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 An Unblinking Gaze:
On the Philosophy of the Marquis de Sade

Geoffrey T. Roche

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of

Philosophy in Philosophy, the University of Auckland, 2004
 ABSTRACT

Throughout the 20th Century, a number of philosophers, writers, artists and film
makers have implied that there is some profound significance to the work of Donatien
Alphonse François, the Marquis de Sade (1740-1814). The project at hand is to
evaluate the claim that Sade, in some sense, is a philosopher, and to assess what his
philosophy amounts to. There are two aspects to this task. Firstly, I will consider the
various philosophical interpretations of Sade’s work. This part of the study will serve
as a guide into the Sadeian labyrinth, and will establish some of the more central
interpretive themes, in particular the claim that Sade’s thought anticipates that of the
Nazis, or that he brings early Modern thought to its logical conclusion. Secondly, I
will inquire into Sade’s writings themselves. Of particular interest are Sade’s thoughts
concerning the nature of sexuality, psychology, and the human condition in general,
his critique of conventional morality, and his description of the nature of power.

ii
 Acknowledgements

First and foremost, thanks are due to my supervisors, Stefano Franchi and Robert
Wicks, without whom this project would have been both unthinkable and impossible.
In particular, I wish to thank Stefano for helping with the construction of the thesis,
and his insistence that deeper insights were available in regions where I could only
see an inky darkness. I am also indebted to family and friends who aided this project
in less direct ways, in particular my parents, for their encouragement and support over
the years. I also wish to thank Caroline Warman, David Martyn, Jeff Love, Robert
Nola, Dennis Robinson, Stephen Davies, Charles Pigden, Karen Riley, Tim Rayner,
Barry Moffatt, Amanda Lennon, Sterling Lynch, Adèle de Jager, Lauren Ashwell, and
Robert C. Solomon, for suggestions, advice, support and assistance. I thank Sébastian
Charles, Masha Mimran and Syliane Charles for providing copies of unpublished
articles. For helping me with my French, I thank Rosemary Arnoux, Selma Kradraoui,
and the teachers at Alliance Française in Lyons. I also thank The Foundation for
Research, Science and Technology, Tuapapa Rangahau Putaiao, for the award of
Bright Futures Scholarship (Doctoral) 664, and the opportunity to attend conferences
overseas, and the University of Auckland for both the Doctoral Scholarship and, with
the assistance of the Overseas Exchange programme, the opportunity to study in
Lyons. I am also grateful to Tessa Laird, David Carman, Astrid Scott, Brian Soppit
and the late John Park, for their inspiration.

iii
My manner of thinking, so you say, cannot be approved. Do you suppose I care? A poor
fool indeed is he who adopts a manner of thinking to suit other people! My manner of
thinking stems straight from my considered reflections; it holds with my existence, with
the way I am made. It is not in my power to alter it; and if were, I’d not do so.

Sade (in a letter to his wife; 1783).

...philosophy, Justine, is not the art of consoling the weak; it has no other aim but to bring
soundness to the mind and to uproot prejudices.

Sade La Nouvelle Justine (1797)

He preaches his horrible doctrine to some; to others, he lends his books.

A.A. Royer-Collard (psychiatrist, in a letter to

the police; 1808).

iv
Contents

Key to Abbreviations, Sources and Translations viii

Preface 1
Introduction 5

Chapter I. Reconnaissance
1.1 Geoffrey Gorer: Citoyen Sade 17
1.2 Juliette de Lorsange, CEO: Angela Carter on Sade 20
1.3 Sade and Nazism in Secondary Literature 25
1.4 Sade and Absolute Revolt 27
1.5 Sade and Dialectics: Adorno and Horkheimer 28
1.6 The Worm at the Core: Crocker on Sade 33
1.7 Sade and Mainstream Philosophy 37
1.8 The Unique One: Maurice Blanchot on Sade 40
1.9 Annie Le Brun on Sade 43
1.10 A Cloacal Eye: Bataille on Sade 51
1.11 The Language of Unreason: Foucault on Sade 71
1.12 Conclusion 91

Chapter II. Machine Man: Ontologies

2.1 Introduction 93
2.2 God and Creation 94
2.3 The Non- Uniqueness of Humans 96
2.4 Death 98
2.5 Naturalism vs. Non-Naturalism 101

Chapter III. Enigma of the Will: Psychology

3.1 Introduction 103
3.2 Theory of Pleasure: Materialist Model 104
3.3 Theory of Pleasure: Intellectual Aspect 107

v
3.4 Theory of Pleasure: Aesthetics 111
3.5 Apathy 114
3.6 Triumph of the Will 120
3.7 Power Over Others 122
3.8 Sadism as Syndrome 125
3.9 The Enigma of Sadism 132

Chapter IV. Sterile Pleasures: Sexuality

4.1 Introduction 133
4.2 The Bataille Doctrine 135
4.3 The Benthamite Doctrine 142
4.4 Outcome of the Rejection of the Traditional Teleology 144
4.5 Homosexuality 145
4.6 Sade contra Rousseau on the Role of Women 147
4.7 Against Reproduction 154
4.8 On Love and Friendship 157
4.9 On Marriage 161
4.10 Joy Divisions 164
4.11 Conclusion 166

Chapter V. Swimming with Sharks: Ethics I

5.1 Introduction 167
5.2 Moral Nihilism 168
5.3 Treatment of Rival Ethical Theories 173
5.4 The Free Will Problem 177
5.5 Why Be Immoral? 180
5.6 The Imprudence Argument 181
5.7 The Self-Harm Argument 184
5.8 The Don’t Be a Schmuck Argument 186
5.9 Monsters, Inc. 190
5.10 The Anti-Social Contract 195
5.11 Doctrinal Dispute 197
5.12 Conclusion 201

vi
Chapter VI. Rome vs. Jerusalem: Ethics II
6.1 Introduction 203
6.2 The Antichrist 203
6.3.1 Non-Transcendent Teleology: the Adoration of Kali 206
6.3.2 Non-Transcendent Teleology: The Beast in Man 210
6.3.3 Non-Transcendent Teleology: Property and Theft 212
6.4 The Slave Revolt in Morals 218
6.5 The Sadeian Caste System 221
6.6 The Extermination of Christianity 230
6.7 Historical Context of the Pagan Return 231

Chapter VII. The Government of Reason: Politics

7.1 Introduction 239
7.2 Antipodes 241
7.3 How to Philosophize with a Brick in the Face 253
7.4 Anarchy 256
7.5 The Pleasure of Control 259
7.6 Despotism without Tears 263
7.7 Anus Mundi 266
7.8 The Anatomical Gaze 274
7.9 Excremental Assault 281
7.10 Conclusion 286

Conclusion. 291
Appendix: Sade and Nazism 295
Bibliography 307

vii
 KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS,
SOURCES, AND TRANSLATIONS

I have used English translations where available. No English translation presently

exists for La Nouvelle Justine or Aline et Valcour. I have modified translations
wherever necessary to preserve relevant aspects of the original text, where the
translation is in error, or for stylistic reasons. Where I have done so, I have given a
page reference to the original French text. If no translation is cited, the translation
is my own. Unless otherwise noted, references are to the texts listed below.

AV : Aline et Valcour ou le Roman philosophique. ed. Jean M. Goulemot

(Paris : le livre de poche, 1994)
CL: The Crimes of Love trans. Margaret Crosland (London: Peter Owen, 1996).
GT: The Gothic tales of the Marquis de Sade trans. Margaret Crosland (London:
Picador, 1990).
J: [the story of] Juliette [or, Prosperities of Vice] trans. Austryn Wainhouse
(New York: Grove, 1968). [Part two of] La nouvelle Justine, ou Les malheurs de
la vertu, suivie de L’histoire de Juliette, sa sœur, the second part of the third
version of Justine, published in 1797.
LNJ : La Nouvelle Justine (2 vols). (Paris: Collection 10:18, 1978).
LP : Letters from Prison. trans. Richard Seaver. (New York: Arcade
Publishing, 1999).
MV: The Misfortunes of Virtue and other Early Tales trans. David Coward
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). (This is the first version of
Justine).
MM: The Mystified Magistrate and other writings trans. Richard Seaver (New
York: Arcade Publishing, 2000).
Œ : Œuvres (3 vols.) ed. Michel Delon, Jean Deprun (Paris: Bibliothèque de la
Pléiade / Gallimard, 1990, 1995, 1998).
PB: Justine, Philosophy in the Bedroom and Other Writings trans. Richard
Seaver (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000).
120: The 120 Days of Sodom and other writings trans. Austryn Wainhouse and
Richard Seaver (New York: Arrow, 1990).

viii
Preface

Donatien Alphonse François, the Marquis de Sade (1740-1814) has something of a

shadow- presence in our culture. We all know the term Sadism, and anyone who reads
is aware of who Sade was, if not of what he wrote. Throughout the 20th Century,
novelists and artists have frequently implied that there is some profound significance
to his writings, and contemporary high culture’s obsession with nihilism and vulgarity
has made him a star. 1 It would be easy to simply dismiss Sade’s contemporary
popularity, and the attendant plays, books and movies, as a particularly morbid, or
misguided, form of intellectual kitsch. 2 Sade’s work is bombastic, long winded and
nauseating. As for Sade the philosopher, he borrows heavily from other thinkers and
at times argues so inconsistently that it is impossible to tell whether he wrote in jest or
was simply incompetent. What is more, secondary literature on Sade often lacks
critical distance, tending towards hagiography and even doctrinal identification. 3

1
Contemporary high culture: I have in mind in particular the work of Jake and Dino Chapman, Wim
Delvoye, Jeff Koons, Zhu Yu, and Paul McCarthy. Zhu Yu ate a stillborn baby in a performance piece
entitled Eating People (2000). For discussion, see Fei Dawei, “Transgresser le principe céleste:
dialogue avec le groupe cadavre,” Artpress : représenter l’horreur Hors Série (mai 1 2001) : 60-64.
2
Literary references: Sade is referred to in passing in Nabokov’s Lolita (Claire Quilty tries to get
Dolores Haze to perform in a film based on the Philosophy in the Bedroom). Milan Kundera
(Slowness), A.S. Byatt (Babel Tower) and Michel Houellebecq (The Elementary Particles) discuss
Sade in their works. Angela Carter’s engagement with Sade will be discussed in Chapter I. Plays and
Movies: The two most important plays written on Sade are Peter Weiss’s Marat/ Sade (1966) and
Yukio Mishima’s Madame Sade (1965). Philip Kaufman’s Quills (2000), based on a play by Doug
Wright, is only the latest of a long line of filmic treatments of Sade, and limits him to the 1960’s radical
clichés of ‘liberator of sexuality’ and ‘satirist of official hypocrisy.’ Pier Paolo Pasolini’s Salo or the
120 Days of Sodom (1975) comes as close as a filmic treatment could come to Sade’s vision without
being banned (it has in fact been banned in the United States owing to questions concerning the age of
some of the actors) or unwatchable. Spanish director Luis Buñuel’s films are filled with references to
Sade’s work, in particular The Milky Way (1969) and L’Âge d’or (1930). The most interesting
cinematic references to Sade are, however, obscure. The Russian ambassador in Kubrick’s Dr.
Strangelove (1964) is named Ambassador Desadeski; the main character of Nagisa Oshima’s The
Realm of the Senses (1976), who asphyxiates her lover (at his request), before cutting off his penis, is
named Sada.
3
A number of critics refer to the victims of torture described in Sade as ‘patients’ or ‘unfortunate
creatures’ -the same terminology used by Sade’s characters- and describe the hideous medical

1
 Sade’s work remains philosophically significant, however, for two reasons.
Firstly, it stands as the most extreme expression of an aspect of Eighteenth Century
thought which is now largely forgotten. We remember this age as one of
‘Enlightenment,’ rather than the Age of Disillusion, and of intellectual despair. Sade
illustrates how terrifyingly disruptive the most advanced thought of his age actually
was. It has been said that modern man has been confronted with three ‘revolutions;’
the Copernican Revolution, the Darwinian Revolution and the Freudian Revolution.
Accordingly, we have learned that we are not in the centre of the universe, that we do
not have a supernatural origin, and that we do not have authority over our mental
states. In pushing the materialism and atheism of his age to hitherto unconsidered
extremes, and in rejecting the notion of Man’s uniqueness or possibility of
transcendence, Sade anticipated the philosophical implications of all three
Revolutions.
Secondly, of all the writers and thinkers of the 18th century, Sade was among the
few to gaze, without flinching, into the worst of human nature, in particular the
capacity of inflicting want, pain and destruction upon others. If a comparison is to be
made, Sade ranks alongside Goya. The raw fury of his work reveals something of the
world that traditional philosophy, hitherto, has never been able to confront. Writes
Robert F. Brissenden, “if the heavenly city of the philosophers is one possible and
imaginary condition for man’s existence, the hellish dungeons beneath the snow-
bound castle of the Duc de Blangis [main character of Sade’s The 120 Days of Sodom]
running with blood and excrement, provide us with another; and any balanced view
must take both into account.” 4

experiments in Sade’s works as ‘poetry.’ Critics also tend to describe those whom Sade found
disagreeable (his gaolers, in particular) in the same sarcastic terms used by Sade himself. Also, notably,
the words ‘rape’ and ‘murder’ scarcely appear in secondary literature in Sade, despite the frequency of
these acts in Sade’s work. See, for example, Béatrice Didier Sade Un écriture du désir (Paris: Denoël/
Gonhier, 1976) p.187; Chantal Thomas Sade, la dissertation et l’orgie (Paris: Éditions Payot, 1978)
pp.96, 148,149; Nelly Stéphane “Morale et nature,” Europe: Revue littéraire- mensuelle 522
(1972):23-42, p.35.
4
R.F. Brissenden “La Philosophie dans le Boudoir; or, A Young Lady’s Entrance into the World,” in
Harold E Pagliaro, ed., Irrationalism in the Eighteenth Century (Cleveland, Press of Case Western
Reserve University, 1972): 113-141, p.137.

2
 The project at hand is to evaluate the claim that Sade, in some sense, is a
philosopher, and to assess what his philosophy amounts to. There are two aspects of
this task. Firstly, I will consider the various philosophical interpretations of Sade’s
work. Secondly, I will inquire into Sade’s writings, independent of previous
interpretations. I will not be concerned with those aspects of his life and work that
have somewhat distracted most writers from the actual intellectual content of his
work- that is- the arguments, presuppositions, and doctrines that it communicates.
This is what it means to treat Sade as a philosopher, as opposed to treating him as the
arcane enigma ‘Sade’ (or- more preposterously- the ‘divine Marquis’). If Sade’s work
is a labyrinth inhabited by monsters, its walls will be breached, its inhabitants will be
captured for study, and their secrets will be yielded.

3
 INTRODUCTION

The intention of this project is to seek out Sade the philosopher. Related to this task is
the surveying of the various interpretations of Sade as philosopher, in part for the sake
of assessment, but also in order to find a pathway into his work. Here I will outline
some interpretive and methodological issues that have arisen.
Two types of literature have been surveyed; a). secondary literature written by
literary specialists, a fraction of which touches upon philosophical themes, or is
theoretical in nature, and b). philosophical literature which treats Sade, in a critical
way, as a thinker in his own right. Work of the latter type is limited to a handful of
references, most of which are brief.
Several issues concerning the specialist literature need to be addressed. Firstly,
there is the question concerning the very idea of reading Sade as a philosopher, this
being a minority view amongst Sade specialists. Not only are most specialists more
interested in biographical, textual, or purely interpretive treatments of Sade’s work;
many explicitly reject the idea that Sade could be read as a philosopher in a literal
way. Sade is, on this view, an amateurish plagiarist, his ‘philosophy’ best understood
as a hateful revenge attack against the cosmos on a purely abstract plane. 1 In keeping
with such interpretations is the tendency to reduce Sade to pure fiction, or pure text. 2
Roland Barthes, the most prominent member of this school, describes Sade as the
creator of a ‘new language’ in which bodies and their intersections take the place (in
some sense) of grammatical units. Accordingly, Barthes holds that Sade was not

1
See Thomas Moore Dark Eros: the imagination of Sadism (Woodstock, Connecticut: Spring
Publications, 1990) p.54; Noël Chatelet “Le libertine à table” in Michel Camus, Philippe Roger, eds.
Sade écrire la crise (Paris: Pierre Belfond, 1983): 67-83, p.78; David Coward, “Introduction,” the
Marquis de Sade The Misfortunes of Virtue and other early tales trans. David Coward (Oxford
University Press, 1999) p. vii.
2
See for example Marcel Hénaff The Invention of the Libertine Body trans. Xavier Callahan
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) p.290. This is in spite of Hénaff’s own claims of
Sade’s significance in diagnosing the black heart of late capitalism, which aligns him with the
interpretation offered by Adorno and Horkheimer, to be discussed in Chapter I. Muriel Schmid, in Le
soufre au bord de la chaire: Sade et l’Evangile, agrees with this view (Genève: Labor et Fides, 2001)
pp.51, 125, 152. I thank Rosemary Arnoux for bringing this book to my attention.

5
interested in discussing the real world, reasoning that “written shit has no odour.” 3
Other critics hold that Sade’s work is simply too horrific to be read in a literal way.
Rather, argues John Phillips, Sade is to read as a writer of black comedy. 4 A number
of points can be made here. Firstly, Sade himself asserted that he was a philosopher,
both in private correspondence (as expressed in the quotes at the beginning of this
essay), and in the presentation of his works. This must surely inform our
hermeneutics. Secondly, Sade was quite clearly preoccupied with ethics and
psychology - what he knew of as ‘moral science’ and the inquiry concerning the
‘human heart.’ That he was engaged in a recognizably philosophical discussion –and a
central one at that– there is little doubt. Finally, the argument that Sade’s works are
‘fictions,’ therefore not philosophical, is to assume a questionable dichotomy between
narrative and philosophy. The Narrative (the Platonic dialogue, the ‘philosophical
tale,’ the libertin novel, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, the fictional work of Dostoyevsky,
Camus or Sartre) has frequently been used to communicate philosophical ideas, and
was a wisely chosen vehicle in an age when personal identification with atheism was
particularly dangerous. Further, Sade frequently blurs the line between fictional
narrative and prescription, most significantly in giving the reader advice as to how
one ought to live one’s life. Finally, for a thinker who has gone beyond the limits of
purely linear reasoning and the standard oppositions of truth and falsity, description
and prescription, sincerity and insincerity, or good and evil, literary form may be a
superior means of philosophical expression. 5 Sade’s work, as this essay will show,
presents a number of intractable interpretive problems, in particular his relationship
with the text and the reader, and there is a bewildering amount of contradiction within
his work. 6 The problem of the intention of the author goes beyond the scope of this

3
Roland Barthes Sade, Fourier, Loyola (Paris: Seuil, 1971) .Quoted in Laurence L. Bongie Sade: A
Biographical Essay (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998) p.297.
4
John Phillips “Laugh? I nearly died! : Humor in Sade’s fiction,” The Eighteenth Century. Theory and
Interpretation 40 (1) (fall 1999):46-67, p.55, 61; John Phillips “Sade in the Corridor,” Nottingham
French Studies 37 (2) (autumn 1998): 26-36, p.34.
5
Here I am virtually quoting Jacob Golomb, Nietzsche and Zion (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 2004) p.96.
6
For discussion on Sade’s style, lack of sincerity, and attempt to ‘brainwash’ or nauseate the reader,
see Timo Airaksinen The Philosophy of the Marquis de Sade (London and New York: Routledge,
1995) p.13, Susan Neiman Evil in Modern Thought: An alternative history of Philosophy (Melbourne:
Scribe publications, 2002) p.180; Geoffrey Bennington “Sade Laying Down the Law,” Oxford Literary

6
project. In any case, I have no interest in writing a What Sade Really Said, a project as
philosophically uninformative as it would be impossible. Using Sade’s text as a
framework for a more generally applicable inquiry into morality and human nature,
whilst maintaining fidelity to the text, I feel, will be a more philosophically
informative approach. A balance must be found between structured, distanced
analysis and the more nuanced approach of thinking ‘through’ the text; between
Marcelin Pleynet’s ideal of a reading that “thinks through the multiplicitous
articulations of textual contradictions and which thinks its own insertion into the order
of these contradictions,” and Jules Jenin’s advice that we study Sade as an
entomologist studies a scorpion. 7
In reply to Phillips, for whom Sade’s work is too horrific to be read as an account
of reality, I note that this a particularly un- Sadeian approach. That is to say, it is to
assume that the world is not, to a large extent, a frightening and obscene place, and
that man is not capable of atrocity. A Nouvelle Juliette, rewritten for the early 21st
Century, would be a project banal in its obviousness. The sex slave-traders of Eastern
Europe, the rapist priests, the warlords of Africa who use mass starvation as a
strategic tool; the Board of Directors of DynCorp, Their Excellencies Robert Mugabe,
Kim Jong-Il, and Teodoro Obiang Nguema; Huda Ammash, Army Specialist Sabrina
Harman, Father Athanase Seromba, Armin Meiwes, Jeffrey Dahlmer, and Marc
Dutroux; - these are the real-life Juliettes, Minskis, Durands and Noirceuils. The

Review 6(2) (1984):38 -56, p.54; Béatrice Didier Sade: Un écriture du désir (Denoël/Gonthier, 1976)
p. 199. Sade’s work contains a few clues as to how he saw himself in relation to the text and how he
viewed the reader. He was apparently aware of his stylistic shortcomings, as his marginal notes show
(120:568, 570). He frequently made direct addresses to the reader, extolling them to follow his advice
(AV: 346). His characters also insinuate that they are not to be trusted (“[w]e do have something of the
treacherous, yes; a touch of the false, you may believe it”; PB: 278). Sade also argued that the opinions
of the characters in a text were not necessarily those of the author. See Jean-Pierre Han, Jean-Pierre
Valla “A propos du système philosophique de Sade,” Europe 522 (October 1972): 105-123, p.108.
7
Marcelin Pleynet “The Readability of Sade,” The Tel Quel Reader ed. Patrick ffrench (sic) and
Roland-François Lack (London and New York: Routledge,1998):109-122,p. 119; Jules Janin “Le
marquis de Sade,” Revue de Paris, 1834, pp.321-322. Quoted in Françoise Laugaa-Traut Lectures de
Sade (Paris: Armand Colin, 1973) p.125.

7
horrors of Silling (the castle of Sade’s the 120 Days of Sodom) are as much a part of
our world as are Haengyong and Abu Ghraib. 8
Of the work on Sade that takes a more philosophical approach, problems remain,
and some perhaps surprising omissions need to be explained. Firstly, much of this
material is hampered by a lack in critical rigor, or is philosophical without engaging
with the philosophy in Sade’s work. That is, it is philosophy about Sade. Philippe
Sollers, in “Sade dans le texte” (1967), argues that Sade has ‘disproved’ the principle
of causality and hence the underlying principle of all civilisation, religion and
philosophy, which Sollers refers to as a ‘neurosis.’ 9 An oft-cited and influential essay
by Jacques Lacan, “Kant avec Sade” (Kant with Sade), also falls into this category
(Lacan reduces all of Sade to the ‘Law of jouissance’), as does the work of Philippe
Mengue, for whom Sade has given a new type of ‘law.’ 10 Other studies are hampered
by an incomplete knowledge of the theoretical content of Sade’s works, which
accounts for the wild variation in interpretation. Timo Airaksinen, in The Philosophy
of the Marquis de Sade, does not so much interpret as misidentify Sade as a Kantian
thinker, for whom the ‘joy of sin’ is the ‘perverse pleasure’ of being ‘irrational’ (as,

8
At the time of writing (2004), Haengyong is thought to be an operational death camp in North Korea.
See Antony Barnett “Revealed: the gas chamber horror of North Korea's gulag,” Observer, Sunday
February 1, 2004. URL: www.guardian.co.uk/korea/article/0,2763,1136483,00.html. (accessed
November 11th 2004).
9
Philippe Sollers “Sade dans le texte” In Tel Quel 28 (1967) :38-50. For discussion, see Caroline
Warman Sade: from Materialism to Pornography (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2002) pp.8-9.
10
Lacan reduces all of Sade to a single aphorism: the ‘right to jouissance’ (‘jouissance’ is defined in
the Larousse dictionary as ‘intense pleasure,’ but it also means ‘orgasm’, which is closer to Sade’s
typical usage of the term. It has no exact English translation). This principle appears to be taken from a
single line in Sade’s Philosophie dans le Boudoir. But Lacan does not find a corresponding philosophy
in Sade to back it up: “[o]f a treatise truly about desire, there is thus little here, even nothing” (Lacan
p.75). See Jacques Lacan ‘Kant with Sade’ trans. James B. Swenson, Jr. October 51 Winter (1989):55-
104. I Thank David Martyn for pointing this text out to me. For an analysis of this essay, see Jean
Allouch Ça de Kant, cas de Sade : Erotologie analytique III (Paris : L’unebevue, 2002). Philip
Mengue’s work is strongly influenced by that of Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleuze and Jean- François
Lyotard. Mengue regards Sade as a “nihilist of meaning,” and yet also reads Sade as introducing a new
concept of ‘law,’ an ‘ethic’ that does not “ignore or deny” the “unconsciousness” (p.228). Given that
Sade had no concept of a subconscious, and was ambiguous on the subject of laws, this reading would
appear to owe to Lacan more than to Sade himself. Philip Mengue L’ordre Sadien : Loi et narration
dans la philosophie de Sade (Paris : Éditions Kimé, 1996).

8
for a Kantian, doing immoral things is tantamount to causing ‘moral harm’ to one’s
‘moral self’). 11 Airaksinen then proceeds to analyse the structure of ‘perverse will’
(the pleasure of doing that which the agent knows is irrational), but his discussion
here has more to do with the insights of Edgar Allen Poe than Sade (for whom doing
‘good’ simply makes no sense for the ‘strong’). Simone de Beauvoir’s essay “Must
We Burn Sade?” is another case in point; she makes no stronger, or informative,
claim than that Sade “disturbs us” and that he “rejected all the easy answers.” 12
I give a final note concerning the censorship of Sade’s works. Roger Shattuck
describes Sade’s work as “potential poison, polluting our moral and intellectual
environment,” and his status in literary and academic circles as indicative of an “eerie
post- Nietzschean death wish.” 13 Sade specialists dismiss this view as moralizing
hogwash, but the view is an interesting one. 14 To fear Sade, to acknowledge his
power to morally corrupt- is to grant his work a great deal of negative respect; more,
in fact, than do a number of specialists. Further, as Lorna Berman notes, “it would
seem that those who have banned Sade’s works have done so precisely out of fear of
just such a latent destructive impulse in human nature.” 15 If Sade’s philosophy is
really so poor, it has to be asked how such a doctrine could be so dangerously
seductive. As philosophers, we wish to know how it is even possible to ‘poison’
people simply by writing philosophically informed pornographic novels.

Sade since 1814.

From the time of Sade’s death in 1814 until the 1930’s, Sade’s works were known
almost exclusively by psychologists and literary figures (Sade’s literary legacy still

11
I thank Caroline Warman for clarifying this point for me. Timo Airaksinen The Philosophy of the
Marquis de Sade (London and New York: Routledge, 1995). pp.156, 168.
12
See Simone de Beauvoir “Must we Burn Sade?” trans. Annette Michelson (120:3-64).
13
Roger Shattuck Forbidden Knowledge: from Prometheus to Pornography (New York: Harcourt
Brace & Co., 1996) p.239, 299.
14
For Michel Delon’s reaction to Shattuck, see Michel Delon “Du danger de la littérature,” Europe
835-836 (novembre- décembre 1998) :3-8.
15
Lorna Berman “The Marquis de Sade and his Critics,” Mosaic 1 no.2 (1968):57-72. Quoted in
Colette Verger Michael The Marquis de Sade: The Man, His Works, and His Critics, An Annotated
Bibliography (New York& London: Garland Publishing Inc, 1986) p.308.

9
remains largely unexplored). 16 Earlier interpretations had been hampered by the
scarcity and illegality of his works, which may account for what appears to be a
shocking naivety of some of the earliest proclamations of Sade’s importance. 17 In the
1920’s, the Surrealists, following the lead of Guillaume Apollinaire, were the first
intellectual group to openly revere him as an intellectual ancestor. Apollinaire
declared Sade “the freest spirit ever to have lived,” and the character Juliette an angel-
the embodiment of the New Woman- that would “rejuvenate the world.” 18 André
Breton and Paul Eluard, following his lead, found in Sade’s work the promise of a
radical departure from the limits of morality, philosophy, and Western culture in
general. In 1926, in the 8th Surrealist manifesto, Paul Elaurd wrote that Sade had been
imprisoned “ …for having wanted to return to civilised man the force of his primitive
instincts, for having freed the erotic [amoureuse] imagination and for having
struggled desperately for absolute justice and equality.” 19 Ever since, Sade has been

16
On André Breton and Sade, and Swinburne and Sade, see Françoise Laugaa-Traut Lectures de Sade
(Paris: Armand Colin, 1973) pp.151, 207. On Samuel Beckett’s reading of Sade, see James Knowlson
Damned to Fame (London: Bloomsbury, 1997) p.293. I Thank Craig Matthews for bringing this
passage to my attention. See also Patricia Mines “The role of the Marquis de Sade in the late novels of
Victor Hugo,” Nottingham French Studies 36 no. 2 (autumn 1997): 10-23. Three essays that discuss the
relationship between Sade and Dostoyevsky: William C Brumfield “Thérèse philosophe and
Dostoyevsky’s Great Sinner,” Comparative Literature 32 (1980), 238-253; Robert Louis Jackson
“Dostoevskij and the Marquis de Sade,” Russian Literature Vol. IV-1 (13) (January 1976):27-45. Jeff
Love “Sade et l’innocence divine” in Norbert Sclippa, ed. Lire Sade, (Paris: l' Harmattan, 2004)
pp.157-172. On Sade and Kafka see Brad Epps “Technoasceticism and Authorial Death in Sade, Kafka,
Barthes and Foucault,” Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 8.3 (1996); Gustav Janouch
Conversations with Kafka trans. Goronway Rees (New York: New Directions Books, 1971) p.131.
(The torture described in Kafka’s In the Penal Colony, in which the ‘sentence’ of a convict is inscribed
into the body, appears in various forms in the work of Sade ;120: 611; J:619). For Aldous Huxley’s
thoughts on Sade, see his Ends and Means (London: Chatto and Windus, 1938) p.271.
17
For an anecdote concerning the difficulty of finding Sade’s works in 1920’s Paris, see Luis Buñuel’s
autobiography, My Last Breath trans. Abigail Israel (London: Vintage, 1994) pp.217-218. I thank
Astrid Scott for bringing this text to my attention.
18
Guillaume Apollinaire Œuvres complètes (Paris : André Balland et Jacques Lecat, 1966) Vol. II
p.231. Surrealist artists that were preoccupied with Sade include Man Ray, Salvador Dalí, Hans
Bellmer and Clovis Trouille. Dali’s works and writings are full of references to Sade, usually involving
excrement, anuses and so on.
19
Paul Éluard “D.A.F. Sade, Écrivain fantastique et révolutionnaire” In La Révolution surréaliste, n° 8,
1st December 1926. Quoted in Laugaa-Traut p.194.

10
hailed as a figure of liberation of the human spirit, an interpretation most dramatically
expressed by Georges Bataille. It was, however, the exhaustive work of two scholars,
Gilbert Lely and Maurice Heine, which secured Sade’s place in French letters with the
publishing of two celebrated biographies. 20
Sade- the thinker- had also been discovered in England. In 1934, Geoffrey Gorer
published The Life and Ideas of the Marquis de Sade, in which he describes Sade as
both humanist political thinker and insightful psychologist. As opposed to the more
impressionistic tone of the Surrealists, Gorer’s work marks the beginning of a more
‘classicist’ interpretation, according to which Sade can, and should, be approached as
an 18th Century philosopher, albeit an eccentric one. This approach has only been
revived in the last ten years and remains controversial.
By the end of World War II, a third interpretation was proposed. Theodor
Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Albert Camus, and Raymond Queneau saw in Sade the
key to understanding European fascism, in particular its purported roots in the
brutalizing, nihilistic potential of Occidental culture in general. Camus’ less literal
interpretation sees in Sade’s writing a prophetic ‘dream of revenge.’ Adorno,
Horkheimer and Crocker, by contrast, make explicit the association between Sade,
Nazism, and early Modern thought. Insofar as Sade was a writer who had lived during
the 18th Century, and that he had in some sense engaged with the philosophy of his
age, the implication is that the roots of Nazism as a cultural phenomena are profound
to a disturbing degree. Again, this interpretation remains controversial.
Since the emergence of Sade scholarship in the mid- 20th Century, there has
been little consensus or even critical engagement between the various interpretive
camps (there is near unanimous agreement, however, that Sade was not in fact a
religious thinker, as suggested by Lorna Berman, Pierre Klossowski, and Jean
Paulhan). 21 Those who regard Sade as a liberator are quick to dismiss associations

20
Gilbert Lely Sade (Paris : Gallimard, 1960); Maurice Heine Le Marquis de Sade (Paris : Gallimard,
1950).
21
For discussion, see: Jean Deprun “Sade et l’abbé Bergier,” Raison Présente 67 (1983) :5-11 ; Pierre
Klossowski Sade my Neighbour trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University
Press, 1991); Jean Paulhan The Marquis de Sade and his Accomplice in Justine, Philosophy in the
Bedroom and Other Writings (London: Grove Press, Arrow Books, 1991):3-37; Béatrice Didier “Sade
théologien” in Michel Camus, Philippe Roger, eds. Sade écrire la crise (Paris: Pierre Belfond, 1983)
219-240: 220, 221,223.

11
with Nazism as merely superficial; those who regard Sade as essentially beyond the
categories and restraints of philosophy tend to dismiss literal analysis of his texts as
beside the point. Of the ‘classicist’ camp, only Caroline Warman, in Sade: From
Materialism to Pornography (2002), has taken the trouble to critique the dominant
strands of Sade scholarship in a systematic and thorough way (yet even here she
scarcely mentions Michel Foucault and Georges Bataille, key intellectual figures,
although not regarded highly by most Sade scholars).
Two dominant trends have emerged in the last twenty years. Firstly, a great
deal of research has been done on Sade’s relationship with his intellectual, historical
and literary context. This has revealed Sade, to some extent, to be preoccupied with
the same basic themes as the philosophers of his age, and has somewhat reduced his
mythic status as a figure of absolute ‘otherness’ (this does not, however, negate his
status as a figure of absolute revolt). Secondly, there have been a number of papers
and books written from a particular doctrinal perspective, whether Bataillian,
Foucaultian, Barthesian, or Lacanian. Some of these ‘schools’ appear to be quite cut
off from Sade scholarship as a whole, with particular students only referring to and
considering the works of their own particular interpretive lineage. In short, Sade
scholars offer a number of markedly different interpretations of Sade’s works, like
explorers with incredible, contradictory tales of some unknown continent. That
continent, to a large extent, remains uncharted.
In order to illustrate the central themes and preoccupations of the existing
literature, and to find a passage into Sade’s work, I will present the work of ten critics
whose work I take to be representative of ‘philosophical interpretation.’ These
approaches fall roughly into three groups. Firstly, I will present the work of Geoffrey
Gorer and Angela Carter, who both treat Sade as a thinker in a conventional sense,
and who have found Sade’s work to be of some merit in the political and social
sphere. That is, they read Sade as a positive thinker, though exclusively in the radical
sense of ‘overturning values.’ Secondly, I will discuss those who consider Sade to be
the link between the Age of Enlightenment and the rise of Nazism. Finally, I will
address the more positive, and dominant, ‘liberator’ reading, according to which Sade

12
is both a figure of cultural revolt, and in some sense stands radically outside the
intellectual mainstream. The authors I will consider here are Maurice Blanchot,
Georges Bataille, and Michel Foucault. This general discussion will end with a
consideration of the interpretation offered by Annie le Brun, a critic whose position
can be read as a synthesis of Sade reception hitherto. Bataille and Foucault, given
their role in bridging the gap between Sade criticism and philosophy proper, will be
given extended treatments.
It should be kept in mind that these distinctions are not mutually exclusive. Annie
le Brun, for example, prefers to work more closely with Sade’s text than others, and is
consequently highly critical of the more interpretative approaches of Bataille and
Foucault. As such, she has a certain affinity with those who prefer a more literal
approach to Sade’s work. More significantly, the ‘liberator’ reading of Sade does not
necessarily negate the belief that Sade has ideological affiliations with the Nazis and
other totalitarian regimes. The Surrealists, Breton and Bataille in particular, took Sade
to be the advocate of a radical break with Christian morality. Although a clean break
with Judaeo-Christian morality or belief does not necessarily lead to total moral
nihilism, this is, apparently, a point that Sade insisted upon and that his less critical
readers accept. Le Brun and Bataille are apparently enthusiastic about this leap into
the ‘abyss’; Crocker, Adorno and Horkheimer, clearly, are not. The disagreement,
then, is not one of interpretation of Sade but of absolute moral values. What passes
for Le Brun and Bataille as ‘liberation of the passions’ appears to other critics as the
megalomania of a self-anointed few. Ultimately, the project of interpreting Sade may
lead to a deepening and reconciliation of existing interpretations of Sade’s work,
rather than a simple process of elimination.
A final word should be said concerning Sade’s personality. Various attempts
have been made to assess Sade’s character, whether by sifting through the
biographical data or through the psychoanalysis of his prose style. 22 Sade’s text
elevates egocentricity, deceitfulness, and lack of guilt or empathy to the level of
philosophical doctrine, and his vision of human nature shows, as Philippe Roger puts

22
Jenny H. Batlay and Otis E. Fellows have suggested that the very tedium of Sade’s texts is
symptomatic of the death drive; Timo Airaksinen suggests that Sade’s work is itself an act of sadism
against the reader (hence, revealing the reader to be a masochist). See Airaksinen p.13;
Jenny H Batlay, Otis E. Fellows “Diderot et Sade: Affinités et divergences, ” L’Esprit Créateur 15 no.4
( winter 1975): 449-459, p.456.

13
it, a “spiritual one-eyedness.” 23 However, to categorize Sade as merely ‘mad’ or a
sociopath is to evade the hard philosophical issues that his work brings to light.
Observes Airaksinen:

Of course, [moral] perversity may be an illness of the mind; but…such a pathological

model either actively conceals the main issue or fails to illuminate it. The concept of
illness permits society to dispose of the perverse person and of anyone whose mental
constitution comes too close to perversity. The classification erects a barrier between the
sick and the healthy, and solicits the use of different principles of explanation with respect
to each group. 24

I finish with a disclaimer. In this project, I will not be concerned with, as it were,
auditing the Sadeian text for intellectual royalties owing. Scholarly work of the last
thirty or so years has already well established that Sade’s work is very much part of
his age. Of his age, true, but in the sense that all extraordinary creations are. To write
off Juliette as a pastiche of plagiarisms of better thinkers would be like describing
Wright Flyer I as a motorized kite. The conclusions that Sade draws from found
premises and hypotheses bear little relation to anything that his intellectual elders
could have imagined.

23
Philippe Roger Sade : la Philosophie dans le pressoir (Paris : Bernard Grasset, 1976) p.18 ; Muriel
Schmid Le soufre au bord de la chaire : Sade et l’Evangile (Genève : Labor et Fides, 2001) p. 143.
24
Airaksinen p.29.

14
To the reader: In this project, I shall quote and discuss passages in Sade that many
will find extremely offensive. Most of the secondary literature on Sade, and some
anthologies, avoid such explicitness. To treat this subject in an accurate and scholarly
manner, I feel, requires that the material at hand is not bowdlerized; to do is to
seriously misrepresent his work.

15
16
 Chapter I: RECONNAISSANCE
Literature Review

When critics disagree, the artist is in accord with himself.

Oscar Wilde Picture of Dorian Gray (1890).

And the den nam’d Horror held a man

Chain'd hand and foot, round his neck an iron band, bound to the impregnable wall.
In his soul was the serpent coil’d round in his heart, hid from the light, as in a cleft
rock;
And the man was confin’d for a writing prophetic.

William Blake The French Revolution (1791).

1.1 : Geoffrey Gorer : Citoyen Sade

Geoffrey Gorer (1905-1985) wrote The Life and Ideas of the Marquis de Sade
(hereafter LI), in 1934, motivated, he wrote, by the wish to understand the rise of
Nazism. 1 He noted that the term ‘sadism’ was constantly used to describe the
destructive nature of the new movement. Gorer writes: “For this reason this first
edition [of The Life and Ideas] placed a major emphasis on the political aspect of de
Sade’s life and writings; and numerous parallels were drawn between the actions and
sayings of de Sade’s characters and those of various Nazi and fascist politicians, and
some public figures and events in Great Britain and the United States” (LI: 9). Gorer
was in apparent agreement with those that saw similarities between Sade’s ‘libertine’
characters and the Nazis, in particular in the novel Juliette. But the later Gorer takes
Sade for a humanist who sought to expose, rather than endorse, the cynicism and
hypocrisy of the ruling classes of his age. Writes Gorer, “[Sade] exposes a system of
corruption and intrigue together with a hard-heartedness and sanctimonious cynicism
which might have served as a model to Hitler’s Germany... he cuts himself entirely
from the revolutionary thinkers of his time to join those of the mid- nineteenth
century. For this reason he can with some justice be called the first reasoned socialist”
(LI: 102; 142). Gorer’s assessment of Sade’s morality is based on a single text, the
novel Aline et Valcour (1795), which he takes to be a reliable representation of Sade’s

1
Geoffrey Gorer The Life and Ideas of the Marquis de Sade (London: Panther, 1963).

17
actual beliefs. The novel features a tangential incident set in a socialist utopia, the
Kingdom of Tamoé. Tamoé is located off the coast of New Zealand, and is ruled by
Zamé, an absolute monarch. Zamé spends some time lecturing a visiting European on
the social ills of Europe, and explains the principles by which his kingdom is
governed. The narrative, as Gorer has it, serves as a soap-box from which Sade
lambastes man’s inhumanity to man, in particular the ills of colonialism, war, the
prison system, prostitution, private property, torture, and racist exploitation. The
institution of the nuclear family is criticized, as it promotes inequality. Gorer’s Sade
also makes sound suggestions on education, agriculture (described as the source of all
true wealth), and optimal population growth, and how to attain it. Sade also proposes
a European Union, in order to bring about an everlasting peace (LI: 105-114).
Gorer also has high praise for Sade’s insights into psychology, in particular his
psychology of sex and pleasure. As such, he takes Sade for a precursor of Kinsey and
Freud (LI: 146-147). His Sade is also an aesthete and epicurean, an advocate of the
personal cultivation of new routes to sensory stimuli. Writes Gorer: “The study and
development of the arts has no other aim than to enable us to perceive beauty and
harmony in shapes, sounds and colours that were before either meaningless or
repulsive.” What one individual or cultural group may find delicious another will find
revolting. Over time and through practice, individuals may be able to override what
they considered to be ‘objectively based’ notions of revulsions, as one learns to
embrace the exotic tastes of another culture (150).2
Gorer goes on to systematize Sade’s psychology of sex. Sade, according to Gorer,
describes people into three categories- the ‘weak’ or ‘repressed,’ the ‘natural
perverts,’ and the ‘libertines.’ The ‘weak’ lack the imagination or psychological
strength to go beyond normal sexuality, and erroneously associate their own lack of
sexual vigour or imagination for ‘virtue.’ Unlike the ‘natural perverts,’ the ‘libertines’
“consciously imitate the obsessions of the second class to enlarge their experience. It
is almost exclusively with these two categories that de Sade deals, though the first
class furnishes the vile bodies with which the experiments are made” (LI: 147).
Gorer’s interpretation of Sade as social critic, utopian political theorist and sexual
liberator leads to irreconcilable contradictions, however. He insists that Sade’s scenes

2
Sade uses the same analogy between exotic sexual practices and ‘gamey’- tasting food in La Nouvelle
Justine (LNJ 2: 83).

18
of torture and degradation are to be understood as a critique of social reality (LI:
79,157), and that he proposes a plausible portrayal of the psychological desire. As for
sadism itself, Gorer denies that this was Sade’s intention at all, stating that “The
people who imagine that de Sade intended Justine and Juliette to be incitements to
cruelty show extraordinarily little insight, unless they indeed are speaking from
personal experience, and find even the coldest and most objective descriptions
exciting” (LI:158). Yet it seems unlikely that Gorer actually believed this, given the
frequent lapses in his description of Sade as being a benevolent humanist. Gorer
himself observes that Sade shared certain personality characteristics with ‘lust-
murderers’ (LI: 182). Further, of Sade’s novels Justine (1791) and Juliette (1797),
Gorer notes that Juliette is written in the first person, whereas Justine is not: “[h]e will
not put himself in the position of the Sadist’s victim and complement; over five long
volumes he will imagine himself the cruel and masterful woman who does not leave
alive a single man whom she had really prolonged contact” (LI: 176). Gorer’s
biographical gloss on Sade is tellingly biased- of the notorious ‘Rose Keller’ case
(Sade was charged with torturing and threatening to kill a young woman), Gore writes
merely that she was “treated in a way she did not like” (LI: p.27).
Sade, clearly, does not merely broaden the horizons of sexual experience. He
apparently suggests that we stab people to death as we rape them (J: 338, 367, 517-
520, 670). Gorer’s discussion of sadistic pleasure (‘algolagnia’) in any case, gives the
lie to such convolutedly moralizing pronouncements. In the passage cited above and
elsewhere, Gorer implicitly accepts the elitism of the Sadeian ‘libertines’ who regard
their victims as ‘weak’ and lacking ‘courage’ (Gorer’s summary of Sade’s psychology
of pleasure is fairly accurate, but scarcely coheres with his own reading of Sade as
being a humanist). He then slips into ‘Sadese,’ describing the ‘victims’ as providing
the ‘vile bodies’ for ‘experimentation.’ (One could add here that Gorer’s distinction
between ‘natural’ perverts and ‘libertines’ does not fully cohere with Sade’s writings,
but this is a minor point).

19
1.2 Juliette de Lorsange, CEO: Angela Carter on Sade

He wore a black cloak with many layers of capes in the shoulders and a top-hat from
which trailers of black crepe depended at the back. He was ready for any funeral and he
carried a cane tipped with a silver ball that looked as if it could kill…
‘You must know that I am a connoisseur of catastrophe, young man. I witnessed the
eruption of Vesuvius when thousands were coffined alive in molten lava. I saw eyes burst
and fat run out of roast crackling in Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Dresden. I dabbled my
fingers in the blood beneath the guillotine during the Terror. I am a demon for a
cataclysm.’

Angela Carter The Infernal Desire Machines of Dr. Hoffman (1972). 3

Angela Carter (1940-1992), a British novelist, occupied a central position in

discussions on feminism and postmodernism during the 1980’s. Her novels are
concerned with the Gothic, the fairy-story and with sexuality, in particular the fluidity
of gender roles. The Infernal Desire Machines of Dr. Hoffmann (hereafter DM, 1973),
the tale, in part, of a diabolical doctor who wishes to destroy the structures of reason,
is clearly inspired by Sade. Two especially Sadeian characters in this novel are the
Count and the Cannibal King. The Count is an amalgam of various Sadeian
characters, including Sade himself, and the Cannibal King is based on Ben Mâacoro,
King of Batua, the cannibal kingdom in Sade’s Aline et Valcour ( the latter being a
glaring omission from Geoffrey Gorer’s treatment of this text). In Carter’s novel, the
two spiritual brothers meet, and the cannibal king decides to eat the Count. In
authentic Sadeian style, the cannibal king explains: “[i]t seemed I might be able to
crown my own atrocities by making my brother in atrocity my victim. That I might, as
it were, immolate myself, to see how I should bear it” (DM: 162). The Sadeian
Woman and the Ideology of Pornography (hereafter SW, 1978; later published as The
Sadeian Woman: an Exercise in Cultural History in 1979) explores a reading of Sade
that is both intelligent and positive, albeit guardedly so. 4 Carter takes Sade to be a

3
Angela Carter The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman (London: Penguin, 1972) pp.122 -
123.
4
Angela Carter The Sadeian Woman and the Ideology of Pornography (New York: Harper Colophon
Books, 1978). I thank Dennis Robinson for bringing this book to my attention.

20
(perhaps unwitting) pioneer of the feminist movement, and characterizes Sade’s
Juliette as a feminist Übermensch. Besides Apollinaire, Carter was the first critic to
reveal an aspect of Sade that had been overlooked by commentators that seems
obviously positive- the endorsement of freedom for women. (It is an interesting
question as to why not even Simone de Beauvoir had noted this earlier. What is even
stranger is that the first English edition of Sade’s major works, published in 1965 by
Grove Press of New York, did not include prefaces that used this aspect of Sade’s
work in order to suit the mood of the time. Instead, the translated essays by Maurice
Blanchot, Simone de Beauvoir and Jean Paulhan included in these editions focus on
the more sinister, almost demonic aspect of Sade’s works). Carter’s intention, as she
explains it, is not a critical study or a historical analysis, but a “ late- twentieth-
century interpretation of some of the problems he raises about the culturally
determined nature of women and of the relations between men and women that result
from it” (SW: 1). Sade is typically understood to have written the most appalling
pornography –even the most explicit pornography permitted in liberal societies is mild
fare compared to Sade’s endless rapes, tortures and executions of women. But Carter
notes that there is more to Sade than this, noting in particular that Sade chose the
character of Juliette, a woman, as the mouthpiece of his own philosophy. Sade installs
women as beings of power in his fictional world, which, she claims, sets him apart
from all other pornographers and most of the writers of his period. 5 Society is
structured in such a way that there will always be the have’s and the have-nots, and
Juliette, as Carter reads her, proves that women can just as successfully become a
‘have’ as a man (SW: 77). Juliette’s savvy is contrasted with Justine, who Carter
reads as a “selfless heroine of Rousseau in the egocentric and cruel world of Hobbes”
(SW: 47); “Justine is a pilgrimage of the soul in search of God written by an atheist;
Juliette is a version of Faust written by a man who believed that if man exists, we do
not need to invent the devil” (SW: 103). 6

5
This is not strictly accurate. Catherine Cusset notes that the 18th Century Libertine novel was
frequently allegorized by a female character and her adventures. Catherine Cusset No Tomorrow: The
Ethics of Pleasure in the French Enlightenment (Charlottesville & London: University Press of
Virginia, 1999) p.12.
6
Sade himself refers to Hobbes, and there are certainly similarities, but Sade does not appear to have
read Hobbes in the original. Han and Valla have noted the similarity, describing Sade’s vision as that
of Hobbes without a contract. See Han and Valla “A propos” p.117. Sade writes, in La Nouvelle

21
 In the two texts that Carter concentrates on, Juliette and Philosophy in the
Bedroom (1795), Sade’s characters endlessly argue for sexual freedom for women.
Not only is no sexual possibility not considered and analyzed in detail; Sade, writes
Carter, argues for the woman’s being free to enjoy herself in whatever way she
pleases. Anything that may impede her sexually, Sade often attacks for this reason
alone. The institution of marriage is questioned, as is any notion of biological destiny.
Sade, writes Carter, is also ahead of Freud and European men in general in another
respect- he knows exactly what the clitoris does, and where it is. 7

Whatever else he says or does not say, Sade declares himself unequivocally for the right
of women to fuck- as if the period in which women fuck aggressively, tyrannously and
cruelly will be a necessary stage in the development of a general human consciousness of
the nature of fucking ; that if it is not egalitarian, it is unjust. Sade does not suggest this
process as such; but he urges women to fuck as actively as they are able, so that powered
by their enormous and hitherto untapped sexual energy they will then be able to fuck their
way into history and, in doing so, change it (SW: 27).

Carter also points out that for Sade, sex and politics are aspects of the same
‘economy’- he offers an absolutely sexualized world where sexuality underlies
everything. Sex is not a moral issue but a political reality. People, on this view, get
into politics for the sex, or the pleasure of power; sexual freedom implies political
power over one’s own destiny. According to Carter’s reading, Juliette is Sade’s
‘master morality’ personified: “[i]f Justine is a pawn because she is a woman, Juliette
transforms herself from pawn to queen in a single move and henceforth goes wherever
she pleases on the chess board” (SW: 79). Her life is an arithmetical progression from
one atrocity to the next. Of Juliette’s monstrous penchant for mass destruction, Carter
observes that “a free woman in an unfree society will be a monster” (SW: 27) and
asks, “if we admire the campaigns of a great general, is it hypocrisy to refuse to

Justine, “[l]a justice ou l’injustice d’une action, dit Hobbes, dépend du jugement seul de celui qui l’a
faite...ce qui le tirera hors de blâme et justifiera son procédé... ” (LNJ 2:112).
7
The clitoris was already known in Sade’s time (by European men). Renaldus Columbus claimed to
have ‘discovered’ the clitoris in 1559. Writes Thomas Laqueur, “[h]e tells his “most gentle reader” that
this is “pre-eminently the seat of women’s delight.” Columbus De re anatomica (Venice, 1559)
pp.447-448. Quoted in Thomas Laqueur Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 1990) p.64, n.7.

22
admire Juliette’s?” (SW: 80). Juliette represents for Carter, in a necessarily
exaggerated fashion, the modern woman.

Juliette stands for the good old virtues of self-reliance and self-help; ‘looking after
Number One’, as we say in Britain. She is an advertisement of the advantages of free
enterprise and her successes in business- her gambling houses, brothels and dispensaries
thrive, her investments always yield fruitful returns- are so many examples of the benefits
of the free market economy. And not only does she illustrate the advantages of self- help
but also of mutual aid…[w]here would Juliette be without the friends who advise her
investments, protect her from the law and warn her when the time comes...to cut her
losses and flee to the anonymous securities of her Swiss bank account? (SW: 101).

Carter reads Sade as recognizing the master type who will succeed in the
economic arrangements of modernity - “the fiscal morality of a market place red in
tooth and claw.” Sade is presenting a virtue ethics for capitalists, on this view, one in
which intellect, talents and insensitivity are supreme. “Juliette is rationality
personified and leaves no single cell of her brain unused. She will never obey the
fallacious promptings of her heart. Her mind functions like a computer programmed
to produce two results for herself- financial profit and libidinal gratification” (SW:
79).
Carter notes a number of slips in Sade’s thinking. Firstly, his moral discussions
run into contradiction- he dismisses the elements of morality as fictions, yet insists on
the pleasure to break rules. Secondly, his feminism (assuming Carter’s interpretation
is correct, that Sade is in fact a feminist to begin with) is incomplete, insofar as it
tends to fall back on a male model of sexuality. Sade ‘dithers,’ as Carter puts it, on
crucial points of sexuality and sexual roles, undermining any simple positive reading
of Sade as a friend of the feminist movement. Women become men through strapping
on dildoes, or by having huge clitorises; the phallus retains its centrality. The
character Clairwil, in Juliette, is so obsessed with the ‘prick’ that she is convinced that
a dissection will reveal one lodged in her brain. Says Carter, “this is one of the
contradictions of Sade’s female libertines that they ingest, but do not integrate within
themselves the signs of maleness” (SW: 90).
Ultimately, Carter’s reading of Sade is not straightforwardly positive. As she says
of Juliette’s throwing her own daughter into a fire- for fun (J:1186-1187), Juliette is
“absolutely free from any of the lingering traces of the human responses that can only

23
be learned through the society of others who are not accomplices, who are not aspects
of the self that confirm the omnipotence of the self” (SW: 99). This, for Carter,
suggests the natural egoism and narcissism of the child. Here, Carter agrees with
Adorno and Horkheimer’s treatment of the character Juliette; despite her iron self-
control and her triumph of the barriers of pain, shame, disgust and morality, she is,
fundamentally, an embodiment of “intellectual pleasure in regression” (SW: 148). As
for Sade’s obvious misogyny, Carter takes it as “a single strand in total revulsion
against a mankind of whom, unlike Swift, he cannot delude himself he is not a
member.” Somewhat inconsistently, Carter states that

Swift saw mankind rolling in a welter of shit, as Sade does, but Sade’s satire upon man is
far blacker and more infernal than Swift’s- for Sade, mankind doesn’t roll in shit because
mankind is disgusting, but because mankind has overweening aspirations to the
superhuman (SW: 34).

This does not quite reconcile with Carter’s reading of Sade as inculcating, in suitably
confident people, the wish to transcend their species through acts ‘beyond Good and
Evil.’ The ‘superhuman’ aspirations of Juliette themselves may appear infantile,
insofar as they stand as a childish rebellion against the demands of socialization.
Carter (as many others do) describes Sade as both the diagnostician and symptom.
This tension in Carter’s reading is not fully resolved or addressed.
Although Carter acknowledges Sade’s wish for a secular republic and other
social changes, at bottom, despite his talk of ‘overcoming’ and of libertinism, he is
above all a pessimist. Carter cites Sade’s description, for example, of humanity as a
“fallen race” (SW: 140). Likewise, in the short story Eugénie de Franval, a character
denies a daughter the right to bear children, arguing that the human race ought to die
out, stating that “[a] plant whose only product is poison cannot be rooted out too
quickly” (SW: 136-136). Sade, Carter notes, is too intelligent to be a Satanist–Satan is
a redundant concept in a world so manifestly evil.

When an atheist casts a cool eye on the World, flesh and the devil fuse; when an atheist
casts a cool eye on the world, he must always find Satan a more likely hypothesis as
ruling principle than a Saviour. Criminality may present itself as a kind of saintly self-
mastery, an absolute rejection of hypocrisy (SW: 33).

24
 Carter also reads Sade as a pessimist of the future. There is Durand, an alchemist
accomplice of Juliette’s, who uses the black art of poisoning and her knowledge of
biology to destroy. An early pioneer of weapons of mass destruction, she wipes out a
city’s population with bubonic plague (SW: 115). Durand, for Carter, represents the
return to pure mythology- the reduction of Enlightenment’s lofty hopes of harnessing
nature through technology to pure chaos. Carter’s Sade also sees in the future a new
age where the commercial class takes the reigns of power, and where knowledge of
the natural world brings neither peace nor harmony, but will certainly make a
minority very rich and powerful (SW: 113).

1.3: Sade and Nazism in Secondary Literature

Theodor Weisengrund Adorno (1903-1969) and Max Horkheimer (1895-
1973), and the later, post-war Albert Camus (1913-1960), are not so much concerned
with interpreting Sade as with understanding those political and cultural phenomena
that gave rise to Nazism. All three suggest that, in some sense, these cultural
associations link back to Sade. A very brief, and rarely discussed, expression of this
same association is given by Raymond Queneau (1903-1976). In his 1945 article
“Lectures pour un front.” This article is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, Queneau
links Sade with an exact contemporary- William Blake (1757-1827) - and notes a
close family resemblance between Sade’s work and the ‘transgression of the law’
implicit in Blake’s Marriage of Heaven and Hell. Secondly, unlike either Adorno,
Horkheimer or Camus, Queneau addresses the specific content of Nazi ideology, as
described by the dissident Hermann Rauschning (who held that nihilism was the ‘fin
et principe’ of Nazi ideology). 8 Thus, Sade, as the first articulator of a fully fledged
rejection of all values, is thought to have anticipated Nazism, taken to be the first
political and national manifestation of this upsurge of nihilism. Queneau’s brief word
on Sade presents, in compact form, the entire thesis of the ‘negative dialectical’
reading of Sade of Adorno and Horkheimer, yet with perhaps greater concern for the
specifics of Nazi thinking. Finally, Queneau goes on to note the irrelevance to this

8
Before fleeing to the United States, Hermann Rauschning was a Nazi party member and mayor of
Danzig. During the Second World War he wrote several books on what he felt to be the nihilism at the
centre of Nazi ideology. Having exaggerated the amount of contact he actually had with Hitler, his
worth as a historical source is in dispute. See Hermann Rauschning The Revolution of Nihilism:
Warning to the West trans. E.W. Dickes (New York: Alliance Book Corporation, 1939).

25
understanding of Sade as to whether or not Sade himself was a ‘terrorist.’ In
Queneau’s view, Sade’s ideas cannot be separated from the reality of the Nazi death
camps. Further, he questions the divide made between the morality of his characters
and of Sade himself.

…il est incontestable que le monde imaginé par Sade et voulu par ses personnages (et
pourquoi pas par lui ?) est une préfiguration hallucinante du monde où règnent la
Gestapo, ses supplices et ses camps. Or Sade fait partie intégrante de l’idéologie
surréaliste, par exemple ; et Breton, dès 1939, montrait quelque embarras dans l’exégèse
de cet auteur. Que Sade n’ait pas été personnellement un terroriste (et Desbordes a très
bien expliqué pourquoi), 9 que son œuvre ait une valeur humaine profonde (ce que
personne ne peut contester), n’empêcheront pas tous ceux qui ont donné une adhésion
plus ou moins grande aux thèses du marquis de devoir envisager, sans hypocrisie, la
réalité des camps d’extermination avec leurs horreurs non plus enfermées dans la tête
d’un homme, mais pratiquées par des milliers de fanatiques. Les charniers complètent les
10
philosophies, si désagréable que cela puisse être.

Significantly, Queneau here makes clear his acknowledgement of the ‘profound

human value’ of Sade’s work (as I will suggest later in the study, to associate Sade’s
thought with that of the Nazis and other such movements is to emphasise, rather than
deny, his significance as a thinker and ‘voyant’). The last line of the passage cited
above –“ philosophies end with charnel houses”– introduces a new understanding of
Sade as central to the understanding of Modernity (Nazism, of course, in particular),
the history of ideas, and the destructive implications of ideas themselves. The
association of Sade and Philosophy through Nazism remains controversial. (This topic
will be returned to in Chapter VII).
Adorno and Horkheimer make a contentious association between the ethical
thought of Kant and that of Sade, but their discussion has the merit of focusing on
some key philosophical claims that at least can be approached in a clear way. Lester
G. Crocker’s work adds depth to the association made by Adorno and Horkheimer
between Sade, the Enlightenment and the rise of Nazism. Camus’ interpretation, on

9
This refers to a biography by Jean Desbordes, Le vrai visage du Marquis de Sade (Paris: Éditions de
la Nouvelle revue Critique, 1939).
10
Raymond Queneau “Lectures pour un front,” in Bâtons, chiffres et lettres (Paris : Gallimard,
1965) :215-216. Quoted in Françoise Laugaa-Traut p.279.

26
the other hand, can only be understood from the perspective of his own thoughts on
the human condition.

1.4 Sade and Absolute Revolt

Albert Camus saw the commonality between Fascism and Sade in terms of what he
calls ‘absolute revolt.’ Camus perceives, in both Fascism and Sade, a response to the
meaninglessness of the universe, on the one hand, and on the other, a revolt against
the ‘universal death sentence’ at the core of the human condition. In both, for Camus,
pursuit of violence and power are the response to existential crisis, in particular the
realization of the meaninglessness of the cosmos. Camus also describes both Sade and
Nazism as manifestations of cynicism and despair; cynicism in the moral and political
spheres, and despair at the human condition and the collapse of traditional systems of
belief. Insofar as Camus largely agrees with the presupposition of cosmic
meaninglessness, his relationship with Sade is highly ambiguous, and went through a
major shift at the end of World War II. 11 His earliest references to Sade are in fact
very positive. His Myth of Sisyphus (Le Mythe de Sisyphe, 1942) at times reads like a
Sadeian tract. 12 He writes, for example, of the “freedom of not being responsible” (
MS : 58); and of the doctrine of the “absurd,” according to which “A man’s rule of
conduct and his scale of values have no meaning except through the quantity and
variety of experiences he has been in a position to accumulate” (ibid:59). As for
ethics, he writes that one can be moral “on a whim” (65). Further, Camus refers to
Sade in this text as one of the great philosophical novelists (92). There are other
Sadeian resonances in Camus’ works. The play Caligula (1941) considers the idea
that absolute despotism is as appropriate as any other response to the Absurd. The
short story The Renegade (1957), about a missionary who is ‘converted’ to nihilism,
rapes an African girl and has his tongue ripped out, is strongly reminiscent of Sade, as
is the conclusion of The Outsider (L’Etranger, 1942) (The convict’s dialogue with the
priest is very similar to Sade’s Dialogue between a Priest and a Dying Man, in turn

11
For discussion, see Jean Gassin “Le sadisme dans l’œuvre de Camus” in La Revue des Lettres
Modernes 360-365 (1973):121-144; Raymond Gay-Crosier “Camus et Sade: Une relation ambiguë,”
Zeitshrift für Französische Sprache und Literatur 98 (1988): 166-173.
12
Albert Camus The Myth of Sisyphus trans. Justin O’Brien (London: Penguin, 2000).

27
derived from Diderot’s Supplément au Voyage de Bougainville). 13 Finally, Camus’
The Fall associates sexuality with the will to destruction, one of Sade’s principal
themes: “I told myself that the ideal solution would have been the death of the person
I was interested in…But one cannot long for the death of everyone or, to go to
extremes, depopulate the planet in order to enjoy a freedom that is unthinkable
otherwise” (F: 50). It is in The Rebel (L’Homme révolté, 1951) in which Camus
associates Sade with modern atrocity, rather than as liberator.

The only logic known to Sade was the logic of his feelings. He did not create a
philosophy, but pursued a monstrous dream of revenge. Only the dream turned out to be
prophetic. His desperate demand for freedom led Sade into the kingdom of servitude; his
inordinate thirst for a form of life he could never attain was assuaged in the successive
frenzies of a dream of universal destruction. In this way, at least, Sade is our
contemporary.
...Two centuries ahead of his time and on a reduced scale, Sade extolled totalitarian
societies in the name of unbridled freedom- which, in reality, rebellion does not demand.
The history and the tragedy of our times really begin with him (R: 36-37, 47). 14

Camus goes on to describe Sade as the prophet of “barbed wire and observation
towers” (R: 42). His association of Nazism and Sade is not fully developed; Camus
reads his own existential assumptions into Sade and Nazism, and does not dwell on
the actual ideological content of either, besides making the observation that, like
Camus himself, both are opposed to traditional religious belief.

1.5 Negative Dialectics: Adorno and Horkheimer

Adorno and Horkheimer’s 1944 text Dialectic of Enlightenment (Dialektik der
Aufklärung) (hereafter DE) is the first text that contains a sustained philosophical
meditation on Sade as a theorist in his own right. 15 The choice of Sade as material

13
Albert Camus “The Renegade” in Exile and The Kingdom trans. Justin O’Brien (New York: Vintage,
1986):34-61; Albert Camus L’Etranger (Paris: Gallimard, 1942); Albert Camus Caligula (Paris:
Gallimard, 1993).
14
Albert Camus The Rebel trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage Books, 1984).
15
Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer Dialectic of Enlightenment trans. John Cumming (London:
Verso, 1997).

28
appears to be unorthodox in the context of a Marxist critique of Fascism, but the
choice does not appear to be ironic. 16
The very idea of taking Sade seriously as a thinker is a testimony to a far-
reaching pessimism with regards to philosophy itself; to reinstate Sade’s status as a
‘philosopher,’ is to reject entirely the comforting association between morality and
thought. It is to incriminate thought. This reinstatement validates (at least the first half
of) an aphorism of Adorno’s, that “the basest person is capable of perceiving the
weakness of the greatest, the most stupid, the errors in the thought of the most
intelligent.” 17 Dialectic of Enlightenment is presented as a ‘diagnosis of the ills of
modernity,’ and Sade is treated as a symptom of what they term a ‘negative Hegelian
progression.’ Horkheimer himself said that the text also represented a move from
Marx to Schopenhauer. This observation matches the pessimism of the text, and the
inclusion of Sade as a guide to the Weltanschauung.
No reader finds the argumentation in this work easy to follow. What is clear is
that Kant, Nietzsche and Sade are the three figures, according to Adorno and
Horkheimer, who “elicited the implications of the Enlightenment” (DE: xvi). The sign
of the Enlightenment, for Adorno and Horkheimer, is the ascendancy of the
‘autocratic subject.’ Sade’s antiheroes are the apotheosis of this new type of being.
They are liberated from God, the Church, government, and ethical concern for the
Other. This ascendancy leads to what Adorno and Horkheimer calls “the mastery of
the blindly objective.” Both Sade and Nietzsche- “black authors of the bourgeoisie,”
recognize the Enlightenment’s trend towards overturning all forms of control (DE:
44). In particular, the authors note in Sade and Nietzsche an advocacy of power as its
own justification, and similar accounts of the alleged origins of the ‘slave morality’ of
the Judaeo-Christian tradition (Sade’s ‘genealogy of Morals’ will be discussed in
Chapter VI). It is also pointed out that Sade’s views on sex are not entirely different
from those of Nietzsche, who writes of sexual love as “in means, war; and, basically,
the deadly hatred of the sexes” (DE: 10). Where Nietzsche draws away from Sade,

16
Adorno observes in his Minima Moralia that “[t]heory must needs deal with cross-grained, opaque,
unassimilated material, which as such admittedly has from the start an anachronistic quality, but is not
wholly obsolete since it has outwitted the historical dynamic. ” Theodor Adorno Minima Moralia
trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 1974) p.151.
17
Adorno Minima Moralia p.50.

29
according to Adorno and Horkheimer, is in his insistence and prejudice in favour of
the grand world- historical crime over the minor theft. 18
In the second chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment, “Juliette or Enlightenment
and Morality,” Adorno and Horkheimer begin with a discussion of Kant and how his
notion of logic prefigures the modern world’s equation of ‘logic’ with
systematization. Although Kant recognized the need for mutual love and respect
within the political, the Enlightenment, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, did not.
Once this rigorous systematization was brought into the political sphere, they argue,
fascism was the result. As Horkheimer writes in the Eclipse of Reason, “the statement
that dictatorship is bad is rationally valid only for those who are not its beneficiaries,
and there is no theoretical obstacle to the transformation of this statement into its
opposite.” 19 Sade portrays “understanding without the guidance of another person”
(DE: 86). Whereas for Kant this meant freedom from superstition, for Sade, the
authors contend, it means the surrender to the domination of brute force. As such,
Sade stands as an ‘early monument’ to the sense of planning of the totalitarian leaders
of the day. Further, Sade is a prophet of our own age, as he has conceived of a world
in which there is an “organization of life which is deprived of any substantial goal.”
Organized sport is seen as particularly Sadeian. Just as Sade’s orgies make use of
every moment, every orifice, and every bystander in intense and purposeful, but
ultimately pointless activity, modern sports are intensive, goal-oriented activities
which, despite variations, combinations and exhaustion, are pointless. 20 The schema
of the activity becomes more important than the content. Enlightenment reason
reveals itself as incapable of providing substantial goals, and human feelings are only
included in the political or economic order of things if they can be sold, in a synthetic
form (DE: 91).
Sade, together with Nietzsche, “constitutes the intransigent critique of practical
reason, in contradistinction to which Kant’s critique itself seems a revocation of his
own thought.” Sade himself makes the “scientistic the destructive principle” (DE: 94).

18
As will be discussed in later chapters, Sade’s characters are in fact preoccupied with crimes on a
world- historical scale.
19
Max Horkheimer Eclipse of Reason (New York: Continuum, 1974) p.29.
20
This negative description of sport may owe something to Schopenhauer’s scathing remarks on
parlour games as a means of evading boredom, which, in turn, repeats Kant’s assertion in the
Anthropology.

30
Sade does not recognize, as does Kant, any ‘moral law within,’ but instead identifies it
as a myth, along with the myth of civilization. Sade’s character Juliette – a “rake
without illusions”- (DE: 109) lives by this insight, and revels in attacking
Enlightenment civilization with its own clearly corruptible instruments. In the
following passage, Juliette is described as the Anti-Kant.

In regard to self-control, {Juliette’s} directions are at times related to Kant’s as the special
application as to its basic proposition : “therefore virtue, to the extent that it is founded
upon inner freedom, also contains an affirmative commandment for men, which is to
bring all of their abilities and inclinations under its control [i.e., of reason], and therefore
under self-control, which prevails over the negative commandment not to be ruled by
one’s emotions and inclinations [the duty of apathy]; because, unless reason takes the
reins of government into its hand , emotions and inclinations will be in control.” 21
Juliette preaches on the self-discipline of the criminal : “Work out your plan a few days
beforehand ; consider all its consequences ; be attentive to what might assist you… what
might betray you, and weigh up all these things with the same callousness you would
apply if you were certain to be discovered”[ J:640-641] (DE:95). (Square brackets are
Adorno and Horkheimer’s).

Both Kant and Sade advocate apathy, but for wholly different reasons. They are
identified as signs of the same crisis, nevertheless. Adorno and Horkheimer appear to
regard this onslaught on compassion by philosophy as the central problem of
modernity. In Sade, the removal of compassion from the outlook of the characters
leads to (what Adorno refers to as) the “barbaric success-religion of today,” and a
fragmentation of society through the abandonment of all linkages between
individuals. Here, Adorno links the rejection of ‘compassion’ with a return to pre-
Christian morality: “The barbaric success-religion of today is consequently not simply
contrary to morality: it is the homecoming of the West to the venerable morals of our
[non-Christian?] ancestors” 22 (Sade’s advocacy of a return to the morality of the Pre-
Christian peoples is discussed in Chapter VI). Love, companionship, marriage, and
familial ties are all dismissed as ‘untruths,’ as they cannot be ‘verified.’ We are all
alone– as is often said of the modern age– when everyone is expendable. Sade is not

21
Metaphysische Anfänge der Tugendlehre, ed.cit.,Vol. VI, p.408 (Adorno and Horkheimer’s
footnote).
22
Adorno Minima Moralia p.187.

31
the first to have made such scandalous suggestions, however- Adorno and
Horkheimer point out that even Democritus had denounced parental love as
economically motivated (DE: 116). But Sade pushes further, towards the destruction
of civilization, or at least the transformation of its institutions into the tools of a
privileged elite.
The authors finish the chapter in stating that Sade stands as a writer who told us
the truth- that the world is cruel, and that a fortunate life in a world of cruelty is a
“vicious contradiction ... in the light of the mere existence of that world” (DE:
118).The memories of the war are fresh in the minds of the authors- both Jewish
Germans, whose text frequently refers to the Nazi experience, beatings, deportations
and pogroms. For them, Sade represents all that the Enlightenment spawned and
failed to control. Only a thinker as awful as Sade, they insist, could shed light on the
abominations of the present. As for those naïves that point out the ‘obviously’
fictional nature of the Sadeian universe, Adorno and Horkheimer reply- “only
exaggeration is true” (118). Other thinkers are dismissed as giving assurances seeking
only to console - as was Sade’s own view.
Adorno and Horkheimer differ from other critics of Sade in that they emphasize
the logical, methodical nature of Sade’s works, as opposed to the more figurative and
symbolic treatments. Adorno and Horkheimer’s understanding of Nazism as primarily
a movement grounded on ‘ruthless efficiency’ is problematic, as is their association of
Nazism with the ‘bourgeoisie’ (and the ‘bourgeoisie’ with Nazism). 23 (In particular,
Nazi doctrine prioritized the destruction of the Jews ahead of heavy industry’s
demand for slave labour; wholesale destruction on racial- ideological grounds, rather
than ruthless efficiency, appears to have been the dominant trend). 24 Further, Adorno
and Horkheimer do not treat the specific doctrines of Nazism, instead focusing on
their prior theoretical interpretation. I will return to this issue in Chapter VI.

23
For discussion of this criticism, see Richard Rorty “The Overphilosophication of Politics,”
Constellations 7 (March 2001):128-32, p.130. I thank Sterling Lynch for bringing this article to my
attention.
24
For discussion see Ian Kershaw Hitler 1936-1945 Nemesis (London: Penguin, 2001) p.492; also
Daniel Jonah Goldhagen Hitler’s Willing Executioners (London: Abacus, 1996) p.296; Robert S.
Wistrich Hitler and the Holocaust (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2001) p.2.

32
1.6: The Worm at the Core: Crocker on Sade

De nombreux lecteurs ont tendance à rejeter les écrits de Sade. Peu agréables à lire, ils
sont souvent ennuyeux et frisent même le ridicule. Ils sont insignifiants tant du point de
vue littéraire que pornographique, en dépit de leur influence sur l’a-littérature. Pour ce qui
est du style, il est médiocre et plat. Cependant, après avoir surmonté ces obstacles
considérables, on découvre en Sade un véritable penseur. Sans être un esprit profond, ce
penseur n’en présente pas moins une perspicacité terrifiante, et la ligne de pensée qu’il a
révélée est aussi importante que provocante.
Lester G. Crocker Au cœur de la pensée de Sade

Lester G. Crocker’s two exhaustive studies of the thought of the French

Enlightenment, An Age of Crisis: Man and World in Eighteenth Century French
Thought (1959; hereafter AC) and Nature and Culture: Ethical thought in the French
Enlightenment (1963, hereafter NC) are two of the best treatments of Sade’s
placement in intellectual context; his essay “Au cœur de la pensée de Sade” is one of
the most concise and elegant treatments of the thought of Sade yet written. 25 Crocker,
acknowledging that Sade was not the most brilliant of thinkers, nevertheless presents
him as a major intellectual figure, and grants him a central place in the history of 18th
Century French thought. Rather than standing radically outside the optimism of 18th
century thought, Crocker holds that Sade is continuous with a profound pessimism.
Notes Françoise Laugaa-Traut, “[l]a réinsertion du texte sadien dans un contexte
philosophique et littéraire fait apparaître l’importance de Sade comme penseur et
comme écrivain et contribue à modifier la représentation d’un siècle des Lumières
rationaliste et optimiste. ” 26 The pessimism of the age extended to man in general,
described, for the most part, as brutal, superficial, credulous, and incapable of either
reason or loving virtue and the social good for their own sake, and to reason itself.
Reason, it was feared, was incapable of unifying morality and truth. The very

25
Lester G. Crocker An Age of Crisis: Man and World in Eighteenth Century French Thought
(Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins Press) 1959.
————— Nature and Culture: Ethical Thought in the French Enlightenment (Baltimore: the
Johns Hopkins Press, 1963
————— “Au Cœur de la pensée de Sade,” Thèmes et figures du Siècle des lumières. Mélanges
offerts a Roland Mortier. ed. Raymond Trousson (Genève : Droz, 1980) : 59-71, p.59.
26
Laugaa-Traut p.290.

33
architects of political philosophy, such as Rousseau, were deeply uncertain about the
applicability of democracy, and feared that all political organization would degenerate
into despotism, remarking that full democracy was “for gods, not men.” 27 Crocker
writes of Rousseau, Diderot, Laclos and Sade, that “Their pessimism stems partly
from their answer to this question: To what does the world give its approbation,
esteem and admiration? To follies, or to sheer success and power, was the reply.” 28
For Bayle, human life was fundamentally corrupt and reason the slave of the passions,
and that, were humanity a product of Nature, it is apparently a product of a natural
order in a state of sickness. 29 Voltaire’s views were scarcely less pessimistic, once
describing the world as “a little ball of mud upon which insects eat each other.” 30
Sade’s comments on the horrors of the world are to be read in this context. 31
Utilitarianism is another cause of the ‘nihilist dissolution,’ insofar as it proposed,
with the new emphasis on the individual, to induce “a revolt of the ego against the
frustration of its demands, against sacrifice for others, and simultaneously a revolt
against rationalistic ethics in favor of the instincts and the effective elements of the
personality” (NC: 334). Among Sade’s chief influences, Crocker notes that the
elements of Sade’s materialism, and its philosophical implications, can be traced to
Count Buffon (1702-1788), Marie-Jean –Antoine Nicolas Caritat, Marquis de
Condorcet (1745-1784), Denis Diderot (1713-1784), Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron
d’Holbach (1723-1789), Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709-1751) and Lucretius (c.

27
Rousseau The Social Contract trans. Maurice Cranston. (London: Penguin Books, 1968) pp. 30-32,
125; also pp. 131, 134-135, 323. Rousseau A Discourse on Inequality trans. Maurice Cranston
(London: Penguin 1984) pp.133-134.
28
Crocker an Age of Crisis p.323.
29
Lester G. Crocker an Age of Crisis pp.25, 221; Pierre Bayle Historical and Critical Dictionary
(1697) (selections) translated with introduction and notes, by Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis, New
York, Kansas City: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1965) pp.290-291.
30
Voltaire, Zadig (Paris: Larousse, 1993) p.91; also Voltaire Candide and Other Tales introduction by
H.N. Brailsford; trans. Tobias Smollett (London: J.M.Dent & Sons, 1937) pp.74, 99, 249, 329.
31
In Reflections on the Novel, for example, Sade writes that “[t]here was not a man alive who had not
experienced in the short span of four or five years more misfortunes than the most celebrated novelist
could portray in a century. Thus, to compose works of interest, one had to call upon the aid of hell
itself, and to find in the world of make-believe things werewhith one was fully familiar merely by
delving into daily life in this age of iron” (120:109). Similar: J: 557, 1160; 120:778, 784; J: CL:73;
GT:25. Sade refers to Voltaire’s Zadig on the first page of both versions of Justine.

34
99-c.55 B.C.E). Sade’s sensationalism is drawn from the writings of Nicolas Fréret
(1688-1794) (ΠVol.III:1393, fn.1-4). 32 None of these thinkers were overtly
nihilistic, yet, according to Crocker, the implications of their thought lead directly to
Sade’s “dark pool”: “[n]ihilism (not only as a philosophy, but as a psychology) is the
worm at the core of our culture. It is the flaw we must constantly overcome. Sade was
the first to bring the full truth of this danger into the general consciousness of the
Western World” (NC: 398-400).
Crocker gives a brief summary of Sade’s system. The obvious internal flaws of
Sade’s system are noted; Sade simply denies our natural tendency towards
cooperation and kindness towards one another; that is, most of what we mean when
we speak of ‘humanism.’ Sade, writes Crocker, “ denies that pity, sympathy, justice,
the surpassing of self, and the demand for limit are natural, whereas in fact they
constitute a large part of the initial adjective in the phrase, “human nature” (NC: 428-
429). Sade also contradicts himself when he speaks of the illusory basis of all values,
and yet speaks of pleasure as a valuable thing in itself (NC: 425). Sade’s ‘project’ also
fails as it leads directly to exhaustion. The pursuit of higher levels of sensation and
pleasure, Crocker holds, can only lead to ennui (NC: 427). But Crocker feels that
these are minor shortcomings compared to the enormity of what he achieved, and the
difficulty of coming to terms with his revelation.
Nazism and Sade’s immorality are drawn together in Crocker’s history of ideas
(NC: 58). The ‘taste for the superhuman,’ in Camus’ words, is in fact the denial of our
instinct for collective harmony (to go beyond other humans) enhanced by cultural
development. For Crocker, it emerges as a known possibility in Sade’s time and texts
and is fully expressed by the Holocaust and similar atrocities.

Accompanying these developments [denial in philosophy of validity of norms

available to reason] was the desire for a total integration of man in nature, with refusal of
any transcendence, even though it was admitted that his more complex physical
organization gave him certain special abilities and ways of living. The important thing, as
La Mettrie, d’Holbach, and others made clear, is that he is submitted to the same laws;
everything is response to need – mechanically, some added, like a tree or a machine. Man

32
For discussion of Sade’s materialism, see in particular Jean Leduc “Les Sources de l’athéisme et de
l’immoralisme du marquis de Sade,” Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 68 (Genève:
Institut et Musée Voltaire, 1969):7-66; Warman Sade: from Materialism to Pornography; Jean-Pierre
Han, Jean-Pierre Valla “A propos” pp.110, 111.

35
 merely carries out natural forces- without any freedom whatsoever- in all he does,
whether he loves or hates, helps or hurts, gives life or takes it….[a]n unbroken line of
thought leads from such eighteenth-century views to Hitler’s Mein Kampf and the Nazi
infamies ...
Nihilism is the rejection of the prevailing organization of instincts which is imposed
by any culture, and ipso facto of all moral restrictions to the id (a revolt against repression
of the instincts). Totalitarianism is a defense of culture based on the acceptance of the
truth of nihilism; it pretends to nothing more than a tyrannical and arbitrary imposition of
a superego and contemplates the remaking of the individual, through the pressures of total
conditioning, so that the id is inhibited and the ego enslaved. If the effort toward
humanistic self-control and voluntary co-operation does not succeed, culture is left with
no other way to defend itself (NC: 333-334, 395).

Besides theoretical similarities, Crocker also notes a similarity in the psychology

of Sade’s characters and the motives of the individuals responsible for the Nazi
atrocities. He draws together the acts of Nazi torturers and those depicted in Sade’s
novels, noting that they both progress from indifference to other people and acts, and
finally act purely for the enjoyment of sensation. In particular, Crocker cites Adolf
Eichmann’s comments whilst on trial in Jerusalem. Before his execution, Eichmann
claimed to have enormously enjoyed the thought that he was responsible for the death
of millions, just as characters in Juliette acquire satisfaction from the enormity of their
crimes (NC: 422). In anticipating both the theoretical and psychological contours of
modern evil, Sade, for Crocker, “foretold the course of the crisis of Western
civilization:”

...Sade speaks with the loudest voice to our own time, and through our own time, for it is
our age that has had to live the truths he revealed, to live through the night he uncovered.
It is in the twentieth century that the failure of rationalism, revealed in history and
psychology, has plunged our arts and often our acts into the absurd of nihilism (NC: 421).

Crocker regards Sade as posing the most important question facing, not merely
philosophy, but civilization itself. In his novels, we are not only confronted with a
vision of planetary holocaust (NC: 428). We are presented with a premonition of the
collapse of the values that distinguish us from base nature and guide us towards
higher ideals; the will to prevent such a global catastrophe from occurring. The world
has not become a kinder or more just place in the two hundred years since Sade wrote

36
his books, or even in the last fifty years, despite the promises our leaders made
following the Second World War. Sade is dangerous as he affirms this abyss, rather
than proposing a solution, or denying that such an abyss exists at all.

1.7 Sade and Mainstream Philosophy

Recent studies on Sade have greatly improved our understanding of his placement
in the context of Western thought. Two outstanding examples are works by Caroline
Warman (Sade: from Materialism to Pornography, 2002) and Svein-Eirik Fauskevåg
(Sade ou la tentation totalitaire, 2001). 33 Only in the last few years, however, has
Sade gained the attention of more mainstream philosophers, as opposed to Sade
specialists or historians of ideas. Timo Airaksinen’s work, The Philosophy of the
Marquis de Sade (1991), has been mentioned above. Michel Onfray’s work, in
particular his irreverent introduction to philosophy, Antimanuel de philosophie (2001),
places Sade firmly alongside the thinkers of the Western canon. 34 Anglo-American
philosophers have recently approached Sade as a philosopher, that is, as a writer
whose ideas are worth considering in their own right. These discussions of Sade are
significant, however brief, as they approach Sade directly, without the filtering of
more literary or ‘Continental’ critiques of his work. These philosophers quote Sade
directly and make no attempt at figurative interpretation. Almost two centuries since
his death, Sade the philosopher finally emerges.
Richard Joyce, in his metaethical study The Myth of Morality (2001), defends
his own version of ‘error theory,’ according to which, as the name suggests, all moral
theory rests on a philosophical error. 35 He cites Sade’s character Eugénie (Philosophy
in the Bedroom) in an argument against ‘internalism about motivation’ (‘MI’), a

33
Svein- Eirik Fauskevåg Sade ou la tentation totalitaire : Etude sur l’anthropologie littéraire dans La
Nouvelle Justine et l’Histoire de Juliette. (Paris: Honoré champion éditeur, 2001). I thank Caroline
Warman for bringing this book to my attention. Caroline Warman Sade: from Materialism to
pornography (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2002).
34
Michel Onfray Antimanuel de philosophie: leçons socratiques et alternatives (Rosny: Bréal, 2001)
pp.141-142.
35
This is slightly different to John Mackie’s ‘error theory,’ according to which all moral sentences are
false. See Richard Joyce the Myth of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). I thank
Charles Pigden for pointing this passage out to me.

