Int Environ Agreements (2016) 16:91–108

DOI 10.1007/s10784-014-9244-7

ORIGINAL PAPER

Africa in the global climate change negotiations

Charles Roger • Satishkumar Belliethathan

Accepted: 31 January 2014 / Published online: 14 February 2014

 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract The African Group of Negotiators (AGN) has become a much more significant
bargaining coalition in the global climate change negotiations. It has been participating
more proactively and on a much more significant scale, and, as a result, it has had a greater
impact on bargaining outcomes, notably in Nairobi, Copenhagen and Durban. Yet, at
present, the group remains poorly understood by both scholars and policymakers. Com-
pared to other groups in the climate negotiations, such as the Group of 77 and Alliance of
Small Island States, it has received relatively little attention. This paper fills this gap by
tracking the evolution of the AGN over the course of the climate change negotiations. In
the early years after the Earth Summit, it shows that the AGN faced tremendous difficulties
pursing regional objectives effectively, largely due to a number of ‘‘internal’’ barriers to
participation, which compounded the structural barriers that the continent faced by making
it difficult to use ‘‘low-power’’ negotiating strategies such as coalition building, agenda-
setting and persuasion. However, in recent years, the group has become much more pro-
active as a result of greater access to material, ideational and institutional resources. These
have relieved, somewhat, the internal barriers that the group faced, making it possible for
the AGN to negotiate much more confidently and effectively than before.

Keywords African Group
Climate change
Negotiations
UNFCCC

Bargaining groups

C. Roger (&)
Department of Political Science, The University of British Columbia, C425-1866 Main Mall,
Vancouver V6T 1Z1, Canada
e-mail: c.roger@alumni.ubc.ca

S. Belliethathan
Horn of Africa Regional Environment Centre, College of Natural Sciences, Addis Ababa University,
Graduate Programme Building, 9th Floor, Room 903, Addis Ababa 80773, Ethiopia

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1 Introduction

African states are likely to be among those most severely affected by climate change. By
2100, average temperatures across the continent are expected to rise by around 3–4 C,
leading to economic, environmental and epidemiological shifts with potentially severe
implications for human well-being (IPCC 2007). According to the World Bank (2010),
climate change will exacerbate existing developmental challenges and could cost Africa as
much as 4 % of its gross domestic product (GDP) each year. The region therefore has a
major stake in the success of the global climate change negotiations that were initiated with
the signing of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
at the Rio ‘‘Earth Summit’’ in 1992.
However, obtaining favorable outcomes in the negotiations has been a continual chal-
lenge. To boost their collective influence, African states have sought to advance their
interests through several negotiating blocs. They have done so, first, through the Group of
77 and China (G77/China) coalition, which has played a major role in the climate change
negotiations to date (Williams 2005). Many have also participated in the Alliance of Small
Island States (AOSIS), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and, more
recently, the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Group,
the Like-Minded Developing Countries and the BASIC group. Finally, they have worked
together as a regional coalition known as the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), the
only regional (as opposed to issue-based) developing country coalition that has consistently
operated in the climate negotiations since their inception in the early 1990s.
Of these bargaining groups, the AGN is especially interesting because of the unique way
it has evolved over the course of the UNFCCC negotiations. For most of this time, it was a
relatively minor coalition. Despite the large number of states involved, it had little success
influencing negotiating outcomes. Its impact on the design of the clean development
mechanism (CDM), for instance, was distinctly limited, despite its great importance to the
African continent. As a result, the group was largely ignored by scholars studying bar-
gaining coalitions in the UNFCCC, in contrast with others, such as G77/China and AOSIS,
which were influential from a very early stage.1 In recent years, however, the AGN has
become a much more important group (Vickers 2013). This first became clear in 2006, at
the 12th Conference of the Parties (COP12), which took place in Nairobi, Kenya. There,
African states appeared to play a much more significant agenda-setting role, putting
adaptation and CDM capacity building at the center of the talks. This high level of
engagement was also evident in Copenhagen and Durban, where the AGN played a
prominent brokering role, particularly in the negotiations on climate finance and those that
underpinned the Durban Platform. Occasionally, the AGN would also use its symbolic
position as a highly vulnerable group of states to exert pressure, staging walkouts and
protests of various kinds. Overall, the group’s approach to the negotiations has been more
dynamic, and its increasingly assertive bargaining has led to important successes. Inter-
estingly, this has occurred while other ‘‘traditional’’ coalitions of developing states such as
AOSIS appear to have encountered greater difficulties (Betzold et al. 2012).

1
The few accounts of the AGN’s activities include Eleri (1997), Maya and Churie (1997), Mumma (2000/
2001), Gray and Gupta (2003), and, more recently, Masters (2011) and Vickers (2013). However, these
studies have primarily focused on evaluating the appropriateness of the AGN’s positions. They have not
generally attempted to account for Africa’s comparative success or failure at different points, as other
accounts have done for the G77/China (Williams 2005; Kasa et al. 2008) and AOSIS (Chasek 2005; Betzold
et al. 2012).

