 Section 19. Eminent Domain.
- A local and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area, prescribing
government unit may, through its chief executive
and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the
power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose
or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power
of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a
valid and definite offer has been previously made to
the owner, and such offer was not accepted:
Provided, further, That the local government unit
may immediately take possession of the property
upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and
upon making a deposit with the proper court of at
least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value
of the property based on the current tax declaration
of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally,
That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court,
based on the fair market value at the time of the
taking of the property.  Held:
Legislative Power
What is legislation?
The exercise of the power and function of making
rules such as laws, that have the force of authority
by virtue of their promulgation by an official organ of
a state.
Sec. 48 of the LGC of 1991:
Local legislative power shall be exercised by the
sangguniang panlalawigan for the province; the
sangguniang panlungsod for the city; the
sangguniang bayan for the municipality; and the
sangguniang barangay for the barangay.
Requisites for valid ordinance
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
Reason why an Ordinance should not contravene a
statute:
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred on them by Congress as the
national law making body. The delegate cannot be
superior to the principal.
City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127,
12 April 2005
Facts:
The City of Manila enacted an Ordinance on 30
March 1993, entitled “An Ordinance prohibiting the
establishment or operation of Business providing
certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services
penalties for violation thereof, and for other
purposes.”
Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC)
argued that the said ordinance was unconstitutional
due to the following reasons.
(1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the
operation of motels;
(2) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper
exercise of police power;
(3) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law;
(4) It is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of
plaintiff's property rights;
(5) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal
protection under the law
Supreme Court held that the said Ordinance is
unconstitutional and therefore null and void for the
following reasons:
A. The Ordinance infringes the Due Process Clause;
B. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause;
C. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is
ultra vires.
Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No.
156052, 13 Feb. 2008
Facts: The City of Manila sought to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassified areas along
Pandacan and Sta. Ana, Manila from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators
of businesses disallowed to cease and desist from
operating their businesses within six months from
the date of effectivity of the ordinance in 2001.
SC in previous decision – Ordinance No. 8027 is
VALID. The City had the ministerial duty under the
Local Government Code (LGC) to "enforce all laws
and ordinances relative to the governance of the
city," including Ordinance No. 8027
Held:
Ordinance is valid
(1) It is a valid ordinance according to the test:
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements:
(a) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute;
(b) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(c) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(d) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(e) must be general and consistent with public policy
and
(f) must not be unreasonable. a. Provinces or cities – 90 days

(2) Did not overcome presumption of validity b. Municipalities – 60 days

The local legislative body, by enacting the c. Barangays – 30 days

ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well being of the
people . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion
of personal or property rights . The ordinance, on its
face, does not at all appear to be unconstitutional. It
reclassified the subject area from industrial to
commercial. Prima facie, this power is within the
power of municipal corporations.
4. Signed before the election register or
representative/s in a public place
5. COMELEC shall certify whether or not the
required number of signatures are met
6. Upon certification, COMELEC shall set a date for
initiative wherein the proposition shall be submitted
for LGU’s approval

(3) Within the power to enact; valid exercise of police 7. If approved, take effect 15 days after certification
power as if made by the Sanggunian

The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to

protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic
devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals.

(4) Not unfair, oppressive, confiscatory, nor Limitations

discriminatory
(1) Limitations on Local Initiatives
The properties of the oil companies and other
businesses situated in the affected area remain ● Not be exercised more than once a year
theirs. What the ordinance seeks to prevent is a
● Only extend to subjects or matters which are
catastrophic devastation that will result from a
within the legal powers of the Sanggunian
terrorist attack.
● If at any time before the initiative is held, the
Sanggunian adopts in toto the proposition, the
Local Initiative Referendum initiative is cancelled

● Republic Act 6735, “The Initiative and Referendum (2) Limitations upon Sanggunian
Act.”
● Approved propositions shall not be repealed,
● LGC Sections 120-127 modified, or amended by the Sanggunian within 6
months from the date of approval
LOCAL INITIATIVE LOCAL
REFERENDUM ● May be modified or repealed within 3 years by
Legal process where Legal process whereby vote of three-fourths of all members
the registered voters of registered voters of
an LGU unit may LGUs may approve, ○ In case of barangays, the period shall be 18
propose, enact or amend, or reject any months after approval
amend ordinance ordinance enacted

Other Features of Local Referendum

Resorted to by the Submits to the ● Control and direction of COMELEC (certify and
people directly registered voters for
proclaim)
approval or rejection of
any ordinance or ○ Provinces and cities – 60 days
resolution duly enacted
○ Municipalities and provinces – 45 days

○ Barangays – 30 days

PROCEDURE: Local Initiative ● Subic Bay v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125416

1. File a petition with the Sanggunian concerned
a. Provinces or cities - not less than 1,000 registered
voters
b. Municipalities – 100 registered voters
c. Barangays – 50 registered voters
September 26, 1996
○ There is a need for COMELEC to supervise the
initiative more closely because its authority extends
not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but
seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the
people in its proper form and language so it may be
easily understood and voted upon.

2. If no favorable action within 30 days, proponents ○ KAPASYAHAN REMANDED TO COMELEC for

may invoke power
of the initiative and give notice to the Sanggunian
3. Upon notice, proponents must collect signatures
further proceedings to correct errors in promulgating
the order and in preparing for the plebiscite.
Governmental Power: Authority over Police
Units
Authority over Police Units: Background
1987 Constitution, Article XVI
SECTION 6. The State shall establish and maintain
one police force, which shall be national in scope
and civilian in character, to be administered and
controlled by a national police commission. The
authority of local executives over the police units in
their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
Compared with Previous Constitutions
1973 Constitution, Article XV
SEC. 12. The State shall establish and maintain an
integrated national police force whose organization,
administration, and operation shall be provided by
law.
1935 Constitution, Article XIII
SEC. 9. The Government shall organize and
maintain a national police force to preserve public
order and enforce the law.
Purpose of the Provision in the 1987
Constitution
According to Fr. Bernas, SJ, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission:
Before the 1987 Constitution, there were two police
forces: one consisting of the municipal and city
police forces and a national police force which was
the Philippine Constabulary. A member of the
Constabulary could be given the option to join the
National Police Force or be integrated with the
military.
From Commissioner Natividad:
- Local executives are in control in day to day
operation of PNP (crime investigation and control,
traffic control).
- National police would take control if the local police
cannot cope with the local situation
- Why is there a sharing of control between
NAPOLCOM and local executives? If control was
given solely to local executives… “By our
experience, this has spawned warlordism, bossism
and sanctuaries for vices and abuses.
In relation to the LGC of 1991
ARTICLE II
Relations with the Philippine National Police
Section 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over
the Units of the Philippine National Police. - The
extent of operational supervision and control of local
chief executives over the police force, fire protection
unit, and jail management personnel assigned in
their respective jurisdictions shall be governed by
the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine
hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise
known as "The Department of the Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990"*, and the rules and
regulations issued pursuant thereto.
*Amended by R.A. No. 8551 ("Philippine National
Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998")
Corporate Powers of LGUs
Corporate Powers: Background
R.A. 7160, Section 15. Political and Corporate
Nature of Local Government Units:
“Every local government unit created or recognized
under this Code is a body politic and corporate
endowed with powers to be exercised by it in
conformity with law. As such, it shall exercise
powers as a political subdivision of the national
government and as a corporate entity representing
the inhabitants of its territory.”
Dual personality of a local government:
1. As a subdivision or agency of the government
2. As a corporate entity representing the inhabitants
of its territory
Corporate Powers
Section 22. Corporate Powers. -
(a) Every local government unit, as a corporation,
shall have
the following powers:
(1) To have continuous succession in its corporate
name;
(2) To sue and be sued;
(3) To have and use a corporate seal;
(4) To acquire and convey real or personal property;
(5) To enter into contracts; and
(6) To exercise such other powers as are granted to
corporations, subject to the limitations provided in
this
Code and other laws.
XXX
(d) Local government units shall enjoy full autonomy
in the
exercise of their proprietary functions and in the
management of their economic enterprises, subject
to
limitations provided in this Code and other applicable
laws.
1. To have continuous succession in its ● If the property is owned by the municipality in its
corporate name public and

● In order to be able to act as a juridical entity and
exercise such corporate powers granted to a local
government, it must first have a corporate name – by
it is known and by which all corporation acts are
done.
governmental capacity, the property is public and
Congress has
absolute control over it. If the property is owned in its
private or

2. To sue and be sued proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and

Congress has no
● Under Sec. 22 (a) (2) of the LGC, all local
government units may be sued. absolute control [Province of Zamboanga del Norte
v. City of Zamboanga,
● It must have the power to sue and be sued
otherwise it cannot securely enter into transactions G.R. No. L-24440 (1968)].
in the performance of its functions. ● The LGU may alienate only patrimonial property,
upon proper

Suability vs. Liability authority [City of Naga v. Court of Appeals (1989)].

● It is a categorical statement that LGUs do not ● Public streets or thoroughfares are property for
enjoy absolute and unqualified immunity from suits. public use,

● The fact that they are suable does not necessarily outside the commerce of man, and may not be the
mean that they are liable. subject of

Reference must be had to the applicable law and lease or other contracts [Dacanay v. Asistio, 208
established facts to determine their liability [San SCRA 404].
Fernando, La Union v. Firme, G.R. No. 52179 ○ Town plazas
(1991)].
5. To enter into contracts
● A municipality cannot be represented by a private
attorney [Municipality of Pililla, Rizal v. Court of Section 22 (c)
Appeals, 233 SCRA 484; Ramos v. Court of
Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract
Appeals, 269 SCRA 34].
may be entered into by the local chief executive in
● If the injury is caused in the course of the
behalf
performance of a governmental function or duty, no
recovery, as a rule, can be had from the municipality of the local government unit without prior
unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor authorization by
from its officers so long as they performed their
duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such
act wantonly and maliciously. contract

● With respect to proprietary functions, the settled shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the
rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable provincial
to third persons ex contractu or ex delicto.
capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall.