37
doctrine Joyce takes to be both a ‘non-negotiable commitment of moral discourse,’
and false. Joyce gives the following form to this thesis:

MI: It is necessary and a priori that any agent who judges that one of his available actions
is morally obligatory will have (defeasible) motivation to perform that action.

According to this view, people have an overriding motive to do the good.

Consequently, it is only out of akrasia (‘moral weakness’) that anyone ever does
something immoral. Joyce thinks that this is incorrect, and turns to Sade for examples.
Writes Joyce, “Some of the villains from the Marquis de Sade’s work... are not just
interested in hedonism and sadism-they appear to be self-consciously pursuing
whatever they consider to be bad” (Joyce: 20). If it is possible, argues Joyce, that
Eugénie is not merely irrational or weak of will, MI has to be abandoned. As for the
fictionality or impossibility of Eugénie, Joyce does not consider this a problem in
moral thought: “Assertions of impossibility have to be explained, not merely insisted
upon” (Joyce: 23). (Sade’s engagement with ethical thought will be discussed in
Chapter V).
Susan Neiman’s Evil in Modern Thought: an alternative history of philosophy
(2002) also treats Sade as a thinker (again, as a moral thinker). Most of her thirty-four
page treatment of Sade is a summary of interpretations already given by other writers,
but she makes a number of salient points of her own. She notes that those who read
Sade as a ‘liberator’ can only have seriously considered half of what Sade had written,
and makes a pointed comment on the national specificity of Sade’s defenders:

Critics who call [Sade] a fighter of freedom, enemy of guilt, privilege, and mediocrity, or
a lover of everything from the concrete in itself [Le Brun] to the abstractness of
transgression in general [Foucault et. al.] ignore half the content of his work. For those
who didn’t make it to the end of Juliette: Sade’s heroes celebrate torturing to death their
own children, and anybody else’s they can get their hands on, as means to a better
orgasm….
Our willingness to aestheticize Sade may itself have limits. I am not certain, for
example, that the late twentieth century would have tolerated a Sade industry among
German intellectuals as it tolerated a French one. 36

36
Neiman p.173.

38
Neiman gives a concise summary of what she takes to be Sade’s primary
philosophical goal: the underpinnings of our faith in the world’s goodness. She notes,
however, Sade’s reliance on accepted religious and philosophical structures and
categories. In particular, the Argument from Design is ridiculed; if God exists, he
must be the most evil entity in the cosmos. If Providence transforms all bad acts into
good purpose, then being a criminal may in fact be divinely approved. Neiman notes
that Sade relies as much on parody and descriptions of how the world actually is as on
theoretical refutation, yet his demolition of everything worth believing in is no less
tortuous for that.
Neiman finds the association between Sade and Kant (as suggested by Adorno
and Horkheimer) highly problematic, and suggests that their association relies more
on innuendo than argumentation. She notes that Adorno and Horkheimer appear to be
proposing an alternative- an appeal to the emotions- that has already been ruled out by
Sade’s merciless attack on Rousseau. 37

The “cold law” of Kant and Moses does not proclaim feeling and knows neither love nor
the stake. Would it be more or less Sadean if we added the stake? Is the coldness that
links Sade to Königsberg and Sinai something we’d rather replace by the heat of passion?
In Sade’s terms or Rousseau’s? Sade and Kant are linked [by Adorno and Horkheimer]
because both traffic in formal structures. Perhaps one ought to add Bach as well, and
denounce him for tormenting harmony by subjecting it to the precision of rule (Neiman:
192).

Neiman does concede that Adorno and Horkheimer make a valid point: “Kant’s moral
law has no basis in the structure of reality. It rests instead on what he calls the fact of
reason. This means that reason justifies itself. Kant would not justify morality on
instrumental grounds, so he offers no arguments to persuade us to be moral. Rather,
he says, it’s a fact of reason that we should be. But as Adorno and Horkheimer point
out, facts do not help us when they’re not there” (EMT: 193). Neiman sees in fact a
commonality between Sade and Kant on this point- the rejection of the idea that there
is a relationship between authentic virtue and reward. The entire argument of Justine
and Juliette, she notes, is to illustrate this.

37
Adorno & Horkheimer Dialectic of Enlightenment p. 114.

39
 Rather than presenting virtue triumphant, he sought to show it in disrepair. For only when
love of virtue is disconnected from all questions of reward can it be seen as sublime. Such
revelation is particularly needed by those of us who live in corrupted ages. If we expect
virtue to be rewarded, we may easily abandon it when it’s not. If we know in advance
how often it is ill-requited, we’ll be better prepared to meet adversity with the virtue that
is its own reward. Was he telling the truth here, he could almost pass for Kant (Neiman:
180).

Neiman notes, however, that Sade’s ‘project’ is closer to that of Hume, insofar as they
are both sceptics: “[w]hile Hume undertook to humiliate reason, Sade sought to
torture it” (Neiman: 194). Hume’s position is unstable. He shows that the traditions
upon which we rely for our morality are supported by nothing more than custom and
habit, yet prescribes that the ‘wise few’ can forgo them. Sade’s solution, notes
Neiman, is to wholeheartedly accept the disjuncture. Neiman reads Sade’s enthusiasm
for the entire destruction of the world as a solution to the gap between reason and
nature: “[i]f nature leads to its own obliteration, you may, of course, decide to view
annihilation as a natural goal” (196). She notes that this may be an entirely consistent
outcome of a possible defence of the unity of nature and purpose. This reading is
interesting, and perplexing. For Neiman, Sade represents the terminus of 18th Century
moral thought on the question of ethics and the problem of evil. As such, Neiman
meshes the interpretation offered by Camus and Crocker; Sade’s thought is at once a
howl at a godless sky, and a lucid (if laboured) exposition of the darker thought of the
period.

1.8 The Unique One: Maurice Blanchot’s Sade

Maurice Blanchot (1907-2003) was a French literary theorist, critic and novelist.
His essay “La Raison de Sade” (1949, Sade, in the English translation, hereafter S)
treats Sade, in approximate terms, as a Nietzschean, for whom power is both “fact and
law, axiom and value” (Blanchot: 65). 38 Sade, in Blanchot’s view, writes of the
achievement of the poor who rise up through the ranks via crime, or the privilege of
those of high birth, who are cunning enough to maintain their position. In Sade, for
Blanchot, solitude and power are interchangeable; the achievement of one implies the

38
This originally appeared in a book entitled Lautréamont et Sade (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit,
1949). The English version, “Sade,” is in PB: 37-73.

40
other. Even if it is the case that Sade’s psychology is simply wrong- that people are
naturally social and cannot really stand true solitude (it is used as a punishment for
criminals, after all) – Sade’s unique individuals, Blanchot claims, are powerful
through their solitude. These are the individuals who have chosen- and are able to-
break off from the rest of civilization: “Sade’s cast of characters is composed
primarily of a tiny number of omnipotent men who have the energy and initiative to
raise themselves above the law and place themselves outside the pale of prejudice,
men feel that nature has singled them out and, feeling themselves worthy of this
distinction, strive to assuage their passions by any and all means” (ibid: 41). Blanchot
notes also a paradox in Sade - Sade may advocate (in places) that all men are equal,
but for Blanchot this merely means that

...no one is worth more than any other, all are interchangeable, each is a unit, a cipher in
an infinite progression. For the Unique Person, all men are equal in their nothingness, and
the Unique One, by reducing them to nothing, simply clarifies and demonstrates this
nothingness (54).

Blanchot reads in Sade a Nietzschean superman, but it stands as a hypostatized hatred

of mankind (S: 60). In fact, according to Blanchot, hate is all that Sade stands for,
retaining the idea of God purely as the object of such hate. He maps out a dialectical
shift in Sade’s thought; Sade begins as advocating crime and base instincts as being
good, as they are in harmony with nature. But the Sadeian protagonist realizes that
destruction merely promotes nature, and that acts of destruction are ultimately futile.
He is merely an instrument of nature’s laws. If crimes are in the spirit of nature, there
is no true crime against nature (this problem will be discussed in Chapter VI). The
dialectic ends with the ‘unique one,’ who has achieved the state of apathy; the
elimination of the capacity for empathy of others or the feeling of normal pleasure in
themselves (68). Blanchot’s Sade also teaches that the truly liberated libertine has
learnt to find anything pleasurable, including torture. He notes that Justine and Juliette
go through more or less similar experiences of torture and degradation, yet Justine is
the ‘victim,’ and Juliette is the libertine. Being a Sadeian libertine in fact makes harm
impossible, as one has learned to find pain and even death enjoyable. Blanchot here
quotes Sade:

41
 The true libertine loves even the reproaches he receives for the unspeakable deeds he has
done. Have we not seen some who loved the very tortures human vengeance was readying
for them, who submitted to them joyfully, who beheld the scaffold as a throne of glory
upon which they would have been most grieved not to perish with the same courage they
had displayed in the loathsome exercise of their heinous crimes? There is the man at the
ultimate degree of corruption (51). 39

Blanchot takes the character Amélie, in Juliette, as merely the extreme of this trend.
She actually wishes to die (this interpretation and example is adopted by Bataille, as
discussed below). Finally, Blanchot’s Sade has discovered negation as the means to
power- negation of the ‘other’; denial that the other even exists in any meaningful
sense.

...the true man knows that he is alone, and he accepts it; everything in him which relates
to others-to his whole seventeen centuries’ heritage of cowardice- 40 he repudiates and
rejects: for example, pity, gratitude, and love are all sentiments he crushes and destroys;
by destroying them, he recuperates all the strength that he would have had to dedicate to
these debilitating impulses and, what is even more important, from this labor of
destruction he draws the beginning of a true energy (67).

Here Sade’s ‘Unique One’ appears as a figure who is guilty of either inconsistency or
bad faith, for to negate the reality of the other is to deny that oneself exists in any real
sense, insofar as the other is basically a member of the same class. Sade recognizes
this, his character Saint-Fond stating that he and anyone else who achieves such
destruction is a ‘god’ in comparison to the average person (59). Blanchot’s Sade is
clearly a proto- Nietzschean figure, insofar as he is depicted as passing through this
field of absolute negation to arrive at a life-affirming hero- the ‘Unique One.’ Yet
Blanchot appears to render Sade harmless, or at least admirable, by presenting him as
a positive thinker whose apparent advocacy of mass destruction is merely incidental
to the ‘expression of energy’ (65). Blanchot also marks Sade as a proto-Freudian.
Dreams, says Blanchot’s Sade, are recognized as “the work of the mind restored to

39
Blanchot does not give a citation here. A passage similar in spirit is in Juliette (J: 1039), but the
Nietzschean idea of capital punishment as vengeance is not, to my knowledge, articulated elsewhere in
Sade’s works.
40
The association with Nietzsche is explicit here.

42
instinct and thus delivered from the influences of waking morality” (69). 41 Finally,
Blanchot describes Sade’s system as a personal product- a standpoint epistemology of
the pervert, but one that illuminates the experience of everyman.
Blanchot’s interpretation of Sade has been critiqued on a number of points. Le
Brun has questioned the view that Sade’s characters are propelled by a death wish.
Sadeian heroes, she says, want to stay alive at all costs (this will be discussed below
in the discussion on Bataille). Jane Gallop questions the rendering of an absolutely
isolated sovereign man, noting that there is in fact a lot of talk of friendship (l’amitié)
in the 120 Days, a ‘lighter, friendlier’ aspect that Bataille’s reading omits. 42
Caroline Warman questions Blanchot’s trivialization of those aspects of Sade’s
philosophy that place him in the stream of Enlightenment thought. As Warman notes,
Blanchot’s reading of Sade omits much of the content of Sade’s actual philosophical
speculations, in particular on the topic of materialism, which Blanchot dismisses as
“les theories à la mode.” 43 Warman also questions the reduction of Sade’s thought to
a celebration of ‘The Unique One,’ given the degree to which Sade’s libertines rely on
teamwork. 44 Blanchot has also written of Sade in the context of his philosophy of
language, the merits of which have also been questioned by Le Brun (Blanchot’s
theory of language will be discussed below, in the discussion on Foucault). 45

1.9 Annie Le Brun on Sade

41
The authenticity of this citation is in doubt. Sade refers to dreams once in a short story:
“When we are awaiting the outcome of some event, and the way it will affect us occupies our mind all
day long, we are quite certain to dream about it; now, our mind, which is exclusively occupied with its
objective, nearly always causes us then to see one aspect of this event about which we have not thought
much the previous day.” Sade, “Faxelange, or The Wrongs of Ambition” (CL: 22n). The only other
reference to dreams Sade makes is in a letter to his wife, in which he calls them “very ridiculous
things.” Sade; Gilbert Lely, editor L’Aigle, Mademoiselle, lettres publiées pour la première fois sur les
manuscrits autographes (Paris: Les Editions Georges Artigues, 1949) p.151, quoted in Lorna Berman
Thoughts and Themes of the Marquis de Sade (Kitchener, Ontario: Ainsworth Press Ltd, 1971) p.150.
42
Gallop associates this idea with Nietzsche’s concept of ‘star friendship,’ although it seems doubtful
that there is anything in 120 that is ‘light and friendly.’ Jane Gallop Intersections A reading of Sade,
with Bataille, Blanchot, and Klossowski (Lincoln and London: Nebraska University press, 1981) p.73.
43
Maurice Blanchot “La Raison de Sade” in Maurice Blanchot Sade et Restif de La Bretonne (Brussels
1986) p.14. Quoted in Warman p. 7.
44
Warman pp.7, 10.
45
Le Brun Sade: a Sudden Abyss p.180.

43
Annie Le Brun (b.1943), writes Lawrence Bongie, is “indisputably one of the more
significant figures in recent Sade criticism, a latter-day surrealist and possibly the
Marquis’ most ardent contemporary champion.” 46 She has written a number of studies
on Sade, the most important being Sade: a Sudden Abyss (Soudain un bloc d’abîme,
Sade, 1986, hereafter SSA). 47 The text swings between analytic and purely figurative
registers, between ‘philosophy’ and ‘poetry’; as such, it takes some effort to extricate
Le Brun’s interpretation. Yet it is there, and it is significant for several reasons.
Firstly, Le Brun, unlike Camus, Adorno and Horkheimer, rejects the association of
Sade with any political ideology, in particular Nazism. Le Brun’s Sade is close in
spirit to the Surrealists, in particular Bataille. For both Le Brun and Bataille, Sade
represents absolute freedom of the passions, and a complete rejection of morality.
Secondly, Le Brun considers Sade “the first, if not the only, author to have seriously
conceived of a universe without God” (SAA: 152). If one embraces atheism with the
wholeheartedness of Sade, she argues, everything follows, as atheism leads to a
“reconsideration of the social position man has usurped in the universe.” Ordinary
atheists, lacking Sade’s “stark gaze,” merely fall back onto an “ideological mire”
(152). Le Brun has, consequently, little patience for Klossowski’s interpretation of
Sade as a closet theist (74).
Le Brun holds that theoretical writings on Sade have largely missed the point of
his works. She rejects the interpretations offered by Barthes and Foucault, charging
them with neglecting Sade’s concern with reality, in particular the concrete
relationship between the body and thought. Le Brun reads Sade as insisting that there
are “neither ideas without bodies nor bodies without ideas” (147), and takes Sade to

46
Laurence Bongie Sade: a Biographical Essay (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press,
1998) p.297.
47
Annie Le Brun Sade : A Sudden Abyss trans. Camille Nash (San Francisco: City Lights Books,
1990).
—————— .“Sade and the Theatre” In Deepak Narang Sawhney, ed. Must we burn Sade? (New
York: Humanity Books, 1999): 99-113.
———————. Sade, aller et détours (Paris: Plon, 1989)
——————. Les châteaux de la subversion (Paris : J.J. Pauvert aux Editions Garnier Frères,
1982)
——————. “Volupté perdue ? ” In Revue de la Bibliothèque national de France 7 (Jan
2001) :19-24

44
be preoccupied with the ‘concrete,’ in particular the concrete, blasphematory power
of words (as opposed to the ‘text’). She also chastises those who have neglected
Sade’s coherence, or drown his works in abstract, ‘disembodied’ literary analysis. To
miss the concrete aspect of Sade, Le Brun contends, is to betray a “criminal frivolity,”
adding that “critical and textual evaluations of Sade are scarcely better than the worst
condemnations” (3, 6, 40,180). In short, she contends, Sade scholars have not been
philosophical enough (61). She singles out Georges Bataille for critique in particular,
despite their commonalities. Both thinkers take Sade to reveal the truth of the human
condition, in particular the destructiveness of the erotic instinct; both take Sade to be a
heroic figure of revolt against morality itself, and both are aware of the horrific nature
of Sade’s writing. Their shared enthusiasm for Sade’s ‘libertine’ code is perhaps their
most striking commonality. Yet Le Brun disagrees with Bataille’s view that Sade’s
work expresses a death wish. Instead, she regards Sade as life-affirming and
“luxuriously erotic,” pointing out that “no Sadian hero actually seeks death” (92).
Finally, Le Brun’s study, like those of Crocker and Neiman, places Sade
squarely in the history and economy of Western thought. She notes Sade’s debt to the
philosophy of the age, noting that Sade was not merely adopting the language and
concepts of the materialists, but taking their worldview to a new level of purity. Le
Brun understands Sade’s writing to be a radicalisation and a simplification of existing
thought. Le Brun cites Fréret, Diderot, the Curé Meslier, Grimm, Toland, d’Holbach
and Machiavelli in particular as Sade’s sources (30, 42-43,140). What sets Sade
apart, she suggests, is Sade’s “physical awareness of infinity” (43). Although he owes
a great deal to other thinkers, Le Brun notes that he radicalizes their ideas, shortens
their philosophical material, and adds sarcasm and ‘cruelties’
That Le Brun’s interpretation of Sade is closer in spirit to that of Bataille and
Foucault, yet is informed by a detailed knowledge of Sade’s work, demonstrates that
the ‘philosophical’ and ‘a-philosophical’ interpretations ( and the ensuing debate as
to whether Sade is a philosopher or a figure radically outside philosophy) need not be
mutually exclusive. In this sense, Le Brun’s interpretation, regardless of its
shortcomings, has the merit of incorporating both aspects of Sade’s work. For Le
Brun, Sade is a reasoning being, yet his reason is in the service of the Unthought.
Le Brun repeatedly characterises Sade’s thought with two metaphors. Sade’s text
functions as either a ‘machine’ (or ‘atheist machine’) or as an optical instrument (SSA:
153). In Sade’s work, philosophy becomes a monstrous distortion of the human need

45
for order (53). Discussion of these metaphors of optics and machines takes precedence
over text-based analysis of ideas, and no argument is offered as to why these readings
are accurate (66, 68, 98, 130, 154, 157). This is significant, as Le Brun evaluates other
interpretations against her own notions of Sade as a ‘scourer’ of ideologies. In
particular, as with others, she takes Sade to be opposed to any particular political
orientation. 48 She discusses at length the lack of political orientation in Sade’s Aline
et Valcour, in which the narrator openly admits to writing a text that is politically
ambiguous (again, an aspect unaccounted for in Geoffrey Gorer’s account). Sade
offers three choices of political attitude: “acceptance, reform, or individual revolt”; it
is left to the reader to decide for themselves (106-109). Political decision, in Sade’s
view, Le Brun argues, is subordinate to individual taste.
Much of Le Brun’s discussion holds that Sade’s text has no core doctrine or
consistency of ideas beyond the imperative to abandon ideas, to return to the ‘purity’
of ‘body’ and ‘desire.’ In the following passage, Le Brun portrays Sade as revealing
the ‘truth’ that we are ‘all criminals,’ and that Fascism is the very opposite of this
‘ideological cleansing’ (67, 73). All ‘crime’ is an expression of human nature (for Le
Brun, as for Sade, only cruelty is considered a ‘true’ expression of human nature); the
notion that crime is simply due to an aberrant ideological choice is

...a comfort Sade does without and makes his readers do without. In laying bare the most
unjustifiable passions in the heart of Silling, Sade foils that questionable play of
justifications which can be made to serve any feelings, especially the loftier ones, from
motherly love to heroism. The fact that these justifications are all equally inadmissible
alters nothing. They all dress up human savageness in ideological uniforms. Fascism,
which draws on all the gaudy stereotypes of race, family, fatherland and countryside,
constitutes one of the most spectacular examples of this ideological masking, so utterly
opposed to the disrobing found in Sade.

Le Brun then states that those who associate Sade with Fascism are in denial about
their ‘true selves,’ without offering, beyond the authority of Sade himself, evidence to
support this assessment of human nature (67). Finally, she offers a curiously non-

48
Slavoj Žižek gives a similar, though more straightforward, argument. Interpreting Sade through
Lacan, Žižek insists that Sade represents ‘absolute autonomy’, whereas Nazism represents the exact
opposite- the rhetoric of sacrifice of the few for the good of the state. See Slavoj Žižek and Glyn Daly
Conversations with Žižek (Cambridge: Polity, 2004) p.126.

46
Sadeian argument as to why this ‘latent criminality’ should be acknowledged: “in
thinking these criminal tendencies elsewhere, one loses the power to prevent their
apparition close to hand” (67).
Le Brun’s evaluation of Sade as being uncommitted to any political ideology is
based on a single text, Aline et Valcour, and does not deal with the more resolutely
‘libertine’ texts, the 120 Days of Sodom, Justine and Juliette. As Le Brun
acknowledges, there is a doctrine of ‘libertinage’ that is constant throughout these
texts. She notes the coherence of this doctrine, its consistency across novels and
characters, and its major features. Le Brun notes for example that the character
Juliette does not actually learn anything from her ‘professors’ of libertinage
throughout the course of the novel, as she already thinks in the same “mode of
thought” (189-190). She also notes that Sade’s thought is “extremely coherent” (152,
212) and that his own thinking is largely that of his characters (40-41, 72). She
associates the same doctrine with both Sade’s libertines and with Sade himself, and
recognises it, in symbolic form, in the cadaverous splendour of the vulture (12).
Simply put- Le Brun reads Sade as teaching the expression of murderous desire
regardless of the consequences. Le Brun describes Sade’s doctrine of ‘Libertinage’ in
some detail. It teaches that pity, kindness and community are doctrines of the ‘weak’
(57, 185). As for economics, it regards the poor as merely tools for the use of the
wealthy, or offers what appears to be a brutal parody of supply-side propaganda (164).
In the practical sphere, libertinage makes various demands on the adherent’s conduct
(such as the cultivation of ‘apathy’ for the pursuit of the ‘pleasure of crimes,’ or the
maintenance of secrecy for the execution of ‘infamies’ (50). One of the most
common topics of philosophical conversation for the libertines, as Le Brun notes, is
the ‘voluptuous pleasure’ of killing people.
Le Brun’s text, then, offers a sketch of a coherent doctrine of a homicidal
narcissism. Juliette, she tells us, is “the embodiment of the finest idea of freedom that
one can possibly acquire” (192) (Juliette, it should be remembered, expresses her
‘freedom’ through mass murder, arson, poisoning, and, finally, immolating her own
daughter after allowing her lover Noirceuil to rape her ; J:1186). Le Brun avoids
discussing the theoretical specifics of this ‘idea of freedom,’ or even clearly
acknowledges its presence within the text as a fully fledged doctrine. At one point,
she writes that to be a ‘libertine’ requires merely that one has a ‘sense for excess’; a
‘sixth sense’: “[e]xcess, indeed, is the one condition necessary for the Sadian hero to

47
exist.” The victims, she writes, are those who lack this sense: “...if Sade’s victims are
indeed characters who do not resist excess, falling by the thousand before the
excessiveness of libertines, isn’t this more on account of their inability to conceive of
excess, than their inability to tolerate it physically?”(182). Le Brun assumes that the
victims die because they cannot conceive of the excess that kills them. This notion of
‘excess’ may be given a more prosaic formulation- Sade’s serial killers are successful,
like real life serial killers, because their acts cannot be anticipated by normal, trusting
people until it is too late.
Le Brun’s treatment of Sade as an ethicist (broadly construed; that is, ‘ethics’ as
concerning the highest values and virtues for a particular doctrine) is complex. Le
Brun identifies (correctly, I think) a close affinity between the ethics of Sade and
Nietzsche, and regards Sade’s tirade against traditional morality and religion as akin
to Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, reading both as holding the Christian God
accountable as the “thief of energy” (137-138). The two thinkers diverge, she
suggests; Nietzsche diagnoses Christian ethics as decadent, whereas Sade allegedly
withholds judgment, and merely illustrates. 49 Also insightful is Le Brun’s reading of
Sade as revealing the naivety of the moral thought of the age, that is, as engaging in
the early modern debate on moral theory (47). More problematic is Le Brun’s attempt
to show Sade as morally superior to the normative morality he attempts to undermine.
She notes that Sade opposed the death penalty (141,172). Le Brun also contrasts
Sade’s ‘ethics’ with what she takes to be the worse evils of conventional, ‘bourgeois’
morality. According to Le Brun’s Sade, conventional morality demands the
subordination of the particular to the general will, and makes demands on our conduct
that are allegedly impossible to live up to (70,170).
Le Brun also makes a number of associations between conventional morality,
the morality of the Revolution, and the (alleged) aesthetic horrors of the Social Realist
school. The moralizing of the bourgeoisie and the revolutionaries, writes Le Brun, are
“accomplished at the cost of a systematic dematerialization of the body…the orthodox
art of the revolutionary era can be said to anticipate the future horrors of socialist
realism.” She goes on to describe the horror of this transformation: “one encounters
49
I question this reading. Sade’s’ libertine’ novels are peopled by protagonists who speak with one
voice on the question of ‘that stupid religion’, and their largely silent victims. The only ‘victim’
character who argues in turn is Justine, but her arguments seldom go beyond pious clichés. Sade’s
critique of Christianity is discussed in Chapter VI.

48
the same violence: a violence perpetrated against the individual body to transform it
into anonymous human material for nourishing the ideological machine” (144-145).
‘Morality,’ for Le Brun, is associated with ‘ideology,’ “weepy sensibility and
revolutionary virtue” (145). 50 She contrasts Robespierre, who executed in the name of
morality, with Sade, in particular the latter’s criticism of the use of the guillotine
(171). Robespierre, writes Le Brun, writes in the “cold, white, cutting tones” of death,
in contrast to Sade’s humanity and his awareness that ‘ideas have bodies.’ “So which
of the two do we call moral?” asks Le Brun: “Robespierre, for whom the end justifies
the means? Or Sade, showing that the means justify the end?” (171). Le Brun
associates Robespierre with morality itself, although it would be more accurate to say
that he was merely hypocritical, or inconsistent, rather than being a representative of
morality as such. Le Brun appears to think that killing people for enjoyment is
morally superior, due to its honesty, than killing in the name of ideology. There is an
incompatibility here between the assertion that Sade is heroically beyond all morality,
on the one hand, and, on the other, the wish to show that Sade is morally superior,
through emphasising a single purported virtue- Sade’s ‘honesty’ or ‘life-affirmation.’
More to the point, it is unclear how Le Brun can object to the ‘violence’ of bourgeois
‘ideology,’ and consistently praise the ‘erotic’ torture machines in Sade that
themselves reveal the “nothingness of bodies” (161). 51
Finally, Le Brun attributes the ‘erotic’ with moral significance, or at least a
significance that overrides other values. Sade, for Le Brun, proposes a new scale of
values that ranks desire and the ‘erotic’ at the pinnacle. She describes The 120 Days of
Sodom variously as a “sumptuous banquet,” shimmering “like myriad rare pearls
slipping through the folds of night,” and praises Sade for freeing “eroticism from the
blinkering idea of beauty” (88,188). The one passage she cites from 120 illustrates
what she means to be the ‘erotic’ is as follows:

…They leave the scalpel, they plunge into a hand, they search inside her bowels and force
her to shit through the cunt; then, through the same opening, they set about splitting the
wall of the stomach. Then they turn back to her face: they cut off her ears, burn the inside

50
See also Le Brun “Sade and the Theatre” pp.111-112.
51
One of Sade’s characters, a reader of Sade, in fact (he reads Philosophy in the Bedroom as he kills),
murders people with a guillotine. Accordingly, Le Brun’s disjunction between the horrors depicted in
Sade and those of the Terror is problematic (LNJ 2:377-378).

49
 of her nostrils and extinguish her eyes by pouring molten Spanish wax in them, they cut a
circle around the skull and hung her up by the hair while attaching stones to her feet, so
that her body is weighed down and the cranium torn off (74-75; similar: 193). 52

The reader can decide for oneself whether this could be taken to be a “sumptuous
banquet.” In any case, Le Brun’s claim that Sade is not preoccupied with beauty is
actually inconsistent with the text. Sade’s brand of absolute horror requires an
acknowledgement of beauty in order to rail against it, or to soil it. States his character
Saint-Fond, “[b]eauty [in a victim] tends to excite us further; virtue, innocence,
candour embellish the object...all these qualities tend to enflame us more” (J: 270).
Sade’s works are full of clichéd descriptions of feminine beauty; in Juliette, victims
are described variously as having “the face of love” with the most beautiful eyes
possible”; “never in my life had I feasted my eyes on a more beautiful body”,
“nothing so fresh, nothing so plump, nothing so pretty,” “radiant as an angel”; “Venus
herself would be envious,” and so on (J: 1012, 1073, 1053, 1126, 1073).
Le Brun’s discussion of Sade takes several other tangents, such as her proposal
that Sade is a critic of “reason itself,” that he exposes the “fierceness of desire,” that
he “frees us from power relationships exercised by knowledge,” and that he marks the
‘end of man’ (54, 60, 156). These Foucaultian avenues are not explored further in Le
Brun (such themes will be discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter VII).
This completes the survey of those who have interpreted, or treated, Sade as a
philosopher. Yet to be discussed is the view that Sade’s work is of some vital,
philosophical significance, yet cannot be approached as one would a philosophical
text. That is, the philosophical dimension of Sade’s work is considered a mere surface
feature, whether a part of a deeply subversive distortion, or secondary to some deeper
insight or project far removed from philosophical practice. This is the view of
Georges Bataille and Michel Foucault.

52
Even more bizarrely, Le Brun refers to the other passage cited here as showing ‘erotic brutality,’
despite the fact that it only concerns the spectacle of mass execution. It is apparently not sex that Le
Brun is interested in. The citation in Sade is 120: 658, 659.

50
1.10 A Cloacal Eye: Bataille on Sade

…if [Sade] had not existed he would have had to be invented…

Bataille The Accursed Share (AS Vol. III: 252).

Georges Bataille (1897-1962) almost single-handedly established Sade’s place in the

realm of ideas, and is unusual, as a non-specialist, in having had a major influence on
Sade scholarship. A good deal of the secondary literature on Sade (for example, that
of Michel Foucault, Marcel Hénaff, David Allison, David Martyn, Deepak Narang
Sawhney, Alphonso Lingis, and Béatrice Didier) takes for granted that there is a
natural intellectual affinity between his work and that of Bataille. Bataille frequently
introduces Sade into his meditations in such a way as to suggest a complete
identification. He takes Sade to be largely in agreement with his own discussions of
sexuality, ‘general economics,’ and what he refers to as the ‘Sovereign.’ In this
section, I will attempt to disentangle Sade from Bataille’s embrace, in order to clarify
the relationship between the two.
In the 1930 essay “The Use-Value of D.A.F. Sade (An open letter to my current
comrades),” Bataille discusses what, for him, is Sade’s true message- total revolution,
and the wish to “release dangerous movements and be their first victims.” 53 In so
doing, he lambastes those members of the Surrealist circle who he felt had entirely
misunderstood Sade, who instead ‘worship’ him in the manner of “primitive subjects
in relation to their king” (UV: 17). Given the anodyne version of Sade embraced by
André Breton and others, Bataille’s has the merit of being under no illusions as to
what Sade’s work entails, this being the most striking, and vital, feature of his
interpretation. Sade reappears again in most of Bataille’s subsequent works, in

53
Georges Bataille “The Use Value of D.A.F.Sade (an open letter to my current comrades)” trans.
Allan Stoekl, in David B. Allison, Mark S. Roberts and Allen S. Weiss, editors, Sade and the Narrative
of Transgression (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) pp.16-32. See also Michel Surya
Bataille: An Intellectual Biography trans. Krzysztof Fijalkowski and Michael Richardson (London and
New York: Verso; 2002) p.264.

51
particular Erotism (hereafter ER, 1957), the Accursed Share (hereafter AS, written
1949, published 1967) and Tears of Eros (hereafter TE, 1961). 54
Bataille shares with Sade a number of thematic preoccupations. Bataille’s
fictional work, in particular Story of the Eye, is similar to that of Sade to the point of
appearing derivative. As in Sade, in Bataille there is a great deal of scatology, sex
scenes in churches, blasphemy, humiliation, rape, torture, and necrophilia. 55 There are
also philosophical similarities, although these have often been exaggerated. The most
obvious theoretical commonality is in their ethical orientation. Sade’s view that
civilization and morals have softened man is close to Bataille’s attitude (J: 776). Both
writers draw a link between the absence of God and the nullity of morality, suggesting
a traditionally religious view of moral thought ( Bataille’s project of founding an
anti-‘ethics,’ without reason or justice, is explicitly a Godless ethics ). 56 Bataille

54
Georges Bataille Erotism: Death and Sensuality trans. Mary Dalwood (San Francisco: City Lights
Books, 1986)
———————. Le Bleu du Ciel (Paris: 10:18, 1957)
———————. Ma Mère (Paris 10:18, 1966)
———————. Literature and Evil trans. Alaister Hamilton (New York and London: Marion
Boyars, 1997)
-——————. Story of the Eye by Lord Auch trans. Joachim Neugroschel (San Francisco: City
Lights Books, 1977)
——————. Madame Edwarda, Le Mort, Histoire de l’œil (Paris: 10:18, 1973).
——————–. Inner Experience trans. with an introduction by Leslie Anne Bolt (New York:
SUNY Press, 1988)
——————. The Tears of Eros trans. Peter Connor (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1989)
——————. The Accursed Share (in three volumes) trans. Robert Hurley (New York/ Zone
Books. Vol. I: 1991; Vol. II and III: 1993).
—————– . “Evil in Platonism and Sadism” trans. El Albert, in Deepak Sawhney, editor Must
we burn Sade? (New York: Humanity Books, 1999) pp.243-262.
55
In Bataille’s Novel Story of the Eye, for example, a “scrumptious streetwalker from Madrid” is raped
in a pigsty full of liquid manure, and the spectacle of a decapitated car crash victim- a young girl- is
described as “very beautiful.” In an outline for a sequel (set fifteen years after the original, placing the
action in 1943), the heroine ‘accidentally’ finds herself in a ‘torture camp’ and is beaten to death in a
scene Bataille describes as, again, very beautiful (SE: 5, 55,102). According to Bataille’s biographer
Michel Surya, in 1944 Bataille planned to make a pornographic film based on The 120 Days of Sodom.
The main character, a soap manufacturer, acts out scenes from Sade’s The 120 Days of Sodom with
some prostitutes, eventually killing one of them. See Surya p.349.
56
For discussion, see Surya p.430.

52
states that Sade took the mentality of the aristocracy to its limit under the pretence of
criticizing it (ER: 166). Bataille also notes that, though Sade’s work remains on the
fictional plane (ER: 175; AS Vol. II: 183) he “stated his [principles] but never really
put them to practice” (TE: 142). Bataille admires Sade for his nihilism and his total
disregard for his fellow man, and notes that he was a “connoisseur of torture” (ER:
171-172, 189; TE: 206). 57 Yet he also describes Sade as in some sense an ethical
figure. In Erotism, Bataille holds that, because “violence is silent,” Sade’s attitude is
“diametrically opposed to that of the torturer” (ER: 186, 252). The paragraph below
illustrates the tension in this account. Sade, for Bataille, represents both the attitude of
‘sovereignty’ that stands beyond concern for the fellow man, and the (assumedly)
moral attitude of the revolutionary.

He was an enemy of the ancien régime and fought against it…He worked out his criticism
but he was a Jacobin and the secretary of a section. He worked out his criticism of the
past along two lines: on one he sided with the Revolution and criticized the monarchy, but
in the other he exploited the infinite possibilities of literature and propounded to his
readers the concept of a sovereign type of humanity whose privileges de Sade visualised
were outrageous compared with those [of] kings and lords (ER: 166).

Ironically, Bataille continues the Surrealist attempt to retain Sade as a figure of

revolutionary liberation from morality, and, simultaneously, as a revolutionary
moralist (insofar as revolution, unless it is a nihilistic revolution, requires a moral
centre). This tension is not resolved in his work.
Despite numerous similarities in their writing, Bataille and Sade are actually very
different thinkers. Bataille lacking a formal philosophical education, was largely
informed by his reading of Nietzsche, Hegel (as interpreted by Alexandre Kojève;
1902-1968), and the Christian mystical tradition. He was also taught briefly by Lev
Shestov (also known as Leon Chestov, 1866-1938). Whereas Sade referred to himself
as a philosopher, Bataille’s attitude towards conventional philosophy was largely
negative, and he often referred to himself as a mystic. 58 Nor did he regard Sade’s

57
For discussion of Bataille’s moral nihilism, see IE: 136; E: 171 AS I p.152-153; III: 370; 448 n37;
EPS: .250; also Surya p.323.
58
Bataille frequently dismisses traditional philosophers as ‘system builders’, ‘babblers,’’ insects’ and
‘careful little men’ (IE: xi, xxii, 14, 66) and reason itself as ‘puerile’ (AS Vol. III p.256).
For explanations for Bataille’s mystic epistemology, see ER: 123, 149,162, 256; AS Vol. I: 58, 191.

53
thought highly, noting its incoherence and its lack of persuasive force (ER: 179,
188,191,195; AS Vol.II:177; LE: 110-111). Instead, Bataille associates Sade with his
own interest in the interrelationship of taboo, sacrifice, transgression, and sexuality.
Sade, largely informed by the 18th century philosophe tradition, was familiar with a
very different philosophical outlook, and lacked a concept of the sacred (as Sade
wrote in the poem La Vérité [1787], “[i]l n’est rien de sacré”). 59 Bataille, like Sade,
describes life as endless flux and destruction, and holds that harmony would destroy
the natural order (ER: 55, 86; AS Vol. I p.23; Sade J: 768, 771). The ontological
similarities end there. Bataille, unlike Sade, holds that humans have a “certain dignity,
a certain nobility” and a “sacred truth” that distinguishes them from animals, whereas
(as to be discussed in Chapter II) Sade emphasises the continuity of humans and other
animals (ER: 29, 149,150). Further, unlike most of Sade’s libertines, Bataille
maintains that there is a soul that survives the physical annihilation of the body (I E:
19; Sade, J: 401). These differences have lead Michael Richardson to remark that,
whereas Bataille implicitly admits idealism, “Sade was the materialist that Bataille
claimed to be, for his materialism was consistent and unyielding.” 60
Another divergence between Sade and Bataille is their use of Christian sources.
Sade’s discussion of the Bible and other Christian texts betrays an encyclopaedic
knowledge of scripture and religious scholarship. Yet, unlike Bataille, his attitude
towards the Christian heritage is entirely negative, using his knowledge of Christian
sources purely order to discredit their doctrine. He would not, unlike Bataille, cite
the Saints or Christian religious art in defence of the claim that a woman’s body is
‘dirty,’ that sex leads to death, is basically sinful, or is linked with sex and sadism
(AS Vol. I: 38; ER: 230-231; TE: 83). 61
Throughout his writings, Bataille retains two psychological assumptions; a). there
is an innate human instinct for sadism; and b). This instinct for sadism is inseparable
from the sexual instinct. In defence of both of these associations, Bataille relies

59
“La Vérité” In Œuvres complètes du Marquis de Sade edited by Annie Le Brun and Jean-Jacques
Pauvert (Paris: Pauvert, 1986). Vol. I: 553-556, p.556.
60
Michael Richardson, “Introduction,” in Georges Bataille The Absence of Myth: Writings on
Surrealism trans. Micheal Richardson (London and New York: Verso, 1994):1-27, p.19.
61
Nevertheless, Bataille insists that he is in fact free from Christian doctrine and, further, that there is
an “indefinite and general taboo” against sexual liberty as opposed to that associated with Christianity;
ER: 92.

54
largely on the authority of Sade. Sade, in The 120 Days of Sodom, Juliette and la
Nouvelle Justine in particular, insists that the taste for cruelty is shared by all with the
strength to express it, and typically describes heterosexual intercourse as ideally
involving rape, sadism and murder ( Writes Sade: “[m]urder is a branch of erotic
activity, one of its extravagances”; J:940). Like Sade, Bataille insists that all men
have a desire for violent, destructive behaviour. Bataille also notes the public’s
universal taste for violence in the manifestation of barbaric activities in the most
‘sophisticated’ cultures (Bataille notes for example “lynch law” as practiced in the
United States; ER: 186). Bataille goes on to suggest that all people desire dangerous
and expensive–as he calls them– ‘sovereign,’ activities, in proportion to their
strengths and means, noting that most people must fulfil this need through the
imagination, in spy novels and suchlike ( ER: 72, 86-87, 186). Bataille also takes at
face value Sade’s contention that there is a natural association (Bataille calls is a
‘general mechanism’) linking erection, ejaculation and ‘breaking the law’:
“[i]ndependently of Sade, the sexual excitement of burglars has not escaped notice.
But no one before him had grasped the general mechanism linking the reflex actions
of erection and ejaculation with the transgression of the law” (ER: 196; Sade J: 124).
The most important associations Bataille makes with his own thought and that of
Sade are those concerning sexuality. To a large extent, this association is apt. Neither
has a conception of sexual relationships as such, nor sexual love or mutual care. Sex is
described entirely in terms of the attainment of a sensation. Bataille occasionally
discusses more commonplace, though by no means less disturbing, associations of sex
and death, for example the association of sexual jealousy or possession (ER:20). But,
for the most part, Bataille does not seek to diagnose or explain such tendencies.
Instead, he describes violence as essential to sexual activity. Bataille holds that
‘[p]hysical erotism has in any case a heavy, sinister quality,” that sexuality, when
taken to its natural limit, leads to murder, and that Sade was the great pioneer who
affirmed this ‘truth’ (ER: 19; TE: 140). Bataille describes sex above all as a ‘limit-
experience,’ which, in general terms, involves the experience of merging with the
universe (AS Vol. II: 168,169,171). As “filth,” for Bataille, is the “secret of being,”
this does not in itself entail a positive account of sexuality (AS Vol. II: 118). It is
frequently the violence and ‘disorder’ of sex that Bataille regards as of central

55
importance, rather than the sex itself. 62 As such, actions as torture may suffice to
attain this state also, insofar as such an activity would be both violent and nauseating.
The following passage, from Inner Experience (1943, published 1957), makes clear
this association of ‘limit-experience’ independent of actual penetrative sex– torture,
beating up one’s spouse, or simply laughing may suffice.

The extreme limit of the “possible”– We are there in the end. But so late?...what,
without knowing it we reached it? (in truth, nothing is changed) by a detour: one man
bursts out laughing, the other is goaded and beats his wife, we become dead drunk, we
make others perish in torture (IE: 37). 63

A recurring theme in Bataille’s discussion of Sade is the idea that the ‘sovereign’ –
invariably a male- plays the active role, whereas the female is described variously as a
victim or as sacrificial victim. To take sexuality to be concerned with communication
or harmony at all, according to Bataille’s Sade, is to deny its ‘truth.’

De Sade makes his heroes uniquely self-centred; the partners are denied any rights at all:
this is the key to his system. If erotism leads to harmony between the partners its essential
principle of violence and death is invalidated. Sexual union is fundamentally a
compromise, a half-way house between life and death. Communion between the
participants is a limiting factor and it must be ruptured before the true violent nature of
eroticism can be seen, whose translation into practice corresponds with the notion of the
sovereign man. The man subject to no restraints of any kind falls on his victims with the
devouring fury of a vicious hound (ER: 167; similar AS Vol.II:174-178)

Again, the male is in the active role, whereas the woman is ‘dissolved.’ The two
sexually engaged people realize their ‘discontinuity;’ they merge into the one entity.
Yet a non-symmetrical relationship remains- the male remains as an active subject;
the female loses her identity. 64

62
Paul Hegarty Georges Bataille: Core Cultural Theorist (London: SAGE Publications, 2000) pp.105-
106.
63
In The Story of the Eye, Bataille describes “going beyond all limits” as sucking the breast of a
girlfriend and simultaneously urinating in the presence of her mother. Story of the Eye p.39-40.
64
‘Critics’ of Bataille often describe his work as preoccupied with ‘play’ and ‘communion,’ as opposed
to total egotism and the treatment of the other as a mere victim of aggression. Roland Champagne
writes that “[e]rotism for Bataille is an avenue of access into the playfulness of human sovereignty and

56
 What does physical eroticism signify if not a violation of the very being of its
practitioners?–A violation bordering on death, bordering on murder?
The whole business of erotism is to strike to the inmost core of the living being, so that
the heart stands still. The transition from the normal state to that of erotic desire
presupposes a partial dissolution of the person as he exists in the realm of discontinuity….
In the process of dissolution, the male partner has generally an active role, while the
female side is essentially the one that is dissolved as a separate entity (ER: 17-18).

Later in this same text, Bataille states that the woman is not fully alive when being
penetrated, suggesting that, were she to be killed during sex, she would not actually be
present. She is not merely sick; she is already dead. Bataille discusses the ‘surprise’ a
person would feel, were he ignorant of the association between madness and
eroticism, if he were to watch “some woman who had struck him as particularly
distinguished” passionately making love.

He would think she was sick, just as mad dogs are sick. Just as if some mad bitch had
usurped the personality of the dignified hostess of a little while back. Sickness is not
putting it strongly enough, though; for the time being the personality is dead. For the time
being its death gives the bitch full scope, and she takes advantage of the silence, of the
absence of the dead woman. The bitch wallows-wallows noisily- in that silence and that
absence... (my italics; ER: 106).

On most of the points outlined above –the association of sexuality with the desire to
kill the ‘partner’ (the victim, in fact); the ‘inauthenticity’ and inferiority of shared
erotic pleasure; the reduction of the other (typically a woman) to the level of inert
object- Bataille is quite correct in reading Sade as advocating much the same doctrine
(J: 268-269). In the passage above, like Sade, Bataille tends to conflate the living
with the dead- an ‘erotics’ that denies the presence of the other person. It is,
essentially, masturbatory or even necrophilic, as neither Sade nor Bataille can
distinguish between sex with another person from merely penetrating a cadaver.

the abyss, an image crucial to Bataille’s literary art of death and anxiety.” In similar terms, Micheal
Richardson writes: “[w]hat is at stake in sex for Bataille is communication between two beings, and in
pushing sexuality to its limits, he wants to test to breaking point the emotional boundaries of the
personality of the man and the woman.” Bataille’s treatment of Sade complicates this interpretation.
Roland A. Champagne Georges Bataille (New York: Twane Publishers, 1998) p.65; Richardson p.16.

57
 An implication of Bataille’s description of the primacy of male sexuality is that
female sexuality cannot exist. That a man may be an erotic object of a woman’s
desire, Bataille concedes, is a theoretical possibility, but implausible. Women “put
themselves forward as objects for the aggressive desire for men.” Consequently,
“prostitution is the logical consequence of the feminine attitude;” an essential part of a
woman’s role in sex is to renounce her pride, for the essence of sex is to “despoil”
(ER: 130-131, 145).

It is intentional like the act of the man who lays bare, desires and wants to penetrate his
victim. The lover strips the beloved [la femme aimée] of her identity no less than the
blood-stained priest his human or animal victim. The woman in the hands of her assailant
is despoiled of her being. With her modesty she loses the firm barrier that once separated
her from others and made her impenetrable. She is brusquely laid open to the violence of
the sexual urges let loose in the organs of reproduction; she is laid open to the impersonal
violence that overwhelms her from without (ER: 90).

Bataille briefly considers the possibility that only neurotics are attracted by the
thought of sexual murder, or that sadism is merely an atavistic throwback. In a section
of Erotism entitled “Vice is the deep truth at the heart of man,” Bataille writes:

It might be said that we wear our sadism like an excrescence which may once have
had a meaning in human terms but now has lost it, which can easily be eradicated at will,
in ourselves by asceticism, in others by punishment. This is how the surgeon treats the
appendix, the midwife the afterbirth, and the people their kings. Or are we concerned on
the contrary with a sovereign and indestructible element of mankind, yet one that evades
conscious appraisal? Are we concerned; in short, with the heart of man, not the muscular
organ, but the surge of feelings, the intimate reality that it symbolizes?
If the first of these alternatives holds, the reasonable man would be justified; man will
produce instruments for his own well-being indefinitely, he will subdue all nature to his
laws, he will be free from war and violence without having to heed the fateful propensity
which has hitherto bound him to misfortune. (ER: 184).

But Bataille rejects this interpretation, hence aligning himself with Sade’s account of
the human condition. Bataille reasons that sadism cannot be dismissed as a non-
essential human trait, for two reasons. The first is that sadism brings humanity “into
harmony with the ceaseless and inevitable annihilation of everything that is born,

58
grows, and strives to last.” This principle is very similar to the naturalistic thinking of
Sade’s character Pope Pius VI, in Juliette, who reasons, “In all living things the
principle of life is in no other than that of death;” that is, as death and destruction are
part of the natural order, so too is the instinct to destroy (J:769). (Yet, in both Sade
and Bataille, this is an argument as to why destruction, not sadism per se, is a part of
the natural order). The second reason offered by Bataille is essentially a restating of
Bataille’s affirmation of destruction, and its association with the sacred and the
‘sovereign.’ This reasoning is uniquely Bataillian- Sade, as noted above, has no
concept of the sacred.

Secondly [sadism] bestows a kind of divine or, more accurately, sacred significance on
that excess and that harmony. Our desire to consume, to annihilate, to make a bonfire of
our resources, and the joy we find in the burning, the fire and the ruin are what seem to us
divine, sacred. They alone control sovereign attitudes in ourselves, attitudes that is to say
which are gratuitous and purposeless, only useful for being what they are and never
subordinated to ulterior ends (ER: 185). 65

Bataille also credits Sade for revealing a link between sexuality and a wish to destroy
oneself; “this tormenting fact: the urge towards love, pushed to its limit, is an urge
towards death” (ER: 42). (One could perceive here a hint of the Surrealist’s interest in
love, and sexuality, as a rendering asunder of the categories of the ‘reasonable’).
Besides appealing to the authority of Sade in defending this claim, Bataille cites
examples from natural history, of animals who expend themselves in coitus
(suggesting the danger of sex), the mystic insights of St. Theresa, and the association
of sex and death implicit in the French expression for orgasm, ‘la petite mort’ (‘the
little death’) (ER: 29,170, 234-240, AS: Vol. II: 105, 177; TE: 20). Bataille also notes
that childbirth is dangerous (although its relevance to the sex-self destruction
association is not clear) and that “depression following the final spasm [of orgasm]
may give a foretaste of death” (ER: 102, 232). Bataille takes the character Amélie (in
Juliette) to be representative of this association of sexuality with the will to self
destruction. Amélie, an impressionable young woman, tells Borchamps that she
wishes to be killed as the “victim of the cruel passions of a libertine.” She adds: “[n]ot
that I wish to die tomorrow- my extravagant fancies do not go as far as that; but that is

65
Note that this argument does not actually concern sadism as such, but the destruction of objects.

59
the only way I want to die; to have my death the result of a crime is an idea that sets
my head spinning” (ER: 175-176; similar; AC Vol.II:182). In Erotism, Bataille writes:

An impersonal denial, an impersonal crime!

Tending towards the continuity of beings beyond death!
De Sade’s sovereign man does not offer our wretchedness a transcendent reality…But in
[the character] Amélie de Sade links infinite continuity with infinite destruction.
(ER: 176). 66

Sade’s characters are extremely glib about life and death, so it is not possible to
dismiss Bataille’s interpretation out of hand (Durand, in Juliette, states that she once
avoided execution “merely for form’s sake”; J: 1025). It is, however, problematic to
interpret Sade as a theorist of a universal death drive on the strength of a single minor
character in a single novel, who is given only twelve lines of a text of some 2,000
pages. As noted above, Le Brun has argued that Bataille’s assertion that ‘eroticism
opens onto death’ contradicts fundamental aspects of Sade’s thought, observing that
the chief Sadeian characters do virtually anything in order to survive. 67 The character
Borchamps cited in the passage above thinks in fact that Amélie had not been sincere
in her desire to be killed: “what she had told me about the way she wanted to end her
days, this, the more I pondered it, had simply been an effort on her part to be
ingratiating; it did not correspond to her real feelings” (Amélie is killed in appalling
agony regardless; J: 876). The lesson to be drawn would seem to be that one should
be careful with what one agrees to when dealing with post-morality sophisticates. But
Annie Le Brun’s criticism of Bataille is not entirely correct either- it could simply be
that Bataille has cited the wrong example. In Juliette, the character Durand contends
that “sensual excitement may even bring on thoughts of death and induce in one an
eager expectancy of death,” and Juliette herself suggests that death would be orgasmic
(J: 1014; 1039). 68 Sade’s characters also enjoy strangling or hanging themselves to

66
In Juliette, this character is referred to as Amélie, not “Amélie de Sade.”
67
Le Brun Abyss p.91.
68
Juliette’s argument is poor. She reasons that, as all of life’s necessities carry some element of
pleasure, and death is a necessity, then death must be pleasurable. Juliette states that it is common
knowledge that death is accompanied by a ‘discharge’, probably referring to the common knowledge
that a hanged man has an erection and ejaculates. This illustrates Sade’s understanding that female

60
enhance orgasm, and deliberately catch sexually transmitted diseases (LNJ2: 328,
340n, 344; J: 1147). 69 (Even Justine exhibits an eroticized death wish; she falls in
love with the evil Marquis de Brassac despite his depravity, and states that she would
gladly sacrifice her life to him; MV: 35). Sade’s characters, although perverse, do not
kill themselves in self- annihilating paroxysms as a rule.
A more complex theme in both Sade and Bataille is the relationship between
sexuality and sin. Bataille acknowledges that there is no such thing as ‘obscenity’ in a
fundamental sense, accepting that it exists entirely ‘in the mind’(ER: 215). Bataille’s
work incessantly associates sex and sin nevertheless. His numerous comments on the
physical, sexualized body, on the sex act, on prostitutes, and childbirth suggests a
negative attitude concerning sexuality and the body in general, as does his obsession
with the ‘filthy.’ Bataille describes sex as infernal, anguished, and disgusting, and
avoids discussing any particular sexual act. He describes prostitutes as “fallen
beings,” “vomited forth” from nature, who “live like pigs” (E: 135, 246; AS Vol. II:
140, 147,178). According to Bataille, nudity is, in a fundamental way, ‘obscene,’ and
the sight of a woman’s breasts “the pure incarnation of sin” (ER: 17, AS Vol.I:5; IE:
127). The penis is variously described as ‘accursed,’ as a ‘larvae,’ and a ‘bestiality’
(ER: 138-139; SE: 74); semen as a type of excrement (UV: 21); the vagina as a
“swampy region” (SE: 21); or a “wound about to suppurate” (AS Vol. II: 130,149).
He writes of the womb as ‘muck,’ and refers to the stench of the bodies of mothers
and sisters (SE: 49; AS Vol. II: 63). He describes the cycle of birth, sex and death a
“shipwreck in the nauseous,” and cites Leonardo da Vinci and St. Augustine to defend
this association of sexuality with disgust (TE: 23, 66, 69; ER: 58; 144-145; 178; AS
Vol.II:126; 81; 62-63 104). Even childbirth is described as a ‘transgression:’

orgasm, like that of men, is accompanied by a ‘discharge.’ The idea that death could be sexually
exciting is one of the central themes of Nagisa Oshima’s film the Realm of the Senses (1976).
69
La Mettrie, for whom death is “not without a certain voluptuousness,” may have had an influence on
Sade on this point. La Mettrie also wrote that he wished to die accompanied by beautiful women,
preferably while having sex- “I want it to be difficult to say which contributed most to my end, Fate or
voluptuousness.” Julien Offray De La Mettrie Machine Man and Other Writings translated and edited
by Ann Thomson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp.107-108, 114). This image is
repeated in Sade’s Dialogue between a Priest and a Dying Man; PB: 175.

61
 The menstrual discharge is further associated with sexual activity and the accompanying
suggestion of degradation: degradation is one of the effects of violence. Childbearing
cannot be disassociated from this complex of feelings. Is it not itself a rending process,
something excessive and outside the orderly course of permitted activity? Does it not
imply the denial of the established order, a denial without which there could be no
transition from nothingness to being, or from being to nothingness? There may well be
something gratuitous about these assessments… (ER: 54).

With this outlook, Bataille must explain why anyone would want to have sex at
all. He gives three responses. Firstly, he holds that we express our true love for
someone by overcoming our nausea of the physical act of having sex (AS Vol.II:95-
96, 113). 70 Secondly, Bataille suggests that “every horror conceals a possibility of
enticement” (AS Vol. II: 96). This claim becomes problematic however, as Bataille
cannot explain why corpses are not sexually attractive (AS Vol.II:97). 71
Finally, for Bataille it is the very sinfulness of sexual activity that makes it
significant. Without the sin of breaking taboos, according to Bataille, sex is not
‘erotic.’ Therefore, sex within marriage, where there are no traditional taboos against
sex, is not erotic; marriage itself providing only a “narrow outlet for pent-up violence”
(ER: 109- 112). Bataille’s affirmation of the sinfulness of sex, rather than sex in and
of itself, is clearest in the introduction to his pornographic novel Madame Edwarda.
In this text, Bataille lambastes against ‘freethinkers’ who would seek to eradicate
sexual ‘sinfulness’ (ER: 17, 128, 135, 266).
Bataille’s work suggests a commonality with Sade that overcomes the overt
theoretical differences of the two thinkers. On the one hand, Bataille’s association of
sex with sin seems to have little in common with the stated views of Sade’s
characters. Sade, in particular in Philosophy in the Bedroom and Juliette, writes
repeatedly on the groundlessness of sexual prudery. Accordingly, he refers to
70
The ‘proof of love’ theory does not really explain why anyone would want to show their love
though overcoming their physical revulsion with sex. One could show one’s goodwill or even love by
cleaning or unblocking a friend’s toilet, but this is done for the benefit of having a toilet that works and
is clean. In Bataille’s scheme, there is no parallel function to sex, as it is not pleasurable as such. In any
case, the lack of fit with psychological reality hardly requires comment.
71
Sade discusses the piquancy of sex with hideously ugly people in The 120 Days of Sodom, but his
theory is based on a comparatively straightforward theory of pleasure (120: 233). Bataille discusses
necrophilia in le Mort. See Bataille Madame Edwarda, Le Mort, Histoire de l’œil (in one volume)
(Paris: Collection 10:18, 1973).

62
prostitutes, in their cynicism in sexual matters, as the “only authentic philosophers”
(PB: 208, 318). Further, Sade wrote incessantly on particular sexual acts, whereas
Bataille in fact appears reluctant to discuss the specific ‘transgressive gestures’ in
Sade’s work. 72 Yet, under the surface, Sade and Bataille appear to speak with the
same voice. Having affirmed death and destruction, and not birth and creation, as the
central life-principles, both Sade’s libertines and Bataille appear to find the concept of
procreation deeply disturbing. In both Sade’s The 120 Days of Sodom and Bataille’s
pornographic novel Story of the Eye, the protagonists avoid vaginal penetration,
showing a marked preference for voyeurism and play with excrement (SE :8, 13, 14,
15,20, 37,46, 48, 51,75) . The one vaginal penetration in Story of the Eye is described
as ‘insipid’ and physically painful (SE:67); likewise, the ‘friends’ of The 120 Days of
Sodom describe the horror of the female form, as does Belmor of Juliette, who
describes the vagina as a “fetid gulf” (J:510). 73 Sade repeatedly portrays the
sexualized body as punished and degraded, as if to imply that sexuality is evidence of
a Fall. 74 Secondly, both Bataille and Sade associate sex with death, a natural enough
association for a Christian, given the association of sin with death, and sex with sin.
Sade’s characters frequently ‘punish’ pregnant women for daring to reproduce,
effectively extending the sin of sex to the sin of reproduction– it is not only the
sexualized, but the reproductive body that is punished (120:440; J:502-517). Both
writers, in the name of ‘authenticity’ and the ‘natural,’ seek to convince the reader
that sexuality cannot and should not be separated from the notion of sin and from the
infliction of pain. Both insist on the naturalness and desirability of torturing and
killing people, which they take to be innate drives. Further, both Bataille and Sade
regard mutually caring sexual relationships and the will to introduce new life into the
world, as unnatural and undesirable; as, in Bataille’s words, ‘degradation’ and

72
Bataille makes a single reference to coprophilia, in the novel Le bleu du Ciel (Paris: Jean-Paul
Pauvert, 1957) pp.84-85.
73
For discussion of the absence of vaginal penetration in Bataille, see Paul Hegarty Georges Bataille:
Core Cultural Theorist (London: SAGE Publications, 2000) p.127.
74
Edmond and Jules de Goncourt (1860) and J.K.Huysmans (1885) regarded Sade’s apparent hatred of
the body as a symptom of Catholic atavism. For discussion, see Laugaa-Traut pp. 147,165; Herbert
Josephs “Sade and Woman: Exorcising the Awe of the Sacred” in Studies in Burke and his Time 18
(177): 99-113 pp.102, 104, 111. In La Nouvelle Justine, Sade does indeed refers to the “exécrables
chairs” (execrable flesh) of his characters’ victims (LNJ 2: 73).

63
‘violence.’ They take the perverse for the ideal, and the natural (specifically the
instinct for mutual care, and for reproduction) for the perverse.
On this theme, it can be argued that Bataille’s intuitive ‘method,’ his sweeping
claims and juxtapositions, discloses aspects of Sade’s thought that a more scholarly,
textual approach would miss. Bataille places Sade in the context of the Occult, in the
shadows cast by Christianity, rather than in the light of the Enlightenment. Bataille
writes that, in pre-Christian societies, passions were unleashed and taboos temporarily
lifted in particular ritualistic contexts, which allowed for the controlled release of
psychic forces. In Erotism, Bataille writes that “[t]ransgression in pre-Christian
religions was relatively lawful; piety demanded it” (ER: 126). Under Christianity, the
possibility of transgression is no longer sanctioned; it is made evil, and the ritual
transgressions are transformed into Christianity’s imagined other- the Witch’s
Sabbath and its attendant horrors. Writes Bataille, “[i]maginary or not, the stories of
the Sabbaths mean something; they are the dream of a monstrous joy. The books of de
Sade expand these tales; they go much further but still in the same direction” (ER:
127). On the face of it, this association is questionable. There are no positive
references to witchcraft or other superstitious beliefs in Sade’s surviving works, and a
number of explicit rejections. In the short story An Inexplicable Affair Vouched for by
an Entire Province, Sade writes of “feeble-minded people” who believe that they can
summon the ‘prince of darkness’ through strange rituals (MV: 170). In the same
Enlightenment spirit, a character in Aline et Valcour criticises supernatural beliefs (an
astrologer and voyant who exploits the gullibility of his clients; AV: 523).
Nevertheless, insofar as it brings to light the relationship between the notion of sin
and Christianity in Sade’s work, Bataille’s association is illuminating. As Nietzsche
noted, Eros and sin were associated by Christianity: “Christianity gave Eros poison to
drink - he did not die of it, to be sure, but degenerated into vice.” 75 The implication
here is that Bataille and Sade’s association of sexuality and sin is an artefact of the
Christian age. Both Sade and Bataille frequently return to it in their work, despite
avowals to the contrary.
According to Bataille’s ‘general economics,’ any system (the biosphere, or a
nation, for example) receives more energy than it can expend in simply maintaining

75
Friedrich Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil trans. R.J. Hollingdale with an introduction by Michael
Tanner (London: Penguin, 1999) § 168 p.105.

64
itself. Bataille holds that the supply of energy available is endless, owing to the output
of the sun, and that growth is limited only by the roundness of the earth. 76 Part of the
excess has to be expended, whether destroyed or lost without profit (it is not clear if
Bataille is offering a descriptive or prescriptive thesis; insofar as he extrapolates from
an is to an ought about how the worlds works, his theory appears to commit a
straightforward naturalistic fallacy). 77 Bataille discusses this ‘spending’ in terms of
luxury or ‘sovereign spending,’ yet his use of language suggests that it is not a
straightforward economic model. He associates this ‘sovereign economics’ to
erotism– itself taken to be a spending of resources– the sacred, in turn defined in
terms of overturning taboos, and to the notion of sacrifice, in particular human
sacrifice. In turn, as noted above, Bataille associates sexuality with human sacrifice.
Sade takes a central place in Bataille’s association of spending, sadism, violence, and
eroticism, and implies rather than directly imposes these associations onto Sade’s
work. In Erotism, Bataille writes that Sade does not formulate the principle of
wasteful expenditure, “but he implies them by asserting that pleasure is more acute if
it is criminal and the more abhorrent the crime the greater the pleasure…” (ER: 169;
see also AS Vol. I: 23).

[Erotism] demands a boundless energy which, stopping at nothing, limits the destruction.
In its ordinary form, it is the vice to which physicians gave the name sadism; in its
reasoned, doctrinaire form, elaborated by the Marquis de Sade himself in the interminable
solitude of the Bastille, it is the pinnacle, the fulfilment of limitless eroticism…eroticism
responds to man’s determination to merge with the universe (Bataille’s italics) (AS Vol.
II: 168).

Bataille here assumes both an innate instinct for destruction, and that such destruction
is associated with a will to unify with the cosmos. The following passage, from the
same discussion, is more problematic.

76
Geoffrey Bennington “Introduction to Economics I” In Bailey Gill, Caroline, ed. Bataille: Writing
the Sacred (London and New York: Routledge, 1995): 46-57, p.49.
77
Where Bataille- paradoxically- offers reasons as to why one should spend excessively, his goals
seem reasonable. For example, Bataille held that the extravagant spending of resources would prevent
wars. Bataille had not considered the opposite claim- that wars are frequently brought about by
competition for scarce resources or territory. See Bennington “Introduction to Economics I” p.50.

65
 De Sade’s doctrine is nothing more nor less that the logical consequence of these
moments that deny reason. By definition, excess stands outside reason. Reason is bound
up with work and the purposeful activity that incarnates its laws. But pleasure mocks at
toil, and toil we have seen to be unfavourable to the pursuit of intense pleasure. (E: 168;
similar: AS Vol.II:180)

Bataille makes the following assumptions here and elsewhere: a). Sade is concerned
with excess; b). excess stands outside of reason; c). reason is bound up with
purposeful activity and toil; d). hence Sade is not concerned with reason. The first
assumption- that Sade stands for excess, is sound, to a point (in La Nouvelle Justine,
the character Madame d’Esterval remarks, “que serait la volupté sans excès?”; LNJ
2:107), as is the association of Sade with destruction and ‘limit’ experience. In Sade,
there are numerous descriptions of ruinous luxury, wastage and excess. Juliette
features elaborately staged orgies that follow the roughly the same plan. There is a
description of the scene, in Baroque style, detailing the drapery, the bouquets and so
on, accounts of the types of food and drink, the table settings; the costumes worn by
the libertines and those to be raped and killed. The action moves on to frenzied
rutting, the participants and their victims dissolving into a single mass of flesh.
Finally, the scene is laid waste- dead and injured victims and animals are piled high,
and the pyre- described variously as the “Greek sacrifice” or “holocaust”- is lit
( J:240-241, 585, 873, 747, 963-965, 1112, 1178; 120: 672). Sade, like Bataille,
discusses the sublime of the spectacle of destruction, and his characters express the
will to become volcanoes, that is, pure agents of destruction (Bataille IE:125; Sade
LNJ2:43-45; J: 522, 1016-1018). Although Sade did not discuss mystic or alternate
states of consciousness in his work, as Bataille implies (LE: 115-116, 119), his
characters indeed speak of the attainment of the “greatest possible upheaval in the
nervous system,” and “the final limit of what our human faculties can endure” (J:
340). Transgression and the overcoming of restraints through ultimately murderous
acts are clearly a commonality between the two thinkers. Yet there are other aspects
of Sade’s work that elude Bataille’s ‘general economy.’ In particular, Bataille’s
opposition of reason, purposefulness and toil, on the one hand, and pleasure, the
‘sovereign,’ and the cessation of thought, on the other, is problematic (the relationship
between pleasure and reason in Sade will be more fully discussed in Chapter III).
Here I will note that Bataille’s association of Sade with excess is problematic, and

66
suggest that Sade’s accounts of economics, and pleasure, are very different to those of
Bataille.
Sade’s characters, in particular in Juliette, are certainly concerned with
destruction and chaos on a large scale, and spending their resources in pointlessly
extravagant ways. Although they appear to reason in terms of utility, their
rationalizations are quite clearly just that- rationalizations. Where they offer reasons
as to why the poorer regions of Rome should be torched, or the entire Catholic
population of France should be killed, the reasons offered- usually the pretext of ‘the
health of the nation’- are frequently revealed to be secondary to the urge to destroy
(J:499-501, 726). A dialogue in Juliette, between Chigi and Olympia, illustrates this
deep complicity between the two thinkers. Chigi, in attempting to rationalize his call
for universal anarchy, makes the following claim:

I grant you that without laws the sum of crime increases, that without laws the world turns
into one great volcano belching forth an uninterrupted spew of execrable crimes; and I tell
you this situation is preferable, far preferable to what we have at present (J:732).

Likewise, in the essay “The Use Value of D.A.F. Sade,” Bataille calls for a total
overturning of the established moral order, and describes Sade as the figurehead of
such a revolution. His rationale, like Sade’s in the passage above, is that total chaos is
preferable to the present situation- the “crushing...yoke of morality” (UV: 27).

Without a profound complicity with natural forces such as violent death, gushing blood,
sudden catastrophes and the horrible cries of pain that accompany them, terrifying
ruptures of what had seemed to be immutable, the fall into stinking filth of what had been
elevated- without a sadistic understanding of an incontestably thundering and torrential
nature, there could be no revolutionaries, there could only be a revolting utopian
sentimentality.
…[s]ince it is true that one of a man’s attributes is the derivation of pleasure from the
suffering of others, and that erotic pleasure is not only the negation of an agony that takes
place at the same instant but also a lugubrious participation in that agony, it is time to
choose between the conduct of cowards afraid of their own joyful excesses, and the
conduct of those who judge that any given man need not cower like a hunted animal, but
instead can see all the moralistic buffoons as so many dogs (UV: 29, 30).

67
 Here the similarity is clear- both Sade’s Chigi and (the early, pre-World War II)
Bataille call for total surrender to a purported human potential for complete chaos and
destruction, on the grounds that such disorder is morally right – as morality,
commonly understood, is ‘oppressive.’ Both essentially argue that morality should be
abandoned, on allegedly moral grounds. Sade’s characters do not propose a way out
of this impasse, yet are apparently aware of a deeper structure at work. On several
occasions in the text of Juliette, Sade’s characters note that irrational forces are
responsible for the doctrines proposed (Noirceuil, notes Juliette, has few peers “where
it comes to constructing rational bases to one’s irrational extravagances” ;J: 139).
Likewise, Saint-Fond suggests that Juliette’s vaunted atheism is grounded on nothing
more than personal taste, or some cognitive error:

“Profoundly an atheist,” I [Juliette] replied, arch enemy of the dogma of the soul’s
immortality, I will always prefer your system to Saint-Fond’s, and I prefer the certitude of
nothingness to the fear of an eternity of suffering.”
“There you are,” Saint-Fond rejoined, “always that perfidious egoism which is the
source of all the mistakes human beings make. One arranges one’s schemes according to
one’s tastes and whims, and always by drifting farther from truth. You’ve got to leave
your passions behind when you examine a philosophical doctrine (my italics; J: 401).

Hence, Sade’s work coheres, although not in a straightforward way, with the notion of
an ‘unreason’ that, for Bataille, in some sense lies beneath or outside of reason. Sade’s
characters’ ‘tastes and whims,’ in this text, usually involve the desire to destroy and
kill. As such, he notes the ease with which the most malignant urges can present
themselves to the council of reason. Insofar as Bataille takes Sade to see in man an
innate, irrational drive for destruction, and that reason plays a secondary causative
role in human activity that leads to such destruction, his interpretation is correct.
Bataille’s adoption of Sade is less accurate with regards to his ‘economic’ theory,
however. According to Bataille’s ‘general economy,’ the ‘economics of scarcity,’
concerned with utility, is a denial of the vitality of life. Bataille holds that societies
produce more than required, and their defining operation, rather than their modes of
accumulation, is ‘exuberant spending;’ the purposeless destruction of resources (AS
Vol. I: 23). Yet it is straightforward to read Sade as the opposite of Bataille’s
characterisation.

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 The acquisition and hoarding of money is a recurring theme in Sade, characters
obtaining almost as much pleasure from amassing wealth as from spending it. Just as,
for Marx, capitalism leads to the fetishization of wealth, both Juliette and Clairwil are
frequently moved to masturbation surrounded in gold. States Clairwil:

I idolize money, I’ve often frigged myself sitting amidst the heaps of louis d’or I’ve
amassed, it’s the idea that I can do whatever I like with the money before my eyes, that’s
what drives me wild. I find it quite natural that others have the same taste; but nonetheless
I won’t have you deprive yourself: only fools are unable to understand that one can be
simultaneously niggardly and lavish, that one can love wasteful squandering upon one’s
pleasures and refuse a farthing to charity (J:286; also 324, 410).

Sade’s characters are, in keeping with Bataille’s description of the ‘sovereign,’

economically parasitic (AS vol. III: 198). But they lack the ‘sovereign indifference’ to
money that Bataille associates with sovereignty (AS Vol.1:76) The libertines are both
canny and careful with their money, and know how to make it, whether selling
warrants for arbitrary arrest, running brothels or gambling dens, or the contract
killing of entire towns with chemical agents ( J:213, 540, 551, 683; 120:191). Juliette,
who repeatedly states her holdings (her narrator occasionally notes the exchange rate
to ensure that the reader knows exactly how wealthy she is), invests her money
wisely, living on the interest. She only spends disposable income on her exploits (J:
409, 648, 806, 940, 1080). The Society of the Friends of Crime, a secret society of
very wealthy paedophiles and murderers described in Juliette, is similarly prudent. It
is managed in accordance to common sense, ‘non-sacrificial’ economic principles,
and has as its primary concern the interests of its ‘shareholders.’ It only accepts
members who can foot the annual fee of twenty-five thousand livres (virtually
defining the libertines as an economically privileged group); where the Treasurer
reports a favourable balance at the end of the year, the surplus is divided amongst the
members. As a precaution, the society maintains an emergency fund to help members
who get into legal difficulties (J: 419). The libertines also know how to acquire
wealth (“for some months we had been living this frivolous and profitable life...” [my
italics] J:627). In sacrifice, for Bataille, one destroys things or people for two reasons-
to maintain balance, in some sense, with the cosmos, or the biosphere, and to confront
the reality of death. In Sade, as we have seen, there is a concern with unifying with

69
the destructive principle of the world, but Sade’s characters, and their societies, are
equally concerned with the simple acquisition of pleasure, and with fiscal stability.
With regards to other interpretations of Sade under consideration, it should be noted
that Bataille’s outlook has points of contact with that of Adorno and Horkheimer,
moral views excepted. Like Adorno and Horkheimer, Bataille is critical of what he
considers the superficiality of contemporary thought, and, in similar tones, writes of
modern thought as having reduced itself to banality, to the “belief in machines”
(IE:28). Bataille also associates the Nazi death camps with the ‘government of
reason.’ In keeping, seemingly, with Adorno and Horkheimer’s ‘negative dialectics,’
Bataille places the Holocaust and Hiroshima squarely in a historical dialectic. In a
review of Sartre’s Réflexions sur la question juive, Bataille writes: “comme les
Pyramides ou l’Acropole, Auschwitz est le fait, est le signe de l’homme. L’image de
l’homme est inséparable, désormais, d’une chambre à gaz” (BŒ Vol. XI: 226). 78 If
one does not hold, like Bataille, that Sade’s killers are opposed to the exercise of
reason in their killing, his interpretation of the Shoah approaches that of Adorno and
Horkheimer. As Sade, according to Bataille, is opposed to legalized, orderly killing
(clearly, not killing per se), Bataille takes it to be an error to associate Sade with the
atrocities of the Nazis. In a lecture given in 1947, Bataille states that “the definition
of evil given in Philosophy in the Bedroom is the profound condemnation of
everything that we have seen the Germans do. Because it is clear that compared to the
executions of the Terror that Sade contemplated in Philosophy in the Bedroom, Nazi
executions responded still more to the images, to the suggestions of Sade. 79 But also,
they responded continually to the fundamental objection that Sade made to the
executions of the Terror since, from beginning to end, the unchaining of the passions
that raged at Buchenwald or Auschwitz was an unchaining that was the government of
Reason” (EPS: 253-254, also 244; similar AS Vol.III:253). Interestingly, in this very
statement, Bataille states that there is a direct relationship- that the Nazis had
‘responded’ to Sade, itself a claim that goes even further than that of Camus or

78
For discussion of Bataille’s thoughts on Hiroshima revealing a ‘new morality,’ see Surya pp. 360-
362, 416, 433.
79
There are no Terrors or executions actually described in Bedroom, although there are allusions to the
Terror in the inserted pamphlet, Yet Another Effort, Frenchmen, If You Would Become Republicans.
Bataille may also be referring to the executions that Sade witnessed during the Terror, which took place
as Sade was writing this text.

70
Adorno and Horkheimer in associating Sade with Nazism. (Whether or not Sade’s
characters are entirely ‘passionate’ killers, as Bataille insists, or more closely
resemble the Nazis, is a question to be answered in Chapter VII).
In conclusion, there are two related problems with Bataille’s ‘merge’ with Sade.
Firstly, Bataille’s interpretation is informed by only one principle text, The 120 Days
of Sodom, and his comments on other texts are cursory. Bataille’s interpretation
misses Sade’s complexity. His reading is not incorrect as such; it merely fails to
acknowledge a number of basic contradictions, or juxtapositions, within Sade’s work.
There are a number of other generally un-Bataillian suggestions in Sade’s work,
suggesting that any monolithic interpretation is incorrect. Sade’s narrative voice
describes St. Peter’s as a wastage of talent and resources, and criticizes duelling,
dismissing it as a revolting anachronism. Additionally, his philosopher- king, Zamé,
rejects state execution precisely because it is merely a secular version of human
sacrifice rituals, based, as they were, on “the absurd supposition that there is nothing
more dear to the Gods than human blood” (J: 657, 948; AV: 332).
The second problem with Bataille’s relationship with Sade is that he (and his
critics) reduces Sade to the status of esteemed but superseded antecedent of himself;
someone who “knew nothing about the basic interrelation of taboo and
transgression…but [who] took the first step.” (ER: 196). 80 Nevertheless, Bataille’s
interpretation can be said to reveal a deeper animus within Sade’s text that goes
beyond the myriad contradictions at the surface level of meaning.

1.11 The Language of Unreason: Foucault on Sade.

Foucault’s biographers frequently note that Sade was one of the writers that he
most admired and knew best, and his name frequently appears in Foucault’s work in a
variety of contexts. 81 In reading Foucault, one gets the impression that Sade plays a
key role in his understanding of literature, of philosophy, and of madness.
Foucault’s interpretation of Sade is strongly influenced by, and is to some extent
continuous with, the interpretation offered by Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot,

80
Roland A. Champagne, for example, writes that Bataille “projects Sade’s insights farther than could
be seen in the Eighteenth century.” Ronald A. Champagne Georges Bataille (New York: Twane
Publishers, 1998) p.25.
81
James Miller The Passion of Michel Foucault (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
2000) p.108; David Macey The Lives of Michel Foucault (New York: Vintage, 1995) p.76.

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some critics suggesting that Foucault’s interpretation owes more to these critics than
Sade himself. 82 Both Foucault and Bataille take Sade to stand radically outside the
dominant streams of his culture; that he represents, in some sense, a dialectical,
occulted ‘other,’ a deeper truth, omitted from the ordinary understanding of humanity.
Whereas Bataille discusses Sade in terms of ‘sovereignty’ and the ‘sovereign man,’
Foucault refers to Sade in relation to the Unreason and of man’s ‘unacknowledged
twin.’ Also, both thinkers assign to Sade the role of expressing ‘desire’ in a radical
way. Whereas Sade, for Bataille, represents ‘desire’ as physical, sexualized violence,
Foucault understands Sade’s ‘desire’ as a literary phenomenon.
We have already seen a bewildering range of interpretations of Sade’s work, many
of which are incompatible. Foucault’s reading, to some extent, notes that Sade had
taken ideas from the discourses of his age, yet places Sade far outside the categories
of official discourse. As such, Foucault’s reading, unlike those already discussed, has
the merit of being consistent with the inconsistency and excesses of Sade’s work, and
of suggesting that the entire project of reading Sade as an ideologist or philosopher in
a fixed, stable sense may be simply incorrect.
Foucault gives three interpretations of Sade, two of which overlap. In Madness
and Civilisation (hereafter MC, 1961) Sade appears as a representative of the shadow-
side of human nature, locked away by new forms of control and classification. In the
essays “Language to Infinity” (hereafter LI, 1963) “Préface a la transgression” (1963)
and in The Order of Things (hereafter OT, 1966), Foucault discusses Sade as a
primarily literary phenomenon, yet links this interpretation with the previous
reading. 83 Finally, in an interview given to the film magazine Cinématographe in
1975, “Sade, sergeant of Sex” (hereafter SS), Foucault gives an entirely different
interpretation – Sade, Foucault concedes, could be taken to be the very representative
of the forms of institutional control, rather than its opposite. 84 Sade is also mentioned

82
Macey p.113.
83
Michel Foucault The Order of Things (London: Routledge, 1994).
—————— Madness and Civilization trans. Richard Howard (New York: Vintage, 1988).
—————— “Language to Infinity” trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. in Donald F.
Bouchard, ed. Language, counter-memory, Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977):
53-67.
—————— “Préface a la transgression,” Critique 19 (1963):751-769.
84
Michel Foucault “Sade, Sergeant of Sex” an interview conducted by G. Dupont, trans. Robert J.

72
in the History of Sexuality (hereafter HS, 1976-1984). These interpretations will be
discussed in turn. 85
In Madness and Civilization, Foucault describes a dialectical opposition between
‘reason’ and what he refers to as the ‘unthought.’ The emergence of the modern age,
for Foucault, was coincident with a new understanding of humans as being essentially
rational; heterodox elements, deemed undesirable, had to be policed and removed
from circulation. The classification, diagnosis, policing and incarceration of heterodox
elements, and the development of the techniques of surveillance and control,
according to this account, came to a head towards the second half of the 18th Century.
Foucault refers to this process as the ‘Great Confinement;’ a rounding- up of those
found to be unfit to participate in the Age of Reason- the mad, the libertines, the
unemployable, the homicidal maniacs (OT:278, MC:282; Discipline and Punish,
hereafter DP: 102, 240, 285). 86 For Foucault, Sade represents this unacknowledged
twin, as man’s “ultimate truth” (MC: 23, 82,282), described elsewhere as “nothing
and night,” “the secret of unreason’s nothingness” and the “cycle of non-being” MC:
93, 115,116, 209, 285; OT: 323). Writes George Canguilhem,

The unthought (whatever name we give it) is not lodged in man like a shrivelled- up
nature or a stratified history; it is, in relation to man, the Other: the Other that is not only a
brother but a twin, born, not of man, but beside him and at the same time, in an identical
newness, in an unavoidable duality. 87

Hurley, in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: essential works of Michel Foucault vol. 2 ed. James
D. Faubion. Paul Ranibow (London: Penguin, 1998):223-227. This originally appeared as
Sade sergent du sexe–Cinématographe 16 (Dec.1975): 3-5. I thank Tim Rayner for bringing this
text to my attention.
85
Michel Foucault The Will to Knowledge: History of Sexuality vol.1 trans. Robert Hurley (Penguin,
1998).
——————The Use of Pleasure: History of Sexuality vol.2 trans. Robert Hurley (Penguin, 1992).
—————— The Care of the Self: History of Sexuality vol.3 trans. Robert Hurley (Penguin, 1990).
86
Michel Foucault Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. trans. Alan Sheridan (New York:
Vintage, 1995).
87
George Canguilhem “The Death of Man, or the Exhaustion of the Cogito” trans. Catherine Porter. In
The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994) p.326. See also MC: 76-78.

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In Sade’s “calm, patient language,” the “final words of unreason” are collected
together; an irrepressible psychic force that emerges into the world through a
“sovereign discourse” that runs counter to that of the “voice of reason” (MC: 188,198,
282; OT: 336). The Classical period had stored, within an “enormous reservoir of the
fantastic,” a memory of its own opposites; madmen, libertines, invalids; a dormant
memory of abstract unreason, “transmitted intact from the sixteenth to the nineteenth
century” (MC: 209). Whereas sadism itself, notes Foucault, is as ‘old as the world,’
the transformation of language into a ‘discourse of desire’ is concurrent with the work
of Sade, and hence, the beginning of literature.

Sadism appears at the very moment that unreason, confined for over a century and
reduced to silence, reappears, no longer as an image of the world, no longer as a figura,
but as language and desire. And it is no accident that sadism, as an individual
phenomenon bearing the name of a man, was born of confinement and, within
confinement, that Sade’s entire oeuvre, is dominated by the images of the Fortress, the
Cell, the Cellar, the Convent, the inaccessible Island which thus form, as it were, the
natural habitat of unreason (MC: 209-210).

The essay “Language to Infinity” continues this thought. Sade’s significance,

Foucault writes, is not in the predilection for cruelty nor the link between literature
and evil (Foucault here makes an explicit break with Bataille’s analysis; LI: 60). As
with other writers of ‘tales of terror,’ Sade represents a new language that is not
merely transgressive, but which seeks “the limits of the possible,” to speak of that
which lies “outside of words” (LI: 61). This is achieved through “subjecting every
possible language, every future language, to the actual sovereignty of this unique
Discourse which no one, perhaps, will be able to hear” (LI:61). This claim is repeated
in The Order of Things, where Sade is taken to represent a further dialectical shift
(OT: 384). Sade, for Foucault, pushes the Classical ‘episteme’ until it turns into its
opposite, the pure expression of desire (This is similar to Adorno and Horkheimer’s
description of Sade as representing the Enlightenment’s complete inversion). Foucault
writes:

Sade attains the end of Classical discourse and thought. He holds sway precisely upon
their frontier. After him, violence, life and death, desire, and sexuality will extend, below

74
 the level of representation, an immense expanse of darkness, which we are now
attempting to recover…in our discourse, in our freedom, in our thought (OT: 211).