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How have African states managed to become more influential in recent years? This is
the question we address in this paper. Our research involved 20 semi-structured interviews2
undertaken in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and Nairobi, Kenya, in April and May 2011 and June
2012, with AGN negotiators from ten African states, as well as officials from the United
Nations (UN), the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN), the
African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Union (AU) and several civil society
organizations. Based on this research, we argue that Africa’s success in recent negotiations
has primarily been a result of improvements in the region’s negotiating capacity. During
the early negotiations, the AGN suffered from a number of constraints, such as inadequate
resources, limited access to high-quality information and poor negotiating skills, which
made it difficult for African states to bargain effectively, both individually and as a group.
These barriers hindered their ability to make use of ‘‘low-power’’ bargaining strategies,
such as coalition building, agenda-setting and persuasion, when common interests were at
stake. However, a number of factors then helped to reduce these barriers, allowing African
states to use such strategies more effectively. Though this has not always translated into
success, these changes have, on balance, allowed African states to have a much more
significant impact on the course of the negotiations than they did in the past.
The paper begins with a discussion of Africa’s early experience in the global climate
negotiations. After a brief overview of the AGN’s origins in the UN system, the first half
provides evidence showing that the group was unable to achieve its objectives in early
years due to the considerable internal obstacles the group faced, which compounded the
continent’s already marginal ‘‘structural’’ position in the UNFCCC. In particular, Africa’s
involvement in the negotiations that established the CDM after Kyoto is used to demon-
strate how a lack of funds, insufficient access to high-quality information and human
resources, and a limited mandate from African leaders made it difficult for the AGN to
convert the group’s ‘‘latent’’ power—mainly, its large membership and symbolic position
as a group of highly vulnerable states—into real power over outcomes. In the second half
of the paper, we then demonstrate the greater impact that the AGN has had in recent years
and discuss the factors underpinning this shift. In the main, three factors have made this
possible. First, African negotiators have been able to persuade leaders to devote a larger
share of scarce domestic resources to the negotiations due to largely exogenous
improvements in information about the costs of climate change and new opportunities at
the international level. They have also gained access to more support from multilateral and
bilateral donors. Second, following the example of similarly positioned groups such as
AOSIS, experts from outside government have been incorporated into official delegations
at the end of the 2000s, improving both the size and quality of African delegations at
relatively low cost. Finally, we argue that the new institutional mechanisms that have been
established to facilitate dialogue between African leaders and technical negotiators have
allowed the latter to operate much more confidently than before.

2 African Groups in the UN system

African cooperation in international diplomacy dates from at least as far back as the early
period of decolonization in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Endeley 2009). As Africa’s

2
Interviews are referenced anonymously and numbered 1–20. ‘‘A’’ indicates an interviewee is (or was) an
African negotiator. ‘‘IO’’ indicates that an interviewee is from an intergovernmental organization. ‘‘CS’’
indicates that an interviewee is from a civil society organization.

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94 C. Roger, S. Belliethathan

states became independent, three competing coalitions of nations emerged in the UN

General Assembly (GA)—the Brazzaville, Casablanca and Monrovia Groups. In 1963, as
the Organization for African Unity (OAU) was established, these were then merged into a
single regional coalition known as the African Group of the Whole (AGW), which aimed
to improve cooperation on issues affecting the continent as a whole. As one of only five
officially-recognized regional caucusing groups in the UN, the AGW played an especially
important role. Above all, it was responsible for selecting which African states would hold
the region’s non-permanent seats on the Security Council, and as the single largest cau-
cusing group in the GA its support was often instrumental for any major diplomatic
initiatives.
The AGW’s ability to increase African influence in the GA subsequently made it
relatively commonplace for similar ‘‘African Groups’’ to form in other diplomatic forums.
‘‘African Groups’’ appeared in major diplomatic centers (in Geneva, for instance) and in a
wide variety of international negotiations, from those related to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade to those surrounding the Convention to Combat Desertification. The
AGW also provided a fairly standard model for such ‘‘offshoots.’’ Subsequent African
Groups tended to adopt the AGW’s formal structure, albeit with some degree of local
variation, as is discussed below. And, to some extent, the AGW itself loosely interacts with
these offshoots as well.

3 African diplomacy at the Earth Summit and beyond

This tradition of African cooperation in international diplomacy meant that during the
preparatory negotiations for the Earth Summit in 1992, it was quite natural for African states
to initiate their own regional preparatory meetings to coordinate a common approach to the
issues on the agenda. They had done so informally, on the issue of climate change, at the
Noordwijk Ministerial Conference of 1989, the first high-level intergovernmental meeting
to address climate change, which involved a group of 15 African states. But the goal of
doing so was first explicitly established at the OAU Abuja Summit of Heads of State in
May–June 1991, which officially recognized the need to develop an African ‘‘common
position’’ so that pan-African concerns would be adequately voiced in Rio. The First
Regional African Ministerial Preparatory Conference for the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) was subsequently held in Cairo in July 1991. A
series of meetings and workshops then fleshed out specific elements of Africa’s approach
with assistance from the AfDB, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the
UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the UN Sudano-Sahelian Office. The
fruit of these labors—the African common position on the African Environment and
Development (UNECA 1992)—was announced at the Second Regional African Ministerial
Conference for the UNCED, held in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, in November 1991.
The 1991 common position, which marked the first occasion in which all African states
officially addressed the issue of climate change as a group, established many principles that
would become commonplace in African environmental diplomacy over the next
10–20 years. For example, it asserted the priority of economic development, improvement
of quality of life and the reduction in poverty over environmental considerations. It
maintained that food and energy security were vital concerns for African governments and
affirmed their sovereignty over the use of natural resources. In order to achieve sustainable
development, the common position called for large financial transfers, transfers of tech-
nology and capacity building programs. The document also promoted adherence to the

