Paper on a Basic Overview of the

Territorial Conflicts in the South

China Sea (circa 1970-2022)
6/June/2022

The South China Sea is a place of immense strategic importance. It is located between the Indian and
Pacific Oceans, holds an estimated 11 billion barrels of oil, and an extra 190 trillion cubic feet of natural
gas.1 Half of the world’s oil tankers and merchant fleet sail through it every year .4 7 countries are located
in its premises (China, Taiwan, Vietnam, The Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia), and all of
them have a vested interest in keeping their stake of the sea to themselves. In total, around 500 million
people live within 100 miles of its coastline.2 On top of that, the South China Sea (to be known as the
SCS from now on) houses an estimated 250 islands. Each of the seven listed countries have claims to
islands within the SCS, but over the last few years (notably on the 19-20th of January, 1974, when
Chinese forces occupied an island under Vietnam’s jurisdiction) the territories of these nations have been
put under pressure and resentment has greatly increased between the SCS nations. In this paper, the
history of the SCS conflict will be briefly summarised.

In the SCS conflict, there has been a clear dividing line between China and the other six SCS nations. The
territorial claims in the SCS started in the early 1970s, when China claimed a number of islands (notably
the Spratly Islands) as its own under Mao Zedong. The justification raised for China’s claims over the
Spratly Islands were on the basis of Chinese fishermen using it as a fishing spot since 200 BC. Other
nations started claiming islands during that time period as well, although there weren’t any serious
incursions until the 9th of January, 1974, when the Chinese government launched an attack on the Paracel
Islands (under Vietnamese jurisdiction at the time) with Chinese forces killing 75 Vietnamese forces,
injuring 16, and capturing 48.3 From there on, an emboldened China has worked to take islands in the
region (by force when necessary) under its own control. When it comes down to justifications, many fall
under the grounds of islands within the SCS being “internal waters,” despite such islands being far out to
sea, not within the Chinese mainland, and China being a continental nation. Additionally, China, although
often using historical explanations to justify their claims. In the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention
for the Law of the Sea) it is stated that historical grounds are not a valid ground for territorial claims .7
Such attempts are seen by many analysts, including Rush Doshi (Director of China for the U.S. NSC) as a
way to give China an iron grip of the region’s seas, particularly to prevent US military vessels from
exiting or entering the region. As Rush Doshi puts it in his new book “The Long Game”:

“It [Chapter 4] shows that the trifecta [Tiananmen Square Massacre, Gulf War, Dissolution of the USSR]
prompted China to depart from a “sea control” strategy increasingly focused on holding distant
maritime territory to a “sea denial” strategy focused on preventing the US military from traversing,
controlling, or intervening in the waters near China.”

Later on, Doshi expands upon this by describing some of the military achievements China made from
1989 to 2008:

“Beijing then built the world’s largest mine arsenal, the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile, and the
world’s largest submarine fleet—all to undermine US military power. } ^ {5 ¿

There is also a map commonly used by Chinese legal teams, media, and other CCP party officials used to
display what part of the SCS belongs to China. The map in question shows that China believes most of
the SCS to be its, with only coastlines spared from the map.

8
Even this map is an underestimation of China’s ambitions. Furthermore, Chinese vessels have had a
history of illegally entering into other SCS countries to fish. In March 2022, around 220 Chinese fishing
vessels entered the immediate coastline around the Philippines (breaching both China’s own nine dash
line and the Philippines' 200 nautical mile “exclusive economic zone”). In response, the foreign secretary
for the Philippines, Teodoro “Teddy Boy” Locsin, tweeted: “China, my friend, how politely can I put it?
Let me see…O…GET THE FUCK OUT.} ^ {6 ¿ As a final note, China has worked towards fully
militarising islands within the SCS and has even gone so far as to create three artificial islands (all of
which were promptly militarized).

Moving away from the ambitions of China, the other 6 SCS nations have also had conflicting claims
(albeit none reaching the levels of alarm or geopolitical consequence as China’s).

The conflicts between the 6 other SCS nations is one of the reasons that said nations do not have a united
confrontational stance towards China that is largely effective. The other reason is the economic leverage
China holds over its SCS nations. Many, including the Philippines, have strong economic ties with China.
Due to the nature of the country, crossing China does not only mean risking conflict with the second
largest army in the world and first largest navy, but also steep economic decline. Most countries in the
region depend on foreign actors (mainly the USA) who are not afraid or at least have more leeway with
China. The USA has large incentives on keeping the SCS out of China’s hands (as a means of limiting
regional Chinese geopolitical dominance), but has had to confront being outclassed, outgunned, and
outnumbered by the PLA (People’s Liberation Army).

To conclude, the modern SCS territorial conflicts started in the early 1970s with the occupation of the
Spratly Islands. Different SCS nations started to further establish claims, with violence almost always
being exclusively seen in Chinese confrontational encounters since 1974 with the battle of the Paracel
Islands. China has continued aggressive expansion and building within the region since then, and even in
the 20s of the 21st century China has been aggressively expanding into the SCS, with a vigor under
General Secretary Xi Jinping that has not been observed since the days of Mao Zedong. Artificial and
natural islands have gone through intensive militarization processes. China has dedicated decades to
building naval capabilities, and as a result China possesses the largest navy in the world as well as a long
list of other tactical advantages that help it control and attempt complete control over the region. The
countries which this directly affects, the 6 other SCS nations, are under economic and military duress to
not make too much of a fuss, or else the CCP will take swift and crippling action against them. Only
strong foreign actors (namely the USA) can stand against China. Although the US has gotten increasingly
outclassed and outgunned in the region due to the incredible speed and growth of the Chinese military.

Sources

1. https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/regions_of_interest/South_China_Sea/
south_china_sea.pdf

2. https://www.southchinasea.org/introduction/#:~:text=The%20South%20China%20Sea
%20extends,100%20miles%20of%20its%20coastline.

3. https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/lessons-from-the-battle-of-the-paracel-islands/
4. https://www.southchinasea.org/introduction/#:~:text=The%20South%20China%20Sea
%20extends,100%20miles%20of%20its%20coastline.

5. https://www.brookings.edu/essay/the-long-game-chinas-grand-strategy-to-displace-american-
order/

6. https://www.economist.com/briefing/2021/09/25/aukus-reshapes-the-strategic-landscape-of-the-
indo-pacific

7. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-china-bending-rules-south-china-sea

8. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29139125

9. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_disputes_in_the_South_China_Sea#/media/
File:South_China_Sea_claims_map.svg