Sade is taken to be the bridge at which discourse and desire - that which is
unknowable to reason and discourse- intersect. Sade’s writing, rather than as a means
of transparent communication, is used to communicate something, paradoxically,
beyond communication, yielding a literature that is the very negation of the very
function of classical discourse, which seeks to represent. The impossibility of
expressing desire’s unreason by means of language’s representative properties forces
other techniques. It is, instead, the force of accumulation and combination of scenes in
Justine and Juliette that allow the “possibilities of desire” to rise to the surface, from
the depths below (OT: 210-211). This interpretation of Sade is again similar to that of
Bataille, who perceived in the very repetitiveness of Sade’s work its meaning: “due to
the decision to subordinate literature to the expression of an inexpressible
event...[b]oredom seeps from the monstrosity of Sade’s work, but it is this very
boredom which constitutes its significance” (TE:115-116). It is also similar to
Bataille’s idea of excess as revealing the limits of the established order. For Foucault,
it is the excess of Sade’s discourse that reveals the limits of the classical episteme.
Foucault goes on to characterise Sade’s work as a manifestation of “the precarious
balance between the law without desire and the meticulous ordering of discursive
representation:”

Here, the order of discourse finds its Limit and its Law; but it is still strong enough to
remain coextensive with the very thing that governs it….the libertine is he who, while
yielding to all the fantasies of desire and to each of its furies, can, but also must, illumine
their slightest movement with a lucid and deliberately elucidated representation. There is
a strict order governing the life of the libertine: every representation must be immediately
endowed with life in the living body of desire, every desire must be expressed in the pure
light of a representative discourse (OT: 209).

Foucault’s account holds that a). Sade’s work incorporates elements from other texts
and discourses, and yet b). stands radically outside all other discourses. Literature
differs from classical discourse in that it abandons the idea of language as a
transparent or pure medium of communication, and which turns in on itself, much as
modern art began with the surrender of painting’s purely illusory role to

75
photography. 88 Sade’s work, he notes, is full of representation; it ‘represents
everything,’ yet “designates nothing other than itself” (OT: 304). Foucault describes
modern literature, in the words of John Johnston, as a discourse that has become “free
of its social function and hence no longer obsequiously obedient to discourse, or its
function as primarily representative.” 89
The influence of Barthes and especially Blanchot is evident in this notion of
literature’s discovery of its own autonomy, through discovering and reflecting back
on itself. 90 Blanchot, in “La littérature et la droit à la mort” (“Literature and the Right
to Death,”1949) describes literature as a radical negation, hence, a radical freedom,
where anything goes and nothing follows. Poetry in particular is described here as a
privileged form of language, as it “has the ability and right to speak to everything, to
say everything,” hence, disclosing its own disruptive power, its own impossibility,
and its own being. 91 Foucault applies this account of literature to Sade, agreeing with
Blanchot’s view that Sade was driven by a desire to ‘say everything’; an endless
reduplication of existing languages that results in “a play of mirrors that has no limits”
(LI: 54).

Perhaps that which we should rigorously define as “literature” came into existence at
precisely the moment, at the end of the eighteenth century, when a language appeared
that appropriates and consumes all other languages in its lightning flash, giving birth to
an obscure but dominant figure where death, the mirror and the wavelike succession of
words to infinity enact their roles (LI: 66).

Blanchot’s metaphor of cancer may also be applied to Sade’s text, as Foucault

understands it here. Cancer cells are of the same substance, more or less, of healthy
living tissues. They simply do not follow the programmed functions of healthy organ
88
Sean D. Kirkland “The Spectre of Literature in Foucault’s The Order of Things,” Henry Street: a
graduate review of literary studies 8:2 (fall 1999):15-35, p.26.
89
John Johnston "Discourse as Event: Foucault, Writing and Literature," Modern language Notes 105
(fall 1990) 800-818: 803.
90
See Roland Barthes “Inaugural Lecture at the Collège de France, 7 January 1977” trans. Richard
Howard. Richard Kearney and Mara Rainwater, eds, The Continental Philosophy Reader (London:
Routledge, 1996) :364-377
91
Maurice Blanchot The Work of Fire trans. Charlotte Mandell (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1995) p.106, quoted in Gerald L. Bruns Maurice Blanchot: The refusal of Philosophy (Baltimore &
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) pp.41, 43.

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tissue, and through their uncontrolled growth, they kill the organism within which
they live, of which they are a part of, even as they are nourished by it. Cancer, for
Blanchot, “destroys the very idea of a program, blurring the exchange and the
message... one of... the ways to dislocate the system, [is] to disarticulate, through
proliferation and disorder, the universal programming and signifying power.” 92
Sade’s endless repeatings of everything that had been and will ever be said are an
insubordination of the discourse that seeks towards its annihilation.
As noted above, and as following chapters of this study will show, almost every
individual element of Sade’s literature and philosophy can be traced to a particular
source text (Foucault himself notes that Sade had assembled his work from, among
other things, heavy borrowings from Rousseau; MC:283). Yet there is still something
that eludes the attempt to dismiss Sade as merely an eccentric plagiarist. Sade’s work,
in particular the texts with philosophical themes, frequently inverts the intended moral
ideals of the philosophers he has borrowed from, in particular the philosophes. He
scathingly notes the shortcomings of the moral philosophies of the age, and he fills his
works with mutually incompatible theories. Detailed analysis of Sade’s text reveals a
constant pattern of deliberate, perhaps malicious, ideological juxtapositions (i.e.
women are equals vs. women are inferior; nature guides conduct vs. nature does not
guide conduct; crime is pleasurable vs. crime does not exist). Sade’s work is also,
plainly, an artifact of an incessant desire to say everything- everything that the
dominant discourses of the time refused to confront. Sade’s “encyclopaedia of
inhuman practices,” insofar as it has a single significance at all, is not straightforward
(J: 1130). There is, therefore, something unnerving to Sade’s work that Foucault’s
interpretation captures. 93 Foucault suggests that Sade is writing about language; its
limits, and its possible roles outside discourse. In deliberately writing a text that
enfolds all possible discourses, all philosophies, all thoughts- thinkable and very
nearly unthinkable-; and regurgitates them up as an uninterrupted stream of atrocities,
Sade did not merely corrupt the idea of the author as unifying principle. Foucault

92
Maurice Blanchot L’écriture du désastre (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1980) p.137. Quoted in Bruns
pp.30-31
93
Sade occasionally refers to the limits of language usage and the way in which language encodes
moral categories, and his own word usage is often highly idiosyncratic (the ‘sublime’ for Sade typically
involves the highly vulgar or horrific, for example). See J: 418.

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implies that Sade has reduced thought itself - ethics, metaphysics, the lot- to
meaningless babble, to rubble.
Three questions are- is this how Sade’s text actually functions? Which texts does
Sade invert, and at what level of meaning does the inversion take place? Is it a
knowing, sophisticated inversion of values, principles and theoretical meanings, or
merely a game played with sense and meaning? And, if so, is it a successful strategy?
A thorough exegesis of Sade’s work is required to answer these questions. Foucault’s
account poses several other questions. What this ‘language of desire’ amounts to, and
what it may suggest concerning understanding Sade, requires elaboration. Also
requiring discussion is Foucault’s assumption of an opposition of two entities; the
Sadeian text and the official discourse, variously framed as an opposition between
‘classical’ discourse and that of ‘literature,’ of ‘sovereign discourse’ and the ‘voice of
reason.’ There is also an assumed opposition in Foucault’s discussion between
‘desire’ and ‘reason.’ I will suggest that the ‘field of vectors,’ as Foucault would put
it, is more complex than his account suggests.
In Madness and Civilization, Foucault places Sade firmly within the context of the
‘Great Confinement.’ He writes in particular of Sade’s cell as the “natural habitat of
Unreason” (MC: 210) and identifies him with “error, illusion, dreams and madness,”
and all that is “unaccounted for by Descartes” (OT: 323). 94 But Foucault’s association
of Sade with the ‘mad’ is not straightforward, and there is some doubt as to whether
Sade was himself a part of the ‘Great Confinement’ of the unemployable, the
libertines, invalids, and the insane. Sade was not, initially, one of the population
Foucault describes as without resources or social moorings– he was an aristocrat with
property, and who had served with a certain distinction in the military. Nor was he
particularly unemployable. Sade proved himself a highly versatile employee when
necessary, as evidenced by his successful (insofar as he, an aristocrat, survived it)
political career during the Terror. Nor was he treated like an animal, as Foucault
describes the ‘mad’ in Madness and Civilisation. Once in prison (at least, until
Napoleon), he was treated as a member of his class and was envied by other prisoners
for his privileges. It would be ironic if Foucault were to classify Sade as mad in the
strictly clinical sense, given that only psychiatrists such as Iwan Bloch and ‘Jacobus

94
Sade, given his admiration for Descartes, may well have found this statement perplexing (AV: 712).

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X’ have classified Sade as such. 95 Sade certainly fits into the grey zone of those
‘diagnosed’ with ‘derangement of morals’ (MC: 66). But Foucault does not describe
Sade as mad in this sense. He notes, in Madness and Civilisation, that Sade was
described by an unnamed official as a “dreadful lunatic” who wrote in order to
“corrupt the time to come”; elsewhere, he describes Sade as not suffering from an
organic madness (MC:228; 202; also “Sergeant of Sex,” hereafter SS, p.225). Rather,
Foucault describes Sade as standing outside of the dictates of social control and of
official designations of the socially acceptable. More specifically, Sade is associated
with a discourse which is beyond the dictates of official discourse.
In the preface of Madness and Civilization, Foucault associates Sade’s Juliette
with Thrasymachus and Callicles (MC: xi-xii). 96 This association may hold the key to
understanding what, in Foucault’s dialectic, Sade represents. In the Socratic
dialogues, Thrasymachus (Republic) and Callicles (Gorgias) both argue against
Socrates on the nature and validity of moral principles. Both reject Socrates’ defence
of morality, and for this insolence in the face of officially approved philosophical
discourse, they are reduced to infuriated silence. In Sade, writes Foucault, vengeful
destruction
...is only the first phase of Sade’s thought: the ironic justification, both rational and
lyrical, the gigantic pastiche, of Rousseau. Beyond this demonstration-by-absurdity of the
inanity of contemporary philosophy beyond all its verbiage about man and nature, the real
decisions are still to be made: decisions that are also breaks, in which the links between
man and his natural being disappear…
The famous Society of the Friends of Crime, the project of a Swedish constitution,
once we remove their stinging references to the Social Contract and to the proposed
constitutions for Poland or Corsica, establish nothing but the sovereign vigour of
subjectivity in the rejection of all liberty and all natural equality… (MC: 283). 97

95
Dr. Iwan Bloch Marquis de Sade his life and works (Marquis de Sade: Der Mann Und Seine Zeit)
trans. James Bruce (New York: Castle Books, 1948); Dr. Jacobus X*** Le Marquis de Sade et son
œuvre (Paris : Charles Carrington, 1901). Both names are nom de plumes.
96
Jean Deprun notes that Sade may well have known of Plato’s Gorgias (hence Callicles), and that
there was available to Sade an excellent translation of Gorgias, by one P. Grou. See Jean Deprun “Sade
devant la “Règle d’or” In Corrado Rosso, Carminella Biondi, eds. La quête du bonheur et l’expression
de la douleur dans la littérature et la pensée françaises (Genève: Droz, 1995): 307-311, p.309.
97
Foucault associates the Society of the Friends of Crime (which forbids its members from interfering
with politics) with a Swedish Masonic conspiracy, which confuses two different episodes in the novel
Juliette.

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The madness of Sade, for Foucault, is not madness at all, but the ‘sovereign refusal’ to
take the dogmas of traditional philosophy seriously, in particular the call to keep the
appetites in check, and the doctrine of the harmony of reason with morality. The
Western canon, on this view, confines to the category of the ‘un-reason’ and
‘madness’ every viewpoint that rejects morality, just as Socrates rhetorically reduces
Thrasymachus to spluttering and coughing. Sade, then, is identified with an ancient
lineage of anti-moralists; the ‘dialectical other’ of Western thought, present since its
very inception. The association in the passage above with the Society of the Friends of
Crime, the secret society featured in the novel Juliette, is also significant. When
Socrates asks Thrasymachus how he would plan to live a life beyond the constraints
of the law, he replies that it would be necessary to form “secret societies.”98 On this
reading, Foucault’s Sade is similar to that of Crocker, insofar as he takes Sade’s voice
to be a voice in a sense acknowledged by the philosophical literature itself.
Thrasymachus is an early instance of the ‘imagined opponent’ of the philosopher who,
realizing the possibility of denying morality, seeks to defend it. Socrates had
Thrasymachus, Voltaire had his Fox, Kant had those who dismiss all morality as the
mere phantom of the imagination. Sade, in taking the place of this imagined opponent,
continues this discourse, as it were, from the other side.
Even if we grant Foucault a very broad conception of the ‘mad,’ and assume that
the ‘unreason’ incorporates the reasoned counter-morality of Thrasymachus, there is
still the issue of Sade’s placement in relation to other ‘discursive practices.’
Foucault’s rigid dichotomy of reason, philosophy and official discourse, on the one
hand, and incarceration, madness, and refusal of official discourse, on the other, does
not acknowledge the plurality of discourses in Sade’s period. If we assume, like
Foucault, that Sade’s work stands apart as a discourse of its own, it can be said that
there are at least two other discourses besides official philosophical discourse; the
libertin discourse, and the philosophe discourse. The dominant, official philosophical
discourse of 18th Century France was dominated by Catholic thought. As such, it was
largely confined to doctrinal disputes, such as that between the Jansenists and Jesuits.
The philosophes, in particular La Mettrie, Diderot, d’Holbach, and Helvétius,
constitute a different discourse altogether. These thinkers, tending towards

98
Plato The Republic trans. Desmond Lee (London: Penguin, 1987) p.112.

80
materialism and atheism, were a small, radical minority, and were considered
dangerous, as were any other writers who challenged the established order. Voltaire
had his books publicly burned by the state executioner. La Mettrie went into exile, as
did Rousseau; Diderot and Mirabeau had been locked up; Sade had himself been
imprisoned with Laclos for a time. The vanguards of atheism- d’Holbach and La
Mettrie in particular- published anonymously and went to considerable lengths to
ensure that they could deny authorship. In Sade’s age, philosophical writing, in
particular atheistic writings and critiques of religion, was itself subjected to a
confinement of sorts (Sade’s insistence that it was his philosophical writings that had
led to his imprisonment, and not his sadistic rapes, {and certainly not his ‘insanity’}
suggests that Sade himself associated imprisonment with intellectual status). 99
A third distinct, ‘para-philosophical’ discourse had also emerged owing to the
persecution of any publisher or author who challenged the clergy, the government, the
throne, or sexual mores. The Libertin novel, a mixture of atheistic freethought,
political satire, and pornography, constitutes a historically important discourse to
which Sade’s work is closely related. There is no sharp distinction between the
libertin novel and the work of the philosophes, they themselves having written a
number of key works, for example Diderot’s Les bijoux indiscrets (1748) and Boyer
d’Argen’s Thérèse philosophe (circa 1780). The philosophes also wrote tracts on such
topics as the joy of guilt-free sex (La Mettrie’s La Volupté, 1746), or the
establishment of a state brothel system for the ‘public good’ (Helvétius’ Treatise on
Man of 1758). 100 Rousseau’s penchant, in his youth, for public exhibitionism and
other ‘paraphilias,’ and Helvétius’ for having himself whipped in Parisian brothels,
further blur the distinction between Sade the ‘libertine’ and his intellectual
predecessors. 101 Philosophical (philosophe) writing in Sade’s time, simply put, was
as socially respectable as punk rock and, for anyone with something to say, was
considerably more dangerous to get involved in. This makes problematic Foucault’s
association of ‘confinement,’ ‘libertinage’ and irrationality, or the implied

99
Sade attributed his imprisonment to his “considered reflections,” although he did not start writing
until after he was first imprisoned (PB: 137).
100
For discussion on the relationship between philosophy and libertine writing, see Patrick Wald
Lasowski “Préface,” in Romanciers libertins du XVIIIe siècle ed. Patrick Wald Lasowski (Paris:
Gallimard, 2000): ix- lx.
101
Neil Schaeffer The Marquis de Sade: A Life (New York: Knopf, 1999) pp.61-62.

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identification of censorship with rationality, given that it appears that rationality was,
in the case of Sade’s philosophical influences, in a basic sense being locked away.
Foucault, we have seen, grants that Sade has enfolded all other discourse into a
new discourse all of its own, in sovereign isolation from all other discourses. Another
possibility is that Sade is aligned with another ‘sovereign discourse,’ that of the more
militant philosophe or libertin writers. Despite the garbled nature of his writing, Sade
no doubt had a point in arguing, for example, that homosexuality should be
decriminalized, and that marriage was to be avoided until it outgrew its status as
socioeconomic exploitation. In a basic sense, at least some of Sade’s work is
eminently sane. Yet there are aspects of Sade that put him beyond the designations of
‘rogue philosophe’ or even libertin author. It is common for Sade scholars to refer to
Sade as a libertine writer, and to his characters as libertines (as, indeed, they refer to
themselves). Sade referred to himself as a libertine. 102 Sade’s work is clearly
associated with this original sense of the term, being both pornographic and
philosophical, and, for the sake of convenience, I will use the term ‘libertine’ in
Sade’s sense as a convention. Yet the term ‘libertine’ did not originally refer to people
who were sadistic mass murderers. Virtually every person who has written on Sade
has accepted Sade’s usage of the term, despite the fact that it appears to be a serious
distortion of its original sense. 103 No writer, philosopher, philosophe or libertin, went
to Sade’s extreme in rejecting, not only conventional morality, but any morality at all.
It may simply be irrelevant that Sade borrowed and inverted the intended sense of
three other discourses rather than one- the libertines and philosophe authors, no doubt,
would have been as appalled at what Sade had done to their work, given that they held
essentially the same values in common. 104 The question is, once again, - is there an
internal, essential relation between Sade’s work and any other discourse, official or

102
See Sade “My Grand Letter,” February 20th 1781. Letters from Prison trans. Richard Seaver (New
York: Arcade Publishing, 1999):176-191; p.188.
103
The Larousse dictionary defines ‘libertin’ as “Qui est de mœurs très libres, qui mène une vie
dissolue,” essentially the same as the English definition: “dissolute or licentious person.” Both English
and French terms have associations with ‘free thought’, especially during the 17th and 18th Centuries,
and the libertine novel of the same period. The sense of the term has softened since the 18th century.
104
Cusset characterises libertin literature as continuous with the values of the Enlightenment, in
particular in its critique of social, moral and religious prejudice, and in bringing pleasure and reason
into harmony. See Cusset No Tomorrow p.90.

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clandestine? And precisely which discursive practices did Sade seek to absorb and
distort? That even the libertin discourse was corrupted by Sade’s treatment, perhaps
for all time, perhaps suggests the scope and depth of his disruption.
Two other points can be made against Foucault’s classification of Sade. In
Madness and Civilisation, Sade is described as an atavistic figure; a representation of
a ‘long, silent memory’ of the Occidental psyche. There is certainly something of the
arcane in Sade’s writings, in particular the preoccupation with torture. But there are
many strikingly modern aspects also; - biochemical weapons, electrocution,
descriptions of the machines of mass destruction incorporating such features as
conveyor belts and rotating knives, all arguably closer to the early modern world than
the world of centuries past (J:337-338; LNJ 2:377). 105 Also problematic is Foucault’s
association of criminality with the ‘unreason.’ Criminality in Sade’s age was
frequently simply a matter of life and death. Sade, through the character Dubois, notes
that for those born into poverty, the choice is between “Wealth, by any means
necessary, or the Wheel” (MV: 127). The whole point of Sade’s Justine (subtitled, as
it is, “the Misfortunes of Virtue”) is that only the mad would adhere so stubbornly to
morality in a world so corrupted and unjust. Some criminal groups of the period, in
particular pirates, were not only reasonable but in fact politically sophisticated.
Two critics have noted that Sade’s work has more in common with the
mechanisms of power than its opposites, a theme that will be pursued later in the
study. Sébastian Charles describes Foucault’s Sade as representing“l’introduction du
désordre du désir dans un monde dominée par l’ordre, la régularité et la
classification,” but concludes by noting that Sade himself seems to represent
mechanisms of power. 106 In similar terms, Stephen Pfohl, a sociologist, focuses on
what he perceives as an intimate connection between Classical reason and Sade’s

105
On the role of the guillotine in Sade’s work, see Lucienne Frappier-Mazur Writing the Orgy: Power
and parody in Sade trans. Gillian C. Gill (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996)
pp.124-125; Michel Delon “Sade dans la Révolution,” Il Confronto Letterario Supplemento 15
(1991):157-165, p.162.
106
Charles Sébastian Charles “Foucault lecteur de Sade: de l’infinité du discours à la finitude du
plaisir,” First International Congress Sade in North America, March 12-15; Charleston, South Carolina.
pp.7, 10.

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work, noting what he considers to be sadism within Classical reason. 107 In his book
Images of Deviance and Social Control, Pfohl notes what we have all known for half
a century now- that the truly dangerous people in the world are not, in fact, the
‘schizos’ who talk to themselves or the aliens, but those that are, as far as psychology
is concerned, completely sane; the ones that make ‘difficult decisions’ that are ‘too
complicated’ for the rest of us to understand. 108 This is the group that Pfohl sees in
Sade’s novels. In particular, he notes the “extreme individualism of classical thought.
Insomuch as classical theorizing strips individuals of all but the most instrumental
forms of calculative judgement, good intentions aside, the question must be asked: is
there not something sadistic about the isolated individual application of classical
reasoning?” Pfohl suggests that sadism, as described in Sade’s work, is an
“unacknowledged and shadowy double of classical reasoning’s abstract commitment
to rational hedonism.”

De Sade’s arguments concerning the rational benefits of systematically administered pain

resemble the arguments of his early criminological counterparts. Like sadistic
pornography, classical criminology advocates the application of strict disciplinary
punishments in isolation from the complex, contradictory, and often unequal social
landscapes within which people make choices between conformity and deviance. This is
not to reduce the logic of classical thought to the logic of sadism. It is, however, to note
disturbing historical connections between these two excessively rational modes of
thought. Each in its own way seeks to pin punishment onto individuals in isolation from
the historical complexities of their social context. Does this mean that the logic of
classical reasoning and the logic of sadism are historically intertwined? This much may
be said for sure: without some commitment to equalizing the human social conditions in
which choices for or against deviance are culturally made, the classical perspective will
favour a very specialized form of rationality- there rationality of the advantaged, the rich,
and the powerful. The rationality of the disadvantaged, the poor and the powerful will
109
either be denied or classed as deviant.

107
Stephen Pfohl “Seven Mirrors of Sade: Sex, Death, CAPITAL, and the Language of Monsters of
Sade” In Deepak Sawhney, editor, Must we Burn Sade? (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books,
1999): 51-77.
108
Stephen Pfohl Images of Deviance and Social Control: A Sociological History second edition (New
York: Mcgraw-Hill, Inc. 1994) p.1.
109
Pfohl Deviance p.95-96

84
 I am uncertain of Pfohl’s characterisation of a ‘logic of sadism’ that leads to the
‘punishing’ of people independent of their social context. Nevertheless, Pfohl’s
characterisation of Sade’s work as primarily a pornographic fantasy of power rings
true. 110 In any case, it suggests an understanding of the contents of Sade’s work that
is missing from Foucault. Significantly, both Pfohl and Foucault hold that the
positivism of the scientist is itself intrinsically sadistic. 111
In another essay, Pfohl notes that the principal characters of all of Sade’s texts
are advantaged, rich and powerful, and classify the people upon whom they prey as
weak in means and mind. 112 For Pfohl, the chief difference between Foucault’s social
engineers and jailors and the Sadeian libertines is that the libertines are interested only
in pleasure, and are quite aware of this fact. It was desire for power that attracted them
to their offices or laboratories. The clinicians and legislators of the real world,
suggests Foucault, must mask themselves; the pleasures of total control must remain
secret, their cynicism must remain hidden (HS Vol.I:86). ‘Sanity,’ for Pfohl, is loosely
defined by the ‘dominant system’ as physical and mental fidelity to a system that
rewards obedience with financial success (and with financial success, immunity) and
punishes (the) deviance (of the poor) with imprisonment or worse, apparently without
regard to notions of justice or other universal values. Pfohl finishes by citing Adorno
and Horkheimer:

As Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno observe, positivism’s claim to represent a

universal form of truth only holds within “the court of calculative judgement” in which its
methods are historically situated. In reality, positivism “adjusts the world for the ends of
self-preservation and recognizes no function other than the preparation of the object from
mere sensory material in order to make it the material of subjugation.”113

By 1975, Foucault himself had come to accept that Sade may have been more of a
disciplinarian than a figure of resistance. In a lecture dated 29th January 1975, given at
the Collège de France. In the context of a discussion on the relationship between the
‘monstrous individual’ and the law, Foucault identifies the libertines of Sade as

110
Pfohl ibid. p.134.
111
For discussion see Pfohl Deviance p.471-4; Foucault DP: 202; HS Vol. I: 45, 48.
112
Pfohl “Seven Mirrors” pp.59, 70.
113
Pfohl Deviance p.472; DE : 83-84.

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‘criminal- despots’- those who have elevated their own irrational, homicidal whims to
the state of general law.

In most of [Sade’s] novels, in Juliette in any rate, there is this regular coupling of the
monstrosity of the powerful with the monstrosity of the man of the people, the
monstrosity of the minister with the monstrosity of revolt, and their mutual complicity.
Juliette and la Dubois are obviously at the centre of this series of couples of ultrapowerful
monstrosity and rebellious monstrosity. In Sade, libertinage is always linked to the
corruption of power... [t]here are no politically neutral or average monsters in Sade;
Either they come from the dregs of the people and have risen up against established
society, or they are princes, ministers, or lords who wield a lawless superpower over all
social powers. In any case, power- the excess of power, the abuse of power, despotism- is
always the operative element of libertinage in Sade. It is this superpower that transforms
simple libertinage into monstrosity. 114

Here, the libertine figure in Sade is no longer discussed in terms of ‘desire’ or

‘representation,’ but of the potential, of socioeconomic supremacy, for abuse and
corruption. In the “Sade, Sergeant of Sex” interview, given in December of the same
year, Foucault describes Sade’s work as not “open fantasy but a carefully
programmed regulation,” and Sade himself as a “meticulous anatomist” (SS: 223).
When asked about the alleged link between Sade and Fascism, Foucault gave the
following response:

It’s a complete historical error. Nazism was not invented by the great erotic madmen of
the twentieth century but by the most sinister, boring, and disgusting petit-bourgeois
imaginable. Himmler was a vaguely agricultural type who married a nurse. We must
understand that the concentration camps were born from the conjointed imagination of a
hospital nurse and a chicken farmer. A hospital plus a chicken yard...
…It bothers me that in recent films certain elements are being used to resuscitate
through the theme of Nazism an eroticism of the disciplinary type. 115 Perhaps it was
Sade’s. Too bad then for the literary deification of Sade, too bad for Sade: he bores us.

114
Michel Foucault Abnormal: Lectures at the 1974-1975 ed. Valerio Marchetti and Antonella
Salomoni. Translated by Graham Burchell. (New York: Picador, 2003). pp.100-101.
115
Foucault is probably referring to Liliana Cavani’s film The Night Porter (1974). For discussion on
the Sadeian themes in this film, see Primo Levi The Drowned and the Saved trans. Raymond Rosenthal
(London: Abacus, 1988) pp.32, 33.

86
 He’s a disciplinarian, a sergeant of sex, an accountant of the ass and its equivalents (SS:
227).

Given Foucault’s musings on Sade’s importance over a number of years, this can
easily be read as a flippant response. Sade is reduced to a pornographic cliché (Nazis
could not be associated with Sade, according to Foucault, because they were not
‘erotic,’), and the Holocaust is completely removed from its social, historical and
intellectual contexts. Further, that there may be psychological commonalities between
the perpetrators of the killers and Sade’s characters (sadism, in particular) is not
considered. 116 At the end of the interview, however, Foucault appears to
acknowledge a certain similarity between Sade and Nazism after all, noting that both
are characterized by an excessive preoccupation with discipline and order. (Foucault
does not, however, make the association here with the January lecture, in which he
describes Sade’s libertines as figures of the corruption of power).

You know I am not for Sade’s absolute sacralization. After all, I would be willing to
admit that Sade formulated eroticism proper to a disciplinary society: a regulated,
anatomical, hierarchical society whose time is carefully distributed, its places partitioned,
characterized by obedience and surveillance (SS: 226).

This later understanding of Sade, as anatomist, disciplinarian and regulator of bodies,

is very different to that of earlier texts, and approaches the interpretation of Adorno
and Horkheimer. It suggests that Sade was close to the discourses of control, as
described by Foucault (the discourses of medicine and the penal system- of the control
of bodies and minds) if not actually speaking with the same voice. At some stage,

116
It was also common for staff of the death camps to take photographs and films of killings for their
own enjoyment, and both gas chambers and gassing-trucks had observation windows. Pleasure in
seeing the suffering of others was clearly a commonality. For discussion, see Aleksander Lasik
“Historical-Sociological Profile of the Auschwitz SS” in Yisrael Gutman and Michael Berenbaum, eds.
Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp (Bloomington: Indiana University Press in association with the
United States Holocaust Museum, 1994): 271-287, p.285.
Foucault describes the Holocaust as a petite-bourgeois dream of cleanliness, adding: “Millions of
people were murdered there, so I don’t say it to diminish the blame for those responsible for it, but
precisely to disabuse those who want to superimpose erotic values on it” (SS: 226). Even so, Foucault’s
assessment does not explain how so many Germans could have gotten the idea into their heads that
Jewish Germans, a majority of whom were bourgeois themselves, were ‘dirty.’

87
Foucault’s account of Sade is completely reversed, as if anticipating a general change
in how Sade was to be interpreted. Accordingly, Foucault’s earlier, rigid placement of
Sade outside Classical, official discourse, is problematic both in terms of
straightforward textual interpretation, and according to Foucault’s own methodology.
In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault warns against such a traditional
categorisation. The history of ideas, as he sees it, is the science of “obscure
continuities and returns” (AK: 137-138). 117 It requires that the student goes beyond
traditional assumptions as to where the various relations between types of discipline
and ‘discourse’ lie. He cautions that we should be mindful of the murky ‘discursive
unity’ of a given book with other books: “The frontiers of a book are never clear-
cut…it is caught up in a system of references to other books, other texts, other
sentences: it is a node within a network” (AK: 74). Sade’s oeuvre- Foucault knew this-
is the acme of such a work, given its myriad borrowings, plagiarisms, its references to
revolution- period conspiracy theories. Yet Foucault, arguably, commits the very fault
he cautions against in Archaeology, in not looking beyond the ‘façade of the system’
which places Sade and scientific/ medical discourse (for example) in different textual
categories. Further, Foucault- in describing Sade as the very figure of rupture and
change in two distinct aspects (the birth of modern literature, the ‘invention’ of
sadism) obscures the “field of vectors” by the anointing of a “founding saint” (AK:
144, 150).
We learn from Foucault that Sade’s work is full of descriptions of prisons, that it
is excessive and repetitive, and that it stands radically outside other discourses whilst
using them as source material. We do not learn of the specific content of his works.
Instead of discussing the ideas in Sade, or the characters, Foucault places a great deal
of significance on particular images within Sade- the figures of the sisters Justine and
Juliette, the chateau of Silling, and the lightning bolt that kills Justine. 118 He is more
concerned with striking juxtapositions, of marginal relevance to a textual
interpretation, for example the (not implausible) claim that Sade’s literary tradition is

117
Michel Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Routledge,
1995).
118
Georges van Den Abbeele discusses the lightning bolt that kills Justine in detail, noting that, for
Foucault, it represents the end of the classical episteme, the close of the age of reason, and the birth of
literature. Georges Van Den Abbeele “Sade, Foucault, and the Scene of Enlightenment Lucidity,”
Stanford French Review 11, no.1 (1987): 7-16, pp. 10, 15.

88
derived from the ‘confessional’ (HS Vol. I: 20-21). 119 Foucault also makes assertions,
without textual support, which take on significance as his interpretation of Sade
unfolds. For example, he claims that Sade wrote his works solely for his own
consumption, as shown by their ‘unreadability’ and hence their status at the ‘limit’ of
expression (HS Vol. I: 23; LI: 64-65). (Sade was in fact eager to have his work
published, {although he strenuously denied authorship of Justine and Juliette}, and to
get his plays performed in public. Money was a motive also, and Justine- far from
being unreadable, was a commercial success in its time). 120 The second problem with
Foucault’s account is its vagueness. Sade is said to represent the ‘discourse of desire,’
but what exactly this desire is, and how it is to be expressed in a purely literary sense,
is not specified. Even were it a plausible account of the relationship between the
practice of writing and the will, its relevance to Sade is not explained. The same could
be said of Foucault’s account of the ‘unthought.’ It could be that the unthought can
only be defined in negative terms, according to what it is not, but again, more work
needs to be done to demonstrate that it really is that which Sade was concerned with.
A tension emerges- Foucault both asserts that Sade is beyond a fixed representation,
as the confabulation of all representations, all theory, and yet there is the suggestion
that there is a correct interpretation. As Georges Van Den Abbeele notes, instead of
clarifying whatever worth there may be in Sade’s work, Foucault uses the term ‘Sade’
as a term for the obscure. 121 The mythos of the “poisonous de Sade” (MC: 228) would
seem to play a greater role for Foucault than his actual writings, raising questions
concerning his account of both madness and literature.
In Foucault’s work, we have some suggestions as to what may be found, but a
detailed exegesis – an internal- account, of Sade- is necessary to assess its claims.
Firstly, to reiterate, Foucault cautions against finding a fixed reference, or any simple
relationship between the author, the text, and the theorizing therein. The literary

119
This view is well argued for by Béatrice Didier, who notes the similarity between Sade’s lists of
‘virtues to be vexed’ for Justine and the catechism. See Béatrice Didier “Sade théologien” In Michel
Camus, Philippe Roger, eds.: 219-240.
120
See Maurice Lever Sade: A Biography trans. Arthur Goldhammer (San Diego, New York and
London: Harvest/ Harcourt Brace and Company, 1994) p.382.
121
Georges Van Den Abbeele writes that, given Foucault’s preference for “instantaneous illumination,”
“one can argue over whether we really know anything more or less about Sade after reading Foucault.”
Van Den Abbeele pp.12, 16.

89
version of the first interpretation- that Sade has created a mirrored, infinite repeating
of all previous discourses in order to create a new literature- may well be both
implausible and irrelevant to us, given that we are concerned with philosophical
interpretations of Sade. Yet, a philosophical version of the same account may be
pertinent. That is, Sade may have deliberately set up an endless mirroring of
philosophical doctrines, leading to the loss of all perspective, to theoretical paralysis.
Secondly, Foucault’s interpretations raise the question of what relationship Sade
has with other discourses. Was Sade standing in the position of ‘sovereign unreason,’
or the ‘accountant of the ass?’ Was Sade the subject of the Confinement, or its
doctrinal Overlord? Could he have been both at once? Where does the wedge go,
exactly?
Regardless of whether we accept Foucault’s treatment of Sade, a study on Sade
remains a project of Foucaultian interest, and there are a number of points of
association between the writings of the two figures. There is a certain resemblance,
for example, between the later Foucault’s ‘ethic’ or ‘style’ of self-overcoming, of
learning to “think differently than one thinks,” and the apparent objective of Sade’s
‘educational’ Philosophy of the Bedroom in which the reader is encouraged to follow
the example of Eugénie’s libertine education. (HS Vol. II p.8, also p.11, 69) Both
Foucault and Sade are preoccupied with the legal and ‘medical’ classification of
sexual practices. 122 There is also a common interest in the status of hermaphrodites
and other ‘intragendered’ people. Sade’s novels feature many near-hermaphrodites-
women with obstructed vaginas and penis-like clitorises –a grouping whose marginal,
quasi-moral classification Foucault was preoccupied with (HS Vol. I: 38; Sade J: 23,
1032; 120:221; LNJ vol. 1: 172; vol. 2:122, 136.). 123 Further, both Foucault and Sade
are concerned with the pleasures of power, and the injustices, class interests and

122
Both Sade and Foucault were preoccupied with the legal and moral status of sexual practices, and
both encountered the institutional control of sexuality. Sade was hung in effigy for sodomy; Foucault
was ‘diagnosed’ as a homosexual whilst in his teens. For Foucault’s discussion of the medicalisation of
homosexuality, see HS Vol. 1:40, 101,105, 119. For comments on the medicalisation and persecution
of homosexuality in Sade, see J: 237; MV: 179, 212; MM: 55; 120: 113,495.
123
Michel Foucault Les Anormaux : Cours au Collège de France, 1974-1975. (Paris : Hautes Études -
Gallimard- Seuil, 1999); Michel Foucault. Herculine Barbin dite Alexina B. (Paris : Gallimard,
collection “Les vies parallèles” 1978).

90
ulterior motives of the judicial system and related institutions (HS Vol.I:95). Yet,
despite these commonalities of interest, and Foucault’s apparent preoccupation with
Sade, Foucault does not address them in his work. As the exegesis of Sade unfolds,
we find that the relationship between Sade and Foucault, between interpreted and
interpreter, may be reversed- we may find that we learn about Foucault’s project
through reading Sade, rather than the other way around.

1.12 Conclusion.
The various interpretations of Sade’s work discussed in this chapter fall roughly
into two categories. There are those – in particular Le Brun, Adorno and Horkheimer,
Neiman, and Joyce– who either treat Sade as a philosopher in a straightforward
manner, or hold that within his work is a coherent philosophical doctrine, and hold
that it is this doctrine that is of interest, rather than other traits ( such as textual or
symbolic qualities). Others, in particular Foucault and Bataille, find Sade’s work of
philosophical interest, yet withhold from Sade the honorific ‘philosopher,’ deeming
the philosophical passages in Sade of secondary importance. Bataille and Foucault
hold that Sade reveals a side to human nature that is typically occulted from
philosophical discourse, yet Bataille dismisses Sade’s philosophical passages as
merely tiresome, and Foucault describes his work variously as a pastiche, or as a
textual sublimation of desire. Likewise, for Camus, Sade is not so much a thinker as a
‘dreamer of revenge.’
The question is: Sade a philosopher, or not? If not a philosopher exactly, is he of
philosophical interest, nonetheless? If so, what is it about his work that is so
interesting? Does he have some utility as an object of philosophical speculation (on
the nature of sexuality, or of evil, perhaps), or is he a thinker in his own right who
ought to be engaged with as such? If Sade engages with other thinkers and
discourses, what is the nature of this engagement? Does Sade merely absorb other
thinkers into a satirical collage, or hurl abuse, or does he approach other thinkers in a
thoughtful and sophisticated manner? What are Sade’s primary philosophical
concerns, and are they the same concerns that have been attributed to him by his
admirers and critics? And what, exactly, is the range and depth of Sade’s thought?
Finally, is his thought readable in a straightforward manner, and is it coherent (as
suggested by Gorer and Le Brun), or is it purposefully multidimensional and resistant

91
to linear interpretation? The remainder of this study will attempt to clarify these
issues.

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 Chapter II: MACHINE MAN
Sade’s Ontologies

You are not a beautiful and unique snowflake. You are the same decaying organic matter
as everything else and we are all part of the same compost pile.
Chuck Palahniuk, Fight Club 1

2.1 Introduction.

It is not possible to discuss Sade’s thoughts on sexuality, psychology, ethics, or

other topics without beginning with his ontological assumptions, which are the
conceptual foundation of his thought. Sade gave very little attention to this aspect of
his thought, however, and typically takes the cogency of his ontology for granted. As
such, this chapter will be brief.
Few of Sade’s critics who assume the presence of a philosophy in Sade mention
Sade’s ontology at all. Those that interpret Sade’s thought as a path that leads directly
from materialism to moral nihilism have not sought to track this trajectory. Nor have
they accounted for the fact that other thinkers (d’Holbach, La Mettrie, Diderot) with
essentially the same ontology were not themselves nihilistic (beyond stating, as does
Le Brun, that Sade was simply a more coherent thinker).
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, Sade’s ontology draws heavily from the
materialism of his age. In brief, Sade is an empiricist of sorts, stating, in the early
work Dialogue between a Priest and a Dying Man, that “I am convinced only by
evidence, and evidence is provided by my senses alone” (MV: 152). He rejects the
argument from design, the notion of a divine creator, or immortal soul; assumes that
humans lack unique properties that distinguish them from animals, reduces mental
phenomena to physical processes, and assumes hard determinism to be true. The
question, which will be the topic of the following chapters, is whether the ethical
principles that Sade draws from this ontology are warranted.

1
Chuck Palahniuk Fight Club (New York: Verso, 1996) p. 134.

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2.2 God and Creation.
Sade rejects the argument from design; both the idea that there are grounds for
believing in a ‘first cause,’ and that the natural world suggests the work of a divine
creator. Sade, in a manner similar to that of David Hume, argues that conceptual
confusion is responsible for the notion of a first cause. States Madame Delbène (in
Juliette, 1797): “cause was the name given to all beings that bring about some change
in another being distinct from themselves, and effect the word for any change wrought
by whatever cause in whatever being. As this terminology gives rise in us, at best, to a
very muddled idea of being, of action, of reaction, of change, the habit of employing it
in time led people to believe they had clear-cut and precise perceptions of these
things, and they finally reached the stage of fancying there could exist a cause which
was not a being or a body either, a cause which was really distinct from all
embodiment and which, without movement, without action, could produce every
imaginable effect” (J:35). Sade, in denying a traditional teleology, proposes that the
mere appearance of purposeful design in the cosmos does not entail its significance.
From Sade’s Dialogue between a Priest and a Dying Man (1782):

PRIEST: And so everything in the world is necessary?

DYING MAN: Of course.

PRIEST: But if all is necessary, there must be order in everything?

DYING MAN: Who argues that there is not?

PRIEST: But who or what is capable of the order that exists if not an all-powerful,
supremely wise hand?

DYING MAN: Will not gunpowder explode of necessity when lit by a match?
PRIEST: yes.
DYING MAN: And where is the wisdom in that?
PRIEST: There isn’t any.
DYING MAN: So you see it is possible that there are things which are necessary but were
not wisely made, and it follows that it is equally possible that everything derives from a
first cause in which there may be neither reason nor wisdom (MV:153). 2

2
This passage may allow for a Bataillian reading. The traditional association of ‘reason’ with the
‘cosmos’ is severed; reason is not the royal road to the Absolute. The universe may simply be pure
chaos; to achieve understanding here may require surrendering reason itself.

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 Likewise, Madame Delbène argues that “the universe runs itself....[it] is an
assemblage of like entities which act and react mutually and successively with and
against each other; I discern no start, no finish, no fixed boundaries, this universe I see
only as an incessant passing from one state into another, and within it only particular
beings which forever change shape and form, but I acknowledge no universal cause
behind and distinct from the universe and which gives it existence and which procures
the modifications in the particular beings composing it” (J:43; similar: LNJ 1:80,136,
137,). 3 Were the world in fact created by God, Sade’s characters note, the suffering
of the world would suggest that the Creator is evil (repeating one of the most popular
arguments applied by the philosophes). 4 Saint- Fond, one of the few theistic
libertines in Sade’s works, develops this claim into an entire theology: “I see eternal
and universal evil as absolutely indispensable in the world. The author of the universe
is the most wicked, the most ferocious, the most horrifying of all beings. His works
cannot be anything but the incarnation of his criminality. Without his wickedness
raised to its extremist pitch, nothing would be sustained in the universe” (J: 400). This
doctrine is developed into a reductionist account of life itself, described in terms of
“the perpetual re-entry and emergence of wicked elements into and out of the matrix
of maleficent molecules” (J: 400). 5 Saint-Fond argues that the good man is in fact evil
as he does not follow the universal principle towards evil: [t]he man you speak of is
merely feeble, and feebleness is an evil.” As punishment in this world, such a person
is condemned to suffer at the hands of the weak: “[w]eaker than the absolutely and
entirely vicious being, and more completely engulfed by the maleficent molecules
with which his elementary dissolution will conjoin him, this man will have to suffer a
great deal more: and there, precisely, is what ought to oblige every man to render
himself in this world as vicious and wicked as possible” (J: 398). Clairwil, in reply,
3
In La Nouvelle Justine Sade discusses man as being a ‘product of movement’ also. In a typically
appalling passage, a character describes the convulsive movements of a recently killed victim as
‘proof’ of the ‘movement’ which is an innate property of matter. This is most probably a reference to
the experiments conducted by Luigi Galvani (1737-1798) with frog’s legs and electrical currents (LNJ
2: 244).
4
For discussion, see Neiman pp.188-189.
5
This thesis is similar to the reconstituted Satanism of Alaister Crowley (1875-1947) and Anton LaVey
(1930-1997), according to which Satan is a personification of natural forces. Saint Fond explains that
the ‘maleficent molecules’ “compose what poets and others of ardent imagination have named
demons” (J: 398).

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states that Saint-Fond’s system is “the most bizarre of all the systems yet to have
occurred to the mind of man,” suggesting that he has simply invented his own god in
order to hate him. Saint- Fond’s theology is not endorsed by any other character, but
functions as a scathing satire on religious belief (similar: LNJ 2: 40, AV: 431,
433,434). 6
Sade also draws attention to those natural phenomena that count against the
notion of a benevolent God who creates humans in his own image, or in accordance
with traditional gender identity or sexual role, such as ‘monsters,’ or women without
uteruses or with penis- like clitorises (J: 23, 1032; 120:221,602; LNJ. 1: 172; 2: 122,
136,). The general point here is that direct observation of the world provides ample
grounds to doubt the verity of its traditional descriptions.

2.3 Non- uniqueness of humans.

Sade holds that there is no immortal soul, no distinction between humans and other
life forms, and, ultimately, no fundamental difference between life forms and
inanimate matter. To account for the ‘illusion’ that there exists a soul that inhabits an
otherwise inert body, he argues that the ‘self’ itself is an idea created by the memory
of successive impressions―again in the manner of the British Empiricists. From La
Nouvelle Justine (1797) “...ce corps est un machine sensible...la conscience
momentanée de l’impression qu’il reçoit et la conscience du moi, par le souvenir des
impressions successivement éprouvées” (LNJ 1: 242). Against the notion of an
immortal soul, Madame Delbène states: “supposing this soul to exist, tell me, if you
please, how one can avoid recognizing its total dependence upon the body and the fact
that it must share in all the vicissitudes of the body’s fate” (J:44). She goes on to
define the soul, as a distinct entity, out of existence, as “nothing other than matter
subtilized to a certain degree, by the means of which refinement it acquires the
faculties that so amaze us...”(J:49). Whether the soul is an acting or a thinking
principle, she argues, its materiality is demonstrable by “two irrefutable syllogisms”:

6
For discussion, see Schmid Le soufre au bord de la chaire p.31. Jean M. Goulemot writes that the
idea that evil in some sense balances the good in the world is derived from Diderot (AV: n. 366, p.832).
Manichaeism was a popular topic among the philosophes in general. Sade also writes in a positive, if
ambiguous, way about Deism in Aline et Valcour (AV: 235, 354).

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 (1) As active principle it is divisible: for the heart, long after its separation from the body,
preserves its action continuing to beat; 7 now, whatever is susceptible of division is
material. (2) Whatever is susceptible of structural degeneration is material, that which is
essentially spirit cannot deteriorate; well the soul is affected by the condition of the body,
the soul is weak in youthful bodies, decrepit in superannuated frames; it thus undergoes
corporeal influence, anything that degenerates structurally is material: the soul declines
and hence it is material (J:49-50; similar: LNJ 1: 1 94, 243, 245; LNJ 2 : 232, 241 ;
AV:264, 266).

Sade describes mental events in terms of physical phenomena. The following passage
is typical (note that Sade only discusses mental events when discussing pleasure; he
does not discuss nerves, electrical fluid and so on in any other context).

Those little murmurs you hear, my good friend, are caused by my extremely sensitive
nervous system ; the objects which excite our passions create such a lively commotion in
the electrically charged fluid that flows in our nerves, the shock received by the animal
spirits composing this fluid is of such a degree of violence, that the entire mechanism is
rattled by these effects, and one is just as powerless to suppress one’s cries when
overwhelmed by the terrible blows imparted by pleasure, as one would be when assailed
by the powerful emotions of pain (120:489; also LNJ 1:362; 2:110).

Sade rejects the notion of human uniqueness on the grounds that there are
physiological similarities with other animals. 8 In La Nouvelle Justine, Sade’s
character Bressac argues that turtles, midges and humans are essentially the same, as
they are brought into being by the same ‘movements’ and are each equally ‘modified’
to suit their way of life, and concludes that it is not correct to speak of the
‘superiority’ of one organism over the next. Similarly, in Juliette, Braschi (Giovanni
Angelo Braschi, Pope Pius VI {1717-1799}) argues that “the rot-spawned worm is of
no less nor more considerable value in my eyes than the mightiest king on earth” (LNJ

7
This is similar to La Mettrie, who describes an experiment in which the heart is removed from a live
frog. La Mettrie pp.26-27.
8
Sade follows the thought of his age. Against Descartes’ argument as to the uniqueness of humans,
Bayle had noted the contingencies of human intelligence, rejecting the idea that there was such a thing
as a uniquely human soul. In his Dictionary, he referred to earlier thinkers who had proposed the
intellectual superiority of birds and even social insects over humans. See Bayle: 213, 224-228, 234,
240. See also Crocker Age of Crisis p. 85.

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2: 234-235; similar: LNJ: 1: 151, 2:234, 235; J: 781). In denying the uniqueness of
humanity, human reason itself is demoted from sign of our divine nature, or the means
to a higher truth. Instead, it is described as mere adaptation; the “scales we weigh
objects in... the faculty given me by Nature whereby I may dispose myself in a
favourable sense toward such-and-such an object....depending upon the amount of
pleasure or pain I derive from these objects...”J: 34). Sade’s vision reduces the
human, hence the political order, and human history, to the physical order of things.
For Sade, there are no Messiahs, anointed kings or heroes, no divine plan and no
historical progress. Men’s actions are nothing more than the outcome of natural laws
(J: 121). History is simply the record of atrocities perpetuated by exceptionally
powerful individuals, propelled by their passions rather than by reason, their lust for
power and their cruelties the result of innate dispositions. Here Sade follows the
reasoning of Helvétius, who had suggested that the destruction of ‘popery’ in
England was due to the “great acrimony of the seminal matter” of Henry VIII, and
d’Holbach, who held that “blood too much enflamed in a conqueror, a painful
indigestion in the stomach of a monarch, a whim that passes in the mind of a woman,
are sometimes causes sufficient to bring on war, to send millions of men to the
slaughter, to root out an entire people...to spread desolation far and wide upon the
surface of our globe.” 9 The Great Man is merely a volcano, a shudder of the tectonic
plates, “vomited forth from nature...to aid her in destruction” (J: 582-583; LNJ:
2:242). Sade described politics exclusively in terms of the tyranny of such Great Men,
a topic discussed in Chapter VII. Notably, Sade does not acknowledge the logical gap
between the rejection of the traditional teleology, and the rejection of the
meaningfulness of human history.

2.4 Death.
Sade describes living systems as being continuous with dead matter, a view derived
from the thought of the philosophes. Helvétius states that the blood that “carries
nutrition to all the members of a child, and successively enlarges every part, is a
principle of destruction,” as it eventually “ossifies the vessels, destroys their springs,

9
D’Holbach System of Nature Vol. I. Adapted from the trans. by H.D. Robinson (London: Clinamen
Press, 1999) p.42; Helvétius A Treatise on Man; his Intellectual Faculties and his Education (1758)
trans. W. Hooper (2 vols.) (New York: Burt Franklin, 1969) I: 34.

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and produces the seeds of death.” 10 Likewise, for Bayle, living things are essentially
“matter modified.” 11 This eradication of the dichotomy of the living and the dead is a
direct consequence of the denial of the existence of an immortal soul. Death is taken
to be necessary aspect of the cycle of creation, destruction and regeneration. Braschi
explains:

In all living things the principle of life is no other than that of death; at the same time we
receive the one we receive the other, we nourish both within us, side by side. At the
instant we call death, everything seems to dissolve; we are led to think so by the
excessive change that appears to have been brought about in this portion of matter which
no longer seems animate. But this death is only imaginary, it exists figuratively but in no
other way....[t]here is, in the final analysis, no essential difference between this first life
we receive and this second, which is the one we call death (J:769-770).

The principle according to which death is a part of the natural cycle does not entail,
as Sade suggests, that life itself is illusory. One can assume that death is a part of life
and still maintain that there are some basic differences between sentient life and the
general furniture of the world. Also implausible is Sade’s crude reduction of human
life to natural processes. He assumes that, because our bodies nourish further life
(fruit trees, insects, and so on) we ourselves do not die. 12 In keeping with his
reduction of human existence to the natural order of things, humans are reduced to
undifferentiated biomass. 13 He does not acknowledge a relevant ethical distinction
between fertilized eggs and newborn babies, or between people and dirt. Accordingly,
Sade’s characters describe murdering a person as trivial; like breaking a glass, or
killing a chicken. Victims (and only victims) are reduced to pure means, or physical
characteristics, or a mere ‘scum’ or ‘vapour’ thrown up by mundane earth processes.
They are referred to variously as “pleasure – machines,” “robots” (automates), or
“lust-objects”; “material suitable to answer voluptuous purposes” with “charming

10
Helvétius A Treatise on Man; his Intellectual Faculties and his Education (1758). trans. W. Hooper
(2 vols). (New York: Burt Franklin, 1969) Vol. II p.126.
11
Bayle p.300. See also Voltaire Candide p. 309; Denis Diderot Political Writings trans. John Hope
Mason and Robert Wokler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992) p. xxxii; also Diderot’s
Early philosophical works trans. Margaret Jourdain (New York: Burt Franklin, 1972) pp.12-13, 39.
12
For discussion, see Warman p.165.
13
This is similar to La Mettrie, p.91.

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physiognomy” or “commodities” - “we’d rape it first, murder it afterward” (J: 147,
206, 760-761, 870, 910, 1040; MV: 115). 14 This rhetoric rather obfuscates Sade’s
ethical discourses; where he discusses, for example, abortion, he is not defending
women’s rights so much as the ethical triviality of killing children, or in fact, anyone
at all (J:68; ΠIII:241; similar: PB:249). 15 In Philosophy in the Bedroom, Sade,
through the character Dolmancé, states:

This destruction of which man is wont to boast is, moreover, nothing but an illusion;
murder is no destruction; he who commits it does not but alter forms, he gives back to
Nature the elements whereof the hand of this skilled artisan instantly re-creates other
beings: now, as creations cannot but afford delight to him by whom they are wrought, the
murderer thus prepares for Nature a pleasure most agreeable, he furnishes her materials,
she employs them without delay, and the act fools have had the madness to blame is
nothing but meritorious in the universal agent’s eye. It is our pride that prompts us to
elevate murder into crime. Esteeming ourselves the foremost of the universe’s creatures,
we have stupidly imagined that every hurt this sublime creature endures must perforce be
an enormity; he have believed Nature would perish should our marvellous species chance
to be blotted out of experience,… but what an inconsequence, Eugénie! (my italics; PB:
238; similar: AV: 239; LNJ 1: 108, 147,363; 2:73, 111,162). 16

The view that death is not to be feared is on firmer ground; as the time before one’s
life is impossible to imagine, it is not reasonable to fear death. Advises Delbène;

And, pray tell, what were you before birth? ...Several unqualified lumps of unorganized
matter as yet without definite form or at least lacking any form you can hope to
remember. Well, you’re going to turn back into those same or similar lumps of matter,
you’re going to become the raw material out of which new beings will be fashioned, and
this will happen when natural processes bring it about.

... [e]h Juliette, have you existed since the beginning of time? No; and does that fact make
you grieve and despair? Have you any better cause to despair at the fact that you’re not

14
see also Fauskevåg pp. 16, 56, 90,156, 56.
15
Sade’s much vaunted calls for the abolition of the death sentence, accordingly, are inconsistent (AV:
332, 336, 613).
16
Note that Sade’s character insists of the incorrectness of ‘pride’, despite the fact that the ‘libertines’
are clearly proud of themselves and regard modesty a ‘false’ virtue. For discussion, see Lacombe Sade
et ses masques (Paris: Payot, 1974) pp. 217, 218,220, 221.

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 going to exist till the end of time? La la, calm yourself, my pigeon; the cessation of being
affrights only the imagination that has created the execrable dogma of an afterlife (49). 17

2.5 Naturalism vs. Non-Naturalism

As noted in Chapter I, Sade’s work presents to the reader what frequently appears
to be a mass of incompatible theories, which would account for the massive
divergences of interpretation. To borrow Eric S. Raymond’s analogy, I suggest that
Sade was more interested in establishing a doctrinal bazaar, rather than constructing a
cathedral. 18 Most philosophical works are ‘cathedrals,’ constructed by individuals in
isolation, with stable, monolithic literary- philosophical identities. Sade’s work, by
contrast, is a bazaar- a cacophony of voices and ideas, with the goal of imposing upon
the reader an overall effect (such as profound moral self-analysis, perhaps, or total
moral confusion), rather than a singular revelation, in mind. Structurally, Sade does
not present ideas in a linear fashion, but as mutually opposed ideologies. The fact that
these are always presented as paired oppositions (women are equal to men/ women
are not equal to men; anarchy is desirable/ anarchy would only reinforce existing
power structures; crime is pleasurable/ crime does not exist, and so on) suggests- to a
point- that this is a deliberate feature of his work. Sade’s work unfolds as a series of
diptychs. To a large extent, the following chapters will be concerned with identifying
what these opposing doctrines are, and how they engage with one another.
Sade proposes two alternatives to the traditional Judaeo- Christian teleology
proposed concerning moral guidance. On the one hand, Sade’s characters negotiate a
solution to their mutual desires, in the absence of moral absolutes, resolutely avoiding
any notion of teleological thinking. In particular, Braschi, in Juliette, proposes that
there is no relationship between man and nature such that a morality can be derived
from the order of things. In the same vein, other characters develop a mutually
beneficial strategy of reciprocation rather than a morality as such. This response to
the problem of morality, and the free will problem, will be discussed in Chapter V. In

17
In The Misfortunes of Virtue, a different approach is given. Whereas Delbène speaks of death as a
welcome release to everyone, Justine acknowledges that her own death is only welcomed because of
the life she has lead- “Death is to be feared only by those fortunate enough to lead pure, cloudless
lives” (MV: 142).
18
Eric S. Raymond makes this analogy with regards to traditional versus open –source, Linux- type
software development models.

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Chapter VI, I will discuss the non-transcendental teleology that Sade’s characters
propose. This doctrine holds that the world is driven by an underlying Telos, a Nature
characterized by endless strife and domination, and that humans are obliged to
participate in it through remorseless assertion of their strength and power. In the
following chapter, Sade’s reductionist conception of mental processes is further
discussed. In Chapter IV, the implications of the rejection of a traditional Judaeo-
Christian teleology as regards to sexuality will be discussed.

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 Chapter III: ENIGMA OF THE WILL
Psychology

Moralists, by a clearer insight into the evil, will naturally acquire a

clearer skill in the cure.
Helvétius 1

3.1 Introduction.
On the subject of psychology, Sade presents himself as engaged in several tasks.
Firstly, he presents himself as a diagnostician of the human condition, in particular the
capacity for the enjoyment of cruelty and destruction. This aspect of Sade’s writing is
continuous with his literary self-image of scientific thinker. Sade frequently insists
that his ‘tableaux’ will “help toward the development of the human spirit,” and
lambastes the “stupid restraint of those who venture to write upon such matters...
Inhibited by absurd fears, they only discuss the puerilities with which every fool is
familiar, and dare not, by addressing themselves boldly to the investigation of the
human heart, offer its gigantic idiosyncrasies to our view” (PB: 670, 671; similar
120:106, J: 175n, 1122). As such, Sade makes a significant, if somewhat obvious,
advance over those philosophers (Hobbes, for example) who had claimed that a desire
for cruelty in the human soul simply does not exist. 2 Sade also contributes to moral
thought in discussing the appeal of immoral conduct, although this was apparently not
his intention.
Sade’s second adopted role is that of the defiant critic of conventional morality,
and what we would term ‘normalization.’ In the essay “Reflections on the Novel”
(1800), Sade adopts the role of one who has evaluated, according to the standards of

1
Helvétius Essays on the Mind (De L’Esprit, 1758) trans. Anon. (New York: Burt Franklin, 1970)
p.120.
2
Hobbes writes: “[c]ontempt, of little sense, of the calamity of others is that which men call
CRUELTY, proceeding from security of their own fortune. For, that any man should take pleasure in
other men’s great harms without other end of his own I do not conceive it possible.” Thomas Hobbes
Leviathan (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 1994). p.32.

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philosophy and science (in particular materialism), the assumptions that have branded
him a deviant, and found himself vindicated.

…when man has weighed and considered all his restrictions, when, with a proud look his
eyes gauge his barriers, when, like the Titans, he dares to raise his bold hand to heaven,
and, armed with his passions…he no longer fears to declare war against those who in
times past were a source of fear and trembling to him, when his aberrations now seem to
him naught but errors rendered legitimate by his studies-should we then not speak to him
with the same fervor as he employs in his own behavior? (Sade’s italics; 120: 113-114).

That role for which Sade is best known is that of the proponent of the ‘doctrine of
libertinage,’ a proposal for a project, on ostensibly hedonistic grounds, of
psychological self-sculpting for the attainment of superior pleasures. In the absence
(in non- Naturalist mode) of any Telos or higher ideal, the libertines have only this
project to pursue. This chapter will outline these aspects of Sade’s work, and the way
in which the three roles interrelate.

3.2 Theory of Pleasure: Materialist model

Sade holds that the experience of pleasure is due to the movement of ‘animal spirits’
or ‘molecules’ within the brain, and that the intensity of pleasure is proportional to the
‘violence’ of the movement of these objects. Hence, Sade associates extremes of
experience with extremes of pleasure. The following description of the pleasure of
violence, from The 120 Days, is typical: “[the Duc] noticed that a violent commotion
inflicted upon any kind of an adversary is answered by a violent thrill in our own
nervous system; the effect of this vibration, arousing the animal spirits which flow
within these nerves’ concavities, obliges them to exert pressure on the erector nerves
and to produce in accordance with this perturbation what is termed a lubricious
sensation” (120:200). The taste for the horrific, the hideous and the nauseating are
explained in similarly reductionist terms- the most pleasing experience is simply that
which exerts the greatest force on the nervous system (120: 233, 489; J :95, 286-287,
845, 1172 ; LNJ 2 :108). 3

3
This idea is probably derived from Helvétius, who describes the sublime in materialist terms: “[t]he
more lively the sensation is, the more beautiful the verse appears, and when it makes the strongest
impression possible it becomes sublime. It is therefore by the greater or less force that we distinguish
the beautiful from the sublime.” Helvétius Treatise on Man Vol. II p.229.

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 Yet Sade does not hold that there is a direct correlation between bodily sensation
and pleasure. He also rejects the assumption, made by Bentham, that pleasure and
pain are opposite poles of a single continuum. 4 Like Gilbert Ryle, Sade notes that
one’s mood determines whether a particular sensation is experienced as pleasurable or
unpleasant, and that neither pleasure nor pain can be defined in terms of a localized
bodily sensation; like Nietzsche, Sade occasionally describes pleasure and pain in
terms of gradients of the same physical processes. 5 As noted in the quote above,
Sade holds that the imagination of the subject will dictate whether a stimulus is
experienced as pleasurable or painful. Each person, he argues, experiences pleasure
in their own unique way. 6 Painful sensations become pleasurable to very blasé
people. Observes Sade, “[i]s there anything commoner to see, on the one hand, people
who have accustomed their palates to a pleasurable irritation, and next to them, others
who couldn’t put up with that irritation for an instant?” (J: 267; similar; PB: 280).
From the short story Eugenie de Franval:

happiness is an abstraction, it is a product of the imagination; it is a way of being moved,

which depends entirely on our way of seeing and feeling; apart form the satisfaction of
our needs, there is no one way of making all men feel equally happy; every day we see
one individual become happy through something which is totally displeasing to another;
there is therefore no certain happiness, no other can exist for us except that which we

4
William P. Alson “Pleasure,” In Paul Edwards, Ed. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Volume 6 (New
York: The Macmillan Company & the Free Press, 1967) 341-347, p.341.
5
See Gilbert Ryle The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1958) chapter 4. Writes Nietzsche:
“There are even cases in which a kind of pleasure is conditioned by a certain rhythmic sequence of little
unpleasurable stimuli: in this way very rapid increase of the feeling of power, the feeling of pleasure, is
achieved. This is the case, e.g., in tickling, also the sexual tickling in the act of coitus; here we see
displeasure at work as an ingredient of pleasure.” Friedrich Nietzsche The Will to Power trans. Walter
Kaufman & R.J. Hollingdale (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967) section 699 (March –June
1888) p.371.
6
This view coheres with recent findings in neurobiology. Recent research conducted by Patrick
MacLeod suggests that the neurons associated with the sensation of pleasure are not specialised.
Instead, they integrate the ‘images’ given by the different senses, of which some are called up by
memory, and others may be set by one’s culture. Further, no-one has the same sensation of taste. Jean-
Yves Nau “Les neurosciences découvrent les sources du plaisir sensorial,” Le Monde Mercredi 31
Décembre 2003.

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 make for ourselves as a result of our constitutions and our principles!” In Eugenie de
Franval (GT: 46; similar: J: 317).

The imagination is thought to modify and transform bodily sensation. 7 Many

pleasures described in his work are entirely ‘imaginary’ in nature, for example the
pleasure of blasphemy, or speculations on the possibility of a crime that perpetuates
itself decades after one’s death (J: 294, 369, 525). Some characters assert that the
imagination is the only source of pleasure. 8 The character Durand, speaking of sex,
states that “[t]he imagination is the only cradle where pleasures are born, it alone
creates, fashions, orients them; where the imagination is still, when it does not
contribute inspiration or embellishment, all that remains is the physical act, dull, gross
and brutish” (J:1127, also 184; similar: LNJ1 :354, 355). 9 Sade’s mental model holds
that the imagination is itself an entirely physical process, and his language implies
that one can directly introspect and influence one’s own mental processes. From
Juliette: “enable [your philosophy] to forge, to weave, to create new fantasies which,
injecting energies into the voluptuous atoms, cause them to collide at greater speed
and more potently with the molecules they are to make vibrate: these vibrations are
your delight” (J: 341; also LNJ 1:361). An implication of this scheme is that, with
sufficient training, one could learn to enjoy any sensation. (Other passages, however,

7
Fauskevåg notes a similarity here with the description of the imagination offered by Nicolas Bergasse
(1750-1832) (Fauskevåg p. 74). Sade scholars frequently note, erroneously, that Justine and Juliette go
through the same experiences, and yet only Juliette experiences them as pleasurable, owing to her
greater ‘sophistication’ as a libertine. Whilst working as a prostitute, Juliette complains of rough,
“insulting” handling at the hands of clients, and negotiates with the Pope and other characters so that
she does not come to harm (J: 128, 199, 756). Juliette is a moderately powerful figure throughout the
novel, being both politically connected and wealthy, and for most of the time she is in complete control
of her situation. Justine, on the other hand, is powerless throughout the novel. She is branded-
physically, with an iron, as a prostitute (as was customary in Sade’s age), has toes cut off and is finally
killed by a bolt of lightning. Juliette never suffers such things. For discussion, see Jean-Pierre Han,
Jean-Pierre Valla, “A propos” p.109.
8
This is similar to the view of La Mettrie, who held that illusions were preferable to reality, so long as
they are more pleasurable. La Mettrie p.125.
9
Sade’s account of the imagination is not entirely positive. In Juliette, Madame Delbène states that the
imagination is the source of “all our errors,” God, in particular ( J: 36).

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imply that the imagination is not subordinate tot the will; as soon as the sexual act is
complete, notes one character, the ‘voluptuous illusion’ vanishes) . 10
The materialist model cannot account for more complex pleasures, in particular
that of overcoming the ‘chimerical ties’ that prevent us from doing terrible things to
one another, or of the pleasure of cruelty (LNJ 2: 190). Accordingly, Sade discusses
intellectual pleasures, in particular the sense of liberation afforded by intellectual
analysis, and the pleasure of reflection and analysis itself.

3.3 Theory of Pleasure: Intellectual aspect.

Sade makes a distinction between ‘physical happiness,’ explicable (Sade thinks)
according to the materialistic model, and ‘intellectual happiness.’ Saint-Fond, in
advising Juliette on the pleasures of torturing a girl, explains:

The felicity I recommend to you will be infinitely keener; beyond the physical happiness
acquired from enjoyment, there will be intellectual happiness born of the comparison
between her fate and yours; for happiness consists more in comparisons of this sort than
in actual physical enjoyments. It is a thousand times sweeter to say to oneself, casting an
eye upon unhappy souls, I am not such as they, and therefore I am their better, than
merely to say, Joy is unto me, but my joy is mine amidst people who are just as happy as
I. It is other’s hardships which cause us to experience our enjoyments to the full;
surrounded by persons whose happiness is equal to ours, we would never know
contentment or ease… (Sade’s italics; J: 1161).

Sade applies this principle to socioeconomic relations, hence universalizing the

principle of the ‘intellectual pleasure’ of sadism. The pleasure of amassing wealth for
Sade is essentially the pleasure of perceiving oneself as better off than one’s
fellows. 11 Consequently, any attempt to achieve happiness for all through economic
equality will fail. As the pleasure of wealth is not due to the direct bodily sensations
that it affords, but the perception of one’s own station as being above that of others, it

10
La Nouvelle Justine, in Sade Œuvres complètes édition mise en place par Annie le Brun et Jean-
Jacques Pauvert (Pauvert: Paris, 1986-1991) Vol. 9 p.448; quoted in Fauskevåg p.76.
11
Steven Pinker holds a similar view. He notes that the poor of industrialized nations are materially far
better off than the aristocracy of a century ago, yet are still less happy (and die younger) than the more
wealthy. This is because, he says, people’s sense of well-being “comes from an assessment of their
social status.” Steven Pinker The Blank Slate (London: Penguin, 2002) p.304

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is a psychological impossibility to make everyone equally happy. Whether through
simple sadism or acquisition, one is happy because one knows that others are not.

S’il y a, je le suppose, dix portions de bonheur dans une société composée de dix
personnes, les voilà toutes égales, et, par conséquent, aucune d’elles ne peut se flatter
d’être plus que l’autre ; si, au contraire, un des individus de cette société parvient à priver
les neuf autres de leur portion de bonheur pour les réunir sur sa tête, assurément il sera
véritablement heureux ; car il pourra dès lors établir des comparaisons qu’il lui était
impossible de concevoir auparavant. Le bonheur ne gît pas dans tel ou tel état de l’âme : il
consiste dans la seule comparaison de son état à celui des autres, et quelle comparaison
reste-t-il à faire, quand tout le monde nous ressemble ? Si tout le monde possédait une
fortune égale, en serait-il un seul qui osât se dire riche? (my italics; LNJ 2:109, also
p.147; J: 411).

Sade makes some problematic assumptions concerning the pleasure of cruelty,

however. His characters associate its pleasure with a ‘delicate’ imagination and
‘excessive sensibility;’ accordingly, they associate it with sophistication (J: 1179). 12
Elsewhere, this very sensitivity is described as, not refinement, but receptiveness to
brute physical processes- the destructive Will: “…the more sensitive an individual,
the more sharply this atrocious Nature will bend him into conformance with evil’s
irresistible laws…” (J: 991n). Both views are in conflict with another central Sadeian
premise- that a taste for cruelty is a universal trait (PB: 255). This conflict can be
resolved by asserting that the libertines are simply more ‘authentic,’ and that most
people lack the opportunity or the strength to assert their natures. The assumption that
the rarity (of being “unique in one’s species” [J: 218]) of the taste for cruelty is an
indication of ‘refinement’ or ‘delicacy,’ however, is questionable, even if we were to
accept (against Sade’s own reasoning) that the trait is so rare (Sade notes
anthropological and historical sources, and numerous traveller’s accounts, including
his own, to support the claim that people have an innate taste for cruelty). 13 Secondly,

12
This association is found in the work of Sade scholars. Béatrice Didier, for example, draws a
distinction between “sadisme dégénéré” and “sadisme proprement dit [....] Ce serait une excitation du
désir produite par la vue ou par la représentation mentale ou esthétique de la souffrance d’autrui.”
Didier Sade: Un écriture du désir p.129.
13
In his Voyage d’Italie, Sade writes of a cocagne he witnessed in Naples: “the most barbarous
spectacle in the world that one can possibly imagine.” This involved a public festival in which food
was displayed in a public square; at the shot of a cannon, people were permitted to grab what they

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what the pleasure of cruelty amounts to in Sade is limited to ‘active schadenfreude;’
that is, the infliction of pain on another in order to enjoy the spectacle of their
misfortune, the enjoyment of seeing that another person is suffering (rather than the
aesthetic or ‘intellectual’ appeal of such a spectacle). From the pleasures of making a
pretty girl cry by cutting off her hair, to gluing someone to a toilet seat, or giving an
especially traumatic lecture on nihilism, through to the most elaborate mechanized
tortures, the motive is essentially the same (120: 589, 605; LNJ 1:140). That is not to
say that aesthetic or intellectual pleasures are not discussed in Sade; simply that the
pleasure of cruelty as such is not truly aesthetic or intellectual.
Sade does not recognize a dichotomy between pleasure and the workings of the
intellect, or philosophy proper. This is in keeping with his reductionist ontology;
philosophy is dependent on mental processes, which are in turn physical in nature.
Thought itself is passionate and subordinate to desire, all expression of the passions,
for Sade, is pleasurable; and all pleasure is associated with sex. From La Nouvelle
Justine: “[l]’élément du flambeau de la philosophie c’est le foutre. Tout les principes
de morale et de religion s’anéantissent bientôt devant les passions” (LNJ 1 : 95 ;
similar : J:401, MV: 42; AV:243). Further, insofar as philosophy’s role (for Sade) is to
destroy the “yoke of lies and stupidity,” its pleasures are the pleasures of liberation, of
destroying myths (J: 52, 53). States Delbène: “ [f]requently we hear the passions
declaimed against by unthinking orators who forget that these passions supply the
spark that sets alight the lantern of philosophy; who forget that it is to impassioned
men we owe the overthrow of all ...religious idiocies” (J:88). Philosophy is also
described as the matrix within which pleasures are structured and arranged, and
thoughts are described as a blazing fire, or as explosives. The joy of philosophy is not,

could, resulting in a bloody riot. In Voyage d’Italie (Paris: Tchou, 1967) p.440; cited in Berman
Thoughts and Themes p.141. This same spectacle appears in Juliette (J: 999-1000). Lacombe notes the
influence on Sade of abbé Banier and abbé Le Mascrier’s Histoire des Cérémonies religieuses de tous
les peuples de la terre (Paris, 1741), which detailed the variety and inventiveness of torture in history.
See Roger G. Lacombe Sade et ses masques (Paris: Payot, 1974) p.215; also J: 70n, 262n. Sade most
probably accepted an association made by Helvétius: “But suppose a man to have extreme sensibility,
what follows? That he will sometimes have sensations unknown to the common rank of men: that he
will feel what a less delicate organisation will not permit another man to feel.” Helvétius Treatise on
Man Vol. I p.159.

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for Sade, the intellectual satisfaction of resolving of a conceptual problem, but the
ecstasy of a cleansing fire.

How many and various are the desires aroused by the thought of a crime! I liken it to a
spark which swiftly sets alight everything combustible at hand, whose ravages increase in
proportion to the fuel it finds, and which ends up producing a blaze in us such as is not to
be extinguished save by rivers of fuck. But, Juliette, some theory must exist governing
this as there is a theory governing everything else, and it too must possess its principles, it
rules...teach me, my angel, you know what my dispositions, my penchants are, teach me
how to regulate all this (J:634; also 308; also similar:120: 239). 14

Sade also combines intellectual and physical pleasures. Delbène explains: “there’s
more to it than just experiencing sensations- they must be analysed. Sometimes it is as
pleasant to discuss as to undergo them; and when one has reached the limit of one’s
physical means, one may then exploit one’s intellect”(J:60). Were Juliette of our
epoch, she would discuss the sensations of sex in terms of endorphins and serotonin
uptake. After being penetrated both vaginally and anally, Juliette is asked by Madame
Delbène which is the more pleasurable sensation. She replies:

...each gave me such pleasure I cannot decide which gave me the more. Reverberations
are yet going through me of sensations at once so confused and so voluptuous that I
would be hard put to assign them their proper origins.”
“Then we’d best try it again,” Télème observed; “The Abbot and I will vary our
attacks, the lovely Juliette will have the goodness to interrogate her sentiments and to
favour us with a more exact account thereof” (J: 56).

Sade also holds that criminal acts are in themselves intellectually satisfying, although
there are no arguments in his surviving works as to why this is the case. 15

14
Catherine Cusset argues that Juliette is the most successful Sadeian character for this reason : “Ce
que nous apprend Sade avec l’invention de Juliette, c’est que la liberté est le choix de la limite.” I
personally find this reading implausible; Juliette kills literally dozens of people and finally immolates
her own daughter during an orgy, so it is not clear that she could be said to embody an ethic of keeping
to limits, even in relation to other libertines. Catherine Cusset “la passion selon Juliette,” L’Infini 31
(fall 1990):17-26, p.25.
15
For an account of the intellectual pleasures of going beyond morality, see Emil M. Cioran On the
Heights of Despair trans. Ilinca- Zarifopol- Johnston (Chicago &London: University of Chicago Press,
1992). p.120.

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3.4 Theory of Pleasure: Aesthetics

A criminal’s lawyers are seldom artists enough to turn the beautiful terribleness of the
deed to the advantage of him who did it.
Friedrich Nietzsche 16

Aesthetic pleasure, or rather, that which is described as aesthetic pleasure, plays a

major role in Sade’s thought. For Timo Airaksinen, Sade’s aesthetics is universalized
to validate a mode of life; Sade “paints wickedness as a strong and grand phenomenon
which provides glory and spectacle, and entails all the opportunities for enjoyment,
creativity and satisfaction…. [t]o him, the banality of evil would simply mean that
evil without enjoyment is indeed boring.” 17 Sade deploys the rhetoric of aesthetics in
several ways, and it is necessary to track how this aspect links with his account of
pleasure.
In keeping with his general view of human nature, Sade notes that his aesthetics
of the ghastly is scarcely atypical. Executions, tortures and gladiatorial combat have
long been popular events, as Sade’s characters note (PB: 334). 18 Soldiers have
occasionally spoken in poetic terms of the sublime beauty of the battlefield, and even
the Bible contains numerous descriptions of spectacular battles and acts of vengeful
destruction. 19 The same taste for horror is present in the most refined arts; as John
Richetti notes, Sade’s work itself shows the degree to which learning and
sophistication can coexist with the most horrific bestiality. 20 In noting the extremely
grisly nature of Christian iconography, Sade observes that accurate and compelling
portrayal in oils of the Passion of the Christ requires study of death and dying

16
Friedrich Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil §110 p.97.
17
Airaksinen p. 14
18
See also Helvétius Essays on the Mind. p.179.
19
For discussion, see Jeffrey H. Goldstein, ed. Why We Watch: The Attractions of Violent
Entertainment (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Jonathan Glover Humanity: A
Moral History of the Twentieth Century (London: Pimlico, 2001). p.55.
20
John Richetti “The Marquis de Sade (1740-1814) and the French Libertine Tradition” in George
Stade, ed. European Writers: The Age of Reason and the Enlightenment Vols. 3-4 (New York:
Scribner, 1984):615-638, p.632.

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(LNJ1:213). 21 The taste for fantastical, violent sexual (or sexualized) spectacle is also
common enough, and is scarcely confined to the purely pornographic; one only has to
consider the works of Delacroix. 22 Nietzsche formulates this insight in Beyond Good
and Evil: “[a]lmost everything we call ‘higher culture’ is based on the spiritualization
and intensification of cruelty –that is my proposition; the ‘wild beast’ has not been
laid to rest at all, it lives, it flourishes, it has merely become- deified.” 23
The association of mass homicide, spectacle and aesthetics is not unusual in our own
time. In the days following the destruction of the Twin Towers, a number of
prominent cultural figures applauded their destruction as worthy on purely aesthetic
grounds. (Like the Crucifixion, the imagery of the 9/11 attack acquired instant and
enduring iconic power which is, arguably, merely a pious gloss. Sade would perhaps
suggest that Christian iconography, like the endless replays of some catastrophe on
the nightly news, merely satisfies a desire to see suffering on a spectacular scale). 24
Where Sade’s libertines differ from the aestheticians of 9/11 is their desire to actually
cause such spectacular acts of destruction for purely aesthetic purposes (note that,
despite Sade’s talk of ‘refinements’ and ‘style,’ the pleasure is still to be found
primarily in the infliction of pain). From Juliette:

Refinements enter into the thing, as happens with all pleasures; from this moment this
personal stamp is added, all limits are abolished, atrocity is wound to its topmost pitch,

21
Sade asks whether Michelangelo would have felt pangs of conscience if, for the purposes of
rendering the Crucifixion more accurately, he had crucified a young boy. He also states that ‘everyone
knows’ that a girl was killed in the production of a painting by Guide (perhaps Guido Reni, known also
as Le Guide {1575-1642}), Madeleine en pleurs. Theodore Gericault (1791 - 1824), whilst working on
his masterpiece The Raft of the Medusa (1818), kept corpses and severed limbs in his studio for
reference.
22
Eugène Delacroix’s (1798-1863) The Death of Sardanapalus, featuring an indifferent king watching
his men massacre his concubines in cold blood, is as brutal as anything in Sade.
23
Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil p.159.
24
Karlheinz Stockhausen, a German composer, described the terrorists’ actions as “the greatest work of
art one can imagine;” Damien Hirst, similarly, stated that the terrorists “need congratulating” because
of their “artistic achievement.” See Rebecca Allison “9/11 wicked but a work of art, says Damien
Hirst” (Guardian, Wednesday September 11, 2002). Gail Haffern, a New Zealand artist, in agreement,
has produced a number of sculptures honouring the aesthetics of the attack. Linda Herrick “Tribute to
the Towers,” New Zealand Herald September 9, 2002.

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 for the sentiment that produces it exhales it in keeping with the increase or worsening
of the torture; all one’s achievements now lie short of one’s intentions. The agonies
must be now slow and abominable if they are to quicken the soul at all, and one wishes
that the same life could revive a thousand times over, in order to have the pleasure of
murdering it that often, and that thoroughly.
Each murder is a commentary and critique of the others, each demands
improvement in the next; it is shortly discovered that killing is not enough, one must kill
in hideous style; and though one may be unaware of the fact, lewdness almost always
has the direction of these matters (italics mine;J:791). 25

Sade’s libertines soon tire of the art of torturing and murdering individuals; eventually
even city-wide arson with sophisticated incendiary munitions, or even genocide,
cannot sate them (LNJ 1:297, 366 ; LNJ 2 :243 ; J :501, 729). The prospect of a
planetary holocaust becomes their ideal. States Curval (in The 120 Days of Sodom):

“There are,” said Curval, “but two or three crimes to perform in this world, and they,
once done, there’s no more to be said; all the rest is inferior, you cease any longer to feel.
Ah, how many times, by God, have I not longed to be able to assail the sun, snatch it out
of the universe, make a general darkness, or use that star to burn the world! Oh, that
would be a crime, oh yes, and not a little misdemeanour such as are all the ones we
perform who are limited in a whole year’s time to metamorphosing a dozen creatures into
lumps of clay ” (120: 364; similar: J: 774-775, 1185; LNJ 1: 296, 297, 366).

An entire aesthetics of the sublime is implied here and in similar passages. Sade’s
thought is compatible with two possible explanations. The passage above, and others
like it, expresses the wish to participate in the cosmic processes of destruction, like
Hindu gods: “we devastate the planet...and repeople it with new objects, and immolate
these in their turn...” (J: 522). Implied here, in a sense similar to Bataille’s reading, is
the notion of the attainment of oneness with the cosmos through direct involvement
with its processes. Cosmic unity, the Sadeian imperative to maximize destruction, and
the aestheticizing of crime, are united. In what resembles a diabolical fusion of the
principles of Sartre and Nietzsche, Sade proposes an entire lifestyle infused with full

25
A similar tract is Thomas de Quincey’s Murder Considered as One of the Fine Arts (1827). See
Thomas de Quincey On Murder Considered as One of the Fine Arts and Other Related Texts
(Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2004).

113
knowledge of the horrors of the world, and also the acceptance that oneself is
responsible for its horrors, through actively participating in them.
This is the ‘external’ aspect of a Sadeian aesthetics of mass destruction. An
internal aesthetics of the sublime is also compatible with Sade’s account.
For Kant, the aesthetic experience of the sublime discloses knowledge of one’s moral
nature. The sublime experience involves a spectacle of awe-inspiring grandeur; the
starry stars above, or some spectacle of Nature’s awesome power. Either one feels that
one is physically overwhelmed, or one senses one’s utter insignificance. Yet this very
experience reveals to ourselves the metaphysical truth of our intellectual freedom.
Sade’s description of the sublime resembles this account, but in an inverted way. For
Kant, the moral reality disclosed is our capacity to shape the world as a moral world.
Sade, like Kant, claims to be disclosing an important feature of human psychology,
but in a sense that brings to mind J. Robert Oppenheimer rather than the Moral Law
Within. Sade’s characters see in volcanic eruptions a confirmation that the world is
characterized by endless, meaningless destruction- it is nature that is the primary
object of sublime contemplation, rather than, for Kant, the moral self. Yet the
aesthetics of the libertines is even more direct than romantic contemplation– they also
cause disasters (volcanic eruptions, mass arson and so on ) through the application of
scientific knowledge – that is, their rational faculties, and hence their power to
manipulate the natural order of things, and to destroy its inhabitants (LNJ 2 :42).
Sade’s characters, hence, feel a sense of awe of their own intellectual capacity for
destruction. Further, in discovering in themselves the capacity for such destruction,
and of finding this pleasing, the libertines disclose to themselves the capacity for
absolute moral disregard. Where Kant saw a ‘moral law within,’ Sade sees, in the
interior of man, only an endless abyss, or the Rausch of Godhead.

