Questions & Answers-for-Political-Law-for-Issue-Spotting

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Questions for Political Law

Q1: Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 20 provides that the Secretary of
Justice may issue a Hold-Departure Order (HDO), a Watchlist Order (WLO),
and a Allow Departure Order (ADO). A person against whom an HDO or WLO
has been issued cannot leave the country unless an ADO was issued by the
Secretary of Justice. Does the Secretary of Justice have the authority to issue
HDOs, WLOs, and ADOs?

- No. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that the liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.

Further, in the case of Genuino v. Hon. De Lima, a case which has the same
factual milieu in the problem presented above held that the right to travel and
of impairing the same can only be made by a lawful order of the court.

Here, the HDO, WLO and the ADO were issued by the DOJ which is an
administrative agency. The Supreme Court in that case further held that the
acts of the DOJ secretary in issuing the assailed orders has no legal basis. To
quote the Supreme Court, “the questioned circular does not come under the
inherent power of the executive department to adopt rules and regulations as
clearly the issuance of HDO and WLO is not the DOJ's business.

Wherefore, premises considered, the Secretary of Justice has no authority to


issue the said orders.

Q2: A time came when people started to realize that they might be paying too
high a price in allowing the President to trample upon the human rights of the
citizens. When specific acts were sufficiently documented and charges were
about to be filed in the courts, the lawyers of the Chief Executive sought to
restrain any such action, especially criminal cases, from being filed against the
President, arguing that the President is immune from suit during his
incumbency. Further, he could not be charged with a crime where conviction
results in removal from office as the only way to remove him is to have him
convicted in an impeachment proceeding. Even assuming that he could be
charged criminally, he could always pardon himself in advance, just like what is
being said about the present American President. Are the arguments of the
President's lawyers valid?

- Yes. The concept of presidential immunity from suit is rooted in the nature of
the office of the President, in his power of control over the Executive branch,
and in ordinary legislation. Although the 1987 Constitution does not
specifically state that the President is immune from suit, however, in the
unanimous 2019 En Banc decision in Leila de Lima v. President Rodrigo
Duterte, penned by Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the President’s immunity from suit, quoting the 2006 case of David
v. Macapagal-Arroyo:

“Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office
of the President, the head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance
of his official duties and functions.”

Guided by the above ruling, the arguments of the President’s lawyers are valid.

Q3:Petitioner applied for the position of RTC Judge. The Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the
said stations because of the JBC’s long-standing policy of opening the chance for
promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have
served in their current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been
a MTC judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. Petitioner filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC assailing the policy as
unconstitutional and as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. The Respondent JBC contended that the petition
for certiorari and prohibition was not proper since the JBC was not acting in a
judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial capacity when it issued its policy. Is the JBC’s
contention correct?

Yes. Case law provides that the Supreme Court exercises oversight or
supervision over the JBC and the rule-making powers of the Supreme Court is
limited to certain guidelines.

Further, JBC is correct when it denied the petition on the ground that the
applicant has been a judge in the MTC for only a year. There was a valid
classification between judges in the first level courts and second level courts in
this case.

Hence, the JBC’s contention is correct.

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