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‘‘precautionary principle,’’ stating that ‘‘arguments based on ‘reasonable doubt’ should not
be used as an excuse for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation or for
addressing emerging issues such as climate change and global warming’’ (UNECA 1992,
pp. 10). Most of these principles were similar to those embraced by other countries in the
G77/China coalition. However, the common position also emphasized the connection
between global warming, drought and desertification, arguing for an international affor-
estation and reforestation initiative north and south of the Sahara and Kalahari deserts that
would both halt desertification and reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
Largely adhering to the principles set out in the common position, African negotiators
were involved in the UNCED process from an early stage. However, at the time, climate
change was a rather less important issue for African states compared to desertification
(Interview 2-IO). The region’s strong advocacy in favor of an agreement on desertification
departed significantly from the position taken by the broader G77/China coalition, as
Najam (2004) has discussed. Within the Earth Summit’s climate negotiations, in particular,
several African states were important interlocuters. But, overall, Africa largely followed
the lead of the G77/China, and especially states such as China and India (Mumma 2000/
2001; Interviews 2-IO, 10-A and 18-A). Insofar as the AGN elaborated a distinct position
in the climate negotiations, this distinctness was largely due to links drawn with the issue
of desertification. At the fourth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee,
for instance, African states advocated a ‘‘Green Plan’’ for reforestation and forest man-
agement in order to improve Africa’s ability to absorb GHGs while, at the same time,
reducing drought and desertification (Eleri 1997).
Only when the official meetings of the UNFCCC began shortly after the conclusion of
the Earth Summit did African states became more directly invested in the climate nego-
tiations (Interviews 16-A and 2-IO). As elsewhere, the launch of a new set of negotiations
spurred the creation of a new ‘‘African Group’’ (the AGN) that would comprise all of the
African negotiators involved. As with other African Groups, this new coalition sought to
increase the region’s collective influence and, in doing so, followed the general model laid
down by the AGW.3 Like the AGW, the AGN was organized into five sub-groups rep-
resenting each African region. The members in each sub-group would select the AGN’s
chair from among their peers on a rotational basis in order to ensure equitable represen-
tation.4 The chair’s role would be to lead meetings of the AGN, to maintain discipline and
to act as the leading African negotiator. Unlike the AGW, however, the chair of the AGN
would serve a 2-year (as opposed to monthly) term, and their country would provide
secretarial services for the entire group (whereas the AGW has its own permanent Exec-
utive Secretariat based in New York). Led by the AGN chair, African negotiators would
typically meet in the days prior to meetings of the UNFCCC in order to coordinate their
approach to the issues that would be discussed, largely overlapping with similar meetings
of AOSIS, the G77/China and others. Periodically, the AGN would also receive guidance
from AMCEN, an intergovernmental body providing high-level leadership on environ-
mental issues and which usually convenes on a biennial basis.
However, while the AGN was active in all the early UNFCCC meetings, making a mark
on the negotiations was difficult. Compared to other groups, such as the G77/China, the
AGN had little impact on outcomes. The G77/China had significantly shaped the design of
the UNFCCC itself, as well as subsequent negotiations—perhaps most importantly with

3
Details on the AGN’s internal structure are from interviews 7-A and 14-A.
4
One difference here is that the chair of the AGW is selected alphabetically rather than by region. The
AGN’s procedure is instead akin to that used by the AGW’s Committee on Canditures. (see Endeley 2009).

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regard to the scope of non-Annex 1 commitments in the 1995 Berlin Mandate. While all
African countries were members of the G77/China and constituted a large share of the
group’s membership, they demonstrated little ability to act independently of the G77/China
or to greatly influence its positions. By and large, it was the bigger developing states
(including China, Brazil and India) that were more effective operators at the global level
that tended to informally (if not formally) lead the coalition (Williams 2005).
At the start of the negotiations key African issues were also broadly the same as those
facing other developing states: ensuring stable financing and technology transfer, limiting
commitments by developing nations and compelling industrialized states to adopt robust
commitments under Kyoto (Interviews 10-A, 16-A, and 18-A). Generally, there were few
disagreements among G77/China members on these matters, and therefore, the coalition
seemed to speak with a single voice (Williams 2005; Kasa et al. 2008). The AGN only
tended to become more active as an independent coalition when it became particularly
clear that Africa’s interests diverged from the rest of the G77/China coalition. One of the
notable early examples of this occurred during the meetings that established the CDM
framework in the years after Kyoto in 1997. The example is worth looking at more
carefully because it demonstrates the extent to which several ‘‘internal’’ constraints hin-
dered the AGN’s ability to operate independently of more powerful developing states. We
therefore consider it in greater detail in what follows.

