15.
CASE: RECTO VS HARDEN In short, considering the character of the services rendered by the
FACTS:
Atty. Recto was the counsel of Mrs. Harden pursuant to a CONTRACT
OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES and to which Recto represented her in
the case Esperanza P. de Harden vs. Fred M. Harden and Jose
Salumbides. Defendants-Appellants, in turn, moved for the dismissal of
the case, to which Appellee objected. Acting upon the issues raised in
such motion for dismissal and in Appellee’s motion to establish and
enforce his charging lien, as counsel for Mrs. Harden The lower court
rendered a decision dated April 30, 1953, adopting substantially said
report of the commissioner who recommends that Atty. Claro M. Recto
be paid the equivalent amount of 20% of Esperanza P. de Harden’s
share of the conjugal properties or the sum of P369,410.04 as his
contingent fee for services rendered in her behalf but increasing the
contingent fee to P384,110.97. Hence, this appeal taken by Mr. and
Mrs. Harden.
ISSUES:
WON contract of services is void upon the ground: (1) that Mrs.
Harden cannot bind the conjugal partnership without her husband’s
consent; (2) that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in
effect prohibits contingent fees; (3) that the contract in question has
for its purpose to secure a decree of divorce, allegedly in violation of
Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines; (4)
that the terms of said contract are harsh, inequitable and oppressive.
HELD:
The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract in dispute
does not seek to bind the conjugal partnership. By virtue of said
contract, Mrs. Harden merely bound herself — or assumed the
personal obligation — to pay, by way of contingent fees, 20% of her
share in said partnership. The contract neither gives, nor purports to
give, to the Appellee any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to
her aforesaid share. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the
computation of said fees.
For the same reason, the second objection is, likewise, untenable.
Moreover, it has already been held that contingent fees are not
prohibited in the Philippines and are impliedly sanctioned by our
Cannons (No. 13) of Professional Ethics.
“in the United States, the great weight of authority recognizes the
validity of contracts for contingent fees, provided such contracts are
not in contravention of public policy, and it is only when the attorney
has taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client that such a
claim is condemned.”
Needless to say, there is absolutely nothing in the records before us to
show that Appellee herein had, in any manner, taken an unfair or
unreasonable advantage of his client Mrs. Harden.
The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the
contract between them, or by the intent of the parties thereto. Its
purpose was not to secure a divorce, or to facilitate or promote the
procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the interest of
Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the pendency of a
divorce suit she intended to file in the United States.
What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are admittedly
citizens of the United States, their status and the dissolution thereof
are governed — pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which
was in force in the Philippines at the time of the execution of the
contract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
— by the laws of the United States, which sanction divorce. In short,
the contract of services, between Mrs. Harden and herein Appellee, is
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy.
The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant
thereto, one who seeks equity must come with clean hands and
Appellants have not done so, for the circumstances surrounding the
case show, to our satisfaction, that their aforementioned agreements,
ostensibly for the settlement of the differences between husband and
wife, were made for the purpose of circumventing or defeating the
rights of herein Appellee, under his above-quoted contract of services
with Mrs. Harden.
Appellee, the nature and importance of the issues in said litigations,
the amount of labor, time (1941 to 1952) and trouble involved therein,
the skill displayed in connection with said cases, the value of the
property affected by the controversy, the professional character and
standing of the Appellee, the risks assumed and the results obtained,
we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the contract of services in
question is neither harsh nor oppressive or inequitable.
In other words, the occurrence, within the time contemplated by the
parties — bearing in mind the nature of, and the circumstances under
which they entered into, said contract of services — of the event upon
which the amount of said fees depended, was rendered impossible by
Mrs. Harden. Hence, whether such event be regarded as a condition or
as a period, she may not insist upon its occurrence, prior to the
enforcement of the rights of the herein Appellee, for “the condition
shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its
fulfillment” (Art. 1186, Civil Code) and “the debtor shall lose every
right to make use of the period” when he “violates any undertaking, in
consideration of which the creditor agreed to the period.”
