destroyed immediately after such
acquittal, dismissal or release, unless civil liability has also been imposed in the criminal
action, in which case such records shall be destroyed after satisfaction of such civil
liability. The youthful offender concerned shall not be held under any provision of law, to
be guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his failure to
acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry made
of him for any purpose.

"Records" within the meaning of this article shall include those which may be in the files
of the National Bureau of Investigation and with any police department, or any other
government agency which may have been involved in the case.

Article 201. Civil Liability of Youthful Offenders. - The civil liability for acts committed by
a youthful offender shall devolve upon the offender's father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, upon the mother, or in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian.
Civil liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the
youthful offender.

Article 202. Rehabilitation Centers. - The Department of Social Welfare shall establish

regional rehabilitation centers for youthful offenders. The local government and other
non-governmental entities shall collaborate and contribute their support for the
establishment and maintenance of these facilities.

Article 203. Detention Homes. - The Department of Local Government and Community

Development shall establish detention homes in cities and provinces distinct and
separate from jails pending the disposition of cases of juvenile offenders.

Article 204. Liability of Parents or Guardian or Any Person in the Commission of

Delinquent Acts by Their Children or Wards. - A person whether the parent or guardian
of the child or not, who knowingly or wilfully,

1. Aids, causes, abets or connives with the commission by a child of a

delinquency, or
2. Does any act producing, promoting, or contributing to a child's being or
becoming a juvenile delinquent, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five
 hundred pesos or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years, or both
such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.

Also see: Rule 3, Section 5, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

SEC. 5. Minor or incompetent persons.—A minor or a person alleged to

beincompetent, may sue or be sued, with the assistance of his father, mother,
guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad litem. (5a)

Comprehensive Juvenile Justice Act (R.A. No. 9344), Secs. 6 & 7

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age
or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program
pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless
he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption
from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

SEC. 7. Determination ofAge. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the
presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the
law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may
be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other
pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on
information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of
the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.

Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the
information in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary proceeding for the
determination of age before the Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-
four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all interested parties.

If a case has been fiied against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the
appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in the
same court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion,
proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.

In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government
officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict
with the law.

Atizado v. People, G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010

Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when
the crime was committed on April 18, 1994. Firstly, his counter-affidavit executed
on June 30 1994 stated that he was 17 years of age. [27] Secondly, the police blotter
recording his arrest mentioned that he was 17 years old at the time of his arrest on May
18, 1994.[28]Thirdly, Villafes affidavit dated June 29, 1994 averred that Monreal was a
minor on the date of the incident. [29]Fourthly, as RTCs minutes of hearing dated March
9, 1999 showed,[30] Monreal was 22 years old when he testified on direct examination
on March 9, 1999,[31] which meant that he was not over 18 years of age when he
committed the crime. And, fifthly, Mirandilla described Monreal as a teenager and young
looking at the time of the incident.[32]
 
The foregoing showing of Monreals minority was legally sufficient, for it
conformed with the norms subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344,
also known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,[33] viz:
 
Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law
shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the
rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be
eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined
from the childs birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other
pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may
be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies
of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other
relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall
be resolved in his/her favor. 
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law
prior to the filing of the information in any appropriate court may file a case
in a summary proceeding for the determination of age before the Family
Court which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours from
receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all interested parties. 
If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is
pending in the appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to
determine the age of the child in the same court where the case is
pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main
case shall be suspended. 
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and
other government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining
the age of the child in conflict with the law.

Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC, [34] when the offender is over 15 and under
18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. Based
on Article 61 (2) of the RPC, reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion
perpetua to death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and Article 64 of the RPC,
therefore, the range of the penalty of imprisonment imposable on Monreal was  prision
mayor in any of its periods, as the minimum period, to reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as the maximum period. Accordingly, his proper indeterminate penalty is from
six years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight
months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period.
 Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest
on May 18, 1994 until the present. Given that the entire period of Monreals detention
should be credited in the service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act
No. 9344,[35] the revision of the penalty now warrants his immediate release from the
penitentiary.

In this regard, the benefits in favor of children in conflict with the law as granted
under Republic Act No. 9344, which aims to promote the welfare of minor offenders
through programs and services, such as delinquency prevention, intervention, diversion,
rehabilitation and re-integration, geared towards their development, are retroactively
applied to Monreal as a convict serving his sentence. Its Section 68 expressly so
provides:
Section 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentences. Persons who have been convicted and are serving
sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were
below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of
the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence,
shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this
Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this
Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be
immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other
applicable laws.