3.5 Apathy
The pleasure of mass destruction, or of murder, does not come automatically. Sade
proposes a ‘doctrine of apathy,’ a complex merging of hedonistic and stoical
principles, in order to encourage the reader to overcome innate resistance to such
pleasures. The reasoning is as follows: the greatest pleasures are criminal; the sense of
guilt prevents one from enjoying committing criminal acts; hence, one must overcome
the feeling of guilt. This is achieved through repetition of the act until the discomfort
is overcome, and the act becomes pleasurable. Many everyday pleasures require a

114
certain amount of adjustment and of overcoming sometimes considerable discomfort
(the terror of one’s first bicycle ride, the nausea of one’s first cigar) - often followed
by the euphoria of accomplishment. 26 Sade’s scheme is comparable, differing only in
that a total psychic transformation is proposed, rather than simple taste acquisition.
Call this the doctrine of apathy. Two distinct types of apathy are discussed in Sade’s
work, although Sade, confusingly, treats them as being continuous. Call these organic
apathy and moral apathy.
Organic apathy, the result of simple hedonism, is the consequence of over-
stimulus of pleasurable sensation. Overindulgence in sex, food and alcohol, Juliette
explains, “have a gradual degenerating effect and tend before long to render excesses
indispensable.... it is in excess that pleasure exists”(J:709). This state is described as
stoicism, rather than simple burnout: “[s]toical training enervates the soul ...it passes
into one of apathy which soon metamorphoses into pleasures a thousand times diviner
than those which frailties would procure it...delights infinitely more trenchant than
the ones which would have resulted from excitement or the dreary heats of love” (J:
484). More piquant pleasures must be pursued, more bizarre tastes need to be
cultivated if the libertine is to enjoy anything at all: “ [o]ne grows tired of the
commonplace, the imagination becomes vexed, and the slenderness of our means, the
weakness of our faculties, and the corruption of our souls lead us to these
abominations” (120 : 329). 27 This principle is summarized in the classic Sadeian
aphorism: “great pleasures are only born from surmounted repugnances” (J: 1051,
similar: 184). (Sade himself refers to the analogy of acquiring new food tastes in this
context). 28 A heterodox aesthetics of the hideous and disgusting is proposed for the
attainment of “the greatest possible upheaval in the nervous system”: “ugliness,

26
For discussion, see Theodor Adorno Minima Moralia p.46.
27
This is similar to the ‘opponent process theory,’ proposed by Richard L. Solomon and John D.
Corbit. In short, the theory is that the overcoming of deep seated repugnances is followed by a rush of
elation, in order to return the body to homeostasis. The theory was originally proposed with drugs in
mind; Baumeister applies it to the pleasure of sadism and killing. R.L. Solomon, J.D. Corbit “An
Opponent process theory of motivation: I. Temporal dynamics of affect,” Psychological Review 81
(1974):119-145; cited in Roy M. Baumeister Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty (New York:
A.W.H Freeman/ Owl Book, 1999) pp.234-236.
28
Concerning the attractiveness of ugly people, the character Severino remarks: “ne voyez-vous pas
tout plein de gens préférer le gibier faisandé à la viande fraîche?” (“do people not prefer gamey game
to fresh meat?” LNJ 2: 83).

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degradation deal a far stouter blow, the commotion they create is much stronger, the
resultant agitation must hence be more lively” (J: 340; 120: 233 also J: 744). Sade
never discusses the overcoming of disgust concerning sexual acts per se, however;
only with regards to unusual paraphilias. 29
Moral apathy involves a different process and rationale. Its attainment is the
excision of normal emotional response, in particular the moral sentiments, principally
guilt and pity. 30 A key assumption here is that one’s moral disposition is malleable. 31
Sade, as noted above, confuses this with organic apathy, and on one occasion
proposes that organic apathy causes moral apathy: “[i]t is regrettably only too
commonly observed that sensual excess drives out pity in man....[w]hether this is
because most carnal excesses require a kind of apathy of soul or whether the violent
effect they produce on the nervous system weakens the sensitivity by which it
operates, it nevertheless remains a fact that a professional libertine is rarely a
compassionate man” (MV.30 ; 263fn). The two types of apathy are quite distinct,
however. Despite his insistence that moral sentiments are due entirely to ‘chimeras’
and ‘false education,’ Sade’s characters clearly regard the attainment of moral apathy
as a considerable achievement, a fact which acknowledges of the reality of moral
sentiments (J: 450, 548-549, 845, 1053). 32 Organic apathy, on the other hand, is
merely the outcome of simple debauchery.
Sade’s reasoning is as follows. As the voice of conscience prevents one from
committing terrible crimes, and it is terrible crimes that afford the most shocking–
therefore the most pleasurable– sensations, it is necessary to overcome conscience.

29
Freud considered the capacity and pleasure of overcoming disgust (in particular the ‘disgust’ of
seeing the genitals) an essential part of the sexual instinct. Sigmund Freud Volume 7: On Sexuality;
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality and other Works. trans. under the general editorship of James
Strachey; ed. Angela Richards (London: Penguin, 1977) p.64.
30
Fauskevåg calls this process an ‘artificial desocialisation;’ Philippe Roger describes it as
‘brainwashing.’ Roger Sade La Philosophie dans le pressoir p.55; Fauskevåg p.184.
31
This contradicts the libertine’s insistence that they cannot help themselves from committing crimes,
or become better people as, clearly, they think that they can become increasingly bad. The malleability
of the moral sense is a recurring theme in Aline et Valcour. Léonore, in the course of her voyage
around the world, loses the ‘moral sentiments’ of her youth, and Sainville, surrounded by captive slave-
girls in Africa, realizes for an instant that he no longer misses his beloved Léonore (AV:274, 639).
32
This fits with the actual experience of people involved in mass murder- they will feel normal,
‘animal’ guilt, but will learn to overcome it. For discussion, see Baumeister pp.305-342.

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Various means are proposed as to how this is accomplished. Clairwil advises Juliette
that this voice is silenced through the application of “strength, discipline, and a certain
ruthlessness with oneself” (J: 450, also p. 274). A more concrete piece of advice is
that repeated performance of a particular forbidden act will lead to an overcoming of
nausea, fear, or pangs of conscience. Eventually, the student will cross the ‘morality
barrier’ and learn to enjoy the specified pleasure or task, leading eventually to the
experience of pleasure, or even ecstasy (MV: 124; CL: 35). 33 Explains the character
Tergowitz: “accustom yourself awhile to the idea that frightens you, you’ll soon come
to cherish it: that’s the method I have followed to familiarize myself with all known
crimes: I yearned to commit them, but they scared me; fixing my mind upon them, I’d
masturbate, and I perform them today as effortlessly as I blow my nose” (J: 888).
Sade also notes that moral reorientation is easier for children than adults, suggesting
that moral malleability is a child-like trait. Clairwil gives the following comment on
libertine training:

... the necessary procedure for a young person one was endeavoring to train up for life
would be to blunt [their] sensibility; blunting it, you will perhaps lose a few weak virtues,
but you will eliminate a great many vices, 34 and under a form of government which
severely castigates all vices and which never rewards virtues, it is infinitely better not to
do evil than to strive to do good (J: 278).

Similarly, a young executioner tells Juliette that the training for his “rationalized and
scientific ferocity” begins early: “from childhood on we are taught a system of values
wherein human life is nothing and the law everything…” (J: 307).
Sade’s characters also hold the apathetic state to be epistemically privileged; that
is, its attainment is taken to be necessary for deeper insights into the nature of the
world. 35 This is partly because the libertines find that the attainment of “new

33
For discussion of the psychology of enjoying overcoming social instincts, and the pleasure of killing,
see C. Fred Alford What Evil means to us (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997) p.102. For a
discussion on the enjoyment of criminal activity, see Baumeister pp.203-249.
34
Again, Sade insists that virtue is ‘weak’ and vice is ‘strong.’
35
Michel Camus contrasts the apathy of Sade’s characters with that of the Stoics, for whom apathy was
required for receptivity to the Logos, conceived as cosmic harmony. For Sade, according to Camus, it
is openness to Nature that leads to openness to the Logos. Michel Camus “ L’impasse mystique du
Libertin ” In Michel Camus, Philippe Roger, eds.:259-276, p.270.

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perspectives” is itself pleasurable (J: 18). Numbness in some senses is said to enhance
others: “...by numbing two or three of the faculties of sensation one may extract
astonishing things from the others...it is when we have achieved depravation,
insensibility, that Nature begins to yield us the key to her secret workings...(J:710).
Sade associates moral apathy with reason, and interior sensations with morality,
hence, falsity or error. To become apathetic, for Sade, is to encounter the ‘truth’ that
moral precepts are lies and that the moral conscience is not an intrinsic feature of
human existence. This dichotomy is expressed by the character Président de Balmont,
in Aline et Valcour: “ [q]uand vous cédez au sentiment de la pitié plutôt qu’aux
conseils de la raison, quand vous écoutez le cœur de préférence à l’esprit, vous vous
jetez dans un abîme d’erreurs, puisqu’il n’est point de plus faux organes que ceux de
la sensibilité.” (Non- libertine) Madame de Blamont’s reply reinforces this
dichotomy: “j’aime mieux être imbécile et sensible que de posséder le génie de
Descartes” (AV: 712).
Sade’s characters do not apply this principle consistently. They value the interior
sensations associated with pleasure, including the ‘delicious vibrations’ made by their
moral sense as it is being overridden. Sade associates only moral feelings with ‘error’;
pleasurable feelings are invariably described as grounded on truth.
Two problems arise from the attainment of apathy. Throughout Juliette, Sade’s
characters indicate that the Libertine lifestyle leads to the acquisition of tastes and
manias that cannot be satisfied. Towards the end of the novel, Juliette states that,
despite her “enchanted life,” “I do not cease to want; I consider myself poor; my
desires are infinitely in excess of my possibilities; I would spend twice as much as I
had it; and I leave no stone unturned to increase my wealth, criminal or not, there is
nothing I am unwilling to do for money” (my italics; J: 1168; 598, 120: 364).
Secondly, the libertines find that, due to over- stimulus, they are incapable of physical
pleasures at all. Only intellectual pleasures, if any, are left. 36 Rather than taking up
intellectually demanding hobbies, Sade’s characters propose to imaginatively
reconstruct the notion of crime, hence, morality, despite the fact that they consider it
an “arbitrary and meaningless word” (J: 170-171). In some cases, notes Chantal
36
Sade’s account is partly continuous with the views of his contemporaries on the problems related to
‘libertinage.’ Firstly, Sade appears to be in agreement with d’Holbach’s claim that endless debauch
leads to ennui and weariness. D’Holbach pp. 99, 256. Cusset notes that this was a common theme in
libertine literature. For discussion, see Cusset No Tomorrow p. 145.

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Thomas, Sade’s characters hold that prejudices should remain where their violation
can become pleasurable. 37 This is, on their own terms, an escape into illusion. (An
impoverished conception of pleasure seems to be at play here. Sade appears to hold
that only crime can be pleasurable, even if crime does not exist. It is like saying that
you can only truly enjoy eating bacon if you were brought up an observant Jew or
Muslim, and therefore sense that it is sinful). Clairwil explains that it is “illusion
which invests crime with its attractiveness, and a weak spirit encounters greatest
difficulty committing it when, totally self-possessed, illusion there is none” (J: 450).
Sade also makes a curious association of the ‘failure’ of libertinage as a purely
hedonistic project, the sense of emptiness its failure imparts, and the ‘cheapening’ of
human life. He declares that this sense of emptiness (what we might perhaps call
‘existential despair’) is a proof of the non-divine origin of humanity.

…there’s the effect of irregular desires: the greater the height they arouse us to, the
greater the emptiness we feel afterward. From this cretins derive proof of God’s
existence; whereas for my part I find here only the most certain proofs of a materialistic
attitude: the more you cheapen your existence, the less I’ll be inclined to believe it is the
handiwork of a deity (J: 312).

The apparent failure of libertinage is also due to a misunderstanding of the

relationship between ‘criminal pleasure’ and morality. Just as the libertines overcome
the discomfort of illegal activities, they eventually overcome the pleasure associated
with those same activities. Their formulation of the relationship between crime and
pleasure is misconstrued. Rules do not impede pleasure- it is the existence of the rules
that allows for the pleasure of breaking them to be obtained. Once the rule has been
successfully transgressed, pleasure associated with breaking that rule is impossible.
More extreme activities are sought in order to obtain the same thrill. Where this is not
possible, the libertines find that they cannot satisfy their desires; their criminal
ambitions are frustrated. Assessed by the standards of hedonism, Sade’s proposal is
apparently a failure.

37
Thomas Sade, la dissertation et l’orgie p.72.

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3.6 Triumph of the Will.
Although it would appear that Sade’s libertine doctrine is a failure, the trajectory of
Sade’s characters suggests a different motive is at play. In Sade, there are two views
suggested - one implied, the other explicit- concerning the relationship between
pleasure and power. The more overtly stated view is that power is a means to
pleasure. The alternate view is that power itself is pleasurable, or constitutes a
different order of pleasure. 38 If this is the case, it is possible that Sade’s characters are
not motivated by simple hedonism at all.
All of Sade’s accounts of pleasure can be construed in terms of power; either
power over oneself or power over others. At some point, the reductionist model of
pleasure is abandoned completely. As the character Dorval explains, happiness
depends on, more than anything else, “exercising the power to appease our avid little
whimsies” (J: 124-125). There are no purely intellectual pleasures discussed in Sade’s
work; those pleasures which are described in terms of aesthetics (such as murder or
mass destruction) are in fact primarily concerned with power.
The first expression of this Will is complete self mastery; mastery over the fear of
death, over instinctual nausea associated with excrement, and over one’s reluctance to
harm others, that is, the social instincts (although, of course, Sade would not describe
them as such). 39 Organic and moral apathy are to be understood in terms of such
mastery, but the overcoming of the instinct of nausea, central to the Libertine project,
is distinct from both. It is a ritual intended to prove absolute self control. 40 This

38
The first view is that of Helvétius; the second is that of Nietzsche. The association of power and
pleasure had also been considered by the philosophes. Rousseau notes within himself the potential for
becoming a tyrant, observing that “if I were rich, [I would be] a disdainful spectator of the miseries of
the rabble.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau Emile or On Education trans. Alan Bloom Penguin (London:
Penguin, 1979) p. 344; Helvétius Treatise on Man Vol. I, pp.130, 134, 201, 310, 311.
For discussion, see Fauskevåg p.93. For Nietzsche’s criticism of Helvétius on this point, see The Will
to Power §751 p.397.
39
For discussion, see Lacombe p.203.
40
Coprophagy appeared in the initiation rites of the Chewa people of East Africa, just as, for other
African tribespeople, initiation into adulthood may require rituals involving flagellation, exposure to
stinging ants or extensive tattooing or scarification. Boris de Rachewiltz Eros Noir: Moeurs sexuelles
de l’Afrique de la préhistoire à nos jours (Paris : La jeune Parque, 1963) p.191. Sade often associates
coprophilia with sexuality, but this association is not straightforward. Freud discusses the pleasure of
defecation, and of the rituals involving faeces “typical of neurotics.” For Freud, such pleasures are

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accounts for Juliette’s claim that eating excrement is “one of the culminating episodes
of the libertine experience” (J: 163). Robert F. O’Reilly’s suggestion that coprophilia
and cannibalism in Sade represents a Nietzschean practice of “devouring and
reshaping the world” may be off the mark, but not by much. Katherine Landolt, more
accurately, suggests that the cultivation of exotic pleasures is a means of overcoming
nature, and bestows upon the libertine the sign of uniqueness, in being able to
overcome an unspeakable nausea. 41
Sade’s characters, as discussed in the section on Bataille, attain mastery over the
fear of death, whether for the sake of self- mastery or for the pursuit of physical
pleasure. They treat death as utterly trivial; a last cheap thrill, possibly accompanied
by a final arc of ejaculate. Having no truck with either God or the good of the
community, they have no problem with suicide or death through misadventure. Timo
Airaksinen, as noted in Chapter I, reads Sade as essentially an advocate of a profound
perversion. He associates the libertines’ death wish with the conceptual failure of
Sade’s entire a-morality. Airaksinen defines “genuine good” as “what is desirable in
the long run: safety and pleasure.” Accordingly, he characterizes Sade’s perversity as
being essentially ‘self deception’ and ‘negligence’: “…evil is damage- but never
injury-and appears to be a decisional error that is brought about by some kind of
ignorance, mistake, or weakness. [...] One cannot aim at evil, because logically
speaking one’s aims are the good of the person. All evil collapses back into akrasia,

intelligible owing to the richness of nerve endings in the ‘mucous membrane’ of the anus, but he does
not discuss actual coprophilia (Freud Sexuality p.104). Havelock Ellis repeats Freud’s suggestion that
an association of faeces and urine with eroticism is due to childish theories concerning sexuality. Ellis
also takes the child’s fascination for urination and defecation to be a “rudimentary form of the artistic
impulse,” and at the same time a “manifestation of power.” Havelock Ellis Psychology of Sex: A
Manual for Students third impression (London: William Heinemann {Medical Books} Ltd, 1934)
p.139.
41
Katherine Landolt “The Attempt and Failure to Break Out of a Materialist Framework as performed
by the Characters of the Histoire de Juliette under the direction of the Marquis de Sade” in Papers in
Romance Vol. 2 No. 3 (spring 1980):182-193: 186, 191; Robert F. O’Reilly “Desire in Sade’s Les 120
journées de Sodome,” Studies on Voltaire and the 18th Century Vol. 217 (1983):249-256, p.251. See
also Noëlle Châtelet “Le libertine à table” in Michel Camus, Philippe Roger, eds.: 67-83, p.76. Note
also that, curiously, Sade’s libertines demonstrate their transcendence over merely human instinct in
the manner of medieval penitents- by filling their mouths with filth. For discussion of this practice, see
Simone de Beauvoir The Second Sex translated by H.M. Parshley (London: Picador, 1988) p.685.

121
self-deception, and negligence.” 42 Deliberately putting oneself in harm’s way with
no higher goal or end in view than one’s own pleasure (given that, presumably, death
will end one’s own pleasure) is considered to be perverse.
Against Airaksinen, I do not think that Sade’s libertines are really so perverse in
this sense. The libertines, whilst engaged in masochistic practices, typically do not run
the risk of death or even serious injury to themselves (J: 885; also 292, 301,439;
120:478). Yet even where Sade’s characters do things which are intensely pleasurable
but rather dangerous, it can still be argued that there is nothing particularly perverse in
their decision making, regardless of the specifics. People die through misadventure all
the time whilst doing intensely pleasurable things (flying light aircraft, climbing
mountains) - we typically do not consider them perverse. One may ask if there really
is such an essential relationship between the ‘good’ and personal safety, and whether
Sade’s account of pleasure is perhaps more sympathetic to the human condition than
the view that one should best try to die in one’s bed, and not whilst having sex (and
that everyone else would agree, if only they could think it through). 43 If life is
unbearable, further, an especially exciting death may be eminently rational. 44

3.7 Power over Others

In George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, O’Brien asks how one man asserts his
power over another. Winston answers: “[by] making him suffer.” O’Brien agrees:
“[o]bedience is not enough. Unless he is suffering, how can you be sure that he is
obeying your will and not his own? Power is in inflicting pain and humiliation.” 45
In exactly the same way, Sade’s torturers experience the ecstasy of having total power

42
Airaksinen p. 36
43
Most philosophers have died in their beds. A. Quinton “Deaths of philosophers” In the Oxford
Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995):178.
44
Glanville Williams writes: “[a] study by E. Stengel and Nancy Cook indicated that the great majority
of so-called attempted suicides were not on fact single-minded efforts at self destruction but had a
hidden “appeal character;” in other words, the suicide seemed to gamble with his life, consciously or
subconsciously hoping that either the attempt would succeed or, if it failed, his life would be improved
as a consequence of the attempt.” Glanville Williams “Suicide” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Vol. VIII. Paul Edwards. ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1967) p.44.
45
George Orwell Nineteen Eighty-Four (London: Penguin, 1989) p.279.

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over another person. 46 Clairwil, commenting on the rush she obtains from poisoning
people, comments that “it is exquisite to have the lives of others arbitrarily in one’s
power” (J: 523). Likewise, states Princess Borghese, “[s]tripping people of their
liberty amuses me, I like holding captives; I know that while they are incarcerated my
victims suffer: this perfidious idea excites me, I should love to be able to maintain
entire nations in this cruel situation” (J: 712). Sade also assumes that that all powerful
politicians, in fact anyone with any authority at all, whether judges, teaches, surgeons,
or priests- will abuse their positions. 47 Sade portrays all political figures as being
equally cynical, and equally in the thrall of the pleasures of total power. The figures of
the ancien régime are described as monsters; the revolutionaries of Juliette plan to rid
the world of ideological imperfections, by using assassination or other terroristic
tactics, or through massacring entire economic or religious classes. 48 Whether power
corrupts or simply attracts the already immoral is unclear, as Sade’s characters assume
that desire for power over others is a universal trait. States Juliette: “I affirm that the
fundamental, profoundest, and keenest penchant in man is incontestably to enchain his
fellow creatures and to tyrannize them with all his might” (J: 317; also pp. 861, 966n;
AV: 461). Sade also suggests that the character traits of the despot are the
requirements of political ascendency rather than purely its negative effects on the
personality (AV: 462; J: 757).

46
For discussion of this phenomenon, see Baumeister pp.242-243; Ervin Staub The Roots of Evil: The
origins of Genocide and other Group Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)
pp.128, p.133, 139,149, 226.
47
Despite his political incertitude, Sade presented himself as an acute observer of the abuse of power,
commenting in an official pamphlet: “[c]itizens...I know where the abuse of power leads...I have
studied men and know them; nothing is more difficult than to set limits on delegated authority.” Sade
Œuvres complètes (Paris: Cercle du Livres Précieux, 1964) 11:173. Quoted by Shelby Spruell: “The
Marquis de Sade- Pornography or Political Protest?,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the
Western Society for French History 9 (1982):238-249, pp. 246-247. Helvétius, La Rochefoucauld,
Montesquieu, la Mettrie and Rousseau had already noted the egoism in human nature, and the resulting
problems concerning the selection of leaders. For discussion, see Fauskevåg pp. 93, 105.
48
In the name of a global revolution and a universal republic, the Northern Lodge of Stockholm plans
on exterminating all the kings of the world, the extermination of Catholicism, and establishing the
‘liberty of the world.’ Yet the means to be employed include poisoning water supplies and causing
epidemics in order to weaken ‘despotic’ governments, and the elimination of individual freedom (J:
864-870). For discussion on the dangers of moral absolutist thinking, see Baumeister Chapter 6,
pp.169-203; Staub p.76, 88.

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 Sade also describes economic power as continuous with political power. As
Fauskevåg notes, “[d[ans La Nouvelle Justine et l’Histoire de Juliette, l’accumulation
de l’argent est donc un moyen de concentration de pouvoir entre les mains du fort, et
un instrument de violence pour rompre les liens humains et sociaux”). 49 Essentially
feudal economic relationships are maintained, just as the architecture of feudalism
continues in Sade’s work. 50 Money is the means of acquiring assistants and
middlemen in capturing and imprisoning victims, and for paying off corrupt police
and judges (J: 624). The promise of riches, as on the more sadistic contemporary
game shows, is used to reduce human beings to playthings or wild animals (J: 995,
AV: 201, 258; 120: 194, 196; 205, 396, 398). 51 Accordingly, money is described as
potential crime (120: 197). A number of the paraphilias in Sade’s works are
intelligible as fetishizations of the paraphernalia of power. His characters frequently
wear terrifying clothing with which to torment their victims, or masturbate in piles of
gold coins, imagining the crimes they can commit with such wealth (J: 286, 315,
410).
Finally, as discussed earlier in the chapter, Sade’s characters assert their power
over the world of things, or over people that they have reduced (that is, from their
point of view) to the level of inanimate objects. Every prominent libertine character in
Sade is preoccupied with power over the environment, of proving themselves equals
of God, invariably through destruction. 52 In contrast with the optimistic conception of

49
Fauskevåg p. 70. Sade’s description of the very wealthy largely follows Helvétius’ dictum that “gold
is a sorcerer that frequently converts an honest man into a knave,” and that wealth is continuous with
power. Voltaire also made a close association of wealth, economic arrangements and human rights
abuse, in particular slavery. See Candide and other tales pp.160, 165. See also Helvétius Treatise on
Man Vol. II p.282n; Fauskevåg p.69.
50
The preponderance of castles, dungeons, caves and fortressed islands in Sade is frequently
commented upon, as are the feudal relationships that Sade’s libertine characters maintain with their
victims and employees (who are never free to simply leave, and are frequently killed; LNJ 2: 17-18).
For discussion see Fauskevåg pp.110, 112,116, 117.
51
In Juliette, Ferdinand, King of Naples, holds a public event each year in which the poorer townsfolk
are allowed to fight each other in the rush to grab items from a huge pile of luxury goods and
foodstuffs. Hundreds of people are crushed in the struggle (J: 1000-1001). This scene is similar to that
witnessed by Sade himself in Italy (see note 13, in this chapter).
52
For discussion see Michel Camus, “L’impasse Mystique du Libertin” In Michel Camus, Philippe
Roger, eds.:259-276, p.273 ; Fauskevåg p.27

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science associated with the 18th Century, Sade’s characters conceive of science as the
power to destroy in spectacular fashion. 53 The chemist Almani declares that he has
spent his life studying nature’s secrets simply because he wants to cause a volcano to
erupt at his prompting (LNJ 2 :42-43); Count Bracciani uses advanced incendiary
weapons to set fire to all Rome, and so on. This marks the zenith of the Libertine
vision.

3.8 Sadism as Syndrome.

Sade is well known for extolling the pleasures of cruelty, and for associating this
pleasure with both strength and sophistication. Yet, as noted above, his affirmation of
the pleasure of cruelty runs aground; not only does it fail to convince on its own
hedonistic terms, it amounts to the assertion that it is pleasurable to see someone more
unfortunate than oneself. This insight fits poorly with the libertines’ self-image of
gloating, resplendent evil.
Here I suggest that Sade the diagnostician of the human condition is of equal
interest to Sade the ‘evangelist of evil.’ A cluster of Sade’s comments, isolated and
scattered throughout his works, suggest a penetrating, if brief, psychological portrait
of the sadistic will. The fictional villains that usually feature in philosophical
discussions of evil (Iago, Milton’s Satan) appear two-dimensional; their malignancy is
merely the will to do bad, to do the opposite of that which is good (which would
merely acknowledge the primacy of the good). 54 Sade’s characters, by contrast, are
not cruel out of some mysterious, atavistic capacity for enjoying torture, and even go
as far as to suggest reasons as to their taste for torturing and killing (at least we can
give Sade the credit of not considering the inquiry into the evil will to be itself
morally repugnant). They even ponder the problem when there is no obvious answer
53
For discussion, see Robert S. Baker “The Nightmare of the Frankfurt School: the Marquis de Sade
and the Problem of Morality in Aldous Huxley’s Dystopian Narrative” In Nugel- Bernfried, ed. Now
More than Ever: Proceedings of the Aldous Huxley Centenary Symposium: Munster, 1994 (New York:
Peter Lang, 1995):245-260, p.258. Philippe Roger suggests that the increasingly sophisticated torture
machines in Sade are a parody of scientific progress. Philippe Roger La Philosophie dans le pressoir
p.60.
54
Sade, in Voyage d’Italie, notes that the very rarity of the “bizarre mania of doing evil for the sole
pleasure of doing it... spares me the trouble” of offering an analysis, although he suggests that it is due
to a “disordering of the imagination.” Voyage d’ Italie (Paris: Tchou, 1967) p.356. Quoted in Berman
Thoughts and Themes p.163.

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(Borchamps, commenting on his rape and torture of a girl: “[c]an you tell me what it
was bred such feelings in me? I myself do not know; I simply describe to you what I
experienced”; J: 901; Similar; 120; 492, 495).
In general, as noted above, it is the thirst for the sensation of power that Sade’s
characters crave, which itself suggests an inner weakness. This weakness, owing to
the lucidity, vigour and thoroughness of the libertines, cannot be reduced to simple
akrasia, that is, weakness of will, self-deception and negligence. A naturally strong
person, assumedly, is not preoccupied with acquiring a sense of power, or would even
know what such a sense would be like, given that this is a continuous state. A
different type of strength is the ability to overcome fear, and to confront stronger
adversaries. Sade’s characters are, on this view, weak, typically attacking, with
overwhelming force, the physically weak, defenceless and unsuspecting (a large
number of their victims are children, a fact seldom mentioned by the specialists). The
libertines are essentially bullies. They very rarely destroy or even challenge their
equals, and when they kill their peers they do it by stealth and deceit, typically using
poison, or a quick shove over a precipice. It is not the vanquishing of a worthy
adversary, and the possibility of defeat, that gives the libertine pleasure, but the sense
of total power: “[t]he more atrocious the hurt he inflicts upon the helpless, the greater
shall be the voluptuous vibrations in him” (J: 119; similar: 120:251).
Sade makes a number of specific observations concerning the nature of sadism.
Saint-Fond, Prime Minister of France, enjoys humiliating, degrading and torturing his
victims before, or whilst, killing them. When Juliette notes that he would be quite
terrifying to his many victims, Saint- Fond gives the following reply : “…the very
essence of my enjoyment is in making those victims so suffer in the selfsame way
from the thing which plagues my existence (my italics; J: 248). Saint-Fond is driven
to torture through the wish to project his pain onto someone else, although he does not
go into details as to what this pain is. Similarly, Omphale, a pious friend of Justine,
observes that “[t]hose who are wretched are consoled when they see those around
them suffer” (MV: 77). The desire to inflict pain, then, is a desire to project one’s own
psychic pain onto another person. 55

55
This matches the observations of C. Fred Alford, who applies a similar model to the psychology of
sadistic behaviour, and Richard G. Rappaport with regards to serial killers. Alford interviewed working
people, prisoners, and college students to discover how people understand evil. He concluded that

126
 In Aline et Valcour, Sade observes that the cruelty of a person is proportional to
how much hardship they have endured, citing Captain James Cook (1728-1779). Cook
found that the more his crew experienced hardships, the crueller they became: “[l]e
capitaine Cook observe dans ses relations, que plus les gens de son équipage étaient
malheureux, plus il les trouvait cruels” (AV: 608, n). In the same novel, Sade notes
that only the weak seek vengeance, as they lack the strength to endure their situation.
States the character Bersac: “J’ai fait, en étudiant les hommes, une remarque assez
singulière: c’est qu’il n’y a presque jamais que les âmes basses qui se livrent au
sentiment de la vengeance; infiniment plus sensibles à l’insulte, parce qu’elles n’ont la
force de rien endurer, elles ne peuvent en soutenir la blessure, et comme ces êtres-là
méritent peu, ils croient toujours qu’on ne leur rend jamais assez” (ibid.: 624).
Although Sade does not take cruelty to be vengeful, the association is certainly
implied. In particular, Sade’s characters mutilate and torture women, or infibulate the
entrance to the womb, for the ‘crime’ of being mothers (PB: 363). Hostility towards
women is intelligible as a generalized vengeance against womankind for having borne
him.
Further drawing sadism and inner pain together, Sade advises indifference
towards the suffering of others in order to better cope with one’s own misfortune,
again suggesting a relationship between sadism and an inability to tolerate suffering.
Sadeian apathy is akin to armour, or perhaps scar tissue. Delbène gives Juliette the
following advice: “...the less one is sensitive, the less one is affected, and the nearer
one draws to veritable autonomy; we are never prey but to two things: the evil which
befalls others, or that which befalls us: toughen ourselves in the face of the first, and
the second will touch us no more, and from then on nothing will have the power to
disturb our peace” (J: 99).
Cruelty is also associated with sexual frailties, which is consistent with the
central place Sade grants sexuality. In the 120 Days of Sodom, Durcet, one of the four

‘evil’ is experienced as an overwhelming feeling of emptiness or dread, and found that many people
who had done violently sadistic things, by their own estimation, were motivated to transfer this feeling
onto another. See Alford What Evil Means To Us pp.100, 119,121. Similarly, Richard Rappaport holds
that the quest for relief of pain (the inner, unresolved turmoil) is the essential dynamic which impels the
serial killer. Richard G.Rappaport, M.D., “The Serial and Mass Murderer: Patterns, Differentiation,
Pathology,” American Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 9 no.1 (1988). 39-48; 157.

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chief killers, becomes frustrated that he cannot get an erection. In frustration, he
furiously whips the children that the ‘four friends’ have imprisoned, on the pretext (as
is typical with Sade’s characters) that he is punishing them. Sade writes: “...et comme
l’impuissance donne toujours en peu de cette sorte d’humeur qu’on appelle
taquinisme en libertinage, ses visites furent étonnamment sévères” (“as impotence
always provokes that kind of mood called a teasing [sadistic] one 56 in the idiom of
libertinage, his inspections were astonishingly severe” (120: 313; Œ III: 118). In fact,
many of Sade’s male libertine characters suffer erectile problems. 57
Finally, Sade associates ‘infamy’ with simple boredom. This point concerns
‘infamous’ (Sade’s term) behaviour in general, not specifically sadism. In the 120
Days of Sodom, Madame Duclos recounts a client she once had in her brothel, whose
pleasure was to clean the nether-regions of a prostitute with champagne (she was
asked not to have washed or wiped herself for six weeks) and then drank the
compound whilst masturbating across her buttocks. “I understand perfectly,” states
Durcet: “[o]ne becomes grows tired of the commonplace, the imagination becomes
vexed, and the slenderness of our means, the weakness of our faculties, the corruption
of our souls lead us to these abominations” (120: 327-328). The apathy of the
libertines is described here as weakness and lack of imagination, in contrast to other
accounts.
These observations are not associated with an articulated theoretical position.
They could simply be ‘orphaned’ thoughts, which arguably cannot be said to represent
Sade’s thought. Nevertheless, a voice emerges from within Sade’s work that runs
counter to the advocacy of the jouissance of torturing people. The passages in Aline et
Valcour in particular are placed in such a way that suggests that Sade took them
seriously. The reference to Cook is in a footnote; as such, it is either representative of

56
This is a mistranslation. Delon notes that ‘taquinisme’ in fact meant ‘sadism’ in Sade’s time. See Œ
Vol. III 118 n, p.1154.
57
The male libertine characters are often described as having problems with maintaining erections,
discharge or orgasm, which is often described as more violent and painful than pleasing (J:1097;
120:274, 292, 313). Restif (also spelled Rétif) de la Bretonne wrote that old men are especially sadistic,
and that they derive pleasure in proportion to the youth and beauty of the victim (an observation that
perhaps coheres with Sade’s suggestion of a link of sadism and impotence). Rétif de La Bretonne
L’anti-Justine ou les délices de l’amour (Paris: La Bibliothèque privée, 1969) p.1. Cited in Françoise
Laugaa-Traut pp. 89-91.

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the author’s own views, or is meant to appear to be representative of the author’s own
thoughts. The second observation, concerning vengeance, is made by Bersac, an actor
and a minor character. Though not a sadistic and homicidal libertine, he shares with
them the view that crime is natural, and holds that wars and tyranny are necessary to
the order of things (AV:624- 626). His point of view, therefore, is not opposed to that
of Sade’s dominant voice. It is also significant that Sade makes these comments in
Aline et Valcour, the only full length novel which he desired to be publicly associated
with, being published (unlike Juliette and Justine, which he strenuously disavowed)
in his own name. 58
Several other suggestions have been made concerning Sade’s work and the
psychological dynamics of sadism, weakness and loneliness. Bourbon Busset reads
Sade’s sadism as symptomatic of a spiritual weakness, stating that “[p]ersonne de plus
éloigné de l’érotisme sadique qu’un homme fort, qui trouve dans la sexualité
l’épanouissement normal de sa vitalité.” 59 The will to inflict suffering, according to
Geoffrey Gorer, is related to the desire to alter one’s environment and its inhabitants-
that is, the creative desire in man (this could be aligned with Busset’s interpretation,
insofar as weakness can be taken to be, or is analogous to, a lack of creativity). In its
positive mode, for Gorer, this desire takes the form of creativity. The sadist lacks the
talent to enjoy the power of pleasing or impressing others with his art, and so is
limited to torturing people for his egoistic gratification. A healthier person who feels
the satisfaction of having an impact on others, of a less malignant sort (Rousseau’s
feeling of satisfaction of others enjoying his opera, for example) does not require that
others are crushed or reduced to a subhuman state. 60

58
One could hazard a Freudian reading of the relationship between Sade’s anonymous, ‘libertine’ texts,
Justine, Juliette and The 120 Days of Sodom, and those texts that he gladly had published under his
own name. His libertine works are the ‘dream state’ (they were anonymous, and Sade always
strenuously disavowed them), where the narcissistic ego, disinhibited, lives out its fantasy of wish
fulfilment, and the ‘official’ Aline et Valcour represents the superego; the socialized mask. The
perspective of the ‘waking state’ of Aline et Valcour allows for an understanding of the mentality of the
other works, which is not possible from within the libertine perspective.
59
Jacques de Bourbon Busset “La négation érotique,” La Table Rond 19, no.1 (1963) :109-112, p.111.
60
Gorer defines ‘sadism’ as “the pleasure felt from the observed modifications on the external world
produced by the will of the observer.” I would add a). that this extends to both the world and its
inhabitants, and b). it is not appropriate do define sadism as a general ‘will to power,’ although the

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 The observations of Gorer and Busset fits closely with the Motive Psychology of
Hans Morgenthau. Power and love, for Morgenthau, spring from the same root of
loneliness. Love seeks to unite people by dissolving the boundary between them;
power involves the imposing of one will over the other. Power can be manifested, in a
positive way, through creativity, or negatively, through control, which in an extreme
form involves the inflicting of pain. 61 In this sense, it is significant that Sade’s
characters, even when they associate with each other, frequently express loneliness,
whether because they are physically separated from others, or because they regard
everyone else as mere tools or objects (J:583; LNJ 1 : 152, 237, 299; 2 :42). Minski
the Russian cannibal giant, the most isolated of Sade’s characters, takes his despotism
to the point of turning human beings into furniture, or food. He is cut off from his
species to such an extent that he wishes he had not already raped and killed every
member of his family “so that I might have the pleasure of butchering them anew.”
Yet he feels empty: “[w]hat’s left for me these days?” he laments, surrounded by his
victims: “I have nothing but ordinary victims to sacrifice, my heart grows heavy, all
pleasures fade, they pall, the enjoyment is gone-” (J: 598, also 584). Sade’s characters
have no intimate relations with others and have no creative projects. 62 They leave
nothing but corpses and ash in their wake.
In short, aspects of Sade’s work imply that his sadists are not sophisticated
eroticists, but spiritually weak people, in some emotional pain, who lack meaningful
contact with others, and have an overwhelming need to feel that they have power over
others or their environment. Not only does this portrait undermine a straightforward
reading of the Sadeian text as an advocacy of sadism; it also undermines Sade’s (and
Bataille’s) claim that there is a direct and natural link between the sexual instinct and
the will to inflict pain and death (Sade’s account of human sexuality, discussed in the
next chapter, is disturbing nevertheless). 63

association is basically sound. Gorer p. 156; Jean-Jacques Rousseau The Confessions trans. Anon
(1904). (Ware: Wordsworth, 1996) p.368.
61
For discussion, see H. Morgenthau “Love and Power,” Commentary 33 no.3 (March 1962), 247-251.
Cited in Baumeister p.243.
62
Sade’s characters have sex with each other, and are occasionally on friendly terms, but the two
domains are kept distinct. This will be discussed in the following chapter.
63
Simultaneous orgasm of the killer, typically described as a “délicieuse jouissance,” and the death of
the victim is also a common motif (LNJ 1:214, 433, 434; LNJ 2: 12, 19 28, 29, 73, 186, 232, 278; J:

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 A final word on the relationship between weakness and sadism is required. In all
of these observations, the sadistic will is associated with pain and misfortune, and the
inability to passively accept one’s inflictions. But weakness alone does not account
for the manifestation of cruelty. Further, not every libertine character goes through
hardships – something else is necessary to ‘enable’ sadism. The difference between
the two psychological types (the sadist, and the individual who merely endures
hardships) is, in short, the difference between Justine and Juliette. Justine goes
through trials that do not even harden her heart, let alone make her a sadist, yet she is
not so different from her sister. She is equally capable of irrational, risky behaviour,
and falling in with the ‘wrong crowd,’ as evidenced by her love for the bisexual
matricide the Marquis de Brassac, despite his “depravity”(Sade’s term; MV: 35). She
is also as familiar with the doctrine of the libertines as is Juliette, and also seems a
little morally autistic, for example when she tests out a suspected poison on the family
dog (MV:46:) Unlike Juliette, who for the most part merely agrees with and repeats
what she has been told, Justine frequently engages in debate with her captors, at times
with aggression. She is also, by the end of La Nouvelle Justine, suspiciously reluctant
to adopt a more normal lifestyle. Although not a twin (Juliette is a year older), Justine
and Juliette are psychically connected- when Juliette experiences a pang of remorse,
she has a prophetic dream involving her sister (J: 549).There are two, crucial,
differences between Justine and Juliette. Firstly, Justine adheres to absolute moral
principles. Secondly, Justine has inner restraints that prevent her from following
destructive or criminal impulses (or even to follow common sense, such as going to
the police, or trusting monks, regardless of what they do to her). 64 Juliette would
attribute her ‘lack of restraint’- her freedom from the ‘chimeras’ of remorse and

1183; 120: 570-762). Many of Sade’s critics take it for granted that this association of libido and
destruction is valid, yet in defending the association they typically go no further than appealing to
Sade’s authority as a psychologist. See, for example, Lorna Berman “The Marquis de Sade and
Courtly Love,” Eighteenth Century Fiction 11 no. 3 (April 1999):285-300, p.286; Frances Ferguson
“Sade and the Pornographic Legacy,” Representations 0 issue 36 (Autumn, 1991):1-21, p. 7 ; Josué V
Harari “D’un raison à l’autre: le dispositif Sade,” Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 230
(1985) :273-282, p.282; Josephs “Sade and Woman” p.99 ; Beatrice Fink “The Case for a Political
System in Sade,” Studies in Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century vol. 88 (1972): 493-512, p. 506;
Camille Paglia “Sexual Personae ; the cancelled preface” In Paglia Sex, Art and American Culture
(London: Viking, 1992) 101-124, pp.105-106.
64
See Baumeister p.263.

131
conscience– to her philosophical education; yet Justine has received essentially the
same education. This suggests that the crucial difference between the two sisters is not
reducible to intelligence or education. It could be innate; on the other hand, it could be
grounded in the freedom to choose between good and evil.

3.9 Enigma of Sadism

Although the above discussion sheds light on how sadism can become pleasurable, the
pleasure of inflicting pain remains paradoxical. Firstly, Sade’s characters require that
their victims experience terror and pain, and that the sadists themselves are aware of
the pain that their victims are subjected to. Yet these same characters are apparently
unconcerned with knowing the experiences of others. States Dolmancé, in Philosophy
in the Bedroom, “there is no possible comparison between what others experience and
what we sense; the heaviest dose of agony in others ought, assuredly, to be as naught
to us, and the faintest quickening of pleasure, registered in us, does touch us…” (PB:
283). There is not a single word in Sade of what the victims are going through, or, in
fact, who they are as people. Only superficial and external observations are made-
victims merely sob in terror or pain; even Justine describes her pain as if it were
happening to someone else (MV: 52, 61-62). Ironically, Sade, presenting himself as a
navigator of the extremes of human experience, never attempts to describe pain.
Secondly, there is a tension between the pleasure of having power over others (others
as others) and the tendency to reduce people to objects. The need for the sensation of
power, as a psychological dynamic, requires that one recognize the victims as people,
so that they are seen to be acknowledging one’s own power. One cannot be powerful
alone, amongst objects.

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133
 Chapter IV: STERILE PLEASURES
Sade and Sexuality

Some of them want to use you

Some of them want to get used by you
Some of them want to abuse you
Some of them want to be abused

Eurythmics Sweet Dreams (Are Made of This) (1983)

4.1 Introduction.
There is little agreement on what Sade’s writings on sex and gender entail. Angela
Carter, Camille Paglia, and Annie le Brun hold that Sade gives a positive message of
liberation to women; others hold that Sade is the very embodiment of misogyny. 1
Sade has been praised as a great erotic liberator; others find in his writing only
coldness, prudery and nausea. 2 As for the common claim that Sade was a pioneering
sexologist, he was clearly preoccupied such paraphilias as necrophilia, incest,
paedophilia and bestiality, though he made no attempt to explain such practices
(LNJ1:199; 2: 12, 192, 385; J: 189, 745, 746; AV: 512; 120:297, 306). 3 Sade argued
in favour of legalizing paedophilia, and the theme of child prostitution and sexual
slavery frequently appears in his work. In Philosophy in the Bedroom, the rape of
children is discussed and apparently advocated (PB: 320; LNJ 2: 28, 29, 66).
Otherwise, Sade’s thoughts on sex and prudery are largely in keeping with that of the
philosophes, in particular Diderot, Voltaire, Helvétius (who proposed the use of
women captured from vanquished states as sex slaves), La Mettrie (who expressed the

1
Paglia refers to herself as a ‘Sadean’. Paglia pp.105-106
2
For an account of Sade as claustrophobic, mechanical or prudish, rather than erotic, see Didier Sade :
Un écriture du désir p.7 ; also Crocker “Au cœur” p.60; Michel Delon “Le Corps Sadien,” Europe
835-836 (Nov- Déc. 1998) :22-33,27 ; Béatrice Fink “La Langue de Sade,” French Literature Series
10 (1983) :103-122, pp.108-109. Roger La Philosophie dans le pressoir p.56.
3
For discussion, see Béatrice Didier “Inceste et écriture chez Sade,” Lettres Nouvelles, Mai-Juin
(1972) : 150-158 ; Stéphane “Morale et nature,” p.39 Richetti p.624; Roger G. Lacombe Sade et ses
masques pp.261, 262.

133
wish to die surrounded with beautiful women, an image repeated in Sade’s Dialogue
between a Priest and a Dying Man) and the libertin writers, as mentioned in Chapter I
(PB: 175; J: 515; 522). 4 Sade also refers to earlier philosophers on the topic of sexual
mores, for example Diogenes the Cynic’s penchant for having sex in public (J: 63).
The accounts of the explorers Louis Antoine de Bougainville (1729-1811) and Cook
also exerted an influence on the sexual imagination of 18th century France, Sade
included. 5 On the subject of sex, another major influence on Sade was Restif de la
Bretonne. Bretonne sought to distinguish himself from the work of Sade, arguing that
his own works were concerned with erotic pleasure (so that women could ‘better
serve’ their husbands), and described Sade as a ‘vivisector’. One of the few writers of
the time to address Sade’s work directly, Bretonne wrote an ‘antidote’ to Sade’s
Justine, entitled the Anti-Justine. What is indisputable, despite these intellectual links,
is that Sade’s treatment of sex goes far beyond all other discourses, whether the
relative reserve of the philosophes or the jovial innocence of the libertin authors. 6
There are two distinct ideologies in Sade’s work concerning sexuality and
gender, a fact that accounts for the bifurcation of interpretations. Each is directly
related to the two doctrines that emerged in Chapter II. The first ideology, which
describes sexuality in terms of consumption and aggression, is linked to the principle
of a natural order characterized by destruction, and the view that human agency as
continuous with this natural order. Call this the ‘Bataille doctrine.’ 7 The second

4
“If either a beautiful slave or concubine become among the people the reward of talents, virtue, or
valour, the manners of that people will not be readily corrupted. It was in the heroic ages that the
Cretans imposed on the Athenians the tribute of ten beautiful virgins, from which Theseus released
them.” Helvétius A Treatise on Man (ii.291). See also Helvétius A Treatise on Man Vol. I p.129, 146;
Vol. II pp.75, 219-221; Helvétius Essays on the Mind pp.83, 114; La Mettrie p.111
On the relationship between Diderot and Sade on sexuality, see Brissenden.
5
Available in Sade’s time were the following: Louis Bougainville Description d’un Voyage autour du
monde (Paris: 1771-72); James Cook Journal d’un voyage autour du monde en 1768, 1769, 1770, et
1771, traduit de l’Anglais par M. de Fréville (Paris: 1773). Sade gives paginated references to both
Cook and Bougainville in the footnotes to Aline et Valcour (AV: 226n, 261n).
6
Laugaa-Traut pp.90, 176. Sade mentions Bretonne in Juliette and Reflections on the Novel (J: 461;
120: 108, 111).
7
The ‘Bataille doctrine’ coheres with that aspect of Sade’s work that Bataille correctly identifies, rather
than being an accurate reflection of Bataille’s thought. More pedantically, it could be termed ‘the

134
doctrine rejects all teleology, treats sexuality as merely the means to physical
pleasure, and (ostensibly) adheres to the Utilitarian ethic of pleasure maximization
across a population. Call this the ‘Benthamite doctrine.’ I will discuss these two
doctrines in turn, before noting their commonalities, and the way in which Sade
attempts, with difficulty, to bring them together.

4.2 The Bataille doctrine.

The Bataille doctrine concerning sex is based on the principle that sexuality is
continuous with the human ‘passions,’ which are in turn a direct manifestation of
natural impulses, hence, the urge towards violence, dominance and the will to
destruction. Rape and murder are deemed natural outcomes of the sexual impulse.
The association of sexuality with domination, sadism and homicidal aggression is not
straightforward, even within Sade’s text. As noted in the previous chapter, Sade
associates sadism with a particular group of ‘symptoms’ (boredom, frustration,
impotence, and so on), suggesting that sadism is not primarily sexual in nature.
Further, Sade’s work, despite its stated doctrines, better supports the implication of
Diderot’s The Nun, insofar as sexualized sadism is associated with unusual social
situations and their long-term effects. 8 (It is still open to question, however, whether
army barracks, prisons, boarding schools and so on make people into sexual sadists, or
if it is the secrecy of barracks life that enables the inner sadist to emerge). Further,
Sade’s libertine characters do not typically slay each other whilst having sex,
suggesting that the association of destruction and sex has more to do with implied
power relationships than with some innate human drive.
Three of Sade’s claims need to be distinguished here. These are: a). sexuality is
linked with an urge for pure pleasure without consideration for the feelings of the
other; b). sexuality is closely linked with an urge to dominate and subjugate the other;
and, finally, c). sexuality is closely linked with an urge to inflict cruelty and to kill the
other. The last claim here is a direct outcome of Sade’s assumption of the naturalness,
hence the correctness, of the ‘strong’ dominating the ‘weak,’ as will be discussed at
length in Chapter VI. Sade transposes the relationship of predator and prey to the

Bataille’s Sade doctrine.’ I do not mean to say that what I call the ‘Bataille doctrine’ is an accurate
portrayal of Bataille’s ‘philosophy.’
8
For a discussion of Sade’s relation to Diderot, see Batlay and Fellows “Diderot et Sade,” p.455.

135
sexual relationship between humans, essentially recognizing no distinction between
the predatory aggression of the hunter with the instrumental aggression of the rapist or
‘lover’ (J: 738). It could simply be that Sade associates sex and the will to destroy, as
both types of inclination are repressed by social conditioning. In any case, this is an
empirical question. David Buss, in The Evolution of Desire (2003), discusses
sexualized violence towards women in only two contexts- partner abuse, and rape.
Violence towards the female partner, writes Buss, is normally associated with
jealousy, which is in turn associated with (unstable) strategies to retain the ‘breeding
partner.’ Where this jealousy becomes homicidal, Buss suggests, it is maladaptive. 9
(Insofar as women do not prefer sadists, sexual sadism itself is clearly maladaptive, in
particular in forms of social organisation where women are free to choose, or leave,
their partners. Buss notes also that sexual pleasure plays a role in insemination, as
was in fact believed in Sade’s time. Simply being bad in bed, let alone being a sadist,
reduces one’s chances of contributing to the gene pool). 10 Sade’s association of
sexuality with at times homicidal drives cannot be dismissed, however. He notes that
many men would prefer to kill their partners than see them unfaithful, an observation
that coheres with Buss’s own observations (J: 259; Buss p.130).
The association of sexuality with domination and cruelty, rather than homicide
outright, is more complex. The central question here is whether sex is intrinsically
associated with an urge to dominate, or whether the will to dominate another person
can be expressed sexually. (Notably, in making the association of sex with the will to
objectify and dominate, Sade is close to a number of canonical thinkers. Lucretius
describes ‘frenzied lovers’ as being driven by an impulse to inflict pain; Socrates
writes that “in the friendship of the lover there is no real kindness; he has an appetite:

9
David M. Buss The Evolution of Desire: Strategies of Human Mating (New York: Basic Books, 2003)
p.130.
10
Obviously, evolutionary theory strongly suggests the implausibility of Sade’s account of human
nature. Sade’s characters typically rape, tend to kill every woman they rape, and kill all the infants
present, in particular their own, or abandon them to the ‘seraglios’ (harems) of their secret societies.
For discussion on the relationship between orgasm and insemination, see Buss pp.230, 231. On the
Renaissance view that female orgasm played a role in conception, see Laqueur p. 102.

136
as wolves love lambs so lovers love their love.” 11 There are also similarities in the
thought of Kant, Sartre, and Freud). 12 Some have rejected the association of sexuality
and sexual license with aggression entirely, dismissing the notion as groundless
conservative scaremongering. 13 Another possibility is that sadism and sex go together
insofar as sexualized violence and humiliation is all the more traumatizing, given the
deeply intimate nature of sexual contact. The psychological torture and humiliation of
Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison in 2004 was clearly sexualized, insofar as it
involved nudity, forced masturbation and sexualized poses, but the motive was not
straightforwardly sexual. Whether such acts were primarily sadistic or primarily
sexual, or whether rape is primarily sexual or primarily an act motivated by cruelty, is
11
Lucretius On the Nature of the Universe trans. R.E. Latham (London: Penguin, 1983) p.164; Plato
“Phaedrus” in The Phaedrus, Lysis and Protagoras of Plato trans. J. Wright (London: Macmillan and
Co, 1888) p.37. The latter quote is cited in Crocker “Au cœur” p.68.
12
Sigmund Freud considered the need to respect the sexual partner as detrimental to sexual satisfaction,
writing that “the man almost always feels his respect for the woman acting as a restriction on his sexual
activity, and only develops full potency when he is with a debased sexual object; and this in turn is
partly caused by the entrance of perverse components into his sexual aims, which he does not venture
to satisfy with a woman he respects.” Sigmund Freud Volume 7 On Sexuality: Three Essays on the
Theory of Sexuality and other Works trans. James Strachey; ed. James Strachey & Angela Richards
(London: Penguin, 1977) p.254, also p.236. See also Freud Collected papers (London: Hogarth Press,
1950) IV, p.210. Yet Freud also associated sadism with primitive or childish associations of sex with
blood and violence, or (in the context of penis envy) a sense of powerlessness (Freud Sexuality pp. 71,
111, 115, 198,199, 200, 252, 268, 321). Havelock Ellis, like Freud, associates sadism with childishness
and impotence, and also suggests that sadism is not sexual at all, instead viewing it as active
schadenfreude. Ellis Psychology of Sex pp. 76, 173, 175.
Immanuel Kant also held that the sexual act to be deeply degrading for both parties, but in
particular because it leads to the objectification of the other person, and because it leads to ‘animality.’
His only solution- a contract to use each other’s genitalia- suggests an essentially masturbatory
conception of sex. Immanuel Kant Lectures on Ethics ed. Peter Heath & J.B. Schneewind; trans. Peter
heath. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p.156, 159, 378. 404. I thank Robert C.
Solomon for bringing this text to my attention. Finally, Jean-Paul Sartre describes sexual desire as
fundamentally an urge to subjugate and enslave the other person. Masochism occurs for Sartre where
one attempts to escape one’s essential freedom, and making oneself an object; sadism occurs where the
sadist attempts to make an object of the other. Jean-Paul Sartre Being and Nothingness: a
phenomenological essay on ontology trans. by Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Books,
1992) pp 474- 482, 511-522,781.
13
For discussion, see Fred R. Berger “Pornography, Sex and Censorship’” in Alan Soble, ed.
Philosophy of Sex (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield publishers, Inc., 1980) :322-347;

137
in fact a question that Sade’s work is not clear on. This is because he makes little
distinction between simple sexual pleasure, cruelty, and the pleasure of arson or
poisoning, all of which are associated with sexual excitement (J: 240, 704, 987).
According to the Bataille doctrine, simply put, ideal sex is sadistic rape, insofar as it is
violent, cruel, and non-consensual. 14
Sade’s description of sex as simple pleasure is common to both the ‘Bataillian’
and ‘Benthamite’ modes. It clashes with a deeply held belief that sexuality is, or ought
to be, associated with direct, positive communication with a loved one, or at least
someone one feels both physical and emotional attachment to. In the words of
Aristophanes, sexual love is “to heal the wound in human nature.” 15 Call this the
‘communicative’ account of sexuality. Several philosophers, notably Robert C.
Solomon and Thomas Nagel, have attempted to define sexuality as such, Nagel
going as far as to define sex (following Sartre) as having a ‘relational structure’: “it
involves a desire that one’s partner be aroused by the recognition of one’s desire that
he or she be aroused.” 16 Consequently, non-communicative sex (insofar as it does not
follow this structure) is considered perverse, or at least problematic. A ‘small-scale
orgy,’ for example, reasons Nagel, may “degenerate into mutual epidermal
stimulation by participants otherwise isolated from each other.” 17
Sade’s account is no doubt distasteful for anyone who takes the communicative
model to be morally, qualitatively, or even aesthetically superior, and it is tempting to
reject his picture of sexuality as simple consumption as merely a reflection of his
autistic understanding of human relations. This is too easy.
It is necessary to distinguish between the prescriptive and descriptive roles of a
philosophy of sex- that is, between a sexual morality and a ‘natural history’ of human
sexuality. We can fully agree that non-communicative sex is bad sex; but it is still

14
For discussion on this question, see Baumeister p.231; Pinker pp.359-71.
15
Plato Symposium trans. Alexander Nehemas, Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1989) pp.25-28.
16
Solomon does not think that communicative sex need be necessarily pleasant, suggesting that the
expression of dislike or anger may be non-perverse. Robert C. Solomon “Sexual Paradigms” In Alan
Soble, ed. Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary readings (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman &Littlefield,
Publishers, Inc: 1980): 89-98; pp.96, 97; Thomas Nagel “Sexual Perversion” In Soble ed. Philosophy
of Sex: 76-88, p.84
17
Nagel “Perversion” p.86.

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sex, and may still reflect something of our nature. As a prescriptive account of sex,
Sade’s ‘Bataille doctrine’ can be dismissed out of hand for obvious reasons. But the
insistence that non-communicative sex or even rape is less enjoyable for all men, or
even perverse (in the same sense that any immoral act is not necessarily perverse) –
for all men and across cultures and history- is questionable. Sade bases his account of
sexuality on the historical record, and accounts of other cultures, a well as his own
psychological speculations. By contrast, Solomon and Nagel’s treatment of sexuality,
insofar as it is a description of sexuality, may well reflect the philosopher’s vice of
assuming local cultural norms, or even personal preference, to be universal truths.
Further, there is something of a false dichotomy in the debate between
‘communicative’ sex and ‘(merely) pleasurable’ sex. One can accept the prescription
of sexuality as communication without denying the idea of sexual activity as
pleasurable in its own right, or even as an art or an aesthetic. By the same token, no-
strings, merely indulgent sex with another willing hedonist may still give the
momentary Heimlichkeit of shared pleasure. Nagel’s suggestion that a preoccupation
with sexual technique is ‘sadistic,’ as it prevents one from renouncing the role of
‘agent,’ I think, reflects the narrowness of this dichotomy. 18
On the one hand, the Communicative Model is found in a number of cultures.
Shared sexual pleasure, communication, and psychological compatibility are central
principles of the Kama Sutra of Vatsyayana and other erotic texts of the East. 19
Religious teaching (notably, not Christian teaching) also emphasises the importance
of communication and shared erotic pleasure. In Talmudic law, sexual satisfaction of
the wife is regarded as so central that its absence is considered just grounds for
divorce; likewise, the prophet Muhammad emphasises the importance of foreplay,
stating that sex without it is a form of cruelty. 20 Lucretius, one of the few classical
thinkers that Sade cites, also thought that the pleasure of sex is shared. 21 Even
mainstream pornography maintains the illusion of direct communication; the model

18
Nagel “Perversion” p.85.
19
The Kama Sutra of Vatsyayana trans. Sir Richard Burton and F.F. Arbuthnot (London: Thorsons,
1999).
20
Adin Steinsaltz The Essential Talmud trans. Chaya Galai (New York: Bantam, 1976) p.133.
Geraldine Brooks Nine Parts of Desire: The Hidden World of Islamic Women (New York: Anchor
Doubleday, 2003) p.39.
21
Lucretius p.168.

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makes eye contact with the camera, as if to simulate face to face communication with
the masturbator. 22
Yet, in fact, the principal of communicative, mutually pleasurable sex is not a
cultural universal, and anthropological data tends to support Sade’s (descriptive)
conception of sexuality rather than that of Nagel and Solomon. Many cultural
practices are consistent with the view that sex is the use of another’s body as a means
to pleasure, or that the pleasure of the other person (usually the woman) is irrelevant,
if not actually undesirable. Otto Kiefer, in Sexual Live in Ancient Rome, writes that
the Romans of antiquity “regarded sexual activity as sensual satisfaction and woman
as man’s plaything,” noting that this was the opinion of Ovid. 23 David M. Buss notes
that some cultures (typically those where women are not granted the same rights as
men) lack a concept of female orgasm. Where the existence of female sexual pleasure
is acknowledged, it is, in some cultures, deliberately eradicated through
clitoridectomy. 24 Prostitution is also a widespread cultural phenomenon (frequently
supported by local cultural practises, as in the case of the ‘Devadasis’ of India, who
are forced into slavery as temple prostitutes), as is the sequestering of women for the
exclusive sexual use a handful of powerful men (J: 317). 25 Buss also notes that male
fantasies often involve large numbers of practically anonymous partners, and focus on
physical aspects of the ‘partner’ rather than feelings. 26 Evolutionary anthropologist

22
For discussion, see Jennifer Lyon Bell “Character and Cognition in Modern Pornography”
www.utu.fi/hum/mediatutkimus/affective/bell.pdf. (accessed September 2004).
23
Otto Kiefer Sexual Life in Ancient Rome trans. by Anon, from Kulturgeschichte Roms unter
Besonderer Berückschtigung der Römischen Sitten ( London : Abbey Library, 1976) p.225.
24
W. H. Davenport writes: “in most of the societies for which there are data, it is reported that men
take the initiative and, without extended foreplay, proceed vigorously toward climax without much
regard for achieving synchrony with the woman’s orgasm. Again and again, there are reports that
coitus is primarily completed in terms of the man’s passions and pleasures, with scant attention paid to
the woman’s response. If women do experience orgasm, they do so passively.” W. H. Davenport “Sex
in cross-cultural perspectives” in F.A. Beach, ed. Human sexuality in four perspectives (Baltimore: the
Johns Hopkins Press, 1977):115-163. Cited in Buss p. 226; see also Buss p.138.
25
. The monopoly of a powerful minority of men of sexual access to women of fertile age (whether as
concubines, mistresses or wives) is a widespread pattern in a number of cultures, if not actually a
cultural universal. Buss cites the same cultural practices here as does Sade (the harem in particular)
Buss pp. 63, 130-137, 140, 193.
26
Bruce Ellis and Donald Symons write: “[t]he most striking feature of [male fantasy] is that sex is
sheer lust and physical gratification, devoid of encumbering relationships, emotional elaboration,

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Barbara Smuts has observed that societies in which men rarely attack or rape women
are the exception, not the norm. 27 Susan Brownmiller, in Against Our Will, notes that
rape in warfare is a widespread practice that goes as far back as there have been
written records. 28 Sade writes: “Greek commanders gave their soldiers the right [to
rape] as a reward for valour. After the capture of Carbines, the army of Tarentum [les
Tarentins] collected all the boys, the virgins, and the young women who could be
unearthed in the town, stripped them and exposed them in the market place, where
everybody chose what he wanted...” (J: 182; Œ III: 340). Sade also notes the custom
of lending wives and daughters out to travellers and guests: “[a] traveller arriving in
Pegu rents a girl for the duration of his stay in the country; with her he does whatever
he pleases; afterward, much enriched by her experience, she returns to her family and
if anything finds a surfeit of suitors eager to marry her” (J: 183). Ritual uses of sexual
intercourse (the rites of Dionysus for example), and the ‘use’ of sex purely for
procreation (as in Catholic tradition) also fall outside the communicative model,
insofar as the Other is merely a means to an end.
The rejection of the ‘communicative’ model is not, of course, unknown in our
own culture. A number of writers (Catherine Millet, Michel Houellebecq, and Henry
Miller, for example) have written of the pleasures, or the state of ecstasy peculiar to
commitment-free sex with strangers, or the orgy. 29 As Buss argues, there is no
compelling reason to think that this attitude is particularly neurotic, immature or
perverse (whether it is moral is a separate issue). 30 Hence, Sade’s account of sex as a
description of human, in particular, male sexuality cannot be ruled out.

complicated plot lines, flirtation, courtship, and extended foreplay.” These fantasies betray a
psychology attuned to seeking sexual access to a variety of partners.” B.J. Ellis and D. Symons “Sex
differences in sexual fantasy: an evolutionary psychological approach,” Journal of Sex Research 27
(1990): 527-556. Quoted in Buss p.82.
27
Barbara B. Smuts “Male aggression against women: An evolutionary perspective” In Human Nature,
3 (1992): 1-44, p. 1. Quoted in Buss p.277.
28
Susan Brownmiller Against Our Will: Men, women, and rape (New York: Bantam Books, 1975).
Cited in Buss p.277
29
For discussion, see Arno Karlen, Threesomes: Studies in Sex, Power and Intimacy (New York:
Beech Tree Books / William Morrow, 1988) pp.95-98.
30
Buss p.215.

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4.3 The Benthamite Doctrine.
The ‘Benthamite’ doctrine is based on four cardinal premises; a). the rejection of
traditional teleology; b). the assumption that the maximizing of pleasure is the greatest
good c). the assumption that sex is highly pleasurable; and d). the affirmation of
sexuality as being important exclusively as a physical pleasure. In accordance with the
rejection of teleology, Christian notions concerning homosexuality, prudery and
monogamy are rejected, as is the notion of a traditional role of women, the
significance of childbirth, and the importance placed on marriage. In accordance with
Utilitarian thought, Sade declares prudery a ‘chimerical’ virtue, the legal status of
prostitution an absurdity, and a sexual promiscuity in girls and women a virtue (MV:
179, 277; PB: 208). In Juliette:

Only in these multiple and iterated extravagances does a girl’s true virtue reside; the more
she gives herself, the more lovable she is; the more she fucks, the more happiness she
distributes and the more she is instrumental to her countrymen’s happiness… [t]hey are
sordid barbarians, these husbands who stick by the vain pleasure of plucking a rose: it’s
despotism, they claim this right at the expense of other men’s well-being (J: 62).

Sade proposes that ‘mutual aid,’ hence, having as much sex as possible with as many
(here, men) as possible, is the meaning of human existence, again appealing to the
‘general interest.’
Is anyone able to tell me, for I sincerely wish to know, of what use a prudent, well-
behaved woman can be to society? And whether there is anything more superfluous than
the practice of this virtue which, with every passing day, only further numbs and mines
our sex?…Up until the time a girl marries, of what conceivable advantage can preserving
her virginity be to her? And how can folly be carried to the point where one believes a
female creature is worth more or less for having one part of her body a little more or less
enlarged? For what purpose has Nature created every human being? Is it not for giving
mutual aid one to the other, and consequently for giving others all the pleasures it is in
one’s power to dispense? (italics mine; J: 60-61).

As with the Bataille doctrine, Sade’s Benthamite treatment of sexuality is separated

from any notion of communication, shared pleasure or care between two people. Girls
and ‘lewd women’ are admonished to give themselves in the abstract, to anyone,
exactly as Utilitarianism does not distinguish between the utility of one’s loved ones
and total strangers. Scenes in which libertine characters have sex are merely

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microcosms of this same ‘general economy’ of sexual pleasure. They do not make
love or have sex with each other, nor are they interested in such paradigmatically
romantic states as simultaneous climax, for example; they essentially use each other’s
bodies to masturbate with (accordingly, Sade tends to elevate the masturbation
fantasy, or even writing about it, to the status of an actual sexual act; J: 640-641).
Sade’s preoccupation with necrophilia, bestiality and mechanized sexual toys fits this
account. Insofar as sex is reduced to pleasure with an ‘object,’ the ‘partner’ may as
well be a toy, a statue, corpse or dog (LNJ 2: 12, 385; J: 188, 189, 367, 745, 746,
1190). In the following passage from Juliette, it is not clear if the sexual ‘objects’
even exist. Durand the alchemist describes her ability to produce what appear to be
interactive erotic spectacles in her own home; that is, sexuality removed from reality
entirely.

“There is not a single passion,” replied Durand, “not a single whim or fancy, not a living
being on this globe, nor an extravagance or eccentricity, however unusual or picturesque
it be, that cannot be enjoyed here; merely give me several hours forenotice, I will procure
you anything under the sun; let your desire be irregular, let it be fantastic, let it be
gruesome, and this in no matter what degree, I solemnly promise to provide you the
means to execute it. Nor is that all. If there be any men or women anywhere in the world,
with whose tastes or practices you were eager to be acquainted, I will have them here; and
unseen by them, you will watch them in action through a gauze curtain...all individuals,
all races, all nations, all sexes, all ages, simply specify what you wish...” (J: 542-543).

Whether this passage describes a drug –induced state, an optical illusion or some
other sort of virtual reality is unclear. 31 In any case, it illustrates perfectly three
aspects of the Sadeian wish fulfilment fantasy. Firstly, the sexualised other is reduced
to an object (“I will procure anything under the sun”). Secondly, sex is conceived of
as something one does to someone (or something) - quite possibly, something deeply
unpleasant. Thirdly, sexual pleasure is voyeuristic; sex is described here as something
that one watches, through a gauze curtain. Direct physical contact, that is, intimacy
with another human being, is apparently marginalized.

31
Drug induced state: substances that cause hallucinations appear in Sade’s works elsewhere. From the
tortures in The 120 Days: “[h]e has her swallow a drug which unhinges her imagination and causes her
to see horrible things in the room” (120:608, §60).

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4.4 Outcomes of the rejection of Traditional Teleology.
One can speak generally of two schools of thought concerning sexuality in Sade’s
period. According to the doctrine of a ‘Natural Law,’ as held by, among others,
Aristotle, Kant and Rousseau, there is an innate ‘naturalness’ of certain sexual
practices and the innate ‘wrongness’ of others. Aristotle, for example, deals with the
homosexual or cannibal by declaring that they are simply not fully human, and stating
that their pleasures were not truly pleasures except for the depraved. 32 Likewise, both
Kant and Rousseau considered married heterosexual pairings a part of the physical
and moral order of things, and that homosexuality and masturbation were violations of
this order. 33 Sade’s critique of the notion of gender and sexuality is a direct
consequence of rejecting this model. Without a conception of a divine or ideal, in
particular an ideal heterosexual and monogamous human nature, man has no divine
nature that could be perverted or debased. All tastes, including sexual preferences, are
contingent upon physiological states. Hence, one could not be held accountable for
one’s tastes or sexual predilections. ‘Perversion’, therefore, could not be anything
more than a statistical anomaly. 34
Sade dismantles standard notions of gender identity; both the notion of a distinct
sexual dimorphism, and (paradoxically, given Sade’s denial of free will on
materialistic grounds) the notion that sexed (‘engendered’) orientation or behaviour is
physically determined. His female characters frequently become masculine through
changing their dress, thoughts and manner (Juliette maintains her feminine
appearance, when not using her sex for leverage, simply for the sake of camouflage)
or the use of prostheses (J: 28, 91, 457, 299, 1019, 1175). 35 Sade also describes
individuals who are physically outside the usual male/female dichotomy. As
mentioned above, a number of key characters have, for example, obstructed vaginas
and clitorises that function, sexually, as penises. 36 (David Martyn suggests that Sade

32
Aristotle Ethics trans. J.A.K. Thomson (London: Penguin, 1976) p.325.
33
Rousseau Emile: 333-334; Alan Soble “Kant and Sexual Perversion” In the Monist 86:1 (2003): 57-
92.
34
See La Mettrie: 11, 23, 25, 30, 101; Helvétius Essays on the Mind: 83,106, 116.
35
For discussion, see William F. Edmiston “Plots, Patterns and Challenges to Gender Ideology in
Gomez and Sade,” The French Review Vol.73, No.3 (Feb 2000): 463-474.
36
Durand Célestine and Madame d’Esterval (in Juliette) are such characters. Sade’s male sadistic
characters are frequently described as having feminine features (J: 23, 1032; 120:221; LNJ. 1: 172; 2:

144
is the first Western writer to propose the possibility of surgical transformation from
one gender to the next, but the brutal ‘sex change operation’ described in the 120
Days of Sodom seems to be a form of torture rather than a positive contribution to the
discussion on gender identity; 120: 655). 37

4.5 Homosexuality
Sade declares that the ‘naturalness’ of heterosexuality and the unnaturalness of
alternatives is a myth, citing the frequency of homosexuality and bisexuality in other
cultures. 38 From The Philosophy in the Bedroom: “[w]e discover a hemisphere, we
find sodomy in it. Cook casts anchor in a new world: sodomy reigns there. Had our
balloons reached the moon, it would have been discovered there as well…O my
friends, can there be an extravagance to equal that of imagining that a man must be a

122, 136). Foucault has noted that during the 18th Century such physiological abnormalities were
regarded as actually immoral; it would seem that Sade makes this association as well. Rousseau
appears to have believed this; when unable to accept that the prostitute Zulietta is at once beautiful,
regal and witty, he is relieved to find that she has only one nipple (C: 310). For discussion, see Patrick
Graille Les Hermaphrodites aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris : Les Belles Lettres, 2001). Gender
fluidity was in fact not such a rare idea in, or just prior to, Sade’s time. Thomas Laqueur notes that
gender identity was relatively fluid until the early modern period. He notes, for example, the cryptic
gender of Elizabeth I, and the widely held medical belief, during the 16th and 17th centuries, that women
could spontaneously become men. Michel de Montaigne, in his Travel Journal (first published in
1774), writes of a group of girls in Chaumont-en-Bassagni who “plotted together a few years ago to
dress up as males and thus continue their life in the world;” one of the pair fell in love with another girl
and married her, and was eventually hanged “for using illicit devices to supply her defect in sex.”
Laqueur pp.125-127. Although Sade (in his ‘feminist’ mode) tends to eliminate the physiological
distinction between men and women, he also presents the traditional and, in his own time, dated view
that women are a degenerate expression of the male form (J: 510-511).
37
The section from The 120 Days of Sodom is as follows: “[a]fter having sheared off the boy’s prick
and balls, using a red-hot iron he hollows out a cunt in the place formerly occupied by his genitals; the
iron makes the hole and cauterizes simultaneously: he fucks the patient’s new orifice and strangles him
with his hands upon discharging.” For positive discussion of this passage, see David Martyn Sublime
Failures: The Ethics of Kant and Sade (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2003) p. 210.
38
It should be noted that Sade was not particularly advanced in his own time in this respect. Louis
Crompton notes that the law against homosexuality was abolished in France in 1791; Philosophy in the
Bedroom appeared in 1795. Louis Crompton Homosexuality & Civilization (Cambridge, Massachusetts,
and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003) p 524. I thank Shanon
Daly for bringing this text to my attention.

145
monster deserving to lose his life because he has preferred enjoyment of the asshole to
that of the cunt [...] ? (PB: 277). Sade also notes the implausibility of the doctrine that
all semen is ‘intended by nature’ for production. 39 There is, however, a tension in
Sade’s treatment of homosexuality. On the one hand, Sade portrays homosexuality
and anal sex as deeply transgressive; a shocking, and therefore exciting, violation of
nature (J: 312). Sade’s comments also suggest that a certain degree of homosexual
desire is normal for all males (J: 455n; 1124). But if homosexuality is due to a
physiological difference, or even normal, it is not a freely chosen rebellion. Sade’s
arguments concerning the morality of homosexuality seem more defensive than
defiant, such as the claim that “...l’homme doué de goûts singuliers est un malade;
c’est si vous le voulez, une femme à vapeurs hystériques” (LNJ 1: 357). 40
Sade dismisses the principles of monogamy and prudery on similar grounds,
rejecting both as being artefacts of Christian influence (PB: 323-4; J: 69). A woman
who does not follow her natural sexual inclinations is a “victim of her opinions and of
the chilly esteem she hopes for, almost always in vain, from men, she’ll have lived
dry and joyless and shall die with her regrets” ( J: 492; also LNJ 1 :39). Women are
said to be naturally ‘vulguivaguous’ (vulgivagues)- that is, not ‘belonging’ to any
particular males of the group, adding that “[s]elf interest, egoism and love degraded
these primitive attitudes, at once so simple and natural” (PB:318; similar, AV: 633;
LNJ 1: 41). 41 From Juliette;

In Tahiti, Cook discovered a society in which all the women give themselves indifferently
to all the assembled men. 42 But if a later consequence of this rite is pregnancy, the woman

39
Nocturnal emissions are taken to be ‘proof’ that wastage of semen is not ‘contrary to nature’ (LNJ 1:
79).
40
See also MV: 179, 212; MM: 55; AV: 310. Sade also refers to his own sentencing for pederasty (120:
495).
41
Sade here describes egoism as ‘unnatural;’ by contrast, in ‘Bataillian’ mode Sade describes egoism
as in fact natural. Delon notes that Sade has probably adopted la Mettrie’s term here, as used in a
discussion on the sexual mores of Sparta, in the Anti-Seneca. The etymology is based on the Latin term
vulgivalgus, ‘vagabond’, which appears in Lucretius. La Mettrie writes that women are “vulgivagous,”
like “dogs” (the term is missing from the English translation, rendering La Mettrie simply as “women
were shared and were common” (Œ III: 132n 2, p.1340; La Mettrie: 136).
42
This is what Cook actually writes: “A very considerable number of the principle people of Otaheite
[Tahiti], of both sexes, have formed themselves into a society in which every woman is common to

146
 smothers the child the instant it is born: splendid evidence this, that there do after all exist
people of sufficient intelligence to set their pleasures on a higher plane than the futile
laws enjoining us to increase numerically!… a similar society thrives at Constantinople
(J: 69).

Accordingly, laws against adultery are rejected as cruel and unjust (AV: 569), and
spousal jealousy and concerns for the honour of the husband are dismissed as self-
righteous manifestation of a man’s arrogance, pride and fear of humiliation (J: 259-
260 PB: 221, 224 AV: 310, 365). 43

4.6 Sade contra Rousseau on the role of Women.

Continue, therefore, always be as you are, chaste guardians of our morals and all the
gentle bonds of our peace, exploiting on every occasion the rights of the heart and of
nature in the interests of duty and virtue.

Rousseau A Discourse on Inequality (1755) 44

Prudish, God-fearing, or otherwise timorous women, take daily and confident use of these
counsels, it is for you the author intends them.

Sade Juliette (J: 153n).

The relationship between Sade and Rousseau is complex. 45 There is a considerable

every man, thus securing a perpetual variety as often as their inclination prompts them to seek it, which
is so frequent that the same man and woman seldom cohabit together for more than two or three days.
… If any of the women happen to be with child...her poor infant is smothered the moment it is born ...
[that it not] interrupt the mother in the pleasures of her diabolical prostitution.” Captain James Cook
Captain Cook’s Voyages 1768-1779 ed. Glyndwr Williams (London: The Folio Society, 1997) 56-57.
43
The evolutionary psychological line seems to give a more plausible explanation for this than simple
egoism. See Buss pp.125-129.
44
Rousseau A Discourse on Inequality p.65.
45
The complexity of the relationship between Sade and Rousseau is reflected by the divergence of
opinion in the secondary literature. Philippe Roger notes that Sade admired Rousseau and collected his
works. (Sade expresses his admiration for Rousseau in Aline et Valcour; the novel’s principals go on a
pilgrimage to visit him; AV: 69; n. p.811). Nelly Stéphane takes Sade to be the ‘anti-Rousseau;’ Alice
Laborde has suggested that Sade harboured a secret desire to become Rousseau’s equal. Sade agreed
with Rousseau on some matters, for example the absurdity of making suicide a criminal offence.
Elsewhere, however, Sade refers to Rousseau as a ‘misanthrope’ (LNJ 2: 223). Michel Delon comes
closest to identifying the commonality between the two thinkers, observing that “Rousseau et Sade se

147
overlap in the moral thinking of the two thinkers, which will be discussed in the
following chapter. Here I will discuss Sade’s relation to Rousseau on the topic of
sexuality. Rousseau’s Confessions (hereafter C; 1781) is replete with Sadeian themes,
in particular Rousseau’s masochism, his penchant, in his youth, for stealing and
exposing himself in public, his homoerotic encounters, his clothing fetishism, his
confession of such tastes; his infatuation with a Venetian prostitute (a woman named
Zulietta, who has more than a passing resemblance to Sade’s Juliette), his
involvement with child prostitution, and his own libertine friends and acquaintances
(C:13-16, 26, 33, 63,84, 160, 291,426). 46 Pertinent to the discussion at hand, Sade’s
treatment of the subject of women appears to be a direct reply to Rousseau, and is
based on principles Rousseau himself held to. Sade’s statements on women and their
role are an implicit response to this doctrine, as well as the entire cultural edifice it

situent sur les marges des Lumières, Rousseau car il refuse l’équivalence entre progrès et bonheur,
Sade parce qu’il dénonce la convergence du bonheur individuel et de la prospérité collective.” Michel
Delon “Sade contre Rousseau, en marge des Lumières,” Magazine- Littéraire 389 (July- August
2000) :39-43p.42. See also Stéphane “Morale et nature,” p.39; Alice M. Laborde “Sade: l’érotisme
démystifié,” L’Esprit Createur15 (1975):438-448: 446; Philippe Roger “Rousseau selon Sade ou Jean-
Jacques travesti,” Dix-huitième siècle 23 (1991):383-405, p.402.
46
Zulietta, like Juliette, is beautiful and intelligent, quick tempered and potentially lethal; she threatens
to shoot Rousseau with her pistols for his insolence. She is also a brunette, like Juliette, and like
Durand, is physically unusual; she only has one nipple, which makes her, for Rousseau, a ‘monster.’
Like Juliette, she avoids vaginal sex to avoid pregnancy. Rousseau met her in Italy, the scene of much
of the action of Juliette, including Juliette’s stint as a prostitute. Confessions pp.304-311, 415. In 1741,
when Rousseau was 29, together with his friend Carrio, Rousseau ‘purchased’ a girl of 11 or 12, named
Anzoletta. He notes that this is an arrangement “common in Venice” (C: 311). (Rousseau made this
‘purchase’ whilst secretary to the French Ambassador; In Juliette, the French ambassador to Venice
himself has a girl of 16 abducted from her family; J: 1084). Rousseau also discusses his acquaintance
Klüpfel, the preacher and chaplain to the Prince of Saxe-Gotha, who kept a ‘little girl.’ Rousseau says
of a meeting with Klüpfel that “I indulged in a somewhat coarser enjoyment” with this girl, who was,
Rousseau notes, “at everybody’s disposal” and “little adapted for her profession.” (C: 433, 434).
Rousseau refers to three personages in the course of the Confessions that fit the designation ‘libertine’;
Friedrich Melchior Grimm (1723-1807), who apparently did not believe in morality, his friend
Gauffecourt, who (at the age of sixty) attempted to seduce his wife with money and a ‘libertine book,’
and Mme (Françoise Louise Éléonore de La Tour) de Warens (1699-1762), who, according to
Rousseau, “could have slept with twenty men in one day with a calm conscience” (C: 223, 380, 457).

148
represents. 47 Sade’s treatment goes beyond simple parody, although parodic elements
are present. 48
In his introduction to his translation of Emile (hereafter E, 1762), Allan Bloom
reads Rousseau as predicting the feminist movement, portraying it as the final act in a
complete cultural bourgeoisification of the world. For Bloom’s Rousseau (and, it
appears, for Bloom himself), rationalism and egalitarianism would end sexual
differentiation. The designations ‘man’ and ‘woman,’ ‘husband’ and ‘wife,’ ‘parent’
and ‘child,’ it is feared, will become roles, and not designations that refer to natural
properties. Bloom writes that this would inevitably lead to the reduction of all of us to
the level of “the selfish Hobbesian individual, striving for self- preservation, comfort,
and power after power. Marriage and the family would decay and sexes be
assimilated. Children would be burdens and not fulfillments” (all the worse for
questionable theories of ‘natural kinds’; if the institutions of marriage and filial piety
are so vital, they should have stronger foundations than such a questionable ontology;
E: 24). Bloom’s own reading of Rousseau supports the reading of Sade as the Anti-
Rousseau, given that he wrote enthusiastically of exactly this cultural shift, and
advocated the elimination of such apparently concrete social roles and institutions as
the ‘mother,’ the ‘wife’ or the ‘marriage.’
Both Sade and Rousseau note the contingent relationship between sexual
behavior and human relationships. Both hold there is no natural bind that attaches
sexual partners- for Rousseau, marriage and monogamy are a moral institution; the
very reason why Sade rejects them (E: 16). Rousseau recommends absolute honesty
with children on sexual matters, as “a single proved lie told by the master to the child
would ruin forever the whole fruit of the education” (E: 216; 171). Yet Rousseau’s
sexual revolution is very limited, and, as Deutscher notes, his arguments on sexual

47
In Philosophy in the Bedroom for example, Rousseau is cited as saying that adultery is wrong, as the
wife could have a child who is not her husbands,’ to which Madame de Saint-Ange replies- avoid
pregnancy (PB: 223).
48
Sade’s ‘libertine education,’ (the setting of the Philosophy of the Bedroom is described as
“Dolmancé’s academy”; PB: 185) appears to be a parody of Rousseau’s educational ideal, and his role
as author of guidebooks for the young. It is also no coincidence that Sade’s most famous character,
Justine, goes by the name of Sophie, the name of the ideal female partner for Rousseau’s Emile. For
discussion see Jacques Broche “Sade ou le langage terroriste,” La Petite revue de philosophie 2,
(spring 1981): 25-36.