3. To have and use a corporate seal

Section 22 (b)
Local government units may continue using, modify,
or change their existing corporate seals: Provided,
that newly established local government units or
those without corporate seals may create their own
corporate seals which shall be registered with the
Department of the Interior and Local Government:
Provided, further, that any change of corporate seal
shall also be registered as provided hereon.
Requisites
No contract may be entered into by the local chief
executive unless the
following requisites concur:
1. The contract must be within the power of the
municipality
2. The contract must be entered into by an
authorized officer (e.g. mayor with

proper resolution by the Sangguniang Bayan)

4. To acquire and convey real or personal property
● may acquire property in its governmental and
proprietary powers
● may acquire real or personal, tangible or intangible
property, in any
3. There must be appropriation and certificate of
availability of funds
4. The contract must conform with the formal
requisites of a written contract
as prescribed by law; and

manner allowed by law (e.g., sale, donation, etc.) 5. In some cases the contract must be approved by
the President and/or
provincial governor (Revised Adm. Code, Sec. 2068
and Sec. 2196).
Ultra vires contracts
Ultra vires contracts are those which:
1. Are entered into beyond the express, implied or
inherent
powers of the LGU; and
2. Do not comply with the substantive requirements
of the law
e.g., when there must be an actual appropriation and
certificate of availability of funds.
NOTE: Such contracts are null and void, and cannot
be
ratified or validated
Instance when a defective municipal contract may
be ratified:
Ratification of defective municipal contracts is
possible only
when there is non-compliance with the requirements
of
authority of the officer entering into the contract
and/or
conformity with the formal requisites of a written
contract as
prescribed by law. Ratification may either be
expressed or
implied.
NOTE: An act attended only by an irregularity, but
remains within
the municipality’s power, is considered as an ultra
vires act
subject to ratification and/or validation.
Examples of Ultra vires contracts
1. Those entered into by the improper department,
board, officer or agent.
2. Those that do not comply with the formal
requirements of a written
contract e.g., the Statute of Frauds. (Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Cacayuran, G.R. No. 191667, April
17, 2013)
Contracts entered into by a local chief executive may
be subject to constructive ratification
A loan agreement entered into by the provincial
governor without prior authorization from the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan is unenforceable. The
Sanggunian’s failure to impugn the contract’s validity
despite knowledge of its infirmity is an implied
ratification that validates the contract. (Ocampo III v.
People, G.R. No. 156547-51 & 156382-85, February
4, 2008)
Doctrine of estoppel does not apply against a
municipal corporation to validate an invalid contract
The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied as
against a municipal corporation to validate a contract
which it has no power to make, or which it is
authorized to make only under prescribed
conditions, within prescribed limitations, or in a
prescribed mode or manner, although the
corporation has accepted the benefits thereof and
the other party has fully performed its part
of the agreement, or has expended large sums in
preparation for performance. A reason frequently
assigned for this rule is that to apply the doctrine of
estoppel against a municipality in such a case would
be to enable it to do indirectly what it cannot do
directly.
(In Re: Pechueco Sons Company v. Provincial
Board of Antique,
G.R. No. L-27038, Jan. 30, 1970)
6. To exercise such other powers as are granted to
corporations, subject to the limitations provided in
the Local Government Code and other laws
Municipal Liability
 Section 19. Eminent Domain. - A local
government unit may, through its chief executive
and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the
power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose
or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power
of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a
valid and definite offer has been previously made to
the owner, and such offer was not accepted:
Provided, further, That the local government unit
may immediately take possession of the property
upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and
upon making a deposit with the proper court of at
least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value
of the property based on the current tax declaration
of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally,
That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court,
based on the fair market value at the time of the
taking of the property. 
“From what has already been said, it should be clear
that a municipality is not exempt from liability for the
negligent performance of its corporate or proprietary
or business functions. In the administration of its
patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private
corporation or individual so far as its liability to third
persons on contract or in tort is concerned. Its
contracts, validly entered into, may be enforced and
damages may be collected from it for the torts of its
officers or agents within the scope of their
employment in precisely the same manner and to
the same extent as those of private corporations or
individuals. As to such matters the principles of
respondeat superior applies. It is for these purposes
that the municipality is made liable to suits in the
courts.” (MENDOZA vs. DE LEON, ET AL. G.R. No.
L-9596, February 11, 1916)
Sources of Liability of the State
 Sec. 24 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local
Government Code)
SECTION 24. Liability for Damages. – Local
government units and their officials are not exempt
from liability for death or injury to persons or damage
to property.
"The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil
Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city
government relative to the maintenance of roads and
bridges since it exercises the control and supervision
over the same. Failure of the defendant to comply
with the statutory provision found in the subject-
article is tantamount to negligence per se which
renders the City government liable. Harsh
application of the law ensues as a result thereof, but
the state assumed the responsibility for the
maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges
and neither exception nor exculpation from liability
would deem just and equitable. “ (QUEZON CITY
GOVERNMENT vs. FULGENCIO DACARA, G.R.
No. 150304, June 15, 2005)
A. Liability for violation of law, contract, tort
 Art. 2180, 6th par., NCC
Article 2180. The State is responsible in like manner
when it acts through a special agent; but not when
the damage has been caused by the official to whom
the task done properly pertains, in which case what
is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
 Art. 2189, NCC
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities
shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, & other public works under their control or
supervision.
B. Liability for violation of law, contract, tort
 Secs. 38 and 39 of Revised
Administrative Code of 1987
Section 38, E.O. 292 s. 1987. Liability of Superior
Officers. -
(1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts
done in the performance of his official duties, unless
there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross
negligence.
(2) Any public officer who, without just cause,
neglects to perform a duty within a period
fixed by law or regulation, or within a
reasonable period if none is fixed, shall be liable for
damages to the private party concerned without
prejudice to such other liability as may be
prescribed by law.
(3) A head of a department or a superior officer shall
not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions
of duty, negligence, or misfeasance of his
subordinates, unless he has actually authorized
by written order the specific act or misconduct
complained of.
Section 39, E.O. 292 s. 1987. Liability of
Subordinate Officers.
No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly
liable for acts done by him in good faith in the
performance of his duties. However, he shall be
liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which
are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good
customs even if he acted under orders or
instructions of his superiors.
Doctrine of implied municipal liability
“We apply a rule in the law of municipal
corporations: "that a municipality may become
obligated upon an implied contract to pay the
reasonable value of the benefits accepted or
appropriated by it as to which it has the general
power to contract. The doctrine of implied municipal
liability has been said to apply to all cases where
money or other property of a party is received under
such circumstances that the general law,
independent of express contract implies an
obligation upon the municipality to do justice with
respect to the same.” (PROVINCE OF CEBU vs.
IAC, G.R. No. 72841, January 29, 1987)
Local Officials
Provisions applicable to Elective and Appointive
Local Officials
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary
Interest
It shall be unlawful for any local government official
or employee, directly or indirectly, to:
(1) Engage in any business transaction with the local
government unit in which he is an official or
employee or over which he has the power of
supervision, or with any of its authorized boards,
officials, agents, or attorneys, whereby money is to
be paid, or property or any other thing of value is to
be transferred, directly or indirectly, out of the
resources of the local government unit to such
person or firm;
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games
licensed by a local government unit;
(3) Purchase any real estate or other property
forfeited in favor of such local government unit for
unpaid taxes or assessment, or by virtue of a legal
process at the instance of the said local government
unit;
(4) Be a surety for any person contracting or doing
business with the local government unit for which a
surety is required; and
(5) Possess or use any public property of the local
government unit for private purposes.
(b) All other prohibitions governing the conduct of
national public officers relating to prohibited
business and pecuniary interest so provided for
under Republic Act Numbered Sixty-seven thirteen
(R.A. No. 6713) otherwise known as the "Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees" and other laws shall also be
applicable to local government officials and
employees.
Section 90. Practice of Profession
(a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or
engaging in any occupation other than the exercise
of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours: Provided, That
sanggunian members who are also members of the
Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil
case wherein a local government unit or any office,
agency, or instrumentality of the government is the
adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein
an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office.
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in
administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the government
except when the sanggunian member concerned is
defending the interest of the government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession
even during official hours of work only on occasions
of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned
do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
Republic vs. Rambuyong
Can a Vice Mayor represent as counsel before any
court in any civil case wherein an instrumentality of
the government is an adverse party?
Held:
Section 90 (b)(1) of the Local Government Code
provides that Sanggunian Members may practice
their profession or engage in any occupation or
teach in schools except during session hours,
provided when the Member is also a member of the
Bar, he shall not appear as counsel before any court
in any civil case where the local government unit or
any office, agency or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party. Then, the Court
quoted Section 2 (10) of the Revised Administrative
Code which defined “instrumentality” shall include
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and
government-owned or controlled corporations.
Being the Vice-Mayor, Rambuyong is deemed a
Sanggunian Member because Section 446 of the
LGC provided that the sangguniang bayan shall be
composed of the municipal vice mayor as the
presiding officer. As such, Rambuyong cannot
represent himself as counsel for Chu when NPC is
an adverse party, pursuant to the above-mentioned
laws.
Catu vs. Rellosa
Can a punong barangay who presided in the
conciliation appear as a counsel in one of the parties
of the same?
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Applies Only to Former Government Lawyers.
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As worded,that Rule applies only to a lawyer who
has left government service and in connection "with
any matter in which he intervened while in said
service. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment
in connection with any matter in which [they] had
intervened while in said service." Respondent was
an incumbent punong barangay at the time he
committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was
not covered by that provision.
Prohibition against Appointment
Article 11 (b) of the Constitution
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment
or designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Article 7, Section 16, 1987 Constitution
The President shall nominate and, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Flores v. Drilon
Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227 which states, “Provided, however, That for the
first year of its operations from the effectivity of this
Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be
appointed as the chairman and chief executive
officer of the Subic Authority,” violates the
constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government
posts.
Held:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment
or designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
The section expresses the policy against the
concentration of several public positions in one
person, so that a public officer or employee may
serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in
the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation
that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public
officer or employee, like the head of an executive
department described in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, and Anti-Graft
League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico,
as Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
Elective Local Officials
Qualifications/disqualifications
Sec. 39, Local Government Code- Qualifications
An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan,
the district where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read
and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect.
Candidates for the position of governor, vice-
governor, or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of
the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized
cities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age
on election day.
Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor
of independent component cities, component cities,
or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21)
years of age on election day.
Candidates for the position of member of the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan
must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on
election day.
Candidates for the position of punong barangay or
member of the sangguniang barangay must be at
least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be
at least fifteen (15) years of age but not more than
twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
Sec. 40, Local Government Code –
Disqualifications
The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment,
within two (2) years after serving sentence;
Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
Those convicted by final judgment for violating the
oath of allegiance to the Republic;
Those with dual citizenship;
Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political
cases here or abroad;
Japzon v. Comelec
Whether Ty has complied with the residency
requirement for elective position.
Held:
Republic Act. No. 9225 governs the manner in which
a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain his
Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign
citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities
under such circumstances.
Republic Act. No. 9225 imposes no residency
requirement for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect
of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the
concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, the said
Act treats citizenship independently of residence.
With that said, Ty's reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship under the Republic Act No. 9225 had no
automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile.
he could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he
did not necessarily regain his domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Ty merely had the option to again establish his
domicile in the said Municipal, becoming his new
domicile of choice.
Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec
Whether or not Teodora Sobejana-Condon is
disqualified and ineligible to her position as Vice-
Mayor of Caba, La Union for failure to renounce her
Australian citizenship in accordance with Section
5(2) of R.A. No. 9225
Held:
R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born
Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and seek
elective office, to execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships
before an authorized public officer prior to or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections. This applies to all those who have re-
acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner,
without regard as to whether they are still dual
citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the
exercise of the right to run for public office. The
petitioner's failure to comply therewith in accordance
with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual
the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006.
As such, she is yet to regain her political right to
seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn
renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is
ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the
Philippines.
Corodora v. Comelec
Whether Tambunting is a natural born Filipino.
Held:
Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under
this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states.
Elective Local Officials
Manner of Election
Under Sec. 41 of the LGC, local government officials
are elected in office in the following manner:
1) Governor, Vice-Governor, City or Municipal
Mayor, & City or Municipal Vice-Mayor - elected
at large
2) Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman - elected by
registered voters of the Katipunan ng Kabataan
3) Regular Members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Panlungsod & Bayan - elected by
district
4) Presidents of the leagues of Sangguniang
Members of Component Cities and Municipalities -
serve as ex-offico members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan
5) Presidents of the Liga ng mga Barangay and
Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan -
elected by their respected chapters; serve as ex-
officio members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
panlungsod, or bayan
6) 1 sectoral representatives from women, worker
and any of the ff:
 Urban poor
 Indigenous cultural communities
 Disabled persons
 Any other sectors as may be determined by
the sanggunian concerned within 90 days
prior to the holding of the next local election.
Date of Election
LGC 1991:
Section 42. Date of Election. - Unless otherwise
provided by law, the elections for local officials shall
be held every three (3) years on the second Monday
of May.
Omnibus Election of Barangay Officials:
Sec. 37. Regular election of barangay officials. -
The election for barangay officials shall be held
throughout the Philippines in the manner prescribed
on the second Monday of May Nineteen hundred
and eighty-eight and on the same day every six
years thereafter.
The officials elected shall assume office on the
thirtieth day of June next following the election and
shall hold office for six years and until their
successors shall have been elected and qualified.
R.A. No. 7056:
Section 2. Start of Synchronization. - To start the
process of synchronization of elections in
accordance with the policy herein before declared,
there shall be held.
Section 5. Election of Provincial, City, and
Municipal Members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, and
Sangguniang Bayan by Districts. - To reduce the
number of positions to be voted for, which is one of
the problems preventing immediate and full
synchronization of elections in May 1992, for better
representation, and to ensure free, orderly, honest,
and less expensive elections, the elective members
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan shall be
elected by the qualified voters of their respective
districts as follows:
xxxx
Beginning with the 1995 elections:
(a) For provinces and cities with only one (1)
representative district, the Commission on Elections
shall divide them into two (2) districts for purposes of
provincial or city representation as nearly as may be
according to the number of inhabitants, each district
comprising a compact, contiguous and adjacent
territory, and the number of elective members of
their respective sanggunian shall be equally divided
between the districts in accordance with the
standard or formula provided in the next preceding
section.
R.A. No. 7056:
(b) The Commission on Elections shall apportion the
number of elective councilors or members of the
sangguniang bayan among the duly constituted
barangays and sitios as nearly as practicable
according to the number of their respective
inhabitants, each councilor district to comprise a
compact, contiguous and adjacent territory:
Provided, however, That each councilor district shall
elect at least two (2) councilors: Provided, further,
That, in case of any extra member, he shall be
elected in the district with greater number of
population.
No person shall be elected member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, as the case
may be, unless he is an actual resident of his district:
Provided, however, That an incumbent member of
the sanggunian who competes in the election for the
same position may run in any district within the
municipality, city, or province where he is a
registered candidate.
Kida v. Senate of the Philippines
G.R. No. 196271, 18 October 2011
While the Constitution does not expressly state that
Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can
be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to
which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent
officials, sought to attain synchronization of
elections. Objective behind setting a common
termination date for all elective officials, done among
others through the shortening the terms of the twelve
winning senators with the least number of votes, is
to synchronize the holding of all future elections –
whether national or local – to once every three
years. This intention finds full support in the
discussions during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations. These Constitutional Commission
exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent
indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting
the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the
following elections.
From the perspective of the Constitution,
autonomous regions are considered one of the
forms of local governments, as evident from Article X
of the Constitution entitled "Local Government."
Autonomous regions are established and discussed
under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article – the article
wholly devoted to Local Government. Thus, we find
the contention – that the synchronization mandated
by the Constitution does not include the regional
elections of the ARMM –unmeritorious.
Synchronization of national and local elections is a
constitutional mandate that Congress must provide
for and this synchronization must include the ARMM
elections. On this point, an existing law in fact
already exists – RA No. 7166 – as the forerunner of
the current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166 already
provides for the synchronization of local elections
with the national and congressional elections.
Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter
for local governments (with the exception of
barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections
where the terms are not constitutionally provided)
and is technically a reiteration of what is already
reflected in the law, given that regional elections are
in reality local elections by express constitutional
recognition. To achieve synchronization, Congress
necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the
ARMM’s regular elections (which should have been
held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the
fixed schedule of the national and local elections
(fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the
three options open to Congress in order to resolve
this problem. These options are: (1) to allow the
elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a
hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article
VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; (2) to hold
special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of
those elected to expire when those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to
authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to
Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected
in the synchronized elections assume office. As will
be abundantly clear in the discussion below,
Congress, in choosing to grant the President the
power to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and
passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.
Term of Office
Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Sec. 43(b) of the Local Government Code of
1991
No local elective official shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.
Term
A fixed and definite period of time which the law
describes that an officer may hold an office.
Upon expiration of the officer's term, unless he is
authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and
authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In
the law of public officers, the most and natural
frequent method by which a public officer ceases to
be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he
was elected or appointed. (Appari v. Court of
Appeals)
Interruption
Occurs when the term is broken because the office
holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and
cannot be equated with the failure to render service.
The latter occurs during an office holder's term when
he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his
functions for reasons established by law. (Aldovino
v. COMELEC)
Voluntary Renunciation
To give up, abandon, decline, or resign.
Read with the definition of a "term" in mind,
renunciation, means an act that results in cutting
short the term, i.e., the loss of title to office.
does not seek a fourth term, immediately following
the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that
a "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected." This
qualification was made as a deterrent against an
elective local official intending to skirt the three-term
limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third
term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as