(b) Insanity

1. Marriage, FC 45 (2)

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time
of the marriage: (VOIDABLE)

(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

2. Contracts, NCC 1327 (1), 1328

Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:

(1) Unemancipated minors;

(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to
write. (1263a)

Art. 1328. Contracts entered into during a lucid interval are valid. Contracts
agreed to in a state of drunkenness or during a hypnotic spell are voidable.

3. Criminal liability,RPC 12 (1)

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — the following are exempt
from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as
a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without
first obtaining the permission of the same court.

Rule 101, Rules of Court

PROCEEDINGS FOR HOSPITALIZATION OF INSANE PERSONS SECTION

1. Venue. Petition for commitment.—A petition for the commitment of aperson

to a hospital or other place for the insane may be filed with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the person alleged to be insane is found.
The petition shall be filed by the Director of Health in all cases where, in his
opinion, such commitment is for the public welfare, or for the welfare of
said person who, in his judgment, is insane, and such person or the one
having charge of him is opposed to his being taken to a hospital or other
place for the insane.

SEC. 2. Order for hearing.—If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance,
the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date for the
hearing thereof, and copy of such order shall be served on the person alleged to
be insane, and to the one having charge of him, or on such of his relatives
residing in the province or city as the judge may deem proper. The court shall
furthermore order the sheriff to produce the alleged insane person, if possible, on
the date of the hearing.

SEC. 3. Hearing and judgment.—Upon satisfactory proof, in open court on the

date
fixed in the order, that the commitment applied for is for the public welfare or for
the welfare of the insane person, and that his relatives are unable for any reason
to take proper custody and care of him, the court shall order his commitment to
such hospital or other place for the insane as may be recommended by the
Director of Health. The court shall make proper provisions for the custody of
property or money belonging to the insane until a guardian be properly
appointed.

SEC. 4. Discharge of insane.—When, in the opinion of the Director of Health, the

person ordered to be committed to a hospital or other place for the insane is
temporarily or permanently cured, or may be released without danger he may file
the proper petition with the Regional Trial Court which ordered the commitment.

SEC. 5. Assistance of fiscal in the proceeding.—It shall be the duty of the

provincial
fiscal or in the City of Manila the fiscal of the city, to prepare the petition for the
Director of Health and represent him in court in all proceedings arising under the
provisions of this rule.

US v. Vaquilar, 27 Phil 88

There is vast different between an insane person and one who has worked himself up
into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he
does. Persons who get into a quarrel of fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the
fight. An extremely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a madman. The fact that a
person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of the word
"crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms "insane," "non compos mentis,"
"unsound mind," "idiot," or "lunatic." In this case as before indicated, one witness
testified that "according to my own eyes as he looked at me he was crazy because if he
was not crazy he would not have killed his family." That witness' conception of the word
"crazy" evidently is the doing of some act by a person which an ordinarily rational
person would not think of doing. Another witness testified that "he looked like a
madman; crazy, because he would cut everybody at random without paying any
attention to who it was." It is not at all unnatural for a murderer, caught in the act of
killing his wife and child, to fly into a passion and strike promiscuously at those who
attempt to capture him. The appellant's sister said "he must have been crazy because
he cut me." This is another illustration of the popular conception of the word "crazy," it
being thus used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary.

The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail as described by his fellow
prisoner is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person. The reflection and
remorse which would follow the commission of such deeds as those committed by the
appellant might be sufficient to cause the person to cry out, "What kind of people are
you to me; what are you doing to me; you are beast," and yet such conduct could not be
sufficient to show that the person was insane at the time the deeds were committed.

In People vs. Mortimer (48 Mich., 37; 11 N. W., 776), the defendant was indicated for an
assault with intent to murder. The defense attempted to prove "a mental condition which
would involved no guilt." The supreme court on appeal in this decision distinguished
between passion and insanity as follows:

But passion and insanity are very different things, and whatever indulgence
the law may extend to persons under provocation, it does not treat them as
freed from criminal responsibility. Those who have not lost control of their
reason by mental unsoundness are bound to control their tempers and
restrain their persons, and are liable to the law if they do not. Where
persons allow their anger to lead them so far as to make them reckless, the
fact that they have become at last too infuriated to keep them from mischief
is merely the result of not applying restraint in season. There would be no
safety for society if people could with impunity lash themselves into fury,
and then to desperate acts of violence. That condition which springs from
undisciplined and unbridled passion is clearly within legal as well as moral
censure and punishment. (People vs. Finley, 38 Mich., 482; Welch vs. Ware,
32 Mich., 77.)