149
matters tend towards ‘kettle logic’ and the ad hoc. 49 To teach sexual propriety, which
he takes to be a ‘natural good,’ Rousseau recommends that one take the student to a
ward of syphilitics (E: 231). Sade, taking the side of rigorous pragmatism, instead
recommends frequent medical checks (J: 424). Where Rousseau suggests that adultery
may lead to an unwanted pregnancy, Sade recommends condoms and sponges (J: 424;
PB: 223). In an ironic touch, Sade adopts Rousseau’s advice to women not to grant
their favors too eagerly, to “make your favours rare and precious, if you know how to
make them valued” (E: 478,479). Writes Sade, “[if] your husband [proposes] sodomy
to you... don’t be overhasty accepting the invitation: one must always have the look of
refusing what one covets. If fear of having children forces you to suggest the thing
yourself, advance the excuse that you are afraid of dying in labor; maintain that one of
your friends has told you that her husband manages matters with her in that fashion”
(J:79).
In ‘Benthamite’ mode, Sade disagrees with Rousseau on three specific points.
Firstly, Sade questions both the claim of physical and psychological difference
between men and women, and its relevance. Women, according to Rousseau, are
‘made to please man’ and are unsuited to traditionally male-dominated activities, such
as carpentry or running (E:437). 50 Women are child-like in both appearance and
psychology, and are intellectually weak, being incapable of independent or abstract
thought (E: 211,386, 387). 51 They are insidiously manipulative and incapable of self
control (E: 377). Rousseau rejects the charge that he is claiming that women are
inferior, but that they have a ‘role’, which is complementary to that of men (E: 361).
Her function, he argues, is to ‘please’ and ‘console’ men in their pains- she is to look

49
Penelope Deutscher Yielding Gender: feminism, deconstruction and the history of philosophy
(London and New York: Routledge, 1997) p.97. In a kettle logic, several mutually contradictory
explanations are sustained at once, suggesting that the actual motive for retaining the defended point of
view is repressed. The term derives from a joke discussed by Freud. A man lends another a kettle, and
it is returned damaged. When confronted, the borrower says that, firstly, he never borrowed a kettle,
second, the kettle had a hole in it already, and thirdly, he’d returned the kettle undamaged. See
Sigmund Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, trans. James Strachey, Standard Ed.
(New York: Norton, 1990) p. 72. See also Freud The Interpretation of Dreams trans. James Strachey
(New York: Avon, 1970), 152-3.
50
Robert Wokler Rousseau: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p.126.
51
Wokler pp. 127-128. This is despite the fact that Rousseau acknowledges the materialist framework,
noting that, between men and women, “the machine is constructed in the same way” (E: 358).

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pretty and to remain submissive (E: 358, 365, 366, 437, 442,437). (Significantly, the
‘tasks’ that Rousseau holds to be appropriate for women- lace-making, dancing and
singing, and cooking for the home, are economically trivial; women are largely
withheld from economic relevance and independence; E: 425, 394). Yet, according to
Rousseau himself, economic inequality is a cause of tyranny). Rousseau insists that
he is simply clarifying that the sex roles are established in the ‘physical and moral’
order of things, and yet his Emile is filled with admonitions and advice on how one is
to best embody the ‘good woman’- a state which is assumed to be natural. As
Deutscher notes, Rousseau conflates the descriptive with the prescriptive. 52 Much of
this ‘advice’ is quite explicitly related to the enforcement of a ‘natural’ hierarchy
between men and women; women should be pretty and entertaining, but not too
pretty, educated or intelligent, as she will become a source of grief, sexual jealousy, or
an embarrassment to her husband (E: 409, 363, 409). 53 Women are to remain without
knowledge, art or education, lest they become too powerful (that is, independent); an
obvious impossibility if women were simply incapable of such cultivation.
Maintenance of power over a woman is frequently behind Rousseau’s reasoning;
when choosing a wife, Rousseau advises, one should choose a ‘mediocre’ woman to
avoid jealousy or conflict (E: 410). 54 Rousseau also holds that any woman who
wishes to liberate herself from men to be a victim of philosophical fashion (E:
386).Were a woman to ‘betray’ the ‘destiny’ of her sex, she would become weak,
having abandoned her only ‘strength’ (meaning, of course, her feminine weakness and
passivity), which is inextricably tied up with her sex (E: 363, 364). Rousseau’s
assumption that the ‘natural’ is the good, and that anything with a cultural origin is
bad, is the origin of his confusion here, and it is precisely on this point that Sade turns
to in his response. In legislating on what is natural, and privileging the natural over
the good, Rousseau leads to incoherence as he mistakenly assumes the division and
specialisation of the sexual roles to be entirely a natural kind, and not, at least to a
certain extent, a cultural construct.

52
Deutscher p.95. Much of Sade’s thought is open to the same charge.
53
Note that Sade makes exactly the same association of virtue and mediocrity that Rousseau makes,
differing in that he affirms extravagance and excess instead.
54
Again, Rousseau makes the same association of mediocrity and morality that Sade (and later,
Nietzsche) makes.

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 In reply, Sade attacks the assumed physiological inferiority to men, women’s
psychological inferiority to men (both intellectual and emotional), the notion of the
complementary nature of gender distinctions, and the purported teleological
significance of such a difference. 55 Sade uses the imagery of enchainment and ‘divine
impulse’ in making his case. This colonization of the Rousseauian lexicon is apt, as
Sade exploits inconsistencies between Rousseau’s gender theory and his political
thought. In particular, Rousseau criticises the idea that there could be a natural ‘right’
of force of the strong over the weak, but assumes that this is exactly the right that men
have over women (The Social Contract, hereafter SC: 52; Discourse on Inequality,
hereafter DI: 77). 56
In Sade’s short story Eugénie de Franval (1788), explicit references to
Rousseau’s thought and language are made. A submissive married woman, wearing
“her chains for the first few years without suspecting her enslavement,” eventually
breaks free from social convention (GT: 14). Identical language is used in Philosophy
in the Bedroom. Against the marriage contract, Sade writes that “[t]he act of
possession can only be exercised upon a chattel or an animal, never upon an
individual who resembles us, and all the ties which can bind a woman to a man are
quite as unjust as illusory” (PB:319). From Philosophy in the Bedroom:

O charming sex, you will be free: as do men, you will enjoy all the pleasures of which
Nature makes a duty, from not one will you be withheld. Must the diviner half of mankind
be laden with irons by the other? Ah, break those irons: Nature wills it.
For a bridle having nothing but your inclinations, for laws only your desires, for morality
Nature’s alone ; languish no longer under brutal prejudices which wither your charms and
hold captive the divine impulses of your hearts ; 57 like us, you are free, the field as it is to

55
Yet, albeit rejecting such principles dear to Rousseau, Sade has apparently adopted Rousseau’s
intellectual self image as existing above and beyond all stultifying convention, as the great liberator and
iconoclast: “I am cynical, impudent, violent and fearless,” he declares in the Confessions; “I thought
that I was born to destroy all illusions”(C:33,405).
56
Rousseau The Social Contract translated by Maurice Cranston. (London: Penguin Books, 1968); A
Discourse on Inequality trans. Maurice Cranston (London: Penguin 1984).
57
Sade’s footnote: “Women are unaware to what point their lasciviousness embellishes them. Let one
compare two women for roughly comparable age and beauty, one of whom lives in celibacy, and the
other in libertinage: it will be seen by how much the latter exceeds in éclat and freshness; all violence
does Nature is far more wearing than the abuse of pleasure; everyone knows bed improves a woman’s
looks” (PB:323).

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 us ; have no fear of absurd approaches ; pedantry and superstition are things of the past ;
no longer will you be seen to blush at your charming delinquencies ; crowned with myrtle
and roses, the esteem we conceive for you will henceforth in direct proportion to the scale
you give your extravagances (PB: 323).

Against Rousseau’s arguments for the ‘natural’ inability of women to be anything

other than coquettish, Sade suggests that, if only women were educated better, they
would show themselves to be the equals of men (E: 363). 58 The ideal education for
the heroine, commencing at the age of seven, is described in Eugénie de Franval:
“…Mademoiselle de Franval ...was given teachers for writing, drawing, poetry,
natural history, declamation, geography, astronomy, anatomy, Greek, English,
German, Italian, together with instructors for handling weapons, dancing, riding and
music.” (GT: 17). Five teachers would arrive daily for such instruction, and lessons
would commence at nine and finish at two daily. Juliette, like de Franval, also handles
firearms. She also manages her own finances and has sex purely for pleasure, as
would a man (J: 299). Her tutors and mentors, Delbène and Clairwil (who deliver
much of the novel’s philosophy) and Durand (a chemist and poisoner) contrast with
Rousseau’s explanations of the ‘subordination’ of women. Sade explicitly rejects the
traditional, arcane associations of women with witchcraft and other supernatural
powers, as well as rejecting the notion that physical difference could possibly justify
differential treatment (J:506). Yet Sade grants her the freedom of choosing not to
reproduce, even the capacity to destroy, as do men. For Sade, notes Carter, ‘the
Goddess is Dead’ (Carter: 110-113; J: 506). 59
Regarding Rousseau’s insistence on the ‘natural modesty’ that is natural to, and
necessary of women, Sade declares that sexual contact is a requisite for mental health:
“The importance of the need to fuck is no less high than our need to eat and drink…it
is as ridiculous to pretend that chastity is a virtue as it would be to assert that it is a
virtue to deprive oneself of food” (J : 63 ; also pp.84, 434n ; LNJ 1 : 39, 77 ;

58
This follows the thought of Helvétius. See Essays on the Mind pp.339-340.
59
For a critique of the ‘natural complement’ theory and the question of physical differences between
men and women, see Ann Ferguson, “Androgyny as an Ideal for Human Development” in Alan Soble,
ed. Philosophy of Sex 232-255, p.234-238.

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AV :310). 60 Sade also notes that a woman’s capacity for sexual union and pleasure
has no relation at all to how often she can become pregnant (PB: 228).
One may object that Sade, like Rousseau, has buttressed his rhetoric with
characters that are fantastic and implausible. But Sade, being a connoisseur of the
fantastic and factual, packs Juliette with references to women who apparently lived in
blissful ignorance of Rousseau’s feminine ideal. He refers to, among others, Empress
Theodora, wife of Justinian (c.500-548 C.E; PB:256; J:1187), the poisonesses La
Voisin (born Catherine Deshayes Monvoisin; burned for poisoning and sorcery in
1680) and Marie Madeleine d’Aubray, marquise de Brinvilliers (c.1630–76 ; J :
262) , Empress Agrippina 1(5 – 59 C.E; J: 172, 564), Empress Valeria Messalina,
third wife of Claudius (CE c.22-48), the poet Sappho (6th Century B.C.E ; J: 60),
Queen Zingha of Angola (1583-1663; PB : 256 ; J ;69; Œ III: 242), “Zoé, a Chinese
emperor’s wife”(possibly Empress Wu Zetian, a ruthless autocrat, 625-705 C.E. ; PB:
256, Œ III:133) and Sade’s contemporary, Catherine II, Empress of Russia (1729-
1796; J:874- 885). A key Sadeian principle of psychology- that absolute power
liberates absolutely- applies equally as to women as to men. In reply to the objection
that such characters are the exception, not the rule, it could be the case that women
like Catherine the Great are rare, as women were rarely given the opportunity to enjoy
such circumstances. If anything, Sade’s list shows that ambition and ruthlessness may
be normal for women in positions of power. (Rousseau, in the Confessions, oddly,
describes such colourful women; consequently, he presents counterexamples to his
own ideal characterization of womanhood. Therein we find quite positive descriptions
of Comtesse de Menthon, a ‘woman of great wit,’ Zulietta, and Madame de Warens
[C: 185]. In fact, Rousseau attributes his own good education to the women in his life
[C: 289]).

4.7 Against Reproduction.

Sade, in Benthamite mode, argues that women should have control over their own
bodies, advising the avoidance of pregnancy through the use of alternative sexual
techniques. He also discusses contraceptives and, less frequently, methods of inducing

60
This was not an original position. Robert Burton, in his Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), writes of a
girl who was cured of amenorrhea by having sex with fifteen men in one night. Cited in Laqueur p.107.
La Mettrie, too, considered celibacy a risk to mental stability. See La Mettrie pp.8, 72.

154
abortion (MV: 90; PB: 225-230; J: 79; AV: 516). As Nature does not consider murder
a crime, Sade reasons, then abortion is not criminal either (Sade here assumes that
abortion is on a moral par with murder; J: 67n). From Philosophy in the Bedroom:

…there is not the least wrong in diverting a man’s semen into a detour by one means or
by another; because propagation is in no sense the objective of nature; she merely
tolerates it; from her viewpoint, the less we propagate, the better; and when we avoid it
altogether, that’s best of all….deflect that perfidious liquor that whose vegetation serves
only to spoil our figures, which deadens our voluptuous sensations, withers us, ages us
and makes us fade and disturbs our health; get your husband to accustom himself to these
losses; entice him into this or that passage… tell him you detest children, point out the
advantages of having none (PB:248; similar, J: 435).

Sade’s characters argue that there is no particular reason as to why a rational agent
should want to have children, and sufficient reasons as to why it is immoral to do
so. 61 The world, they insist, is no place for human beings, and that the human race is
a plant that should simply be rooted out (GT: 25; J: 373, 1009). 62 It is in the context
of willed sterility that the significance of anal sex in Sade is to be understood. As
Marcel Hénaff notes, anal sex in Sade is a total symbolic affirmation of sterility over
fertility; a principle that, if universalized, would end the human race. 63 On this point,
Sade’s advice against reproduction and non-fertile sex departs from both the
Benthamite and Bataillian doctrines as described above. In denying that pleasure
could possibly make up for the pain of being alive, Sade appears to counter the
Benthamite principle (which would, on such grounds, merely recommend suicide).

61
Helvétius, for example, felt that people only married and had children out of imprudence. Helvétius
Essays on the Mind pp.433, 451, 452.
62
Note that this view is incompatible with the view that there is a teleology according to which one
should participate in the cycle of destruction and creation; in this context, to father more ‘warriors.’
Sade can only conceive of participating in ‘nature’ in terms of destruction. This will be addressed again
in Chapter VI.
63
Notably, by the 250th page of the 120 Days of Sodom, the only approximately sexual act described is
‘thigh-fucking.’ Playing with and eating human excrement, which are not sexual activities in any sense,
are the main themes of the first part of the text. For discussion, see Marcel Hénaff Libertine Body
pp.204-205. For Sade’s comments on the ‘arcane allure’ of anal sex, see J: 312; LNJ 1: 47n, 49, 78.
Frottage against the thighs was the preferred method of sexual intercourse in Classical Greece, which
may indicate that Sade is making a specific allusion. See Kenneth James Dover Greek Homosexuality
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1977).

155
Similarly, the declaration that the human race should simply end does not cohere with
the principle of participating in Nature’s cycle of domination and destruction. 64 A
third, even more nihilistic position appears; a direct assault on the very principle of
reproduction. Call this the ‘Sterile doctrine.’
Whereas the Benthamite Sade associates non-fertile sex with simple prudence,
and liberates women from the reproductive role, the ‘sterile’ Sade expresses both an
absolute horror of the reproductive role, an abhorrence of all female sexual
65
characteristics, and a form of misogyny which identifies women with this role.
Characters have their female victims cover their breasts in bandages, and anally
penetrate them on principle (120: 298, 306, 440). Women, frequently pregnant, or
with infants, are tortured precisely because they have committed the ‘crime’ of being
mothers. It is for this reason, assumedly, that torture of women in Sade is typically
concentrated on the reproductive organs- vaginas are ritualistically sewn shut or
mutilated, wombs are ripped out, babies are crushed in front of their mothers
(alternatively, mothers are forced to kill their own children, before being slaughtered
in turn). 66 Duclos, in 120 Days of Sodom, holds that all mothers are all guilty as they
have taken the unnecessary “risk of exposing us to all the ills and sorrows the world

64
Rather than consistently affirming a life of struggle, Braschi argues that propagation of the human
race is a wrong, as “[man] usurps from Nature the honour of a new phenomenon” - our existence as a
species prevents Nature from bringing – forth new species of organism (J: 767). Compare: “One gives
birth only to unhappy children! And they too are preachers of death.” Friedrich Nietzsche Thus Spake
Zarathustra trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 2003) p.73.
65
“The difference between a man and a woman, of this we may be perfectly confident, is quite as
pronounced, quite as important as between man and ape; our grounds for refusing to include women in
our species would be quite as valid as for refusing to consider the chimpanzee our brother. Next to a
naked woman stand a man of the same age and naked too; now examine them attentatively, and you
will be at no pains to discern the palpable and marked difference which (sex aside) exists in the
composition of these two beings; you will be obliged to conclude that woman is simply man in an
extraordinarily degraded form; there are internal differences as well, and these are brought to light by
anatomical comparison: the dissection should be performed carefully and simultaneously.” Footnote, J:
511. Similar: 120 422, 440; LNJ 2: 164. J: 486, 498, 519, 656, 894, 913-924, 988-990, 1100, 1110;
120:650).
66
There are literally dozens of examples of this: J: 1100- 1110; 120:650); PB: 367; 120: 611-665;
LNJ; 1; 235; 2: 12, 73. For discussion, see Caroline Weber “The Sexist Sublime in Sade and Lyotard,”
in Philosophy and Literature 26 (2002): 397-404. I thank Stephen Davies for bringing this article to my
attention.

156
holds in store for us” (120: 476; MV: 41). Our relationship with other humans, and the
world itself, begins with our mothers. The ripping apart of the pregnant mother’s
body, a key image in Sade, is an expression of profound hatred and disgust for both.
Universalizing to all women the crime of bringing oneself into the world hardly
speaks of a heroic affirmation of the world, or a positive appreciation of its natural
workings. The sexualized mutilation of women for being women also coheres with the
idea of sadism as revenge, rather than due to a deep seated psychic and sexual urge.
This aspect also makes the very identification of women with the reproductive role
that the Benthamite doctrine explicitly denies (it is also one-sided; no-one in Sade is
tortured to death for being a father).
A final point can be made here. As Carter notes (as discussed in Chapter I), Sade’s
women characters are not free from the phallus. Clairwil is bisexual, but so deeply
identifies with the phallic that she at once embodies and worships it: “I live in the
name of nothing but the penis sublime; and when it is not in my cunt, nor in my ass, it
is so firmly anchored in my thoughts that the day they dissect me it will be found in
my brain” (J: 492-493). Juliette, too, literally suffers from penis envy. 67 Again, the
framework of the Christian worldview appears in Sade’s text. St. Augustine held the
erect penis as the revolt of the flesh over the spirit; through worshipping it, for an
Augustinian, the materialist revolt against ‘spirit’ is complete. 68

4.8 On Love and Friendship.

Sade’s libertines take both positive and negative views on the notion of love and
friendship, yet, in keeping with the principles discussed above, retain a rigid
distinction between friendship and physical love.
In keeping with a typically 18th Century disdain for the ‘irrational,’ several
characters insist that neither love nor friendship truly exists. 69 States Minister Saint

67
“Manlike in my tastes as in my thinking, how bitterly I regretted that I was unable to burn some more
real incense before my idol” (‘incense’ here means semen; J: 699).
68
Thomas Nagel “Sexual Perversion” in Soble ed. pp.76-88, p.84. A direct affront to the Augustinian
attitude, and a confirmation of the potency of the symbol, is Sade’s footnote noting the pleasure of
seeing one’s own erection (J: 455).
69
For discussion on the 18th Century attitude towards the emotions, see Cheshire Calhoun and Robert
C. Solomon, editors What is an Emotion? Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1984) p.227.

157
Fond to Juliette, “[w]hatever originates in the heart is false; for my part, I believe in
the senses alone, I believe alone in carnal habits and appetites…in self-seeking, in
self-aggrandizement, in self-interest” (J: 232). Yet other characters acknowledge the
reality of romantic sentiments through cautioning against emotional involvement,
recommending, rather, that one simply use other people for simple sexual
gratification. 70 Two extended discourses, one addressed by a woman to women
(entitled “Instructions to Women Admitted into the Sodality of the Friends of Crime”)
the other by a man to men, are offered in Juliette. The first such discussion is a
brochure issued to female members of the Society of the Friends of Crime. ‘Apathy’
is recommended in sexual relations, not only for the sake of maximizing pleasure, but
to avoid the entrapment that marriage entails. Sade describes love as (as we would
now say) a psychopathological condition; an instinct for attachment to men which
should simply be purged, like wisdom teeth or the appendix. 71 Sade also assumes an
‘economy of lack’ concerning sexual pleasure; love is the “veritable and certain kiss
of death to enjoyment,” reasons the author of the “Instructions to Women,” as “her
inevitable concern to give pleasure to her lover will prevent her from tasting any
herself” (J: 432). The monologue given by the Comte de Belmor (Juliette) is more
illuminating.

The word love is used to designate that deep-seated feeling which propels us, as it were
despite ourselves, toward some foreign object or other; which provokes in us a keen
desire to become united to it, to ever lessen the distance between it and ourselves…which
delights us…ravishes us…renders us ecstatic when we achieve that union, and which
casts us into a despond, which tears us asunder, whenever the intrusion of external
considerations constrain us to rupture this union. If only this extravagance never led to
anything more serious than pleasure intensified by the ardour, the abandon, inherent in it,
would merely be ridiculous; but as it leads us into a certain metaphysic[s], which,
confounding us with the loved object, transforming us into it, making its actions, its
needs, its desires quite as vital and dear to us as our own- through this alone it becomes
exceedingly dangerous, by detaching us from ourselves, and by causing us to neglect our
interests in favour of the beloved’s; by identifying us, so to speak, with this object, it

70
Sade revives the old philosophical view that sexual pleasure is superior to romantic love, and that the
latter will only cause pain. Both Epicurus and Lucretius, in particular, taught this. For discussion, see
Simon Blackburn Lust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
71
For discussion of this view, see Elizabeth Rapaport “On the Future of Love: Rousseau and the
Radical Feminists,” The Philosophical Forum 5, Nos. 1-2 (1973-74), pp.185-205.

158
 causes us to assume its woes, its griefs, its chagrins, and thus consequently adds to the
sum of our own ( J: 502).

The braggadocio of the libertine here gives way to, quite simple, fear of getting
emotionally hurt. Belmor holds that the torment of romantic love is a cross (Sade’s
word) simply too painful to bear.

If the reward for so many pains, or their counterpart, were anything beyond an ordinary
spasm, I might perhaps recommend risking it; but all the cares, all the torments, all the
anguishes and nuisances of love never yield anything but what might be conveniently
obtained without it; why then must one put on these chains! (J: 502).

This attitude coheres with the observation made in the previous chapter concerning
the relationship between sadism, emotional vulnerability, and a lack of inner restraint
to violence. Belmor, elsewhere in the novel, proposes the execution of France’s
fifteen million Catholics, and professes the wish to kill six small boys per week (J:
499, 500, 521). Yet he states that he could not bear the emotional hurt associated with
romantic love. He appears to be an emotional cripple, able to engage with others only
in killing them.
The libertine characters of Juliette do, however, frequently fall in love with each
other. 72 Where such partnerships emerge, they are invariably described in terms of a
love of extraordinary equals, proud of each other’s achievements. 73 Belmor himself
states that “[f]riendship requires openness and equality; when one of two friends
dominates the other, friendship is destroyed.” Belmore insists that women cannot be
friends with men for this very reason (J: 505). The notion of friendship dovetails into
the doctrine of superiority (to be discussed at length in later chapters) in passages such
as this, in which Noirceuil seduces Juliette.

Noirceuil glanced their way. “Feeble-minded creatures,” he murmured; “pleasure-

machines, sufficient to our purposes, but, truly, their appalling insensitivity depresses
me.” His eyes now rested meditatively upon me. “You, Juliette, your subtler mind

72
There is, for example, the lesbian relationship between Durand and Juliette, between Juliette and
Clairwil (although Juliette later poisons Clairwil), the sexual relationship between Clairwil and her
brother Brisatesta, and between Brisatesta and fellow Gulag convict Tergowitz.
73
For discussion, see Carter Sadeian Woman pp.96-97.

159
 conceives me, understands me, yes, anticipates me, I relish your company. And,” he
added, further narrowing his eyes, “you cannot hide it: you are in love with evil” (J: 147-
148; 592; similar: LNJ 2:98-99, 174) 74 .

Sade also suggests that, by their nature, such relationships between ‘higher types’
will soar beyond such base prejudices as the prohibition on incest, or even (it should
be kept in mind) killing each other. 75 Yet- and this is a curiously Kantian point-
Sade’s characters insist that the ground of the relationship is not sexual, but
intellectual, in nature. Friendship between libertines is entirely bracketed off from
physical sexuality; the friendship comes first. Duvergier gives a very positive
description of love, yet makes it quite clear that it is entirely distinct from sexual
pleasure.

There are two manners of loving a man: morally and physically. A woman can morally
idolize her husband and morally and momentarily love the young blade who pays her
court; she can cavort with him without in any sense or decree offending the moral
sentiments she entertains for and owes him she worships: every individual of our sex who
is of a different opinion is an idiot who is steering nowhere but toward disaster (J: 151).

Noirceuil continues:

Belinda is ugly, she’s forty-two, not one hint of the gracious anywhere about her person,
not a single attractive feature, no, she’s a slug, grossly ill-favoured. But Belinda is clever,
she has wit, a delicious character, a million things which mate nicely with my sentiments
and tastes; I’d have no desire to bed with Belinda, but I’d be wild about her conversation
nevertheless. I’d intensely desire to have Araminthe, but I’d cordially detest her the

74
Catherine Cusset notes that the equally close relationship between Juliette and Durand similarly
contradicts the libertine doctrine of complete isolation. She notes that it is not a contractual relationship
between two libertines but a link based on exclusivity and sentimentality. Consequently, it is a major
contradiction of the novel. See Catherine Cusset “la passion selon Juliette.”
75
In the story Eugénie de Franval (1800), Eugénie is ‘trained’ do dismiss the incest prohibition. The
father maintains that their love transcends social norms: “[t]he domination of beauty and the sacred
rights of love know nothing of futile human conventions; their ascendancy annihilates these just as the
rays of the sun purify the earth from the fogs that enshroud her at night” (GT: 31). The principle that
‘true love’ overrides local custom or even morality has a certain family resemblance to Friedrich
Nietzsche’s aphorism, “That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil.”
Beyond Good and Evil §153 p.103.

160
 moment the fever of desire had abated, because in her I have found a body only, and none
of the moral qualities which would win her a place in my heart (J: 260).

Sade acknowledges the contingency of the relationship of fellowship and sexual

attractiveness, yet he refuses to acknowledge the fluidity of the relationship between
friendship and sex, or that sexual contact creates a relationship with an entirely
different structure to non-sexual friendship. For Sade, there is no conception of
making love, of expressing closeness with someone through sex. On the contrary-
having sex with someone is said to make love for that person impossible, stating that
“il est impossible d’aimer ce que l’on a foutu” (LNJ 1: 397, also 359,360). 76 In a
sense, these passages reflect Belmor’s fear of getting too attached to another person in
a deep sense; of losing one’s sense of individuality. Duvergier’s dichotomy (there are
two ways of loving a man; morally and physically; that is, morally or physically)
expresses this fear.

4.9 On Marriage

Nobody ever marries, said one philosopher, except when they don’t know what they
are doing, or when they don’t know what to do.
Sade, Eugénie de Franval (1788) (GT:24).

All of Sade’s advice concerning marriage is addressed to women. His rejection of

marriage is largely grounded on principles already discussed, in particular the
rejection of the notion that people are morally required to be monogamous,
heterosexual, or involved in raising children. Sade’s rejection of marriage is also in
keeping with his rejection of the traditional associations of marriage with conjugal
fidelity, generational continuity, mutual service, or any other notion of a goal that
transcends the atomized individual. Sade also argues that the institution of marriage,
for women, is little more than a socioeconomic trap. From Philosophy in the
Bedroom:

76
Buss notes that a “negative shift in attraction” after orgasm, for men, is not atypical. Buss suggests
that this is more common in men who are not interested in a committed relationship. Buss pp.83-84.

161
 Indeed, Eugénie, consider the young girl scarcely out of her father’s house or her pension,
knowing nothing, without experience: of a sudden she is obliged to pass thence into the
arms of a man she has never seen, she is called to the altar and compelled to swear to this
man an oath of obedience, of fidelity, the more unjust for her often having nothing in the
depths of her heart but the greatest desire to break her word. In all the world, is there a
more terrible fate than this, Eugénie? However, whether her husband pleases her or no,
whether or not he has tenderness in store for her or vile treatment, behold! She is married;
her honor binds her to her oaths: it is attained if she disregards them; she must be doomed
or shackled: either way, she must perish or despair. Ah, no! Eugénie! It is not for that end
we are born; those absurd laws are the handiwork of men, and we must not submit to
them. And divorce? Is it capable of satisfying us? Probably not. What greater assurance
have we of finding the happiness in a later bondage that eluded us in an earlier? (PB:
223). 77

Sade’s account of marriage is similar to that of Friedrich Engels, who considered

marriage as continuous with prostitution; insofar as both involve services tangible and
intangible provided in return for economic support. 78 Engels describes bourgeois
marriage as “…conditioned by the class position of the parties and is to that extent
always a marriage of convenience….this marriage of convenience turns often enough
into the crassest prostitution-sometimes of both partners, but for more commonly of
the woman, who only differs from the ordinary courtesan in that she does not let out
her body on piecework as a wageworker, but sells it once and for all into slavery.” 79
Sade describes marriage in exactly these terms:

A man ridiculous enough to demand that a woman never give herself to anyone except
himself would be behaving quite as absurdly as he who would not tolerate his mistress or
wife ever dining with someone else; not only would such an attitude be downright queer,
it would be tyrannical; for by what right, being incapable of satisfying the woman single-
handed, can he require that this woman suffer and not seek to console herself by whatever
means at her disposal? ...she is under no obligation to cede to her keeper save when her
pays for her services, and while she does definitely owe him the use of her body when he

77
Sade writes elsewhere that “[m]ismatched individuals are imprisoned all their lives in nightmarish
unions” (J: 296).
78
For discussion, see Alison M. Jaggar “Prostitution” in Soble ed. Philosophy of Sex 348-368, pp.353-
356.
79
Frederick Engels The Origin of the Family, Private and the State (New York: International
Publishers, 1942), p.63. Quoted in Jaggar “Prostitution” p.354.

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 contracts for it, before the bargain is struck and after she ahs fulfilled her part of it, she is
free, the rest of her hours are her to employ as she likes, and it is then that, business
attended to, she may devote herself to pleasure and the inclinations of her heart; and why
should she not, since her only commitment to her keeper is physical?
The paying lover, or the husband, must perfectly well understand that he cannot exact
from the object of his doting those feelings of the heart which obviously cannot be
bought…from a woman a husband or a lover expects not virtue but the appearance of
virtue (J: 152-153; ΠIII: 314).

In the society of Sade’s time (and to this day, in many places), prostitution was the
only form of employment available to women that would bring in an income
comparable to that of men, or an adequate standard of living without getting married.
Sade, notes Carter, makes prostitution look like the more attractive option through the
depiction of marriage as socioeconomic entrapment. 80 Unsurprisingly, Juliette’s one
marriage is for money (J: 551). She and Clairwil know the economic worth of their
bodies, even though they claim to prostitute themselves for enjoyment, but it is
evident that, in Juliette, sex for money is a paradigmatic relationship. Sade’s advice
here is continuous with the libertine association of money and sex. For the libertines,
as discussed in the previous chapter, money is the means to force one’s will upon
others, whether through simply paying for sex, or through payment of legal aid,
bribery, or for the abduction of victims (LNJ 2: 28, 29, 66,173; AV: 258). Notes
William C. Brumfield, the ‘doctrine of libertinism’ is largely a rationalisation of
sexual exploitation based on economic dependency. 81 Sade warns the woman reader
not to fall victim to this very entrapment. This, and Sade’s portrayal of libertines as
abusive and sadistic husbands, complicates the view that Sade is simply proposing the
doctrine of his characters (assuming that he intended to be read by women; 120:192.
J: 225; LNJ 2:137). Significantly, in the utopian kingdom of Tamoé, divorce is legal,
and perfect economic equality between ‘boys and girls’ is required to ensure that
marriages are for love alone (AV: 319).

80
Carter Sadeian Woman p.9.
81
William C. Brumfield “Thérèse philosophe and Dostoyevsky’s Great Sinner,” Comparative
Literature 32 (1980): 238-253, p.246.

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4.10 Joy Divisions
Embedded within the text of Philosophy in the Bedroom is a pamphlet entitled “Yet
One More Effort Frenchmen, If You Would Become Republicans” (Français, encore
un effort si vous voulez être républicains). This has been variously interpreted as
being a revolutionary tract, or a parody of such a document (a discussion that will be
returned to in Chapter VII), and has already been cited above concerning Sade’s
views of homosexuality and marriage. In a strikingly confused way, this text runs the
Benthamite and Bataille doctrines together, suggesting that Sade may not even have
been aware of the conflict. On the topic of marriage, and ostensibly adhering to the
principle of equality, Sade writes: “[n]ever may an act of possession be exercised
upon a free being; the exclusive possession of a woman is no less unjust than the
possession of slaves; all men are born free, all have equal rights...according to which
never may there be granted to one sex the legitimate right to lay monopolizing hands
upon the other” (PB: 319). Yet the text also endorses the Law of the Strong, absolute
egoism, and the pleasure of cruelty.
The text proposes that each city establish brothels, named ‘Temples of Venus,’ in
order to foster “nothing but fond feelings for a government which so obligingly
affords him every means of satisfying his concupiscence” (PB: 317).

Various stations, cheerful, sanitary, spacious, properly furnished and in every respect safe
[!], will be erected in divers points in each city; in them, all sexes, all ages, all creatures
possible will be offered to the caprices of the libertines who shall come to divert
themselves, and the most absolute subordination will be the rule of the individuals
participating; the slightest refusal or recalcitrance will be instantly and arbitrarily
82
punished by the injured party... (PB: 316-317).

The women and children kept in these brothels are apparently not free to leave, and
may be ‘punished’ for giving resistance. Their differential treatment is justified
according to a ‘Natural Aristocracy’ of the Strong and the Weak, and according to the
Bataille-doctrine view that to share pleasure (meaning- to restrain from inflicting

82
Shaeffer notes that an actual revolutionary petition made proposed a national brothel system. See
Schaeffer p.436. Helvétius’ identical proposal has been noted above. See A Treatise on Man Vol. I
pp.129 p.291-292.

164
 83
pain) is to diminish it for oneself. Here Sade explains why there is no minimal age
for the ‘objects’ kept in the brothel.

The issue of her well-being, I repeat, is irrelevant. As soon as concern for this
consideration threatens to detract from or enfeeble the enjoyment of him who desires her,
and who has the right to appropriate her, this consideration for age ceases to exist; for
what the object may experience, condemned by Nature and by the law to slake
momentarily the other’s thirst, is nothing to the point; in this study, we are only interested
in what agrees with him who desires (PB: 320).

Applying the same principle, Sade also writes that men have an absolute natural right
to rape women, owing to their physical weakness, and to ‘punish’ those that resist
rape and to “compel their submission” (PB:319; similar, p.174). He attempts to avoid
contradiction with the principle of equality in the following footnote:

Let it not be said that I contradict myself here, and that after having established, at some
point further above, that we have no right to bind a woman to ourselves, I destroy those
principles when I declare now we have the right to constrain her; I repeat, it is a question
of enjoyment only, not of property; I have no right of possession upon that fountain I find
by the road, but I have certain rights to its use; I have the right to avail myself of the
limpid water it offers my thirst; similarly, I have no real right of possession over such-
and-such a woman, but I have incontestable rights to the enjoyment of her; I have the
right to force from her this enjoyment, if she refuses me it for whatever the cause may be
(319n).

Elsewhere in the text, Sade adds that rape is ‘trifling,’ as it

...wrongs one’s neighbour less than theft, since the latter is destructive to property, the
former merely damaging to it. Beyond that, what objections have you to the ravisher?
What will you say, when he replies to you that, as a matter of fact, the injury he has
committed is trifling indeed, since he has done no more than place a little sooner the
object he has abused in the very state in which she would have been put by marriage and
love (PB: 325).

83
The same proposal occurs in a political pamphlet in Juliette (J: 321).

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The backgrounds assumptions here are noteworthy. Sade refers to the rape victim as
an object. Accordingly, Sade does not acknowledge the psychological pain of rape,
only the physical (this is remarkable, for an authority on sadism). Further, Sade
considers rape a crime against the husband, not the rape victim herself- in accordance
with the view that women are possessions. Yet Sade employs the rhetoric of
utilitarianism and ‘uprooting prejudices’ in defending the sexual freedom of women.
Women can be sexually free so long as this freedom is on the male’s terms.

If we admit, as we have just done, that all women should be subjugated to our desires, we
may certainly allow them ample satisfaction of theirs... I say that women, having been
endowed with considerably more violent penchants for carnal pleasure than we, will be
able to give themselves to it wholeheartedly, absolutely free of all encumbering hymeneal
ties, of all false notions of modesty, absolutely restored to a state of Nature; I want laws
permitting them to give themselves to as many men as they see fit; I would have them
accorded the enjoyment of all sexes and, as in the case of men, the enjoyment of all parts
of the body; and under the special clause prescribing the surrender to all who desire them,
there must be subjoined another guaranteeing them a similar freedom to enjoy all they
deem worthy to satisfy them (PB: 321).

4.11 Conclusion.
In conclusion, I note that Sade’s account of sexuality is in fact two accounts. One, the
Benthamite doctrine, anticipates the state of sexuality as it is widely understood in the
21st Century - an arena of sensation, with only historical ties to its biological function.
The other appears to be a hypertrophy of the total subordination of women, divorced
from its traditional, theological justifications. There is one significant continuity; both
accounts have essentially masturbatory notions of sexuality- sex is merely the use of
the other’s body for physical pleasure.
To reiterate- this chapter has discussed, in passing, the two moral schemes
introduced in Chapter II. The first holds that morality is to be derived from the ‘laws
of nature,’ and that this nature is characterized by strife and the struggle for
dominance. The other is an attempt, in the absence of any such teleology, to
coordinate action in the absence of absolute moral truths. The two following chapters
will discuss each of these in turn.

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167
 Chapter V: SWIMMING WITH SHARKS
Ethics I.

It’s mercy, compassion and forgiveness I lack, not rationality.

Arlene Machiavelli /Beatrix Kiddo

Quentin Tarantino Kill Bill Volume 1.

5.1 Introduction
As discussed in preceding chapters, there are two general approaches to the problem
of morality in Sade. The first, the ‘Bataille doctrine,’ to be discussed in the following
chapter, holds that it is possible to derive a morality from the natural order. The other
view- that it is impossible to derive a morality from the natural order- and the
alternatives that it proposes, is discussed in this chapter.
Much of the ethical discussion in Sade’s work assumes the latter view, yet only in
Juliette is the former explicitly rejected. Braschi, in the midst of a monologue which
is largely faithful to libertine (Bataillian) Orthodoxy, momentarily rejects this view,
stating that morality must be grounded entirely upon its subjects- the human, and
states –perplexingly- that there is a moral law inherent in us.

Man ... has no relationship to nature, nor Nature to man; Nature cannot bind man by
any law, man is in no way dependent upon Nature, neither is answerable to the other, they
cannot either harm or help each other; one has produced involuntarily- hence has no real
relationship to her product; the other is involuntarily produced- hence has no real
relationship to his producer. Once cast, man has nothing to do with Nature; once nature
has cast him, her control over man ends; he is under the control of his own laws, laws that
are inherent in him. With his casting man receives a direct and specific system of laws by
which he must abide, under which he must proceed ever after; these laws are those of his
personal self-preservation, of his multiplication, laws which refer to him, which are of
him, laws which are uniquely his own, vital to him but in no way necessary to Nature, for
he is no longer of Nature, no longer in her grip, he is separate from her (italics mine) (J:
766-767; also p.923).

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 Braschi does not develop this line of reasoning, and does not elaborate on what the
‘laws of man’ entail. As such, this is another of Sade’s orphaned passages, and its
function in the Sadeian matrix is unclear. This chapter will discuss the options that
Braschi leaves open to his libertine colleagues- whether to simply accept moral
nihilism, or to formulate a strategy (with morality- like features) in the absence of all
moral absolutes or teleological schemes. The first part of the chapter concerns the
various meta-ethical positions in Sade, and his critique of existing moral thought. The
remainder of the chapter will deal with Sade’s response to the traditional claim that it
is irrational to be immoral.

5.2 Moral Nihilism.

Moral Nihilism is a commonly voiced ethical doctrine in Sade’s works, although it is
often spoken in conjunction with the Bataille doctrine (with which it is, strictly
speaking, incompatible). 1 Minski, the Russian cannibal giant described in Juliette, is
the most coherent advocate of this doctrine in Sade. He has travelled the world and,
having acquainted himself with the ‘vices’ (his term) of a thousand different cultures,
accepts Cultural Relativism, and, hence, Moral Nihilism. In Africa, he develops a
taste for cannibalism, and now lives in a castle, on an island, in a lake, somewhere in
Italy, alone with his staff and his hundreds of imprisoned victims. Minski has little
fellow feeling for other libertines, such is the purity of his nihilism (these details are
important, as will be explained below). 2 He explains his meta-ethical standpoint (note
here that by ‘justice’ and the ‘just,’ Sade’s characters mean ‘morality’; in Sade’s age
the two terms were largely interchangeable).

…we had better, I think, come to some sort of understanding upon what we mean by just
and unjust. If now you meditate a little upon the ideas lying behind these terms, you will

1
For recent defences of Ethical Nihilism and Error Theory, see Charles Pigden The Reluctant Nihilist
or Nihilism and Moral Philosophy (Dunedin: Department of Philosophy, University of Otago,1991);
Ian Hinckfuss The Moral Society: Its Structure and Effects (Canberra: Department of Philosophy,
Australian National University, 1987), available from www.philosophy.ru/library/hinck/contents.html,
or www.uq.edu/philosophy/morsoc/ (retrieved September 2004). Richard Joyce The Myth of Morality
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). I thank Denis Robinson and Katrina Lawson for
bringing these texts to my attention.
2
Minski befriends Juliette and her entourage, but kills her best friend (J: 591). In order to escape with
their lives, Juliette knocks Minski out with a dose of stramonium (J: 599, 609).

168
 recognize that they are most profoundly relative, and profoundly lacking in anything
intrinsically real. Similar to concepts of virtue and vice, they are purely local and
geographic ; all that which is vicious in Paris turns up, as we know, a virtue in Peking,
and that is quite the same thing here… [a]midst these manifold variations de we discover
anything constant? Only this: each country’s peculiar legal code, each individual’s
peculiar interests, provide the sole basis for justice. (my italics; J: 605).

Despite the allegations of your demi-philosopher Montesquieu, justice is not eternal, it is

not immutable, it is not in all lands and in all ages the same; those are falsehoods, and the
truth is the reverse: justice depends purely upon the human conventions, the character, the
temperament, the national moral codes of a country... let us have the courage to tell men
that justice is a myth, and that each individual never actually heeds any but his own; let us
say so fearlessly (my italics; J: 606- 607; similar: 12, 170, 174, 215,731 PB: 208, 354;
120: 198).

Noirceuil comes to the same conclusion, arguing that all acts are indifferent from the
standpoint of Nature. That is, he holds that a). if ethics is to hold, nature is the
foundation of moral beliefs, and b). nature gives no such foundation. Unlike Braschi,
he does not consider the possibility that ethics could be grounded on human needs
rather than ‘nature.’

...all acts are indifferent; that they are neither good nor bad intrinsically, and if man now
and then so qualifies them, the sole criteria by which he performs his judgment are the
laws he has elaborated for himself or the form of government under which he chances to
live; but from the standpoint of Nature, and barring all else from consideration, all are
acts are as one, none better, none worse than the rest [my italics].

Consequently,
...if from somewhere within us there arises a murmur of protestation against the acts of
wickedness we concert, this voice is nothing whatever but the effect of our prejudices and
education, and that if we had been born and reared in some other climate, it would address
us in a very different language (J: 170-171; similar: LNJ 2:111).

This is Noirceuil’s argument;

1). morality is not eternal

2). morality is not immutable
Therefore

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 3). morality is contingent on human conventions and cultural norms
(Cultural Relativism thesis).
Therefore
Morality is without foundation.

A number of assumptions in these passages need to be unpacked. Firstly, it is assumed

that notions of justice and morality, to be valid, must be universal and unchanging.
Secondly, it is assumed that the moralities of different cultures are so different that no
common properties could be identified. Thirdly, the very fact that notions of justice
and ethics are the work of men (“elaborated for himself”) is taken to be grounds for
not believing in them.
Whether notions of justice or morality (as opposed to their expression) really
change over time is debatable. Another, equally plausible view is that we are
gradually learning to apply the principles we already had in a more coherent manner.
The claim for Moral Relativism is more problematic. A standard argument against
Moral Relativism is that there is in fact little difference in fundamental moral
principles across cultures. Rather, it is argued, the ‘peculiar legal codes’ of different
cultures are due to different economic and environmental conditions (Sade makes this
very point in the short story Florville and Courval or Fatality). 3 Yet, as Sade (in
‘libertine’ mode) would note, cultures do in fact differ widely in how they treat, for
example, women, non-members, or slaves. The entire basis of Sade’s call to return to
the morality of Rome, and the charge that Christian morality is sick (as to be
discussed in Chapter VI), itself presupposes a deep moral difference between cultures.
The step from Moral Relativism to Moral Nihilism requires the assumption that,
for a moral theory to be sound, it must be universal and eternal. This appears to be a
straightforward claim; if one accepts the view that morality is entirely relative, and

3
Sade writes: “... [o]ne might as well doubt the reality of a river, because it divides into a thousand
different streams. Well, what better proof is there both of the existence of a virtue and of its necessity
than man’s need to adapt it to all his different ways of life and to make it the basis of all of them? Show
me a single race that lives without virtue, a single one among whom good deeds and humanity are not
the fundamental bonds, I will go further, show me even a band of villains who are not kept together by
some principles of virtue, I will renounce my cause; but on the contrary it is show to be useful
everywhere, if there is no nation, no state, no society, no individual who can do without it, if man, in
fact, cannot live happily or safely without it, would I be wrong, my child, in exhorting you never to
relinquish it?”(GT: 104-105).

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that ethics is not supposed to be, the conclusion is unavoidable. What is not a
straightforward claim, however, is the view that ethics is the ‘mere’ work of men, a
recurring claim throughout Sade’s work. 4 Like Rousseau, Sade had difficulty with
the idea that ethics could manage without God to underwrite it. The implication is that
ethics cannot be merely human, as humans themselves are not in a sense ‘eternal and
universal.’ To be good is to be associated with something universal and eternal;
something divine. This intuition is expressed clearly in Rousseau’s Emile:

[the good man] is ordered in relation to the common centre, which is God, and in relation
to all the concentric circles, which are the creatures. If the divinity does not exist, it is
only the wicked man who reasons, and the good man is nothing but a fool (E: 292;
similar: E: 91; DI: 70, 101). 5

The loss of the Absolute only leads to Moral Nihilism only if one assumes that
such a link to the Absolute is necessary. Sade himself recognizes that the rejection of
Ethical Naturalism does not necessarily lead to Moral Nihilism, as noted by Braschi.
Braschi rejects both forms of Ethical Naturalism (that of Rousseau and that of the
Bataillian doctrine), yet concludes that man must develop his own laws: “he is under
the control of his own laws, laws that are inherent in him” (J: 767).
(One possible solution to the problem of morality, which will not be pursued in
this study, is to abandon the principle that an absolute moral ground to morality is
necessary. Charles E. Larmore, for example, argues that moral scepticism is based on
a questionable assumption of the relevance of metaphysics to ethical thought. Writes
Larmore, “Our deepest moral commitments…are commitments whose meaning for us
[whatever their origin] is that we come with them to the world, and not that we infer

4
Sade also reverses this thinking; as morality is the work of men, not of God, to go beyond morality is
to become superhuman. In The 120 Days the ‘four friends’- ( the four main characters) speak of “what
mortals call crimes,” for example, as if placing themselves beyond their species (120:293).
5
The reading of Rousseau as a reluctant Sadeian is reinforced by an earlier passage in this text- “[h]ow
many times in my researches have I grown weary as a result of the coldness I felt within me! How
many times have sadness and boredom, spreading their poison over my first meditations, made them
unbearable for me! My arid heart provided only a languid and lukewarm zeal to the love of truth. I said
to myself, “Why torment myself in seeking what is not? Moral good is only a chimera. There is nothing
good but the pleasures of the senses” (E: 291).

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them from the world. 6 Similarly, Simon Blackburn describes what he calls the
‘Rationalist’ approach to moral theory as an artefact of a bygone age). 7
The four meta- ethical standpoints in Sade’s work are set out in the two tables
below. Braschi (for a single paragraph, as noted) believes neither in deriving morals
from Nature, nor Moral Nihilism. Therefore, he holds a view compatible with the
Benthamite principle (as discussed in Chapter IV). The Bataille principle does hold
that a ‘morality’ of sorts can be derived from Nature. Finally, Minski and Noirceuil
assume that Ethical Naturalism is false, and conclude that Moral Nihilism is true.
Meta-ethical positions in Sade.
Braschi Benthamite Principle Bataillian Minski, Noirceuil
Principle
Ethical Naturalism No & Yes † No Yes No
Moral Relativism ? No No Yes
Moral Nihilism ? No No Yes

Rousseau / Zamé

yes

Bataillian Principle

Ethical Naturalism?

Braschi † Benthamite Principle

No

Minski & Noirceuil Nihilism

†Braschi is inconsistent on this point.

Notably, the only meta-ethical approach in Sade’s work that logically entails
destructive and homicidal acts is the Bataillian doctrine. This is because it affirms

6
Charles E. Larmore Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
p.149
7
Simon Blackburn Being Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p.133.

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destruction as a value. A nihilistic doctrine, by definition, is ethically neutral. Minski
and Noirceuil could spend their lives merely helping the aged and growing roses
without contradicting their principles (as, by definition, they do not have any); they
merely prefer to rape and murder. Sade’s characters are not concerned with
formulating, or adhering to, a particular metaphysics of morality. They frequently
express both Benthamite and Bataillian principles in the same breath, despite their
incompatibility (this being the cause of the sense of disorientation and frustration in
reading Sade carefully). What Sade’s characters are concerned with, however, is
living without recourse to morality; or, if one accepts their rhetoric, the art of survival
in a fallen world. Sade thereby deals with moral philosophy in a radical way. Rather
than discussing ethics primarily at the level of theory, Sade theorizes as to how one
could live without morality. Writes Beatrice Fink, Sade’s work “is an attempt to
explore the behavioural characteristics of groups when the constraints exerted by the
outside world have been removed. How do people act, asks Sade, when there is not so
much the fear as the fact of retribution among an intelligent and powerful elite?” 8
Before addressing this discussion, I will outline Sade’s other observations concerning
ethical thought.

5.3 Treatment of rival ethical theories

Sade does not give a sustained critique of existing ethical theory, and, as noted, makes
no attempt at doctrinal coherence concerning normative ethics. He makes several
salient points, and observations, whether into his own thought, or into ethical thought
itself. Firstly, Sade criticizes the conception of ethics as ‘reciprocal exchange.’ In a
passage that mirrors Bataille’s association of his ‘sovereign economics’ with
‘sovereign ethics,’ Noirceuil states that conventional morality ‘stinks of commerce,’
as opposed to the ‘natural health’ of the life of crime:

…in my view the value of the virtuous sentiment deteriorates when I remember not
only that it is not a primary natural impulse, but that, by definition, it is a low, base
impulse, that it stinks of commerce; I give unto you in order that I may obtain from you
in exchange (Sade’s italics; J:144).

8
Beatrice Fink “Political System” p.506.

173
The implementation of an ethical system based on contract or covenant is also
criticized. In both Juliette and Aline et Valcour, the Social Contract is rejected as a
rotten deal (the same argument is given both by King Zamé, a follower of Rousseau,
and by Dorval, a libertine).

...when the weak individual agreed to surrender part of his independence to ensure the
rest of it, the maintenance of his goods was incontestably the first thing he desired, and so
to enjoy in peace whatever little he had, he made its protection the prime object of the
regulations he wanted formulated. The powerful individual assented to these laws which
he knew very well he would never obey (J: 115; also AV: 336).

Sade’s engagement with Utilitarianism has already been introduced; both his
problematic application to Benthamite principles to sexuality, and his criticism of
classical Utilitarianism’s psychological assumptions. Besides a number of sarcastic
comments, Sade also reveals some of the theory’s shortcomings. 9 In particular, Sade
notes that it yields counterintuitive conclusions. Utilitarianism holds that pleasure is
the highest good, yet demands that one regard the interests of others as important as
one’s own. To adhere to the demands of society’s principles or the ‘greater good,’ as
Sade puts it, is to ‘inflict cruelties’ upon oneself (J: 143). In overriding the principle
of justice, Utilitarianism also justifies causing pain to the innocent (medical
experiments, for example- Sade’s preferred example; LNJ 1: 212; MV: 57, 59,104; J:
727-728). Rather than deal with such inconsistencies, Sade simply endorses
hedonism, presenting himself to the reader as an ethicist of a distinctly Epicurean
stripe: “Imitate me, if you wish to be happy”, he tells the reader; “I guarantee
happiness” (LNJ 1: 138, 366; 2:77). As such, Necali Polat notes, Sade anticipates the
very critique of Bentham’s utilitarianism offered by Rawls: “…what the Sadean
intervention does is to merely extract from the Benthamite principle, as superfluous,
the priority of the greater number over the lesser number, down to one single

9
D’Albert, in Juliette, discusses his corrupt political plans, adding that “...it is impossible to render all
men equally happy; therefore we hold our mission fulfilled when we have been able to satisfy several
among the many” (J: 215). In La Nouvelle Justine the character Chrysostôme asks rhetorically, “…est-
il essentiellement utile que les autres soient heureux?” (“is it necessarily useful that others could be
happy?”; LNJ 2:34; similar: LNJ 1: 294).

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individual. Which is precisely the move one finds in later liberal political theories,
such as that of John Rawls, against Utilitarianism.” 10
The applications of Utilitarian thought in the novel Aline et Valcour are especially
ambiguous (the utopian society of Tamoé therein, based on Utilitarian principles, will
be discussed at length in Chapter VII). Sade’s application of Utilitarian thought to
legal matters in particular seems more an unintentional critique of Utilitarianism’s
incompatibility with justice than an endorsement. Sade describes a Bohemian criminal
gang leader- a free-thinking hero- who presides over a rape case. Instead of punishing
the rapist (who, incidentally, threatened to shoot the victim in the head), he states that
the rapist “took as he had to” (prise comme il fallait) and orders the plaintiff and
defendant to marry, adding that “…le devoir d’un juge n’est pas de punir, il est de
rendre les deux parties contentes autant qu’il est possible” (the responsibility of a
judge is not to punish- it is to render both parties as content as is possible”; AV: 539) 11
In keeping with the thought of both Kant and Hume, Sade also notes the inability
of instrumental reason (that is, confined to truths about the formal relations of ideas)
to formulate an ethics. Sade notes that it would not be contrary to reason to prefer the
destruction of millions for the sake of a minor pleasure. Juliette explains:

If from immolating three million human victims you stand to gain no livelier pleasure
than that to be had from eating a good dinner, slender though this pleasure may appear in
the light of its price, you ought to treat yourself to it without an instant’s hesitation; for if
you sacrifice the good dinner, the necessary result is a privation for you, whereas no
privation results from the disappearance of the three million insignificant creatures you
must do away with to obtain the dinner, because between it and you there exists a

10
Necati Polat “Three Contemporaries: The International, Bentham, and De Sade,” Social Text 65,
Vol.18, no.4 (winter 2000): 1-23, p.8.
11
Robert Nozick writes of such suggestions :“Deterrence theorists of the utilitarian sort would suggest
(something like) setting the penalty P for a crime at the least point where any penalty for the crime
greater than P would lead to more additional unhappiness inflicted in punishment than would be saved
to the (potential) victims of the crimes deterred by the additional increment in punishment…This
utilitarian suggestion equates the unhappiness the criminal’s punishment causes him with the
unhappiness a crime causes its victim. It gives these two unhappinesses the same weight in calculating
a social optimum.” Robert Nozick Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) p.61.

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 relationship, however tenuous, whereas none exists between you and the three million
victims (J: 642). 12

Perversely, Sade draws the same conclusion as Hume, stating that it is sensibility, not
reason, which is the basis of making moral judgements. Clairwil- totally out of
character- describes a person without sensibility as “an inert mass, equally incapable
of good or evil, and human only insofar as he has a human shape” (J :277). Sade turns
Hume’s logic against itself by prioritizing reason, and instrumentality, over morality.
On her own terms, through attaining the state of apathy, Clairwil transcends humanity
and renders herself incapable of being a moral agent.
Finally, Sade’s characters universalize principles with disastrous consequences,
thus throwing a spanner in the works for Kant. For Kant, one decides whether an act
is moral or not through the ‘universalization’ test. If one can consistently will that
every one perform the same act, the act passes the test. There are acts, however, that
appear to be ethically neutral, yet their universalization would have disastrous
consequences (a common example is paying up the full balance of one’s credit card at
the end of every month-were every card holder to do this, the credit card companies
would collapse). A more striking example is voluntary extinction of the human race.
In the short story Eugénie de Franval, Monsieur de Franval speaks with his wife
concerning their daughter’s plans to marry. Monsieur de Franval warns that all
husbands are “treacherous, unfaithful, cruel or despotic” and that their daughter
should avoid marriage and having children (Sade here takes the two to be
synonymous).

12
David Hume, in 1739, Adam Smith, in 1759, and Jean –Jacques Rousseau, in 1762, had already
made essentially the same point. Adam Smith, in 1752, writes of the typical person’s attitude towards
the extermination of all China: “… [i]f he would lose his finger tomorrow, he would not sleep to-night;
but provided he never saw them, he would snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a
hundred million of his brethren.” Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments. (Indianapolis: Liberty
Classics, 1976) pp.233-234. Rousseau, in Emile, writes: “[p]rivate interest, which in case of conflict
necessarily prevails over everything, teaches everyone to adorn vice with the mask of virtue. Let all
other men do what is good for me at their expense; let everything be related to me alone; let all
mankind, if need be, die in suffering and poverty to spare me a moment of pain and hunger. This is the
inner language of every unbeliever who reasons” (E: 314). Finally, Hume wrote that it was rational “to
prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.” David Hume, Hume’s Moral
and Political Philosophy ed. Henry D. Aiken (New York: Hafner Press, 1948) p.25.

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 ‘Must one let the world come to an end, then?’
‘One might as well; it is never too early to exterminate a plant which yields nothing but
poison’ (GT: 25). 13

Philosophy, for Sade, is to “combat, discredit, destroy, extirpate”- he leaves the slate
clean, leaving others to do what they will with the empty space (J: 592). Sade
undermines every major ethical proposal of his age without need of a coherent ethics,
just as a virus can fell a donkey without teeth and claws.

5.4 The Free Will Problem

We are in nature’s hands like a pendulum in the hands of a watchmaker; she kneads us as
she wishes, or rather as she can. So when we follow the imprint of the original
movements which govern us, we are no more criminal than the Nile is because of its
floods or the sea because of the ravages it causes.
La Mettrie 14

In keeping with his materialism and determinism, Sade assumes that all human acts
are determined and that, consequently, there is no free will. Hence, there is no
morality, or just grounds for punishment. 15 Writes Sade (through Madame Delbène):

All moral effects...are to be related to physical causes, unto which they are linked most
absolutely: the drumstick strikes the taut-drawn skin and the sound answers the blow: no
physical cause, that is, no collision, and of necessity there’s no moral effect, that is, no
noise. Certain dispositions peculiar to our organisms, the neural fluids more or less
irritated by the nature of the atoms we inhale, by the species or quantity of the nitrous
particles contained in the food making up our diet, by the flow of humours and by yet a

13
Predictably, Monsieur de Franval is sexually possessive of his daughter. He is also inconsistent,
given that he has already had a child.
14
La Mettrie p.103.
15
Here Sade follows La Mettrie, who held that some ‘unfortunately born’ could not help but find
criminal activities intensely pleasurable, and that the ‘sentiment’ of guilt is in fact the erroneous “fruit
of education,” and d’Holbach, who thought that there were no criminals, only those “unfortunately
born,” who could not help themselves from committing acts deemed deviant or criminal by the rest of
society (La Mettrie pp.141, 155; d’Holbach System of Nature pp. 7, 50, 59, 137, 172, 212). Abbé
Bergier, similarly, held that some people required stronger sensations of pleasure than others due to
their natural constitution. See Jean Deprun “Sade et l’abbé Bergier,” p.8.

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 thousand other external causes- this is what moves a person to crime or to virtue and
often, within the space of a single day, or both... 16 And so it is madness, it is simply
extravagance to refrain from doing whatever we please, and, having done it, to repent of
it. (J: 15).

The sense that we have free will is dismissed as a mere cognitive illusion. The
character Bernis (Juliette) states that “...in the moment when the decision is taken it is
not we who determine it, it is enjoined upon us... and as a consequence our will is not
free” (J: 677). Elsewhere, Sade writes that personality traits are determined in the
womb: “ [i]t is in the mother’s womb that are fashioned the organs which must render
us susceptible of this or that fantasy; the first objects which we encounter, the first
conversations we overhear, determine the pattern; do what it will, education is
incapable of altering the pattern” (LNJ 1:356). Sade concludes that, with sufficient
information, it would be possible to predict all of a person’s behavior: “l’ homme est
une espèce de machine presque toujours déterminée par l’habitude” (AV: 522). Sade
also holds that one’s capacity for feeling pity is physiologically determined (AV: 644,
645). Hence, the libertines hold that they may lack an innate moral sense through no
fault of their own, as they had no choice but to act on their desires, which they did not
consciously choose (AV:344). 17 The libertines insist that one cannot be punished for
one’s ‘tastes’ (“…sommes-nous les maîtres de nos goûts?”), that these tastes cannot
be changed through education, and that they themselves are “blind instruments of the
will of Nature” or even mentally ill (LNJ 1: 362, also 356, 357; 120: 499; AV: 344;
CL: 30). (An unstated assumption here is that ‘criminal tastes’ entail an uncontrollable
desire, and that the desire to commit crime is simply a ‘taste’; LNJ 1: 358, 361). 18
Consequently, any punishment for ‘crimes,’ Sade’s characters insist, is an injustice. In
dissolving the distinction between human agency and the natural order, Sade dissolves
St. Augustine’s distinction between natural and moral evil. Writes Sean Spence, a
neurologist, the more we know how sociopaths and killers differ at the neurological

16
This is similar to La Mettrie, p.141.
17
Roy F. Baumeister largely rejects the idea that people lack self control, regarding it as a dangerous
cultural artefact. He concludes that “the very notion of an ‘irresistible impulse’ seems to me to be a
cultural construction and one that is highly questionable on psychological grounds.” Steven Pinker, on
the other hand, thinks that sociopathy and other anti-social traits may be hereditary. Baumeister pp.274-
277; Pinker pp. 259-263.
18
For discussion, see also Fauskevåg pp.21- 25; Han and Valla “A propos” p.111.

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level, “it seems that the space for moral evil contracts” - exactly as d’Holbach, La
Mettrie and Sade suggested. 19 Significantly, Sade repeats this doctrine in both the
pornographic, ‘libertine’ works (The 120 Days of Sodom, Justine, La Nouvelle
Justine, Juliette) and the non-pornographic Aline et Valcour. Zamé, who gives some
rather crude arguments for hard determinism, suggests that even the most gentle laws
are unjust (AV: 346-347). There is perhaps some merit to making, as did Hobbes, a
distinction between premeditated crime and ‘passionate’ crimes. 20 But Sade’s subjects
appear to be claiming to be ‘blind instruments’ of passion continuously, which
Hobbes would classify as madness. Sade’s apologetics for murder, were it
consistently applied, amounts to no more than an insanity defence.
As Carter and others have noted, there are some obvious contradictions in
Sade’s works concerning free will. The libertines consider themselves free of the pull
of social convention and the ‘natural,’ yet also pride themselves on apparently
following the ‘authority’ of the ‘passions,’ despite the fact that they are, in effect,
agencies of the given order of things. Further, crime, within the terms of Sade’s
scheme, is conceptually impossible, the very notion of crime being reliant upon the
traditional moral framework. Juliette compares herself and her friends to
mountainous peaks, “...and virtuous folk resemble those flat stretches of Piedmont
countryside whose mournful evenness depresses,” but she must also accept that,
according to her own philosophy, she did not choose to become a serial killer any
more than a volcano chooses to kill villagers (J:951). Sade’s character Chigi makes
this explicit: “we all, through some blind force that is in us, a force both irrational and
essential, we are but stupid machines of the vegetation whose secret workings,
explaining the origin of all motion, also demonstrate the origin of all human and

19
Sean Spence “Bad or Mad?” New Scientist 181 (20 March 2004):38-41, p.40. For discussion on this
topic, see also James Waller Becoming Evil: how ordinary people commit Genocide & Mass Killing
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Jonathan H. Pincus Basic Instincts: What makes Killers Kill
(New York: Norton & Company, 2001).
20
“A crime arising from a sudden passion is not as great as when the same ariseth from long
meditation…” Thomas Hobbes Leviathan Edwin Curley, ed. (Indianapolis/ Cambridge: Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc.1994) p.200. There is one case of ‘passionate’ murder in Aline et Valcour, in
which a man, named Don Juan, ‘blinded’ by tempestuous passion, stabs his lover to death and then is
overcome with remorse (AV: 566). Goulemot notes that this episode is highly ambiguous (847, n. 584).

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animal activity” (J: 743; also 120: 199, 784; similar: LNJ 1:356). This doctrinal
tension is never resolved in Sade’s work.
I will now turn to the ‘Why be Moral?’ question.

5.5 Why be Immoral?

Many treatments of the ‘why be moral?’ question in philosophy, notes John
Van Ingen, often miss the point, formulating some implausible version of ‘universal
egotism’ that succeeds in fulfilling analytic assumptions of what a philosophical
theory should have (in particular internal consistency and universality), but having
virtually no applicability in the real world. 21 Sade, by contrast, is apparently interested
in real-world applicability. He is also apparently concerned with the possibility that
being immoral is possible without committing the philosophical sins of incoherence or
irrationality. If he succeeds, this may tell us something of the nature of the
relationship between reason and morality. If he fails, it will be instructive to see where
his strategy fails.
One response to the ‘why be moral?’ question is simply to hold that philosophy
has no duty to give a reply, as Paul W. Taylor and Brian Medlin have argued. Brian
Medlin expresses this view as follows: “I’m a philosopher, not a rat-catcher-and I
don’t see it as my job to dig vermin out of such burrows as individual egoism.” 22
Francis Herbert Bradley has objected that the question is fundamentally confused, as
it assumes that virtue is only good as a means. This, he believes, is an attitude that can
only corrode morality. 23 On this view, the very inquiry into the relationship between
rationality and morality is itself, arguably, perverse. This answer is not satisfying. We
want to know why there is something basically wrong with Sade’s egotism. For
philosophy to avoid or refuse to answer this, as with any other question- seems
dogmatic, or to simply throw in the towel. If ethical thought is to have real-world

21
John Van Ingen Why Be Moral? The Egoistic Challenge (New York: Peter Lang, 1994) p.37-55.
22
Brian Medlin “Ultimate Principles and Ethical Egoism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 35
(1957), 111-118. Quoted in Van Ingen p.79. Paul W. Taylor holds that this ‘ultimate question’ is not
decidable through reason. Paul W. Taylor Principles of Ethics: An Introduction. (Encino, California:
Dickenson Publishing, 1975) p. 225, quoted in Van Ingen p.20.
23
F.H. Bradley “Why should I be moral?” In Ethical Studies (selected essays), 3-28 (New York:
Liberal Arts Press, 1951). Quoted in Van Ingen p.26.

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applicability, the real-world applicability of its opposites should be considered, just as
military strategy requires a consideration of that of the enemy.
One rather evasive response to this discussion is to declare all criminals as either
insane or foolish. 24 Another, more fruitful approach is to argue that the immoral life is
undesirable. Two traditional arguments offered are the imprudence argument (simply
put- crime leads to the gallows); and the self harm argument (crime causes damage to
oneself, or harms one’s interests, regardless of whether one is intercepted).

5.6 The Imprudence argument

Sade himself considers the imprudence argument. Juliette’s pious husband, the
Comte de Lorsange, makes this intriguing statement. Men who propose a doctrine of
absolute immorality, he cautions, want simply to deceive, to “seduce you and abuse
your good faith.”

...in addition to deceiving you, they deceived themselves; there is the worst of it, there is
what never enters into the wicked man’s calculations; to get himself one pleasure he loses
a thousand, to pass one happy day he destines himself to a million dismal days; such is
the contagion of vice that he who is attacked by it wishes to infect everyone around him…
(J: 553).

Juliette does not debate Lorsange, but refutes him by means of a practical
demonstration- she poisons him (noting that he becomes increasingly pious as the
poison takes effect in his brain), takes all his money, and continues in her exploits. In
the structure of the novel, her methodology functions as a response to the imprudence
argument.
Sade’s characters do not advocate just any criminal lifestyle, which would simply
be irrational. 25 They give several specific pieces of advice for successful criminal

24
This is the so-called ‘Socratic View’ as taken in Socrates’ early dialogues. For discussion, see
Martha C. Nussbaum The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Hobbes (in a quote that illustrates the intellectual gulf
that separates him from Sade), expresses this view also: “... [t]he source of every crime is some defect
of the understanding, or some error of reasoning, or some sudden force of the passions.” Thomas
Hobbes Leviathan ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc,
1994) p.191.
25
For a discussion on the poor returns of crime, see Baumeister pp.108-112.

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living. Firstly, the importance of secrecy is stressed. An entire treatise on camouflage
and stealth is scattered throughout Juliette, covering the importance of, among other
things, logistical support, preplanning, camouflage, and avoiding scandals (J: 83, 261,
279, 299, 635, 638, 925, 987; also PB: 288). Sade also suggests techniques to avoid
one’s natural reactions to betray one’s crimes. After a criminal act, advises Juliette,
“...you will be best advised, especially as a beginner, to avoid company for a while,
since the visage is the mirror of the soul and despite us the muscles that shape our
facial expression will inevitably, try as we will to prevent it, reflect our inmost
feelings” (J:653). 26 Secondly, the student must maintain sang-froid. Clairwil states:

The cold-blooded crimes will be perhaps less splendid than somber, but they will be less
ready of detection, because the phlegm and premeditation wherewith they will be
perpetrated will guarantee leisure to so arrange them as not to have to fear their
consequences; the other category, those perpetuated barefacedly, brashly, thoughtlessly,
impulsively, will speedily bring their author to the gibbet (J: 279-280).

Thirdly, the student must be mindful of the inconsistencies of the law. Sade observes-
and this is still largely true today- that punishments for criminal offences are class-
based. White-collar crime is typically punished much more leniently than more
‘working class’ crime (J: 215, 124). 27 The poor petty thief is executed, whereas
Juliette gets away scot-free when she declares herself bankrupt and ruins the
livelihoods of dozens of people. 28 Clairwil advises:

...having regard to the laws of the country where he resides, in such sort that if the pettiest
is punished and the most frightful is not, then it is very assuredly the most frightful you

26
This suffices as a reply to Robert Nozick’s argument as to why criminal activity does not pay.
Nozick writes that the “antisocial being” tends to “overestimate one’s chances of success in evading
detection and punishment,” and that we have an uncontrollable tendency to feel guilt and shame, and to
communicate this to others. See Robert Nozick Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001) pp. 272-273.
27
Stephen Pfohl notes that corporate, organizational, or white- collar crime, whilst being among the
most costly forms of lawbreaking to society as a whole, is relatively lightly punished. Pfohl Images of
Deviance p.84.
28
Again, this was a complaint made by earlier philosophes. See Denis Diderot Jacques the fatalist and
his Master (1796) trans. J. Robert Loy (Washington Square: New York University Press, 1959) p.220;
La Mettrie p.131.

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 must let [your student] commit. For, once again, it is not from crime you must shelter
him, but from the sword that smites the perpetrator of crime: crime entails no
disadvantages, its punishment entails many (J: 279-280; see also 116, 204, 487,
777). 29

The most important advice in Sade concerning crime is to simply evade the reach of
the law. Sade proposes three ways in which this can be achieved. One can operate in
collusion with those in power, become powerful oneself, or establish secret societies
and coordinate with other immoral people. Sade’s thought here follows that of
Thrasymachus and Glaucon, in Plato’s Republic, and Callicles, in Plato’s Gorgias. 30
Thrasymachus seeks a satisfactory reply to the suggestion that morality is simply
whatever is convenient for those in positions of power. After Socrates’ rejection of
this proposal, Glaucon restates the argument in a different form, adding that it could
be in one’s best interests to be a tyrant, and gives a detailed description of what being
a successful tyrant would entail. The prospective tyrant requires a secret society of
colleagues who have also secured important offices in government. They will have a
vested interest in keeping society as safe and stable as possible, so that they may
predate upon it all the more easily. They will behave in an honorable manner whilst in
the public eye, only committing crimes against others when no one can catch them
out. The tyrant will have to be deceitful. Socrates says that such a life will be
difficult, to which Glaucon replies, “nothing worth while is easy.” 31 Sade’s characters
reason in much the same manner. Yet his treatment of the secret society is more fully
sketched out than that of Glaucon, and exposes some of its doctrinal problems. Before
treating these, I will address what I will term the self- harm argument and the don’t be
a schmuck argument.

29
Thrasymachus, in Plato’s Republic, makes the same point; “when a man succeeds in robbing the
whole body of citizens and reducing them to slavery, they forget these ugly names and call him happy
and fortunate...” Plato The Republic pp.85-86.
30
Whether Sade had read the Republic or not is not known, although he had certainly seen the name
Glaucon; Rousseau refers to Glaucon in his ‘demonstration’ that the honest life is superior to that of the
wealthy tyrant (E: 19). Jean Deprun has noted the similarity between Sade and Callicles, and that there
was an excellent translation available in Sade’s time. Jean Deprun “Sade devant la ‘Règle d’or,’”
p.309. Foucault makes the association of Juliette and Thrasymachus, as noted in Chapter I (MC: xi-xii).
31
Plato The Republic p. 112.

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5.7 The Self-Harm argument.
It has been suggested that being immoral will lead to unhappiness. Voltaire, for one,
ridicules the notion that the honourable man in chains is happier than a ‘voluptuous
tyrant’ fondling his latest mistress in his ‘purple bed,’ and himself could give no
stronger argument against immorality than prudence. 32 Socrates gives a more
thoughtful reply to the challenge laid down by Glaucon and Thrasymachus. The tyrant
will have access to base physical pleasures to his heart’s content, he concedes, but he
argues that this is a poor quality sort of pleasure, the sort that ‘commoners’ indulge in.
To indulge only in sex, food, wine and getting into fights is, allegedly, to allow
oneself to become a victim to the worst aspects of one’s nature- described by Socrates
as a great dragon-lion creature who is insensate to any idea of decency; a creature that
we come to know in our dreams, who wishes to have sex with the Gods, or our
parents, or who wishes to kill, or eat forbidden food. Socrates explains to Glaucon:

“I think that some of the unnecessary pleasures and desires are lawless and violent.
Perhaps we are all born with them, but they are disciplined by law and combination of
reason and the better desires till in some people they are got rid of altogether, or rendered
few and feeble, though in some they retain their numbers and strength.”
“But what desires do you mean?”
“The sort that wake while we are asleep, when the reasonable and humane part of us is
asleep and its control relaxed, and our fierce bestial nature, full of blood and drink, rouses
itself... [a]s you know, there is nothing too bad for it and it’s completely lost to all sense
and shame. It doesn’t shrink from attempting intercourse (as it supposes) with a mother or
anyone else, man, beast or god, or from murder or eating forbidden food. There is, in fact,
no folly or shamelessness it will not commit.” 33

Although Socrates describes this aspect as a part of all of us, he thinks that to give
in to its demands is to become enslaved, and to allow the divine part of ourselves to
be starved. Furthermore, owing to the dynamics of the tyrant’s social arrangements,
he will by necessity be surrounded by rather base people; anyone of quality would be
32
Voltaire Philosophical Dictionary (1764) trans. Theodore Besterman (London: Penguin, 1972) p.68.
This is Socrates’ argument in Gorgias.
33
Plato Republic p.392. In Gorgias Socrates resorts to a rather weak analogy between the body and the
state, and to punishment after death, which he admits may simply be “ludicrous old wives’ tales.” Plato
Gorgias trans. Robin Waterfield (London: Penguin, 1994) p.126.

184
frightened away or will present competition. In other words, a thoroughly immoral
lifestyle would be incompatible with the basic human needs of living in a community
and abiding by its social rules. Crime, it is said, is contrary to our needs as social
beings. As Voltaire asserts (note the inconsistency with the Voltaire passage cited
above): “[t]he wicked have only accomplices, the voluptuous have companions in
debauchery, self-seekers have associates, princes have courtiers. Only the virtuous
have friends.” 34 Sade gives replies to both the claim that an immoral life will be
bereft of higher pleasures, and the claim that one will have no true friends.
Sade recognizes no hierarchy between higher and lower pleasures in a qualitative
sense, and, in keeping with his ontology, does not recognize a divine self or higher
goal to which one should aspire. Sade also denies that tyranny and philosophy are
mutually exclusive pleasures- his philosophical characters (Saint-Fond, Braschi,
Catherine the Great) frequently are tyrants. (The assumption that philosophy is a
‘higher pleasure’ is also open to question- the theme of the agonies of meditation,
from Pascal to Bayle through to Schopenhauer, suggests that at least a few
philosophers would have questioned the association of philosophy with pleasure).
Further, two of Sade’s ‘favorite things’- anal sex and writing ‘freethought’ literature
(even without the pornographic content) were illegal and severely punished. 35 Sade
tends to identify immorality with illegality- that is, ‘wickedness’ with ‘crime,’
frequently describing sodomy, in particular, as a criminal, ‘unnatural’ act. Sade
himself recognizes the contingent relationship of morality and law, so he is
inconsistent on this point- given that he frequently criticizes what he takes to be unjust
laws (to be discussed in Chapter VII). Yet the point stands- the fact that Sade’s style

34
Voltaire Philosophical Dictionary p.29. Similarly, Hume holds that one must sacrifice “inward peace
of mind, consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review of [his] own conduct”; that he loses
fellowship with his peers for the sake of the “feverish, empty amusements of luxury.” David Hume
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983),
p.82. Writes Richard Joyce, “This is a more promising argument [than moral harm to self], but it has
inevitable limits. Our stipulated criminal participates in a sincere and caring manner in his local
community, and wouldn’t dream of cheating his friends. It is only upon a neighbouring community that
his harmful activities are visited.” Joyce p.33.
35
Sade’s Justine and Juliette were published anonymously for this very reason; when arrested for their
authorship in 1799, he claimed to be merely their copyist (PB: 111-112). He also attributed his
dangerously blasphemous poem “La Vérité” to La Mettrie. In Œuvres complètes du Marquis de Sade
ed. Annie le Brun, Jean-Jacques Pauvert (Paris: Pauvert, 1986). Vol. I p.551.

185
of philosophy was itself essentially illegal rather complicates Socrates’ assertion that
‘lawless’ pleasures block the path to philosophy. For Sade, quite literally, philosophy
was itself a lawless pleasure (as it was for Socrates himself, in the end); and obeisance
to the law in 18th century France, for an intellectual, would itself be self-harm for
those who sought to go beyond the confines of accepted doctrine. Further, where
Sade associates immorality with the ‘crime’ of anal sex or homosexuality, his thinking
is typical of the period (Kant not only accepted that sodomy, homosexuality and
masturbation were immoral, but argued the case in the terms of his own ethical
thought). 36
Whether Sadeian characters could have truly satisfying relationships with their
peers is not a straightforward question, and will be discussed more fully in the
discussion of the Secret Society below. As discussed in the previous chapter, Sade’s
characters do have a conception of love and friendship amongst other libertines.
Competition with one’s peers is welcomed; fear of conflict is dismissed as a trait of
the weak. Sade’s characters are birds of a feather, and would assumedly not be able to
enjoy, or keep, any other company (all of this contradicts both the reading of Sade as
advocating absolute isolation from other people, and the Machiavellian principle,
stated by Juliette, of avoiding the use of accomplices). 37

5.8 The Don’t be a Schmuck argument.

Sade argues that it would actually be imprudent, in a completely corrupt age, to follow
the law. Law-abiding citizens, like Justine, are schmucks (or, in Australian or British
English, mugs). He states also that committing crimes is a necessity of survival, in
particular for the very poor. From The Misfortunes of Virtue:

36
For discussion of Kant’s sexual morality, see Soble “Kant and Sexual Perversion.”
37
Machiavelli’s name appears frequently in Sade, yet Sade does not discuss or borrow from
Machiavelli at length. Instead, he repeatedly states the same two Machiavellian principles; a). if you
use accomplices, destroy them as soon as possible; and b). maintain power through violence, fear, and
ruse (J: 147, 316; 479-480, 637, 934 AV: 725). Sade tends to vulgarize Machiavelli, attributing him
such advice as using mass starvation or murder to maintain power (PB:315,336). For discussion of
Sade’s use of Machiavelli, see Fauskevåg pp.104, 124; Catherine Cusset “Sade, Machiavel et Néron,”
Dix-huitième Siècle 22 (1990): 401-411.

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 There are two kinds of wicked men in the world: those whom great wealth and prodigious
influence put beyond the reach of so tragic an end [the scaffold], and those who, if
apprehended, will not avoid it. The latter kind, born with nothing, if they have any wit at
all, can have only two prospects in view: either Wealth or the Wheel (MV: 127). 38

Again, Sade applies rigid notions of right and wrong (the poor, he writes, must
become wicked to escape the Wheel) to a scenario that cannot justify such
classifications or condemnations. 39 Only a severely dogmatic moralist could declare
Juliette immoral simply because she turned to prostitution, or Justine truly virtuous
because she foolishly trusts every monk, no matter how many times she is abused. It
is an open question as to whether the laws and institutions of a state are ethical at all if
people incur the full force of the law in merely stealing food, or cohabiting out of
wedlock, as was frequent in the 18th century. Sade makes a point in noting that being
rational is only contingently related to being law-abiding (in 1797, for a British
woman to avoid wedlock yet enjoy sex, as Sade recommends, would have
automatically made her a criminal in the eyes of the law; sufficient grounds for being
sent to Australia). 40 Yet this is quite different to a critique of being moral. In an
environment in which not even killing is forbidden, as Simon Blackburn notes,
society (for those that cannot protect themselves) has simply dissolved, and no
decision concerning moral orientation can be made. 41 Sade also uses the ‘don’t be a
schmuck’ argument in a dishonest way. He demonstrates that, in some cases, it is
necessary to break the law to acquire the basic necessities of life (as this world is

38
The Wheel, notes David Coward, “was a form of torturous execution. The criminal was
spreadeagled on a horizontally slung cartwheel and his limbs were broken by successive blows with an
iron bar until death ensued. When mercy was recommended, the victim was strangled before the
sentence was carried out or, to expedite matters, the executioner was allowed to deliver heavy blows
(the coups de grâce) to the chest or stomach” (MV: 269-270, n127).
39
Sade’s characters use exactly the same cynical logic in a political context, as discussed in Chapter
VII.
40
Patrick Colquhoun, in his Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis (1797), claimed that 115,000
people- one in eight- was a member of the ‘criminal class’ of the City of London. Colquhoun classified
scavengers and gypsies as members of this class, as well as 50,000 ‘harlots,’ many of whom were
simply women cohabiting out of wedlock, in an age when divorce was impossible. Cited in Robert
Hughes The Fatal Shore (London: Pan, 1987) p.24.
41
Simon Blackburn Being Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p.71.