4 Africa and the CDM negotiations

As the CDM proposal emerged in the UNFCCC negotiations, developing on the back of
the July 1997 Brazilian Proposal for a Clean Development Fund, African negotiators
became especially concerned by the leading negotiators’ lack of regard for the geographic
distribution of projects and their overall ‘‘developmental’’ benefits (Interviews 10-A, 16-A,
and 9-IO). The CDM’s architects envisioned the distribution of projects to be concentrated
in emerging economies (Cole 2012). This would be a product, primarily, of the market-
based character of the mechanism, which would give a distinct advantage to countries with
better functioning markets, as well as the mechanism’s emphasis on industrial projects.
With the acquiescence of larger emitters and pressure from industrialized states, the
CDM was adopted as one of the main flexibility mechanisms for helping Annex-1 coun-
tries meet their Kyoto commitments. But, after Kyoto, much remained to be done, as many
of the issues of institutional design had not been settled. AGN negotiators therefore began
discussions on how best to approach the CDM talks. Many of the key design issues were
the focus of a regional workshop hosted by UNEP and Ghana’s Environmental Protection
Agency in Accra in September 1998, as well as a previous meeting hosted by the UNFCCC
in Abijan, Côte d’Ivoire. On the basis of these preparatory meetings, an African common
position on the CDM was finalized at a special meeting of AMCEN in October and
eventually submitted to the UNFCCC in November. The common position set out a
number of African objectives related to the CDM, including the following:
• The CDM should operate ‘‘in principle through market-based mechanisms, but projects
should be allocated on an equitable regional/sub-regional basis;’’
• The need for ‘‘balanced geographical representation’’ on the CDM Executive Board
and capacity-building programs;
• Emphasis on both the environmental and developmental benefits of CDM projects;

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• A goal of establishing an adaptation fund that would be financed from a small tax on
CDM transactions (Quotations are all from UNFCCC 1998).
Advocacy of this position at COP4 led many to note that African states had become
more proactive. Depledge (1999), for instance, describes Buenos Aires as a period where
the assertiveness of the AGN had visibly grown. However, while it is clear that African
negotiators had managed to reach a common position in the talks—one that was even
opposed in some respects to positions taken by powerful states in the G77/China—their
impact on the CDM’s design was small. Once it was established, the CDM made no special
arrangements to ensure an equitable distribution of projects; indeed, the geographical
distribution of projects has been subsequently characterized by marked inequality, with
African states faring particularly poorly. Sustainable development was, on the other hand,
included as an objective of the CDM. However, the concept of sustainable development
that was used was narrow, focusing on the direct benefits of CDM projects (Cole 2012).
The wider notion embraced by African countries failed to gain traction among key parties,
such as Brazil and the United States (Interviews 10-A and 9-IO). Capacity-building pro-
grams and an adaptation fund, which would be financed by a levy on issued Certified
Emissions Reductions (CERs) as well as voluntary contributions by donors, were also
eventually adopted, but their establishment only occurred after a major increase in AGN
participation and an African campaign much later on in 2006. Initially, these proposals
amounted to little (Interviews 9-IO, 10-A and 18-A). The only clear successes for Africa at
this stage were a principled agreement on the need for an adaptation fund and measures to
ensure equitable representation on the CDM Executive Board, which both received support
from non-African states.
The AGN’s failed efforts to advocate a common position on the CDM underscored a
number of the problems that African negotiators had encountered since the start of the
UNFCCC negotiations. Many of these problems also beset developing states outside of
Africa (see Fisher and Green 2004). Yet in Africa they were particularly pronounced. First,
participating in climate change negotiations was costly, and the costs of taking part in
meetings tended to rise over time, especially as attending UNFCCC meetings became
progressively more burdensome (Gupta 2006). Demand for accommodations, support staff,
legal advisory services and travel often outstripped the resources that were available
(Interviews 18-A, 10-A and 9-IO). Delegations were small, and the number of documents
that had to be read and the number of meetings that needed to be attended frequently
overwhelmed the few delegates that did take part. Such challenges proved especially
problematic in the CDM negotiations. One of the key issues was Africa’s poor represen-
tation early on in the agenda-setting phase (Mumma 2000/2001). African states were not
major players in formulating key dimensions of the CDM proposal at Kyoto, which was
mainly negotiated after the formal meeting period when many AGN negotiators had left,
largely because UNFCCC-provided funds for travel5 only covered the formal meeting or
because visa requirements did not allow for an extended stay.6 Thus, due to a lack of
resources their role was largely reactionary, limited to adjusting at the margins a mecha-
nism that was already well developed by the time they concluded it was important to them.
Second, a lack of information, skills and expertise proved to be a major barrier to
meaningful participation. This made the use of persuasion tactics especially difficult, since
the AGN frequently had to rely on sources of information provided by Annex 1 countries

5
These typically cover the travel expenses of two negotiators per country.
6
We wish to thank Stephan Hoch for bringing this point to our attention.