In People vs. Foy (138 N. Y., 664), the court sad: "The court very properly continued
with an explanation to the jury that 'the heat of passion and feeling produced by
motives of anger, hatred, or revenge, is not insanity. The law holds the doer of the
act, under such conditions, responsible for the crime, because a large share of
homicides committed are occasioned by just such motives as these.' "

The Encyclopedia of Law and Procedure (vol. 12, p. 170), cites many cases on the
subject of anger and emotional insanity and sums up those decisions in the following
concise statement:

Although there have been decisions to the contrary, it is now well settled that
mere mental depravity, or moral insanity, so called, which results, not from any
disease of mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system, where the
person is mentally sense, does not exempt one from responsibility for crimes
committed under its influence. Care must be taken to distinguish between mere
 moral insanity or mental depravity and irresistable impulse resulting from disease
of the mind.

In the case of United States vs. Carmona (18 Phil. Rep., 62), the defendant was
convicted of the crime of lesiones graves. The defendant's counsel, without raising any
question as to the actual commission of the alleged acts, or the allegation that the
accused committed them, confined himself to the statement, in behalf of his client, that
on the night of the crime the defendant was sick with fever and out of his mind and that
in one of his paroxysms he committed the said acts, wounding his wife and the other
members of her family, without any motives whatever. In the decision in that case this
court stated:

In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became
demented a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it
is presumed that he was in a normal condition of mind. It is improper to
conclude that he acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from
responsibility on the ground of exceptional mental condition, unless his
insanity and absence of will are proven.

Regarding the burden of proof in cases where insanity is pleaded in defense of criminal
actions, we quote as follows from State vs. Bunny (24 S. C., 439; 58 Am. Rep., 262,
265):

But as the usual condition of men is that of sanity, there is a presumption that the
accused is sane, which certainly in the first instance affords proof of the fact.
(State vs. Coleman, 20 S. C., 454.) If the killing and nothing more appears, this
presumption, without other proof upon the point of sanity, is sufficiently to support
a conviction and as the State must prove every element of the crime charged
"beyond a reasonable doubt," it follows that this presumption affords such proof.
This presumption however may be overthrow. It may be shown on the part of the
accused that the criminal intent did not exist at the time the act was committed.
This being exceptional is a defense, and like other defenses must be made out
by the party claiming the benefit of it. "The positive existence of that degree and
kind of insanity that shall work a dispensation to the prisoner in the case of
established homicide is a fact to be proved as it s affirmed by him."
(State vs. Stark, 1 Strob., 506.)

What then is necessary to make out this defense? It surely cannot be sufficient
merely to allege insanity to put his sanity "in issue." That is merely a pleading, a
denial, and ineffectual without proof. In order to make not such defense, as it
seems to us, sufficient proof must be shown to overcome in the first place the
presumption of sanity and then any other proof that may be offered.

In the case of State vs. Stickley (41 Iowa, 232), the court said (syllabus):

One who, possession of a sound mind, commits a criminal act under the impulse
of passion or revenge, which way temporarily dethrone reason and for the
moment control the will, cannot nevertheless be shield from the consequences of
the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will only excuse the commission of a
criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to appear that the person committing it
was insane, and that the offense was the direct consequences of his insanity.

People v. Rafanan, 204 SCRA 65

Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was only
in People vs. Formigones 10 that the Court elaborated on the required standards of
legal insanity, quoting extensively from the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara
on the Revised Penal Code, thus:

The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance
may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason;
that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least
discernment; (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur.
Crim. 413.) that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, (Decision of
the Supreme Court of Spain of April 29, 1916; 96 Jur. Crim. 239) or that there be a
total deprivation of freedom of the will. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
April 9, 1872; 6 Jur. Crim. 239) For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or
insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a
person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not exclude imputability. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
April 20, 1911; 86 Jur. Crim. 94, 97.)

The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be [equated
with] imbecility or insanity.

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive

evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a
few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed
that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be
voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in
order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his
insanity and absence of will are proved. (Emphasis supplied.)

The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases. 11
A linguistic or grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones
established two (2) distinguishable tests:

(a) the test of cognition — "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the

[criminal] act," and

(c) the test of volition — "or that there be a total deprivation freedom of the will."