The descriptive word "voluntary" linked together with Cause Involuntary Basis
"renunciation" signifies an act of surrender based on interruption
Cause Involuntary interruption Basis
Conversion The abolition of Latasa v.
of a an elective local COMELEC
Municipality office due to the
Assump Succession in local Monteb into a City conversion of a
tion of government office is by on v. municipality to a
Office operation of law and as COMEL city does NOT, by
by such, it is an EC itself, work to
Operatio involuntary severance interrupt the
n of Law from office. incumbent
official's
Recall An elective official, who Adorme continuity of
Election has served for three o v. service.
consecutive terms and COMEL
who did not seek the EC Period of A preventive Aldovino v.
elective position for Preventive suspension COMELEC
what could be his Suspension CANNOT simply
fourth term, but later be a term
won in a recall election, interruption
had an interruption in because the
the continuity of the suspended official
official's service. For, continues to stay
he had become in the in office although
interim (from the end of he is barred from
the 3rd term up to the exercising the
recall election) a private functions and
citizen. prerogatives of
the office within
the surenderee's own freely exercised will; in other the suspension
words, a loss of title to office by conscious choice. period.
(Aldovino v. COMELEC)
Election When a candidate Lonzanida
Protest is proclaimed as v.
WINNER for an COMELEC,
elective position Dizon v.
Abundo v. COMELEC and assumes COMELEC;
G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013 office, his term is
INTERRUPTED Ong v.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective when he loses in Alegre,
local office, the following requisites must concur: an election Rivera III v.
protest and is COMELEC
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms in the same local ousted from
office. However,
government post; and when an official is
DEFEATED in an
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. election protest
The principle behind the three-term limit rule covers and said decision
only consecutive terms and that what the becomes final
Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. only after said
Put a bit differently, an elective local official cannot, official had
following his third consecutive term, seek immediate SERVED the full
reelection for a fourth term. term for said
office, then his
There has to be a break or interruption in the loss in the
successive terms of the official after his or her third election contest
term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does NOT
constitute an
interruption since
he has managed
to serve the term
from start to
finish.
distinguished from involuntary interruption which
may be brought about by certain events or causes.
Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any
of these events or causes: succession or
assumption of office by operation of law, preventive
suspension, declaration of the defeated candidate as
the winner in an election contest, declaration of the
proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an
election contest, proclamation of a non-candidate as
the winner in a recall election, removal of the official
by operation of law, and other analogous causes.
When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an
elective position and assumes office, his term is
interrupted when he loses in an election protest and
is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from
serving what would otherwise be the unexpired
portion of his term of office had the protest been
dismissed. The break or interruption need not be for
a full term of three years or for the major part of the
3-year term; an interruption for any length of time,
provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to
break the continuity of service.
However, when an official is defeated in an election
protest and said decision becomes final only after
said official had served the full term for said office,
then his loss in the election contest does not
constitute an interruption since he has managed to
serve the term from start to finish. His full service,
despite the defeat, should be counted in the
application of term limits because the nullification of
his proclamation came after the expiration of the
term.
Borja v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998
Art. VII, §4 of the Constitution which provides for
succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency
in case of vacancy in that office. After stating that
"The President shall not be eligible for any
reelection," this provision says that "No person who
has succeeded as President and has served as such
for more than four years shall be qualified for
election to the same office at any time." The framers
of the Constitution included such a provision
because, without it, the Vice-President, who simply
steps into the Presidency by succession, would be
qualified to run President even if he has occupied
that office for more than four years. The absence of
a similar provision in Art. X, §8 on elective local
officials throws in bold relief the difference between
the two cases. It underscores the constitutional
intent to cover only the terms of office to which one
may have been elected for purposes of the three-
term limit on local elective officials, disregarding for
this purpose service by automatic succession.
There is another reason why the Vice-President who
succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that office
for more than four years is ineligible for election as
President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to
succeed the President in the event of the latter's
death, permanent disability, removal, or resignation.
While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his
becoming, so is entirely dependent on the good
graces of the President. In running for Vice-
President, he may thus be said to also seek the
Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise
choose as Vice-President the candidate who they
think can fill the Presidency in the event it becomes
vacant. Hence, service in the Presidency for more
than four years may rightly be considered as service
for a full term.
This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under
the Local Government Code, he is the presiding
officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials
and employees of such local assembly. He has
distinct powers and functions, succession to
mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only
one of them. It cannot be said of him, as much as of
the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the
Presidency, that, in running for vice-mayor, he also
seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the
mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter
of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that
office should not be counted in the application of any
term limit.
Aldovino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2012
An interruption occurs when the term is broken
because the office holder lost the right to hold on to
his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to
render service. The latter occurs during an office
holder's term when he retains title to the office but
cannot exercise his functions for reasons
established by law. Of course, the term "failure to
serve" cannot be used once the right to office is lost;
without the right to hold office or to serve, then no
service can be rendered so that none is really lost.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two
vastly different aspects of an elective officials'
service in office and they do not overlap. As already
mentioned above, preventive suspension involves
protection of the service and of the people being
served, and prevents the office holder from
temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term
limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an
elective official has served his three terms in office
without any break. Its companion concept -
interruption of a term – on the other hand, requires
loss of title to office. If preventive suspension and
term limitation or interruption have any commonality
at all, this common point may be with respect to the
discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But
even on this point, they merely run parallel to each
other and never intersect; preventive suspension, by
its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render
service during an unbroken term; in the context of
term limitation, interruption of service occurs after
there has been a break in the term.
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by
operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act on
the part of the suspended official, except in the
indirect sense that he may have voluntarily
committed the act that became the basis of the
charge against him. From this perspective,
preventive suspension does not have the element of
voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies.
Neither does it contain the element of renunciation
or loss of title to office as it merely involves the
temporary incapacity to perform the service that an
elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive
suspension is - by its very nature - the exact
opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary
and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery
of service, not the title to the office. The easy
conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature,
different and non-comparable.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office
and the total incapacity to render service, is
disallowed by the Constitution as an effective
interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a
mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not
involve an effective interruption of a term and should
therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term
limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we
shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective
interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a
preventive suspension is easier to undertake than
voluntary renunciation, as it does not require
relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest
time. It merely requires an easily fabricated
administrative charge that can be dismissed soon
after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In
this sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an
effective interruption of a term can serve as a
circumvention more potent than the voluntary
renunciation that the Constitution expressly
disallows as an interruption.
Adormeo v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local
officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that
an individual has served three consecutive terms in
an elective local office, he must also have been
elected to the same position for the same number of
times before the disqualification can apply.
The second sentence of the constitutional provision
under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which he was elected." The clear intent
of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt
to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect
the people's choice and grant their elected official
full service of a term is evident in this provision.
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three term
limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office
for any length of time short of the full term provided
by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service.
Socrates v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002
These constitutional and statutory provisions have
two parts:
(a) The first part provides that an elective local
official cannot serve for more than three consecutive
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms
count in determining the three-term limit rule.
(b) The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not
interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is
that involuntary severance from office for any length
of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents
the service before and after the interruption from
being joined together to form a continuous service or
consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local
official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth
term. The prohibited election refers to the next
regular election for the same office following the end
of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no longer covered
by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a
subsequent election like a recall election is no longer
an immediate reelection after three consecutive
terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate
reelection for a fourth term following three
consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does
not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term
as long as the reelection is not immediately after the
end of the third consecutive term. A recall election
mid-way in the term following the third consecutive
term is a subsequent election but not an immediate
reelection after the third term.
Latasa v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003
Substantial differences do exist between a
municipality and a city. For one, there is a material
change in the political and economic rights of the
local government unit when it is converted from a
municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these
changes affect the people as well. It is precisely for
this reason why Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution mandates that no province, city,
municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, without the approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate
existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality. This does not mean, however, that for
the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional
provision, the office of the municipal mayor would
now be construed as a different local government
post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated
earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos
is the same as that of the municipality.
Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are
the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are
the same group of voters who elected petitioner
Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three
consecutive terms. These are also the same
inhabitants over whom he held power and authority
as their chief executive for nine years.
Mendoza v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 149736, December 17, 2002
As revealed by the records of the Constitutional
Commission, the Constitution envisions a continuous
and an uninterrupted service for three full terms
before the proscription applies. Therefore, not being
a full term, a recall term should not be counted or
used as a basis for the disqualification whether
served prior (as in this case) or subsequent (as in
the Socrates case) to the nine-year, full three-term
limit.
A term during which succession to a local elective
office takes place or a recall election is held should
not be counted in determining whether an elective
local official has served more than three consecutive
terms. He argued that the Constitution does not
prohibit elective local officials from serving for more
than three consecutive terms because, in fact, it
excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the
continuity of service, so long as such interruptions
are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office
by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28,
1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent
Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan
by virtue of a recall election held in1993, should not
be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had
previously served as governor of Bataan for only two
consecutive terms (1995–1998 and 1998–2001), his
election on that day was actually only his third term
for the same position.
A recall term should not be considered as one full
term, because a contrary interpretation would in
effect cut short the elected official’s service to less
than nine years and shortchange his constituents.
The desire to prevent monopoly of political power
should be balanced against the need to uphold the
voters’ obvious preference who, in the present case,
is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast.
He explained that, in Socrates, he also voted to
affirm the clear choice of the electorate, because in
democracy the people should, as much as legally
possible, be governed by leaders freely chosen by
them in credible elections. He concluded that, in
election cases, when two conflicting legal positions
are of almost equal weight, the scales of justice
should be tilted in favor of the people’s
overwhelming choice.
Ong v. Alegre
G.R. No. 163295, January 23, 2006
For the three-term limit for elective local government
officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must
concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the
same local government post, and (2) that he has
fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes,
for Francis, "service for the full term", and should be
counted as a full term served in contemplation of the