It should be noted, also, that the compensation agreed upon for
Appellee’s services, consists of three (3) parts, namely: (a) 25% of the
increase in the allowance of Mrs. Harden; (b) litis expensae; (c) 20%
of her share in the conjugal partnership. The first part was dealt with
in the first paragraph of their contract of services. The second and
third parts were the object of the second and third paragraphs,
respectively. The first paragraph limited the rights of Appellee
thereunder to two (2) years, in the event of termination of the case or
amicable settlement thereof within two (2) years from the filing of the
complaint. No such limitation appears in the second and third
paragraphs of said contract. Hence, the same were intended by the
parties to be fully operative under any and all conditions.
It may not be amiss to add that the value of the properties involved
has been assessed, not summarily, but after due notice and full dress
hearing, in the course of which both parties introduced testimonial and
documentary evidence.
In conclusion, it appears that the assets of the conjugal partnership
between Mr. and Mrs. Harden are reasonably valued at P3,841,109.70.
One-half (1/2) thereof, representing the share of Mrs. Harden, is
therefore, worth P1,920,554.85. Twenty percentum (20%) of this sum
is P384,110.97, which is the contingent fee due to the Appellee, apart
from the litis expensae already paid to him.
16. CASE: PIONEER CONCRETE vs TODARO
FACTS:
Antonio D. Todaro (Todaro) filed with the RTC of Makati City, a
complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary
Attachment against Pioneer International Limited (PIL), Pioneer
Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc.
(PPHI), John G. McDonald (McDonald) and Philip J. Klepzig (Klepzig).
Todaro alleged that PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of Australia and is principally engaged in the ready-mix
concrete and concrete aggregates business; PPHI is the company
established by PIL to own and hold the stocks of its operating
company in the Philippines; PCPI is the company established by PIL to
undertake its business of ready-mix concrete, concrete aggregates and
quarrying operations in the Philippines; McDonald is the Chief
Executive of the Hongkong office of PIL; and, Klepzig is the President
and Managing Director of PPHI and PCPI.
Todaro has been the managing director of Betonval Readyconcrete,
Inc. (Betonval), a company engaged in pre-mixed concrete and
concrete aggregate production. He resigned from Betonval in February
1996. In May 1996, PIL contacted Todaro and asked him if he was
available to join them in connection with their intention to establish a
ready-mix concrete plant and other related operations in the
Philippines. Todaro informed PIL of his availability and interest to join
the.
Subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein the
former consented to engage the services of the latter as a consultant
for two to three months, after which, he would be employed as the
manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete operations should the company
decide to invest in the Philippines. Subsequently, PIL started its
operations in the Philippines; however, it refused to comply with its
undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent basis. Instead of filing
an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action,
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint, as the same is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that
the complaint should be dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. RTC dismissed the MTD which was affirmed by
the CA.
ISSUE
W/N the RTC should have dismissed the case on the basis of forum
non conveniens due to a presence of a foreign element
RULING
NO. Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of
said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
In the case of Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court held that "xxx [a] Philippine Court may assume
jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the
following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to
which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine
Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and
the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have
power to enforce its decision."
The doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground
for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
does not include said doctrine as a ground. This Court further ruled
that while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from
assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital
facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances
require the court’s desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a
case based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of
defense.
17. CASE: NAVIDA vs DIZON
Facts:
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in
different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve foreign countries,
including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought damages
for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to
dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes
(worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases
were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The
defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all the
actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Case 1 (125078) and 2 (125598):
336 plaintiffs from General Santos City filed a Joint Complaint in the
RTC of General Santos City. Named as defendants therein were: Shell
Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow Chemical Co. (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp.
(OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard
Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively
referred to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands
International, Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A. and Del
Monte Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL
MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine
Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned
defendants are hereinafter collectively referred to as defendant
companies.)
NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the
illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which they allegedly
suffered because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among
others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970’s
up to the early 1980’s when they used the same in the banana
plantations where they worked at; and/or when they resided within
the agricultural area where such chemical was used. NAVIDA, et al.,
claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or
negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they produced,
sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-
containing products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to
be exposed to the said products, which the defendant companies
knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the former’s
health and well-being.
Case 3 (126654), 4 (127856), 5(128398)
Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW,
OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL MONTE, and CHIQUITA was filed before
Branch 16 of the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City.
They alleged that as workers in the banana plantation and/or as
residents near the said plantation, they were made to use and/or were
exposed to nematocides, which contained the chemical DBCP.
According to ABELLA, et al., such exposure resulted in “serious and
permanent injuries to their health, including, but not limited to, sterility
and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities.”
The RTC of Davao City, however, junked Civil Cases. The Court
however is constrained to dismiss the case at bar not solely on the
basis of the above but because it shares the opinion of legal experts
given in the interview made by the Inquirer in its Special report
“Pesticide Cause Mass Sterility,” Former Justice Secretary Demetrio
Demetria in a May 1995 opinion said: The Philippines should be an
inconvenient forum to file this kind of damage suit against foreign
companies since the causes of action alleged in the petition do not
exist under Philippine laws. There has been no decided case in
Philippine Jurisprudence awarding to those adversely affected by
DBCP. This means there is no available evidence which will prove and
disprove the relation between sterility and DBCP.
Eventually, the cases reached the SC!
Present case:
The main contention of the petitioners states that the allegedly
tortious acts and/or omissions of defendant companies occurred within
Philippine territory. Said fact allegedly constitutes reasonable basis for
our courts to assume jurisdiction over the case.
DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant
companies constitute a quasi-delict, which falls under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code
CHIQUITA (another petitioner) argues that the courts a quo had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases filed before them.
CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter is the place of the alleged
exposure to DBCP, not the place of manufacture, packaging,
distribution, sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in consonance with
the lex loci delicti commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort,
which states that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was
committed will govern the action.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTCs have jurisdiction over the subject matter in
these cases.
Held: Yes.
1. The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein. Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be
dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the
enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in
civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7691, was:
In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the
value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where
the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:
The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining
the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where
the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the
main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of
such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court.
It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and
that the total amount sought in the complaints is approximately P2.7
million for each of the plaintiff claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have
jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City.
2. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for
otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend
upon the defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is
the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in
the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief
sought are the ones to be consulted.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant
companies constitute a quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for
damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual
claims of approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which
obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the
RTCs.
3. It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they
dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the
mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had occurred outside
and beyond the territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., “the
manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in containers, their
distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their
becoming part of the stream of commerce,” and, hence, outside the
jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or
the situs of the act complained of, would be determinative of
jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal civil actions, such
as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action
to be commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the
plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims
of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are available only in the
Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines,
either in General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific
areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are
within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA,
et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed their claims for damages. Third,
the testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses,
such as doctors, co-workers, family members and other members of
the community, would be easier to gather in the Philippines.
----
Re: Jurisdiction over the person
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the defendant companies.
All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly appeared and
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo. All the
defendant companies submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
courts a quo by making several voluntary appearances, by praying for
various affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating during the
course of the proceedings below.
In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the
Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, held that jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary
appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons. Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the
proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction
and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar
said party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.
---
Jurisdiction v Exercise of Jurisdiction
It may also be pertinently stressed that “jurisdiction” is different from
the “exercise of jurisdiction.” Jurisdiction refers to the authority to
decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein.
Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants and the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo,
the decision on all questions arising therefrom is but an exercise of
such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise
of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect
its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the
jurisdiction over the case.
18. CASE: KAZUHIRO HAZEGAWA & NIPPON VS KITAMURA
FACTS:
Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm
providing technical and management support in the infrastructure
projects national permanently residing in the Philippines. The
agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services
to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as the project
manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When
the STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged the
consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering
& construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement
(BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manger in the
contract.
Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division,
informed Kitamaru that the company had no more intention of
automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the
company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project.
Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon
insisted that Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term that had expired.
Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of
Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.
Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed
by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no
jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamaru’s ICA
could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan
following the principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle
of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because
nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put
in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of
lex loci solutionis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in
civil cases for specific performance & damages involving contracts
executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on
the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, “the state of the
most significant relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens.
HELD:
NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive
phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and
enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct
concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant
to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether
the application of a substantive law w/c will determine the merits of
the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does
not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum
law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide,
the “minimum contacts” for one do not always provide the necessary
“significant contacts” for the other. The question of whether the law of
a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of
whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction. Jurisdiction,
however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power
to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the
plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject
matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property,
over the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. In assailing
the trial court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually referring to
subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is
conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and organizes the
court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is
further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must
show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to
it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.
In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is
not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject
controversy for a civil case for specific performance & damages is one
not capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the
RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise as grounds to question subject
matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex
contractus, and the “state of the most significant relationship rule.”
The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony”
or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex
contractus or lex loci contractus means the “law of the place where a
contract is executed or to be performed.” It controls the nature,
construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them
either expressly or implicitly. Under the “state of the most significant
relationship rule,” to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the
court should determine which state has the most substantial
connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a
contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was
negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business,
or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account
several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.
Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law
applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the 2nd phase, the
choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in
resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as
the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are
not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.
Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is
exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict
between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law
should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation
requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the
law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the
solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and
proved.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign
element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are
3 alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case,
either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction
over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the
internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and
take into account or apply the law of some other State or States. The
court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the
Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of
foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short
of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding
rights provided by foreign sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used
to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a
motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does
not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be entertained
or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the
facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of
the RTC. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the
propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly
considered a matter of defense.
19. CASE: MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST VS GUERRERO
FACTS:
Respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally
withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with
the Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature
verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his account.
The Bank filed its Answer alleging that by stipulation Guerrero’s
account is governed by New York law and this law does not permit any
of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank
filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking the
dismissal of Guerrero’s claims for consequential, nominal, temperate,
moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees on the same
ground alleged in its Answer. The Bank contended that the trial should
be limited to the issue of actual damages.
The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the
Bank’s claim that Guerrero’s bank account stipulated that the
governing law is New York law and that this law bars all of the claims
except actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office in NY
authenticated the Walden affidavit.
The CA ruled that even if an affidavit was submitted, they still have to
go through trial as provided for in the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the bank still has to undergo trial despite submitting an
affidavit, which under the law in NY is already sufficient?
HELD:
There is still a need to go to trial in the case at bar.
The Bank filed its motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court which reads:
Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. – A
party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time,
move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
his favor as to all or any part thereof.
A court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case
if, on motion of either party, there appears from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact
are involved, except the amount of damages. In such event, the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the
issues raised in the pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious, as shown by
affidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the motion?
A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation
of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or
contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
The parties’ respective pleadings would show that there are genuine
issues of fact that necessitate formal trial. Guerrero’s complaint before
the RTC contains a statement of the ultimate facts on which he relies
for his claim for damages. He is seeking damages for what he asserts
as "illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking
account with the Bank, a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to
signature verification problems, and unauthorized conversion of his
account." In its Answer, the Bank set up its defense that the agreed
foreign law to govern their contractual relation bars the recovery of
damages other than actual. Apparently, facts are asserted in
Guerrero’s complaint while specific denials and affirmative defenses
are set out in the Bank’s answer.
There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in
issue or where material allegations of the pleadings are in dispute. The
resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual
damages is a question of fact as far as the trial court is concerned
since foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts. Foreign laws
are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether
New York law or Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims present a
clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a
trial on the merits.
Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Banks
motion for partial summary judgment and the Walden affidavit just
because he failed to file an opposing affidavit. The Bank still had the
burden of proving New York law and jurisprudence even if Guerrero
did not present an opposing affidavit.
20. CASE: CATALAN VS CATALAN – LEE
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June
4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United
States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof.
After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April
1988.
Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married
respondent Meropein Calasiao, Pangasinan. Contending that said
marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage
with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando
and Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause
of action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it
was denied. Trial on the merits ensued. On October 10, 2000, the RTC
rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the respondent before appellate court and
ruled in favor of her reversing the decision of the trial court. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was dismissed by the
appellate court.
Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents,
which brought embarrassment to her and her children, confers upon
her an interest to seek judicial remedy to address her grievances and
to protect her family from further embarrassment and humiliation. She
claims that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not
declaring the marriage void despite overwhelming evidence and the
state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of
bigamy.
HELD:
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we
cannot rule on the issue of whether petitioner has the personality to
file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may
have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained
was a limited divorce oramensaetthoro; or the foreign law may restrict
remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. In such
case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the
respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in evidence
two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the
Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959
between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,and the other, in
Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.
However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which,
following the national law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the
Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal
personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no
longer has any interest nor should each have the personality to inquire
into the marriage that the other might subsequentlycontract. x x x
Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in
Orlando’s subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect
or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced
status of Orlando and Felicitas.
In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity
of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the
divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the
case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary
to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce
decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or
restricts remarriage.
If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same
did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court
should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio
but reduce the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to
P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00.
On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss
the instant case.
21. CASE: SAN LUIS VS SAN LUIS
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis (Rodolfo San Luis’s dad)
contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit
on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August 11,
1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin,
with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971,
Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before
the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad
San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with
Felicidad but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Upon death of his dad, Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their
Felicisimo’s conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, Felicidad filed a petition for
letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Rodolfo claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the
petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter,
at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus,
she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by
virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code.
Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate Felicidad’s bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Felicidad may file for letters of administration over
Felicisimo’s estate.
HELD:
he divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the
legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence
to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as
the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof
of its authenticity and due execution must be presented.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1)
an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized
in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage
Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California
which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance
with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
22. CASE: MINORU FUJIKI VS MARINAY
FACTS
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on
January 23, 2004. Sadly, petitioner Fujiki could not bring respondent
Marinay back to Japan and they eventually lost contact with one
another. In 2008, Marinay met Shinichi Maekara and they married
without the earlier marriage being dissolved.
Marinay suffered abuse from Maekara and so she left him and was
able to reestablish contact with Fujiki and rekindle their relationship.
The couple was able to obtain a judgment in a Japanese court that
declared Marinay's marriage to Maekara void on the ground of bigamy
in 2010. Fujiki then filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)”. In this case, petitioner prayed that:
(1) The Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;
and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such
annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it did not
meet standing and venue requirements as prescribed on the Rule on
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), specifically,
only the spouses (i.e. Marimay or Maekara) may file an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Petitioner in a Motion for
Reconsideration claimed that the case should not be dismissed as the
above rule applied only to cases of annulment of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity and not in a petition for recognition
of a foreign judgment.
Notably, when the Solicitor General was asked for comment, it agreed
with the Petitioner stating that the above rule should not apply to
cases of bigamy and that insofar as the Civil Registrar and the NSO are
concerned, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provide the procedure to be
followed. Lastly, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108,
citing De Castro v. De Castro and Niñal v. Bayadog which declared that
“[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition
to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
HELD:
YES. Firstly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,
this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”
The Supreme Court further held that:
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a
fact under the Rules of Court.
To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted
in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25,
in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who
has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a
foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in
Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
xxx
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void
does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it
were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the
foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment
on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is
under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.
xxx
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact
the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines
has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation
to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. Article 26 of the Family
Code further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides that “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.”
Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate the
proceedings.
23. CASE: LWV CONSTRUCTION vs DUPO
FACTS:
Petitioner, a domestic corporation, which recruits Filipino workers,
hired respondent as Civil Structural Superintendent to work in Saudi
Arabia for its principal, Mohammad Al-Mojil Group/Establishment
(MMG). On February 26, 1992, respondent signed his first overseas
employment contract, renewable after one year. It was renewed five
times on the following dates: May 10, 1993, November 16, 1994,
January 22, 1996, April 14, 1997, and March 26, 1998. All were fixed-
period contracts for one year. The sixth and last contract stated that
respondent's employment starts upon reporting to work and ends
when he leaves the work site.
Respondent left Saudi Arabia on April 30, 1999 and arrived in the
Philippines on May 1, 1999. On May 28, 1999, respondent informed
MMG, through the petitioner, that he needs to extend his vacation
because his son was hospitalized. He also sought a promotion with
salary adjustment.
In reply, MMG informed respondent that his promotion is subject to
management's review; that his services are still needed; that he was
issued a plane ticket for his return flight to Saudi Arabia on May 31,
1999; and that his decision regarding his employment must be made
within seven days, otherwise, MMG "will be compelled to cancel his
slot." On July 6, 1999, respondent resigned.
Under the Law of Saudi Arabia, an employee who rendered at least
five (5) years in a company within the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia, is
entitled to the so-called long service award which is known to others
as longevity pay of at least one half month pay for every year of
service. In excess of five years an employee is entitled to one month
pay for every year of service. In both cases inclusive of all benefits and
allowances.
ISSUE:
1. WON respondent is entitled to a service award or longevity pay
of US$12,640.33 under the provisions of the Saudi Labor Law;
and
2. WON prescription barred respondent's claim for service award as
the complaint was filed one year and seven months after the
sixth contract ended.
RULING:
Respondent's service award under Article 87 of the Saudi Labor Law
has already been paid.
Article 87 clearly grants a service award. It reads:
Article 87 Where the term of a labor contract concluded for a specified
period comes to an end or where the employer cancels a contract of
unspecified period, the employer shall pay to the workman an award
for the period of his service to be computed on the basis of half a
month's pay for each of the first five years and one month's pay for
each of the subsequent years. The last rate of pay shall be taken as
basis for the computation of the award. For fractions of a year, the
workman shall be entitled to an award which is proportionate to his
service period during that year. Furthermore, the workman shall be
entitled to the service award provided for at the beginning of this
article in the following cases:
A. If he is called to military service.
B. If a workman resigns because of marriage or childbirth.
C. If the workman is leaving the work as a result of a force majeure
beyond his control.(Emphasis supplied.)
On the matter of prescription, however, we cannot agree with
petitioner that respondent's action has prescribed under Article 13 of
the Saudi Labor Law. What applies is Article 291 of our Labor Code
which reads:
ART. 291. Money claims. -- All money claims arising from employer-
employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be
filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued;
otherwise they shall be forever barred.
In Cadalin v. POEA's Administrator, we held that Article 291 covers all
money claims from employer-employee relationship and is broader in
scope than claims arising from a specific law. It is not limited to money
claims recoverable under the Labor Code, but applies also to claims of
overseas contract workers.
Thus, in our considered view, respondent's complaint was filed well
within the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of our Labor
Code. This point, however, has already been mooted by our finding
that respondent's service award had been paid, albeit the payroll
termed such payment as severance pay.
24. CASE: ATCI OVERSEAS, ET AL. VS ECHIN
FACTS:
Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in behalf of its principal
co-petitioner, Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of
medical technologist under a two-year contract with a monthly salary
of US$1,200.00.
Within a year, Respondent was terminated for not passing the
probationary period which was under the Memorandum of Agreement.
Ministry denied respondent‘s request and she returned to the
Philippines shouldering her own fair.
Respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
a complaint against ATCI for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered
judgment in favor of respondent and ordered ATCI to pay her
$3,600.00, her salary for the three months unexpired portion of the
contract.
ATCI appealed Labor Arbiter‘s decision, however, NLRC affirmed the
latter‘s decision and denied petitioner ATCI‘s motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner appealed to the Court Appeals contending that their principal
being a foreign government agency is immune from suit, and as such,
immunity extended to them.
Appellate Court affirmed NLRC‘s decision. It noted that under the law,
a private employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the
implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker;
hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for
any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.
Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this present
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners be held liable considering that the contract
specifically stipulates that respondent‘s employment shall be governed
by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait.
Ruling:
Court denied the petition. According to RA 8042: “The obligations
covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between
the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with the
term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide
to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the
contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the
same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment
contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the
said recruitment agreement. In international law, the party who wants
to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law.
Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved,
the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we
apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before
us.
25. CASE: BANK OF AMERICA VS CA
FACTS:
Eduardo K. Litonjua, Sr. and Aurelio J. Litonjua (Litonjuas) were
engaged in the shipping business owning 2 vessels: Don Aurelio and El
Champion. Because their business was doing well, Bank of America
(BA) offered them to take a loan for them to increase their ships.
BA acquired through them as borrowers four more ships: (a) El
Carrier; (b) El General; (c) El Challenger; and (d) El Conqueror. The
registration, operation, income, funds, possession of the vessel
belonged to the corporation.
May 10, 1993: Litonjuas filed a complaint in the RTC of Pasig City
claiming that during its operations and the foreclosure sale, BA as
trutees failed to fully render an account of the income. They lost all
their 6 vessels and 10% of their personal funds and they still have an
unpaid balance of their loans. BA NT&SA, and BA international filed a
Motion to Dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens and lack of
cause of action against them
ISSUE:
1. W/N there is grounds of forum non conveniens
2. W/N there is litis pendentia
HELD: Denied
The doctrine of forum non-conveniens, literally meaning 'the forum is
inconvenient', emerged in private international law to deter the
practice of global forum shopping
Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking
remedies elsewhere.
Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said
doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to
do so; provided, that the following requisites are met:
(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to; - present
(2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent
decision as to the law and the facts; and, - present
(3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce
its decision - present
This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do
so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the court's desistance; and that the propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens
requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly considered
a matter of defense.
26. CASE: EDI-STAFFBUILDERS VS NLRC/GRAN
FACTS:
Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI, and deployed by ESI (another
recruitment agency) to work for OAB, in Riyadh, KSA. After Gran had
been working for about five months for OAB, his employment was
terminated through OAB's letter, based on: (1) non-compliance to
contract requirements by the recruitment agency primarily on the
salary and contract duration; (2) Non-compliance to pre-qualification
requirements by the recruitment agency, OAB; and (3) insubordination
or disobedience to Top Management Order and/or instructions (i.e.
non-submittal of daily activity reports despite several instructions).
Gran received from OAB the total amount of SR 2,948.00 representing
his final pay, and thereafter, executed a declaration releasing OAB
from any financial obligation.
Upon arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a complaint, against
ESI/EDI and OAB inter alia, with the NLRC - NCR, Quezon City, for
underpayment of wages/salaries and illegal dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gran's dismissal is justifiable by reason of
incompetence, insubordination, and disobedience.
HELD:
EDI failed to prove that Gran was justifiably dismissed due to
incompetence, insubordination, or willful disobedience. In illegal
dismissal cases, it has been established by Philippine law and
jurisprudence that the employer should prove that the dismissal of
employees or personnel is legal and just.
In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and
between the OFW, the local recruiter/agent, and the foreign
employer/principal are governed by the employment contract. A
contract freely entered into is considered law between the parties
hence, should be respected.
The employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi
Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g.
specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being
the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the
contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the
termination of the employment of Gran.
However, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign
law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved
as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign
law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for EDI, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the
matter; thus, the doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or,
even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is
the same as ours. Thus, Philippine labor laws was applied in this case.
According to Philippine laws, incompetence may be shown by weighing
it against a standard, benchmark, or criterion. However, EDI failed to
establish any such bases to show how EDI found Gran incompetent.
Likewise, in order to justify willful disobedience, it must be determined
whether the order violated by the employee is reasonable, lawful,
made known to the employee, and pertains to the duties which he had
been engaged to discharge. In the case at bar, EDI failed to show that
the order of the company which was violated—the submission of "Daily
Activity Reports"—was part of Gran's duties as a Computer Specialist.
An allegation of incompetence should have a factual foundation.
Hence, petition is denied.
27. CASE: ASIAVEST LIMITED VS CA
FACTS:
In 1984, a Hong Kong court ordered Antonio Heras to pay US$1.8
million or its equivalent, with interest, to Asiavest Ltd. Apparently,
Heras guaranteed a certain loan in Hong Kong and the debtor in said
loan defaulted hence, the creditor, Asiavest, ran after Heras. But
before said judgment was issued and even during trial, Heras already
left for good Hong Kong and he returned to the Philippines. So when in
1987, when Asiavest filed a complaint in court seeking to enforce the
foreign judgment against Heras, the latter claim that he never received
any summons, not in Hong Kong and not in the Philippines. He also
claimed that he never received a copy of the foreign judgment.
Asiavest however contends that Heras was actually given service of
summons when a messenger from the Sycip Salazar Law Firm served
said summons by leaving a copy to one Dionisio Lopez who was Heras’
son in law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign judgment can be enforced against Heras in
the Philippines.
HELD:
No. Although the foreign judgment was duly authenticated (Asiavest
was able to adduce evidence in support thereto) and Heras was never
able to overcome the validity of it, it cannot be enforced against Heras
here in the Philippines because Heras was not properly served
summons. Hence, as far as Philippine law is concerned, the Hong Kong
court has never acquired jurisdiction over Heras. This means then that
Philippine courts cannot act to enforce the said foreign judgment.
The action against Heras is an action in personam and as far as Hong
Kong is concerned, Heras is a non resident. He is a non resident
because prior to the judgment, he already abandoned Hong Kong.
The Hong Kong law on service of summons in in personam cases
against non residents was never presented in court hence processual
presumption is applied where it is now presumed that Hong Kong law
in as far as this case is concerned is the same as Philippine laws. And
under our laws, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a
non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority
of the court, personal service of summons within the state is essential
to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method of
service is possible if such defendant is physically present in the
country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide
the case against him. Without a personal service of summons, the
Hong Kong court never acquired jurisdiction. Needless to say, the
summons tendered to Lopez was an invalid service because the same
does not satisfy the requirement of personal service.

28. CASE: CORPUZ VS STO. TOMAS

FACTS:
Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized
Canadian, married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He soon left to
Canada after their wedding due to work commitments. He returned to
Philippines on April 2005 only to find out Daisylyn has an affair with
another man. Gerbert returned to Canada to file a divorce that took
effect on January 2006.

Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in
the Philippines. He went to Pasig City Registrar's Office to register his
Canadian divorce decree but was denied considering that his marriage
with Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law, that the foregin
divorce must be recognized judicially by the Philippine court.

Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial

recognition of foreign divorce but was subsequently denied since he is
not the proper party and according to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only
a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of

recognition of the foreign divorce decree

HELD:

The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in
favor of Filipino spouses. The legislative intent of Article 26 is for the
benefit of the clarification of the marital status of the Filipino spouse.

Art. 26 (2) was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying
his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, Art. 26 (2) provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without
Art. 26 (2), the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce,
whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond.

An action based on Art. 26 (2) is not limited to the recognition of the

foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated
the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. However,
no Philippine court can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse,
whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national
law.