But our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on a
test relating to "freedom of the will;" examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up
any case where this Court has exempted an accused on the sole ground that he was
totally deprived of "freedom of the will," i.e., without an accompanying "complete
deprivation of intelligence." This is perhaps to be expected since a person's volition
naturally reaches out only towards that which is presented as desirable by his
intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. In any case, where the
accused failed to show complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court has
recognized at most a mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in accord with
Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code: "Such illness of the offender as would
diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving
him of the consciousness of his acts." 12

Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder

characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is
said to be the most common form of psychosis an usually develops between the ages
15 and 30. 13 A standard textbook in psychiatry describes some of the symptoms of
schizophrenia in the following manner:
Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of schizophrenia: a
disturbance of association, a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance of activity. Bleuler
also stressed the dereistic attitude of the schizophrenic — that is, his detachment from
reality and consequent autism and the ambivalence that expresses itself in his uncertain
affectivity and initiative. Thus, Bleuler's system of schizophrenia is often referred to as
the four A's: association, affect, autism, and ambivalence.

xxx xxx xxx

Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia that he

considered in no way specific for the disease but of great pragmatic value in making a
diagnosis. Schneider's first-rank symptoms include the hearing of one's thoughts
spoken aloud, auditory hallucinations that comment on the patient's behavior, somatic
hallucinations, the experience of having one's thoughts controlled, the spreading of
one's thoughts to others, delusions, and the experience of having one's actions
controlled or influenced from the outside.

Schizophrenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on the basis
of second-rank symptoms, along with an otherwise typical clinical appearances.
Second-rank symptoms include other forms of hallucination, perplexity, depressive and
euphoric disorders of affect, and emotional blunting.

Perceptual Disorders

Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia . . . .

Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding external

stimuli are common symptoms of schizophrenia. Most common are auditory
hallucinations, or the hearing of voices. Most characteristically, two or more voices talk
about the patient, discussing him in the third person. Frequently, the voices address the
patient, comment on what he is doing and what is going on around him, or are
threatening or obscene and very disturbing to the patient. Many schizophrenic patients
experience the hearing of their own thoughts. When they are reading silently, for
example, they may be quite disturbed by hearing every word they are reading clearly
spoken to them.

Visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory hallucinations in schizophrenic

patients, but they are not rare. Patients suffering from organic of affective psychoses
experience visual hallucinations primarily at night or during limited periods of the day,
but schizophrenic patients hallucinate as much during the day as they do during the
night, sometimes almost continuously. They get relief only in sleep. When visual occur
in schizophrenia, they are usually seen nearby, clearly defined, in color, life size, in
three dimensions, and moving. Visual hallucinations almost never in one of the other
sensory modalities.

xxx xxx xxx

Cognitive Disorders

Delusions. By definition, delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by

reasoning, and that are idiosyncratic for the patient — that is, not part of his cultural
environment. They are among the common symptoms of schizophrenia.

Most frequent are delusions of persecution, which are the key symptom in the paranoid
type of schizophrenia. The conviction of being controlled by some unseen mysterious
power that exercises its influence from a distance is almost pathognomonic for
schizophrenia. It occurs in most, if not all, schizophrenics at one time or another, and for
many it is a daily experience. The modern schizophrenic whose delusions have kept up
with the scientific times may be preoccupied with atomic power, X-rays, or spaceships
that take control over his mind and body. Also typical for many schizophrenics are
delusional fantasies about the destruction of the world. 14

In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting

circumtance, 15 it has mostly been rejected by the Court. In each of these cases,
the evidence presented tended to show that if there was impairment of the mental
faculties, such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the accused of
intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.

The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the
burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. 17 Here, appellant failed to
present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before
and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental
state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very
moment the act is committed. 18 Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of two (2)
physicians (Dr. Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport to characterize
his mental condition during that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to
circumtances occurring on or immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies
consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted
with schizophrenia. Curiously, while it was Dr. Masikip who had actually observed and
examined appellant during his confinement at the National Mental Hospital, the defense
chose to present Dr. Nerit.

Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.

In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not
exempting because it does not completely deprive the offender of the
consciousness of his acts, may be considered as a mitigating circumstance
under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., as an illness which diminishes
the exercise of the offender's will-power without, however, depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts. Appellant should have been credited with this mitigating
circumstance, although it would not have affected the penalty imposable upon him
under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code: "in all cases in which the law prescribes a
single indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua in this case), it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed."

Standard Oil v. Arenas, G.R. No. L-5921, July 25, 1911

Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been
declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary
be not proved, that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane,
or out his mind: which, in the opinion of this court, has not been proved in this case.

Neither is there any proof whatever with respect to the third point, that is, that, granting
that he was a monomaniac, he was dominated by that malady when he executed the
bond now under discussion. In the interpretative jurisprudence on this kind of incapacity,
to wit, lunacy or insanity, it is a rule of constant application that is not enough that there
be more or less probability that a person was in a state of dementia at a given time, if
there is not direct proof that, at the date of the performance of the act which it is
endeavored to invalidate for want of capacity on the part of the executor, the latter was
insane or demented, in other words, that he could not, in the performance of that act,
give his conscious, free, voluntary, deliberate and intentional consent. 