three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and
statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective
officials from being elected and serving for more
than three consecutive terms for the same position.
Rivera III v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 167591, May 9, 2007
When the proclamation is declared void only after
the elected official has been able to serve the full
term of the office, such service shall be counted in
the three-term limit.
The assumption of office and his continuous
exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish
of the term, should legally be taken as service for a
full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
In the present case, Morales was able to serve for
the full term from July 1, 1998, to June 30, 2001.
The decision declaring his proclamation void only
became final on August 6, 2001. Clearly, the three-
term limit rule applies to him.
Morales was elected for the position of Mayor in the
1998 elections, and he served as mayor until June
30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period
notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the
electoral protest.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated,
and its purpose defeated when an official serves in
the same position for three consecutive terms.
Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he
exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of
the office which enables him "to stay on indefinitely".
A second-place candidate cannot be proclaimed as
a substitute winner.
Dizon v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009
For purposes of determining the resulting
disqualification brought about by the three-term limit,
it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times. There should be a
concurrence of two conditions for the application of
the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post and (2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms.
Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat
for the following periods: 1 July 1995 to 30 June
1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to
30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007.
However, because of his disqualification, Morales
was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007
term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor
of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be
deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007
because he was ordered to vacate his post before
the expiration of the term. Morales' occupancy of the
position of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to
16 May 2007 cannot be counted as a term for
purposes of computing the three-term limit. Indeed,
the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007
served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit
rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010
term is effectively Morales' first term for purposes of
the three-term limit rule.
Bolos v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009
The rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, has
two parts:
The first part provides that an elective local official
cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms.
The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count
in determining the three-term limit rule. The second
part states that voluntary renunciation of office for
any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
service. The clear intent is that involuntary
severance from office for any length of time
interrupts continuity of service and prevents the
service before and after the interruption from being
joined together to form a continuous service or
consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local
official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth
term. The prohibited election refers to the next
regular election for the same office following the end
of the third consecutive term.
The Court held that two conditions for the application
of the disqualification must concur: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same government post;
and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was
elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive
terms, satisfying the first condition for
disqualification.
The Court agrees with the COMELEC that there was
voluntary renunciation by petitioner of his position as
Punong Barangay.
He knew that his election as municipal councilor
would entail abandonment of the position he held,
and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like
resignation, is voluntary.
The term "operation of law" is defined by the
Philippine Legal Encyclopedia as "a term describing
the fact that rights may be acquired or lost by the
effect of a legal rule without any act of the person
affected." Black's Law Dictionary also defines it as a
term that "expresses the manner in which rights, and
sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person by the
mere application to the particular transaction of the
established rules of law, without the act or
cooperation of the party himself."
Petitioner did not fill in or succeed to a vacancy by
operation of law. He instead relinquished his office
as Punong Barangay during his third term when he
won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan
member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a
voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong
Barangay.
COMELEC v. Cruz
G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009
The Constitutional Commission's deliberations on
Section 8 show that the authority of Congress to
legislate relates not only to the fixing of the term of
office of barangay officials, but also to the
application of the three-term limit.
The Congress has plenary authority under the
Constitution to determine by legislation not only the
duration of the term of barangay officials, but also
the application to them of a consecutive term limit.
The Congress had determined at its discretion both
the length of the term of office of barangay officials
and their term limitation. Given the textually
demonstrable commitment by the 1987 Constitution
to Congress of the authority to determine the term
duration and limitations of barangay officials under
the Constitution, we consider it established that
whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these
matters are political questions beyond the pale of
judicial scrutiny, subject only to the certiorari
jurisdiction of the courts provided under Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution and to the judicial
authority to invalidate any law contrary to the
Constitution.
Our own reading shows that no retroactive
application was made because the three-term limit
has been there all along as early as the second
barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987
Constitution took effect; it was continued under the
LGC and can still be found in the current law. We
find this obvious from a reading of the historical
development of the law.
The challenged proviso has been there all along and
does not simply retroact the application of the three-
term limit to the barangay elections of 1994.
Congress merely integrated the past statutory
changes into a seamless whole by coming up with
the challenged proviso.
The the respondents' retroactivity objection does not
involve a violation of any constitutional standard.
Retroactivity of laws is a matter of civil law, not of a
constitutional law, as its governing law is the Civil
Code, not the Constitution. The Civil Code
established a statutory norm, not a constitutional
standard.
The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws can get
to a genuine constitutional issue is if a law's
retroactive application will impair vested rights.
Otherwise stated, if a right has already vested in an
individual and a subsequent law effectively takes it
away, a genuine due process issue may arise. What
should be involved, however, is a vested right to life,
liberty, or property, as these are the ones that may
be considered protected by the due process clause
of the Constitution.
In the present case, the respondents never raised
due process as an issue. But even if they did, the
respondents themselves concede that there is no
vested right to public office.
Rules on Succession
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices
of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and Vice-
Mayor
If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor.
If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the
governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the
highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case
of his permanent inability, the second highest
ranking sanggunian member, shall become the
governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as
the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said
office shall be filled automatically by the other
sanggunian members according to their ranking as
defined herein.
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
punong barangay, the highest ranking sanggunian
barangay member or, in case of his permanent
inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian
member, shall become the punong barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking
sanggunian members shall be resolved by the
drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve
only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy
arises when an elective local official fills a higher
vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to
qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily
resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in the
Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of votes
obtained by each winning candidate to the total
number of registered voters in each district in the
immediately preceding local election.
Vacancy
There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied
by a legally qualified incumbent. Corollarily, there is
a vacancy when there is no person lawfully
authorized at present to assume and exercise the
duties of the office.
Permanent Vacancy
A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume
office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
Effect of Disqualification of winner of election
It is fundamental of republican forms of government
that no one can be declared elected unless he
receives a majority of legal votes in the election. The
exception is where the electorate, fully aware of the
fact and in law of a candidate’s disqualification so as
to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor
of another candidate.
In such a case, the electorate may be said to have
waived the validity and efficacy of their votes, by
notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing
away their votes, in which case, the eligible
candidate obtaining the next higher number of
votes may be deemed elected. In such a case, the
vice-mayor takes over the position of mayor.
Substitution of Candidate
Only an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party can be substituted. A
person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot
be considered a candidate in much the same way as
any person who has not filed any certificate of
candidacy at all cannot by any stretch of imagination
be candidate at all.
There can be no valid substitution for the latter,
much in the same way that a nuisance candidate
whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course
and/or cancelled may not be substituted.
Likewise, where the position sought to be substituted
for was filled by another candidate who filed his
certificates of candidacy for the same party and for
the same position, the other certificate can be
cancelled as there was no void to fill.
When position of vice-mayor is vacant
A vacancy in position of vice-mayor should be
filled by the highest ranking sanggunian member
if the candidate who filed a cancelled certificate
receives the highest number of votes.
How ranking in sanggunian is determined
It is determined on the basis of the proportion of
votes obtained by each winning candidate to the
total number of registered voters, not the total
number of voters who actually voted.
When Section 44 is inapplicable
The Court ruled in Aratea v. COMELEC and
Jalosjos Jr. v. COMELEC that the cancellation of
the COC based on an ineligibility that existed at the
time of its filing means that the candidate was never
a valid candidate from the very beginning.
As to who should assume the post vacated by the
ineligible candidate, the Court amply explained in
Jalosjos Jr. that:
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-
placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-
placer is disqualified or declared ineligible
should be limited to situations where the
certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was
valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to
be cancelled because of a violation of a law that
took place, or a legal impediment that took
effect, after the filing of the certificate of
candidacy.
If the COC is void ab initio, then legally the
person who filed such void COC was never a
candidate in the elections at any time. All votes
for such non-candidate are considered stray
votes and are not counted. Thus, such non-
candidate can never be a first-placer in the
elections.
There is another compelling reason why the eligible
candidate who garnered the highest number of votes
must assume the office. The ineligible candidate
who was proclaimed and who already assumed
office is a de facto officer by virtue of the ineligibility.
The Rule on Succession in Section 44 cannot apply
in instances when a de facto officer is ousted from
office and the de jure officer takes over. The ouster
of a de facto officer cannot create a permanent
vacancy as contemplated in the Local Government
Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as the de jure
officer, the rightful winner in the elections, has the
legal right to assume the position.
DQ after filing of COC – second placer
DQ at the time of filing of COC (COC void ab initio) –
vice mayor
Section 45. Permanent Vacancies in
Sanggunian
(a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where
automatic succession provided above do not apply
shall be filled by appointment in the following
manner:
(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary,
in the case of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities
and independent component cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of the sangguniang
panlungsod of component cities and the
sangguniang bayan;
(3) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of
sangguniang barangay, upon recommendation
of the sangguniang barangay concerned.
(b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the
nominee of the political party under which the
sanggunian member concerned had been
elected and whose elevation to the position next
higher in rank created the last vacancy in the
sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner
hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come
from the same political party as that of the
sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and
shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office.
In the appointment herein mentioned, a nomination
and a certificate of membership of the appointee
from the highest official of the political party
concerned are conditions sine qua non, and any
appointment without such nomination and
certification shall be null and void ab initio and shall
be a ground for administrative action against the
official responsible therefore.
(c) In case or permanent vacancy is caused by a
sanggunian member who does not belong to any
political party, the local chief executive shall, upon
recommendation of the sanggunian concerned,
appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy.
(d) In case of vacancy in the representation of the
youth and the barangay in the sanggunian, said
vacancy shall be filled automatically by the official
next in rank of the organization concerned.
“Local Chief Executive under Section 45(c)”
This refers to those persons enumerated under
Section 45(a)(1) to (3). Implicit in these provisions is
a policy to vest in the President, the governor and
the mayor in descending order the exercise of an
executive power whether to appoint in order to fill
vacancies in local councils or to suspend local
officials. These provisions are in pari materia with
Section 45.
“Sanggunian Concerned” under Section 45(c)
This refers to that Sanggunian where the vacancy
was created. This is in keeping with the policy
implicit in Section 45(a)(3).
Nature of appointing power under Section 45(c)
the
The appointing authority is limited to the
appointment of those recommended to him. The
appointing authority is not bound to appoint anyone
recommended to him by the Sanggunian concerned.
The power of appointment is a discretionary power.
On the other hand, neither is the appointing power
vested with so large a discretion that he can
disregard the recommendation of the Sanggunian
concerned. Since the recommendation takes place
of nomination by political party, the recommendation
must likewise be considered a condition sine qua
non for the validity of the appointment, by analogy to
the provision of Section 45(b).