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and had many inexperienced delegates (Interviews 9-IO and 18-A). Understanding all the
issues, putting forward well-thought-out proposals and providing new information that
could change the views of other states on issues such as the CDM’s design, depended upon
access to solid information and analyses of the various policy alternatives. However, the
analytical capabilities of individual African states were weak. Negotiating experience and
training was also in short supply. Particularly in the early negotiations, African states
tended to send climatologists who typically lacked the training and negotiating skills
needed to bargain effectively in political settings (Maya and Churie 1997). The high
turnover rate of delegates also made it difficult for negotiators to develop sufficient
experience through ‘‘learning by doing’’ and hindered their ability to build relationships of
trust and reciprocity with their counterparts elsewhere (Interviews 10-A and 18-A). In the
CDM negotiations, in particular, African states’ access to information was minimal.
Although negotiators received support from organizations such as UNEP, their under-
standing of the CDM proposal itself, its implications and the specific needs of African
states, was quite shallow, mainly as a result of a dearth of homegrown expertise (Interview
9-IO). In the end, the AGN position only outlined general principles related to CDM
governance and implementation, which made it difficult to engage productively with other
negotiators who had opposing ideas and interests.
Third, an unclear mandate from African governments tended to constrain individual
negotiators and collectively hindered the AGN’s bargaining (see also Gray and Gupta
2003). The main problem stemmed from the fact that for many governments, the UNFCCC
negotiations were a low priority. Climate change negotiators generally came from low-
ranking ministries of the environment or meteorology (rather than foreign affairs, devel-
opment or finance), making it difficult to convey important information to and coordinate
with their counterparts in other ministries. As a result, they often had to negotiate without a
solid understanding of what their governments would consider acceptable, causing them to
lean toward ‘‘defensive’’ positions and to shy away from any innovative proposals that may
turn out to be controversial later on. The lack of clear instructions from the ministerial level
was especially clear during the CDM negotiations. During this time, AMCEN became
much less active than it had been, leading to notable lack of leadership at the regional level
(AMCEN 2006; Interview 10-A). This, in turn, greatly limited the boldness of the positions
taken by the AGN. When some African delegates and advisors suggested that the CDM
should not be designed as a market-based mechanism—based on the thinking that such a
design would inevitably be biased against African countries—they were sidelined by others
who feared stepping out of line and favored a ‘‘safer’’ position that would not risk pro-
voking larger states in the G77/China (Interviews 9-IO and 18-A).

5 Nairobi, Copenhagen and Durban

By the mid-2000s, it had become clear how little African negotiators had achieved. ‘‘When
the CDM was rolled out,’’ to use the words of one former chair of the AGN, ‘‘Africa was
totally nowhere’’ (Interview 10-A). Just a year after the CDM started operations, Africa
was already losing out. In 2006, Africa’s share of the overall carbon market amounted to
only 1.4 % (Capoor and Ambrosi 2006). Of the 1,274 projects in the CDM pipeline, only
36 were located in Africa. Capoor and Ambrosi (2006), researchers at the World Bank,
primarily attributed this small share of the carbon market to the continent’s tiny energy and
industrial sectors, which offered few opportunities for generating carbon credits. This was
compounded by the fact that projects aimed at carbon sequestration from reforestation,

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avoided deforestation and from agriculture, which did offer important opportunities for
Africa, were generally excluded from the CDM or were particularly onerous to implement
and not attractive to buyers due to the non-permanence of forestry CERs. At the very least,
a major capacity building initiative was needed to enhance access to the CDM.
Adaptation—perhaps the most important issue for Africa—had also been neglected. The
Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change garnered attention within African
political circles with its assertion that Africa would be the region most severely affected by
climate change. ‘‘The human consequences [of climate change],’’ it stated, ‘‘will be most
serious and widespread in sub-Saharan Africa, where millions more will die from mal-
nutrition, diarrhea, malaria and dengue fever, unless effective control measures are put in
place’’ (Stern 2006, pp. 99). Resources for adaptation were desperately needed. But the
UNFCCC negotiations had only nominally considered adaptation issues. According to one
study published in 2006, ‘‘[the] feeling, especially among developing countries, [was] that
despite the widespread instances of climate impacts now being witnessed, the COP has not
yet created sufficient elements of the climate regime aimed at implementing adaptation’’
(Kartha et al. 2006, pp. 6). Among African delegates, this was keenly felt (Interviews
10-A, 16-A, and 18-A).
To a considerable extent, African states themselves attributed these failures to the
region’s inability to participate effectively in the negotiations. Poor negotiating capacity
was acknowledged as an important issue. After COP4, for instance, several African
negotiators called upon the International Institute for Sustainable Development to host a
negotiating skills workshop in Dakar. African ministers also voiced their concerns about
the abilities of negotiators, who ‘‘had been unable to secure positions of advantage for
Africa’’ (AMCEN 2006, pp. 53). In response, they sought support from UNEP and other
multilateral institutions for regional consultations prior to COP7 in Marrakesh. But these
early capacity-building efforts were inconsistent and had little immediate effect. For the
most part, African negotiators continued to face the same internal barriers that had limited
participation throughout the CDM negotiations (Interviews 7-A, 10-A and 9-IO). The
AGN’s stature even tended to decline somewhat after Marrakesh once it was clear that
Africa’s efforts to influence the CDM’s design would have limited impact (see Fig. 1,
which registers no AGN submissions or agenda items between Marrakesh, in 2001, and
Nairobi, in 2006).
Beginning around 2005, however, as the effects of Africa’s lack of influence became
particularly apparent, the AGN slowly started to have a greater impact on the UNFCCC
negotiations. In particular, COP12, which took place in Nairobi, in 2006, proved to be a
turning point. As the first COP to take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, the meeting offered an
ideal opportunity to call attention the region’s concerns in front of global audience. It also
helped to raise the issue’s salience among African leaders. As a result, more resources were
devoted to the talks, and African negotiators made significant efforts to develop a common
position that would adequately reflect Africa’s urgent needs (Interviews 10-A and 16-A).
Both AMCEN and UNEP, with financial support from South Africa, the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom, organized a meeting of climate change experts and African negoti-
ators in Naivasha, Kenya, in September 2006. The meeting enabled Africa’s negotiators to
reach a consensus on a number of issues, especially on adaptation and the CDM, but also
deforestation, climate finance and technology transfer. Crucially, the meeting produced a
common position paper, which was subsequently adopted as the basic platform for African
negotiators at an extraordinary session of AMCEN in Nairobi. African participation in the
COP itself increased considerably compared to previous years, and delegates were much
more involved in setting the agenda. And, in many respects as a result of the AGN’s