187
‘utterly corrupt’) as a defence of breaking the law for the mere pleasure of it (the
libertines- by definition- never commit immoral acts out of necessity).
Sade’s case for the rationality, if not the reasonableness, of immorality is
strengthened if this argument is dropped. To be truly immoral actually requires that
many others are not immoral. Accordingly, John Van Ingen notes that the ‘why be
moral?’ question should really be “why should I be moral in a society with a relatively
stable political and legal system in which a large majority of the population not only
respects the law but also holds similar versions of a conventional morality?” 42
Likewise, John Bigelow suggests immoral conduct may be ‘adaptive’ to the
environment under stable social conditions. 43 He has illustrated this with his ‘Rats
and Lemmings’ computer model, which is based on research into Simpson’s Paradox
and Game Theory. Bigelow explains: “[i]magine the lemmings to be altruistic and
self-sacrificing, or alternatively imagine them to be irrational, inefficient or lazy —
either way, by one means or another, imagine that they behave in ways that benefit
their neighbours at their own expense. Imagine the rats to be selfish, rational and
efficient, and regularly to gain benefits at the expense of their neighbours.” Bigelow
has found that, in populations in which the lemmings outnumber the rats, the rats
flourish, so long as their numbers remain small. In populations in which the rats
dominate, life is made worse for both lemmings and rats. Therefore, being a rationally
self interested, lazy and parasitic person- that is, a Sadeian libertine- may be
advantageous so long as the population only sustains a limited number of beings such
as oneself. Bigelow concludes: “In these games [of the type similar to Bigelow’s Rats
and Lemmings] it is a surprising result that populations robustly sustain a proportion
of Suckers or Lemmings in the long term. Sharks and Rats never disappear
completely, but nor do they ever take over completely. Thus, Simpson's Paradox

42
Van Ingen p.10.
43
Writes Bigelow: “Simpson’s paradox is a counterintuitive phenomenon that occurs when conclusions
are drawn from individual sets of data, and yet the opposite conclusion can be drawn if the data sets are
all added together. This indicates a way, in particular, in which patterns could evolve under Darwinian
natural selection which runs strongly against “adaptationist” expectations. In a similar way, business
“inefficiencies” could be unexpectedly resilient even in an ideally “free market.” Bigelow; paper
abstract: “Simpson's Paradox and the Game of Life” Centre for Biomedical Engineering, University of
Adelaide. Wednesday 8th August 2001. Sourced at:
www.eleceng.adelaide.edu.au/Groups/centre_bme/seminars/2001/Bigelow01.html

188
places a constraint on how selfish, how efficient and how rational businesses or
organisms can become. On balance, this is probably cheerful news.” 44 Ultimately,
Sade’s contention that adopting a ‘ratty’ strategy in a society of other rats is not
plausible. The flourishing of his characters (if one can call it that) is largely due to
their wealth and power, or assets that can be converted into the protection of the
wealthy and powerful (such as sexual attractiveness, in the case of Juliette), and not
primarily because of their lack of morality. Whether one is a rat or a lemming in a
‘totally corrupt age’ may in fact be trivial, and one’s fate may be more or less the
same unless one attains enough power over other rats (the theme of power in Sade
will be further developed in following chapters). In fact, Bigelow’s finding- that being
a rat only pays off when everyone else is a lemming- exactly matches the world of
Sade’s novels. Sade’s libertine characters do not live in utterly corrupted
environments. They are able to lie, cheat, steal, and deceive people precisely because
their victims are trusting and assume that others are trustworthy, parasiting upon the
ethical structures of the society upon which they prey. What is not so cheerful news is
the possibility that, so long as there are not many other sociopaths, sociopathy may
map onto, or constitute, a perfectly rational strategy. 45
Sade associates the attainment with power with immorality, and being moral with
being weak. In a ‘ratty’ society, clearly, being powerful is better than being weak, but
it is not obvious that there is such a link between the attainment and holding of power
and immorality. 46 If one assumes that weak people can be evil, and strong people can
be moral, Sade’s account founders. 47

44
Gary Malinas, John Bigelow, "Simpson's Paradox", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Spring 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/paradox-simpson/>. Last accessed September 2004.
I thank Lauren Ashwell and David Braddon-Mitchell for bringing this study to my attention.
John Maynard-Smith’s ‘hawks and doves’ model yields largely the same conclusion. Aggressive, hard-
fighting hawks win every conflict with timid, quick-to-retreat doves, yet in hawk-dominated
populations, the hawks pay the cost of frequent fights with one another. See John Maynard Smith
Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
45
Linda Mealey has suggested that psychopaths may represent a ‘minority strategy.’ Linda Mealey
“The Sociobiology of sociopathy: An integrated evolutionary model,” Behavioural and brain Sciences
18 (1995): 523-99.
46
One could become more powerful through cultivating a reputation for being trustworthy, for
example. Democracy, ideally, forces such a situation. A business example could work just as well; in a

189
5.9 Monsters, Inc.
With one notable exception (who will be discussed presently), every libertine
character in Sade is associated in some way with a secret society or organization, and
every libertine crime is committed either in secrecy or with the collusion of secretive
or untouchably powerful people or organizations (the relationship between the
Bataillian doctrine and the topic of power in Sade’s work will be discussed in Chapter
VII). A common and significant feature of each of these societies is their degree of
social cohesion, and their adherence to a particular code of practice. Writes Beatrice
Fink, “[r]ather than being totally unstructured, the alternatives to official society
proposed by Sade all exhibit explicit codes of behaviour and institutions which
organize daily existence in a minute, even regimental fashion.” 48 The secret society
provides several advantages over the lifestyle of the ‘lone wolf’ criminal. It pools the
financial and information resources of the group of like minded individuals, provides
contacts for its members in other cities and countries, and it satisfies the social needs
of the members. 49 The intriguing factor here, as Fink notes, is that the Libertines
escape the confines of society only to accept the confines of another.
There are three types of such societies in Sade. The first group are ready-made
institutions which allow for predation and abuse of the powerless. Schools, asylums
and convents are typical examples (LNJ 1: 171, 178, 201, 257; 2:41, 298). 50 The

country known for rampant corruption and poor quality goods and services, a company could achieve
higher profitability through cultivating a trustworthy name.
47
I suspect that this association of virtue and the renouncing of worldly power is due to Sade’s
Christian heritage.
48
Fink “Political System” p.501.
49
Sade’s account is not novel, however; discussions of secret societies and their exotic moralities
appear in the writings of Rousseau, Helvétius and Diderot. Rousseau was preoccupied with secret
societies, and his speculations concerning shadowy conspiracies are similar to those of Sade. He
discusses the secretive Council of Ten who ran Venice by stealth, and suggested that wars had been
started by cynical financiers with profits to be made thereby. He also refers to the machinations of the
Jesuits (C: 595; SC: 170, DI: 149). Both Helvétius and Diderot had considered the moral systems of
criminal groups; Helvétius Treatise on Man vol. II p.309; Diderot “Droit naturel” In Œuvres politiques,
ed. Paul Vernière (Paris: Garnier, 1966): 29-35, p.34. Quoted in Bennington “Sade Laying Down the
Law,” pp. 40-41.
50
Deepak Sawhney, Stephen Pfohl, Adorno and Horkheimer and others have noted the similarities
between Sade’s description of the Libertines and the negative aspects of Capitalism. In reply, I suggest
that the real source of the problem is the nature of organizational structures, rather than the economic

190
second group is the ‘shadow government, ’which typically plans vast conspiracies
involving mass murder. Two notable examples are the Northern Lodge of Stockholm,
a Masonic group, which conspires to lead France to revolt and cause global anarchy,
and the Secret Government of Venice, which plots to destroy entire rebellious villages
with biochemical agents (J: 864, 1150, 1188, 1192). 51
The third group are made up of wealthy, powerful individuals (typically made up of
‘pillars of society,’ such as ministers, high court judges, and police chiefs) who seek
to pool their resources for the pleasures of raping, torturing and murdering women
and children (the only difference is of scale; that described in 120 has only four core
members; that in Juliette has four hundred). The most thoroughly described such
society is the Society of the Friends of Crime, described in Juliette.
The text of Juliette includes the full statutes of the Society, which covers all
aspects of its functioning. This text, running to ten pages and forty-five particular

dynamic as such, given that socialist systems also create oppressive structures. Deepak Sawhney
“Unmasking Sade” In Sawhney ed. Must we burn Sade? (New York: Humanity Books, 1999): 15-
30:27; Stephen Pfohl “Seven Mirrors” p.56.
51
Many of the most bizarre and horrifying schemes described in Sade’s work are derived from the
paranoia of the period, in particular the conspiracy theories that were circulating during the French
Revolution. In Juliette, Sade suggests that French government officials were plotting to starve the
population through manipulation of the grain supply, that an international Masonic conspiracy
dedicated to exterminating all the world’s monarchies was responsible for the fall of the Swedish
government, and that plans were afoot to kill the entire Catholic population of France (the latter idea
was not so much a conspiracy theory as a continuation of the trend of systematic imprisonment and
execution of clergymen; J:478-479, 500-501, 549, 850-871). Sade’s text also states that the French
Revolution had been instigated by the Jacobins and Jesuits (J: 501n). Lacombe cites several texts that
detail such conspiracy theories that bear a textual resemblance to Sade’s work, in particular Le
Tombeau de Jacques Molay by Cadet- Gassicourt (which details the role played by the Masons in the
fall of the Swedish government), and the work of abbé Barruel. Barruel accused the Masons for
instigating the French Revolution. He also linked the Masons with the atheistic philosophes, an
association that Sade also makes. Barruel’s conspiracy theory involves a plot to kill all the kings and
the pope, demoralise the people, exhaust the population, corrupt morality, and ruin the public treasury.
It was also commonly believed that the Templars and Masons engaged in elaborate and bizarre orgies,
another Sadeian motif. Lacombe pp.62-83; 94-100. For discussion on the roll played by the
Freemasons in disseminating Enlightenment ideas and a-religious literature, see Margaret C. Jacob The
Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1981).

191
statutes, serves as a codification of all libertine social interaction. 52 A dissection of
this document is revealing; it shows that, even though the society is established to
provide organizational support for illegal activity, it has its own principles of ethics
53
and social cohesion and, hence, its own notions of legality and illegality.
The introduction of the document is a restatement of two counter-moral
principles; firstly, the denial of free will, and, secondly, the Bataillian doctrine.
Through crime, “it is the Sodality’s belief that...the individual serves Nature” (J: 418).
Yet the first statute makes a clear distinction between the doctrine of natural
superiority and the legally enforced equality of all members of the Sodality:

1. No distinction is drawn among the individuals who comprise the Sodality; not that it
holds all men equal in the eyes of Nature- a vulgar notion deriving from infirmity, want of
logic, and false philosophy- but because it is persuaded and maintains that distinctions of
any kind may have a detrimental influence upon the Sodality’s pleasures and are certain
sooner or later to spoil them (J: 418).

We can therefore describe the Sodality as being -micro-Benthamite and macro-

Bataillian. Benthamite principles are adhered to with regards to its own members (co-
operation for maximum pleasure) but, with regards to non- members, in particular the
six hundred children imprisoned in the ‘seraglios,’ adheres to the principle that the
strong should predate upon the weak. Whether Sade’s doctrine here stands depends on
whether this dual ideology can be sustained without inconsistency.
Two other aspects of the Sodality’s principles sit uneasily with the rest of Sade’s
works. Firstly, for the purposes of maximizing utility, the Sodality adheres to what
appears to be a social contract, despite Sade’s mockery of it, as noted earlier in the
chapter. Secondly, there is a sense of fraternity and mutual support (romantic love is
banned, in keeping with the observations concerning love and friendship discussed in

52
Such codes exist in The 120 Days of Sodom and La Nouvelle Justine also; the Statutes of the Sodality
of the Friends of Crime differs in that it is written specifically for the libertines themselves (120:241-
249; LNJ 1:316-319)
53
One statute suggests that the Sodality is Sade’s fantasy of a place where he could feel at home.
Statute 17 reads: “No condemnation of a court of law, no public disgrace, no defamation of character
will disqualify a candidate for admission...Rejected by the world, these outcasts will find consolations
and friends in a society which recognizes their value...(J:421).

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Chapter IV; J: 423). 54 The eighth statute reads: “[t]he Members of the Sodality,
united through it into one great family, share all of their hardships as they do their
joys; they aid one another mutually in all life’s situations...” (J: 420, 423).
Accordingly, members are required to address each other en tutoyant, to express
fraternity (J: 423; ΠIII: 556n.2).
The ethics of the Sodality are enforced with an elaborate political and legal
structure. The Sodality elects, by secret ballot, a President each month, of either sex,
whose chief duty is to see that the Sodality’s laws are respected (J: 420). The
Sodality’s membership of four hundred members is to be made up of equal numbers
of men and women (J: 424). 55 The rules and regulations of the Sodality fulfil several
functions, besides merely pooling resources. Firstly, the rules protect the members
from each other. Bullying, dueling, and the carrying of weapons- not so much as a
walking stick- within the Sodality’s premises are all forbidden (suggesting a certain
amount of distrust; J:421, 424, 425). Murder is banned, except of the victims in the
‘seraglios.’ Cruelty towards another member is forbidden: “no cruel passion, save
whipping upon the buttocks only, may be given vent to” (J: 421). Sexually transmitted
diseases are checked by the Sodality surgeon, and seriously diseased members are
expelled (J: 424). The role of the Censor, the Sodality’s disciplinary officer, is to
maintain “decorum and a propitious atmosphere...to see to the preservation of quiet,
moderating laughter and conversations and everything else that is not in the spirit of
libertinage or that is damaging to it” (J: 423). As noted above, an emergency fund is
maintained for members in legal trouble (J: 420).
The rules also protect the society as a collective. Betrayal of its secrets is
punished with execution; involvement in politics (which would assumedly attract
undue attention) is banned also (J: 421, 424, 425). The society is also protected from

54
Juliette’s natural instinct for fellow feeling is expressed as camaraderie for other moral outsiders:
“By some quirk of the imagination, by some curious way of reckoning, thanks to some feeling I’d
perhaps had difficulty explaining clearly, even to myself, I never wanted to wrong anyone as corrupt as
I. It is doubtless here the old story of honor among thieves, or of mutual respect; but it was operative in
me (J: 159; similar: 969).
55
In keeping with Sade’s commitment to ideological vertigo, and in matching every doctrine with its
opposite, the Society’s president gives a talk on misogyny, whilst the society’s female members are
issued with a pamphlet advising on the viciousness of men (J: 431; 502).

193
infiltration by non-partisans with a rigorous selection process. During a month-long
probation period, members must be utterly subservient; refusal during this period to
participate in any sexual act is punished with immediate execution (J: 21).
Interestingly, secret societies (“factions, cabals, cliques”) within the secret society are
strictly forbidden (J: 422).
Two aspects of Libertine protocol have no direct relation to either Benthamite or
Bataillian principles. There is a high value placed on ideological conviction for its
own sake- in effect- the libertines have a concept of ‘thought-crime.’ Juliette realizes
this when, whilst listening to Prime Minister Saint-Fond discussing the genocide of
two –thirds of the population of France, she visibly shudders with horror. For this
involuntary show of all-too-human feelings, she is expelled from the Society and
exiled from Paris (J: 549). (Likewise, Juliette herself throws her companion Olympia
into the crater of Mt. Vesuvius because she “lacked depth and rigor in her principles”;
J: 1019). Secondly, there is a preoccupation with, as Foucault puts it, transforming
desire into discourse. Members are expected to give papers “contrary to polite custom
and religion” at the beginning of each Assembly; those deemed worthy are printed
and kept in the Sodality archives (J: 420). 56 Members are also required to give
confession “the dates of which coincide with what Catholics call the four great
festival days of the year;” those who have done the most terrible things collect a prize,
so long as they can provide witnesses (J:422). The official posts specified in the
Statutes includes printers, scribes, and- bizarrely- a Censor of Texts and Publications
(J: 422); the Sodality also maintains “a print shop, type setters, a dozen copyists, and
four [proof?] readers (J: 425).
Sade has done us the service of trying to formulate the ethics, or rather the
cooperative strategy, of such a group in as coherent a way as he was able. The pure
nihilism of Minski is unassailable; no purchase can be found on its surfaces. The
complexity of the Secret Society, however, may allow us to pick its locks. Two
features of the Sodality of the Friends of Crime- its utilization of the Social Contract,
and its commitment to coordinated self interest, require further analysis.

56
The same pattern is found in the 120 Days, in which a story-teller, brought to Silling for the purpose,
gives a four hour monologue each evening (120:246).

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5.10 The Anti-Social Contract
The Society of the Friends of Crime has an implied society or partnership contract,
defined as follows: “[t]he society contract assumes that two or several persons agree
to place something in common, with an eye to reaching a ... goal from which mutual
benefit will be derived.” 57 Members are obliged to pay annual fees to cover the costs
incurred; profits and losses are the same for every member. Details on finances show
this: “when the Treasurer reports a favourable balance at year’s end, he divides it
among his fellow Members; and in that other case where disbursements have
exceeded revenue, a tax is levied and the deficit made up to the treasurer”(J:419).
Two passages in La Nouvelle Justine make explicit the contractual nature of the
criminal society, stressing both its plausibility and its lack of underlying moral
sentiment. The gang leader Sylvestre explains to Justine that the solidity of his gang
requires certain sacrifices, but that these sacrifices repay themselves handsomely
(LNJ1: 380-381). 58 Another gang member, Cœur -de –Fer (‘Ironheart’), discusses the
internal dynamic of criminal groups with Justine. As all criminals are egoistic, reasons
Justine, criminal societies will inevitably fly apart. In reply, Cœur-de -Fer explains to
Justine that the social cohesion of his gang has nothing to do with virtue as such: “[c]e
n’est nullement par vertu que, me croyant, je le suppose, le plus fort de la troupe, je ne
poignarde pas mes camarades pour les dépouiller; c’est parce que, me trouvent seul
alors, je me priverais des moyens qui peuvent assurer la fortune que j’attends de leurs
secours” (LNJ 1:87). Sade sees reciprocal co-operation in terms of an underlying
mental calculus, rather than as a morality. As has been shown in both sociological
research and game theory analysis, there are situations where it is rational for egoists
to cooperate, even though individual defection may appear to be individually

57
Jean Imbert Le droit antique (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1961) p.112. Quoted in Hénaff
p.219.
58
“ … la solidité de notre association devient utile à sa conservation et que, pour son maintien, nous
préférons quelques sacrifices dont tous les moyens que nous avons ici de faire de mal savant nous
dédommager amplement. Ne t’imagine pas que nous nous chérissons beaucoup pour cela ; nous nous
voyons tous les jours de trop près pour nous aimer : mais nous sommes obligés d’être ensemble, et
nous nous y maintenons par politique, à peu près comme les voleurs dont la sûreté de l’association n’a
d’autres bases que le vice et la nécessité de l’exercer ” (LNJ 1 :381).

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rational. 59 Insofar as Sade’s libertines do, after negotiations, settle on rules of conduct,
hence, notions of justice and punishment, this makes problematic his dismissal of
‘true’ justice as being ‘chimerical’(J:171).

2). Coordinated self interest does not alone yield an ethics.

The emergence of a mutually beneficial behavioural stratagem amongst the libertines
clearly does not lead to an elegant synthesis of private and public good. This
observation is in keeping with Sade’s refusal to reduce morality to rational self
interest. If there were a rational, instrumental explanation for behaving in a moral
manner, this would not, for Sade, provide a moral reason. It is an argument for
prudence (as Sade’s character Saint-Fond puts it, “What the devil would the merit be
in virtue if vice weren’t preferable to it?”; J: 318). As such, Sade follows Rousseau in
critiquing those theorists (Bernard Mandeville, and in our own time, Robert Nozick)
that attempted to define morality as collective, rational self interest. 60 The social

59
Pinker pp.255-258; Steven Kuhn "Prisoner's Dilemma" In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Fall 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/prisoner-dilemma/>. Accessed September 2004;
Robert Axelrod “The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists," The American Political Science
Review 75 (1981): 306-318.
60
In The Fable of the Bees or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits (1725), Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733)
had argued that humans are by nature base and egoistic, and that vice, corruption and the satisfaction of
desire were the only viable basis for building a thriving economy. For the greatest ‘publick benefit’, he
argued, it is only necessary that we act in accordance with our instinct for ‘private vices’, but conduct
ourselves in a rational manner; the ‘invisible hand’ of the market place (as Smith would later refer to it)
would sort out the rest. Sade appears to have known of this principle. Sade’s Aline et Valcour the
philosopher-king Zamé states that, in his Utopian state, “… je tâche de profiter des défauts ou des vices
pour les rendre les plus utiles possible au reste des citoyens” (AV: 365). See Bernard Mandeville The
Fable of the Bees or Private vices, Publick Benefits, 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988). I
thank Charles Pigden for pointing this text out to me. D’Holbach, too, effectively reduced morality to
rational self interest; D’Holbach System of Nature pp. 99,108, 221.
In Invariances, Nozick writes: “The function of ethics is to protect and promote voluntary
cooperation and coordination between people, to guide this cooperation (through norms of division of
benefits), and to demarcate the domain of such cooperation (which people are to be the participants):
also, to specify what is to be done when the above rules, norms, etc. are not followed, that is, to
specify norms of response to different kinds of non- cooperation (should it be met by boycott,
punishment, retribution?) ;and to guide or mandate character virtues relevant to cooperation, and to
people’s response to noncooperators” (Nozick Invariances pp 266-267). As for the notion of ethics as

196
arrangements that foster mutual altruism are typically symmetrical; that is, the
rewards, punishments and temptations concerning cooperation or defection from the
‘social contract’ are the same for each ‘player.’ 61 The fact is that the real world is not
an even playing field. In this sense, Sade is correct to reject the supposition that it is.
The members of Sade’s Society of the Friends of Crime are all extremely wealthy
and hold high offices in the government- their power is evinced in the fact that a
statute bans them from using their influence in politics (J: 425). They cannot afford to
harm each other (Necati Polat notes that Sade’s libertines interact with one another as
‘equal sovereigns,’ that is, as nation-states). 62 Accordingly, Sade’s characters do not
cooperate with people who give nothing in return, are more valuable to them against
their own free will (children to be raped and killed, primarily), and people who do not
pose a threat. 63 Individuals who are too weak to participate as equal players are
reduced to their exchange value, as sex objects. 64

5.11 Doctrinal dispute

...quel peut être le rapport de l’exception avec l’exception ?

Maurice Blanchot 65
To succeed as an immoral agent, one must operate in conjunction with other
immoral agents- that is, as a society. This solution leads to some doctrinal problems.
This is because, as Fink notes, “Sade never fully develops the mechanics of libertine

assisting people (or other entities) that may not, or cannot, directly cooperate with us, Nozick writes of
these ‘Higher levels of ethics’ that they are “matters of personal choice or personal ideal,” rather than
the core of morality (ibid. p.281).
61
Steven Kuhn “Prisoner's Dilemma."
62
Polat p.14. President Saint-Fond can afford to expel Juliette precisely because she has no political
rank, and her monetary assets are essentially gifted to her by wealthier people with higher connections
(J: 550).
63
Rousseau had essentially made the same point: “There is no profit so legitimate that it cannot be
exceeded by what can be made illegitimately and an injury done to a neighbour is always more
lucrative than any service” (DI: 147-148; see also SC: 21).
64
Monsieur Dubourg explains the principle of capitalism to Justine, a girl of 12, when she refuses to
have sex with him for money: “on what grounds do you believe that Wealth should extend a helping
hand seeing that you serve its purpose in no way whatsoever?” (MV:13).
65
Maurice Blanchot “Sade” (Preface to La Nouvelle Justine and Juliette) in Œuvres Complètes (Paris:
Cercle du livre Précieux, 1966-1967) VI : 11-43, p.20. Cited in Fink “Political system in Sade” p.511.

197
relationships, namely those of power with power.” 66 Firstly, membership of the secret
society apparently entails the same conflicts and anxieties that (for Sade) characterize
conventional morality and social compromise; that “human legislation” which forces
one to “forego certain things” (J: 143). This places Sade’s insistence on the injustice
and impossibility of social compromise in an interesting light. Delbène, earlier in
Juliette, states that “words like punishments, rewards, commandments, prohibitions,
order, and disorder are merely allegorical terms drawn from what transpires in the
sphere of human events and intercourse” (Sade’s italics; J:41). At this, one can reply-
so what? The libertines of the Sodality themselves do not consider their own
commandments and prohibitions as merely allegorical (again, note the curiously
religious tone in Delbène’s reasoning; ethics is ‘merely’ human, therefore is in some
sense diminished).
Secondly, there is a basic doctrinal contradiction involved in the Secret Society, of
which there are two aspects. Firstly, there is a tension between the Benthamite and
Bataillian principles. Secondly, there is a tension between the contractual nature of the
Society, and the libertines’ disdain for such contracts (expressed less elegantly– there
is a tension between the Benthamite-Contract doctrine and the Bataille-Isolationist
doctrine). The libertine position, writes Hénaff, “is to affirm naked, undisguised
strength or to recognize it wherever it is obliged to operate in disguise.” As such, the
contractual relationship is an “abdication or domestication of strength.” 67 Sade’s
disdain for contractual agreements, to be consistent, ought to apply whether the
contract is in the name of good or evil (especially so if such a dichotomy has been
dismissed as groundless, as is the case for the resolutely nihilistic characters). Beatrice
Fink notes this problem also: “Although master libertines overtly pledge loyalty to
one another as a measure of enlightened self- interest, at times they dispose of one
another when they are so inclined, eg. la Durand’s false accusations intentionally
leading to Clairwil’s murder by Juliette” 68
Likewise, the conflict between Benthamite and Bataillian principals is evident in
the first lines of the Statutes. The introductory passage states clearly that there are no
crimes; even to murder is allegedly to act in accordance with Nature. Were a member

66
Fink “Political System”p.511.
67
Hénaff p.221.
68
Fink “Political System” p.505.

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to start killing other members in the midst of an orgy, they would only be
contradicting the Benthamite principal. Yet the members contradict this principal
insofar as they imprison and torture children. It cannot be both ways.
Imagine that Minski travels up to Paris and joins the Sodality (suppose that he
convinces the President that he is in fact from Paris, which is a requisite). He agrees to
submit to the one-month probation period, and swears to atheism and the ‘god of
pleasure,’ as required, in accordance with Statute Nº3 (J:419). (Note that the Statutes
do not require that one swear on Statute N°8, which unites all members as “one great
family”). A welcoming orgy ensues. Minski cannot penetrate anyone without killing
the recipient of his enormous member, so he glumly accepts passive anal sex and so
forth. Yet, if he is to honour his vows and ‘worship pleasure,’ he will simply have to
start killing. The Censor calls a stop to the orgy, and tells Minski that he must leave,
as he has broken the rules. Suppose that Minski replies as follows:

a). I was asked to swear to atheism, and the god of pleasure; I was not asked to swear to
any other principal. I am a man of my word (just a quirk, mind you- I am a nihilist, after
all).
b). The 8th statute is groundless. Even if every Sodality member here really was a family
member, this gives no grounds for mutual care- the rules of the Sodality themselves state
that all offspring of Sodality members are abandoned to the Seraglio, as child sex slaves,
at the age of seven. I myself raped and killed every member of my own family, male and
female (J: 580). I do not understand such irrational sentiments as love for family
members. Frankly, I doubt that you do either. Perhaps you refer to your peers here as
siblings in a metaphorical sense; this is not, however, an argument.
c). I am a giant, forty- five and in my prime, and can easily overpower every one of you,
in particular as you have banned all weapons from the chamber. You see yourselves as
superior to all others by the grace of your intelligence and wealth. I personally own an
entire Italian district. I note that your doctrine is absurd and contradictory, hence
demonstrating my intellectual superiority. In keeping with the Law of the Strong, the
reduction of all value to my own sovereign pleasure, and out of sheer boredom, I will,
without contradicting either myself or your principles- take my pleasure with every one of
you until you are all dead, wondering vaguely what it must feel like to be amongst the
weak of this world whilst doing so.

As the Censor screams for mercy, Minski wryly cites the 8th Statute again, which
states that alms or charities to non- members in distress are strictly forbidden (J: 420).
(Noticing the hint of incomprehension on the Censor’s terrorized face, Minski adds

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that the Society is hereby dissolved- its more or less plausible, if contradictory,
doctrine unworthy of such pathetic wretches). Another tries to reason with Minski; -
certainly, His Honour is clearly a superior specimen, but the rules of the Sodality-
based, as they are, on the principle of maximizing pleasure, must be adhered to-
Reason demands it. Minski notes that, as he absolutely must kill in order to acquire
pleasure, adherence to his own pleasure maximization requires it. He adds that the
laws of the Sodality are merely the work of men, and weak men at that, to protect
themselves from the strong with a spurious notion of ‘brotherhood.’ The Sodality and
its laws is merely a means to maximizing the pleasure of a small group; the
Brotherhood of Man is not a central principle of either the Sodality or Minski (J: 593).
Insofar as immediate execution is the fate of anyone who breaks the rules of the
house, he notes that the Sodality has essentially the same scorn for hospitality as
himself (J: 591). Absolute contempt for the lives of others is another key Libertine
principle, as is the acknowledgement of any contractual reciprocity. Through ripping
apart every member of the Sodality, Minski –according to the logic of the Libertines
themselves- makes them his inferiors, and proves his superiority through mocking
their laws. 69 In turning the Hall of Pleasure into his own private abattoir away from
home, Minski merely concentrates the same logic of destruction to a smaller point.
This doctrinal conflict illustrates a crucial point concerning the behaviour of
criminal society. Minski is an incredible character, who lives an utterly implausible
life. His household is staffed by fifty “evil-looking blackamoors,” and seven hundred
victims, regularly restocked by one hundred agents (J: 580-582). He has no equal or
familiar in his house, relying entirely on his wealth and his physical strength to
maintain security. His only engagements with others are – literally- penetrating and
then eating them. Whether such a character could survive with such simple, bestial
master-slave relationships is doubtful. The Sodality, on the other hand, is no more
implausible than any other paedophilia ring. The immorality of Minski- insofar as it
does not even admit of the possibility of cooperation- is so pure that it has no real-
world plausibility. The Sodality makes compromises with Libertine orthodoxy,
insofar as it requires for its implementation a certain fellow feeling, a certain notion of
virtue- ‘quasi-virtue,’ perhaps, ‘quasi-punishment’ and so on. Immorality, to function
with any degree of cooperation, requires an impoverished moral sense, but a moral

69
Hénaff p.244.

200
sense all the same- the minimal social glue for the predatory corporate organisation to
function. (A consequence of this analysis is that a secret society of criminals is far
more stable, hence dangerous, if the members actually believe in the moral code of
that society). Libertines and their affiliates must have just enough social sense to
cooperate with each other, but not enough to make them feel pity for the non-
members who they harm. For this to work, Libertines must also be able to distinguish
members, or potential members, from non-members. 70 Without a). a doctrine that
distinguishes between members and non-members, and b). the belief that such a
difference could be ethically relevant (or that all, or most, non-members are hostile, in
accordance with the ‘don’t be a schmuck’ argument), it would be impossible, or at
least very difficult, to maintain the balance between disdain for outsiders and respect
for insiders. 71 Without such an ‘aristocratic’ principle, Sade’s libertines cannot act in
accordance with two distinct moral codes. The following chapter will discuss this
doctrine, the Natural Aristocratic Principle in Nature.

5.12 Conclusion
Sade’s texts are so horrific that he may have in fact overstated the argument against
being moral, insofar as a more subtle account of criminality may have appeared more
appealing. Perhaps it is more honest to describe criminality in such a way, in
revealing its essential truth. If Sade had merely wanted to encourage vice, he would
have described criminality in abstract, poetic language, and through avoiding
unpleasant details. By forcing an association of immorality with the most brutal
violence and degradation- ( in the manner of Goya, rather than Tarantino) - it is as if
Sade wishes to inoculate the reader. 72
Minski rapes and kills his victims without remorse. He proclaims himself
“intelligent enough to destroy every creed, to flout every religion…proud enough to

70
Juliette presents herself to new acquaintances with paperwork concerning her earlier contacts and
allegiances, and impresses with her philosophical sophistication, suggesting a combination of economic
and intellectual elitism. Even so, negotiations with more powerful libertines, such as Minski and
Braschi, are especially tense (J: 579, 756, 937,981, 993; also 120: 639).
71
This schema maps onto what anthropologists refer to as ‘in-group –out-group bias.’ For discussion,
see Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence
(Boston, Ma: Mariner Books. 1997) pp.195, 196.
72
Roger Shattuck considers, and rejects, this position. See Shattuck p.292.

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abhor every government, to refuse every tie, to ignore every check, to consider myself
above every ethical principle...” (J: 583). It seems enough to declare him evil without
having demonstrated that he is irrational also. It is also tempting to write off Sade’s
proposal as a doctrinal structure that collapses into itself, like a dying star. Yet
characters the equal of Sade’s Minski, from Pyongyang to Kampala, appear in the
newspapers all the time. That such monsters actually thrive is a question for ethical
counterintelligence and forensic psychology, rather than an exercise in pure theory. 73
Sade gives no straightforward reason as to why a life of crime or despotism
should be pursued, and illustrates the shortcomings of such a life even in the absence
of interception by the law. Yet he shows also shows the difficulty, or futility, in trying
to argue why such a life should be abandoned using reason alone.
This chapter has discussed Sade’s negotiation with ethics from a thoroughly a-
moral standpoint. The following will explore the other approach in Sade- the attempt
to derive a morality from the order of things.

73
Ian Hinckfuss writes: “...society not only harbors the mere possibility of the free rider. It positively
generates an entire class of them.” Hinckfuss p.55. Hinckfuss’ sense is different to mine; he holds that
it is morality itself that is morally questionable, as, he argues, it is essentially a means of controlling
society for the benefit of the few. I merely agree that human society is full of syndicated, egoistic free
riders. Hinckfuss’ vision of a society ruled by shadowy immoral elites, where what passes for morality
really is mere crowd control, is not far off the mark, however. North Korean society could well be such
a situation. South Korean filmmaker Shin Sang-Ok had this to say of his captors, the Government of
North Korea, “The North Koreans were all talented and good people; only 200 or so were evil, and they
were in charge.” “The Madness of Kim Jong-Il,” The Observer Sunday, November 2nd, 2003.

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 Chapter VI: ROME vs. JERUSALEM
Ethics II.

The watchwords of the battle, written in characters which have remained legible
throughout human history, read: “Rome vs. Israel, Israel vs. Rome.” No battle has been as
momentous as this one.
Nietzsche Genealogy of Morals 1

6.1 Introduction
As was noted at the end of Chapter II, two distinct doctrines are proposed in Sade
concerning the relationship between ontology and morality. Firstly, as discussed in the
previous chapter, Sade holds that there is no relationship at all between the order of
things and morality. The second view, to be discussed here, is a teleological
philosophy according to which one should live in accordance with nature. Sade rejects
not only the specific beliefs and doctrines of Christianity, but also its morality,
dismissed as a psychic artefact of a spiritual sickness. In its stead, Sade proposes a
philosophy according to which Man is to live according to his innate nature,
characterized by a desire to subjugate and destroy others. Accordingly, the doctrine of
equality and the notion that life is sacred are rejected. Christianity is dismissed as
detrimental to the spiritual health of the state. Accordingly, Sade’s characters propose
to kill every Catholic in France. This chapter will track the vector of this thought.

6.2 The Antichrist

A dead God! Nothing so droll as this incoherent term out of the Catholic’s lexicon. God
means eternal; dead means noneternal. Blithering Christians, what do you propose to do
with your dead God?” (J: 560).

Sade’s criticism of Christianity, to a point, follows the popular anticlericalism of

his age, in particular that of Voltaire. Sade repeats Voltaire’s accusation that religious
doctrine and institutions are a tool used by the powerful to subjugate the weak (the

1
Friedrich Nietzsche The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals (in one volume) trans. Francis
Golffing (New York: Anchor Books, 1956) p.185.

203
opposite view- that religion is a psychological subterfuge used by the ‘weak’ to
overthrow the ‘strong,’ is discussed below). Juliette, in conversation with King
Ferdinand of Naples, describes religion as an “...opium you feed the people, so that
drugged, they do not feel their hurts, inflicted by you” (J: 930; similar: MV: 37,157).
The Papacy is described as a dynasty based on intrigue, murder, and exploitation of
the gullibility of the populace, and the priests are described as lecherous, cynical,
cruel, and hypocritical (J:393, 751-753, 968; MV :64, 101). 2 The character Friar
Claude explains that the hypocrisy and cynicism of the clergy is due to what the
French call deformation professionnelle: “[d]welling closer to the being it
presupposes, we are in a better position than others to perceive the features of the
falsehood” (J: 458; similar: 459, 766-798). Sade also associates the cloistered life of
clergy, monks, and nuns with the development of psychosexual abnormalities, a large
number of Sade’s more sexually exotic characters being associated with the Church.
Further, according to Sade’s psychology, where authority figures have unchecked and
unquestioned power, it is inevitable that such trust and power is abused.

Although Sade’s attack on Christian belief and dogma follows well established
anticlerical lines, as everywhere, he takes it to an unprecedented extreme. Again in
keeping with Voltaire, Sade cites the religious intolerance of Jewish and Christian
dogma as the cause of the senseless slaughter of millions (MV: 160; J: 499, J: 790n).
Sade employs the standard Argument from Evil; God cannot be simultaneously all
good, all knowing and all powerful whilst terrible things happen (MV: 127). 3 Against
the reply that human agency requires free will, which therefore requires the possibility
that human agents will do ill, it is argued that human psychology is itself the creation
of an omnipotent and omniscient being (J:372). Against the Doctrine of Hell, Sade
argues that it is merely unjust, and vindictive, to have condemned billions of souls to
eternal damnation, or to have created men at all (J: 373-380). Sade has his characters
enact various demonstrations to make his points- the man who believes himself

2
For Sade’s observations on the hypocrisy of the church, see MV: 5, 15, 276; 120: 217, 266, 268, 270,
274, 335, 446; J: 24, 57,461, 573, 630, 707. For discussion on the depiction of clergy as sexual
predators in 18th Century pornography, See Jean - Marie Goulemot Ces Livres qu'on ne lit que d'une
main: Lecture et lecteurs de livres pornographiques au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Editions Alinea, 1991).
3
For comparable views in Voltaire, see his Philosophical Dictionary pp. 331- 332. For discussion of
Sade’s borrowings from Voltaire, see Jean Deprun “Quand Sade récrit Fréret, Voltaire, et d’Holbach,”
Obliques 12-13 (1977):263-266.

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absolved of atrocities after making confession, for example, or Saint-Fond’s ritual
slaying which, according to his understanding of Catholicism, should enable him to
send the victim straight to Hell with the aid of a communal wafer, a forbidden (and
non-consensual) sexual act, and a contract with the devil written in the victim’s own
blood (J: 369, 547). The very possibility of such reductios, Sade’s characters
conclude, would indicate that the religious dogma that permits them would be merely
insulting to a supremely wise entity (J: 391; MV: 157). Sade also discusses
inconsistencies between the Bible and Church doctrine, and irregularities in the Bible
itself, betraying a knowledge of both scriptural sources and secondary literature that
betrays an intriguing mastery of biblical scholarship (he notes, for example, that the
Exodus account is implausible, as Pharaoh ’s cavalry units would not have been
deployed in a desert terrain, and that the doctrine of Hell is inconsistent with either
Ecclesiastes or the original, Hebrew concept of Gehenna [LNJ 1:126, J:388]). 4

Sade’s assault on Christianity goes far beyond such Freethought staples, however,
in both depth and ferocity. The philosophes were content, to a point, to merely accuse
the Church of perverting the very morality that it publicly upheld, and did not
generally question its morality (they had touched upon this idea, a topic which will be
discussed briefly at the end of the chapter). Not only did Sade take an axe to the
morality that underlies the Judaeo-Christian heritage; he proposed an entirely new
Weltanschauung with which to supplant it. Strength, power, and domination, for Sade,
are the true values; the Truth of Man, occulted by the inauthentic, sickly and life-
denying values of Christianity. Sade holds that conventional morality is passive and
conceptually secondary, and that it is the so-called criminal will that expresses
richness and energy (in a single stroke, Sade neutralizes the argument that to will evil
is merely to acknowledge the ‘good’). To account for the existence of Christian
morality, as will be discussed below, Sade argues that it began as a psychological
subterfuge to defeat the natural masters.

4
This apparent erudition may be due to such secondary sources as Bayle’s Dictionary, however,
although Bayle is not mentioned in Sade’s surviving works.

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6.3.1 Non-Transcendent Teleology: the Adoration of Kali

Who dares misery love,

And hug the form of death
Dance in destruction’s dance
To him the mother comes

Vivekananda 5

Sade’s characters propose a teleology that emphasizes war, strife, and destruction
as fundamental natural principles (introduced in previous chapters as the ‘Bataille
doctrine’). As with the doctrine of Rousseau, Sade’s teleology assumes that a).
morality can be derived from the Natural order, and that b). Man, if only he can learn
to overcome the restraints of Christian morality, is at home in a world whose harsh
truth is continuous with his own inner nature. This teleology is explained on three
levels of organization; at the cosmic level, at the ecological, or ‘biological’ level, and
as a general theory of human nature. At each of these strata, Sade associates energy
with evil, and virtue with stasis. Hence, good and evil map onto stasis and energy.
William Blake (1757-1827) gives a more formulaic and ethically neutral expression of
this idea.

Without contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love
and Hate, are necessary to Human existence.
From these contraries spring what the religious call God & Evil. Good is the passive
that obeys Reason. Evil is the active springing from Energy. 6

At the cosmic level, Sade’s characters hold that the cosmos is steady by a balance of
chaos and order, and that both are necessary parts of the world. Noirceuil explains:

5
Quoted in Ajit Mookerjee Kali: The Feminine Force. (New York: Destiny Books, 1988) p.71.
6
William Blake “The Marriage of Heaven and Hell” Plate 3, In William Blake Selected Poems ed. P.H.
Butter (London: Everyman, 1991) p.52. This duality of passive vs. active, matter vs. reason is the
standard Stoic principle as described in Cicero. In a letter dated April 17th 1781, Sade claimed to have
learned Cicero by heart. Sade, L’Aigle, Mademoiselle, lettres publiées pour la première fois sur les
manuscrits autographes. Gilbert Lely, ed. (Paris: Les Editions Georges Artigues, 1949) p. 89. Quoted
in Berman Thoughts and Themes p. 702.

206
 A totally virtuous universe could not endure for a minute; the learned hand of Nature
brings order to birth out of chaos. And wanting chaos, Nature must fail to attain anything:
such is the profound equilibrium which holds the stars aright in their courses [...] She
must have evil, it is from this stuff that she creates good, upon crime her existence is
seated... (J: 172; similar: LNJ 1:154, 296).

Likewise, Curval, in The 120 Days of Sodom, states:

...to inspire [crimes and murders] Nature has wrought her law, and the one commandment
she graves deep in our hearts is to satisfy ourselves at no matter whose expense (120:
534).

Sade, of course, is preoccupied with affirming destruction, yet reasons that chaos is
necessary for the maintenance of a higher order of stability. Sade also considers only
destructive acts as those which cohere with Nature’s dictates-not even the ‘breeding
of warriors,’ as proposed by Nietzsche. 7 Sade’s system, being a mirror image of
Rousseau’s, runs into similar problems. That is, Sade classifies those who have no
innate inclination to do evil of being immoral (‘Sade-immoral’), according to his own
scheme. This point is directly addressed in The Misfortunes of Virtue. Dubois argues
that conscience is nought but the fear of being caught; the “gloomy mind-workings
which are but the product of ignorance, cowardice and education” (MV: 125). In
reply, Justine argues against the theory that conscience is unnatural, noting that it is
her own nature to follow the good.

You admit that there is a finite quantity of good and evil in Nature and that it follows
therefore that there must be a certain number of people who do good and another category
of persons who do evil. The policy which I have chosen is, by your principles, natural.
You cannot therefore ask me to depart from the laws which Nature prescribes for me.
Furthermore, since you say you have found happiness in the career which you have
followed, I should in my turn find it equally impossible to meet with felicity by departing
from the course on which I am embarked (MV:126).

Dubois does not address this objection. Without proposing another normative
principle, Sade can only suggest that choosing to do evil is to choose the more

7
“Man shall be trained for war and woman for the procreation of the warrior. All else is folly.”
Nietzsche Zarathustra p.91.

207
aesthetically pleasing, or the more interesting, alternative, if one is so inclined (the
importance of aesthetics in Sade’s scheme is discussed in Chapter III).
The Bataillian principle, as expressed in the passages quoted above, holds that
humans both can and should impact upon cosmic processes ( exclusively in terms of
murder and destruction), lest the wheels of the cosmos seize. To read the doctrine as
stated, in a strictly literal way, leads to complications. The Bataille doctrine implies
that human life is, in some sense, meaningful, insofar as humanity is an emanation of
the cosmos, and that it has an important role to play in the cosmos’ functions.
Therefore, this teleology has a structural similarity to the doctrine that Sade seeks to
supplant, and appears to conflate with the view that human life is trivial and
essentially indistinguishable from that of other organic systems (as discussed in
Chapter II). 8 Yet, paradoxically, only those that engage in destroying others are
considered moral, as only they participate in the ‘health’ of the cosmos. The idea that
humans could participate in cosmic processes is not out of the question (we now know
that we can impose our will on the biosphere to such an extent that we could end life
completely, so the view that we can impact upon the cosmos is not itself implausible.
The terra-forming of other planets is now a seriously considered scenario; Arthur C.
Clarke has theorized on turning Jupiter into a second Sun). Yet the assumption that
people (in particular, Sadeian libertines ) ought to work to sustain the world is
curious, given that Sade’s characters frequently hold God to task for creating the
world to begin with (J:399). Further, there are logical problems with the very notion
of either violating or acting in accordance with ‘Nature’s Laws.’ Human activities are
taken to be ‘Sade- immoral’ only if they are harmful to nature, as it is against nature’s
laws to extinguish itself (Noirceuil explains: “one can rationally describe as a crime
only that which might conflict with her laws”; J: 171).Yet, by definition, such an
operation would be to perform a miracle- as Sade acknowledges- a logical

8
Sade’s characters are not consistent on this point. A chemist who wishes to cause a volcanic eruption
states that nature is a ‘minotaur’: “instructed in her frightful secrets, I imitate her, in detesting her”
(LNJ2:44, 45). Accordingly, Marcel Hénaff interprets Sade’s characters as fundamentally opposed to
Nature, and holds that Sade distinguishes himself from the ‘Materialist vulgate’ on precisely this point.
Also, Juliette cites Machiavelli’s view that Nature must be mastered, rather than simply obeyed:
“nature is a woman to be mastered only by one who goes to her whip in hand” (J: 526). See also
Marcel Hénaff “Sade and the Enlightenment Project” Presented at the First International Congress
Sade, Charleston, South Carolina; USA March 12-15, 2003. Trans. Norbert Sclippa p.11.

208
impossibility. 9 In short, the best that Sade can argue is that, for some, ‘crime’ is
natural and beneficial to the ‘general order,’ and then only if the empirical
assumptions can be supported (i.e. murdering large numbers of people is actually
necessary to sustain the world). Insofar as everyone, in any case, is mortal, this seems
unlikely.
A more fluid interpretation of the Bataille doctrine may be more fruitful. Sade’s
central claim, again, is that Christianity and the thought of Rousseau have suppressed,
or skirted around, some vital truth of the nature of Man. The affirmation of calm over
chaos is to deny the way the cosmos actually works, and to deny that our fate and our
destiny is continuous with the cosmos in which we dwell. It is also, Sade holds, to
deny the facts of human nature. As such, Sade aligns himself, to a point, with the
doctrines of Hinduism, which affirms both the cycles of creation and of dissolution.
The figure of Kali, goddess of Destruction, could be said to be the symbolic analogue
of what Sade is attempting to reintroduce into his philosophy (writes Carter: “Clairwil
and Juliette, like Tantric devotees of Kali, engage in sexual rituals in a graveyard, at
Durand’s instigation. Kali herself dances upon severed heads, juggles with limbs,
wears necklaces of skulls and copulates with corpses. Snakes issue from her vulva.
Durand is as destructive as Kali, a sumptuous infecundity whose masterpieces are
plagues”). 10 Yet Kali is only one part of a duality, and to emphasise the will to Chaos
at the neglect of the other is to commit exactly the same error that Sade’s critique
makes of Christianity, as Justine has noted.
It should also be noted that Sade’s conception of virtue - as being necessarily
opposed to violence, or even action- is characteristically Christian, or perhaps, more
accurately, Buddhist, and is not universally held ( as previous chapters have shown,
Sade assumes an especially pure form of morality, only to discredit it). The God of the
Torah gives clear approval for wars of conquest, despite the Messianic hope for peace
expressed in Isaiah. 11 Acknowledgement that war and strife are part of the order of
things does not alone lead to the abandonment of all moral principles.

9
“To be convinced of the truth of a miracle, I should have to be quite certain that the event which you
call miraculous ran absolutely counter to the laws of Nature, since only events occurring outside
Nature can be deemed a miracle” (MV:156).
10
Carter p.115.
11
See for example Exodus 17 and18, and Deuteronomy 25.

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6.3.2 Non-Transcendent Teleology: The Beast in Man

This is rat eat rat, dog eat dog. I'll kill ‘em, and I'm going to kill ‘em before they kill me.
You're talking about the American way – of survival of the fittest.
Ray Kroc, founder of McDonald’s (1902-1984) 12

In order to close the gap between the way of Man and that of the natural processes of
the Cosmos, Sade transposes the image of the relationship of predator and prey to
human affairs. Dom Lopèz, Portuguese employee of the cannibal king of Batua,
explains:

Son étude la plus réfléchie nous apprend chaque jour que le sacrifice de la faiblesse à la
force est partout la première de ses lois: les rameaux touffus du chêne, en privant la plante
qui végète à ses pieds des rayons de l’astre qu’ils absorbent, la font languir et de sécher.
Le loup dévore l’agneau, le riche énerve le pauvre, et partout la force écrase ce qui
l’entoure sans que la nature réclame jamais en faveur de l’opprimé…sans qu’elle le
venge, sans qu’elle le soulage, sans même qu’elle imprime au cœur de l’homme de
protéger ou de secourir ce que le despotisme ou la force anéantissent à ses yeux (AV:
461).

In La Nouvelle Justine, the same doctrine is offered, linked to the more general
dynamic of the ‘equality of good and evil in the world.’

“[d]es loups qui mangent des agneaux, des agneaux dévorés par des loups, le fort qui
sacrifie le faible, le faible la victime du fort, voilà la nature, voilà ses vues, voilà ses
plans : un action et une réaction perpétuelle, une foule de vices et de vertus, un parfait
équilibre, en un mot, résultant de l’égalité du bien et du mal sur la terre, équilibre
essentiel au maintien des astres, à la végétation, et sans lequel tout serait à l’instant
détruit” (LNJ 1:364).

In associating the Law of the Jungle with the dynamics of economics (“the wolf eats
the lamb, the rich fatigue the poor”) Sade aligns himself with Nietzsche and the Social

12
“Builders and Titans: Twenty innovators who Change How the World Works,” Time Magazine
website www.time.com/time/time100/profile/kroc2.html (accessed October 2004).

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Darwinists of the 19th Century, as well as industrialists such as Ray Kroc. 13 Charity,
in reversing this natural order, is dismissed as merely encouraging indolence: “c’est
s’opposer à celui de la nature; c’est renverser l’équilibre qui est la base de ses plus
sublimes arrangements; c’est travailler à une égalité dangereuse pour la société; c’est
encourager l’indolence et al fainéantise... ” (LNJ 2 :347, 348). At this level, the
association of wolves with capitalism does not go beyond a loose metaphor, or
beyond the bare assertion that there is a ‘sublime arrangement’ according to which
there are supposed to be rich and poor classes.
Again, at a strictly literal level, Sade’s analogy is problematic. Caroline Warman
tracks the view that destruction is part of the natural order of things to the biologist
Count Buffon (1707-1788), who had written that violent death was as a natural part of
the order of things, insofar as the activities of carnivores kept population numbers in
check. 14 If Warman’s understanding of Sade is correct, Sade has extended to the
behaviour of human beings the conclusions derived from biological observations on
inter-species behaviour. But it is difficult to see where he could find support for this
transposition. Sade has assumed that human existence is constrained by the same
Malthusian principles that dictate animal life, which is simply not the case. Even
where economic pressures force communities to abandon or kill the very young or
very old, this scarcely equates to legitimating wanton killing, or the imposition of
crushing economic hardships upon others. At best, economic constraints on
population levels would legitimate infanticide, contraception, abortion, or euthanasia,
if anything at all (admittedly, contraception was not an option for most people in
Sade’s age, or even in our own, for Catholic populations). Further, intra-species
killing amongst predators, even in competition for mates or territory, is extremely
rare. Humans do not kill each other (any more) in the same way that the fox kills the

13
For ‘wolf and lamb’ imagery in Nietzsche, see Zarathustra pp.309-310, Genealogy of Morals in The
Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals p.178. For Nietzsche’s association of socialism with
‘slave morality,’ see Nietzsche The Will to Power p.398.
14
Buffon “Les Animaux carnassiers,” In Histoire naturelle, vol. vii, ch. I. Quoted in Warman p.164.
For discussion on the relationship between Sade’s ‘biologic’ thinking and that of his age, see Jean
Deprun “Sade et la philosophie biologique de son temps.” In Le Marquis de Sade, centre aixois
d’études et de recherches sur le XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1968):189-205.

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hare. 15 Yet it is a fact of history and anthropology that humans kill each other, and
compete for resources in a vigorous way, though not in a manner typical of
carnivores. The beast in Man is above all a calculating, reasoning, human beast.

6.3.4 Non-Transcendent Teleology: Property and Theft

In Italy, for thirty years under the Borgias, they had warfare, terror, murder, bloodshed,
but they produced Michelangelo – Leonardo Da Vinci, and the Renaissance ...[i]n
Switzerland, they had brotherly love. They had five hundred years of democracy and
peace, and what did that produce?...The cuckoo clock.

Harry Lime, in Graham Green The Third Man (screenplay)

The greatest pleasure is to vanquish your enemies, to chase them before you, to rob them
of their wealth, to see their near and dear bathed in tears, to ride their horses and sleep on
the white bellies of their wives and daughters.
Ghengis Khan (1167-1227) 16

Consistent with the Bataille doctrine is the view that rapine, theft, and war are not a
problem to be solved, but a basic truth of Man that must be embraced. Like Harry
Lime, Sade does not go into details as to how warfare and non-reciprocal exchange fit
into a broader ‘general economics’ (as opposed to the ‘narrow economics’ of
reciprocal, beneficial exchange). Sade is not interested in a straightforward, a-moral,
inquiry into, for example, the relationship between war and cultural development, or
the economic importance of the sex industry in 18th Century Paris. His resolute

15
Whether cannibalism was ever a widespread practice in human populations, or whether it was
practiced beyond merely eating those killed in war, is a controversial topic. Nevertheless, the
anthropological data rather supports Sade rather than Rousseau; there is no doubt that cannibalism was
practiced in Fiji and New Zealand, for example. For discussion, see Bill Arens The Man-Eating Myth:
Anthropology and Anthropophagy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) and Timothy Taylor The
Buried Soul: How Humans Invented Death (London: Fourth Estate, 2002). Sade discusses cannibalism
at length in Aline et Valcour, citing Cook, M. M. Meunier and Paw as anthropological references (AV:
227n).
16
Trevor Royle A Dictionary of Military Quotations (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990). Quoted in
Buss p.277.

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immorality limits him to pointing out, in a slightly puerile way, the ‘paradox’ that
theft or war could be construed as beneficial. Nevertheless, Sade has a point that is
(like all his better points) at once obvious, disturbing, and profound. That is, there is a
considerable gap between how our civilization operates, or has operated historically,
and our day to day morality. The view proposed is a more bloody version of
Mandeville- were everyone to live according to Christian meekness and piety, very
little would ever get done. Mandeville was content to note that people are industrious-
and benefit society- out of such ‘vices’ as greed and pride. Sade takes this a step
further, in asserting that the wheels of human progress are driven by the Will to
Domination; the desire to kill, to wipe out entire civilizations, to instrumentalize the
vanquished to our own ends.
Again, Sade follows Rousseau’s reasoning in an unfaithful (that is to say,
highly original) manner. Rousseau holds that introspection will disclose the inner
voice of Natural Law; the voice of conscience. Sade, similarly, holds that ruthlessly
honest introspection will disclose the Passions –greed, lust, violence, destruction- the
voice of Khan, rather than Kant. He describes the passions as “blind instruments” or
“laws” of the “will of Nature”: the “means that [nature] employs to accelerate her
designs” (LNJ 1: 55, 148, 149, also 151, 214, 293). Where Sade admits of instincts for
common feeling, he adds that they are subordinate to the ‘higher’ passion of egoism
(in La Nouvelle Justine, a man kills his brother over a quantity of gold, stating that
“…mon action vous prouvera, mes camarades, que vos intérêts me sont plus chers que
tous les liens de la nature, et que je sacrifierai toujours tout, dès qu’il s’agira de vous
servir ”( LNJ 2: 292).
The Bataille doctrine, as stated, is present within Rousseau’s thought. Rousseau
had considered the possibility of one who advocates a ‘right of the strongest,’
dismissing him as “the man who brings terror and chaos into the human kind” (SC:
52-53; DI: 77). 17 Nevertheless, Rousseau believed that such a doctrine was at the
heart of civilized society, and that it was there for all to see who were willing to peer
behind the mask: “my hero will cut every throat until he is sole master of the universe.
Such is the moral portrait, if not of human life, at least of the secret ambitions of the
17
This doctrine appears also in the work of Restif de la Bretonne. His morally nihilistic character
Gaudet states: “[m]y friend, there are only two classes in the world, that of slave, and that of master.”
Restif de la Bretonne Paysanne pervertie, ou les dangers de la ville (A la Haie, 1784) 2 vols. Quoted in
Crocker Age of Crisis p.440.

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heart of civilized man” (DI: 149). 18 Rousseau blames civilization for this evil; Sade
assumes that it was there in the human heart all along (how Rousseau can hope that
we can all find the same moral law within, despite our civilized state, is a question
that goes beyond this project). Hence, Sade’s thought follows a vector similar to
Rousseau’s. That is, Sade’s doctrine goes something like this: that which is good is
that which is natural. How do I know which inclination or impulse is good? I inquire
into my heart, and I do as it tells me. Rousseau himself states that the heart of
civilized man is a rapacious killer; the rest follows. Only the complexities of
Rousseau’s understanding of human nature separates the two doctrines.
Concerning war, Sade merely asserts that it is in accordance with Nature’s plans.
Braschi, in Juliette, explains:

These wars, these famines she hurls at us, these pestilences she now and again looses with
the aim of wiping us off the face of the earth, these great villains she fabricates in
profusion, these Alexanders, these Tamurlanes, these Ghengis Khans, all these heroes
who lay the world waste, by these tokens, I say, does she not plainly demonstrate that all
our laws are contrary to hers, and that her purpose are to destroy them? [...] these murders
[...] are in some sort instrumental to her, since she is a great murderess herself... (J: 768).

As such, Sade’s discussion does not go beyond Kali- veneration; war plays a role
insofar as it returns the living to the movement of matter “which renews and
reorganizes itself within the entrails of mother earth...the regenerating womb” (J:770).
A single line alluding to Heraclitus of Ephesus leaves open other possibilities,
however. Braschi again:

18
In fact Rousseau appears to have known people (or claimed as much), who lived by this ideology
personally. In the Confessions Rousseau writes of the doctrine of his acquaintance and onetime
friend, Friedrich Melchior, Baron von Grimm (1723- 1807): “I remembered the compendium of his
morality, which Madame d’Epinay had told me of, and which she adopted. This consisted of one single
article, namely, that the sole duty of man is, to follow in everything the inclinations of his heart. This
code of morality, when I heard of it, afforded me terrible material for thought, although at that time I
only looked upon it as a witticism. But I soon saw that this principle really was his principle of
conduct, and, in the sequel, I had only too convincing proof of it at my own expense. It is the inner
doctrine, of which Diderot has so often spoken to me, but of which he has never given me any
explanation” (C: 457).

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 Crimes [are] essential to the laws of the kingdoms, and essential to the laws of Nature. An
ancient philosopher [Heraclitus] called war the mother of all things. The existence of
murderers is as necessary as that bane… (J: 771). 19

The fragment of Heraclitus to which Sade alludes is as follows:

War is father of all, king of all: some it shows as gods, some as men; some it makes
slaves, some free. 20

Another reads:

One should know that war is common, that justice is strife, that all things come about in
accordance with strife and with what must be. 21

These passages suggest a way in which Sade’s doctrine concerning war can be further
developed. The Sadeian implication of these aphorisms is that war is good, as it
creates distinctions among men. Elsewhere, Sade holds that feudalism and economic
inequality are requisites of economic and cultural flourishing (LNJ 2:225). The
relationship between war and cultural strength is straightforward. One plunders the
other group for their resources, and reduces the vanquished to slavery, so that one’s
own community can concentrate on more tertiary-sector activities, like the arts and
sciences. The principle here is that reciprocal exchange is not the typical, or the most
efficient, mode of economic development, or territorial expansion, for a group with
overwhelming physical or strategic superiority. To assume that economic relations are
independent of the threat of violence is naïve. 22 Dorval speaks:

19
Nietzsche offers an identical argument, writing that “[n]o act of violence, rape, exploitation,
destruction, is intrinsically ‘unjust,’ since life itself is violent, rapacious, exploitative, and destructive,”
and that to counter the “radical life- will” with legal or moral systems “can only bring about man’s utter
demoralization and, indirectly, a reign of nothingness.” Nietzsche Genealogy of Morals in the Birth of
Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals p.208.
20
From Hippolytus Refutation of All Heresies, translated by Jonathan Barnes. Quoted in Jonathan
Barnes Early Greek Philosophy (London: Penguin, 1987) p.102.
21
Origen, Against Celsus VI xliii Quoted in Barnes Early Greek Philosophy p.114.
22
There are, of course, more complex relationships between warfare and economic activity. A stronger
power can force open a country’s market against the will of its leaders, such as the Opium/ Anglo-
Chinese Wars of 1839-42, 1856-60. A stronger state can also coerce other, less powerful states into

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 Kind friends, by a single feature alone were men distinguished from one another when,
long ago, society was in its infancy: the essential point was brute strength. Nature gave
them all space wherein to dwell, and it was upon this physical force, distributed to them
with less impartiality, that was to depend the manner in which they were to share the
world. Was this sharing to be equal, could it possibly be, what with the fact that naked
force was to decide the matter? In the beginning, then, was theft; theft, I say, was the
basis, the starting point; for the inequality of this sharing necessarily supposes a wrong
done the weak by the strong, and there at once we have this wrong, that is to say, theft,
established, authorized by Nature since she gives man that which must necessarily lead
him thereto (J: 114).

Sade also associates the art of thievery with (what could be termed) his ‘virtue ethics’-

If we glance at the history of ancient times, we will see theft permitted, nay, recompensed
in all the Greek republics; Sparta and Lacedaemon openly favoured it; several other
peoples regarded it as a virtue in a warrior; it is certain that stealing nourishes courage,
strength, skill, tact, in a word, all the virtues useful to a republican system and
consequently to our own (PB: 313).

Sade does not explicitly associate war up with theft, or any other economic
Realpolitik, perhaps because, again, he is more intent on merely thumbing his nose at
the Decalogue than proposing a more complete schema (in The 120 Days of Sodom,
the wars of Louis XIV are said to merely drain the State’s treasury and “exhaust the
substance of the people,” as well as enriching a “swarm of bloodsuckers,” including
the Four Friends; 120:191). On the one hand, his account of both war and economics
is simplistic and narrow. Where war is discussed at all, it is either good because it
kills people, and for no other reason, or bad, for the same reason. Sade does not even
refer to the grandeur or spectacle of battle (this is unusual, given the Libertine attitude
towards violent spectacle as discussed in Chapter III). Just as Rousseau considered
the mechanical sciences as ‘mere’ ambition and mathematics an expression of avarice,
Sade sees all economic activity as theft (CS: 16). From Juliette:

participation in its own wars in exchange for access to its markets, such as the case with New Zealand’s
relationship with the United States, since the Vietnam War to the present day.

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 ...theft, instituted by Nature, was not ...banished from the face of the earth; but it came to
exist in other forms: stealing was performed juridically. The magistrates stole by having
themselves feed [sic] for doing the justice they ought to render free of charge. The priest
stole by taking payment for serving as intermediary between God and man. The merchant
stole by selling his sack of potatoes at a price one-third above the intrinsic value a sack of
potatoes really has (J:115).

Sade’s purist notions of what is and is not theft, and his woolly notion of ‘intrinsic
value,’ do not detract from the essential point. A great deal of wealth and territory,
historically, has been acquired through what was essentially theft. Warfare is no
longer the economic or political strategy it once was, but for entirely Sadeian- that is,
instrumental, reasons- it is too expensive, its arts now too effective. 23
To conclude: The analogy of the beast of prey applied to economic activity is
crude, but perhaps not that crude. Corporations will discontinue products that are
known to be lethal, will maintain safety standards in offshore manufacturing plants,
will maintain humane standards for their employees, or stop selling weaponry to
poorer nations, only when the legal costs are no longer in the interests of the
shareholders- that is, in the interests of the Board of Directors.
A reconstituted Sade, or perhaps, more accurately, Harry Lime, would add that it
is this same ruthlessness that drives the wheels of civilization. Human progress is
driven along by impulses for wealth and power, which, in the past, frequently took the
form of open war. Further, warfare itself- or its sublimated forms (for example the
‘Cold War’) has always been a powerful catalyst of technological and scientific
progress (the jet aircraft, the ballistic and cruise missiles, the first operational
computers, the helicopter, radar, and the nuclear bomb saw fully functional, active
service for the first time during World War II ). If humanity has any form of non-
transcendental Telos, it is assumedly associated with the progress of civilization, in
particular economic and technological progress (artistic progress is arguably only
possible where economics and technology are developed to the point where an artistic
and intellectual elite can flourish, and is historically related to advances in technology,
in particular optics and information systems). Hence, the Telos is expressed through
this competitive drive, and through individuals that embody it, whether Napoleon,
Ghengis Khan or Ray Kroc.

23
I thank Aaron Davidson for the discussion that gave shape to this thought.

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6.4 The Slave Revolt in Morals
Sade denies that Christian morality is a sound moral code in keeping with
universally valid and self evident principles. Its origins, he notes, are quite alien to the
peoples of Europe or the Classical world. In a footnote to Yet One More Effort, Sade
writes that Christianity is filled with “impieties” which are derived from the “ferocity
and innocence” of the Jews, adding that “the Christians seem only to have formed
their doctrine from a mixture of the vices they found everywhere” (PB: 299).
(Elsewhere, Sade emphasises the Jewish– hence, in his mind, the lowly– origins of
Christianity, referring to Jesus as a “Jewish slave of the Romans,” a “grubby Nazarene
fraud” and a “clumsy histrionic from Judea” (PB: 296, 299). 24
More specifically, Sade argues that Christian morality is to be understood as the
artefact of a spiritual sickness. When, according to Sade, the Jews and Christians
were oppressed by the Romans, they conspired, out of their weakness, desperation and
resentment, to develop a doctrine of brotherly love, equality, and the virtue of poverty
and meekness, in an attempt to reduce their harsh treatment at the hands of their
‘natural’ masters. Their ethics is described by Sade as servile and hypocritical,
contrary to the Natural Order (LNJ 2: 35; J: 145). Their religion is described variously
as a myth for the fearful and ignorant, for “imbeciles who unfailingly believe all
they’re told and never examine anything critically,” and the doctrine of the immortal
soul a dogma “comforting to the downtrodden and unlucky” (J: 48& n, PB: 305; also
120:498; LNJ 1: 32; 2:109). Dolmancé, in Philosophy in the Bedroom, explains:

It is a very false tone you use when you speak to us of this Nature which you interpret as
telling us not to do to others what we would not have done to us; such stuff never came
but from the lips of men, and weak men. Never does a strong man take it into his head to
speak that language. They were the first Christians who, daily persecuted on account of
their ridiculous doctrine, used to cry at whosoever chose to hear: “Don’t burn us! Don’t

24
Concerning the Jews, Sade’s writing largely repeats the anti-Semitism present in the writings of
Voltaire. In Frenchmen, Yet One More Effort, Sade writes that Jews are natural murderers; in Aline et
Valcour a character ridicules a Marrano Jew’s observance of kashrut laws, and in La Nouvelle Justine,
Sade describes a Jewish lawyer, Abraham Pexoto, as a deeply immoral scam artist (PB:334, AV:520,
521; LNJ 1: 425-429).
Jewish slave: this comment comes from one of Sade’s Revolutionary pamphlets. Oeuvres complètes
du Marquis de Sade ed. Annie le Brun and Jean-Jacques Pauvert (Paris: Pauvert, 1986-91) 3:364,
quoted in Schaeffer p.437.

218
 flay us! Nature says one must not do unto others that which unto oneself one would not
have done!” Fools! How could Nature, who always urges us to delight in ourselves, who
never implants in us other instincts, other notions, other inspirations, how could Nature,
the next moment, assure us that we must not, however, decide to love ourselves if that
might cause others pain? (PB: 253; similar: J: 178; PB: 283, 309, 310, 360, LNJ 1:283,
363; 2: 264-265).

Sade describes the French Revolution in similar, if more subtle, terms. The following
is a footnote to Juliette, added to later editions.

L’égalité prescrite par la Révolution, n’est que la vengeance du faible sur le fort, c’est ce
qui se faisait autrefois en sens inverse ; mais cette réaction est juste, il faut que chacun ait
son tour. Tout variera encore, parce que rien n’est stable dans la nature, et que les
25
gouvernements dirigés par des hommes, doivent être mobiles comme eux.

The thought is similar- the revolution is revenge of the strong against the weak- yet,
as the narrator adds, “each will get his turn,” as nothing is stable in nature.
Sade also proposes that Christian morality is motivated by resentment towards the
rich and powerful, and the desire to merely drag others down to one’s own level:
“[t]he proponents of that absurd doctrine of equality will always be recruited from the
ranks of the weak; it is never espoused save by him who, unable to rise to the class of
the strong, can at least find comfort in pulling that class down to his own level” (J:
418n, also 748). The doctrine of hell is suspected of being little more than a
sublimated revenge fantasy (“[d]oes not the act of imposing a punishment out of all
proportion to the fault speak far more in behalf of vindictiveness and cruelty than of
justice?” ; J: 378).

25
The Wainhouse translation gives the incorrect sense. The phrase “…that everyone should have his
turn is only meet” should perhaps read “It is necessary that each has their turn.”
“The equality prescribed by the Revolution is simply the weak man’s revenge upon the strong; it’s just
what we saw in the past, but in reverse; that everyone should have his turn is only meet [sic]. And it
shall be turnabout again tomorrow, for nothing in Nature is stable and the governments men direct are
bound to prove as changeable and ephemeral as they” (J:120, n12a; Œ Vol. III: 287). In this section
the character Dorval complains that the noble “have become the slaves of the kings” (again, Sade’s
characters show inconsistency between thoughts and deeds; Dorval himself specializes in robbing
noblemen).

219
 Sade also makes a direct comparison of Christian and Classical cultures. Sade
declares that “[i]t is to strong passions alone invention and artistic wonders are due;
the passions should be regarded...as the fertilizing germ of the mind and the puissant
spring to great deeds… Those beings who are not motivated by strong passions are
mediocre beings” (J: 731). Christianity, in denying the passions, promotes mediocrity
as a virtue, and has made humanity ‘soft’ (J: 776). Accordingly, its emphasis on
sobriety and temperance would be catastrophic if strictly adhered to: “...si la
tempérance et la sobriété dominaient malheureusement dans le monde, tout y
végéterait il n’y aurait plus ni mouvement ni force et tout retomberait dans le chaos”
(LNJ 1:192). By contrast, the idols of Greece and Rome, writes Sade, “elevated the
soul, electrified it, and more: they communicated to the spirit the virtues of the
respected being.” Whereas the Greek and Roman pantheons inspire wisdom and
heroism, Sade describes the saints of the “Christian Elysium” lacking in any
greatness, heroism or virtue. Sade adds: “[s]o alien to lofty conceptions is this
miserable belief, that no artist can employ its attributes in the monuments he raises;
even in Rome itself, most of the embellishments of the papal palaces have their
origins in paganism, and as long as this world shall continue, paganism alone will
arouse the verve of great men” (PB: 299; similar: LNJ 1:139, AV: 454). The ancient
past is frequently referred to as a source of superior moral principles.

Remember that sect of Greek philosophers who maintained there was crime in seeking to
meddle with the various shades in the Nature- ordained spectrum of social classes [...] Be
equally certain...that men of the stamp of Denis, Nero, Louis XI, Tiberius, Wenceslas,
Herod, Andronicus, Heliogabalus, Retz based their happiness upon similar
principles...(J:283).

In accordance with the doctrine of ‘master morality,’ the moral sentiments- remorse,
guilt and conscience- are dismissed as either ‘chimerical’, due to faulty reasoning, or
psychological weakness; the mark of an easily enslaved mind, or the psychological
artefact of Christian indoctrination (J: 13; MV: 124). In Aline et Valcour, Sade makes
clear the divide between ‘reason’ and moral sentiment. States Président de Balmont,
“ Quand vous cédez au sentiment de la pitié plutôt qu’aux conseils de la raison, quand
vous écoutez le cœur de préférence à l’esprit, vous vous jetez dans un abîme
d’erreurs, puisqu’il n’est point de plus faux organes que ceux de la sensibilité...”.

220
Madame de Blamont’s (who, to repeat, is not a libertine) reply reinforces this
dichotomy: “j’aime mieux être imbécile et sensible que de posséder le génie de
Descartes” (AV: 712). In the same novel, and elsewhere, it is argued that, even if one
accepted a normative Judaeo-Christian morality, pity would still not qualify as a
virtue. Again, the resemblance here to Kant is evident.

Pity acts on people only according to their softness. The more vigorous an individual is,
the less he is susceptible to that kind of perturbation, whence it would result…that the
person the least open to pity, would be incontestably the best constituted. But let us
analyse this sentiment embellished in our day with such superb names and yet felt less
than ever. The proof is that this pusillanimous impulse acts on us only physically, that the
moral shock which it conveys is absolutely subordinated to the senses, is that we feel
much more sorry for the misfortune which takes place under our eyes than for that which
happens 100 leagues from us…Pity then is not a virtue at all, since it acts on us only in
proportion to the impression received, to the vibration imparted to the fibres of our soul
by the greater or lesser distance of the misfortune that has occurred ( AV: 644, 645). 26

6.5 The Sadeian Caste System

For the most part, Sade’s characters assume a sharp dichotomy between ‘natural
masters’ and ‘natural slaves.’ The teleological order of the libertines dictates that the
slaves were “created to be our tools and whom we suffer to exist solely in the interest
of our passions” (J: 354; similar: 120:426). The libertines consider themselves to be
proud, powerful, dynamic, intelligent, imaginative, cynical, solitary, independently
minded, passionate, and egoistic. The slaves, by contrast, are described as stupid,
group- oriented, and psychologically weak. No character in Sade makes the transition
from one class to the other, owing to the implicit assumption that the relevant traits
are innate and unchanging. Although there is a process of ‘libertine education’
described in Sade’s works (as discussed in Chapter III), the apt pupil is typically a-
moral before lessons begin.

26
Sade Aline et Valcour (Paris:Jean-Jacques Pauvert, 1956) Vol. IV pp.17-18., Quoted in Lorna
Berman Thoughts and Themes p.238. Sade’s thought here resembles that of Helvétius, who dismissed
remorse merely the “foresight of bodily pain” (Treatise of Man Vol. I p.127). See also Nietzsche
Writings from the late Notebooks ed. Rüdiger Bittner, trans. Kate Sturge (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003) p.172; Genealogy of Morals in The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of
Morals pp.200-202. For recent discussion of the ‘error’ of guilt, see Hinckfuss p.44.

221
 Yet the classification of ‘masters’ and ‘slaves,’ or ‘libertines,’ and their victims,
is far from straightforward. In an attempt to explain or justify their dominion (that is,
in an attempt to reduce power to another category), the libertines seek to clarify a
doctrine of innate superiority. Superiority across three categories is discussed;
biological, or physical superiority, intellectual superiority, and economic superiority
(that ‘libertine power’ is simply a terminal category {that is, irreducible to innate
caste characteristics} is not considered).
Sade takes the Celts, “our earliest ancestors,” to be a paradigmatically superior
people, noting that ‘Celt’ in German meant ‘courageous’ or ‘Lords of War.’ He
attributes to the Celts his own counter-morality, implying that his doctrine is a
renewal to an older, more authentic moral outlook. Noirceuil states: “the Celts...held
that the highest and most sacred of our rights was that of might, which is to say, of
Nature; and they considered that when Nature deems wise to assign a superior quality
of potential to some of us, she does so only to confirm the prepotency over the weak
which she invests in us strong” (J: 173). 27 Noirceuil attempts to link the natural
aristocracy of the age of the Celts to modern economic inequalities. He continues:
“[i]f since Celtic days matters have changed physically, they haven’t morally. The
opulent man represents what is mightiest in society; he has brought up all the rights;
he ought therefore to enjoy them... [i]t’s all the same thing, whether I filch my
neighbour’s purse, rape his son, his wife, or his daughter: these are mere pranks, of
too slight importance and scope ever to be of any utility to Nature...” (J: 173-174). 28
In order to enforce his power and satisfy his ‘caprices,’ Noirceuil adds that one must
enforce “discipline, forbearance, and compliance” from the ‘subordinate’ class of men
(J: 174).

27
For discussion of Sade’s admiration of the Celts, see Lacombe Sade et ses masques p.28.
28
Compare Nietzsche, on the ‘higher morality’ of the ‘nobles’: “we can imagine them returning from
an orgy of murder, arson, rape, and torture, jubilant and at peace with themselves as though they had
committed a fraternity prank...” Friedrich Nietzsche Genealogy of Morals in The Birth of Tragedy and
the Genealogy of Morals p.174. It should also be noted, to put Sade’s work in context, that neither
Diderot nor Helvétius took rape particularly seriously. In his Supplément au Voyage de Bougainville,
Diderot’s idyllic Tahitians rape a woman upon her arrival. The scene is supposed to be comic- the
woman is disguised as a man, and the Tahitians, being more in tune with nature, immediately realize
the deception. Diderot Political Writings p.46. Helvétius’ brothel proposal, as discussed in Chapter IV,
is also indifferent to the issue of forced sex.

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 Two extended monologues in Sade’s surviving work also describe the master-
slave relationship in terms of ‘caste’ (we would now consider this ‘race’ theory). 29
Minister Saint-Fond argues against those theorists who had suggested that apparent
intellectual differences between ‘master’ and ‘slave’ castes could be accounted for as
differences in education. He proposes an experiment. Placing two infants, one of
‘each class,’ side by side, “you’ll observe that the child of the first class manifests
tastes and aims most unlike those the child of the second class demonstrates; and you
will perceive the most striking dissimilarity between the sentiments and dispositions
proper to each.” Saint-Fond goes on to assert that natural slaves are no more humans
than are chimpanzees: “[n]ow perform the same study upon the animal resembling
man the closest, upon, for example, the chimpanzee; let me, I say, compare this
animal to some representative of the slave caste; what a host of similarities I find! The
man of the people is simply the species that stands next above the chimpanzee on the
ladder; and the distance separating them is, if anything, less than that between him
and the individual belonging to the superior caste”(J:322-323).
Sade also notes that the oppression of an ‘inferior’ population is a widespread
cultural and historical phenomenon, if not actually an anthropological norm.
In La Nouvelle Justine, the character Verneuil states that humans are naturally divided
into natural masters and natural slaves, and that each people has a corresponding
‘despised caste’ (caste méprisée): “les Juifs formaient celle des Égyptiens, les Ilotes
celle des Grecs; les Parias celle des Brames; les Nègres celle de l’Europe ” (LNJ 2 :
222-223). 30 If it is a racial distinction that is applied here, it is not Eurocentric. Sade
makes the same distinction between the Greeks and Helots, both European
populations, and between the Ancient Egyptians and Jews, who are both ‘Semitic.’ In
fact, Saint- Fond’s conclusion to his discussion indicates that, in Sade, the doctrine of
inequality runs much deeper than differences between races. After comparing

29
Sade also briefly discusses race theory, in particular the gradations of different classes of men and
primates, in “Quatrième cahier des Notes ou Réflexions; extraites de mes lectures ici ou fournies par
elles”, written in the dungeon of Vincennes between June 1780 and August 1780. In Sade Œuvres
complètes de Sade ed.Annie Le Brun and Jean-Jacques Pauvert (Paris: Pauvert,1986) Vol. I :469-485,
p.471.
30
For discussion of this passage, see Fauskevåg p.104, 129; Jean Pierre Faye “Juliette et le Père
Duchesne, foutre” In Camus, Roger, ed. Sade écrire la crise 289-302, p.301. See also Han and Valla
“A propos” p.119

223
‘inferior’ peoples with chimpanzees, Saint- Fond states: “You should certainly never
lump Voltaire and Fréron in the same class, any more than you would the virile
Prussian grenadier and the debilitated Hottentot. Therefore, Juliette, cease to doubt
these inequalities...” (J: 322-323). Élie Fréron (1718-1776) was a critic and journalist
who attacked the principles of the Enlightenment, and Voltaire frequently made him
the butt of his ridicule. 31 Yet Fréron and Voltaire, obviously, are of the same
ethnological and social group; the difference being that Fréron is an anti-philosophe
Catholic, whereas Voltaire is not. Other texts suggest again that the distinction
between libertines and their victims has little to do with race. Ben Mâacoro, the
Cannibal King of Batua in Aline et Valcour, is clearly a libertine figure, despite being
African, and is enthusiastic about acquiring white sex slaves (who would be, by
definition, victims). Likewise, the killers of The 120 Days of Sodom make a point of
selecting as victims the children of their own race and economic group (120: 226-
227). Race can therefore be ruled out as the defining distinction between libertines
and victims (expressed here in terms of that between masters and slaves).
The superior strength and intelligence of the libertine are typically given as
defining characteristics. The character Dorval associates the ‘natural rights’ of the
Nobleman with historical ties with vagabondage, and with superior strength, and the
Rousseauian ideal of a return to ‘natural ways.’

There was a time when the German magnates counted among their rights that of highway
robbery. This right derives from the earliest and most fundamental institutions in
societies, where the free man or vagabond got his livelihood in the manner of the beasts
of the forests and the birds of the air: by wresting food from whatever convenient or
possible source; in those days, he was a child and student of nature, today he is the slave
of ludicrous prejudices, abominable laws, and idiotic religions. All the good things of this
world, cries the weak individual, were equally distributed over the surface of the globe.
Very well. But by creating weak and strong, Nature with sufficient clarity announced that
she intended these good things to go to the strong alone... (J: 122).

31
For discussion on the anti- philosophes, see Darrin M. McMahon Enemies of the Enlightenment: The
French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity (New York: Oxford University Press,
2001).

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 Sade also suggests that intellectual traits have supplanted brute strength as the
deciding qualities of the ‘strong.’ Dalville, in the Misfortunes of Virtue, states: “[t]he
adroitness and wit of humankind determined the relative positions of individuals, for
soon it was not physical strength which decided rank but the strength a man acquired
through wealth. The richest man was the strongest man, the poorest was the weakest”
(MV: 110).
Sade also attempts to demonstrate a close link between economic strength, power,
and innate, superior traits. In Juliette, Dorval, a thief, argues that there is a non-
arbitrary distinction between the powerful man, who exploits a subject population,
and the poor thief. 32 The poor thief who robs from the ‘natural’ masters, states
Dorval, “is doing nothing that isn’t completely natural, he is trying to redress the
balance which, in the moral as well as the physical realm, is Nature’s highest law...”
yet, adds Sade, this “isn’t quite what I was aiming to prove; however, proofs aren’t
needed ... [w]hat I should like to convince you of is that neither does the powerful
individual commit a crime or an injustice when he strives to despoil the weak.”
Dorval then makes the following moral claim: “...theft perpetrated by a strong man is
assuredly a better and more valid act, within the terms and from the standpoint of
nature” (my italics). This is because, in attempting to take from the strong, “the weak
man must make use of physical forces he does not possess, he must adopt a character
that has not been given him, in short, he must in some sense fly in the face of nature”
(my italics; J:117). Sade/Dorval adds an additional ‘moral principle’ in order to
justify such a distinction: “That sage mother’s [Nature’s] laws... stipulate that the
mighty harm the feeble” (J: 117). At this point, Sade’s case risks collapsing into a
tautology (simply put, ‘the master is the one who masters’). To avoid this, Sade needs
to identify essential traits that distinguish between the natural master and the natural
slave. He eventually settles upon a vaguely defined notion of authenticity.

The strong individual, unlike the weak, never dons masks, he at all times acts true to his
own character, his character is the one he has received from Nature, and in whatever he
does is an honest and direct expression thereof and in the highest sense and degree
natural...his tyrannies and outbursts...pure emanations of what he is... (J: 117).

32
This is a clear case of a character being ‘body-snatched’ by Sade’s voice. Dorval is arguing from the
perspective of someone who believes that the wealthy- who he himself specializes in robbing- are more
honest in being despotic than the poor thief who steals from them.

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The ‘powerful man,’ then, a). despoils the weak and b). acts in accordance with
nature out of c). an authentic expression of his true nature. By contrast, the weak man
goes against nature, in using physical forces that he lacks. Dorval assumes, in making
this charge, that a). it is possible to go against nature, b). that it is somehow wrong
(invalid) to go against nature, and c). that it is possible to use resources (whether
intellectual or physical) that one does not have. He also assumes that d). ‘honest and
direct’ expressions of one’s actual powers are in a sense ‘virtuous.’
To a point, it could be argued that Sade’s characters are applying a double
standard. When discussing the first Christians or the French Revolutionaries, cunning,
craft and ‘sneakiness’ are considered vices (J: 119- 121). Yet when Clairwil- a
libertine- succeeds in defeating some men, she declares: “how sweet are the victories
the weak contrive to win over the strong” (J: 520). Sade’s introduction of the notion
of ‘honesty’ fits awkwardly both with the Sadeian rejection of all morality, and with
the conduct of his characters. Humaneness is dismissed as due to ‘fear and egoism’:
“this chimerical virtue, enslaving only weak men, is unknown to those whose
character is formed by stoicism, courage, and philosophy” (PB: 360; similar: LNJ1:
138). Yet the libertines tend to view bravery as simple stupidity, and pride themselves
on their own egoism (“[t]o disesteem a man because he fears danger- is to hate him
for loving life”; J: 949, also 248). The ‘weak,’ according to the libertines, formulate a
collective strategy and a doctrine of equality to convince others not to harm them. The
Four Friends retreat to an impregnable fortress, and the Sodality of the Friends of
Crime adopt a Social Contract for essentially the same reasons. The charge that the
first Christians were ‘dishonorable’ in avoiding hurt through proposing their doctrine
cannot be a moral charge, as, for the libertines themselves, the highest of all goods is
the pursuit of happiness (J:910). Nor can the subterfuge of the Slave Revolt in Morals,
or the ‘inauthentic’ expression of one’s true strength, be moral (that is, Sade-moral)
wrongs on Sade’s view.
The defining characteristic of the libertines is not, therefore, racial, reducible to
specific caste traits, or explicable in terms of ‘authenticity,’ and remains unstated.
Certain rankings of the superior and inferior in Sade in fact appear to be deliberately
juxtaposed, perhaps in order to undermine the whole notion of innate superiority.
Characters in Juliette, for example, argue variously that men and women are equal;
that men are superior to women, and vice versa (J: 354, 505-506). Nor is intelligence

226
the deciding factor. Justine, who is forced to work as a slave at one point, is quite
capable of discussing philosophy (MV: 111). Five factors, in general, distinguish the
libertines from their victims- their atheism, their cynicism, their immorality, their lack
of a sense of pity or remorse, and their power, whether in the form of wealth or
political influence. Wealth is only a necessary condition; being, like power itself, an
‘enabler’ of libertine exploits; there are plenty of cases of innocent people in Sade
who are slaughtered for their money (wealth trumps high birth- for the Sodality of the
Friends of Crime, only the income of prospective members is considered ; J:424). Not
even atheism, it appears, is a necessary condition of being a libertine, as evidenced by
the case of Saint-Fond ( who believes in God only to hate him, as discussed in
Chapter I), Mondor (who makes confession after killing people) or Abraham Pexoto,
a Jew (LNJ: 425-429; J:547). The capacity for remorse or guilt is unusual for
libertines, but Juliette has to fight it nevertheless (J: 549). Cynicism is necessary for
‘libertinage’ (that is, harming and killing for pleasure), though not sufficient.
Brigandos, the leader of a criminal gang (in Aline et Valcour) is cynical, and his
notion of justice is problematic (as discussed in Chapter V), yet he never oppresses,
tortures or kills other people. The same can be said of Le Chevalier, in Philosophy in
the Bedroom (discussed below).
Ultimately, only one factor universally distinguishes the ‘master’ from the
‘slave’ in Sade’s work. The libertine possesses power. The master is the dominant
member of a power relationship, and lacks the restraints that would prevent him, or
her, from harming or killing the victim. The term ‘master’ is, therefore, largely a
relational term. The relationship between Saint-Fond and Juliette illustrates this. They
have the same general libertine traits- passion, cynicism and intelligence. Yet Saint
Fond is far more powerful. Not only is he the source of Juliette’s wealth early in her
career (seven million francs a year) – if she does not cooperate with him and become
his poisoner and spy, which requires that she betray her own friends, he threatens her
with imprisonment in the Bastille (J: 231, 237). Juliette herself seems confused about
the nature of the relationship, referring to Saint-Fond as an ‘accomplice’ and to
herself as his ‘slave,’ and feeling it necessary to express her submission to him by
eating his excrement (J:236). Saint-Fond’s clarifies the situation for us. He advances
Juliette’s career purely to magnify his own sense of power over others: “...I’ll raise
you so high in the world you’ll have no more trouble believing in your superiority
over others: you cannot imagine the joy I derive in advancing you to atop the very

227
pinnacle, and making your pre-eminence conditional upon profound humility and
unbounded obedience toward me alone. I wish you to be the idol of others and, at the
same time, my slave...” (J: 323). 33 Whilst listening to a plan to two kill thirds of
France through famine, Juliette involuntarily shows human feelings of moral concern.
Having betrayed herself to the Libertine equivalent to the Thought Police, she is
forced to leave Paris (J: 549, 550). Juliette is coerced and exiled by other libertines.
Further, Juliette loses members of her own entourage to the murderous impulses of
Minski, again indicating her lower ranking. Sade’s claim that power is anchored by
innate superiority is therefore problematic.
Sade’s libertines themselves in fact discuss the possibility is that there is no such
thing as innate superiority, and that there are no such morally relevant distinctions
between themselves and those upon whom they exploit. Le Chevalier, in Philosophy
in the Bedroom, is that rarest of creatures in Sade’s menagerie– the libertine
moderate: “I am libertine, impious, I am capable of every mental obscenity, but my
heart remains to me...” (PB: 341). He rejects Dolmancé’s view that economic
difference can justify inhumane treatment of others.