Nature of appointment
The appointment is permanent in nature, and for the
unexpired portion of the deceased predecessor’s
term. The sanggunian member acquires security of
tenure in the position and could be removed
therefrom only for any of the causes, and
conformably to the procedure prescribed under the
LGC.
Where the Sanggunian member’s appointment has
been issued and accepted, and he has already
assumed office, his appointment cannot be recalled
to accommodate another. The substantive and
procedural requirements cannot be circumvented by
the simple process of recalling the appointment.
“Last Vacancy” under Section 45(b
This refers to that created by the elevation of the
member formerly occupying the position next higher
in rank which in turn becomes vacant by any of the
causes already enumerated. This term is used in
Section 45(b) to differentiate it from the other
vacancy previously created.
The reason behind the right given to a political party
to nominate a replacement where a permanent
vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the
party representation as willed by the people in the
election.
Section 46. Temporary Vacancy in the Office of
the Local Chief Executive
(a) When the governor, city or municipal mayor, or
punong barangay is temporarily incapacitated to
perform his duties for physical or legal reasons such
as, but not limited to, leave of absence, travel
abroad, and suspension from office, the vice-
governor, city or municipal vice-mayor, or the
highest ranking sangguniang barangay member
shall automatically exercise the powers and perform
the duties and functions of the local chief executive
concerned, except the power to appoint, suspend, or
dismiss employees which can only be exercised if
the period of temporary incapacity exceeds thirty
(30) working days.
(b) Said temporary incapacity shall terminate upon
submission to the appropriate sanggunian of a
written declaration by the local chief executive
concerned that he has reported back to office. In
cases where the temporary incapacity is due to legal
causes, the local chief executive concerned shall
also submit necessary documents showing that said
legal causes no longer exist.
(c) When the incumbent local chief executive is
traveling within the country but outside his territorial
jurisdiction for a period not exceeding three (3)
consecutive days, he may designate in writing the
officer-in-charge of the said office. Such
authorization shall specify the powers and functions
that the local official concerned shall exercise in the
absence of the local chief executive except the
power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees.
(d) In the event, however, that the local chief
executive concerned fails or refuses to issue such
authorization, the vice-governor, the city or municipal
vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang
barangay member, as the case may be, shall have
the right to assume the powers, duties, and functions
of the said office on the fourth (4th) day of absence
of the said local chief executive, subject to the
limitations provided in subsection (c) hereof.
(e) Except as provided above, the local chief
executive shall in no case authorize any local official
to assume the powers, duties, and functions of the
office, other than the vice-governor, the city or
municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking
sangguniang barangay member, as the case may
be.
Absence
An elective official is “effectively absent” where the
officer is powerless, for the time being, to discharge
the powers and prerogatives of the office.
Effect where no designation is made under
Section 46 (c)
Where no officer-in-charge is designated, the default
rules provided under Section 46(a) shall apply. The
rule merely provides that the local chief executives
may designate officers-in-charge where the former
are traveling within the country for a period not
exceeding three consecutive days.
Talaga v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012
In the case at bar, a permanent vacancy in the office
of Mayor of Lucena City resulted, and such vacancy
should be filled pursuant to the law on succession
defined in Section 44 of the LGC, which provides
that “If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of
the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-
mayor concerned shall become the governor or
mayor.”
Castillo in this case could not assume the office for
he was only a second placer. The Court emphasized
that the candidate obtaining the second highest
number of votes for the contested office could not
assume the office despite the disqualification of the
first placer because the second placer was "not the
choice of the sovereign will." A minority or defeated
candidate could not be deemed elected to the office.
There was to be no question that the second placer
lost in the election, was repudiated by the electorate,
and could not assume the vacated position.
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take
the place of a disqualified winning candidate is when
two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes is
disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully
aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s
disqualification as to bring such awareness
within the realm of notoriety but the electorate
still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate. But the exception did not
apply in favor of Castillo simply because the second
element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City
were not the least aware of the fact of Barbara
Ruby’s ineligibility as the substitute.
Gamboa v. Aguirre
G.R. No. 134213, July 20, 1999
While a Vice Governor is in the capacity of Acting
Governor, does he temporarily relinquish the
powers, functions, duties and responsibilities of the
Vice-Governor, including the power to preside over
the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
(SP)?
The Local Government Code is silent on this matter,
but the Supreme Court answered this query in the
positive. Under R.A. 7160, the Governor is deprived
of the power to preside over the SP and is no longer
considered a member thereof. A Vice-Governor who
is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a
quasi-Governor. This means, that for purposes of
exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers,
he is deemed as a non-member of the SP for the
time being.
Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor
cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the
duties of the latter office, since the nature of the
duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time
occupant to discharge them. The continuity of the
Acting Governor's (Vice Governor) powers as
presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as
he is in such capacity. Under Section 49(b), "(i)n the
event of the inability of the regular presiding officer
to preside at the sanggunian session, the members
present and constituting a quorum shall elect from
among themselves a temporary presiding officer.
Recall
Section 69. By Whom Exercised.
The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local
government unit to which the local elective official
subject to such recall belongs.
Applicability of due process clause
While the soundness of the assertion that a public
office is a public trust and as such not amounting to
property in its usual sense cannot be denied, there
can be no disputing the proposition that from the
standpoint of security of tenure guaranteed by the
Constitution, the mantle of protection offered by due
process could rightfully be invoked.
A public officer cannot be deprived of his office
without due process of law. Although public office is
not property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of
the Constitution, and one cannot acquire a vested
right in public office, it is nevertheless a protected
right.
Nature of Right to Recall
The right to recall is complementary to the right to
elect or appoint. It is based on the theory that the
electorate must maintain a direct and elastic control
over public functionaries. It is also predicated on the
idea that a public office is burdened with public
interests and that the representatives of the people
holding public office are simply agents or servants of
the people with definite powers and specific duties to
follow if they wish to remain in their respective
offices.
The question of whether the electorate has lost
confidence in a local elective official is a political
question.
“Loss of Confidence”
It is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their
trust in a person’s ability to discharge his office
previously bestowed on him by the same electorate.
Section. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process
(a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall
assembly or by the registered voters of the local
government unit to which the local elective official
subject to such recall belongs.
(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in
every province, city, district, and municipality which
shall be composed of the following:
(1) Provincial level. - All mayors, vice-mayors, and
sanggunian members of the municipalities and
component cities;
(2) City level. - All punong barangay and sanggunian
barangay members in the city;
(3) Legislative District level. - In case where
sangguniang panlalawigan members are elected by
district, all elective municipal officials in the district;
and in cases where sangguniang panlungsod
members are elected by district, all elective
barangay officials in the district; and
(4) Municipal level. - All punong barangay and
sangguniang barangay members in the municipality.
(c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly
members may convene in session in a public place
and initiate a recall proceedings against any elective
official in the local government unit concerned.
Recall of provincial, city, or municipal officials shall
be validly initiated through a resolution adopted by a
majority of all the members of the preparatory recall
assembly concerned during its session called for the
purpose.
(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal,
or barangay official may also be validly initiated upon
petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the
total number of registered voters in the local
government unit concerned during the election in
which the local official sought to be recalled was
elected.
(1) A written petition for recall duly signed before the
election registrar or his representative, and in the
presence of a representative of the petitioner and a
representative of the official sought to be recalled
and, and in a public place in the province, city,
municipality, or barangay, as the case may be, shall
be filed with the COMELEC through its office in the
local government unit concerned. The COMELEC or
its duly authorized representative shall cause the
publication of the petition in a public and
conspicuous place for a period of not less than ten
(10) days nor more than twenty (20) days, for the
purpose of
(2) Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the
COMELEC or its duly authorized representative shall
announce the acceptance of candidates to the
position and thereafter prepare the list of candidates
which shall include the name of the official sought to
be recalled.
Reasons for People’s Recall Assembly
Legislative records show that there were two
principal reasons why this alternative mode of
initiating recall was adopted:
 To diminish difficulty of initiating recall
through the direct action of the people;
 To cut down on its expenses.
There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely
suggest that the people have the sole and exclusive
right to decide on whether to initiate a recall
proceeding.
Notably, Republic Act No. 9244 has removed the
People’s Recall Assembly as a mode for initiating
recall.
Judicial Review of COMELEC decision
Issues of propriety sent to members of the People
Recall Assembly is factual in nature and the
determination of the same is a function of the
Commission on Elections. In the absence of patent
error or serious inconsistencies in the findings, the
Supreme Court should not disturb the same.
A motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the
viability of a special civil action for certiorari to review
the decision of the COMELEC.
Meaning of percentage requirements
Section 69(d) of the Code requires the petition to be
filed, not only by one person, but by atleast 25% of
the total number of registered voters. While the
initiatory recall petition may not yet contain the
signatures of atleast 25% of the total number of
registered voters, the petition must contain the name
of atleast 25% of the total number of registered
voters in whose behalf only one person may sign in
the meantime.
Section 71. Election on Recall
Upon the filing of a valid resolution or petition for
recall with the appropriate local office of the
COMELEC, the Commission or its duly authorized
representative shall set the date of the election on
recall, which shall not be later than thirty (30) days
after the filing of the resolution or petition for recall in
the case of the barangay, city, or municipal officials.
and forty-five (45) days in the case of provincial
officials. The official or officials sought to be recalled
shall automatically be considered as duly registered
candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions
and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be
voted upon.
Section 72. Effectivity of Recall
The recall of an elective local official shall be
effective only upon the election and proclamation of
a successor in the person of the candidate receiving
the highest number of votes cast during the election
on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled
receive the highest number of votes, confidence in
him is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in
office.
Section 73. Prohibition from Resignation
The elective local official sought to be recalled shall
not be allowed to resign while the recall process is in
progress.
Section 74. Limitations on Recall
(a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a
recall election only once during his term of office for
loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from
the date of the official's assumption to office or one
(1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election.
“Regular Local Election” under Section 74(b)
This refers to the election where the office held by
the local elective official sought to be recalled will be
contested and be filled by the electorate.
Also, regular local election refers to the date of the
election not to the election period or campaign
period.
Meaning of “recall” in Section 74(b)
The term refers to recall election and not to the
preliminary proceedings to initiate recall:
1) Because Section 74 speaks of limitations on
“recall” which, according to Section 69, is a
power which shall be exercised by the
registered voters of a local government unit.
Since the voters do not exercise such right
except in an election, it is clear that the
initiation of recall proceedings is not
prohibited within the one-year period
provided in paragraph (b);
2) Because the purpose of the first limitation in
paragraph (b) is to provide voters sufficient
basis for judging an elective local official,
and final judging is not done until the day of
the election;
3) Because to construe the limitation in
paragraph (b) as including the initiation of
 recall proceedings would unduly curtail
freedom of speech and of assembly
guaranteed in the Constitution.
Section 75. Expenses Incident to Recall
Elections
All expenses incident to recall elections shall be
borne by the COMELEC. For this purpose, there
shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act a contingency fund at the
disposal of the COMELEC for the conduct of
recall elections.
Resignation
What is resignation?
Resignation is the act of giving up, or the act of
an officer by which he declines his office and
renounces the further right to use it. It is an
expression of the incumbent in some form,
express or implied, of the intention to surrender,
renounce, and relinquish the office and the
acceptance by competent and lawful authority
(Ortiz, vs. COMELEC, 162 SCRA 812).
Section 82, Local Government Code of 1991
Resignation is deemed effective only upon
acceptance by the following authorities:
1. President – governor/vice-gov/mayor/vice-
mayor of highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities
2. Governor – municipal
mayors/vice-mayors/city mayors/vice-mayors of
component cities
3. Sanggunian concerned – sanggunian
members
4. City or municipal mayor – barangay officials
When is there a valid resignation?
To constitute a complete and operative
resignation from public office, there must be: (a)
an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b)
an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance
by the proper authority (Gamboa vs. Court of
Appeals, 108 SCRA 1).
Resignations by sangguniang panlalawigan
members must submit their letters of resignation
to the President or to his/her alter ego, the SILG.
The letter must be submitted, received and
acted upon by the supervising officials,
otherwise, there was no valid and complete
resignation (Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118883, January
16, 1998).
Section 82, Local Government Code of 1991
• Copies of the resignation letters of elective
local officials, together with the action taken
by the aforesaid authorities, shall be
furnished the Department of the Interior and
Local Government.
• It is deemed accepted if not acted upon
within 15 working days from receipt.
General Rule: Irrevocable resignations by
sanggunian members shall be deemed accepted
upon:
1. Presentation before an open session of the
sanggunian concerned; and
2. Duly entered in its records.
Exception: Sanggunian members who are
subject to recall elections or to cases where
existing laws prescribe the manner of acting
upon such resignations.
Discipline
Discipline in General
Grounds
According to Section 60 of the Local
Government Code (LGC):
● Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
● Culpable violation of the Constitution;
● Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office,
gross
negligence, or dereliction of duty;
● Commission of any offense involving moral
turpitude or
an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;
● Abuse of authority;
● Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15)
consecutive working days, except in the case of
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod,
sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang
barangay;
● Application for, or acquisition of, foreign
citizenship or residence or the status of an
immigrant of another country; and
● Such other grounds as may be provided in this
Code and other laws.
NOTE:
● Subject to discipline, suspended or removed
from office
● An administrative case, not criminal, against
the public official for disloyalty only requires
substantial evidence (Aguinaldo v. Santos)
 province, highly
urbanized city or an
Jurisdiction Independent
component city
● Power to remove erring elective officials from
Governor Elective official of a
service is
component city or
EXCLUSIVELY with the courts (Section 60; municipal
Pablico v. Mayor Elective official of a
barangay
Villapando; Salalima v. Guingona)