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Fig. 1 Total number of

submissions and agenda items,
1991–2012. Source: UNFCCC
(2014b)

efforts, the conference achieved two important outcomes meant to address some of the
major issues it had identified (Interviews 2-IO, 9-IO and 10-A). The first—the Nairobi
Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change—sought to
improve capacity building related to adaptation decision-making in LDCs. The second—
the Nairobi Framework—aimed to facilitate participation by underrepresented countries in
the CDM.
In subsequent negotiations, African efforts to influence the negotiations grew sub-
stantially, especially during and after COP15 in Copenhagen. This can be seen by looking
at the rising number of submissions to the UNFCCC by individual African states and by
the AGN as whole. As Fig. 1 shows, the total number of submissions and agenda items put
forward by the AGN grew substantially during and after the Nairobi COP. Indeed, after
2009, the number of AGN submissions even dwarfed those of the G77/China, reversing a
trend that had prevailed since the UNFCCC’s early years when the G77/China dominated.
The number of submissions by individual African states also rose considerably (Fig. 2).
Between 1991 and 2006, African states rarely submitted more than 20 items. From 2007
onwards, however, they rarely submitted less than 40. In 2011, at COP17 in Durban,
African countries put forward around 100 submissions and agenda items, a number roughly
equivalent to the total submitted between 1991 and 2005.
Of course, the growing number of African submissions need not indicate that Africa had
become more influential. It simply suggests that greater efforts were made. However, there
is evidence that African states were indeed able to influence outcomes to a greater extent.
Africa’s successful efforts to draw attention to the issues of CDM capacity building and
adaptation in Nairobi—just mentioned—offer one such example. African states had
campaigned for several changes at a crucial point in the negotiations and managed to
initiate two new UNFCCC programs. But this was not simply a ‘‘one-off,’’ made possible
by the unique opportunity that Nairobi presented. At Copenhagen, for instance, Meles
Zenawi (the late Prime Minster of Ethiopia) represented Africa in the Heads of State
meetings and considerably shaped the negotiations on climate finance (Held et al. 2013;
Vidal 2009). Zenawi argued that US $50 billion per year should be provided to developing
countries by 2015, including $10 billion in ‘‘fast-start’’ financing. The amount provided
should then rise to $100 billion by 2020, with as much as 50 % of the total earmarked for
the most vulnerable states. He also sought to give developing countries control over the
disbursal of funds and wanted to create an intergovernmental panel that would monitor and
address issues related to the financial pledges made by developed states. To a great extent,
the final Copenhagen Accord bore Zenawi’s mark with its call for $30 billion in ‘‘new and
additional’’ funding for the 2010–2012 period and for $100 billion by 2020. His efforts also
led to the creation of the High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing,

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Global climate change negotiations 101

Fig. 2 Total number of

submissions and agenda items by
African states, 1991–2012.
Source: UNFCCC (2014b)

convened by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, which had been resisted by the United
States.7 Meles Zenawi would serve as its co-chair.
During COP17, in Durban, the AGN would again play an influential role under the
leadership of Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu. Like Nairobi—with South Africa hosting the meeting
this time—it offered another ideal opportunity for the AGN. Two issues dominated the
agenda: whether or not to extend the Kyoto Protocol for a second commitment period (a
key demand by developing countries) and how to lay the basis for a new agreement that
would involve new commitments by developing countries (the key demand of industri-
alized states). A number of industrialized countries resisted a second Kyoto commitment
period, notably Canada, while many emerging economies, such as China, objected to a
more comprehensive, binding agreement. In this fraught negotiating environment, African
states were able to play a critical role, largely due to their collective symbolic position as
one of the most vulnerable regions and because of South Africa’s position as host of the
COP itself. When the AGN broke ranks with traditional allies in the G77/China and came
out strongly in favor of a second commitment period and a comprehensive legally binding
agreement—along with European states, AOSIS and the LDC Group—this move helped to
push recalcitrant states toward agreement and paved the way for the adoption of the
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (see Vidal and Harvey 2011). Thus, they helped to
move the whole UNFCCC negotiations in an entirely new direction, aimed at reaching a
new agreement by 2015.
The AGN, therefore, was much more assertive in later negotiations, as were individual
African states, and their influence on outcomes rose. Success was not uniform, of course.
There were resource constraints and challenges involved in coordinating a diverse group of
negotiators from countries with only partially overlapping views and interests. But the
AGN’s growing clout was particularly remarkable because the relative position of African
states had, on the whole, been fairly constant over time. In recent years, a number of
developing states have become much more influential in the climate negotiations. Having
grown considerably over the past two decades, countries such as China, Brazil, India and
South Africa have become much more powerful. The BASIC group was especially
influential during the endgame at Copenhagen. In contrast, the ‘‘structural’’ power of
African states changed only marginally between 1992 and 2012. The continent’s share of
global emissions and global GDP—often used as metrics of ‘‘power’’ in the climate
negotiations (Weiler 2012)—stayed roughly the same (see Figs. 3, 4). Over time, UN-
FCCC meetings have also become much more complex, leading some to conclude that
developing countries are becoming increasingly ‘‘disenfranchised’’ due to the mounting

7
See the statements made in the leaked US embassy cable reporting conversations between Under Sec-
retary of State Maria Otero and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on the Guardian (2010) newspaper website.