People v. Bugalao, G.R. No. 184757, Oct. 5, 2011

Accused-appellant, in his appeal, did not insist on the allegation in the trial court that he
was suffering from mental retardation. 

Nevertheless, we agree with the finding of the trial court that there was no proof that the
mental condition accused-appellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by
Yolanda Palma was already present at the time of the rape incidents. Anyone who
pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with
clear and convincing evidence.[32] Besides, this Court observes that neither the acts of
the accused-appellant proven before the court, nor his answers in his testimony, show a
complete deprivation of intelligence or free will. Insanity presupposes that the
accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at
the time of the commission of the crime. [33] Only when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the
exempting circumstance of insanity be considered. [34

(c) Deaf-Mutism, NCC 1327 (2), 807 & 820

Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:

(1) Unemancipated minors;

(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.
(1263a)

Art. 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must personally read the will, if
able to do so; otherwise, he shall designate two persons to read it and
communicate to him, in some practicable manner, the contents thereof. (n)

Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and
not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the
execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code. (n)

(d) Prodigality, ROC Rule 92 Sec. 2

SEC. 2. Meaning of word "incompetent."—Under this rule, the word

"incompetent"
includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized
lepers,prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are
of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being
of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar
causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their
property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.

(e) Civil Interdiction, RPC 31, 34, 41

Art. 31. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification.

— The penalties of perpetual or temporal special disqualification for public office,
profession or calling shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected;

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either
perpetually or during the term of the sentence according to the extent of such
disqualification.

Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012

The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal
conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper
ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’
certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any
public office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a
candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of
Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified
candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.

The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, 15 the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any
election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office." The
duration of the temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the
principal penalty.

On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special
disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his disqualification," which is perpetually. Both
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification
constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from
these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a
false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is
eligible to so run.

In Lacuna v. Abes,16 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the
import of the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification:

On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that

appellee’s conviction of a crime penalized with prisión mayor which carried the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and Section
99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had been
sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the

convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only
during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal
Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of
perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This
accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or
hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special
disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal
Code, provides:

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the
exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification
for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during
the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in
any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
disqualification.

The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be
applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers
to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the
sentence" refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration between the
perpetual and the temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the
provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states that such duration is
"according to the nature of said penalty" — which means according to whether the
penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification
"deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office
perpetually."

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect

immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this
accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on
whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32
states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during
the period of his perpetual special disqualification." Once the judgment of
conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the
convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality
of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public
office perpetually. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to
hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time his judgment of
conviction became final.

(f) Family Relations -  FC 150-151; cf. FC 87, 37, 38

NCC 1490
NCC 2035
cf. NCC 963-967

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;

(3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or halfblood. (217a)

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should
appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no
such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.

This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under
the Civil Code. (222a)

Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses
may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also
apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (133a)
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the
beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of
public policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up

to the fourth civil degree;

(2) Between step-parents and step-children;

(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted
child;

(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;

(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;

(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and

(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed
that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. (82)

NCC 1490

NCC 2035

cf. NCC 963-967

(g) Alienage, cf. Art. IV, Secs. 1-5, 1987 Constitution

Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

(h) Absence, NCC 381 – 396, FC 41

Olaguer v. Purugganan, G.R. No. 158907, February 12, 2007

(i) Insolvency and Trusteeship, NCC 1381, 1491, 2236

Umale v. ASB Realty, G.R. No. 181126, June 15, 2011

(j) Gender, Art. II, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution; cf. NCC 403

See also: Rule 3 Section 4, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

(k) Physical Incapacity/Disease, FC 45(5), 45(6), 46, NCC 820

Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, et al., G.R. No. 185922, Jan. 15, 2014

RULES GOVERNING PERSONS WHO ARE ABSENT

NCC 381-383, 384-389, FC 96, 101, 124, NCC 390-396, FC 41

Reyes v. Alejandro, 141 SCRA 65

Eastern Shipping v. Lucero, 124 SCRA 425

Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, Nov. 29, 2005

Pantollano v. Korphil, G.R. No. 169575, March 30, 2011

Republic v. Granada, G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012

Republic v. Narceda, G.R. No. 192760, April 10, 2013

Subsequent marriage, upon reappearance of absent spouse

FC 41 in relation to FC 42-44

NCC 390-391, FC 55 (9), FC 101

Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil 179

Republic v. Nolasco, 220 SCRA 20, March 17, 1993

Bienvenido v. CA, 237 SCRA 676, October 24, 1994

SSS v. Jarque, G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006

Procedure - Republic v. Granada, G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012