Procedure of administrative complaint

(Section 61)
● Abuse of the exercise of power of preventive
● Verified complaint suspension shall be penalized as abuse of
● 7 days after filing, respondent shall submit authority
verified answer within 15 days of receipt ● Preventive suspension cannot be imposed
● Investigation will commence within 10 days within 90 days before any local election. If
after receipt of answer imposed, it shall be deemed automatically lifted
upon start of the period
● Where to file complaint
○ A single preventive suspension shall not
Elective official of Where to file extend beyond 60 days

○ If there are multiple cases, he cannot be

Province, highly Office of the President preventively suspended more than 90 days in a
urbanized city, single year on the same grounds known
independent component
city, or component city ● Official shall not receive salary or
Municipality Sangguniang compensation.
Panlalawigan
Upon exoneration or reinstatement, he shall be
(Appealable to the
Office of the President) paid in full
Barangay Sangguniang
Panlungsod or ● Full opportunity to appear and defend himself
Sangguniang Bayan in person or by counsel
concerned
● Confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him
● No investigation shall be held within 90 days
prior to any election ● Require the attendance of witnesses and
production of documentary evidence in his favor
● The power of investigating and deciding an
administrative case against municipal official is
not executive in nature. It cannot be frustrated
Removal
by absence of Provincial Governor (Castillo v.
Villarama) ● Power to remove erring elective officials from
service is EXCLUSIVELY with the courts
(Section 60; Pablico v. Villapando; Salalima v.
Preventive suspension Guingona)

● Suspension does not remove the officer, but
prevents him from performing the functions of
office (Cornejo v. Gabriel)
● May be exercised without notice to person
suspended, notice and hearing are not
prerequisites unless required by the statute
○ Contrary to Article 124(b) of IRR of LGC which
is considered VOID
● If the official is removed from office, he or she
shall be barred from running for any elective
office