Look at those others wasted by the drudgeries that support your existence, and at their
bed, scarcely more than a straw or two for protection against the rude earth whereof, like
beasts, they have nothing but the chill crust to lie down upon; cast a glance at
them…Barbaric one, are these not at all human beings like you? And if they are of your
kind, why should you enjoy yourself when they lie dying? (PB: 340-341).

Like Dolmancé, le Chevalier is opposed to religious belief, yet adheres to the

Rousseauian notion of the “sacred voice of Nature”- the very doctrine that Dolmancé
(and other libertines) has inverted (PB:341). Dolmancé’s reply does not answer the
question as to whether those whom one exploits are in fact essentially different to
oneself. Rather, Dolmancé repeats that the sense of remorse is merely a ‘pain’ caused
by the mind’s ‘miscalculations,’ and insists that le Chevalier will eventually lose,
through contact with the ingratitude of others, “those...virtues for which, perhaps, like
you, I was also born” (PB:341, 342). Eugénie declares Dolmancé the winner of the
debate, and Le Chevalier gives up, simply adding: “I’ll save my ethics for others”

33
Saint-Fond also uses the ‘tu’ form of informal address when talking with Juliette (J: 245).

228
(PB: 342-343). The objection that power is assigned arbitrarily occurs also in Juliette.
Juliette has this to say to Archduke Leopold, a libertine:

How did you get your rank? By luck. What did you do to merit your rank? That first of
kings who earned it through his courage or his cunning, he could perhaps claim to some
esteem; but he who has it through mere inheritance, may he hope for more than
compassion? (J: 616-617).

Again, for the King of Sardinia, another libertine:

...wisdom laughs at a little fellow like you who, because he has some of his forebears’
parchments stored away in some box, fancies himself empowered to rule over men; your
authority...no longer reinforced by periodical lootings, ...rests upon nothing solider than
opinion (J:568).

In the first of these passages, Juliette notes that there was once a meritocracy- of
courage and cunning- that dictated rank, but no more. In the second passage, Sade
implies that paperwork is the only remnant of the relationship between the Kings of
the past and their present representatives. It is also significant that Juliette accuses the
most powerful heads of state of lacking any qualities that could justify their posts, as
it is these very characters who give the most extreme expressions of the master/ slave
relationship, seeing themselves as ‘gods, ’ and their subjects as “swarming insects”
(J:243; 748, PB:216). Regardless of Sade’s intended sense, his characters serve to
illustrate Helvétius’ view that people with absolute power frequently fell to the
delusion that they were a higher order of being. 34

Sade’s characters largely fail to reduce, or validate, their power in terms of a

single trait, and entertain the possibility that, within larger power structures, there
could be very little relationship between power and innate qualities. The power of the
libertines (in Juliette in particular) is not due to any one personal trait, but one’s place
in the socioeconomic matrix, in particular the specific relationships that one has
within that matrix, as shown by the emphasis on secret societies, wealth, and official
power. The administration, relations and mechanisms of power will be discussed in
chapter VII.

34
Helvétius A Treatise of Man Vol. II p.351.

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6.6 the Extermination of Christianity
On the question of what is to be done with Christianity, Sade distinguishes himself
from all but the most radical thinkers of his age. Like the philosophes, Sade is critical
of Christianity, in particular Catholicism, and in particular for its intolerance of other
religions and belief systems. Yet, unlike Sade, Voltaire and others had promoted
religious tolerance. 35 Two reasons for religious tolerance are given. Firstly, in the
absence of absolute religious truth, it is argued, it makes no sense to persecute
religious beliefs. Secondly, pragmatic grounds are offered- historically, religious
intolerance leads to violent and bloody disputes, as would, assumedly, persecution of
all Christians by non- Christians. Rousseau and Locke are not of this opinion,
reasoning that the intolerant cannot be tolerated. 36 Rousseau proposes that
Christianity should be replaced, and a national cult erected in its stead (its sole
“negative dogma” being “no intolerance”; SC: 186). Sade’s characters, by contrast,
are unconcerned with resolving the paradox of tolerating the intolerant. Further, they
have no interest in the values of peace or avoidance of suffering, and no belief in
respect for the beliefs of others. Moreover, they do not accept that their own beliefs
concerning religion are fallible (they are quite certain that Catholicism is false). As
such, they are intolerant of religion in the extreme, and make proposals accordingly.
As Adorno and Horkheimer have it, they apply instrumental reason, stripped of the
Enlightenment’s traditional concern for humanism.
Sade’s politically powerful characters propose four distinct solutions to the
‘Church Question.’ One solution is to simply colonize religious doctrine and
institutions for the state’s- (that is, the ruler- libertines’) own ends, a doctrine that
which will be discussed further in Chapter VII. Another other option is to eliminate
Christianity through legalistic and punitive means. In Yet another effort, Frenchmen,
if you would become Republicans, the narrator proposes the removal of priests and the
exiling and imprisonment of Christians, “a scythe to mow the land clean of all those
phantoms, and a steady heart to hate them.” But Sade’s narrator thinks that execution

35
Voltaire Philosophical Dictionary p.389. See also Hertzberg p. 300.
36
See, for example, John Locke: A Letter Concerning Toleration In Focus edited by John Horton and
Susan Mendus (London: Routledge, 1991).

230
or exile are not ideal solutions -“these are royal atrocities” (PB: 306; similar: J: 970-
972). The Comte de Belmor, of Juliette, suggests a more extreme solution. He
proposes genocide; the death of every Catholic in France. He reasons that this would
eliminate irrational superstition, and because it would be “a hundred times better that
our fair part of Europe be inhabited by ten million honest folk rather than by twenty-
five million rascals.” He goes on to describe Catholicism and its adherents as a
‘plague,’ and the coming destruction as the end of “eighteen hundred years of thorns
in France’s side” (J: 499, 501).
States Belmor:

... we must arrest and slaughter all the priests in a single day and deal similarly with all
their followers; simultaneously, inside the space of the same minute, destroy every last
vestige of Catholicism ; and concurrently proclaim atheistic systems, and instantly entrust
to philosophers the education of our youth ; paint, publish, distribute, give out,
everywhere display those writings which propagate incredulity, unbelief, and for fifty
years persecute and put to death every individual, without exception, who might think to
re-inflate the balloon (J:499-500).

Belmor proposes the establishment of a death squad of twenty-five thousand men for
the execution of this operation: “...the elements of success are some political support,
secrecy, and firmness: no flabbiness, that’s essential, and no keeping people waiting
in line. You fear martyrs, you’ll have them so long as a single worshipper of that
abominable Christian god is left alive” (J: 500-501; similar: LNJ 2:403). Belmor’s
genocidal scheme is consistent with the acts of Sade’s primary libertine characters,
who make a point of torturing and killing those who express Christian morality or
piety. This is most explicit in The 120 Days of Sodom, in which children are killed for
breaking the regulations concerning religious observance (120: 248).

6.7 Historical Context of the Pagan Return

Sade was not, by far, the first to depict the origins of Christianity as lowly and
dishonourable, or to propose that the morality of Christianity was life- denying and
detrimental to French cultural and political life. Helvétius dismissed the ancestors of
Judaeo-Christian tradition as mere ‘dregs’ and ‘wretches.’ 37 Rousseau described the

37
Helvétius A Treatise on Man Vol.2 p.143.

231
first Christians as living under a “hypocritical submission” until the time was right “to
usurp that authority which they made a show of respecting while they were weak,”
prefiguring Sade’s and Nietzsche’s view that Christian morality originated as a
psychological subterfuge (SC:178-179, 184). Following the reasoning of Machiavelli,
Rousseau considered Christianity incompatible with the needs of a warlike state, and
proposed that it be replaced with a minimalist Deism, explicitly subordinate to the
needs of politics (SC:87). Further, Rousseau proposed the reintroduction of Roman
symbols, including the Fascis, such was his enthusiasm for ancient Rome (E: 322; SC:
184).

The most extreme and sustained expression of the ‘pagan Return,’ however, was
that of d’Holbach. In his L’Esprit du Judaïsme ou Examen Raisonné de la Loi de
Moyse, & de son influence sur la Religion Chrétienne (The Spirit of Judaism or
Reasoned Examination of the Law of Moses and its Influence on the Christian
Religion, 1750) -a copy of which Sade owned- d’Holbach called for the elimination
of the influence of the Jews. 38 D’Holbach reasoned that the religion of Jesus,
described as a ‘pollution,’ had been foisted upon the Romans by the Jews as an act of
vengeance. Further, d’Holbach argued that Judaism itself emerged as a deception by
Moses and, later, the Priests and Prophets to subjugate the people and the Kings of
Israel. In order to free Europe of this ‘irrational’ creed, d’Holbach calls for the
elimination of the entire cultural edifice, although he does not specify how this is to
be accomplished. He finishes his work with these words: “Europe! Happy land where
for so long a time the arts, sciences, and philosophy have flourished; you whose
wisdom and power seem destined to command the rest of the world! Do you never tire
of the false dreams invented by the impostors in order to deceive the brutish slaves of
the Egyptians? [...] Leave to the stupid Hebrews, to the frenzied imbeciles, and to the
cowardly and degraded Asiatics these superstitions which are as vile as they are mad
....” 39 As noted above, Sade explicitly associates the origins of Christianity with the

38
For discussion on this text, see Arthur Hertzberg The French Enlightenment and the Jews (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1968/ The Jewish Publication Society of America Philadelphia,
5728) p.310. Alain Mothu lists d’Holbach’s L’esprit du Judaïsme among those in Sade’s library. Alain
Mothu “Les lectures ‘nécessaires’ du Marquis de Sade,” La lettre clandestin 3 (1994):311-319 p.317.
39
[Baron d’Holbach] L’Esprit du Judaïsme ou examen raisonné de la loi de MOYSE, & de son
influence sur la Religion Chrétienne (‘Londres’ [probably false] 1750) p. 200-201. Quoted in Arthur
Hertzberg The French Enlightenment and the Jews p.310.

232
Jews, and largely repeats the ‘slave revolt’ theory, though in a more straightforward
manner. Sade also repeats the view, promulgated by Voltaire, d’Holbach, and others,
that that all of the great religious figures were ambitious charlatans: “Lycurgus,
Numa, Moses, Jesus Christ, Mohammed, all these great rogues, all these great
thought-tyrants, knew how to associated the divinities they fabricated with their own
boundless ambition...they were always... to consult [their Gods] exclusively about, or
to make them exclusively respond to what they thought likely to serve their own
interests” (PB:300). 40
Nor was Sade the first to express interest in the morality of the Pagans as a
possible alternative. Notably, where Sade describes the early Christians as a ‘horde of
troublemakers,’ he alludes to the same Classical authors (Tacitus and Lucian) that
Voltaire and Rousseau had turned to (J: 283, 758, 759). 41 Rousseau felt that
seventeen centuries of Christianity had made Europe decadent and soft, and called
upon Europe to “...reclaim…your first innocence” (DI: 153). Children should be
taught to steal, as practiced in Sparta, Rousseau suggested, rather than being “glued to
books,” and he thought that hunting should be encouraged, as it “hardens the heart”
to “blood and cruelty” (E: 119,128, 320). Even where Rousseau is discussing
Christian (that is, conventional) morality in a positive way, he tends to align himself
with Sade’s association of morality with weakness and a lack of passion. We have
morality, Rousseau reasons, as we are weak: “[i]t is man’s weakness which makes
him sociable; it is our common miseries which turn our hearts to humanity; we would
owe humanity nothing if we were not men” (E: 221; also: SC: 77). Diderot and
Helvétius were similarly suspicious of Christian morality. Diderot suspected

40
On this subject, one particularly influential anonymous tract was the “Three Impostors,” known also
by its Latin title, De Tribus Impostoribus. It is thought to have first appeared in French in 1719, but its
actual origins are obscure. See Anonymous, Treatise of the Three Impostors and the Problem of
Enlightenment, A New Translation of the Traite Des Trois Imposteurs (1777 Edition) With Three
Essays in Commentary, translated by Abraham Anderson (Lanham, Maryland, U.S.A.: Rowman &
Littlefield Pub Inc, 1997). For discussion, see Silvia Berti, Francoise Charles-Daubert, Richard Henry
Popkin, editors, Heterodoxy, Spinozism, and Free Thought in Early-Eighteenth-Century Europe:
Studies on the Traite Des Trois Imposteurs (Archives Internationales D'histoire Des Idées, 148)
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996).
41
For discussion, see Hertzberg pp.299-300. Lucian satirized the Christians in his Passing of
Peregrinus, a story of a philosopher sage who at one point becomes a leader of the Christians to take
advantage of their gullibility.

233
conventional morality to be “meek slavish conformance to the laws.” 42 Helvétius
discussed at length the merit of pride as a virtue, and the superior warrior virtues of
the Vikings. He suggested, like Diderot, that virtue was frequently due to “a want of
talents,” and that “to the same defect we owe all our virtues.” 43 He also had praise for
the “fierce and savage” Northern Nations, “infinitely more courageous and warlike
than people indulged in luxury, softness, and subject to arbitrary power.” 44 He
presents the following passage as testament to their greatness of Viking culture, which
goes some way to illustrate the radicalism of philosophe thought with regards to the
question concerning Morality.

“Our warriors, greedy of death,” says one of their [Viking] poets, “seek for it with fury;
being struck in battle by a mortal blow, they fall, and laughing die.” This truth is
confirmed by one of their kings, named Lodbrog: “With what unknown joy am I seized! I
hear the voice of Odin call me; I see, coming [from the gates of Valhalla] beautiful
virgins half naked; they bear a blue scarf, which augments the whiteness of their bosoms;
they advance towards me and offer me the most delicious beer, in the bleeding skulls of
my enemies. 45

It is against this intellectual nostalgia that Sade offers his thoughts on the
greatness of the Celts, discussed above. Whereas Helvétius is content to note the
passion and the poetry of the Vikings, Sade makes a more direct claim- the morality
of the Celts ought to be revived and applied directly to the modern world. Sade
emphasizes just how different the morality of the pre-Christian peoples of Europe
really was, and that it was based on very different standards and principles. Notes
Christopher Hibbert, the European understanding of crime and punishment was
completely transformed by the adoption of the Mosaic Law. Punishment was often
settled with a fine, or a duel, which of course would place the wealthy and strong, and
those trained in the art of war (that is, the nobles) at an advantage (an institution Sade
proposes in Aline et Valcour, to be discussed in Chapter VII). Until the rediscovery of
Roman law, murder, robbery and rape were regarded, not as sins, but as torts that
could be settled by compensation. Rape was regarded not as a crime against the

42
Diderot Political Writings pp.181-182.
43
Helvétius Essays on the Mind pp. 290.
44
Ibid. p.349.
45
Helvétius Essays on the Mind p.327-328.

234
woman so much as a violation of the property of the woman’s husband (exactly as
Sade views it, as discussed in Chapter IV). 46 Writes Hibbert, around the 7th Century,
“In a society where every fighting man was a valuable asset, execution and mutilation
could not reasonably be considered suitable for lesser offences, such as murder or
theft... injuries which interfered with a man’s ability to work or fight were
compensated at a higher rate than those which disfigured him.” 47

Finally, Sade relentlessly emphasises the gulf that separates the morality of
modern Europe from that of the Roman Empire, so enthusiastically championed by
Rousseau and Voltaire. Both writers, even as they asserted the moral superiority of
Ancient Rome and Greece, were content to overlook certain negative aspects, in
particular slavery and (Rome in particular) cruelty. In his Philosophical Dictionary,
Voltaire notes that the Jews were tolerant and did not use torture, despite stating that
they were “cannibals” and “the cruellest people on earth.” 48 Yet he also asserts that
the Romans were more moral than the Jews, and that “the Romans inflicted torture
only on the slaves, but the slaves were not reckoned to be human.” 49 Similarly,
Rousseau writes of the Greeks that they lived for freedom, and that “slaves did all the
work...” (SC: 142). Sade’s characters, to be sure, discuss at length the naturalness of
the slave caste, but they are far less glib about the ‘mere’ fact that the Romans treated
humans like beasts. Catherine Cusset, in the essay “Sade, Machiavel et Néron,”
suggests that Sade’s celebration of Nero – in a manner completely at odds with the
thought of his time, was specifically to scandalize and incriminate the enthusiasm the
philosophes had for Imperial Rome. 50 Further, whereas the philosophes admired the
grandeur of Rome despite its more repugnant aspects, Sade’s characters admire Rome
because it was so barbaric, mentioning it only in the context of gladiatorial combat,
throwing people to wild animals, or crucifying them (J: 337, 604, 803, 999, 1011,
1123- 1124). Further, they assert that Rome was great because of its lack of concern
for its more unfortunate subjects. From Encore un effort:

46
Christopher Hibbert The Roots of Evil: A Social History of Crime and Punishment (London: Penguin,
1963). p.18
47
Ibid. p.17
48
Voltaire Philosophical Dictionary 389, 395.
49
Ibid. p. 322, 395.
50
Catherine Cusset “Sade, Machiavel et Néron,” Dix-huitième Siècle 22 (1990): 401-411, p.402.

235
 What people were at once greater and more bloodthirsty than the Romans, and what
nation longer preserved its splendour and freedom? The gladiatorial spectacles fed its
bravery, it became warlike through the habit of making a game of murder. Twelve or
fifteen hundred victims filled the circus’ arena every day, and there the women, crueller
than the men, dared demand that the dying fall gracefully and be sketched while still in
death’s throes. The Romans moved from that to the pleasures of seeing dwarfs cut each
other to pieces; and when the Christian cult, then infecting the world, came to persuade
men there was evil in killing one another, the tyrants immediately enchained that people,
and everyone’s heroes became their toys (PB: 334, also 299; similar: J:784).

Note that Sade links up the greatness of Rome precisely with its brutality, and its
collapse with the ‘softening’ of the belief that human life is sacred. Exactly the same
group of associations- the grandeur and barbarity of Rome, and the doctrine of
inequality- is made in an official letter Sade wrote whilst serving as a Revolutionary
functionary. On November 7th 1793, Citoyen Sade, vice- president of the Section des
piques, was given the job of rechristening the streets of the neighborhood in his
jurisdiction with appropriately revolutionary names. Included in his letter to the
Comité de surveillance is the following proposal:

La rue de l’Arcade s’appellera

RUE DE SPARTACUS

Les Romains, malgré leur grandeur, portaient l’inhumanité au point

de sacrifier des hommes dans leurs spectacles : l’esclave Spartacus
fut condamne a cet avilissement : il crut que le titre d’homme devait
l’en mettre a l’abri ; il se révolta contre les barbares qui voulaient
s’amuser de sa mort ; il se fit un parti, soutint la liberté, l’égalité de
l’homme ; et la postérité le verra toujours comme un des plus zèles
défenseurs des droits de l’humanité. 51

Citoyen Sade- in terms identical to the official Revolutionary view, proposes to name
a street after the celebrated Roman slave. Even though Sade’s ‘official’ morality is the
exact opposite of that of the libertines, he consistently makes the association of Rome,
its grandeur, and its barbarity, as if to point out a lacuna in the Revolutionary
penchant for the Classical world. Unlike Rousseau or Voltaire, Sade notes that the

51
Sade Opuscules et Lettres politiques (Paris: 10/18, 1979) p.137.

236
Romans were ‘inhuman.’ Whichever Sade is the true one – Citoyen Sade or Libertin
Sade- whether Sade wanted to warn of the actual implications of returning to Rome,
or was sincerely in favour of razing Jerusalem- is unclear.
In the following chapter, the doctrine of the Natural Right of the Strong, as
applied to the political domain in Sade’s work, will be discussed.

237
238
 Chapter VII: THE GOVERNMENT OF REASON
Sade’s Politics

Power is nothing without control.

Pirelli slogan.

7.1 Introduction.
On the subject of politics, there is no consensus on what Sade had in mind, what his
work amounts to, or whether he treated the topic, as such, at all. The political aspect
of Sade’s work is a relatively neglected area, and a number of influential scholars (in
particular Hénaff, Le Brun, Blanchot, Bataille, and Klossowski) scarcely mention it at
all, giving the reader the impression that Sade only depicts isolated libertines, entirely
cut off from the rest of the world. Sade’s one direct statement on his political
orientation only clarifies that he was, at least publicly, unable to commit to any
particular political ethic or ideology. 1 In 1792, he wrote the following lines to his
lawyer and friend, Gaufridy:

It is not, in truth, for any of the parties, yet it is a composite of all of them. I am an anti-
Jacobin, I hate them to the death; I love the King, yet I detest the former abuses; I love the
vast majority of the articles of the Constitution, others of them revolt me; I would like the
nobility returned to their glory, because taking it away from them accomplishes nothing; I
wish the King were the head of the nation; I do not at all want the national Assembly, but
two houses as in England, which gives the King a mitigated authority, balanced by the
concurrence of a nation necessarily divided into two orders, the third [i.e., the clergy] is
unnecessary, I want nothing of them. There you have my profession of faith. What am I
now? Aristocrat or democrat? Please tell me, lawyer, because, as for me, I do not have the
faintest idea. 2

1
For discussion, see Thomas Sade, la dissertation et l’orgie p.14 ; Alain Verjat “L’imaginaire de Sade
et la Révolution” in Chalas-Ives, ed. Mythe et révolutions (Grenoble: PU de Grenoble, 1990):185-197,
p.187. See also Lacombe Sade et ses masques pp.123, 127-129.
2
Letter to Gaufridy, December 5th 1791. In Sade Correspondance inédite du Marquis de Sade de ses
proches, et de ses familiers ed. Paul Bourdin (Paris : Librairie de France, 1929) pp.301-2. Quoted in
Shaeffer pp.414-415.

239
 In Chapter I, I noted that there are various interpretations concerning Sade’s
political orientation. Sade has been interpreted as a totalitarian, as a liberator of the
human spirit, as a socialist, and as a revolutionary. There are also various views as to
whether Sade was promulgating a particular doctrine, was simply confused, or wished
to undermine the reader’s faith in any particular political solution. I wish to sidestep
the impossible hermeneutic task of deciding what Sade himself had in mind. He
himself had no clear statement on political matters, true, but his characters are not
politically ambivalent, and have specific ideas concerning political power. What will
be discussed here is the relationship between the various political positions which
they offer, how they cohere with the doctrinal matrix as discussed in previous
chapters (in particular the various ethical and psychological assumptions), and their
intersections. Further, Sade’s depiction of the powerful, and how they think and
function, is an essential part of his overall description of the world and how to survive
in it (Sade is also insistent that what he describes concerns the real world, frequently
noting, in footnotes throughout Juliette, that the atrocities performed by his characters
refer to actual events). 3 Besides preparing the way for a final assessment of the Sade-
Nazism association, the chapter will also serve as a reply to the claim that Sade’s
work is resolutely a-political.
Sade’s complex and intimate involvement with the French Revolution, and his
debt to other writers on politics, population control and economics, are themes that go
far beyond the scope of this study. 4 Nor will I be concerned with readings of Sade as

3
Juliette is full of lurid caricatures of living political and church figures. Juliette herself meets Gustav
of Sweden, Pope Pius VI, Ferdinand of Naples, Victor-Amédée of Savoy, and Leopold of
Tuscany. Another character, Brisatesta, brother of Clairwil, is an intimate of Catherine the Great
(Juliette pp.874-880). In The 120 Days of Sodom Sade refers to a certain ‘Bishop de X***,’insinuating
that this was a real serial killing cleric, and refers to himself as the Marquis de S***, who was burned
in effigy for the crime of sodomy (120:191, 495). Sade also writes that a particular vivisecting doctor is
based on an acquaintance (J: 729) Further, throughout Juliette there are a number of assertions that
particular plots and atrocities are based on fact, such as a plot to set fire to every hospital in Rome:
“[t]his project was actually conceived while I was at Rome, and I alter nothing but the names of the
actors” (J: 726,762, 858). He also alludes to the sexual exploits of Marie Antoinette (934) and the link
between the sex trade industry and the Italian church (980).
4
For discussion of Sade’s political career, see Michel Delon “Sade Thermidorien” In Michel Camus,
Philippe Roger, eds Sade, écrire la crise:99-118 ; Michel Delon “Sade dans la Révolution” pp.160-
161 ; Michael La Chance “Marat, Sade: Despotiser de corps” in 1789: Conférences 1989 (Montréal:

240
a revolutionary in a sense which is not straightforwardly political- those, for example,
who read Sade as a liberator of the libido, the psyche, or the confines of language. 5

7.2 Antipodes

Oh Sainville! A great revolution will come to your people!

Zamé, Aline et Valcour (AV:372).

It is the epistolary novel Aline et Valcour, ou le roman philosophique (1795),

that is most commonly cited in discussions of Sade’s purported socialism ( in
particular by Geoffrey Gorer, as discussed in Chapter I), and is the closest Sade comes
to an endorsement of a straightforwardly socialist politics. 6 This is the only surviving

Dépt. d’études françaises, Université de Montréal, 1990):5-32, pp.17, 23; Lucienne Frappier –Mazur
“A Turning Point in the Sadean Novel: The Terror” In Sawhney, ed. Must We Burn Sade? : 115-131;
Marcelin Pleynet “The Readability of Sade” in The Tel Quel Reader ed. Patrick ffrench (sic), Roland-
François Lack (London and New York: Routledge, 1998):109-122, p.188; Michaël La Chance “Marat,
Sade: Despotiser de corps” in 1789: Conférences 1989 (Montréal: Dépt. d’études françaises, Université
de Montréal, 1990):5-32, p.17.
For discussion on the sources of Sade’s thoughts on politics and population control, see Jean Ehrard
“Pour une lecture non sadienne de Sade: mariage et démographie dans Aline et Valcour” In Roger,
Camus ed. Sade, écrire la crise: 241-258; Yves Giraud “La ville du bout du monde: Sade, Aline et
Valcour” In Studi di letterature francese 11, 1985:85-100, p.98. Lacombe p.156-161, 168 -178 ;
Giraud p.92 ; AV:866, fn. 406. Philippe Roger “La trace de Fénelon” In Camus and Roger, eds. Sade
écrire la crise pp.149-175. Sade also mentions abbé de Saint-Pierre’s proposal for a Pan- European
republic (AV: 531).
5
Béatrice Didier and Philippe Roger both take Sade to be engaged in a destruction of the confines of
language itself. See Philippe Roger Sade La Philosophie dans le pressoir pp.189-190; Didier Sade: Un
écriture du désir pp 129, 203, 222. James N. Glass “Rousseau’s Emile and Sade’s Eugénie: Action,
Nature and the Presence of Moral Structure,” The Philosophical Forum: a Quarterly 7, no. 1 (Fall
1975):38-55, pp.340. Kazuhiko Sekitani, “Révolution française et érotisme vus à travers les textes
politiques de Sade,” Etudes de langue et littérature françaises 62 (March 1993):16-28.
6
There are socialist aspects of Sade’s libertine works. The libertines are frequently described by the
narrative voice as ‘bloodsuckers,’ and, as discussed in preceding chapters, the association of
immorality and economic power is explicit (120:191, 195,700; J: 167, 213, 683). The doctrine of the
natural rightness of economic equality appears elsewhere also. In La Nouvelle Justine, for example,
several thieves argue that, as Nature creates all men equal, they are justified in correcting the imbalance

241
‘philosophical novel’ that Sade admitted to have written, and the first to have
appeared under his own name. 7 Like his short stories, it has a moral orientation quite
unlike that of the ‘libertine’ works. Within this text are a number of unremarkable and
unoriginal suggestions concerning economic and defense policies, such as the
importance of agriculture to national wellbeing, and the necessity of strengthened
naval power to defend trade routes (AV: 236; 237). It is Letter XXXV, however, that
has received the most interest.
In Letter XXXV, Léonore is kidnapped by Turkish pirates and is feared sold to
a Sultan. Sainville, in the course of his rescue attempt, and following a rumour that
Léonore is aboard Captain James Cook’s research vessel Endeavour, travels the world
in search of her. 8 On his travels he encounters two exotic societies; the Kingdom of
Batua, in West Africa, and the Kingdom of Tamoé, a tiny Republic off the coast of
New Zealand (AV :279). 9 As interpretation of Sade’s politics has focused on the latter,
I will begin here.
Upon arrival in Tamoé, Sainville meets Zamé, self-described philosopher king of
the island (AV: 281). Sainville is surprised that Zamé understands French. In reply,
Zamé explains that he is familiar with the ways of Europeans, and tells his story.
Many years earlier, a French battleship discovered the island, and for a month, the
crew took advantage of the “weakness and innocence” of the islanders, committing
“many disorders” (AV: 388). Nevertheless, Zamé took the chance to see the world,
and travelled to Europe, remaining there for three years. Having seen the hypocrisy
and absurdity of European laws and practices, he returned to Tamoé, and transformed
the Republic into the ideal state, based on the lessons learned.
The figure of Zamé, and his doctrine, is largely in keeping with the political
thought of his age. He is an ‘enlightened despot,’ or, as Fink describes him, “a

between rich and poor (LNJ 1: 68; 83). Only in Aline et Valcour, however, is economic difference and
exploitation discussed as an actual wrong.
7
Schaeffer p.455.
8
Captain James Cook of the Royal Navy (1728-1779) was the first explorer to circumnavigate and
accurately chart New Zealand, and has the status of ancestor figure for European (Pakeha) New
Zealanders. It may amuse the reader to know that the author was born in New Zealand, in a region
called The Bay of Plenty, a rather Utopian name given by Captain Cook himself.
9
This appeared as a separate book in the 10:18 series. Marquis de Sade Histoire de Sainville et de
Léonore introduction par Gilbert Lély. (Paris: 10:18, 1963).

242
paternalistic autocrat.” 10 He rules entirely in accordance with his own education and
judgement. Like Voltaire, Diderot and Rousseau, Zamé is distrustful of the notion of
Democracy (notably, even Rousseau feared that democracy was only suited to small,
poor countries, remarking that full democracy was “for gods, not men”; SC: 30-32,
125). 11 When Sainville asks him why the island lacks any political or legal apparatus
besides his own authority, Zamé states: “[s]i les lois sont justes, elles n’ont pas besoin
d’être déposées ailleurs que dans le cœur de chaque citoyen, et elles s’y placeront
naturellement.” He adds that a British- style parliamentary system would be
undesirable: “[m]oins de danger pour le peuple, sans doute, mais bien plus d’entraves
pour moi; plus je diviserai mon pouvoir, plus je l’affaiblirai, et comme je n’ai envie
que de faire le bien, je ne veux pas que rien m’en empêche” (AV: 298).
Every aspect of life on Tamoé is dictated by principles laid down by Zamé, and
many of his directives appear (to modern eyes, at least) draconian. Reasoning– based
on his experiences in Europe– that luxury goods harm the economic wellbeing of the
state, and that crime is entirely due to economic difference, Zamé has (or claims to
have) eliminated all luxury, economic inequality, and private property. 12 An
extremely limited diet is enforced; meat is banned, as is every beverage other than
water (AV: 283, 285, 352, 357). All property is held in common, and there is no hard
currency. Zamé boasts that this ‘system’ (call it ‘Zamism’) is “closer to nature,” citing
the authority of Diogenes and Epicurus (not, curiously, Rousseau) on the virtues of
‘natural’ living (AV: 294). He declares: “[é]tablissez l’égalité des fortunes et des
conditions, qu’il n’y ait d’unique propriétaire que l’État…et tout les crimes dangereux
disparaîtront; la constitution de Tamoé vous le prouve” (AV: 319, 321, 337, 339). The
Republic is both an autarky (all trade, and all interaction with other states is
prohibited) and a command economy. Industry on Tamoé is restricted to agriculture,

10
Fink “Political System” p.503.
11
Candide and Other Tales p.398; Diderot Political Writings pp 32, 91. For discussion, see also Isaiah
Berlin “the art of Being Ruled” In Times Literary Supplement February 15th 2002 p.15. For discussion
on the theory of ‘Enlightened Despotism’ in the 18th Century, see Geoffrey Bruun The Enlightened
Despots (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc, 1967).
12
Juliette makes similar pronouncements, describing the city as a “pit that swallows up all the wealth
of the nation, and thereby impoverishes it”; a place where inequality, “that all-destroying poison,” is
visible everywhere (J: 928). Rousseau, on such grounds, proposed that Paris be destroyed (E: 469).

243
textiles, construction and defence, despite the presence of significant gold deposits on
the island (AV: 288, 289, 329).
Zamism permeates all aspects of life on Tamoé. Zamé, who clearly does not
believe in the principle of separation of church and state, holds that it is “necessary”
to “have a god” in order to maintain control (again, this view is in keeping with the
thought of the 18th Century, in particular that of Voltaire, Rousseau, and the architects
of the Cult of Reason proposed during the French Revolution. People, it was thought,
need a religion; a ‘rational’ religion stripped of dogma is better). 13 Zamé is both the
founder and the high priest of the island’s religion (a combination of rationalist Deism
and solar worship), and leads the entire population in its daily dawn Prayer to the Sun,
at which the following prayer is said: “[y]ou who steer our thoughts, who regulates
our actions, who purifies our hearts, our sentiment, of respect, and love, you inspire”
(AV: 354, 355). He has everyone on the island brought up to regard him as their
father, and to love a deity which is essentially a personification of the established
order (AV: 322). As such, he is both a cult leader and the only personality cult in
Sade’s work.
Censorship on Tamoé is strictly enforced, and all art and entertainment is
subordinate to the interests of the state. All publishing is limited to the necessities of
education and industry, and all theatrical works (some written by Zamé himself) are
written for the purposes of the moral education of the community. 14 Anything more
elaborate, notes Fink, “would stimulate creativity and controversy and thus a desire
for change.” 15 Education, too, is subordinate to the needs of the state. Besides
‘religious’ (that is, cult) indoctrination, Children’s tastes are consciously shaped for
good citizenship at an early age (AV: 361). Writes Fink, “[i]nstruction is purely
factual; there is no teaching of aesthetic, speculative or policy-oriented disciplines.
The child, that is, is educated to understand the system and meet its technical
requirements, not to innovate or make decisions for himself.” 16 Education is also

13
During the Revolution, Sade himself served as an official in the ceremonies of the Cult of Virtue. See
Lever, pp.445-449.
14
One play that is mentioned, written by Zamé himself, deals with the subject of adultery. The function
of the play is not to provide catharsis but to allow the public to see their own guilt (Goulemot’s note;
AV: 359).
15
Fink “Political System” p.503.
16
Fink “Political System” p.509.

244
used to give children the belief that it is to the State, and not to their families, that
allegiance is owed (an idea derived from Rousseau). 17 States Zamé: “it is the state
which feeds the citizens, who raises the children, which treats them, judges them;
which condemns them; and I am nothing other than its first citizen” (AV: 366).
Education in Tamoé, being focused on civic virtue and practical skills, mirrors
education in our own society. To varying degrees, the educational systems of all
modern states emphasise practicality (over the emphasis, in Sade’s day, on such
subjects as Latin and Greek), and civic duty. The emphasis on civic duty is more
explicit in the education systems of, say, South Korea and France than in New
Zealand or Canada, yet even here the values and principles that the State upholds,
such as multiculturalism, are instilled at school. Insofar as it is a society in which
Rousseau’s proposals for educational reform has been implemented, Tamoé is
prophetic. The same could be said of Zamé’s subordination of the family to the
authority of the state. This is a common enough idea in our age, yet, again, a recent
idea that was only officially implemented from the time of the French Revolution.
Now, it is taken for granted in Western- style democracies that the state is the sole
authority in family matters, and that laws of the state have precedence over family
ties. We take it for granted that the State has the power, and the right, to remove
mistreated children from their parents, to take husbands from their wives in order to
serve in the military, and so on. Further, under the ancien régime (under the lettre de
cachet system) one could be imprisoned, not by order of a court of law appointed by
the state, but by the request of a family member. The universal and absolute nature of
state power, now so familiar to us, is only visible at all through the distorting lens of
Sade’s strange ‘utopian’ vision. Insofar as we may regard Zamé’s edicts concerning
eating meat both presumptuous and paternalistic, the same may be said of his laws
concerning civil identity.
Other aspects of Tamoean social engineering are also of note. No health care,
besides the policing of diet and the banishment of the sick from the island, is
provided. Special permission has to be granted to avoid marriage; men are whipped to

17
Rousseau, in The Government of Poland, proposes that infants see nothing but the Fatherland from
the moment of birth, so that their mother’s milk is laced with love for their country. Rousseau
The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, ed, trans., and annotated by Victor Gourevitch
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 189. Quoted in Robert Wokler Rousseau: A very
Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 118-119.

245
recover virility. The unmarried (célibataires) and the “répudiés de l’un et de l’autre
sexe” are housed in a separate part of the island (AV: 364, 367). Adultery is banned,
although divorce is permitted (AV: 283, 365). Sade’s description of the inhabitants of
Tamoé, in terms of ‘race and blood,’ is also consistent with the preoccupation with
social engineering. 18
It is the town planning of Tamoé that betrays its nature as an architectonic of
total power. The whole of the island, as Jean M. Goulemot puts it, is “un système
généralisé de contrôle” (AV: p.837, n.424). The streets and buildings are laid out in a
perfectly circular pattern so that one of Zamé’s representatives is able to observe his
subjects from a central observation point: “…afin que l’œil vigilant du commandant
de la ville pût s’étendre avec moins de peine sur tous les sujets de la contrée” (AV:
368-370). It is, in fact, Bentham’s Panopticon; in contemporary terms, every citizen is
on closed-circuit television. The enforced isolation of the island is also significant.
The citizens are forbidden from leaving (a privilege granted Zamé, but denied
everyone else), and all but military vessels are destroyed to make departure
impossible. There is no interaction with other states, despite the opportunity to trade
with gold. Notes Fink, “[i]solation notably precludes comparisons with other life
styles and thus minimizes the unsettling weighing of alternatives.” 19 Zamé, for an
avowed pacifist, spends a considerable amount of time discussing military
preparedness. He proudly shows off the precision and might of his navy in a mock
battle, and discusses the strict meritocracy of the army, a defence force of 42,000
personnel (a militia of 3,000 soldiers for each of Tamoé’s fourteen towns; AV:314,
326, 330, 329, 370). This is curious, as the island has not been visited by foreigners in
at least sixty years, suggesting that there is an ulterior motive for such militarism. 20 In

18
Although Tamoé is off the coast of New Zealand, Sade describes its inhabitants as white and blond
with blue eyes, wearing European dress and living in European style dwellings, provoking one critic to
suggest that Sade is immune to exoticism. See Yves Giraud, “La ville du bout du monde”: Sade, Aline
et Valcour,” Studi di letteratura Francese 11 (1985):85-100, p.92. Sainville, in describing the women,
states that “en général, le sang est superbe à Tamoé” (AV: 315, 331, 363, 367). This old idea of ‘blood’
being the agency of ‘biological heritage’ reappears elsewhere in the novel. For example, the character
Valcour states that “… le sang de mes ancêtres coule pur dans mes veines” (AV: 676).
19
Fink “Political System”p.508.
20
Zamé states that the island was visited by the French navy at the end of the reign of Louis XIV,
which ended in 1715. Sainville’s travels are contemporary with the third voyage of Cook, 1776 -1779
(AV: 277, 288).

246
Juliette, written two years later (1797), a clear association is made between the
maintenance of authoritarian rule and military readiness. A king is, states Juliette, “to
the body politic as a doctor is to the physical body: you may call him when you are ill,
you must show him to the door once health returns, else he’ll prolong the malady so
as to be of eternal aid, and while pretending to cure, he’ll bide with you to the grave”
(Sade adds in a footnote: “Not until the fatherland was in danger did the Romans
name a dictator” J: 936&n).
The Laws of Tamoé (the bans on ‘controlled substances’ such as meat and
alcohol, censorship, forbidden sexual activity, and so on) are enforced with a range of
punishments. Whilst milder crimes are punished with public humiliation (clearly a
chastisement, or even collective revenge, rather than a ‘correction’), or being forced
to wear specially marked clothes, more serious violations are punished with exile in a
canoe with a week’s provisions- in the middle of the South Pacific Ocean, banned
from returning on pain of death (AV: 325, 344). Another of Zamé’s suggestions- that
murderers are punished according to the economic value of the dead to the community
– shows that individuals are not judged as equal in the eyes of the law (AV:343). 21
The most intriguing aspect of Zamé’s doctrine is his belief that he rules his
kingdom without the use of laws. Laws, he states, are not only unjust but vain- a
spider’s web in which flies are killed and from which the wasps always escape (AV:
337). 22 He also argues that laws create crime : “Plus vous leur offrez de digues, plus

21
Zamé notes that this was the custom of the ancient Francs and Germans. This reflects Sade’s interest
in a return to the ethics of the pre-Christian Europeans, as discussed in the previous chapter.
22
Here Zamé’s discussion matches that of the libertines, who frequently complain that the justice
system is blind, corrupt, or insufficient. These criticisms are made in monologues that typically involve
slips from Bataillian to Benthamite mode and back again. For example, the highwayman Dubois argues
that his crimes are themselves the ‘fault of the law’ rather than his own. He has to kill all the people he
robs, as the punishment for aggravated robbery is death. Yet he observes that murder gives him a
‘pleasurable tickling” (LNJ 1: 85). Similarly, a character in La Nouvelle Justine complains of “absurd
laws” that “prevent me from treating my wife as I see fit,” namely, imprisoning her and drinking her
blood (LNJ 2:168). Other, general comments made concerning the legal system: a man may do many
good things in his life, but will be harshly punished for doing one bad thing; the courts will find guilty
that person that they think is most likely to have committed the crime; people can change their ways;
the justice system punishes those who are ignorant of the law; some laws are patently arbitrary, in
particular the lettre de cachet system; the judges and magistrates are corrupt and hypocritical (AV: 16,
337, 344; MV:21; J:376, 215, 358; LNJ 2:404). Further, the theme of the judge who derives sexual

247
vous leur préparez de plaisir à les rompre ; c’est, comme vous dites, l’infraction seule
qui les amuse ; peut-être ne se plongeraient-ils pas dans cette espèce de mal, s’ils ne le
croyaient défendu ” (AV :340; also 338, 339). 23 His justice system, he declares, is
based on prevention and the ‘hope of correction’ (l’espoir de corriger), on the grounds
that to imprison and punish merely embitters the wrong- doer (AV: 327). 24 Zamé also
assumes (in keeping with Sadeian ontology) that hard determinism is true. The
criminal is merely a “hapless instrument of blind nature”; hence, “perhaps even the
softest law is tyrannic” (AV: 347). He also argues against the death penalty, his
arguments ranging from the well- known (miscarriages of justice cannot be reversed)
to the irrelevant (the execution of criminals originated with Celtic rites; AV: 332, 336).
25
As people cannot be improved through legislation, Zamé holds that they can only
be made compliant through changing their motives, and through examples and
‘compensations.’ He explains this principle to Sainville:

–Voyez cet arbre, poursuivit Zamé, en m’en montrant un dont le tronc était plein de
nœuds; croyez-vous qu’aucun effort puisse jamais redresser cette plante?
–Non.
–Il faut donc la laisser comme elle est ; elle fait nombre et donne de l’ombrage ; usons-en
et ne la regardons pas. Les gens dont vous me parlez sont rares. Ils ne m’inquiètent point ;
j’emploierais le sentiment, la délicatesse et l’honneur avec eux, ces freins seraient plus
sûrs que ceux de la loi. J’essaierais encore de faire changer leur habitude de motifs, l’un
ou l’autre de ces moyens réussirait : croyez-moi mon ami, j’ai trop étudié les hommes
pour ne pas vous répondre qu’il n’est aucune sorte d’erreurs que je ne détourne ou
n’anéantisse, sans jamais employer de punitions corporelles. Ce qui gêne ou moleste le
physique n’est fait que pour les animaux ; l’homme, ayant la raison au-dessus d’eux, ne
doit être conduit que par elle et ce puissant ressort mène à tout, il ne s’agit que de savoir
le manier ( AV:340).

Given that, as noted above, Tamoé has both (by our standards) draconian laws,
and applies harsh punishments to offenders, we have a portrait of a society in which

pleasure from sentencing people to death occurs frequently in Sade’s work (J: 126, 222; 237; 120:363,
531; AV: 334). For commentary see Bongie p. xi.
23
Chigi, the chief of Police in Juliette, makes the same claim (J: 734).
24
This complaint is made in Juliette (J: 730).
25
Many of Sade’s characters argue against the death penalty. Zamé’s case differs, as his arguments are
consistent here with his own ethics (LNJ. 1:152, 153; J: 122 AV: 739).

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the reality of the penal system scarcely matches the official rhetoric of humanistic
values and the principle of ‘correction’ (if not in New Zealand, certainly in other
Western states). Again, Tamoé is uncomfortably similar to contemporary society.
A global reading of Sade’s corpus mitigates against reading the Tamoé episode
as a straightforward expression of political ideology. In particular, the morality of
Tamoé is based entirely on principles that Sade savages elsewhere- namely, the
principle of equality, the undesirability of luxury, and the idea that a commonplace
morality can be derived from nature. The doctrine of enforced equality is taken to an
extreme that would lead to immediate conflict even on Zamé’s own grounds (because,
as Zamé explains, laws simply make more attractive the forbidden, prohibition would
create a black market economy of everything banned, and a desire to simply leave the
island, or perhaps even to mutiny). 26 Zamé, a benevolent philosopher- king, is a
psychological impossibility for Sade (as discussed below, power is closely associated
with its ‘enjoyment,’ and Sade typically warns that the powerful are not to be
trusted). 27 Yet one suspects that he returned from Europe as much a Sadeian as a
Rousseauian. Zamé makes several doctrinal lapses whilst conversing with Sainville,
betraying thoughts that would be catastrophic for his subjects to seriously consider.
For example, he suggests that the same set of rules could not possibly suit everyone,
or that criminals are chained to the “superior laws of nature,” even though the official
doctrine is ostensibly grounded on the same ‘laws of nature’ (AV: 348, 352). These
incongruities are brought to a head as the episode concludes. Sainville informs the
reader that the citizens of Tamoé are “un peuple doux, sensible, vertueux sans lois,
pieux sans religion,” despite clearly having both laws and a state religion, and lacking
the freedom to truly exercise the virtues (AV: 371). Finally, in order to aid Sainville
in his travels, Zamé gifts Sainville with 7,570,000 livres in gold bullion, despite
having claimed to be the equal of his citizens, and to have banned luxury and wealth

26
Given his penchant for marshmallow syrup, roast beef, and only the most expensive rosewater, it is
hard to believe that Sade himself could have considered Tamoé a Utopia. Marquis de Sade Letters from
Prison pp.295, 154, 157, 160-161, 169, 295.
27
This may not necessarily be an indication of actual parody, given that, throughout the novel,
characters frequently adopt theoretical points of view that do not cohere with their behaviour. Léonore
is both a good Christian and a devout atheist, for example (AV: 570, n. 587). For discussion, see Pierre
Favre Sade utopiste : sexualité, pouvoir et état dans le roman “Aline et Valcour” (Paris : Presses
universitaires de France, 1967).

249
from the island (AV: 375). Again, he grants to himself, and to his guest, that which is
denied his subjects. 28
Tamoé was not, in fact, intended to be read in isolation. As noted above, it
makes up one half of a diptych, the other wing being the Kingdom of Batua. Le Brun
and Roger note that in both Aline et Valcour (with regards to political doctrine) and
the 120 Days of Sodom (with regards to sexual ‘penchants’) the author invites the
reader to choose their favourite position from within the text. Sade states, in the
introduction to Aline et Valcour: “the wiser reader should amuse or occupy himself
with the different political systems presented, whether for or against, and adopt those
which best promote his ideas or inclinations (AV: 46, also 120:254).” 29
Batua is a Kingdom somewhere on the West Coast of Africa, with a population
of 30,000. Like Tamoé, Batua is ruled by an absolute monarch, Ben Mâacoro.
The kingdom is essentially Minski’s Castle on a larger scale- a totalitarian sexual
utopia for one- and makes as little sociological sense. Principal economic products are
maize, monkey meat, human flesh and the trade in sex slaves (AV: 257, 258). Political
control is maintained through brute force, rather than the finely calibrated system of
indoctrination of Tamoé (AV: 236, 238). Writes Fink: “... [b]rainwashing is
accomplished by a priestly class which, in exchange for social privileges, inculcates in
the inhabitants the principles of superstition, fear and contempt for others.” 30 Only
women perform any function besides the role of King or Village Chief, making up all
of the country’s labourers, sex slaves, or soldiers (the only functions Sade lists). Yet
they are taught to be absolutely submissive to men, and are locked up, punished, or
condemned to death for the least misdemeanour, or sacrificed to the Cult of the
Serpent, despite the fact that, bizarrely, they hold all the arms and do all the
productive labour (AV:223, 248). Women are also considered lowly whilst pregnant,

28
The sum is so vast that Sainville can buy a new vessel and have it fully crewed without making a
dent in his fortune, and the sum of gold he carries causes him serious legal problems upon arrival in
Europe. On the continuity of socioeconomic elites in Sade’s work, see Michel Delon “Sade
Thermidorien” p.107.
29
Le Brun Sudden Abyss pp. 106, 108-109 ; Roger “ La trace de Fénelon” pp.165, 167.
30
Beatrice Fink “Political System”p.508 See also Shelby Spruell “The Marquis de Sade- Pornography
or Political Protest?,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History 9
(1982):238-249.

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and, if the King’s concubines, are killed if made pregnant by the King- customs in
keeping with the ‘will towards sterility’ outlined in Chapter IV. 31
Upon arrival in Batua, Sainville meets Sarmiento, a Portuguese expatriate,
whose function is to ‘inspect’ ‘pleasure objects’(that is, women for the harem) for the
delectation of the King (AV:239, 272, 274). Sarmiento’s philosophy- which is that of
his adopted home- is of a piece with that of other libertines. Sarmiento speaks of the
same ontology and reductionist psychology – of “violent irritations” and “shocks of
the atoms” as the Libertines (AV: 240, 264). Likewise, he denies free will, and blames
his acts on his ‘natural despotism,’ concluding, in classic Sadeian style, “j’ai trouvé le
bonheur dans mes systèmes, et n’y ai jamais connu le remords” (AV: 243). Sarmiento
argues that, as destruction is natural, and that man’s nature leads him to destruction,
war is not criminal. 32 He argues that the weak are created by Nature to be dominated,
and that crime does not exist. When Sainville criticizes the trade in black slaves,
Sarmiento replies that the very fact that they were enslaved at all proves their natural
inferiority. 33
Direct comparison of Batua and Tamoé is revealing, and perhaps discloses
Sade’s intentions. Zamé is the weakest philosophe character in all of Sade’s surviving
works. Unlike the likes of Juliette or Clairwil, Zamé never discusses the actual
premises of his doctrine- rather, he imposes the doctrine of equality and mediocrity
onto the people, and presents the aberrant individual with the threat of a certain death
in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. Further, every point he makes is countered
somewhere else in the novel. 34 His dialogue is also one- sided, lacking the back-and-
forth of the discussion between Sainville and Sarmiento that immediately precedes it.
Zamé is deeply inconsistent, in sharp contrast to the frequently unassailable logic of
the lone-wolf libertines such as Minski. The two figures have theoretical
31
Accordingly, Sarmiento argues that Nature merely tolerates reproduction (AV: 254).
32
D.N. Beach “The Marquis de Sade: First Zimbabwean Novelist,” Zambezia VIII (i) (1980): 53-6,
pp.56, 58.
33
Beach p.58. This is more or less Aristotle’s argument in the Politics, Aristotle The Politics, ed. S.
Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) Book I, chapters iii-vii. For discussion on
Greek philosophical views on slavery, see Stephen L. Esquith, and Nicholas D. Smith (1998).
“Slavery,” In E. Craig, ed, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge). Retrieved
November 17, 2004, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/S055SECT1.
34
The importance of the market for luxury goods to the economy is discussed later in the novel (AV:
643).

251
commonalities. Neither Sarmiento nor Zamé believe in free will, or accept normative
notions of ethics or justice. Both Zamé and Ben Mâacoro use religious indoctrination
to maintain power (AV: 260), and both societies are monolithic, as opposed to open,
societies. Neither trusts their citizens to follow instructions without either thorough
indoctrination, constant surveillance, or the direct threat of punishment, and neither
assume that the citizens will simply see the reasonableness of their legislation. Zamé
holds to the principle of equality and respect for all, Ben Mâacoro does not. More
importantly, power in Batua is visible and crude, its relationship plainly linked to
brute force, whereas, on Tamoé, it is invisible but meticulously organized.
Reading the Tamoé and Batua episodes in a literal way- that is, as a political
proposal or manifesto, may not be the most profitable approach. A great deal of
thought went into Tamoé, but apparently more thought went into the planning of the
ultimate micromanaged state than into political doctrine as such. With regards to
Tamoé, Fink writes:

The hallmark of a serious political philosophy, whether analytical or normative, is a

preoccupation with the phenomenon of power in society: its origins, magnitude,
distribution, limitation, validation etc. Immediately we are confronted with the fact that
Sade’s writings demonstrate an almost ubiquitous concern with the concept of power and
its ethical validation, use and consequences at the level of interpersonal and intergroup
relationships. 35

Whether Tamoé and Batua are to be read as satires (Tamoé, as one of revolution, Ben
Mâacoro’s Batua, as Fink suggests, as a parody of the absolute Monarchy) is
unclear. 36 What can be ruled out is the reading of either as being a positive political
treatise, or even as an open- ended smorgasbord: there are only two options offered:
Darfur or North Korea. If Aline et Valcour was intended as a straightforward
statement of Sade’s political views, the overall picture is one of utter hopelessness. 37

35
Fink “Political System” p.494.
36
Ibid. p.500.
37
Unsurprisingly, no critic who has carefully read Sade as a political theorist has given him a positive
reception. Giraud takes Aline et Valcour to be a confession of absolute political pessimism that secretes
“boredom, uniformity and general anaesthesia.” Giraud “La ville du bout du monde,” p.100. Roger G.
Lacombe notes sardonically that Sade seems more concerned with discussing punishments to be meted

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Fink’s approach-according to which Sade’s political thought concerns the “tools and
mechanics of psychological conditioning and control”- appears to be the most fruitful
one, and will be returned to below. 38

7.3 How to Philosophize with a Brick in the Face.

The pamphlet Yet Another Effort ( Encore un effort) is the only surviving text by Sade
that both resembles a political tract, and was not written as part of his official duties as
a revolutionary. Encore un effort loosely follows the format of a political pamphlet of
the revolutionary period, and is the only extended and argumentative political
discourse in Sade’s work that is not an explicit defence of authoritarianism. The text
utilizes the slogans and ideals of the Revolution, and is ostensibly in favour of
Rousseauian or Benthamite principles –Equality and Happiness. The author states that
‘liberty and equality’ are the basis of society, and that our ‘reciprocal obligations’ are
prescribed by humanity, fraternity, and benevolence (PB: 307,308). With regards to
education reform, Sade writes: “get promptly to the task of training the youth, it must
be amongst your most important concerns...rather than fatigue your children’s young
organs with deific stupidities, replace them with excellent social principles...let them
be instructed in their duties toward society; train them to cherish the virtues...make
them sense that this [individual] happiness consists in rendering others as fortunate as
we desire to be ourselves ”(PB:303). The text concludes: “...the laws we promulgate
have, as ends, nothing but the citizen’s tranquillity, his happiness, and the glory of the
republic” (338). As the text progresses, however, it becomes increasingly clear that
the author is committed to neither liberty, equality, nor the advocacy of reciprocal
obligations. As discussed in Chapter VI, the pamphlet proposes that both Christianity
and its moral code are eliminated. The author rejects the principle of duty to other
people: “[t]his absurd morality [that] tells us to love our neighbours as ourselves”
(309). (Similarly, in Juliette, Sade expresses scepticism with regards to the ideological
integrity of the Revolution, accusing its supporters of rejecting God but retaining
essentially religious ideals and principles). 39 Whether Sade is suggesting that a). the

out than a call for class struggle. Lacombe Sade et ses masques pp.141, 149, 157. See also Michel
Delon “Sade dans la Révolution” p.158; Philippe Roger “La Trace Fénelon” p.160.
38
Fink “Political System”p.510.
39
“And what goes beyond all understanding is that the Jacobins of the French Revolution wanted to
smash the altars of a God who spoke precisely their own language. Yet more extraordinarily, they who

253
French Revolution has not gone far enough in eliminating the very morality of
Christianity or, perhaps b). the Revolutionaries have not understood what the return to
Rome entails, is not clear.
Also discussed above (in Chapter IV) is the proposal for the establishment of
brothels, which conflates Benthamite and Bataillian principles. Sade asserts that there
is a relevant distinction between the excesses of existing political institutions and
those of the libertines; the distinction Sade makes between “l’absurde despotisme
politique” and the “très luxurieux despotisme des passions de libertinage” (the ‘absurd
political despotism’ and the ‘luxurious despotism of the passions of libertinage’):

The poverty of the French language compels us to employ words which, today, our happy
government, with so much good sense, disfavours; we hope our enlightened readers will
understand us well and will not at all confound absurd political despotism with the very
delightful despotism of libertinage’s passions” (PB:344,fn).

As discussed, the brothel system is essentially an apparatus of the state, established to

bribe the libertines with sex slaves, so that they do not interfere with official power.
This assumes that the libertines have the means to upset official power. Therefore, as
a). the libertines themselves are very powerful, and b). ‘private’ despotism as
exercised in the state brothels is in fact sponsored by the state, the distinction between
private and public despotism is problematic. The sex slaves are essentially pawns in
an economy between two rival powers. Insofar as Sade himself rejects all authority as
equally illegitimate, describes his libertines, frequently, as political figures, and
associates all libertinage as actualized by socioeconomic privilege, it is not possible to
make such a distinction between private and public despotism. 40
There is also a clash between the authoritarianism and the anarchic aspects of
Encore un effort. The author rejects the death penalty as “cruel and inhuman,” yet
calls for the systematic killing of the handicapped and therefore “unfit to live” (PB:
310, 335-336). Robbery and slander is defended, and the punishment of being robbed

detest and want to destroy the Jacobins act in the name of a God who speaks like the Jacobins. If this
isn’t the ne plus ultra of human folly, I ask you where it is to be found” (Supplementary note; J: 749).
40
Several critics have mentioned this distinction without directly addressing its basic untenability, for
example Chantal Thomas “Isabelle de Bavière: Dernier heroine de Sade” in Camus and Roger, ed.,
Sade, écrire la crise 47-66:56; Michel Delon “Sade Thermidorien” p.110; Mengue L’ordre
Sadien p.256.

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is proposed (305,314); yet the text also proposes the preparation of the entire state for
war, the elimination of the nuclear family (as a rival source of authority to the State),
life imprisonment for clergymen, and (unspecified) punishment for those that resist
rape in the state brothels (PB: 314, 306, 318-319, 322, 334). 41
There are two further, dizzying, conflations. On the one hand, Sade argues in the
terms of his own core ontological assumptions. On the grounds of his rejection of free
will, he rejects the principle of laws that are equally applicable to all (PB: 310). 42 On
the grounds of his ontology (according to which the lives of humans are trivial),
murder is not a crime; on the grounds of (a cynical abuse of the) principle of self
defence, it is a political necessity (PB: 330-335). Yet, finally, Sade condemns the
Revolution as a crime of metaphysical proportions- the murder of the very concept of
Law (note the conservatism here- there is no higher morality or ideology that
transcends that of the ancien régime, and its anchor- point- the life and body of the
King). 43

41
Sade reasons that, if the slander is an exaggeration, it may yet reveal ugly truths about the person
slandered. If it is unfair, the person will work all the harder to show that he is virtuous.
42
This appears to be a non sequitur- if there is no free will for anyone, there ought to be the same
regulatory principles applied to all. If some are incapable of exercising judgement, one simply
recognizes a category of people who should be withdrawn from circulation.
43
Sade himself, in particular in the earlier works such as Dialogue between a Priest and a Dying Man
(1782), shows a marked conservatism. This conservatism does not concern this study, as is not
supported by any doctrinal standpoint in Sade’s work (although, of course, it has a vague resemblance
to the Aristocratic principle). In the Dialogue, the ‘dying man’ states: “I forgive all errors save those
which may imperil the government under which we live; kings and their majesty are the only things
that I take on trust and respect.” He goes on to state that “The man who does not love country and his
king does not deserve to live” (MV: 157). Sade’s nostalgia for the old order is also expresses disdain for
the ‘immorality’ of the emergent bourgeois class, and repeated statements to the effect that feudalism is
necessary for cultural flourishing (L N J 2:225; J:116, fn.).
Writes David Coward, “Sade’s pre- Revolutionary political views reflect a mixture of patrician
conservatism and the progressive values of the Enlightenment. Like many of the old nobility, he
resented the erosion of aristocratic power and privilege which had been the centralizing monarchy’s
policy since the time of Richelieu; yet at the same time he was opposed to the excesses of the old
feudal tyranny” (MV: 282). Even Aline et Valcour, the most ‘socialist’ of Sade’s works, contains
passages that suggest this; in a critique of the virtue of charity, beggars are described by a central
character as “vermin” who are “sure of a living at the expense of dupes;” and the hero of the novel (an
aristocrat, who has a butler) insults a rival by stating that “mon valet demain peut être votre égal.”
(“tomorrow my servant may be your equal”; AV: 642; 673).

255
 Sade argues that the revolution, to follow its trajectory to the bitter end, requires
the end of law: “Is it though that goal [the progress of our age] will be attained when
at last we have been given laws?” (296). He goes on to describe the newly established
Republic as an institution grounded upon and dependent on criminality, and its
victims, the Aristocrats, as “honourable suicides” (PB: 338). Murder, Sade reasons,
can no longer be regarded as a crime, asking rhetorically “[i]s it not by murders that
France is free today?” (PB: 332). Republican France, having made a complete break
with the laws of the ancien régime, is taken to be addicted to ferocity and
‘dynamism.’ In keeping with Sade’s reductionist ontology, he argues that crimes are
necessary to politics as the ‘political organism’ is essentially plant-like. The
Republic, he states, is essentially criminal; and crime is associated with vigour and
health, stating, “[w]hat happens to the tree you transplant from a soil full of vigour to
a dry and sandy plain? All intellectual ideas are so greatly subordinate to Nature’s
physical aspect that the comparisons supplied us by agriculture will never deceive us
in morals” (PB: 333).
Encore un effort is too problematic to be treated as a straightforwardly
revolutionary tract, or even a parody of one- its lattice of contradictions protect it from
instrumentalization to any particular doctrine. Literal philosophical analysis may
simply be inappropriate. Scrambling the jabbering of all available discourses, text is
deployed in the service of Nothing and No-One.

7.4 Anarchy
Given Sade’s endless tirades against everything that stands, it is understandable that
he has been read as an exponent of anarchy. Yet, as my discussion has, to some
extent, already shown, this is not the principled anarchy of theorists such as Pëtr
Kropotkin. 44 As noted in Chapter V, Sade’s libertines are dependant upon power
structures as tools of domination, and they require a concentration of power, not its
dissipation. It is, therefore, particularly problematic to simultaneously praise Sade’s
libertin doctrine and (what is taken for) Sade’s call for radical overthrow of the very
political and economic structures that enable libertine activities. Where Sade’s
44
Jacques Broche, for example, considers Sade as endorsing an absolute freedom that calls for a
complete destruction of all sources of authority, stating that the “employment of liberty involves the
complete abolition of all forms of power.”Jacques Broche “Sade ou le langage terroriste,” La Petite
revue de philosophie 2, (spring 1981):25-36, p.34.

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characters call for anarchy, it is necessary to identify what principles, if any, are
behind such calls.
The libertines hold that personal and general interest are incompatible. Dolmancé,
in Philosophy in the Bedroom, states:

...laws, being forged for universal application, are in perpetual conflict with personal
interest. Good for society, our laws are very bad for the individuals whereof it is
composed; for, if they one time protect the individual, they hinder, trouble, fetter him for
three quarters of his life; and so the wise man, the man full of contempt for them, will be
wary of them, as he is of reptiles and vipers which, although they wound or kill, are
nevertheless sometimes useful to medicine; he will safeguard himself against the laws as
he would against noxious beasts; he will shelter himself behind precautions, behind
mysteries, the which,[sic], for prudence, is easily done (Il s’en mettra l’abri par des
precautions, par des mystères, toutes choses faciles à la richesse et à la prudence) (PB:
287-288; ΠVol. III:102-103; similar J:176).

So long as the laws are well formulated and simply prevent harm inflicted upon
others, they serve to ‘regulate desires’ (as with the rules of the Sodality of the Friends
of Crime). As Clairwil – of all people– observes: “it is the duty of every society to
eliminate from its midst such elements whose conduct may be prejudicial to the
community; and this justifies a quantity of laws which, when viewed alone from the
standpoint of the individual’s self- interest, might appear monstrously unjust” (J:
377). Dolmancé also appears to make a false dichotomy, insofar as he does not
recognize that the interests of a society is assembled of individuals (there is no such
false dichotomy, however, if he simply accepts the Bataille doctrine, and actually
believes that the ban on homicide is against his ‘personal interest’). Other discussions
in favour of anarchy in Sade tend to conflate the Bataillian and Benthamite doctrines.
From Encore un effort:

Cruelty is natural. All of us are born furnished with a dose of cruelty education later
modifies; but education does not belong to nature, and is as deforming to Nature’s sacred
effects as arboriculture is to trees. In your orchards compare the tree abandoned to
Nature’s ministry with the other your art cares for, and you will see which is the more
beautiful, you will discover from which you will pluck the superior fruit.
Cruelty is simply the energy in a man civilization has not yet altogether corrupted:
therefore it is a virtue, not a vice. Repeal your laws, do away with your constraints, your
chastisements, your habits, and cruelty will have dangerous effects no more, since it will

257
 never manifest itself save when it meets with resistance, and then the collision will always
be between competing cruelties; it is in the civilized state cruelty is dangerous, because
the assaulted person nearly always lacks the force or the means to repel injury; but in the
state of uncivilization [d’incivilisation ] , if cruelty’s target is strong, he will repulse
cruelty; and if the person attacked is weak, why, the case here is merely that of assault
upon one of those persons whom Nature’s law prescribes to yield to the strong-‘tis all
one, and why seek trouble where there is none? (PB: 253-254; ΠVol. III: 69; similar: J:
1120).

The first half of this paragraph is in keeping with the Bataille doctrine. Cruelty is
natural and ‘sacred’ (note the inversion of Rousseau here), and is merely an
expression of man’s innate ‘energy,’ which has been corrupted by the influence of
civilization. The release of energy through cruelty is considered beneficial here,
although Sade does not explain how, and his fruit-tree metaphor is vague (in any case,
the metaphor is poorly chosen; pruned trees, as with all domesticated organisms, are
of course vastly superior sources of food to their wild varieties). In giving a
straightforwardly Utilitarian justification for anarchy, Sade switches back to
Benthamite mode. He argues that laws are undesirable, as they create a situation
where the cruelty of official power is dangerously powerful (similarly, Chigi argues:
“I’d rather be oppressed by my neighbour who I can oppress in my turn than to be
oppressed by the law before which I am helpless”; J: 732). All justice would
therefore be vigilante justice (which is in fact criticized by Sade in the tale Émilie de
Tourville {1787}; MV: 203).
The view that civilization creates ‘excessive’ cruelty (which is a category that
Sade, in Bataille mode, cannot recognize) contradicts the previous claim that
civilization (and its prohibitions of open cruelty) corrupts our ‘natural cruelty.’ The
passage above also assumes some ‘hydraulic’ theory of criminality; that is, ‘cruelty’ is
said to only manifest itself when pressure is exerted by prohibition, which, again, does
not fit with Sade’s own psychology of pleasure (as discussed in Chapter III). Further,
as with any advocacy of anarchy, it is assumed here that a state of ‘incivilization’ is
even possible. In any case, by the end of the passage, it is clear that Anarchy is not
really being advocated at all, but an intensification of power relationships, validated in
accordance with ‘Nature’s Law’ of the Strong.
Similar passages in Juliette only continue this doctrinal conflict. Juliette argues
that universal anarchy will simply open wide “the door to every sort of horror” (J:

258
733). Chigi responds with the Benthamite principle: “crime is...not a plague in the
world since, although rendering half the world’s population unhappy, it renders the
other half very unhappy indeed” (J: 734; similar: PB: 313). Conceding that this might
not actually be the case, he insists that general anarchy will always be less dangerous
than a country ruled by the corrupt, even if “without laws the world turns onto one
great volcano belching forth an uninterrupted spew of execrable crimes” (J:733). The
only options on offer, it is assumed, are a deeply corrupt political order,
indistinguishable, in fact, from organized crime, or a world in flames. We have here a
fusion of utter despair, contempt for humanity, and the desire for destruction- not so
much a political principle as a wish to see the whole ant heap dowsed in kerosene.
Sade’s minimal claim- that pure anarchy is not as dangerous as corrupt, inept or
immoral government- cannot be dismissed out of hand, and the view that civilization
has actually made men crueller than hitherto has been considered by Hinckfuss,
Baumeister and others. 45 Yet pure anarchy is not, for Sade’s characters, either a
desirable state or a political possibility. Simply put, Sade is too pessimistic to
advocate anarchy.

7.5 the Pleasure of Control.

The despotic form of political power is a logical outcome of the Sadeian
principles discussed in the preceding chapters, in particular its a-moral principles and
psychological assumptions. 46 Sade frequently criticizes the ‘tyranny’ of the many

45
For discussion, see Baumeister p.381. Ian Hinckfuss notes that the ‘state of nature’ was quite
possibly preferable to modern civilization. He notes in particular “The massacre of the moral Catholic
highlanders by the moral Protestants at Culloden and its aftermath, the genocide of the peaceful and
hospitable stone-age Tasmanians by people from moral Britain, the mutual slaughter of all those dutiful
men on the Somme and on the Russian front in World War I, the morally sanctioned slaughter in World
War II, especially in the area bombing of Hamburg, London, Coventry, Cologne, Dresden, Tokyo,
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the subsequent slaughter in Korea, Vietnam, Northern Ireland and the
Middle East all of this among people the great majority of whom wanted above all to be good and who
did not want to be bad. If life in a ‘state of nature’ was less secure than this, things must have been very
exciting indeed for our stone-age ancestors.” Hinckfuss p.29.
46
The definitive work on this topic- the relationship between Sade’s philosophy and its relationship to
‘totalitarianism’ is that by Svein- Eirik Fauskevåg, Sade ou la tentation totalitaire : Etude sur
l’anthropologie littéraire dans La Nouvelle Justine et l’Histoire de Juliette (Paris : Honoré champion
éditeur, 2001).

259
over the interests of the individual, but his characters frequently affirm the opposite-
the tyranny of the minority over the many. Though despotism is occasionally
denounced in the libertine novels, these denunciations are highly ambiguous. 47 The
powerful libertines (Braschi, Catherine the Great, the King of Naples, Minister Saint-
Fond) regard statecraft purely as a means of maintaining power for sake of personal
pleasure; every other libertine (in particular Juliette) is either a satellite of the more
powerful, or (like Minski) has complete control over a smaller, more tightly
controlled population, such as a prison or convent.
Sade’s despots dictate according to five distinct principles. The first, grounded
on Sade’s theory of pleasure, is simply that one’s own happiness takes precedence
over the welfare of the subject population. States Saint- Fond: “[a] contemptible fool,
that statesman who neglects the State finance his pleasures; and if the masses go
hungry, or if the nation goes naked, what do we care so long as our passions are
satisfied? Mine entail inordinate spending; if I thought gold flowed in their veins, I’d
have every one of the people bled to death” (J: 234).
The second principle holds that power itself is pleasurable. the more power-
hence, the more pleasure, the better. For Sade, this means domination and
exploitation. 48 As Fauskevåg notes, what this amounts to is little more than the
elevation of egoism to the level of political ideology; the elevation of individual
whims to the status of absolute ideals. 49 Intellect, power, and money are considered

47
Fauskevåg p.128. Juliette gives a lengthy political and economic critique of Naples for the benefit of
its King, specifically noting the “all-destroying poison” of economic inequality, and the extravagance
of the people. Yet Juliette arrives at the King’s palace in a six-horse coach, the equivalent of a stretch
limousine. The discourse ends with an orgy, during which the King casually strangles a page (J: 924-
941).
48
This view was common amongst the philosophes. Rousseau feared that even he himself would
succumb to the pleasures of power, given the chance: “I have a hundred times thought with terror that
if I had the misfortune today of filling a particular position in a certain country, tomorrow I would
almost inevitably be a tyrant, an extortionist, a destroyer of the people, and a source of harm to the
prince; due to my situation I would be an enemy of all humanity, of all equity, of every sort of value….
if I were rich [I would be] a disdainful spectator of the miseries of the rabble.” (E: 344; see also 224,
SC: 30-33.). Helvétius held the same view. See Helvétius A Treatise on Man: Vol. II p.126. What is
remarkable is that both Helvétius and Rousseau proposed political systems that required technocrats or
law-givers that were not prone to such human failings.
49
Fauskevåg pp.10, 60.

260
as the three interchangeable elements of Libertine economics. To be a libertine
requires the inclinations and means to follow one’s impulses, and “[a] man with much
intellect, much power or much money cannot possibly amuse himself the way
everybody else does” (J: 940). A very specific pleasure recurs frequently in Sade- the
pleasure of total mobilization of others into a single coordinated spectacle, whether of
order, as in a military parade, or destruction, as in the case of the Roman Circus.
Even King Zamé follows this pattern, showing off the orderliness and perfection of
his state by preparing a number of spectacles for his guests- a staged naval battle, a
musical performance, and a display of the ‘blood stock’ of the islanders :“Fifty of the
most beautiful girls brought together for inspection” (AV:351).
The third principle is the view that all others are hostile forces, hence validating
harsh treatment of non-members of one’s own group. This is continuous with Sade’s
ethical thought, as discussed in Chapter V. Democracy is held to be impossible, as the
people are held to be too corrupt or foolish to rule themselves; the only way of
controlling them being to keep them in total subjugation. 50 As politics is merely the
enslavement and destruction of the weak at the hands of the strong, the only means of
survival is to become powerful-which is only possible through means antithetical to
morality. 51 We may speak here of a doctrine which is not truly political at all, but
merely a method of survival- of survivalist alienation. 52 Minister Saint- Fond explains
this to Juliette:

… in a totally corrupt world there is never any danger being more rotten than one’s
neighbors; rather, ‘tis there to assure oneself of the whole sum of felicity and ease which
virtue would procure us in a moral society. But the mechanism that directs government
cannot be virtuous, because it is impossible to thwart every crime, to protect oneself from
every criminal without being criminal too; that which directs corrupt mankind must be
corrupt itself, and it will never be by means of virtue, virtue being inert and passive, that
you will maintain control over vice, which is ever active: the governor must be more
energetic than the governed: well, if the energy of the governed simply amounts to so

50
Michel Delon “Sade Thermidorien” p.107.
51
“Human society”, wrote Rousseau, “contemplated with a tranquil and disinterested eye [,] appears at
first to display only the violence of powerful men and the oppression of the weak” (SC: 21).
52
I thank Amanda Lennon for this term.

261
 many crimes threatening to be unleashed, how can you expect the energy of the governor
to be anything different? (J: 480). 53

The fourth principle is simply that of the Bataille principle- the attainment of
absolute mastery over the weak is in accordance to the ‘laws of nature.’ The suffering
of the poor is described as being in accordance with a “law of nature” and “useful to
the general plan,” and that they were created to serve the rich (LNJ 1: p. 90; 2: 286,
389, 391). In accordance with this distinction between ‘natural masters’ and ‘natural
slaves,’ the subjects of political control are reduced to a faceless mass, or to the
categories of the natural sciences. 54 The libertines frequently describe their subjects as
“polluting vermin, ” “dangerous animals,” “common excrement” or “scum thrown up
by nature, ” fit only to be thrown to the lions “comme on faisait des chrétiens,
autrefois, à Rome” (LNJ 2: 224, 368, 392-395).
The fifth principle is that terrible things must be done for the sake of the greater
good, or glory, of the State. This principle is only offered in discussing mass murder,
whether Catholics, peasants or the handicapped. Sade’s characters, for example,
suggest that feudal law is superior as it is the best for the grandeur and prosperity of
the state (again, “à l’exemple de Rome”), LNJ 1: 295; 2:225), and use the language of
medicine to justify bloodshed: “[b]lâmeriez-vous un homme surchargé d’humeurs qui
prendrait une médicine, pour se rendre plus dispos et plus sain? C’est absolument la
même chose.” (LNJ 2:392; also J: 726).
Whilst not appearing to be a positive contribution to political thought as such,
Sade’s pencil-sketch of a political doctrine is interesting, nevertheless, and for the
same reason as to why his counter-ethics is interesting. It is an attempt to express the
doctrine of a resolutely despotic regime as honestly as possible, hence revealing its
key assumptions.

53
Note also the association of virtue with weakness, and crime with energy.
54
For discussion, see Fauskevåg p.121, 136-141.

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7.6 Despotism Without Tears

One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes the
revolution in order to establish the dictatorship. The object of persecution is persecution.
The object of power is power.
George Orwell Nineteen Eighty-Four 55

“I think and discourse like Hobbes and Montesquieu” Juliette tells Ferdinand,
King of Naples (Ferdinand IV, 1751-1825) during one of her lectures. But she does
not discourse like Hobbes or Montesquieu. Rather, she and her libertine accomplices
are preoccupied with maintaining political power. Their understanding of politics, as
method and theory, is essentially a methodology of total control and domination of the
masses for their own ends. Juliette continues: “…it is not despotism I forbid you, I am
too familiar with its charms to deny it to you; I simply advise the suppression or the
rectification of whatever jeopardises or interferes with the maintenance of this
despotism, if it is upon the throne you choose to stay” (J:934). Fauskevåg, following
Hannah Arendt, notes that Sade’s work explores a number of methods typical of
totalitarian regimes, in particular the use of isolation, propaganda, terror, and secrecy.
56
I will largely follow Fauskevåg’s exposition.
Firstly, Sade advises that all rival sources of authority or power be either
neutralized or instrumentalized to one’s own ends. Both options are suggested with
regards to organized religion. Clairwil sees the church entirely as a rival source of
authority, and advises Prince Ferdinand accordingly: “atheize and incessantly
demoralize the people whom you wish to subjugate, so long as they cringe before no
god but you, so long as there are no morals except yours, you will always be their
sovereign” (J :971). Zamé, as noted above, and Madame Delbène are more moderate;
Delbène noting that the “revolting dogmas” of Christianity are “indispensable to those
who have taken upon themselves the chore of infecting public opinion” (J:48). On the
same grounds, the obliteration of the nuclear family and the collectivising of child

55
Orwell p.276.
56
Fauskevåg pp.105-.109.

263
rearing, is recommended by Zamé and the author of “Yet Another Effort” alike (PB:
322; AV: 317, 364). 57
Secondly, Sade recommends the maintenance of a false front. Power is always
associated with secrecy, which is in turn associated with isolation. 58 Absolute
remoteness from the common people is also recommended. As Saint-Fond says to
Juliette, “ do not forget that if the kings are beginning to lose their credit in Europe,
it’s the vulgarity they’ve become attainted with that has been their downfall; had they
remained aloof and invisible like the sovereigns of Asia, the whole world would yet
tremble at the sound of their names” (J:316). Propaganda is also recommended.
“Errors are necessary to us,” states Braschi (Pope Pius VI, who is, of course, both the
Pope and an atheist), adding that “it does not follow that we must deceive ourselves”
(J: 677). Braschi explains the principle of propaganda, the art of making “pygmies
appear to be giants”: “The foremost preoccupation of man and of the statesman…is to
penetrate others without letting his own thoughts be known” (J: 480, 759). 59
Philosophers, for the character Francavilla, are left with the authority only to
promulgate the interests of the government- that is- philosophers are to be employed
as propagandists (J: 969). 60 One of the most disorientating passages in Sade concerns
a proposal to incorporate the libertine text into the machinery of social control. Saint-
Fond, in a monologue on despotism, proposes the dissemination of works that
promote ‘loose morals’ in order to flush out dissenting voices, in exactly the same
manner as Mao Tse-Tung’s ‘Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom’ campaign. When the
‘weak’ are encouraged to break their bonds, the strong “will find instruction therein
upon how to load further and heavier chains upon the captive masses” (J: 319). In
keeping with the need to disseminate untruths, education is regarded as a threat to
power by the libertines of Juliette, or as a carefully managed tool of thought control,
57
For discussion see Fauskevåg: 110. This proposal reflects the social engineering proposals of
Helvétius (A Treatise on Man p.138).
58
On this point, Fauskevåg notes Hannah Arendt’s observation that secrecy is “the beginning of real
power.” Hannah Arendt Le système totalitaire, traduit de l’américain par Jean- Loup Bourget, Robert
Davreu et Patrick Lévi. (Paris : France Loisirs, 1989) p.181.Quoted in Fauskevåg p.116.
59
For discussion, see Fauskevåg p.130.
60
La Mettrie gives the same proposal, writing: “Use the force of specious arguments to prop up their
tottering faith, bring their weak genius, by the force of your own, down to the level of your own, down
to the level of their father’s religion and, like our sacred Josses [editor’s note- A character in Molière’s
Amour médicin] lend the most revolting absurdities an appearance of plausibility.” La Mettrie p.169.

264
as on Tamoé (J: 321; AV: 361). Further, various economic measures are also
suggested in order to maintain control over the populace. On the one hand, Juliette
proposes the encouragement of ‘enfeebling debauchery’ in order to keep the
populace’s minds from considering political matters, on the grounds that “human
beings cease to be observant when they are happy” (J: 320, 934). 61 On the other,
Saint –Fond recommends the perpetuation of grinding poverty and economic
inequality. Saint –Fond explains: “[t]he common herd will be kept in a state of
subservience, or prostate bondage, which will render them powerless even to strike
for, let alone attain to, domination, or to encroach upon or debase the prerogatives of
the rich. Tied to the glebe as in olden days, the people will be held like any other
property, and, like it, will be subject to all the various mutations of value and
ownership” (J:321). Clairwil advises Ferdinand:

…their slavery must be perpetual and grinding, and every possible means of escape
from it must be denied them, as will assuredly be the case when the figures who support
and surround the government are there to prevent the people from breaking loose from
irons which it is in the upper class’ interests to tighten day and night. You cannot
imagine how far such tyranny is able to extend (J: 970-971).

Finally, Sade’s characters recommends state terrorism and mass killing as a political
tool; of “cementing the throne of the sovereign” through bloodshed (LNJ 1:300).
Sade’s explanation never goes beyond stating that population control is necessary,
hence, the necessity of killing people en masse. 62 In The Misfortunes of Virtue the
character Monsieur Dubourg states, “France has more citizens than it needs. The
government sees everything in broad terms and is not overly concerned with

61
Helvétius had made the same point, which is somewhat ironic, given that his own utopian proposals
involved rewarding loyal citizens with brothel passes. He writes of Venice: “Who but an ignorant and
voluptuous people could support the yoke of an aristocratic despotism? This the government knows,
and encourages it subjects to debauchery: it offers them at once fetters and pleasures: they accept the
one for the other; and, in their base souls, the love of luxury always outweighs that of liberty. The
Venetian is nothing better than a swine, that is nourished by his master, for his use, and is kept in a
stable, where he is suffered to wallow in the mire.” Helvétius Treatise on Man Vol. II p.74.
62
This goes against the advice Juliette gives Ferdinand, King of Naples: “[w]hen they weary of you,
they’ll turn the guns against your castle” (J: 935).

265
individuals provided that the machinery runs smoothly overall” (MV: 15; similar: J:
577). 63 Clairwil advises Ferdinand:

….The government must regulate the population, must command all the means of
snuffing it out if it becomes troublesome, for increasing it if that is esteemed
advantageous; its justice must never be weighed elsewhere in the scales of the ruler’s
interests or passions, combined solely with the passions and interests of those who, as
we have just said, have obtained from him all the allotments of authority necessary to
multiply his own a hundredfold when they are conjugated. [Sade’s footnote: “See, on
this subject, the speech of the Bishop of Grenoble in the fourth volume of La Nouvelle
Justine, pp.275ff”].Glance at the governments of Africa and Asia: all of them are
organized in accordance with these principles, and all invariably maintain themselves
thereby (J: 970-971).

In La Nouvelle Justine the character Dubois, in a political tract of some ten pages,
proposes that the government introduce various measures to control population
growth. Infanticide and the immediate execution of ‘surplus’ members of peasant
families is also recommended. States Dubois, “il fût permis de tuer comme les boeufs
qu’on vend à nos boucheries” (“one would be permitted to kill them as cows are sold
in our butcheries”; LNJ 2: 388). Dubois also recommends the establishment of public
wheat storage facilities, established purely for the purposes of financially ruining
peasants, who are then to be executed as ‘punishment’ for being beggars
(LNJ 2:394). 64

7.7 Anus Mundi

The desire for control of the subject, and the preoccupation with systems of control,
as evinced by the accounts of Tamoé and Batua, are brought together in the Libertine
works. A general pattern in Sade is the pushing of all ideologies and philosophies to
the point where they break, or become monstrous. Here I will discuss a related
pattern- Sade’s tendency to divorce the rituals and structures of the most powerful

63
Zamé also discusses politics in terms understanding the “secret of the machine” (AV: 309).
64
Given both the economic absurdity of slaughtering peasants, and the fact that this very plan was
feared in a widespread Revolution- period conspiracy theory, Sade is probably in ‘satire’ mode here.
All the same, Stalin’s creation of the Ukrainian famine of 1932-1933, intended to force peasants into
collectivisation, was no more reasonable.

