1B cmon gue Debating Empathy: Historical Awareness and Conceptual Precision Dan Zahavi ot ae 2028) 1-2 ne Raho 2022 an snytsunanesioreer Cater or Subject Reser, Univesity of Copenhagen, Copehagen, Denmark | welcome Murphy, Lilienfeld and Algoe’s eriicism of the restrictive isomorphic matching (RIM) definition of empathy, [think that definition fails to get to the heart of ‘what empathy is: that i, atleast in its most basic version, has counterintuitive implications (sa petson who feels mur- drous rage aller observing another person feeling murderous ‘age empathic”), and that there is a built-in tension between the insistence on isomorphism and the simultaneous focus on the preservation ofthe selEother distinction. I agree with the authors’ claim that an imporant reason for the increasing popu larity ofthe RIM definition isto be Found in the neuroscintitic interest in empathy and in that discipline’ need for an opeatio~ nalizable concept. As they write, “Compared with its predeces- som the RIM definition, static and restricted rather than unfolding and highly complex, is easier 19 operaionalize in a neuroimaging paradigm.” And T also think that much of the recent push-back against empathy (eg, the work of Bloom) 's promised on an acceptance ofthe narrow RIM definition, Inthe following, however, I want to focus an some points of disagreement. The authors lament the ahistorical character ofthe current empathy debate. People are often only discuss ing publications from the Tast few decades and frequently remain unaware of the intellectual heritage of the concept. ‘Tre authors then refer to work by Lanzoni and by Cottrell and Dymond in support of the claim that the 1950s were the deeisive decade. It was then that the term “empathy” became common in public discourse, and it was only then that academic psychology started to pay attention to empathy. A central part of the atele then examines older ‘psychological work on empathy from 1950-1980 with ap licuar focus on Rogers. The problem with this selection and Focus is thatthe authors are thereby regrettably committing the very mistake they are warning against. They are ignoring. the history of the concept and atleast $0 years of academic psychological work on empathy. 1 suspect some kind of ‘Anglocentie bias is behind this lacuna. The authors are for- geting or are simply unaware af the rich debate that took place in Germany. They rightly note that Tiehener translated the German term Einfhlung as empathy. But for that very reason, itis also a mistake to claim that “precursors of the ‘empathy’ construct” canbe found in weatments of Einfihlung by Lipps and Stein. When Lipps, Stein, Sicbeck, Volkelt, Witasck. Groos, Geiger, Prandtl and tater Binswanger and Schilde (lo mention just a very few names) were discussing Einfullung, they were precisely discussing empathy (and not merely a precursor to i) and moreover they were doing so in the context of academic psychology (Gee, for instance, Geiger, I9IO/T). Why is this of more than historical relevance? Because the merits and demerits of a precursor of the RIM definition were already debated then, Good arguments against the isomorphism requirement were provided, arguments that have also been taken up and employed agains the RIM definition more recently (se, for instance, Zahavi & Overgaad, 2012; Zahavi & Rocks, 2015), ‘The authors object to the narrowness of the RIM defin- ition, { agree with their eriticism, but I also think that the alternative definition they provide is much to imprecise Empathy is defined as imaginative porspective taking, other- oriented caring and compassion, and a the effort to sympa. thetially appreciate what another i feeling. The authors also talk of empathy as involving a dynamic interplay between Imagination and inference. They even write that they see ro strong rationale for definitionaly separating empathy and sympathy. I disagree with all of dhese claims. 1 think tempalhy must be distinguished not only from sympathy, tbat also from imaginative perspective taking and. fom ‘more inferentially based forms of mindreading (Zahavi 2011, 2014, 2017). In theie concluding discussion, the ‘authors write dha the hard core of empathy isa process of imaginatively experiencing the subjective consciousness of ‘another, To support this claim, the authors then refer to Halper's claim that empathy is a “perceptual” activity ‘But are imagination and perception the same thing? The ‘marked contrast toa least pat of the earlier German discus sion is informative. What one finds inthe work of some of the ‘early empathy theorists is precisely an attempt to carefully dlistinguish empathy (Eoyfililing), not only feom imagin- ation, but also from processes such as emotional contagion Careponding nto Bin abt Carer Sect eee, Uses of Copan Cnetsen, Dem ison. ‘Suppied by the Brish Library 1 Jl 2022, 0756 (BST) pe imeassogenscom/onefen2 Emotion Review (Gefullsunsteckung> sympathy (Mitgefth), and emotional sharing (Miteinanderfihlen). AS Stein would argue, ‘empathy is a particular experiential engagement with the other, one involving a perceptuslly-based acquaintance with the othee’s experiential life. To empathically grasp. say, the other's sadness, is not to have the same kind of experience oneself, Nor is it 10 infer the other's sadness from a certain patter of behaviour, or 10 project the sadness onto the other on the basis oF some ing of imagina- tive exercise. None ofthese proposals captures the distinetive tcomplishment of empathy. which is that it provides the cempathizer with the intuitive here-and-now presence of an experience tht i at his or her own (Stein, 1917, pp. 10-11. ‘A possible objection to this narrow definition is that it will fail (6 capture the complex and multifaceted process that tnfolds in the context of psychotherapy. T think that is ‘quite true, But we have 0 options. One option is to acknowledge that a psychotherapist employs several diferent processes in the course of her work: she uses empathy, imaging tive perspective taking, inferential reasoning, and also engages in prosocial acts of sympathy and compassion, The altemative isto argue that everything the psychotherapist does ean be cap- tured by one tem only, namely “empathy”. One ean, ofcourse, choose to use the term “empathy” as an umbrella tent) or ‘mongrel concept. one covering and encompassing various ‘quite different and heterogeneous processes. But in my view, this lek oF conceptual precision is not only unfortunate and confusing: it also undermines the very attempt 10 defend the Claim that empathy has a distinct contribution to make. Declaration of Conflicting Interests ‘The autor declared wo poi cali of meres wih Fspst 0 AE ‘each shoi, ander pbicon of his aie Funding “Tea recived oil ppt fr tbe scar, sath, ner bli of th el onciD iD ‘an Zaha peri rg9O0.0002. 2869-4951 References ‘Geiger, M. (MIQI9ID). her dae Waren und cle Beieune dee ‘ifng, tn F. Schur (EV. Konaress fr experimentle Psychologie gp. 29-79) Vers A, Bash Sn, E- (917/989), On she problem af enparhy (ab ef) ICS Pubcon Zaha, D.C), Empathy an et sos psepan: A phenomena eck pos ever of Plow and Pro. 20. TSK. pesto 0107 316801107053, ‘ana GOI. Sa ee: exploring subjects, empty. aud tae, Ox Zvi D. (201. Phenology, enpthy. aad iresting. tH Taibo (E.TheRotadeehandboo of pos of empathy (np 35-43) Rote zshare, & Over 52012). Eat witout amps: A he rerenioal meet In. Desay (C8). Expats fam ech Pedi 3-20) Tne MET Pres. ataicD Roh (2013). Epa # shing Pespecives fom phe Twonenelogy and development peycholog. Conicloest and Caption 16, 583-553, ipods Oconee 201805 008 ‘Supplied by the Bish Litrary 01 Jl 2022, 0755 (BST)