Imposition
Administrative appeal
● May be imposed any time after the issues are
● Decisions in administrative cases may be
joined, the evidence of guilt is strong, and given
appealed within 30 days (Section 67)
the gravity of the offense, there is great
probability that the continuance in office shall Origin Appeal to
pose a threat to safety and integrity of records
Sangguniang Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Panlalawigan
component cities and
● Who can impose? Sangguniang Bayan
Sangguniang Office of the
To impose Official affected
Panlalawigan and President*
Sangguniang
President Elective official of a
 Panlungsod of
highly urbanized
cities and
independent
component cities
● Decisions of the Office of the President are
deemed final and executory
● An appeal shall not prevent a decision from
becoming final and executory
○ Considered as having been placed under
preventive suspension if he or she wins the appeal
○ Does not apply to administrative decisions of the
Ombudsman (Lapid v. CA)
Disciplinary actions in LGC
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. - An
elective local official may be disciplined, suspended,
or removed from office on any of the following
grounds:
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office,
gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral
turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision
mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive
working days, except in the case of members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang
barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign
citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant
of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this
Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office
on the grounds enumerated above by order of the
proper court.
Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative
Complaints. - A verified complaint against any erring
local elective official shall be prepared as follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a
province, a highly urbanized city, an independent
component city or component city shall be filed
before the Office of the President;
(b) A complaint against any elective official of a
municipality shall be filed before the sangguniang
panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to
the Office of the President; and
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official
shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall
be final and executory.
Section 62. Notice of hearing. –
(a) Within seven (7) days after the administrative
complaint is filed, the Office of the President or the
sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall
require the respondent to submit his verified answer
within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, and
commence the investigation of the case within ten
(10) days after receipt of such answer of the
respondent.
(b) When the respondent is an elective official of a
province or highly urbanized city, such hearing and
investigation shall be conducted in the place where
he renders or holds office. For all other local elective
officials, the venue shall be the place where the
sanggunian concerned is located.
(c) However, no investigation shall be held within
ninety (90) days immediately prior to any local
election, and no preventive suspension shall be
imposed within the said period. If preventive
suspension has been imposed prior to the 90-day
period immediately preceding local election, it shall
be deemed automatically lifted upon the start of
aforesaid period.
Section 64. Salary of Respondent Pending
Suspension. - The respondent official preventively
suspended from office
shall receive no salary or compensation during such
suspension; but upon subsequent exoneration and
reinstatement,
he shall be paid full salary or compensation including
such emoluments accruing during such suspension.
Section 65. Rights of Respondent. - The respondent
shall be accorded full opportunity to appear and
defend himself
in person or by counsel, to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him, and to require
the attendance of
witnesses and the production of documentary
process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.
Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. -
(a) The investigation of the case shall be terminated
within ninety (90) days from the start thereof. Within
thirty (30)
days after the end of the investigation, the Office of
the President or the sanggunian concerned shall
render a
decision in writing stating clearly and distinctly the
facts and the reasons for such decision. Copies of
said decision
shall immediately be furnished the respondent and
all interested parties.
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the
unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six
(6) months for
every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty
be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so
suspended as long
as he meets the qualifications required for the office.
(c) The penalty of removal from office as a result of
an administrative investigation shall be considered a
bar to the candidacy of the respondent for any
elective position.
Section 67. Administrative Appeals. - Decisions in
administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days
from receipt thereof, be appealed to the following:
(a) The sangguniang panlalawigan, in the case of
decisions of the sangguniang panlungsod
of component cities and the sangguniang bayan;
and
(b) The Office of the President, in the case of
decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities
and independent component cities.
Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final
and executory.
Section 68. Execution Pending Appeal. - An appeal
shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or
executory. The respondent shall be considered as
having been placed under preventive suspension
during the pendency of an appeal in the event he
wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in
an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such
other emoluments during the pendency of the
appeal.
Ganzon v. court of appeals
FACTS:
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10
complaints were filed against him on grounds of
misconduct and misfeasance of office. The
Secretary of Local Government issued several
suspension orders against Ganzon based on the
merits of the complaints filed against him hence
Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension.
Ganzon appealed the issue to the Court of Appeals
and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the
Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987
Constitution does not authorize the President nor
any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local
officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution
supports local autonomy and strengthens the same.
What was given by the present Constitution was
mere supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local
Government, as the President’s alter ego, can
suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the
Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, “supervision” is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and
extent of the power of supervision by the President
over local government officials in contrast to the
power of control given to him over executive officials
of our government wherein it was emphasized that
the two terms, control and supervision, are two
different things which differ one from the other in
meaning and extent. In administration law
supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them the former may take such action or step
as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter. But from this
pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that
the power of supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power of
investigation when in his opinion the good of the
public service so requires. The Secretary of Local
Government, as the alter ego of the president, in
suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He
however overstepped by imposing a 600 day
suspension.
Joson v. torres
FACTS:
Ganzon, after having been issued three successive
60-day of suspension order by Secretary of Local
Government, filed a petition for prohibition with the
CA to bar Secretary Santos from implementing the
said orders. Ganzon was faced with 10
administrative complaints on various charges on
abuse of authority and grave misconduct.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government
(as the alter ego of the President) has the authority
to suspend and remove local officials.
RULING:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as
existing legislation authorizes the President (through
the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed
against local officials administratively, the
Constitution contains no prohibition. The Chief
Executive is not banned from exercising acts of
disciplinary authority because she did not exercise
control powers, but because no law allowed her to
exercise disciplinary authority.
In those case that this Court denied the President
the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because
that the President cannot exercise it on account of
his limited power, but because the law lodged the
power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the
law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v.
Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the
President, through the Secretary of Interior from
exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion
that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power
oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave
abuse of discretion.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of
suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor
Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him
spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to
make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension
permanent.
Salalima v. guingona
Facts:
- NPC filed a case against the Province of Albay
questioning the validity of the auction sale, which the
Province conducted because of NPC’s failure to pay
real property taxes assessed.
- The Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan, through a
resolution, authorized respondent Governor to
engage the services of a Manila-based law firm
(Cortes & Reyna Law Firm) to handle the case
against NPC. Later, the Province also engaged the
services of Atty. Cornago. This is despite the
availability of the Provincial Legal Officer, Atty.
Ricafort, who already filed the Province’s comment
on the NPC petition.
- A retainer agreement was entered into which
provided that Atty. Cornago and the law firm shall
receive P50,000 as acceptance fee and 18% of the
value of the property subject matter of the case
which is P214 Million.
- The province had already paid P7,380,410.31 as
attorney’s fees when the COA disallowed further
disbursements for lack of the requisite prior written
conformity and acquiescence of the Sol Gen and the
written concurrence of the COA as required by COA
Circular No. 86-255.
- An administrative complaint was then filed against
Gov. Salalima, Vice Gov. Azaña, and other Albay
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members relative to the
questioned retainer contract and the disbursement of
public funds in payment thereof.
Issue: WON respondents have incurred
administrative liability in entering into the retainer
agreement with Atty.
Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and in
making payments pursuant to said agreement
Held: YES. In hiring private lawyers to represent the
Province of Albay, respondents exceeded their
authority and violated a provision of the LGC and a
Supreme Court doctrine. Moreover, the entire
transaction was attended by irregularities.
- Sec. 481 LGC: requires the appointment of a legal
officer to represent the LGU in all civil actions and
specal proceedings wherein the LGU or any official
thereof, in his official capacity is a party
EXCEPTION: In actions or proceedings where a
component city or municipality is a party adverse to
the provincial government or to another component
city or municipality, a special legal officer may be
employed to represent the adverse party
- Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok: LGUs
cannot be represented by private lawyers and it is
solely the Provincial Fiscal who can rightfully
represent them.
Attendant Irregularities:
- No prior written approval of the Sol Gen and COA
before the disbursements were made
-The resolution passed by the Sanggunian only
authorized the Governor to sign a retainer contract
with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and yet he also
signed with Atty. Cornago, a different entity
- The Province paid the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm
despite the fact that it didn’t appear as counsel for
the Province in the SC case
- Considering the standing of both Atty. Cornago the
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm, the P38.5 Million
attorney’s fees is unconscionable and violative of (a)
COA Circular No. 85-55-A prohibiting irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures
or uses of funds; and (b) Sec. 3 (e) and (g) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
*** However, it was held that respondents could no
longer be subject to disciplinary action for such
administrative misconduct as it was committed
during a prior term.
Berces v. executive secretary
FACTS: Petitioner filed two administrative cases
against respondent Naomi C. Corral, the incumbent
Mayor of Tiwi, Albay with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Albay. The first Administrative Case
is an action for abuse of authority and/or oppression
for non-payment of accrued leave benefits due the
petitioner amounting to P36,779.02. The second
Administrative Case is for dishonesty and abuse of
authority for installing a water pipeline which is being
operated, maintained and paid for by the
municipality to service respondent's private
residence and medical clinic.
Respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the
President questioning the decision and at the same
time prayed for the stay of execution in accordance
with Sec. 67(b) of the Local Government Code
(LGC). The Office of the President thru the
Executive Secretary directed “stay of execution”.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was
dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary
injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the
President as having been issued with grave abuses
of discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC
(1991) impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative
Order No. 18 (1987).
RULING: NO. Petition was dismissed. “Stay of
execution” applied. The first sentence of Section 68
merely provides that an “appeal shall not prevent a
decision from becoming final or executory.” As
worded, there is room to construe said provision as
giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the
execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing
to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are
deprived of the authority to order a stay of the
appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to
repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it
could have used more direct language expressive of
such intention.
An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal
upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be
found between the new and prior laws. In the
absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law
cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless
an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
exists in the terms of the new and old laws.
MALINAO v. REYES
FACTS: .Virginia Malinao is Human Resource
Manager III of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque.
Respondent Mayor filed a case against her in the
Office of the Ombudsman for gross neglect of duty,
inefficiency and incompetence. While the case was
pending, he appointed a replacement for petitioner.
Petitioner then filed an administrative case against
respondent Mayor in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Marinduque, charging him with abuse of authority
and denial of due process.
In an executive session of the Sanggunian, a vote of
5-3 found respondent Mayor guilty of the charge and
imposed on him the penalty of one-month
suspension, which decision was signed by only one
member, Rodrigo Sotto, who was also the Presiding
Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Committee of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. As a result, respondent
Mayor questioned said decision and alleged that
since only Sotto alone signed the decision it can only
be considered as a recommendation of the Blue
Ribbon Committee and he was not bound by it.
ISSUE: Whether or not the "Decision" had become
final and executory, for failure of respondent Mayor
to appeal, thus it was beyond the power of the
Sanggunian to render another decision.
RULING: The contentions are without merit. What
petitioner claims to be the "Decision" of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan bore the signature of
only one member (Rodrigo V. Sotto) who signed the
"Decision" as "Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon
Committee, Sangguniang Panlalawigan.” Contrary to
petitioner's claim, what the minutes only show is that
on August 12, 1994 the Sanggunian took a vote on
the administrative case of respondent Mayor and not
that it then rendered a decision as required by
Section 66(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A.
No. 7160) which provides that the investigation of
the case shall be terminated within ninety (90) days
from the start thereof. Within thirty (30) days after
the end of the investigation, the Office of the
President or the sanggunian concerned shall render
a decision in writing stating clearly and distinctly the
facts and the reasons for such decision. In order to
render a decision in administrative cases involving
elective local officials, the decision of the
Sanggunian must thus be "in writing stating clearly
and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such
decision."
What the Sanggunian, therefore, did on August 12,
1994 was not to render a decision. Neither may the
so-called "Decision" prepared by Sanggunian
Member Rodrigo V. Sotto on September 5, 1994 be
regarded as the decisionof the Sanggunian for lack
of the signatures of the requisite majority.
Sanggunian baranggay of don mariano marcos
v. Martinez
RULING: No, the Sanggunaing Bayan is not
empowered to do so. Section 60 of the Local
Government Code conferred upon the courts the
power to remove elective local officials from office.
During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local
Government Code, the intent to confine to the courts
jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of
elective local officials was evident.
In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc
nullified Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991 which granted to the “disciplining
authority” the power to remove elective officials, a
power which the law itself granted only to the proper
courts.
The rule which confers to the proper courts the
power to remove an elective local official from office
is intended as a check against partisan activity.
Vesting the local legislative body with the power to
remove from office a local chief executive, and only
relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to
implement the decision, would still not free the
resolution of the case from partisanship. Thus, if the
acts allegedly committed by the barangay official
would merit the penalty of removal from office, the
case should be filed with the RTC.
Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains
jurisdiction over the case even if it would be
subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty Other Disciplinary Actions
less than removal from office is appropriate. On the
other hand, the most extreme penalty that the

Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan

may impose on the elective official is suspension; if it
deems that the removal of the official from service is
warranted, then it can resolve that the proper
charges be filed in court.

Lingating v. Comelec

ISSUE: Whether or not Sumulong is disqualified to

run for local election.

RULING: The filing of motion for reconsideration by

Sulong prevented the decision of Sangguniang
Panlalawigan from becoming final. There is thus no
decision finding Sulong guilty to speak of. Neither
can the succession of the then vice-mayor of
Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, to the office of mayor be
considered proof that the decision in AC No. 12-91
had become final because it appears to have been
made pursuant to Sec 68 [16] of the Local
Government Code, which makes decisions in
administrative cases immediately executory.

Aguinaldo and Reyes Cases are inapplicable. In

Aguinaldo v COMELEC, the court held that removal
cannot extend beyond the term during which the
alleged misconduct was committed. If a public
official is not removed before his term of office
expires, he can no longer be removed if he is
thereafter re-elected for another term. However,
Aguinaldo is not applicable as at the time the case
was decided, there was no provision similar to 40(b)
of the LGC and hence, cannot be given retroactive
effect. Neither is Reyes vs. COMELEC applicable as
AC No. 12-91 remains to this day, not final.