266
institutions (organized religion, law, medicine) from their purported ideological, legal
or moral purposes, and incorporate them- with some alteration- into the will to
control. This pattern, in the case of Tamoé, has been outlined already at the macro-
level. I will now turn to the patterns in Sade’s work that concern the domination of the
body and mind of the individual.
As discussed in Chapter III, the ultimate desire of the libertines is to have power
over the subject. Political power is simply the means of increasing the scope of this
power. The Sadeian structure is also a preoccupation with the intensification of this
power. This intensification involves a transposition of the ordering and disciplinary
mechanisms of the school, the convent, the barracks, the prison and the hospital to the
Sadeian space. The structures, symbols and rituals of the institutionalized space
reappear, divorced from any notion of legal or moral authority, transformed into the
pure signs of power. (Alternatively, Sade’s sites of coercion are schools, hospitals and
prisons; J: 982; LNJ1:170-172). This process is a direct consequence of the cynicism
of the libertines, their rejection of all traditional notions of justice or ethics, and the
instrumentalization of all institutions (the Church, for example) to their own ends.
Sade’s image of the libertines- dressed as executioners- torturing and murdering with
the aid of barbaric machines, is exactly as a state execution would appear to someone
who has completely rejected, or is incapable of understanding, the stated principles of
such an act.
The Architecture and equipment of the Sadeian space is one of the most
characteristic features of Sade’s work; every detail concerns either the maintenance or
the enjoyment of total control. Tamoé, as noted, is isolated; all citizens know their
place, and all is arranged so that all are visible to the ‘master.’ The libertines commit
their atrocities within an enclosed space which is essentially based on the same
principles, turned inwards. The most developed, and the prototype of such spaces in
Sade, is the Château of Silling, the setting of The 120 Days of Sodom. Silling is
situated on the summit of a mountain “almost as high as the Saint-Bernard,” in the
most treacherous sector of the Black Forest in south-west Germany (120:236). As the
Four Friends approach their destination, they destroy all the bridges behind them, and
arrive on November 1st, when it would be impossible to escape through the ice and
snow. As with all such locations in Sade, Silling is an impregnable fortress, with a
deep moat and thirty feet walls, with chambers and dungeons that extend far beyond
ground level. Another characteristic is the absolute secrecy of the place: “...to what

267
degree might not the villain be reassured who brought his victim here! What he had to
fear? He was out of France, in a safe province, in the depths of an uninhabitable
forest.... [in a redoubt which] only the birds of the air could approach” (120:240). 65 In
order to forestall escape or external attack (“which,” notes the narrator, “was a little
dreaded”), all the gateways are walled up: “there was no longer any trace left of where
the exits had been” (120:240-241). The architecture of the Sadeian site is that of a
prison. In fact, the upper floors of Silling are converted into a prison at the end of the
narrative (120:671).
The interior is more thoroughly planned still, and, like the exterior, establishes a
pattern that recurs throughout Sade’s work. Like Tamoé, the interior of Silling is
functionally identical to Bentham’s Panopticon. 66 The central chamber has a circular
or semi-circular form, as in an amphitheatre. It has niches in which the victims (the
‘subjects,’ as Sade refers to them) are on display, and an ottoman, in black upholstery,
in the centre in an elevated position (LNJ 2:201). The room is typically lined with
mirrors, often covering the walls and ceiling, is very well lit (Sade frequently gives
the exact number of candles used), and is linked to further niches, torture machines,
trap-door pulleys, laboratories, and dungeons (120: 237-238; LNJ1: 306; 2:376; J:195,
659, 975). Note that the subject (Sade’s term) must be able to see the symbols of
power lest they consider insubordination.

On either side of the central throne an isolated column rose to the ceiling; these two
columns were designed to support the subject in whom some misconduct might merit
correction. All the instruments necessary to meting it out hung from hooks attached to

65
Note the inconsistency with the Sadeian principle, discussed in Chapter V, according to which one
must become a criminal as the world is utterly corrupt and lawless. The precautions taken by the
libertines assume that people are in general just, and that they will intervene in concert if they view
actions as being morally wrong.
66
Allen W. Weiss has noted the functional similarity of Sade’s preoccupation with mirrors and the
Panopticon of Bentham. See Allan W. Weiss “Structures of exchange, acts of transgression” in David
B. Allison, Mark S. Roberts, Allen S. Weiss, eds. Sade and the Narrative of Transgression
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995):199-212; p.204. For discussion of Sade’s
preoccupation with visibility and control, see Giraud “La ville du bout du monde.” Other examples of
panoptic systems in Sade: LNJ 2:306, 376, 120: 237-238.

268
 the columns, and this imposing sight served to maintain the subordination so
indispensable to parties of this nature... (my italics; 120:237).

Variations on this theme emphasize the need for visibility and ease of control of the
subject. From the short story Eugénie de Franval:

Eugénie, on a pedestal, represented a young savage exhausted from the chase, leaning
against the trunk of a palm tree, the branches of which concealed an infinite number of
lights arranged in such a way that they illuminated [her] charms...this animated statue was
surrounded with a canal, six feet wide and filled with water which acted as a barrier to the
young savage... [a]t the edge of this encircling moat was placed Valmont’s armchair, to
which was attached a silken cord. By operating this thread he could turn the pedestal in
such a way that he could see the object of his adoration from many sides... (GT: 56).

In the 120 Days of Sodom, as in Juliette, elaborate systems of pulleys and cables are
employed to control the subjects.

Each child in each quatrain shall have one end of a chain of artificial flowers secured to
his arm, the other end of the chain leading to the niche, so that when the niche’s
proprietor wishes any given child in his quatrain, he has but to tug the garland, and the
child shall come running and fling himself at the master’s feet (120:245; similar: J: 588,
589).

The Sadeian space, then, is essentially a machine for controlling people, and reducing
67
them to objects. Metaphorically, such an arrangement reveals a preoccupation with
moving the body of the coerced subject, en masse, as part of a larger unit. 68 In more
elaborate arrangements, the body of the subject disappears entirely, becoming a
component in a greater system of parts designed with a specific instrumental goal. In a
passage in Juliette, men are placed into a conveyor belt system for providing sexual
pleasure: “a mechanism ensured that once those pricks had discharged, they
disappeared in a trice and were replaced by new ones the next instant” (J: 973). From
another orgy scene: “At the four sides of the room were that many raised platforms,

67
For discussion of this reading, see Philippe Roger Sade: La Philosophie dans le pressoir p.61.
68
For discission on this pattern, see Foucault DP: 158,164. On the relationship between the theatre and
power in Sade, see Pierre Frantz “Sade: texte, Théâtralité,” in Camus and Roger, eds. Sade écrire la
crise: 193-215, p.210.

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upon each of which a couple of Negroes lashed a girl of sixteen or seventeen who,
once torn to shreds, would vanish through a trap door, to be replaced the same instant
by a fresh one” (J:1112). Torture and death machinery incorporating rotating drums
and knives, pulleys, and trapdoors, all of which are put into action with the “touch of
a lever,” are frequently described in Sade’s work (J: 334, 338, 1010, 120: 665-669,
724, 784). The culmination of Sade’s list of tortures is the ‘hell passion,’ which
involves the immolation of victims in a manner reminiscent of a meatworks.

before launching her [the torture victim], he slips a ribbon around her neck, thereby to
signal which torture, according to his best belief, will be most suitable for that particular
patient, which torture will prove most voluptuous to inflict upon her, and his acuity and
judgment in these matters, his tact and discrimination are truly wonderful (120:667).

Once the machines are running and the torturers are at work a ‘villain’ “spends fifteen
minutes contemplating each operation…he falls into a comfortable armchair whence
he can observe the entire spectacle” (120: 669).
Already mentioned is the libertine’s preoccupation with formulating rules and
regulations for their own conduct. They are also preoccupied with formulating such
regulations for their victims, the most developed version being the Statutes (referred
to also as the ‘protocols’) of the Château of Silling in The 120 Days of Sodom
(120:238, 241-249). Two related attitudes are expressed concerning such rules. On the
one hand, there is the view that to be compelled to follow rules at all is associated
with weakness, of being dominated (Dorothée, in La Nouvelle Justine, states that laws
are a trap for the easily controlled, adding that “il n’y a de lois dans l’univers que les
vôtres”; LNJ 2: 196). On the other, a paradox already discussed in Chapter V, is that
the libertines impose rather obsessive rules upon themselves; even when outside a
particular disciplinary space. 69
The libertines frequently wish to make their victims think that they are being
punished, rather than being merely tortured, occasionally going to the length of
having a ‘trial’ (J: 742). When Justine finds herself imprisoned in a remote convent
school, she is frequently beaten and raped, but before these beatings she is made to

69
The Statutes of Silling give details of strict monetary penalties for harming the cooks. Juliette gives a
particularly anal account of her daily routine, in which each hour is accounted for and assigned a
particular function (J: 409; 120: 241-249).

270
read aloud the particular rule that she is said to have broken (LNJ 1: 316-324; 34;
2:80-82). The following passage, from Juliette, illustrates the language and rituals of
discipline and punishment in the context of sadistic pleasure. The libertine approaches
the victims with his ‘escort,’ conducts an ‘inspection,’ and exposes ‘culprits’ to be
‘punished.’

The president gave orders that during his inspection nobody be admitted into the premises
apart from ourselves, who made up his escort; and he commenced his tour forthwith. Such
a man, with such prepossessions, was able, as you can imagine, to uncover a prodigious
number of culprits; he was accompanied on his rounds by a quartet of executioners, two
flayers, six flagellators… to the lash he condemned thirty aged between five and ten,
twenty-eight between ten and fifteen, sixty-five between eighteen and twenty-one; three
children in the six-to-ten age group were condemned to be flayed alive… (J: 517).

Two other features of the Sadeian disciplinary system- documentation and the
markings worn by the subject- are noteworthy. Administrative or official
documentation appears frequently in Sade’s work, in particular lists of people to be
killed, death warrants and lettres de cachet (J:216, 237,324,). 70 Juliette’s links with
wealth and legal protection- the matrix of power relations upon which she, a minor
libertine power, depends, are maintained, in part, through the sheaf of letters of
recommendation she presents to every new acquaintance, as if visiting the local
prefecture (J: 981,994). Official documentation, Sade emphasises, is also an
instrument of administrative killing. “I have but to put my signature to that
[document],” notes a judge in Juliette; “and a very attractive person dies tomorrow.
She is in prison at the moment; [her family’s] only grievance is that she prefers
women to men” (J: 237; similar: 213). When the character Belmor presents his plan to
kill every Catholic in France, he notes that most important logistic issue is the
identification of the target population, and the necessary paperwork: “separating the
sheep from the goats would not take long. Compiling my lists should require no more
than a year’s work in shadow silence...” (J: 501).

70
The lettre de cachet was a warrant by the French king for imprisonment or death. Originally the
privilege of the aristocracy, by the 18th century they were requested by middle and lower classes for the
institutionalisation of deranged or profligate family members. Sade himself was imprisoned through the
lettre de cachet system by his mother in law. For discussion, see Shaeffer p.168.

271
 Another key administrative tool in Sade is clothing. On Tamoé, assumedly to
facilitate surveillance, all stages of the human life-cycle are assigned colours; grey for
the old, pink for adults and green for the young. Different clothing is also used to
identify ‘sinners’ (AV: 325). 71 Within the space of Château Silling, coloured ribbons
are used to designate victims, the ribbon corresponding to the torture used to kill them
(120:667). Elsewhere, the victim is dressed in the black crêpe of those to be executed
by the authority of the law (LNJ1: 324; J: 325). Likewise, the libertines dress
themselves as cannibals, demons or tigers (J: 325, 1177; 120: 615, 667), or in the
insignia of the power over life and death- the skull and crossbones device, worn on
the brow (J: 333). 72 In combining the text with the sign- the official document with
the need to identify the subject, Sade invents a new type of administrative tool.
Whereas, in the 18th century, it was routine practice in France to tattoo or brand
criminals or prostitutes, Sade describes the inscribing of the official document onto
the body. 73 His characters brand serial numbers on the bodies of their victims to
facilitate ordering them to their deaths, are branded with a text describing the manner
in which they will be further tortured to death, or tattoo the victim with words of
poison instead of ink (120 :610, 666; MV:61-62; J: 619). 74 In The 120 Days of
Sodom, victims are reduced to, and referred to, their serial numbers, rather than their
names (120:666-668; similar: J: 517). The text of the 120 Days pursues this logic of

71
Notes Goulemot, this was a practice typical of Medieval and Classical societies to control heretics,
Jews and plague victims. In Diderot’s Supplement to the Voyage to Bougainville, also, sterile women
wear grey (AV: 325n 370).
72
Jean Leduc notes that Nero- a character frequently referred to by Sade, would dress in a tiger skin.
Jean Leduc “Les Sources de l’athéisme” p.45. According to the police records, Sade would terrorize his
victims in a manner reminiscent of official torturers. For example, he made a point of displaying before
a victim, Rose Keller, a range of torture implements, forcing her to select the whip with which she was
to be beaten. For discussion, see Lever p.119.
73
For discussion, see Foucault Discipline and Punish p.118.
74
“...he brands each [girl victim] upon the shoulder, imprinting a number on the flesh; it is to indicate
the order in which he [the torturer] will receive them” (120: 666). In Justine the protagonist is also
branded (MV: 61-62). The tattooing of a victim with the text of their ‘sentence’ is similar to the
tattooing- machine described in Kafka’s short story In the Penal Colony (1919). Coward notes that
thieves and prostitutes were still frequently being branded in Sade’s time, and that convicts carried the
letters TF (travaux forces) until the ending of the practice in 1832 (MV: fn 265). Also J: 619; 120:610.

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orderly, administrated destruction to the end, concluding with a tabulation of
survivors and the dead:

The following capitulation lists the inhabitants of the Château of Silling during that
memorial winter:
Masters...................................................4
Elders......................................................4
Kitchen staff...........................................6
Storytellers.............................................4
Fuckers...................................................8
Little boys...............................................8
Wives......................................................4
Little girls...............................................8
Total............................46

FINAL ASSESSMENT

Massacred prior to the 1st of March,

In the course of the orgies......................10
Massacred after the 1st of March............20
Survived and came back........................16
Total...............46 (120:673).

It is paradoxical that the libertines inform their victims that no notion of

universal law or morality is valid, then inform those same victims that they are to be
punished and executed, rather than merely tortured and murdered. A possibility is that
the libertines are validating their own worldview- according to which all law is
arbitrarily assigned- through a practical demonstration. The interior of Silling is as
the libertines describe the outside world- there is no morality, in the accepted sense,
and no justice- only the avoidance of pain or death inflicted through adherence to
arbitrary rules, laid down by a leadership that is senseless and despotic, guided
entirely by the impulse to destroy as thoroughly and methodically as possible. On the
one hand, the very strangeness of Silling suggests that this is not how the outside
world appears. On the other, we know that it is well within human potential to create

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such a space, and on German, or French, soil. 75 Were anyone to survive such a place
as Silling (recall that only atheists, and those who are forced to participate in the
destruction of others, survive to the end of the book) they are unlikely to have the
same trust in the innate goodness of the world and its inhabitants ever again.

7.8 The Anatomical Gaze

Not content with colonizing the structures of law and order, the libertines also
adopt the gaze of the anatomist and the rituals of the hospital. 76 Medical language
and a certain ‘medical gaze’ permeate Sade’s work as thoroughly as does the language
of punishment and discipline. He frequently discusses his characters in anatomical
terms (whether the “charming physiognomy” of the victims or the precise details of
the ‘wrinkled members’ of the Four Friends), and his introduction to a young girl of
the mysteries of sex, as Lacan puts it, reads like a “contemporary medical
pamphlet.” 77 In a discussion on the ‘natural inferiority’ of women to men, in a
footnote, Sade casually recommends the reader to perform a dissection to see the
difference for himself. More disturbing still is the anatomical detail with which he
discusses torture and murder (J: 332,511).
There are, in particular, numerous ‘medical examinations’ in Sade’s works. The
libertines reduce their subjects (often referred to as “unfortunate patients”) to objects
of scientific inquiry, examining and assessing them, and deciding upon their fates
accordingly (LNJ 1: 346). They invent elaborate classificatory schema in order to
categorize victims according to physiology and ‘pleasure function,’ in the manner of
Victorian naturalists (LNJ1: 270-271, 120:232). In La Nouvelle Justine, a libertine
doctor sexually molests the children in his school, examining them under the pretext
of issuing them with epidemic certificates (LNJ1: 323). Associated with the desire to

75
This is perhaps as the Terror could have looked to Sade himself. Yet 120 was written in 1785, before
the Terror had begun.
76
Some passages in Sade appear to be a simple satire of the medical profession. A short story, The
Mystified Magistrate, contains an explicit satire on medical theory; a man posing as a doctor terrifies a
patient with “aphorisms culled from Hippocrates and commentaries from Galen,” and convinces him
that he is insane (MM: 13). A number of the tortures in The 120 Days of Sodom and La Nouvelle
Justine, in particular the bleeding of victims and the application of highly toxic enemas, are similar to
the medical procedures of the period (LNJ. 2:132; 120:613, 614,615).
77
Lacan “Kant with Sade” p.72. Also, see PB: 241, 243, 260.

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measure, quantify and classify is also a desire to eliminate all the “flaws in the
pattern.” 78 In The 120 Days of Sodom, all such elements (Catholic piety, having
slightly imperfect teeth, being insufficiently subordinate) that are deemed
unacceptable or aberrant are destroyed in the person of the victim. The libertines
examine their child victims for blemishes: “This done, the child was led away, and
beside her name inscribed upon a ballot, the examiners wrote passed or failed and
signed their names... one, as lovely as a day, was weeded out because one of her teeth
grew a shade higher from the gum than the rest..” Those that ‘fail’ the test are thrown
out into the snow to die from exposure; those that ‘pass’ are raped and tortured to
death later (120:225-231).
This pattern of systematic extermination of the ‘aberrant’ occurs throughout
Sade’s work. The libertines advocate the killing of children, orphans (described as
‘vegetative parasites’), the infirm and the ‘unfortunate,’ the torching of public
schools, poorhouses and hospitals (LNJ 1:33; J: 604, 710, 726-729; PB: 335-336).
Sade’s characters differ from their real, 18th century counterparts in being all the more
thorough. Foucault notes the 1780 proposal to burn down the Bicêtre asylum
buildings to control a “putrid fever”; Sade’s characters plan to torch every hospital
and poor-house in Rome in order to eliminate the poor and sick themselves (J: 726;
Foucault MC: 204). Pinel notes that Catholicism causes insanity; Sade’s character
Belmor plans on solving the problem for all time by having every practitioner of the
‘irrational creed’ eliminated (J: 501; Foucault MC: 255). Both Philosophy in the
Bedroom and Juliette contain passages justifying such massacres in the name of the
‘greater good,’ and in the medical rhetoric of a ‘necessary amputation.’ From “Yet
Another Effort”: “Do you not prune the tree when it has too many branches? And do
not too many shoots weaken the trunk? (PB: 336-337). From Juliette: “What does the
horticulturalist do when he espies that branch? He cuts it off, without qualms. The
statesman must proceed likewise: one of the basic laws of nature is that nothing
superfluous subsist in the world. …my desire is that they be totally eliminated,
extirpated; exterminated, killed... killed as one kills a breed of noxious animals” (J:
726; similar: 2:207, 209). This pattern is what sociologist Zygmunt Bauman takes to
be a key feature of Modernity; the mentality of the “Gardeners who treat society as a
virgin plot of land to be expertly designed and then cultivated and doctored to keep to

78
Orwell p.267.

275
the designed form.” 79 In the same way, the interests of the individual disappear in
discussion on the merits of medical experimentation. In Juliette, a character reports
on the practice of her doctor friends, summarizing the general attitude of the doctors
in Sade’s world.

Almost all of them use no other means of testing out a remedy, and it’s surely nothing to
them [vraiment un vide pour eux]; I am reminded,” she added, “of what young Iberti, my
personal doctor, said to me only the other day upon arriving at my bedside fresh from one
of those experiments. ‘What concern to the State is the existence of the vile beings that
ordinarily crowd those dens?’ he said in response to the look of disapproval I assumed in
order to find out how he would justify himself; ‘you would be doing society an enormous
disservice by not permitting us medical artists to test our talents upon society’s
dishonoring dregs. These have their use; Nature, in making them weak and defenseless,
indicates what is to be... (J: 727; ΠVol. III: 833). 80

Further, Sade describes a medical gaze that tortures and murders in the name of
the abstract ideals of health. In Justine, Monsieur Rodin, a “callous and brutal”
surgeon, has imprisoned a twelve year old girl for medical experiments, and argues
for the utilitarian rationale for such a venture (MV: 57,59 ,104). The science and
technology of the human body is wrested from the purpose and principles of medical
practice. The ‘patient’ disappears entirely; medicine is transformed into an inquiry
into the human machine, or into the most complex and painful way of killing
someone. Here, the pleasures of sadism and the pleasure of ‘revealing truth’
intersect. 81 In The 120 Days of Sodom, Sade gives a vast list of surgically or
scientifically informed tortures. One involves asphyxiation in a ‘pneumatic machine;’
another involves giving injections of a “venereal distemper” (120: 603-611, 629, 652-
659 MV: 57, 59). Still other experiments involve starvation (“in order to study the
effects of famine”), live organ transplantation, or removal, including the brain;
involuntary sex change surgery, and procedures which are specified as tortures (“her
nerves were laid bare...the nerves are tied to a short stick...” (120: 649, 653, 658, 652).

79
Zygmunt Bauman Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2000)
p.113.
80
In a corresponding footnote, Sade states that Iberti was a real figure, a friend, in fact, and that this
was his real name (729n).
81
Foucault HS1: 71.

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The operations are invariably agonizing and fatal (“...he knows just enough about
surgery to botch all four operations”; 120:655). In Juliette ( notably, predating
Shelley’s Frankenstein by two decades), a victim is tortured and killed, then struck
with an artificial thunderbolt; in the same novel, a man raises his children dumb, like
animals, in order to study their psychological development (J : 741, 1176). In
similar fashion, chemistry is discussed only in discussing ways of killing thousands of
people: “[a] treacherous bugger regularly deploys a drug which, sprinkled on the
ground, very wonderfully kills whosoever walks thereupon; he sprinkles it about
rather frequently, and over wide areas (120:637; similar: LNJ 2:207, 209; J:540,
1150).
Here I return to the discussion of Foucault’s interpretation of Sade, as discussed
at the end of Chapter I. Sade’s work, according to the early Foucault, is a document
of the revolt against this rigorous reordering; Sade himself being the very voice of
that unnameable madness deemed unfit for the Age of Reason. I suggest that this
understanding of Sade is in fact upside-down. Sade’s description of the disciplined,
obedient subject, his colonizing of the disciplinary mechanism of the prison or the
hospital, the rituals of power and the accumulation of documentation, suggest that his
work is the ultimate discursive artifact of Foucault’s Age of Control, of “infinite
examination and compulsory objectification” and “inhuman vigour” (DP: 189; MC:
234). Sade confirms the negative, Foucaultian view of society, as described in
Discipline and Punish, and particularly the view that this society is consistent with the
Enlightenment values and theories. In depicting every possible method of domination
and coercion, and the way in which institutional systems can be incorporated into a
universal and intensive mechanism of control, Sade appears to be – Foucault’s
precursor. 82 It was perhaps an awareness of this link that led to Foucault’s
characterization of Sade as the exact flip- side of scientific discourse, writing, in The
Order of Things, that “ Les 120 Journées is the velvety, marvelous obverse of the
Leçons d’anatomie comparée” [of Georges Cuvier {1769-1832}] (OT: 278). 83 Sade
had intimate and direct knowledge of the Prison, the Asylum, the Barracks, the

82
Fink does not make this association, but her appraisal of Sade is in very Foucaultian terms. “Political
System”p.512.
83
Concerning such Sadeian themes as the pleasure of institutional control, the creation of the obedient
subject, the importance of document accumulation, the rituals of power, See also DP: 40, 128-129,
181-182,189, 264. (HS I: 45, 48, 71-73).

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School, and the Hospital, institutions which, for Foucault, represented the emergence
of new techniques of administration, so such a relationship between Sade and those
institutions that he was subjected to (institutions make the man, as Montesquieu said)
is only natural. 84
The most obvious similarity between Sade’s work and the account of the
hospital of the 18th Century is the incredible cruelty involved. Foucault notes that
there was a specific doctrine of using fear as a ‘psychiatric technique’ (MC: 180, 245),
and many of the pronouncements given by psychiatrists that Foucault cites have a
distinctly Sadeian ring to them. There is, for example, the account of one Dr.
Sauvages, who advises that the physician must “become a philosopher” in the sense
identical to that of Sade- that is, one must purge all natural human feelings of
sympathy in favour of a particular notion of the good (MC: 183). There is François
Leuret, who advised other physicians of the mad as follows: “[a] single string still
vibrates in [the patient], that of pain, have courage to pluck it” (MC: 182). 85 The
details of the terrifying methods employed reinforce the association; for example the
‘spinning machine’ used by Joseph Mason Cox (1763-1818) to spin melancholia out
of the mad (eventually used simply as a punishment or threat), or the methods of
Hermann Boerhaave (1668-1738), who claimed to have cured convulsives in 1777 by
burning the ‘patient’ to the bone with red-hot pincers. 86 Sade’s characters also use the
exact same methods to ‘cure’ the mad that Foucault describes. In Madness and
Civilization, Foucault describes the curing of a man of the delusion that he is a king,
and another who believes himself to be God, through, essentially, the humiliation of
confronting banal reality. 87 Similarly, the character Vespoli (in Juliette) degrades

84
In his formative years, Sade was educated by Jesuits, well known for their discipline (and sexual
abuse of students). As a young man, Sade served with distinction as a captain in the cavalry, and during
the Revolution he served as an inspector of hospitals and as a judge. In the latter role, Sade found
himself representing the very institution responsible for the mass execution of fellow aristocrats.
Finally, of course, Sade spent twenty - seven years in prisons, and spent his final years in the Charenton
lunatic asylum. In a letter to his wife written in July 1783, Sade insinuates that he was sodomized by
his Jesuit teachers (120:132; LP: 313). Shaeffer makes the association of Sade’s treatment by the
Jesuits and the conduct of the libertines of his novels (Schaeffer p.23).
85
François Leuret, Fragments psychologiques sur la folie (Paris, 1834) pp. 308-321. Quoted in
Foucault MC :182.
86
MC: 176-177, 185.
87
Ibid. pp.260, 263.

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humiliates, then murders, a man who believes himself to be God, another who thinks
that he is Jesus, and a woman who believes herself to be the Virgin Mary (J:982,
984).
Most interesting is the underlying theory of the psychiatrists, which was,
according to Foucault, that of the Materialists- the very same theorists that Sade draws
from. La Mettrie, d’Holbach and Helvétius appear in both Madness and Civilization
and Discipline and Punish as the theoretical overlords of the Great Confinement and
the new technologies of control. 88 Just as La Mettrie, d’Holbach and Helvétius
reduce man to a machine that can be manipulated according to elementary theories of
causation, Sade’s libertines, as torturers, crush their victims by reducing them to their
physical, earthly presence (DP: 106,128,136,138). The actual attempt to understand
the mind of the insane man, the criminal, the innocent victim or the ‘people,’ to
attempt to see the world from the perspective of the subject, is not permitted. 89 As
Foucault notes, the medical authority figure knew madness only in that he had power
over it, just as the libertine knows the subject only in having the power to manipulate
(MC: 272). In the words of Sade, we hear a grotesque parody of the vulgarity of
positivism: “il avait mieux le foutre que le comprendre.” 90 This is, as Foucault puts
it, the “merciless language of non-madness” of those who confine their neighbours in
an act of ‘sovereign reason’ (MC: ix).
In Chapter I, I outlined the discussion as to whether Sade can be associated with
Nazism. Those who have noted the similarity emphasize the role played by
organization and political power in Sade. Camus’ characterization of Sade’s work as
extolling of “totalitarian societies in the name of unbridled freedom”- the freedom of
the few- is essentially correct (R: 42). Adorno and Horkheimer’s association of Sade
with Nazism is based on similar observations- the advocacy of power, in both Sade
and Nazism, as its own justification; the association, or reduction, of scientific
thinking to the impulse, with ruthless efficiency, to destroy; the development of
organization without any substantial goal beyond the acquisition and exercise of
power; the transformation of political and economic power into a tool of the

88
Ibid. pp.37, 126, 142, 132, 136,155,173; DP: 204.
89
Marcel Hénaff makes this point: “The victim, irremediably mute, is only the guinea pig in an
experiment, the argument in a demonstration.” Hénaff Libertine Body p.247.
90
Œuvres complètes (Paris : Editions Têtes de Feuilles, 1973) vol.13, p.280-281.Quoted in Mengue
p.103.

279
privileged elite, and the emergence of absolute political cynicism: “the statement that
dictatorship is bad is rationally valid only for those who are not its beneficiaries, and
there is no theoretical obstacle to the transformation of this statement into its
opposite.” 91 Such traits in Sade are acknowledged by Foucault, who grants that his
‘eroticism’ is “proper to a disciplinary society: a regulated, anatomical, hierarchical
society whose time is carefully distributed, its places partitioned, characterized by
obedience and surveillance” (SS: 226). One trait missing from these accounts of
Sade’s work however, is the pattern of systematic destruction of ‘aberrant’
individuals. This is precisely the trait Foucault attributes to the Nazis, and not to Sade.
Foucault describes the Holocaust as a petite- bourgeois dream of cleanliness- a
campaign to eliminate undesirable, aberrant elements, adding: “[m]illions of people
were murdered there, so I don’t say it to diminish the blame for those responsible for
it, but precisely to disabuse those who want to superimpose erotic values on it”
(SS:226). Hence- Nazism and Sade cannot be confused, as Sade is ‘erotic.’ Bataille
makes the disjunction of Sade from Nazism in a similar way, describing the
“unchaining of the passions that raged at Buchenwald or Auschwitz” as “an
unchaining that was the government of Reason” (my italics), and not of the ‘passions’
(EPS:253-254; also 244; similar: AS Vol. III:253). Le Brun takes Sade to be
concerned with the stripping away of ideologies, and returning to the ‘authenticity’ of
bodies; Norbert Sclippa holds that Sade’s characters cannot be proto-Nazis as they
are not concerned with interfering with politics. 92
In reply, I note that Le Brun, Foucault (with the exception of the “Sergeant of Sex”
interview, where he adopts a different interpretation), Sclippa and Bataille are
working from a one- sided account of Sade that omits its meticulous ordering of
disciplinary relations, the descriptions of massive, politically enabled destruction of
human lives, and above all the doctrinal continuity of authoritarian rule and that of the
libertines. That which Adorno, Horkheimer and Camus emphasize in their reading of

91
Max Horkheimer Eclipse of Reason (New York: Continuum, 1974) p.29.
92
Norbert Sclippa writes: “I do not think personally that Adorno, Horkheimer or Camus have shown
that a link exists between Sade and Nazism. Sade’s materialism, as any other “faith,” proposes a
hopeful message of life, which extends to all men. And like any faith, it can be abused... a total
rejection of established laws and institutions [as in Sade] would be the opposite of Nazism, their
Epitome.” Sclippa also adds that the Society of the Friends of Crime “have in their rules NOT to
disturb the existing political order.” Personal correspondence via e-mail, August 4th 2002.

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Sade, and that which has been discussed in this chapter, is almost completely
unaccounted for in the work of Bataille and Le Brun. This is a serious error of
omission, and only out of a questionable taste for paradox could the similarity
between Sade’s dungeon and the practice of the Nazis be denied outright.

7.9 Excremental Assault

Many of the tortures in Sade are merely the infliction of pain through whatever
means imaginable, ranging from forcing the victim to kneel on gravel to complex
procedures involving dismemberment, boiling oil or explosives (120: 618- 636).
Psychological torture is also used. Absurd or impossible instructions are given,
inevitably resulting in torture when the subject ‘fails’ to follow the instructions
correctly. From the Statutes of Silling:

Should any subject in some way refuse anything demanded of him, even when
incapacitated or when that thing is impossible, he shall be punished with utmost severity;
‘tis for him to provide, for him to discover ways and means (120:248).

In similar fashion, girls are tortured if they fail to interpret a piece of music ‘correctly’
through their movements, forced to ice-skate an impossibly difficult obstacle course
whilst fireworks are thrown at them, or to dance barefoot on broken glass (J: 613,
626, 1182; 120:613, 640). What remains to be accounted for are the forms of torture
which are associated with control and coercion. Sade’s characters are not merely
concerned with the thrill of killing or the pleasure of inflicting physical or
psychological pain. They want the more staid pleasure of total submission: “... tous
les sujets que vous voyez ici ne s’y réunissent que pour obéir à vos ordres: la
soumission la plus complètes la prévalence la plus entière...” (LNJ 2 : 196). This is
attained through three principal means: silence, terror, and degradation.
To silence the victim is to remove from them the most elemental freedom- the
capacity to communicate, whether to complain or to cry from help. In order to reduce
the victim to silence, they are tortured if they attempt to communicate with one
another, or even for the expression of feelings (120:248). Submission is also enforced
by more direct means, such as the removal or mutilation of the tongue or mouth, or
blinding the victim (J: 908, 1183, 620; 120: 620, 649).

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 Every means is used to terrorize the victim into submission. The mutilated
corpses of previous victims, or (as noted above) the tools of torture are placed on
display (J: 1059, 120:606). The “least evidence given of lack of respect or lack of
submission” is punished with instant death (120:248). Victims are also informed that
they have no hope of escape, as in the following passage from The 120 days:

Give a thought to your circumstances, think what you are, what we are, and may these
reflections cause you to quake–you are beyond the borders of France [in the Black Forest
region in Germany] in the depths of an uninhabitable forest, high amongst naked
mountains; the paths that brought you here were destroyed behind you as you advanced
along them...insofar as the world is concerned, you are already dead... (120:250-251).

Various means are employed to humiliate and degrade the victims, both physically
and morally. They are forced to desecrate or defecate on religious ritual objects, and
are executed for the performance of any religious act; in The 120 Days, such
desecrations are intensified during Christian holidays (120: 248, 581, 589). Victims
are typically stripped naked, or given thin, inadequate clothing which is easily
removed, making it impossible to escape. Again, from The 120 Days: “...the little
boys and the little girls ...shall always be differently and splendidly costumed, ...but
all these costumes shall be of taffeta or of lawn; at no time shall the lower half of the
body be discomfited by any raiment, and the removal of a pin shall suffice to bare it
completely” (120:245; similar: MV: 111).
Already discussed in Chapter III is the Libertines’ preoccupation with eating
excrement. What remains to be explained is the preoccupation with forcing others to
eat excrement, to prevent others from washing, or forcing them from defecating
anywhere but in a chapel, and then only according to a strict regime. Just as Sade’s
libertines demonstrate their own mastery over nausea through coprophagy, they
torture their victims through forcing them to violate that those deep seated instinctual
revulsions that they have silenced in themselves. In Yet another effort, being “smeared
in filth in public places” is the recommended punishment for the “blessed charlatans”
of the church (PB: 306). In other texts, victims are regularly forced to soil their own
clothes or to be prevented from relieving themselves, to eat excrement or defecate in
the full view of others, to be covered in excrement, or have excrement forced into

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every orifice (LNJ 2 : 82, 210, 269, 290, 311, 383 ; 120 : 372, 373, 579, 621; J:906,
907, 916). From the “Statutes of Silling:”

...it is strictly forbidden to relieve oneself anywhere save in the chapel, which has been
outfitted and intended for this purpose, and forbidden to go there without individual and
special permission, the which shall often be refused, and for good reason, the month’s
presiding officer shall scrupulously examine, immediately after breakfast, all the girl’s
water closets, and in the case of a contravention discovered in the above-designated place
or in the other, the delinquent shall be condemned to suffer the penalty of death (120:242)

No subject, whether male or female, shall be able to fulfil duties of cleanliness

whatsoever they may be, and above all those consequent upon the heavy need relieved,
without express permission from the month’s presiding officer, and if it be refused him,
and if despite that refusal he surrender to this need, his punishment shall be of the very
rudest [kind]. (120:249). 93

Excremental assault, a term used by Emil Fackenheim and Terence des Pres, defines
the methods used in Nazi death camps to abolish the prisoner’s sense of self worth
and psychologically break the victim. 94 Writes Fackenheim: “excremental assault
was designed to produce in the victim a “self-disgust” to the point of wanting death or
even committing suicide. And this-nothing less- was the essential goal. The Nazi logic
of destruction was aimed, ultimately, at the victim’s self-destruction.” 95

93
Micheline Maurel has this to say of this particular torture: “[i]magine what it would be like to be
forbidden to go to the toilet; imagine also that you were suffering from an increasingly severe
dysentery, caused and aggravated by a diet of cabbage soup as well as by the constant cold. Naturally,
you would try to go anyway. Sometimes you might succeed. But your absences would be noticed and
you would be beaten, knocked down and trampled on. By now, you would know what the risks were,
but urgency would oblige you to repeat the attempt, cost what it may...I soon learned to deal with the
dysentery by tying strings around the lower end of my drawers.” Micheline Maurel An Ordinary Camp
trans. Margaret S. Summers (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958) pp.38ff. Quoted in Emil L.
Fackenheim To Mend the World: Foundations of Future Jewish Thought (New York: Schocken Books,
1982) p. 209.
94
“Excremental Assault” is Chapter 3 of Terence des Pres, The Survivor (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1976). Cited in p.208. Primo Levi uses the term ‘excremental coercion.’ Primo Levi
The Drowned and the Saved translated by Raymond Rosenthal (London: Abacus, 1988) p.90. On this
topic, see also Danuta Czech “The Auschwitz Prisoner Administration” in Yisrael Gutman, Michael
Berenbaum, eds. Anatomy: 363-378, p.375.
95
Fackenheim p. 209.

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 This is also the goal of Sade’s libertines- to subjugate their victims to the point
that they willingly participate in their own destruction. Besides simply watching their
loved ones murdered in front of them, victims are frequently coerced into killing each
other. 96 This is the goal of their absolute submission (states Borchamps, about to
execute an unwitting victim: “remember....it’s step by step to lead them gradually to
death”: J: 917). Either the victims prefer that those close to them to die quickly rather
than slowly and painfully at the hands of the libertines, or they are only allowed to
live if they participate in the destruction of others. Mothers are forced to stab sons,
and lovers are forced to stab each other (J: 920, 120:663). Libertines force their
victims to kill and eat one another through starvation, to eat their own body parts, or
to cut off their own limbs in order to obtain food (120: 621, 647, 653, 656, 663) As
Juliette says of Saint-Fond: “The great art of Saint-Fond consisted in always placing
his victims in such a situation that of two evils they had inevitably to elect the one
which more nicely suited his perfidious libertinage” (J:363; also 922; 120: 650, 670).
This principal is basic to the administrative structure of Silling: “...Messieurs decide
to dispatch the rest of the subjects one by one. Messieurs devise new arrangements...
[they] agree to give a green ribbon to everyone whom they propose to take back with
them to France; the green favour is bestowed, however, upon condition the recipient is
willing to lend a hand with the destruction of the other victims”(120:670). 97 This
deep coercion serves three functions: it is pleasurable for the sadists to witness the
moral destruction of the victims; it reduces the work that has to be done to physically
kill them, and it imposes upon any survivors the role of collaborator. 98 The objective
of such degradation is not simply to enjoy the pleasure of control. It is to reduce the
victim to the status of an animal. The Duc tells his victims:

96
scenes involving mothers watching the murder of their infants, or forced abortions, are especially
common (J: 988-990, 1010, 1122; 120: 619, 661, 664-665, 638, 639). In another, a man is forced to eat
his mistress (120:653).
97
Similarly, in the Misfortunes of Virtue, monks have survivors of an ‘orgy-massacre’ swear not to go
to the police (MV: 102).
98
In one scene in Juliette, an army captain orders two groups of ten soldiers to massacre each other,
perhaps a comment on the ease with which institutional control can be used to kill (J:922).

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 ...consider that it is not at all as human beings we behold you, but exclusively as animals
one feeds in return for their services, and which one withers with blows when they refuse
to be put to use (120:252).

Sade’s characters, as noted, refer to their victims variously as vermin or animals,

or mere material (Alberti, a character in Juliette, takes this dehumanization to this
extreme of stating of a victim that “such offal is fit for nothing but to be boiled down
onto soap”; J: 1131; similar: 120:666). To degrade the victim, to remove their human,
civilized characteristics (their clothes, their ability to clean themselves) also allows
the torturer or killer to regard the victim as somehow inhuman, through turning them
into beings not permitted, or even able, to function as human beings.
To reduce the victim to the status of an object is deeply paradoxical for a number
of reasons, despite the fact that such a process is clearly within the compass of human
possibility. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter III, the pleasure of power is primarily the
pleasure of being seen as powerful by the other. If the other ceases to exist as a human
being at all, the dynamic is lost. Secondly, the very complexity and intensity of the
degradation of the victim is to affirm their status as already being more than merely
human, or merely dead matter. For a thinking sadist, degradation of the victim,
therefore, ought to be a failure. Further, the libertines have caught themselves in a
doctrinal trap. They assert that there is no higher order of human existence, that they
themselves are no more than animals, or excrement (Braschi announces that he
“worships shit”; J:763). Yet, in order to demonstrate their supremacy over their
victims, they reduce their victims to an animalistic state, to alimentary functions-
eating and excreting- and to following instructions. They are, therefore, reduced to
the base preoccupations, and to the ontological categories, of their masters– entities
that have no freedom, and allegedly no capacity for moral action.
For Primo Levi, the excremental coercion of the camps was not merely a
destruction of the victim’s will to live. It is a violent imposition of the torturer’s
nihilism onto the victim: “[w]e have embraced you, corrupted you, dragged you to
the bottom with us. You are like us, proud people, dirtied with your own blood, as we
are.” 99 The objective of the camp system, as in Sade’s scheme, is to rid the world of

99
Primo Levi The Drowned and the Saved (London: Abacus, 2000) p.90. See also Danuta Czech “The
Auschwitz Prisoner Administration” in Gutman, Berenbaum, eds. Anatomy 363-378, p.370; Leo

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everything that is unintelligible, undesirable and erroneous according to the ontology
of the rulers– the obliteration of the spirit, the principle of morality; of whatever
distinguishes human life from a living death. The reduction of the victim to the level
of animal is not driven by an ontological given, but an essentially irrational article of
faith- an ideology that is forced upon the body of the victim, as with the victims of
any given Crusade or Inquisition, rather than a calmly stated, self- evident truth. The
Sadeian edifice, constructed in the name of strength, power and health, is circular and
artificial. Silling is a house of cards.

7.10 Conclusion

…go undress the four destined for holocaust and whose brows are wreathed in the foliage
of death’s tree, go strip them, and of their raiments, whereof there is no further need,
make the employment I have prescribed to you. The emissaries step forward; the four
victims are despoiled of every article of clothing, which is flung piece by piece into the
roaring blaze…
Sade Juliette (J: 1178) 100

There is no political doctrine in Sade as such. There is, rather, an insightful

description of the means of control and subjugation. There is also a direct link
between the doctrine of Libertinage and the establishment of, or cynical abuse of
comprehensive and intensive power relationships, by whatever means necessary, for
purely egoistic ends. As such, Sade’s discussion of power and control continues the
doctrinal tension in libertine doctrine. On the one hand, the libertines adhere to the
Bataillian principles of energy and chaos, as symbolized by the motif of the volcano.
Yet, on the other, complex administrative and logistical systems are established or
requisitioned in order to control over a subject population. The Libertine doctrine calls
for destruction and domination on a massive scale, which requires organization, out of

Eitinger “Auschwitz- A Psychological Example” in Gutman, Berenbaum, eds. Anatomy: 469-482,

p.473.
100
Sade appears to be the first writer to associate the term ‘holocaust’ with mass murder. In his age, the
word was applied to fires of great destructiveness- although his usage follows the original sense. Two
further examples: “Laurette, leur mère, et mme de Verneuil devaient contenir les holocaustes…” (LNJ
2:216) “…atop the holocaust, bound hand and foot, the old crone was burned alive…: (J: 747).

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sheer logistical necessity (one exception to this rule– a libertine activity which does
not require resources and planning– is arson).
Work in this, and previous chapters, goes some way towards overcoming the
purely metaphorical nature of the association of Sade and Nazism, and in undermining
some of the reasons offered as to why the association is groundless. In Chapter VI,
the doctrine of Natural Aristocracy, an explicit (albeit problematic) doctrine of
‘master race’ and ‘slave race,’ was discussed. In this chapter, it was noted that
rigorously systematized and ‘reasoned killing’ are dominant trends in Sade’s thought.
What is missing, from both those who note the Sade-Nazi association and those who
reject it, is a commentary on the specifics of Nazi doctrine.
To conclude, there are a number of similarities between the descriptions of both
the doctrine and the exercise of power in Sade and that of the Nazis. There is the
doctrine of innate supremacy, of ‘natural masters’ and ‘natural slaves;’ the validation
of the ‘right of the strong’ to capture and subjugate others; the systematic
extermination of religious or economic groups, or those ‘unfit to live,’ or of the very
fabric of Judaeo-Christian morality; the nostalgia for the glories of Europe’s pre-
Christian past- its (to recall Rousseau) “first innocence.” In terms of practice, in Sade
we see the rituals of control and humiliation, the use of surveillance, secrecy, terror,
propaganda and indoctrination; the mechanized killing, the medical experiments, the
branding, marking and tattooing of victims, even the rhetoric- the suggestion of
turning victims into soap, the rhetorical reduction of the target population to
vermin. 101 The differences between, say, the thought of Saint-Fond or Chigi, and that
of Hitler, Stalin or Marat, are minor, offering similar rationales (the ‘greater good,’

101
Only one Sade scholar- Schaeffer- has made explicit the association of the disciplinary system in
Sade’s 120 Days with that of the Nazi death camps (Schaeffer p.345). For discussion on starvation-
inducement experiments, see Berenbaum ed. p.270. For discussion of the use of Jewish sex slaves in
the camps, and Himmler’s personal involvement of the ‘punishment’ of Jewish women, see Czech
p.376, Wistrich Hitler and the Holocaust p.240.For discussion of the immediate killing of sick
prisoners in the Auschwitz camp, see Irena Strzelecka “Hospitals” In Gutman and Berenbaum, eds.
Anatomy: 379-392, p.389. For discussion of the experiments of Josef Mengele, see Helena Kubica “The
Crimes of Josef Mengele” in Gutman and Berenbaum, eds. Anatomy: 317-337, pp.321, 324, 324;
Robert Jay Lifton The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (New York:
Basic Books, 2000). For discussion of forced abortions and murder of babies, the impossibly
contradictory rules, the destruction and desecration of religious ritual objects, and the coerced
destruction in the camps, see Fackenheim pp.213, 216. p.207, 218-219.

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the ‘health’ of the State) for the extermination of millions who fail to fit the
ideological model. One key difference is that, besides Zamé, there is no personality
cult or Führerprinzip. Le Brun holds that fascism dresses up human savagery with an
ideological dress- the exact opposite of the ‘honesty’ of Sade. In reply, I note that
Sade’s characters themselves discuss the importance of propaganda to hide their true
motives. It is not even clear whether, like Orwell’s O’Brien, the libertines are simply
more lucid than most dictators concerning the nihilism that drives them. 102 The entire
libertine doctrine of ‘natural aristocracy,’ in fact, could itself be an ideological
masking of human savagery, a view that Sade’s characters indeed occasionally ponder
(“[o]ne arranges one’s schemes according to one’s tastes and whims”; J:401, also
p.555). The association of Sade and Nazism, to be brought to a close, would require
an analysis of the specifics of Nazi ideology. Although this topic goes beyond the
scope of this project, an attached appendix to this project addresses some key
similarities.
Whether Sade predicted any specific modern atrocity is a question concerning the
supernatural rather than philosophy. The correct question is- in driving the rhetoric,
the ideology, the philosophy, and the bureaucratized terror of his age to their
furthermost limits, did Sade see the direction in which the Occident, morally, was
headed? The reply seems to be- yes, he did. The question to follow is: what might this
mean for ideology and philosophy, and the culture of the Occident? ( Concerning
Sade scholarship and Sade- interpretation, an entirely different question is - why have
no Sade scholars noted the similarity between Sade and Nazism, and have rejected the
association without addressing the primary reasons offered for this association {the
emphasis, in Sade, on structure and organization in killing}? Hitherto, it has been left
almost entirely to non-experts – philosophers, writers, film makers and biographers-
Schaeffer, Camus, Adorno and Horkheimer, Pasolini- to make the association at all).
What can we say, then, about the political relevance of Sade? As I claimed in
Chapter I, to associate Sade’s thought with that of the Nazis and other such
movements is to emphasise, rather than deny, his significance as a thinker, and on
Sade’s terms. On several occasions, Sade informs the reader that he had the power of
102
O’Brien states: “[w]e are different from all the oligarchies of the past, in that we know what we are
doing. All the others, even those who resembled ourselves, were cowards and hypocrites. The German
Nazis and the Russian Communists came very close...but they never had the courage to recognize their
own motives.” Orwell p.275.

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prophecy; in both Aline et Valcour and Juliette he tells the reader that he had
predicted the revolution itself. 103 In his Reflections on the Novel (1800), Sade states
that the craft of the novelist is to depict the possibilities of human existence (120:106).
Such a project requires, by extension, an investigation into the possibilities of political
reality as well (writes Fink, Sade “opts to experiment with extremes, a laboratory
method resorted to by scientists in order to intensify and clarify the causes and effects
of their research).” 104 If Sade had indeed anticipated the Shoah and other modern
Holocausts, or, more generally, a malignancy at the heart of Civilization, it would
appear that his project had been a success. Beyond the visions of Blake, the systems
of Hegel or even the frenzy of Nietzsche, Sade saw in the chaos and the anxious
meditations of his age another world, another Enlightenment, and another Revolution.

103
The frontispiece of Aline et Valcour reads “Écrit à la Bastille un an avant la Révolution de France”
(AV: 3). The same claim is made in a footnote in Juliette (J: 66).
104
Fink “Political System” p.506.

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290
 Conclusion

The question that initiated this essay remains unanswered. That is, is Sade a
philosopher, or not? This study tends towards the view that Sade indeed is a
philosopher of sorts, whilst accepting that aspects of the less literal readings (that of
Foucault, principally) have their merits. As I hope to have shown, the most
interesting, and relevant, aspects of Sade’s work are only visible through the optic of
philosophy. Further, Sade’s texts resemble philosophical works, in particular the
populist philosophical tracts and pamphlets of his time. Sade clarifies the senses of the
terms used, uses footnotes, and italicizes words for emphasis. His characters argue,
cite Machiavelli, ridicule Rousseau, propose thought experiments and shoot each
others’ theories down. More crucially, Sade’s work functions as does all good
philosophical writing. Sade forces the reader to meditate on central, personal
questions of morality, such as the ‘why be moral’ question, to a degree that is quite
possibly unsurpassed. Sade forces the reader, in asking oneself why one continues to
read at all, to confront their own most basic moral assumptions. What began as a hunt
for Jabberwocky ends as a glimpse at the world through the monster’s eyes. No matter
how brief or unconvincing this vision may be, the experience is bruising. Sade will
not necessarily send the reader out into the street with an axe; nor will he necessarily
send the reader to Yeshiva or a monastery. Yet Sade cannot be taken lightly. If
philosophy begins in wonder, in Sade it ends in a shipwreck on a dark, boiling sea, far
from civilization. To read Sade, and to take him seriously, is to risk intellectual death
by misadventure.
Sade is not a typical philosophical writer, to be sure, and his intentions are far
from clear, but the same could be said of other, less obscure thinkers ( it is not clear
whether Mandeville wrote The Fable of the Bees in jest, for example). There is a
multidimensional and open- ended aspect of Sade’s thought that is captured by
Foucault’s account, for whom Sade represents the enfolding and inversion of all other

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discourses. Yet this interpretation does not do justice to Sade, insofar as it reduces his
work to an amateurish collage. Sade attacks moral ideas with a high degree of
sophistication that is seldom acknowledged. For this reason- and not for the endless
descriptions of rape and murder, Sade is a deeply subversive, and frightening, thinker.
The range and depth of Sade’s thought is considerable. From the beginning of the
study, it is clear that Sade’s philosophy possesses the traits of any complete
philosophical system, beginning with his rigorously scientific and rationalistic
ontology. On materialistic and rationalistic grounds, Sade classifies humans as a type
of animal, rejects the existence of souls, or free will, and so on. As such, Sade is
shown to be a student of the radical thought of his age, rather than a radical outsider.
In Chapter III, Sade’s doctrine as it pertains to psychology was discussed. Here,
his account of the psychology of sadism is found to be sophisticated and insightful,
and throws into doubt, rather than confirms, the association of sexuality with an
instinct for destruction. Rather, Sade associates the will to cruelty with the desire for
the sensation of power and control. Power, its pleasures, its distribution and its
techniques, appears to be the central theme in Sade’s thought. This chapter also tracks
Sade’s inversion, or continuation, of conventional theories concerning pleasure and
aesthetics.
Chapter IV further undermines ‘traditional’ accounts of Sade as liberator and
eroticist, and the notion that Sade is primarily concerned with the sexual act itself, as
implied by Bataille. Instead, Sade is shown to be a forceful critic of Rousseau’s
discussion of the role of women, and of the institution of marriage. Sade’s treatment
of the notion of homosexuality and ‘perversion’ also places him far ahead of his
contemporaries. Sade’s misogyny, however, counts against a straightforwardly
positive reading.
In Chapter V, Sade is shown to be an imaginative and insightful moral thinker. He
relentlessly probes ethical systems for weaknesses, and explores their counterintuitive
implications. Sade exposes serious, and now widely acknowledged, flaws in
Utilitarian thought, and explicitly rejects attempts to reduce ethics to a rational,
mutually beneficial behavioural stratagem. Further, Sade’s ‘applied a-moral
philosophy’ – sheds light on the cooperative strategies of criminal society, and the
limits of the ‘self harm’ argument.
In Chapter VI, Sade’s critique of Judaeo- Christian morality, and his inversion of
the teleology of Rousseau, were discussed. Sade cannot be said to merely destroy pre-

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existing values, doctrines and philosophies, however. Sade also seeks to supplant
them with an entirely new Weltanschauung, one which affirms death and destruction
as necessary aspects of the order of things.
Whereas VI concerns the theoretical justification of absolute power, Chapter VII
concerns the way in which power is managed, at both the level of the state and at the
level of the institution. Through formulating a doctrine of absolute despotism, Sade
does us the service of identifying its salient features.
We need not agree with Sade’s verdict of the world, his pessimism, or his
assessment of human nature, to see the worth of his work. It takes, as Adorno and
Horkheimer realized, a disturbing thinker to shed any light at all on the horrors of our
age, a world that is frequently both frightening and obscene. Hegel wrote that
philosophy is the world as it is brought to consciousness, and that art is an unfolding
of truth. If this is so, and if the truth of the world is frightening, then Sade is both
artist and philosopher.

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 APPENDIX:
Sade and Nazism

I suggest that philosophy, if it is bad philosophy, may be dangerous, and therefore

deserves that degree of negative respect which we accord to lightning and tigers.

Bertrand Russell Philosophy and Politics (1947). 1

A.1 Introduction

This appendix supplements the discussion concerning the alleged connection between
Nazism and the thought of Sade. The doctrine of Nazism requires an entire, quite
different, study in itself; here I merely note what the ideological commonalities are.
The implication of this association is a serious one. Adorno, Horkheimer and
Crocker in particular take Sade to represent Enlightenment – that is, Western thought-
at its logical terminus. Therefore, to make the association of Sade with Hitler is to
reveal the roots of Hitlerian ideology in the very heart of Western intellectual culture.
It should also be explained that it is an association that is at question- that is, whether
Sade’s thought anticipates the Nazis– either their specific acts, or their doctrine.
Defenders of Sade, either implicitly or explicitly, approach the question as if they are
countering the accusation that Sade was actually responsible for Nazism. 2 Whether or
not this is a deliberate straw man, this approach is to misconstrue the issue. Such a
question is a case for historians of ideas (and an easy one at that) – and does not
concern the inquiry into the economy of ideas and their implications.
As noted in the previous chapter, the association between Sade and Nazism is
not decisively established. Of those thinkers who have proposed the association, none
has made the distinction between drawing a specifically doctrinal comparison, or
between the acts committed by the Nazis and those depicted by Sade. Sade, for

1
Bertrand Russell Philosophy and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947) p.7.
2
Sawhney writes that “[t]he issue of whether or not Sade was responsible for Nazism and the death
camps is one which continues to generate controversy to the present day...” Deepak Narang Sawhney
“Unmasking Sade” in Sawhney ed. Must We Burn Sade? : 15-30, pp.20-21.

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Camus, represents a prophetic ‘dream of revenge;’ Adorno and Horkheimer dwell on
the incessant orderings of bodies, and the commonality of Sade and Nietzsche, rather
than that of Sade and Hitler. 3 Further, their understanding of Nazism is highly
problematic. They identify Nazism with an expression of rigorous rationality and
capitalist efficiency, which does not cohere with Nazi practice or doctrine. A rational,
capital– driven Nazism – a Nazism focused on rational, instrumental goals, such as
maximizing the output of war material or winning the ‘conventional’ war - would not
have led to the decision to murder six million Jews. In so doing (many of the victims
of the Holocaust were trained or potential slave laborers in crucial armaments
factories) the Nazis were destroying a workforce that was in fact desperately needed.
4
Therefore, the imperative to kill every Jew is a feature of Hitler’s thought of which
the Adorno & Horkheimer account cannot account for. This is because they do not
account for the unconventional war that Hitler was (or, rather, believed himself to be)
fighting, as I will explain below.
Because of this gap between interpretation and actual Nazi policy, the
association of Sade and Nazism made is at risk of appearing little more than
metaphoric (Nazism is ‘sadistic’; Sade’s thought is ‘somewhat similar to that of an
inner- circle Nazi’). A direct comparison of Nazi thought and that of Sade, however,
shows that there is in fact a deeper resemblance. Despite the range of ideologies,
racial myths, pseudo- sciences and so on that were grouped under the aegis of
Nazism, Nazi ideology was primarily Hitler’s ideology. Further, that of his inner
circle (in particular Himmler) is largely continuous with that of Hitler, in particular on
the subject of race. As Goering put it, “[i]n the last analysis, it is the Führer who
decides.” 5 (It may be more accurate to speak of Hitlerism here, rather than Nazism,
when discussing particular doctrines).

3
One particularly weak treatment of this topic- and the only extant article dealing exclusively with it-
is Colette C. Peter “Maurrassisme, Sadisme et Nazisme,” Esprit 411 (1972):184-192. The author goes
no further than noting that Sade and Nazism embody ‘violence.’ There is no discussion of the specific
content of either Sade’s works or those of the Nazis.
4
For discussion see Kershaw Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis p.492; Wistrich Hitler and the Holocaust
p.2.also Daniel Jonah Goldhagen Hitler’s Willing Executioners (London: Abacus, 1996) p.296.
5
Gerald Fleming Hitler und die Endlösung (Munich, 1982) p.64. Quoted in Wistrich Hitler and the
Holocaust p.77; see also p. 228. By all accounts, Nazi ideology was Hitler’s ideology. Hitler was

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 Hitler’s thought is clearly expressed in Mein Kampf (1924) and in his recorded
private conversations, in particular those recorded in the Table Talk (1941-1944;
hereafter MK and TT). These texts show clearly that Sade had clearly anticipated a
central – possibly the only - guiding ideology of Nazism. 6
Many are reluctant to acknowledge that Hitler was a human being at all, much
less one that could think. This approach is understandable at an emotional level, but is
an error of strategic judgement, as well as, in elevating Hitler to supernatural status,
paying him unwarranted respect. I take to be a less extreme version of the same view
the reluctance among philosophers (though not historians) to accept the suggestion
that Adolf Hitler, or any other prominent Nazis, had what could be called a
philosophical outlook (or in any case an outlook that is related to philosophical
doctrines), or, had they one, that it was historically relevant. Kai Nielsen, for example,
has argued that Hitler’s anti-Christian and anti-Jewish thought is historically
irrelevant. He writes that the association of Nazism with anti-religious intellectual
currents in Germany “attributes far too much causal power to the beliefs of a few
intellectuals.” 7 Similarly, Richard Rorty states that “[t]he rulers of Nazi
Germany...were greedy selfish thugs, not people guided by a mistaken philosophical
outlook.” 8
Nielsen’s comment presupposes that ideas are the sole domain of ‘intellectuals’;
that the rulers themselves were ideologues, (what is more, repeating popular
ideologies), is not considered. Rorty’s comment assumes a dichotomy between people
who are ‘greedy selfish thugs,’ on the one hand, and people capable of sustaining a

dismissive of Nazi intellectuals, in particular the ‘official’ Nazi philosopher, Alfred Rosenberg
(Hitler’s Table Talk p.422).
6
Adolf Hitler Hitler’s Table Talk 1941-1944 His Private Conversations introduced by Hugh Trevor-
Roper, trans. Norman Cameron, R. H. Stevens (London: Phoenix Press, 2000).
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf trans. Ralph Manheim (London: Pimlico, 1995).
7
Kai Nielsen Ethics without God (New York: Prometheus Books, 1989) p.13.
8
Richard Rorty and Chronis Polychroniou, “On Philosophy and Politics, The Cold War, and the Left,”
New Politics 8, no. 3 (summer 2001): 128-39, p.130. I thank Sterling Lynch for pointing this article out
to me. For a discussion of the interplay of Nazi ideology and dominant intellectual currents in Germany
(in particular the rejection of Christianity and humanistic values, and the celebration of power as its
own justification), see Hans Kohn The Mind of Germany: the Education of a Nation (New York:
Harper &Row, 1960).

297
philosophical or ideological viewpoint. That an individual can be both a selfish thug
and a holder of a philosophical viewpoint was, to his credit, no paradox for Sade.
I feel that this approach– of excluding Hitler from philosophical discourse, the
history of ideas, and perhaps also philosophical education– is mistaken on a number
of levels. Firstly, to adopt this position from the outset is to render philosophy too
pure to get its hands dirty with bad ideas, hence, useless as a diagnostic or strategic
tool. Bad ideas should be granted negative respect, as Russell put it, as one respects
lightning and tigers. Nazism may have been grounded or (mis)guided by intellectual
rubbish, but it was nevertheless grounded on intellectual rubbish.
Secondly, the reluctance to give the ideologies of tyrants serious critical
attention, on the grounds that it is ‘obviously rubbish,’ is to invite serious distortions
in our understanding of the history of ideas. As I hope the Sade project goes some
way in illustrating, the History of Western Thought is considerably messier than
suggested by the folksy philosopher’s hero narrative of ‘the great thinkers.’
Hitler did, in fact, have a specific ideology concerning the Jews, Christians and
Communists, what they represented, and what should be done about them– views that
cannot be reduced either to traditional anti-Semitism, or to the enduring folklore of
the ‘Zionist conspiracy.’ 9 Further, his ideology has links with a philosophical
(broadly construed) discourse that stretches back to Sade’s era. I suggest that even if

9
This is not to deny that there is a link between conspiracy theories and traditional anti-Semitism and
Nazism. There is a direct link between The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion – the anti-Semitic
tract that appeared in Russia in the 1910’s and was later circulated as ‘evidence’ of a ‘global Zionist
conspiracy,’ and the political cynicism of Sade’s age. The Protocols was compiled by Sergei Nilus in
1911 for the Czar’s secret police, and was purported to be the mission statement of a secret cabal of
Jews who wish to take over the world through promoting, among other things, atheism, communism
and (!) Nietzsche. It is partly made up of text taken directly from Maurice Joly’s 1864 satire on the
reign of Napoleon III, Dialogue aux Enfers entre Machiavel et Montesquieu (Dialogue in Hell
Between Machiavelli and Montesquieu). Both texts describe the type of conspiracy theory- a shadowy
Masonic or Jesuit conspiracy- that originated during the French Revolution. Most intriguingly, the
Protocols express exactly the type of absolute moral and political cynicism that Hitler embodied. The
Dialogue aux Enfers is available as a zipped file from Project Gutenberg at
www.gutenberg.org/etext/13187 (accessed November 2004). See also The Protocols of the Elders of
Zion trans. Victor E. Marsden (Florrisant, MO: Liberty Bell Publications, 2004); Benjamin W. Segel,
Richard S. Levy A Lie and a Libel: The History of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1995).

298
Hitler had simply adopted a philosophical Weltanschauung to justify the
manifestation of pathological hate (which is, of course, entirely possible), it is of both
philosophical and cultural importance that such an outlook could have been associated
with such destruction.

A.2 Weltanschauungskrieg.

Pope and Rabbi shall be no more

We want to be Pagans once again
No more creeping to churches
We are the joyous Hitler Youth
We do not need any Christian virtues
Our leader, Adolf Hitler, is our saviour.

Hitler Youth song 10

Here I will outline Hitler’s thought concerning Christianity, Judaism (or, rather, the
Jews), and Communism. 11 The purpose of this discussion is to point out the
ideological commonalities between Hitler’s views on Judaeo-Christian morality and
that of Sade, as outlined in Chapter VI. Recall the dominant ideas in Sade’s thought
concerning Christianity; a). that its morality originated with the Jews, in particular
Jesus, dismissed as “one of Titus’ slaves,” and their historical experience as a
‘slavish’ people; b). that Christian morality originated as a psychological subterfuge
to defeat the Romans; c). that the acceptance of this doctrine, and the belief in the
sanctity of human life, led to the fall of Rome; and finally, d). that Christianity has
caused humanity to forget the ‘truth’ that there is an essential, morally relevant
distinction between ‘natural masters’ and ‘natural slaves.’ Hitler’s thought follows
this pattern.
As noted above, neither the ‘task’ of murdering the Jews nor the war on Russia
made any sense in terms of conventional war. They did make sense in terms of

10
Quoted in Carl Friedrich, “Anti-Semitism: Challenge to Christian Culture” in Jews in a Gentile
World: the Problem of Anti-Semitism, ed. Isacque Graeber and Stuart Henderson Britt (New York:
Macmillan, 1942) p.8; Quoted in Dennis Prager and Joseph Telushkin Why the Jews? (New York:
Touchstone/ Simon & Schuster, 1983) p.160.
11
In neither the Table Talk nor Mein Kampf does Hitler discuss the specifics of Jewish religious belief.

299
Hitler’s ideologically driven goal. Hitler considered Communism and ‘World Jewry’
as essentially the same entity (Communism being the political instrument of the
Jews), and took its destruction as his primary task. Hitler referred to these campaigns
collectively as the Weltanschauungskrieg, a ‘War of Worldviews.’ 12 Underpinning
this campaign, ultimately, is Hitler’s doctrine of the Natural Aristocracy of Nature. In
short: the doctrinal commonality that Hitler shares with Sade is the very factor that
characterizes Nazi ideology.
Hitler’s doctrine assumes the following: a). the principle of equality is false, as
b). there are large, and ethically relevant, differences amongst people. In particular, c).
there is a natural distinction between ‘natural’ masters and ‘natural’ slaves. The Jews
were accused of pioneering and promoting this doctrine in three ways- in instigating
Christianity, in promoting Marxism, and in advocating the doctrine of equality of
racial groups. To train “Hottentots and Zulu Kaffirs” in intellectual professions,
insists Hitler, is exactly like “training a poodle”: “it is criminal lunacy to keep on
drilling a born half-ape until people think they have made a lawyer out of him”
(MK:391). Hitler adds: “the Jew shrewdly draws form [educating people of African
heritage] a new proof for the soundness of his theory about the equality of men that he
is trying to funnel into the minds of the nations” (MK: 391). The Jewish doctrine of
equality is, Hitler writes, a violation of what he calls the “natural principle in Nature”:
“[t]he Jewish doctrine of Marxism rejects the aristocratic principle in Nature and
replaces the eternal privilege of power and strength by the mass of numbers and their
dead weight” (MK: 60). Further, Hitler holds that the Jews introduced Christianity
specifically in order to cause the ruin of stronger races through its unnatural morality.
From the Table Talk:

The Jew who fraudulently introduced Christianity into the ancient world-in order to ruin
it- re-opened the same breach in modern times, this time taking as his pretext the social
question…It is Jewry that always destroys this [natural] order. It constantly provokes the
weak against the strong, bestiality against intelligence, quantity against quality. It took

12
On 30th March 1941, Hitler informed his military commanders that the war with the Soviet Union
would be a “struggle between two opposing world outlooks” [Kampf zweier Weltanschauungen
gegeneinander]. F. Halder, Kriegstagbuch, 1939-1942 (Stuttgart, 1962-4), vol. 2, pp.336-7; Lucy
Dawidowicz The War Against the Jews, 1933-45 (London/ New York, 1983), p.157. Quoted in
Wistrich Hitler and the Holocaust pp.103-104.

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 fourteen centuries for Christianity to reach the peak of savagery and stupidity. We would
therefore be wrong to sin by excess of confidence and proclaim our definite victory over
Bolshevism...[a] people that is rid of its Jews returns spontaneously to the natural order
(17 February 1942 ;TT:314).

Finally, Hitler holds that the fall of Rome was due to the corrupting influence of
Christian morality. 13 On the 21st of October 1941, as part of a talk comparing
‘Jewish Christianity’ with ‘Jewish Bolshevism,’ Hitler compared the fall of Rome
with latter- day Bolshevism, the product, Hitler, believed, of Jewish influence. 14 The
following statement, made several months later, continues in the same vein:

But for the coming of Christianity, who knows how the history of Europe would have
developed? Rome would have conquered all Europe, and the onrush of the Huns would
have been broken on the legions. It was Christianity that brought about the fall of Rome-
not the Germans or the Huns… One day ceremonies of thanksgiving will be sung to
Fascism and National Socialism for having preserved Europe from a repetition of the
triumph of the Underworld… (27th January 1942; TT: 253).

Hitler expresses his hope for the future of the Nazi movement in terms virtually
identical to those used by Sade’s Belmor, who says of his planned Christian Genocide
that “it will ensure France’s health and happiness forever” (J:501). Note, in particular,
Hitler’s discussion of genocidal ideological engineering in the name of ‘tolerance.’

Our epoch will certainly see the end of the disease of Christianity. It will last another
hundred years, two hundred years perhaps. My regret will have been that I couldn’t, like
whoever the prophet was, behold the promised land from afar. We are entering into a
conception of the world that will be a sunny era, an era of tolerance… What is important
above all is that we should prevent a greater lie from replacing the lie that is disappearing.
The world of Judaeo-Bolshevism must collapse (27th February 1942, TT: 343-344).

13
The theory is historically questionable. For discussion, see Henry Chadwick “Envoi: On Taking
Leave of Antiquity” in John Boardman, Jasper Griffin, Oswyn Murray, eds, The Oxford History of the
Classical World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) 807-828, p.826.
14
Werner Jochmann, ed. Adolf Hitler: Monologe im Führerhauptquartier 1941-1944. Die
Aufzeichnungen Hienrich Heims (Hamburg, 1980) p.99; Aufzeichnungen des persönlichen Referenten
Rosenbergs Dr. Koeppen über Hitlers Tischgespräche 1941, Bundesarchiv R6/34a, Fols. 1-82 (Notes
of Dr Werner Koeppen, liaison of Alfred Rosenberg at FHQ, on Hitler’s ‚table talk’, 1941) pp.60-61.
Cited in Kershaw Hitler 1936-1945 p.488.

301
Hitler’s ideology, as shown in these passages, is similar to that outlined in Sade, down
to the same appeal to the ‘natural order’ (and is analogous to the ‘Bataille doctrine).’
The one doctrinal difference is Hitler’s appeal to ‘providence’ or the Will of God,
although, of course, little seems to be left of any recognizably Judaeo- Christian
principle in Hitler’s monotheism. 15 Hitler even uses the same racist clichés as does
Sade (referring, for example, to Africans as ‘Hottentots,’ or comparing them to
monkeys; J: 323). Another commonality between the two doctrines is the attitude
towards the sanctity of human life. Robert S. Wistrich writes that “Hitler consistently
regarded the ethics of Biblical monotheism as the curse of mankind, especially the
fifth commandment-‘Thou shalt not kill.’” 16 Again like Sade’s characters, Hitler held
conscience to be a creation of the pernicious influence of the Jews. Writes Jonathan
Glover, “[t]he effort to break free from the constraints of conscience was one of the
central aspects of the Nazi’s own revaluation of values. They believed in crossing the
moral or emotional barriers against cruelty and atrocity.” 17 Nazism emphasized the
‘ethics’ of hardness towards others, characterized humanitarian ethics as a ‘poison’,
piety a ‘disease’, and considered compassion as weakness, cowardice and self-
deception. 18
The details concerning the ‘Final Solution’ concerning the Jews hardly requires
repetition. What is not so well known is that Hitler’s attitude, and that of other
prominent Nazis (in particular Goebbels) towards Christianity was of a piece with this
same ‘struggle.’ Christianity, for Hitler, was a continuation of the very worst aspects
of the intolerance of the Jews (Recall Sade: “[a] careful examination of [Christianity]
will reveal...that the impieties with which it is filled come...from the Jew’s

15
This was a part of publicly stated Nazi doctrine; the belt buckles issued to German soldiers bore the
legend Gott mit Uns (God is with us).
16
Wistrich Hitler and the Holocaust p.245. Ian Kershaw also states that the “ideological objective of
eradicating ‘Jewish-Bolshevism’ was central, not peripheral, to what had been deliberately designed as
a ‘war of annihilation’”… Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945 p.461; also pp.488-489.
17
Glover Humanity p.356.
18
For discussion see Chapter 37, “The Nazi Moral Identity”, in Glover, Humanity pp.355-359; Robert
S. Wistrich “The Cross and the Swastika” in Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich, eds, Nietzsche,
Godfather of Fascism? (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002) p.163; Kershaw
Hitler 1939-1945 pp.39-41.

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ferocity...PB: 299). In Mein Kampf, Hitler has this to say of the intolerance of
Christianity:

Christianity could not content itself with building up its own altar; it was absolutely
forced to undertake the destruction of the heathen altars...intolerance is, in fact, its
absolute presupposition... such phenomena in world history arise for the most part from
specifically Jewish modes of thought, in fact, ...this type of intolerance and fanaticism
positively embodies the Jewish nature...with the appearance of Christianity the first
spiritual terror entered into the far freer ancient world...

Hitler concludes this line of reasoning with what appear to be a call for the end of
Christianity- through “coercion and terror.”

...since [the emergence of Christianity] the world has been afflicted and dominated by this
coercion, and that coercion is broken only by coercion, and terror only by terror. Only
then can a new state of affairs be constructively created (MK: 413).

Writes Ian Kershaw, “[t]he assault on the practices and institutions of the Christian
churches was deeply embedded in the psyche of National Socialism.” 19 Besides the
‘philosophical’ views concerning the nature of Christianity, Hitler viewed it as an
ideological rival, speaking ominously both of a ‘showdown’ with the Church once the
war was over, and the necessity of purging it lest its influence lead to revolt against
the regime. 20 One well known case of the Nazi regime’s executing Christians for
their beliefs was the guillotining, in 1943, of every member of the White Rose group
(their only action being the circulation of pamphlets that noted the incompatibility of
Nazi policy and Christian morality). 21 Official action against Christianity was
otherwise minimal, owing to the political risks entailed. In 1937, Hitler informed his

19
Kershaw Hitler Vol. II p.40.
20
Elke Fröhliche, editor Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels. Teil II, Diktate 1941-1945, Munich
etc., 1993-1998 II/4, 177 (26 April 1942). Quoted in Kershaw Hitler Vol. II p. 509. See also Vol. II
pp.235, 516; Hitler’s Table Talk pp. 409,607, 626. Karl Dietrich Bracher The German Dictatorship:
The Origins, Structure and Consequences of National Socialism trans. Jean Steinberg (London:
Penguin, 1970) pp.475, 478, 483.
21
Kershaw Hitler 1936-1945 pp.552, 663. I thank Selma Kradraoui for bringing the White Rose to my
attention.

303
inner circle that a ‘Church Struggle’ would have to wait until the end of hostilities,
although individual followers tended to take matters into their own hands. 22 Notably,
elite units, the SS and the Nazi party pressured their members to leave both their
religious denominations and congregations. 23

A.3 Other Commonalities

Space and the concern for relevance do not allow for a more thorough comparison of
the Sadeian and Hitlerian texts, but there are other resonances. In both the work of
Sade and in Hitler’s Mein Kampf and the Table Talk, there is the same contempt for
the ‘granite stupidity’ of humanity, in particular the populace’s extreme susceptibility
to propaganda; the tendency to describe the population as an undifferentiated mass;
the same description of the ‘inferior types’ as vermin, or the vector of a disease; the
view that continual warfare is necessary for a state to purge ‘weak blood,’ the view
that ‘bourgeois marriage’ is a “sin against nature ” and that the cult of virginity is
absurd; that all priests are actually hypocritical atheists; that the Saints were all
insane; that a strong leader should cut off all feeling for the members of one’s family
(MK:341,165; TT:353, 384, 420, 513, 651, 661). Another commonality is the
claustrophobic sense of chaos and despair in Mein Kampf - Hitler’s conspiracy
theories concerning the shadowy machinations of the Jews, the fear that culture itself
was on the verge of disappearing into a nihilistic abyss, the spectre of a “slowly
rotting world,” and the view that one simply had to commit evil- on a massive scale-
merely in order to survive (MK: 235).

A.4 Historical associations

Hitler’s “intellectual” anti-Judaism is historically related to a well established, if now
largely forgotten, discourse which stretches back to the Enlightenment period. This
discourse, introduced in Chapter VI, holds that the Jews were to blame for ‘saddling’
Europe with Christianity and its ‘alien’ morality. 24 Sade’s work, in carrying

22
Kershaw Hitler 1936-1945 p.39.
23
Alexander Lasik “Historical-Sociological Profile of the Auschwitz SS” in Israel Gutman, Micheal
Berenbaum Anatomy: 271-287, p.279.
24
I call Hitler’s anti-Semitic writings “intellectual” anti-Semitism, as they have a closer resemblance to
‘philosophical’ writings on the Jews than to traditional Christian anti-Semitism (‘traditional’ anti-
Semitism being hostility towards Jews based on traditional, pre-‘Enlightenment’ notions of the Jews as

304
d’Holbach’s doctrine one step forward- in proposing the genocide of Catholicism-
stands as the most extreme expression of this doctrine. Similarly, the originator of the
term “anti-Semitism,” Wilhelm Marr (1819-1904), denounced Christianity as a
“disease of the human consciousness,” which he took to be a manifestation of
Judaism. 25 Eugen Dühring (1833- 1921), a political economist and philosopher,
argued that Christianity was itself “Semitic,” and, again in terms similar to those of
d’Holbach and Sade, held that all monotheistic religions preach hatred of life. 26
Similar thoughts gained ground in England. In 1920, Winston S. Churchill, in a
newspaper article entitled “Zion versus Bolshevism,” wrote that the Jews were
conspiring to “overthrow civilization” with an “impossible equality”- essentially the
same doctrine promulgated by Hitler himself. 27
Despite all of these later thinkers on the ‘Jewish Question,’ however, Robert S.
Wistrich notes that many of Hitler’s comments on the Jews and Christians hark back
to the thinkers of Sade’s era. Writes Wistrich: “...Hitler’s diatribes against the
barbarism, credulity, ignorance and “poverty of spirit” encouraged by the Christian
Churches also contain crude echoes of eighteenth-century rationalists like Gibbon and

being usurious, vampiristic, ‘Christ-killers,’ and so on). Hitler, of course, was happy to encourage such
traditional expressions of anti-Semitism, but does not appear to have been a traditional anti-Semite,
especially given his negativity towards Christianity.
Other “intellectual” streams of anti-Semitism hold that the Jews are too superstitious to become
‘Enlightened’ (Fichte, Kant), or too ‘materialistic’ (Houston Stewart Chamberlain, T. S. Eliot). Hitler’s
Mein Kampf and Table Talk do not adhere to either of these views, although in Mein Kampf he repeats
the old ‘Enlightenment’ canard that the Jews had bequeathed to the Christian church its intolerance and
fanaticism. Although Chamberlain’s The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century is widely regarded as
a central source of Nazi anti-Semitic theory, Chamberlain hardly refers to Judaeo-Christian morality,
much less criticize it. His attack on Judaism largely repeats the traditional Christian accusations that,
again, the Jews are ‘materialistic,’ and that they have no idea of ‘divine grace’ and redemption by faith,
and argues that Jesus was not a Jew. See Houston Stewart Chamberlain, The Foundations of the
Nineteenth Century (London: John Lane, the Bodley Head, 1910).
25
Quoted in Uriel Tal, “Anti-Christian Anti-Semitism,” In The Catastrophe of European Jewry:
Antecedents, History, Reflections: Selected Papers ed. Yisrael Gutman and Livia Rothkirchen (New
York: Ktav Pub. House, 1976) p.94. Cited in Prager and Telushkin p.160.
26
Tal p. 95; cited in Prager and Telushkin p.160.
27
Winston S. Churchill, “Zion versus Bolshevism: A Struggle for the Soul of the Jewish People,”
Illustrated Sunday Herald, February 8th 1920 p. 1.

305
Voltaire.” 28 Hitler’s admiration for Frederick the Great, King of Germany (1712-
1786) also suggests an admiration for, if not actual influence, of 18th century thought.
Fredrick was close to, and frequently assisted, the French philosophes, in particular
Voltaire, d’Alembert, and La Mettrie, and professed atheism to those close to him.
Hitler made a point of comparing himself with Frederick II specifically because
Frederick was both a great leader and a great theoretician.29 In particular, Hitler cited
the correspondence between Frederick and Voltaire as a favourite text, and admired
Fredericks’s policy concerning race policy and the control of Jewish internal
migration (TT: 84, 476).

28
Wistrich “Between the Cross and the Swastika” p.163.
29
Kershaw Hitler I p.277.

306
 Bibliography

Works by Sade.
Sade, Marquis de. Aline et Valcour ou le Roman philosophique. ed. Jean M.
Goulemot. Paris : le livre de poche, 1994.
——————L’Aigle, Mademoiselle, lettres publiées pour la
première fois sur les manuscrits autographes. Gilbert Lely, ed. Paris: Les Editions
Georges Artigues, 1949.
——————.Correspondance inédite du Marquis de Sade de ses proches, et de ses
familiers. ed. Paul Bourdin. Paris : Librairie de France, 1929.
——————.The Crimes of Love. trans. Margaret Crosland. London: Peter Owen,
1996.
——————. The Gothic tales of the Marquis de Sade trans. Margaret Crosland
London: Picador, 1990.
——————. Histoire de Sainville et de Léonore. Paris: Collection10:18, 1963.
——————. Justine, Philosophy in the Bedroom and Other Writing. trans.
Richard Seaver. New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000.
——————. Letters from Prison. trans. Richard Seaver. New York: Arcade
Publishing, 1999.
——————. The Misfortunes of Virtue and other early tales. trans. David Coward
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
—————— The Mystified Magistrate and other writings trans. Richard Seaver.
New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000.
——————. La Nouvelle Justine (2 vols). Paris : Collection 10 :18, 1978.
——————. Opuscules et Lettres politiques. Paris : Collection 10 :18, 1979.
——————. Œuvres complètes (15 vols). édition mise en place par Annie le Brun
et Jean-Jacques Pauvert. Pauvert: Paris, 1986-1991.
——————. Œuvres complètes (15 Vols). Paris: Cercle du Livres Précieux, 1964.
——————. Aline et Valcour ou le Roman philosophique. ed. Jean M. Goulemot
Paris : le livre de poche, 1994.
——————. Œuvres (3 vols.) ed. Michel Delon, Jean Deprun. Paris:
Bibliothèque de la Pléiade / Gallimard, 1990, 1995, 1998.
——————. [the story of] Juliette [or, Prosperities of Vice]. trans. Austryn

307
 Wainhouse. New York: Grove, 1968.
——————. Voyage d’Italie. (Paris: Tchou, 1967)
——————. The 120 Days of Sodom and other writings. trans. Austryn
Wainhouse and Richard Seaver. New York: Arrow, 1990.

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Adorno, Theodor W., Max Horkheimer Dialectic of Enlightenment trans. John
Cumming. London: Verso, 1997.
Airaksinen, Timo. The Philosophy of the Marquis de Sade. London and New York:
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Allison, David B, Mark S. Roberts and Allen S. Weiss, eds. Sade and the Narrative
of Transgression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Barthes, Roland. Sade, Fourier, Loyola. (Paris : Editions du Seuil, 1971).
Bataille, Georges. Erotism: Death and Sensuality. trans. Mary Dalwood. San
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——————. “Evil in Platonism and Sadism” trans. El Albert, in
Must we burn Sade? ed. Deepak Narang Sawhney, 243-262. New York: Humanity
Books, 1999.
———————. Literature and Evil. trans. Alaister Hamilton. New York and
London: Marion Boyars, 1997.
——————. The Tears of Eros. trans. Peter Connor. San Francisco: City Lights
Books, 1989.
Baker, Robert S. “The Nightmare of the Frankfurt School: the Marquis de Sade and
the Problem of Morality in Aldous Huxley’s Dystopian Narrative” in Now More
than Ever: Proceedings of the Aldous Huxley Centenary Symposium: Munster,
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Batlay, Jenny H., Otis E Fellows “Diderot et Sade: Affinités et divergences,”
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Beach, D.N. “The Marquis de Sade: First Zimbabwean Novelist,” Zambezia 8 (1)
(1980): 53-6.
Beauvoir, Simone de “Must we Burn Sade?” trans. Annette Michelson. London: New
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Bennington, Geoffrey. “Sade Laying Down the Law,” Oxford Literary Review 6 (2)

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Berman, Lorna. “The Marquis de Sade and Courtly Love,” Eighteenth Century
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——————. “The Marquis de Sade and his Critics,” Mosaic 1 no.2 (1968): 57-72.
——————. Thoughts and Themes of the Marquis de Sade. Kitchener, Ontario:
Ainsworth Press Ltd, 1971.
Blanchot, Maurice. Lautréamont et Sade. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1949.
—————— .Sade. in Œuvres Complètes. Paris: Cercle du livre Précieux,
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Bloch, Dr. Iwan. Marquis de Sade his life and works [Marquis de Sade: Der Mann
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Bongie, Laurence. Sade: a Biographical Essay. Chicago & London: University of
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Bourbon Busset, Jacques de. “La négation érotique,” La Table Rond 19 no. 1
(1963) :109-112.
Brissenden, R.F. “La Philosophie dans le Boudoir; or, A Young Lady’s Entrance into
the World,” Studies in Eighteenth-century Culture 2 (1972):113-141.
Broche, Jacques. “Sade ou le langage terroriste,” La Petite revue de philosophie 2
(spring 1981): 25-36.
Brumfield, William C. “Thérèse philosophe and Dostoyevsky’s Great Sinner,”
Comparative Literature 32 (1980): 238-253.
Camus, Michel “ L’impasse mystique du Libertin ” in Sade: écrire la crise eds.
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Camus, Michel., Philippe Roger, eds. Sade écrire la crise. Paris : Pierre Belfond,
1983.
Carter, Angela. The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman. London: Penguin,
1972.
——————. The Sadeian Woman and the Ideology of Pornography. New York:
Harper Colophon Books, 1978.
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