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Dominance and Leadership in The International Economy
Dominance and Leadership in The International Economy
Dominance and Leadership in The International Economy
Free Rides
Author(s): Charles P. Kindleberger
Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, Symposium in Honor of Hans J.
Morgenthau (Jun., 1981), pp. 242-254
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600355
Accessed: 28-02-2017 04:57 UTC
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Dominance and Leadership
in the International Economy
Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER
Department of Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
242
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Kindleberger / INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 243
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244 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
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Kindleberger / INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 245
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246 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
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Kindleberger / INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 247
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248 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
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Kindleberger / INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 249
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250 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
2. Barnet and Muller (1975) hint darkly that the energy crisis was contrived by the oil
companies to raise their profits, saying, "The extent to which the crisis was a result of con-
spiracy may not be known until historians are given access to the oil companies' equivalent
of the Pentagon Papers." The correct position, in my judgment, is set out in Goodsell
(1974: 85): "Our evidence suggests that rather than being in conspiratorial alliance with
oligarchic elites, the (foreign) businessmen share with them a certain number of goals and
values." Conspiracy is, of course, possible, but I believe that most times its appearance is
the result of like-minded people, similarly placed, responding in the same way to the same
stimulus.
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Kindleberger / INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 251
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252 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
I choose not to discuss item 3, which sets limits to free rides within
national states, on the ground that its idealistic and visionary
character is self-evident. Free riding or escape from what was
believed to be excessive burdens by a regional unit might have to
take the form of secession, but there seems no doubt that in the
present state of inadequate sense of world social and political
cohesion, it would do so.
For as far ahead as today's social scientists can see, I think it is
necessary to organize the international community-both related
to policy and economy alike-on the basis of leadership. Entropy
is inevitable. After breakdown, there follows a long, drawn-out,
and dangerous process of establishing a new basis of legitimacy,
under a new leader. Self-consciousness in the role does not appear
to be a help, and will make many candidates, as today in the
economic field (Germany, Japan and Switzerland), hesitant and
shy. But leadership to provide the public good of stability, prop-
erly regarded, misunderstood as exploitation, or sniped at by free
riders, seems a poor system, but like democracy, honesty, and
stable marriages, is better than the available alternatives.
I should perhaps add that I have not discussed the possibilities
of a compromise among these systems, where two or more coun-
tries take on the task of providing leadership together, thus
adding to legitimacy, sharing the burdens, and reducing the
danger that leadership is regarded cynically as a cloak for domi-
nation and exploitation. In 193 1, the suggestion was widespread
that France and the United States together make a big loan to
Germany. The French insisted on political conditions, the United
States was unwilling to throw good money after bad, although
that is the crux of rediscounting in a crisis.
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Kindleberger / INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 253
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254 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
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