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102 C. Roger, S. Belliethathan

Fig. 3 Regional shares of yearly

global carbon dioxide emissions,
1992–2012. Source: World Bank
(2012)

Fig. 4 Regional shares of global

GDP, 1992–2012. Source: World
Bank (2012)

burdens of the negotiation process (Gupta 2006). African states, these studies seem to
imply, would likely be especially affected, making their growing influence all the more
puzzling.

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Global climate change negotiations 103

6 Improving participation in the UNFCCC

While there was little change in the continent’s structural position in the negotiations,
major efforts were made to reduce the ‘‘internal’’ constraints that had hindered the AGN in
the 2000s. This began at COP12 in Nairobi, but became more sustained in the years that
followed. Several new dynamics served to bolster African participation. First, during the
meetings that followed Nairobi—and especially after the Bali COP in 2007, which initiated
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action—it became evident that
African states simply had to become more involved, since the magnitude of the stakes was
now much better understood (Interviews 11-A, 3-A, 4-A, 2-IO and 19-CS). More dynamic
coalitions of developing states had also appeared on the scene, providing a powerful
incentive for African states to raise their collective voice. The rise of BASIC, in particular,
suggested that large emerging economies (including South Africa) were differentiating
themselves from the rest of the G77/China and could not be relied upon to consistently
advocate on behalf of the wider developing world. Second, many distributional questions
became important, especially with respect to access to climate finances and the transfer of
technology, and led to divisions among developing countries (Interviews 11-A, 3-A and
4-A). Industrialized states promised to increase the resources available to the developing
world, yet these would ultimately be limited and many questions remained about who
would get what—and how. African states wanted to maximize their access to new funds,
and therefore they sought to differentiate themselves from other developing states by
highlighting their unique needs. Finally, the growing prominence of the climate negotia-
tions made it more likely that African leaders would be able to bolster their position in
other non-climate issue areas by taking on certain positions desired by industrialized states
(Hoste and Anderson 2011).8
However, acting upon these new incentives required major changes. As Africa’s pre-
vious experience with the CDM demonstrated, having compelling regional interests was
not enough to ensure that those interests would be represented effectively. Significant
efforts were therefore made to bolster the coalition’s coherence and negotiating capacity.
First, African negotiators attempted to improve their access to funding in order to increase
the size and quality of their delegations (Interviews 10-A, 2-IO and 9-IO). This was done is
in several ways. One, they attempted to persuade leaders within their own governments
that climate negotiations should be a higher priority with a greater claim on scarce
resources. Many negotiators tried to raise awareness about the consequences of climate
change, the potential for attaining access to funds and technology and the opportunities for
demonstrating leadership. Their efforts were supported by the publication of the Stern
Review in 2006 and the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report in 2007, as well as the many
National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) and Technology Needs Assessments
(TNAs) that a large number of African states had completed by this time (see Fig. 5).
These new studies strengthened the case that African negotiators were making by pro-
viding some of the first country-level estimates of the costs of climate change. Two,
officials also tried to attain greater support from multilateral and bilateral donors. For
example, in 2008, the chair of the AGN approached the AfDB and was granted funding
that would support African participation (Interview 13-IO). The funds would be controlled
by the AGN chair, and would be allocated to a select group of negotiators who could
contribute to the negotiations in important ways. African delegates also benefited from

8
For indirect evidence of such ‘‘chequebook diplomacy’’ see the comments by Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu in Vidal
and Harvey (2011).

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104 C. Roger, S. Belliethathan

Fig. 5 Number of states with

completed NAPAs, 2004–2011.
SIDS small island developing
states. Source: UNFCCC (2014a)

Fig. 6 Total number of

delegates, by negotiating group,
COP1–COP17. Source:
UNFCCC (2014b)

capacity building and training programs run by the European Capacity Building Initiative,
the International Institute for Environment and Development, and the United Nations
Institute for Training and Research, among others, which had all stepped up their activities
(Interview 13-IO). A final, yet very important strategy that was used by African states to
expand their access to human resources was to increasingly embed outside experts (often
from intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations) into their delegations, a tactic
that had been little used in Africa prior to COP12, but which had been particularly crucial
to the successes of other developing world coalitions (especially AOSIS). This allowed
them to leverage their own ‘‘in-house’’ human resources at very little cost (Interviews 16-A
and 18-A). By COP17, delegates from civil society organizations constituted roughly a
quarter of all AGN delegates and the size of African delegations had greatly increased over
time (see Figs. 6, 7, 8).
Second, African negotiators managed to improve their access to information, advice and
analytics, which was essential to putting forward more dynamic proposals and persuading
others of their merits (Interviews 7-A, 13-IO and 9-IO). To do so, they used strategies
similar to those just discussed. They leveraged external human resources and gained
support from multilateral donors. Via the AfDB and UNDP, for example, negotiators were

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Global climate change negotiations 105

Fig. 7 Average size of country

delegations within negotiating
groups, COP1–COP17. Source:
UNFCCC (2014b)

Fig. 8 Composition of AGN

delegations, COP1–COP16.
Source: UNFCCC (2014b)

able to attain funds for policy-relevant studies by consulting firms such as Vivid Eco-
nomics, which was hired by the AfDB in 2009. A permanent international legal advisor
was also provided. Another influx of resources for new information and analytics came
from the Climate for Development in Africa Initiative, which was established by the AU,
the AfDB and the UNECA. Among other things, it enabled the creation of the African
Climate Policy Centre in Addis Ababa, which began conducting research for African
states, and especially AGN negotiators. Additionally, various multilateral donors and the
UNFCCC itself had been assisting the work that underpinned the NAPAs and TNAs that
many LDCs had been eligible for and which helped to generate new information about the
impacts of climate change and the needs of African states. Most NAPAs were completed
by 2008 (Fig. 5), and the undertaking was crucial for building expertise on country-specific
climate-related issues within African governments, allowing AGN delegates to negotiate
much more knowledgeably than before. As Fig. 5 also suggests, due to the large number of
LDC in Africa the continent benefited relatively more from this assistance than other
developing regions.

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106 C. Roger, S. Belliethathan

Third, and finally, several changes helped the AGN to negotiate with a much stronger
mandate from African leaders (Interviews 10-A, 14-A and 16-A). AMCEN, for instance,
became more focused on the issue of climate change and met more regularly. In addition to
the biennial ‘‘regular sessions,’’ at least four ‘‘special sessions’’ were held in the 2000s.
Africa’s Regional Economic Communities also became more active prior to Copenhagen,
as Masters (2011) has noted. The Algiers Declaration on Climate Change—the African
‘‘common position’’ going into Poznan and Copenhagen—built upon declarations made at
regional meetings in Bangui, Cotonou and Nairobi in 2008. Perhaps most importantly, the
AU also created the Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate
Change (CAHOSCC) in May 2009. In recognition of the need to act strategically in the
climate talks as Copenhagen approached, CAHOSCC would operate as a sub-committee of
AU leaders that would provide direct, high-level leadership to African negotiators. It
would be composed of the chair of the AU, plus eight heads of state, who would collec-
tively approve common positions developed by the technical AGN negotiators and rep-
resent Africa’s highest level of leadership in the UNFCCC meetings. Though the creation
of CAHOSCC initially led to some confusion at Copenhagen, where there appeared to be a
discrepancy between the position taken by Meles Zenawi (the chair of CAHOSCC) and
that advocated by the technical negotiators (see Vidal 2009), it enormously improved
dialogue on climate change issues by establishing a direct line of communication between
African leaders and the AGN. With explicit support from Africa’s leaders, this enabled
African negotiators to become more confident and assertive. It brought the political weight
and status of African heads of state to directly bear upon the negotiations as well.

7 Conclusion

African countries have become much more proactive in the UNFCCC negotiations since
the early 2000s. By a number of quantitative measures—including submissions, delegation
size, and so on—and qualitative assessments—by those within the AGN itself and
beyond—participation has increased substantially. Further, this assertiveness has translated
into a substantive impact on the negotiations—including on the CDM, adaptation and
climate finance—which, we have shown, sharply contrasts with the group’s past experi-
ence. We have also sought to demonstrate that African states have achieved this turnaround
by improving their negotiating capacity: by increasing access to material resources,
improving information and creating more effective regional institutional structures. These
changes have enabled them to wield their regional coalition and use ‘‘low-power’’ tactics
with much greater effect in Nairobi, Copenhagen and Durban. African states may not have
become more powerful on some ‘‘traditional’’ measures of power, but they have been able
to play the game of international environmental diplomacy better.
Overall, the AGN now commands far greater attention in both the negotiations and the
media than it did in the past. Yet, as many of our interviewees explained, the group
continues to face many challenges. Over time, the negotiations have become more
demanding, and despite the greater resources and expertise that have been attained, they
still fall short of what is needed. Further, since many the gains rely upon uncertain funding
sources and political commitments, the robustness of the changes we document can be
questioned. Dlamini (2013), chair of the AGN at COP19 in Warsaw, lamented the fact that
many countries sent fewer delegates due to funding cuts. Resources, advice and infor-
mation are greater, on balance, but also unequally distributed. Some efforts have been
made to rectify this. In response to a mandate from the AU, the AGN has now established a

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Global climate change negotiations 107

permanent AGN Bureau, a sub-committee of the AGN charged with advising the chair and
ensuring that the group speaks with ‘‘one voice.’’ But progress has been slow. Undoubt-
edly, Africa has made progress since Rio. However, many barriers continue to obstruct
Africa’s enfranchisement in the global climate change negotiations.

Acknowledgments The authors would like to acknowledge and thank the Africa Initiative at The Centre
for International Governance Innovation (Waterloo, Canada), which provided funding for Charles’s
research, as well as review and editing of this paper. Peter Dauvergne, Joyeeta Gupta, Thomas Hale, Stephan
Hoch and Lesley Masters, as well as the anonymous peer reviewers, offered thoughtful comments on earlier
drafts. Finally, outstanding research assistance was provided by Andrea Stucchi, Kieran Meehan, Gezahegne
Seyoum, Tolosa Belete and Titayal Tebeje.

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