Section 21, LGC

(a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an

ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open
any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its
jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of
permanent closure, such ordinance must be
approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the
members of the sanggunian, and when necessary,
an adequate substitute for the public facility that is
subject to closure is provided.

(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be

permanently closed without making provisions for
the maintenance of public safety therein. A property
thus permanently withdrawn from public use may be
used or conveyed for any purpose for which other
real property belonging to the local government unit
concerned may be lawfully used or conveyed:
Provided, however, That no freedom park shall be
closed permanently without provision for its transfer
or relocation to a new site.

(c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square

may be temporarily closed during an actual
emergency, or fiesta celebrations, public rallies,
agricultural or industrial fairs, or an undertaking of
public works and highways, telecommunications,
and waterworks projects, the duration of which shall
be specified by the local chief executive concerned
in
a written order: Provided, however, That no national
or local road, alley, park, or square shall be
temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic
activities not officially sponsored, recognized, or
approved by the local government unit concerned.
(d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly
enacted ordinance, temporarily close and regulate
the use of any local street, road, thoroughfare, or
any other public place where shopping malls,
Sunday, flea or night markets, or shopping areas
may be established and where goods, merchandise,
foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of commerce
may be sold and dispensed to the general public.
Section 24, LGC
Section 24. Liability for Damages. - Local
government units and their officials are not exempt
from liability for death or injury to persons or damage
to property.
Hagad v. gozo-dadole
Facts:
Respondents were elected officials of Mandaue City.
An administrative complaint and criminal complaint
for violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, Articles
170 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A.
No. 6713 were filed with the Ombudsman by some
aggrieved Councilors. They alleged that the
respondents had caused the alteration and/or
falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing
the allocated appropriation therein from
P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,000.00 without authority
from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City.
In their opposition, respondents alleged that by the
enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991
the Ombudsman was ousted from its jurisdiction to
hear and rule on complaints against erring elective
officials as contained in the Ombudsman Act. They
insist that it is the Office of the President that has
jurisdiction to hear and decide such cases. In the
same vein, he likewise does not have any authority
to impose preventive suspension against
respondents.
The Ombudsman dismissed the opposition citing
that its authority to investigate any elected and
appointive official emanated from the Constitution
and may not be repealed by a statute. He likewise
imposed preventing suspension against
respondents. Respondent then filed a petition for
prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order, was filed
by respondent officials with the Regional Trial Court
of Mandaue City. Finding their arguments tenable
and having dismissed the motion to dismiss of
petitioner, Hon. Gozo-Dadole issued a writ of
prohibition against petition, restraining him from
proceeding with the case.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the LGC repealed the authority of the
Ombudsman to hear and decide cases filed and
impose preventive suspension against elected local
officials.
Ruling:
No, it did not.
The Court ruled that Congress could not have
enacted a law that would do injustice to the
Constitutional mandate given to the Ombudsman –
this mandate being only expounded by R.A. No.
6770. It showed that in the Local Government Code
of 1983, the power to hear and decide cases against
elected local officials was lodged with both the
Ombudsman and the Minister of Local Government.
The only change brought about by the LGC of 1991
was the authority was transferred from the Minister
of Local Government.
Likewise, the power to impose preventive
suspension is different in the LGC and the
Ombudsman Act. In the former, it would be enough
that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that
the respondent has committed the act or acts
complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is
strong, (c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or
(d) the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety
and integrity of the records and other evidence;
while the latter requires that (a) the charge against
the officer or employee should involve dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges should warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's
continued stay in office would prejudice the case
filed against him. Therefore the six-month preventive
suspension contained in the Ombudsman Act
operates differently from the sixty-day preventive
suspension in the LGC.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez
Facts:
On 26 August 2003, the Office of Ombudsman in
Visayas received a complaint for abuse of authority,
dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and
neglect of duty against respondent punong barangay
of Brgy. Sto. Rosario, Binalbagan, Negros
Occidental. On 1 September 2003, Vice-Mayor Yulo
received a similar complaint.
The municipal vice-mayor required respondent to
submit his answer. Instead, he filed a motion to
dismiss citing lack of factual and legal basis for the
complaint, and that the complainants were guilty of
forum shopping. In the Ombudsman, respondent
alleged that the complaint was barred by litis
pendentia and forum shopping, as the sangguniang
bayan had already acquired jurisdiction over him.
Later on, the complaint in the sanggunian was
withdrawn by the complainants.
The Ombudsman denied the motion to dismiss by
Rodriguez as this was a prohibited pleading.
Rodriguez moved for reconsideration alleging that
the sangguniang panglungsod still exercised
jurisdiction over him because he
had not yet received a decision on the withdrawal of
the complaint. Subsequently, it found Rodriguez
guilty of dishonesty and oppression, and dismissed
him from service.
After his MR was denied by the Ombudsman,
Rodriguez appealed to the CA which reversed the
decision of the OMB citing that the sangguniang
panglungsod has jurisdiction over him, because it
was the latter that first served him notice thus had
acquired jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether it is the sangguniang panglungsod or the
Ombudsman that has jurisdiction over Rodriguez.
Ruling:
It is the Ombudsman.
The Court cited Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso
which states that “In administrative cases involving
the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining
authorities, the body in which the complaint is filed
first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case,
acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.”
Likewise, there was no forum shopping because in
the decision of Laxina, Sr. v. Ombudsman, the Court
held therein that the rule against forum shopping
applied only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to
administrative cases. Thus, even if complainants
filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayan
identical complaints against private respondent, they
did not violate the rule against forum shopping
because their complaint was in the nature of an
administrative case.
Republic act 3019,
Anti-graft and corrupt practices act
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law,
but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been
filed against him.
Talaga, jr. v. sandiganbayan
Facts:
Petitioner was the mayor of the City of Lucena.
Together with some City Councilors, he was charged
before the Sandiganbayan for giving unwarranted
benefits to Jose Sy Bang in the form of a bingo
franchise.
A motion to preventively suspend the petitioner was
filed by the prosecution. Petitioner opposed this.
Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan preventively
suspended the petitioner for ninety-days.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s reliance on Section 13
of R.A. No. 3019 in suspending petitioner was
proper?
Ruling:
Yes, it was proper.
The Court pointed out that Section 13 is mandatory
in character and there are no ifs and buts in applying
it. If the charge of the accused is under R.A. 3019 or
bribery under the RPC, then the Sandiganbayan has
no choice but to impose the preventive suspension.
Therefore, the preventive suspension imposed on
petitioner is not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Executive order no. 292,
The administrative code of 1987
SECTION 51. Preventive Suspension.—The proper
disciplining authority may preventively suspend any
subordinate officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if the charge against such
officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression
or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance
of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the
respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant
his removal from the service.
SECTION 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension
Pending Administrative Investigation.—When the
administrative case against the officer or employee
under preventive suspension is not finally decided by
the disciplining authority within the period of ninety
(90) days after the date of suspension of the
respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the
respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the
service: Provided, That when the delay in the
disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence
or petition of the respondent, the period of delay
shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
Doctrine of Condonation
The Condonation Doctrine, also known as the
Aguinaldo Doctrine, provides that a re-elected public
official cannot be removed for an administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, since his
re-election to office effectively operates as a
condonation of his past misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor
(Aguinaldo v Santos. G.R. 94115, 21 August 1992).
When it is not applicable
1. There is already a final determination of guilt.
Subsequent re-election cannot be deemed a
condonation if there was already a final
determination of his guilt before the re-election
[Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120905 (1996)].
2. Criminal cases. The doctrine finds no application
to criminal cases, as these are violations against the
state itself [Aguinaldo v. Santos, (1992)].
3. The condonation doctrine would not apply to
appointive officials since, as to them, there is no
sovereign will to disenfranchise [Carpio-Morales v.
CA, (2015)].
Overturned
This doctrine has been overturned in Carpio-Morales
v. CA, where the Court held that election is not a
mode of condoning an administrative offense. The
doctrine cannot be sanctioned under our present
Constitution, which upholds the concept that a public
office is a public trust and the corollary requirement
of accountability to the people at all times [Carpio-
Morales v. CA, G.R. No. 217126 (2015)].
Prospective application of the doctrine
● The abandonment of the condonation doctrine
should be prospective in application for the reason
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines (Carpio-
Morales v. CA).
● Last March 2021, the Supreme Court clarified the
effectivity of abandonment of the Condonation
Doctrine is prospective or enforceable upon finality
of the Carpio-Morales decision, which was on 12
April 2016. Thus, the Condonation Doctrine can no
longer be used by elected public officials as a
defense if they have been re-elected on or after 12
April 2016.
● This clarification was enunciated in a Supreme
Court En Banc decision (G.R. 237330, Madreo v
Bayron; G.R. 237579, Ombudsman v Bayron, 3
November 2020).
AGUINALDO v. SANTOS
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's re-election to the
position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the
administration case moot and academic
RULING: Aguinaldo’s re-election to the position of
Governor of Cagayan has rendered the
administrative case pending moot and academic. It
appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner
garnered the most number of votes among the
candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The
rule is that a public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior
term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor.
The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to
criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he
may have committed during the failed coup.
Salumbides, jr. v. office of the ombudsman
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of condonation
should be expanded to cover coterminous appointive
officials who were administratively charged along
with the reelected official/appointing authority with
infractions allegedly committed during their
preceding term.
RULING: The electorate's condonation of the
previous administrative infractions of the reelected
official cannot be extended to that of the reappointed
coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the
rule being to uphold the will of the people expressed
through the ballot. In other words, there is neither
subversion of the sovereign will nor
disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in
the case of reappointed coterminous employees. It is
the will of the populace, not the whim of one person
who happens to be the appointing authority, that
could extinguish an administrative liability.
Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they
cannot claim the mandate of the electorate. The
people cannot be charged with the presumption of
full knowledge of the life and character of each and
every probable appointee of the elective official
ahead of the latter’s actual reelection.
The appellate court correctly ruled that as municipal
legal officer, petitioner Salumbides "failed to uphold
the law and provide a sound legal assistance and
support to the mayor in carrying out the delivery of
basic services and provisions of adequate facilities
when he advised the mayor to proceed with the
construction of the subject projects without prior
competitive bidding."
Ombudsman carpio-morales v. CA and binay
ISSUE: Whether or not the condonation doctrine
should still be applied.
RULING: The concept of public office is a public
trust and the corollary requirement of accountability
to the people at all times, as mandated under the
1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the
idea that an elective local official’s administrative
liability for a misconduct committed during a prior
term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected
to a second term of office, or even another elective
post. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is simply no
constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to
support the notion that an official elected for a
different term is fully absolved of any administrative
liability arising from an offense done during a prior
term.
There is no presumption in any statute or procedural
rule that the electorate, when re-electing a local
official, do so with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his
faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.

In reality, most corrupt acts by public officers are

shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the public.
Condonation presupposes that the condoner has
actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus,
there could be no condonation of an act that is
unknown.

However, the Court's abandonment of the

condonation doctrine should be prospective in
application. It should be, as a general rule,
recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment.