POLYBIUS AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR

Author(s): David Golan

Source: L'Antiquité Classique , 1989, T. 58 (1989), pp. 112-127
Published by: L'Antiquité Classique

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41658308

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 POLYBIUS AND THE OUTBREAK
OF THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR

"I did not think it right to pass over the event

without comment" (Polyb., XXIX, 21,8)

In the introduction to his Histories Polybius emphasized that the Third

Macedonian War was not just another resort to arms designed to ga
political and material advantage at the expense of neighbouring states
Rather, he presented it as a turning point in the history of the recently
intertwined worlds 2 of the Greeks and the Romans. He intended to l
down his pen after recounting these particular events (III, 4, 1). Polyb
paid special attention to this subject because of its general, epoch-making,
character, and because of its fatal impact on the history of his own countr
and of the Achaean League, in particular.
Polybius did not openly seek the motives which had brought the
Romans to launch a war aimed at the extermination of the Macedonian
Kingdom, and at its replacement by four territories separated by demar-
cation borders 3. Would a Greek Polybius have described the whole

1 See, for example, J. A. O. Larsen's estimation of the total value of the booty and
indemnities extracted from Macedón and Greece by the Romans during half a century
(200-149 B.C.): it amounted to more than 73,250,000 Denarii; see T.Frank, An
Economic Survey of Ancient Rome , IV (Baltimore, 1938), p. 323. On pillage and spoil as
an integral part of Roman war routine, see Polyb., X, 16, 2-9. Cp. also I. Shatzman, The
Roman General's Authority over Booty, in Historia, 21 (1972), pp. 177 fF.
2 Polybius coincides the "fifty three years" reckoning at the end of which Rome had
become master of the whole inhabited world (Polyb., I, 1, 5) with the intertwining
( (WfiTtÀoxri ) of the affairs of Greece, Italy and Africa (V, 105, 4). Thus he adduced a more
universal significance to the outbreak of the concluding war of the "fifty-three years" term,
the Third Macedonian War. However, "in a sense the Third Macedonian War begins
already to assume some of the character of a rebellion - for it was a war which sought to
undo the past", L. Radusa, Bella Macedonica, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen
Welt, I, 1 (Berlin - New York, 1972), p. 584.
3 Polybius nevertheless indirectly referred to its result by presenting a view, certainly
in the name of others (=evioi), who had seen in the "rooting out the Kingdom of
Macedón" (XXXVI, 9, 7) a new and decisive change in the course of history. Yet compare
modern historiography : "Die Autoren neuerer Arbeiten sind sich im Wesentlichen darüber

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 POLYBIUS AND THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 113

Perseus affair as a Roman Livy did some generations later : in a very

different political and historical context, by putting all the blame for the
Third Macedonian War and its devastating results on the defeated last king
of Macedón 4? It seems that Polybius sought even in this case 5 to avoid
open criticism of Rome as well as confrontation with his benefactors.
Nevertheless, Polybius did bring forward his evaluations in his own way.
Various details and notions, which he chose to recount within the
framework of, and in relation to, the so-called Third Macedonian War are
tellingly instructive. Their accumulated message differs totally from Poly-
bius's formal contentions, which were necessarily in keeping with his
master's positions ; it represents the altera pars, that is Polybius's factual
views on the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War, as this paper
proposes to demonstrate.
*
* *

A Megalopolitan by birth, and an Achaean b

convictions, Polybius was certainly not enthus
overlordship, be it Macedonian or Roman 6. Th
in his father's house, that of the Achaean states
make him emulate a Philopoemen rather than
extinction of a Greek-minded dynasty, the Anti

einig, daß die Schuld, ob gewollt oder ungewollt, bei Ma

Quellenkritische Bemerkungen zu den Ursachen des Perseu
(1977), p. 150.
4 Note the statement of Livy (XL, 16, 3) in the context of the events of 182 B.C., to
the effect that "the seeds, so to speak, of the Macedonian war were sown while Philip was
still alive, but the war for the most part was to be waged by Perseus". Cp. also XL, 21,
1 f. ; XLI, 19, 3. But see also Diodorus, XXXII, 4, 5, who states that (first) "they (the
Romans) held sway over virtually the whole inhabited world", (then) "they confirmed their
power by terrorism and by destruction of the most eminent poleis ... the Macedonians,
Perseus for example, they rooted out...".
5 See D. Golan, Autumn 200 B.C. : The Events of Abydos, in Athenaeum , 73 (1985),
pp. 389 ff.
6 See e.g. P. Pédech, Polybe hipparque de la Confédération achéenne , in Les Et. Class.,
37 (1969), pp. 252-259.
7 Even a Philopoemen was well aware of the new political situation. Yet he insisted on
acting in a way which would postpone the time of Greece being "forced to yield complete
obedience to Rome" to a time "... as distant as possible" (Polyb., XXIV, 13, 6). Although
Polybius then praised Aristaenos as well, one may suppose that his own views were closer
to those of his much admired Philopoemen, whose encomiastic biography in three books
he had composed in his earlier days. Cf. R. M. Errington, Philopoemen , Oxford, 1969,
pp. 231-236.

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 114 D.GOLAN

berment of its kingdom, which

the Achaean leaders in Polybi
or Philopoemen) in various pe
mically nor emotionally indiff
The very Roman solution, w
themselves as "The Macedo
Macedonian Threat" 10, could
scruples about the rights of th
political life he had been broug
destined him to share the sh
Polybius might have felt that,
Romans went too far in their
their universally acknowledged
The Roman victory over Antio
terms at Apamea (188 B.C., P
had to set them, as he saw it, w
Greek political theatre 13. T
became a new sort of balanci
a tendency to slow down, ne
populum perveniat (Liv., XLII

8 Polybius admits that the "Memoir

the negotiations between Aratus and
between the Achaean League and Ma
exception. Yet Achaean and Macedo
57, 1 - 58, 12 ; Plut., Aral , 45, 6-9)
explanation and justification. For Ph
Errington, op. cit., pp. 28-34.
9 Cp. Liv., XLII, 18, 3 : "... so a
province...".
10 It seems that Livy preferred
comminatio (cp. XXVI, 8, 3), or met
Perseus - a non-forgivable exaggera
11 Cp. e.g. XVIII, 33, 2, where Polyb
in the hour of disaster" ; and also X
12 As the destruction of "seventy c
slavery of a hundred and fifty thou
13 "The Greek world probably reco
Magnesia (cf. XXI, 16, 8 : a speech
Rhodian envoy...)". See F. W. Walban
p. 42.
14 See D. Golan, Two Letters of Perseus to the Greeks , in Scripta Class. I sr., 5
(1979/80), pp. 1 18-136 ; J. Deininger, Der politische Widerstand gegen Rom in Griechen-
land, Berlin, 1971, pp. 11, 112 ff.

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 POLYBIUS AND THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 1 1 5

The repercussions of the "Macedonian solution" 15 of the year 167 B.C.

seriously affected the Achaean League and Polybius himself16. The
deportation of one thousand prominent Achaeans to Rome, including
Polybius himself, became more to him than merely a shocking intellectual
experience 17. The whole traditional art of policy-making with all its
shrewdness and articulated formulations appeared now, in light of the
recent deeds of the Romans in Macedón, Epirus and Achaia, as meaning-
less verbal adventures, deceptive in the present and dangerous in the
future. The unwritten conventions of realizing the fruits of martial victo-
ries, as assumed by Polybius, gave way to newly devised Roman methods
of irreversible political and physical extinction 18.
These revelations necessarily made Polybius less confident concerning
the views he had held from then on about political issues 19. They made
him even more cautious in expressing his opinion openly, now that he was
no longer a free citizen of an independent league, but rather the half-free

15 In a history written under Roman surveillance, Polybius could not but name it "The
Perseus war and the dissolution of the Kingdom in Macedonia" (III, 3, 8).
16 Although relieved by good luck (Polyb., XXXI, 23, 4 ; see F. W. Walbank, Poly-
bius, Berkeley, 1972, p. 8), even Polybius "had to adjust to a life of internment" (ibid.)
which lasted for some sixteen years, "without any change made or any opportunity for
defence being offered" (ibid). His father Lykortas was, certainly, not spared the exile and
seemingly died before the general release after seventeen years, an event which would have
left an emotional mark on his son's heart and mind. (Cp. K. Ziegler, in P.W., XXI, 2,
5. v. Polybios, col. 1450.)
17 Philopoemen's ávrepeíòeiv and Aristaenus's ovvepyetv (Polyb., XXIV, 13, 7), the
leading mottoes of Achaean foreign policy, appeared in 167 B.C. to have been meaningless
and self-deceiving to the same extent.
18 In an introductory chapter (III, 4), we read that "no man of sound sense goes to war
with his neighbours simply for the sake of crushing an adversary" (III, 4, 10). It seems that
this was Polybius's way, though a very oblique and concealed one, to express his view on
the matter. The difficulty faced by Polybius in justifying Rome's actions [cp. F. W.
Walbank, Polybius between Greece and Rome , in Polybe : Fondation Hardt, 20 (1974),
pp. 3-38] was no less concerning the events of the year 167 B.C. than those of 150 B.C.
onwards.
19 One may gather the stress and embarrassment that befell Polybius because of the
outbreak of the Third Macedonian War from the memorandum on his hipparchy, written
admittedly after his relegation to Rome. Polybius admits that in order to face the new
situation, he left his father's faction and joined a more pragmatic group (XXVIII, 6, 6)
(which had also secured his election as hipparch), which claimed to do everything possible
and to be "giving the pro-Roman party no chance to denounce its opponents". F. W.
Walbank, Polybius between Greece and Rome , in Polybe: Fondation Hardt, 20 (1974),
pp. 7 f.

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 116 D.GOLAN

detainee playing the role of th

Roman celebrities 20.
Polybius was quite aware th
22, 8) would be read by the
Res Africae or Res Hispania
himself overmuch in order to
and discover the kind of inter
conclusions of an independent
Indeed, Polybius presented
being inevitable results of Rom
their better balanced constitu
tion and their better communi
every single case the victrix
came to deal with the Third
substantial experience in pr
personalities in his work.
Loyal to himself, he scatter
around his chapters dealing
remarks, as well as their co
evidence of Polybius's more
Macedonian War.
*
* *

20 Note Polybius's digression in the Histories concernin

with and gratitude owed to the Scipio brothers (XXX
observations brought A. Momigliano to state : "È ovvio
aristocratici che non differivano di molto da lui negli in
emozionali" ( La storiografia greca, Torino, 1982, p. 259
21 "Polybius was writing his account of the Third Maced
late fifties and more probably after 145" [F. W. Walban
Rome , in Polybe: Fondation Hardt, 20 (1974), p. 9]. See
des polybianischen Geschichtswerkes , in Rhein. Mus., 94
22 This was the aim and the gist of Book VI ; because "
the form of a state's constitution" (VI, 1, 9, passim).
23 The widely accepted "unitary" hypothesis of book V
Berkeley, 1972) may imply that Polybius's criticism wou
sary praise of Roman mastery, had he felt as free in Ro
detention. Polybius's remark in this frame of mind that,
(XXXI, 25, 4), the process of incontinence, laxity and
speedily ( raxêwç ) accelerated among Roman youths",
Polybius's own views of the outbreak of the Third Mace

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 POLYBIUS AND THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 117

We learn from Polybius (via Liv., XXXI, 28, 5) that as early as 199
B.C., King Philip had already decided to make Perseus the crown prince
of Macedón. Perseus's mental and physical qualities at the age of thirteen
were already such as to satisfy the expectations of his father, then some
forty years old. We are also told that Perseus was inferior to his brother
Demetrius "both in natural ability and acquired accomplishments" (Po-
LYB., XXIII, 7, 5). Yet this prevailing opinion, possibly held by King
Philip himself, did not move the Macedonian King later from his deter-
mined plan 24 . Perseus might have been less suspicious of his admittedly
brighter brother Demetrius, had Demetrius produced the necessary tokens
of conformity, loyalty and acceptance of his older brother's position of
privilege in the royal hierarchy in time.
We learn from Polybius (via Liv., XL, 5 fif.) selected details that indicate
that this was not the case. Demetrius, five years younger, refused to
comply with the dynastic rule imposed by their father. (To live as the loyal
and supporting brother of a king was not unknown in those days.) Their
father Philip had not spared any efforts to bring up his two sons in mutual
loyalty and collaboration 25. This may have been the real cause of the
Romans' pressing demands for one of Philip's sons to be given as hostage
to Rome (197 B.C.).
Demetrius was not detained in Rome under conditions similar to those
his brother Perseus found thirty years later26. It is clear that young
Demetrius underwent a sort of re-education of the comfortable ambiance
type in Rome. Its results, from the Roman point of view, appeared to be
quite promising. Demetrius was induced to think that his better friends
lived in Rome, not in the palace of Pella 27 . Subsequently, the adult

24 Philip's change of mind concerning the heir to the Macedonian throne (Liv., XL,
56, 2 ff.) in the last months of his life can be viewed as a result of his terminal illness, which
had certainly weakened his perception of reality. Livy named it "broken down by age and
grief at the death of his son" (sc. Demetrius : XL, 54, 1). See F.W. Walbank, Philip V
of Macedón , Cambridge, 1940, pp. 251 ff.
25 Note the argument of King Philip presenting the cooperation of the Pergamene
brothers, Attalus and Eumenes (Liv., XL, 8, 14), and of others as examples most worthy
of emulation by his two sons.
26 Although young Demetrius had to march in front of the chariot of Flamininus on
the third day of his triumph (Liv., XXXIV, 52, 9), he, nevertheless, had been treated
differently because of the actions the Romans expected him to carry out for them in Pella.
27 Perseus's loud declaration that "those who go to Rome from here (Macedón) sound
and untainted ... return from there stained and corrupted by Roman enchantments" (Lrv.,
XL, 11,3) clearly shows the concern in Pella about this Roman method of undermining
the Antigonid dynasty of Macedón.

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 118 D.GOLAN

Demetrius was encouraged

that, by heading a pro-Rom
increase his chances of attain
emerged that in Pella was a
holding out against Rome
nominate the successor to th
A lethal confrontation in th
weakening of the Macedon
princely feuds had certainly
implementing a nova sapient
in his own way, leads us to c
had been hostile long before
The excerptors of Polybius
tone of the whole section
disappointed by Perseus's li
of his father's alliance. Perse
new clauses extending Mac
made by Philip V with Rome
B.C., that is, from a time be
ushered in an era of total p

28 The elaborate speech of Deme

accusations and used refined rhetor
and inconsistency of the adversary
loyalty to his brother the crown
support. See W. L. Adams, Perseus
the Great and the Macedonian He
29 "Why in the World, Demetri
king?" (Liv., XL, 15, 2) ; see also,
15, 17.
30 Titus Quinctius Flamininus, the most prominent of Demetrius 's friends in Rome had
already delineated Roman policy toward Macedón in 191 B.C. as : non supra modum
Philippum crescere (Liv., XXXVI, 34, 10). Demetrius's "friendship with the Romans" (XL,
15, 7) could have been part of that policy. This supra modum mood is just another
phrasing for the Romans' dewpovvreç ávOovaav rr¡v Maxeôóvwv oixíav (Polyb., III, 16,
4) by Polybius in so remote a context as 220/219 B.C. It clearly implies that, already in
220, there prevailed in Rome a view that a flourishing Macedón endangers Rome. The
"fifty-three years" reckoning of Polybius is in fact centered on Rome's 'Macedonian
obsession'.
31 Perseus inherited the crown of a Philip who, despite his good services to the Romans
- especially in the critical years of Rome's war with Antioch III - was constantly depicted
as a living threat to Rome. See e.g. Lrv., XXXIX, 24, 1-3.
32 Polybius felt that, by quoting the actual text of the Treaty of Apamea (XXI, 41, 10),
any "further comment" on its epoch-making effect would be superfluous.

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 POLYBIUS AND THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 1 1 9

The Romans seem to have expected Perseus to make a stronger

acknowledgment of Rome's irrevocable and prior standing in the Balkan
area. Thus, Polybius's indication that Perseus insisted on not adding new
submissive clauses to Macedoni existing commitments to Rome - as if
the "Antioch III War" had never been fought and won decisively by the
Romans - is of crucial importance 33. Romans might have presented his
intransigence as proof of Perseus's doggedly following the path of his
warlike father, King Philip.
This setting of Perseus from the outset in his late father's square on the
chess-board of the Roman foreign policy implied that Rome had virtually
decided to launch a war against Perseus at the appropriate time 34. From
the summer of 179 B.C. on, the policy makers of Rome loudly and
continuously interpreted any of Perseus's deeds as self-evident expressions
of enmity towards Rome and therefore as steps calling for war.
Yet, Polybius indicates to the reader that Perseus had done no harm to
Rome, and had kept Macedon's treaty with Rome to the letter. The legates
of Perseus kept on reporting at the indicated opportunities to the Roman
senate on the nature and extent of their king's political activities, and
always stressed that Perseus was fully aware of his commitment to
Rome 35.

33 Note the way in which a Diodorus interpreted that renewal of "his father's treaty of
alliance and friendship : The Senate ... renewed the alliance, thereby deceiving the deceiver
on his own ground" (XXDC 30, 1).
34 "I maintain," says Polybius, "that Philip ... first conceived ... of entering on the last
war against Rome, ... but on his decease Perseus was the executor of the design" (XXII,
18, 10). This official Roman view, which Polybius had to voice, was certainly that of the
detainee ; the free Polybius scattered various remarks and pieces of information which
treated Perseus with more justice. See for example his remark, in a historical context
remote in time (III, 2, 6) but close by association. Cp. P. Pédech, La méthode historique
de Polybe, , Paris, 1964, pp. 83, 86, 92, 161, 508-509.
35 The case of the accusing of Perseus of stirring up trouble between the Dardanians
and the Bastarnae (XLI, 19, 4) is exemplary. Yet, in spite of the affirming report of the
Roman ambassadors "sent to investigate the situation in Macedón," the Roman senate
"had not blamed nor charged Perseus with it," after the king's envoys were given a proper
hearing ( ibid , 5-7). It seems that the ambassadors returning from Macedón, who acted
for the senatorial faction that sought to launch a war against Macedón immediately, had
suffered a temporary setback. The majority of the senate had not rejected the idea of
launching a decisive war against Perseus, but expected its promoters to provide Rome,
because of the severity of the action in view, with more convincing charges against
Macedón and Perseus, having a wider range and being more acceptable to public opinion.
Cp. the range and number of accusations in the speech of Eumenes (Liv., XLII, 11,3-
13, 12) and the SylL, 3rd ed., no. 643.

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 120 D.GOLAN

We are shown that, at every

of Perseus was and remain
War 36. We learn from Poly
declared, at the hearing they w
king would readily pay ind
might impose on his realm
of Macedonian hopes, the fi
the Bellona temple comprise
notice that "the consul Pub
with an army" {ibid., 5) 37 , a
wished to give satisfaction,
acting in Macedonia (ibid., 6
reader, who was interested
Macedonian War, would draw
Bellona audience.
We are equally instructed by Polybius (via Livy) that, even at a later
stage of the Roman war against him and his kingdom, Perseus was still
ready to play the deceived vassal so as to retain the faint hope of a possible
appeasement of Rome. Perseus could not have known in advance what
precise shore the Romans would choose for their landing. Had he
intended to fight a deliberate war against the Romans, he would have
made the appropriate effort to block the smaller Roman expedition corps
- if not vanquish it - long before it reached Macedonian soil 38. It is too
grave an undervaluation of the experience and skill in warfare accumulated
at the court of Pella from the days of Philip II and his son Alexander on
to assume that it was only the cunning of Q. Marcius Philippus that
brought the Romans a badly needed half year truce (Liv., XLII, 43, 3).

36 See Perseus's entreaties while negotiating with Q. Marcius Philippus and Aulus
Atilius to the effect that "I am confident that I have done no wrong knowingly. ... Certainly
I have done nothing irreparable, nor such you should think it must be avenged by war and
arms" (Liv., XLII, 42, 8-9). "Perseus understood his limitations from the very beginning
of his reign..." : W. L. Adams, art. cit, p. 255.
57 Livy (sc. Polybius) had a similar, insolently insulting answer (XXXV, 33, 10) given
by an Aetolian magistrate to Roman envoys. This indispensable comparison seems a way
for Polybius to indicate his personal view when he was unable to state it bluntly.
3! This is the core of Polybius's opinion as rewritten by Livy, maintaining that "the
Romans had nothing thoroughly ready for war ... while Perseus have had everything
ready ... and could have begun the war at a time most favourable to himself" (Lrv., XLII,
43, 3). Cp. F. Geyer, in P.-W., XIX, 5. v. Perseus, col. 1008.

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 POLYBIUS AND THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 1 2 1

The offer Perseus made, after the victory of his horsemen over the
Romans at Callinicus, of satisfying the various claims of the Romans
peacefully 39 , corroborates the view that Perseus was fully aware of the
relative capacities of the Macedonian and Roman forces. This assessment
was well attested by the bloody wars of the previous generation 40. Even
a Perseus would have grasped that if the scales had turned at all since then,
it was not in favour of Macedón.
The conspicuous achievements of Rome in the political theatre east of
the Adriatic sea left little room for the illusion that one might carry on a
policy competing with Rome. Greeks as well as barbarians of the nearer
and more distant regions sought Rome's guarantees and protection
incessantly. The more prominent of the Hellenistic kings could not be
construed in any way as friends. The Pergamene king, Eumenes, was
professedly inimical 41 ; the Seleucid king, under Roman dictate, was
forbidden to have any relations whatsoever with Macedón 42 ; the throne
of the Ptolemies was then occupied by a mere boy, who was far from being
a potential partner of Perseus in maintaining some sort of balance of
power in order to secure the independence of Macedón and other states
from Rome 43. Prusias of Bithynia appeared to Perseus as a king who
wished more to rely upon Macedón than to act as a supporter of its stand
against Roman ambitions in the Balkan area 44. The experience of collabo-

39 Perseus agreed to pay the same tribute to Rome that his father had been engaged to
pay on his defeat, and to evacuate the same places (Polyb., XXVII, 8, 1-2 ; Lrv., XLII,
62, 10). According to Appian's source (Macedonica, XII : cf. P. Meloni, Il valore storico
e le fonti del libro Macedonico di Appiano , Roma, 1955, pp. 164-168), Perseus even
"promised to make many concessions which his father, Philip, had refused".
40 Public opinion in Greece since then has classified Macedonian power as being far
inferior to that of the Romans. See Polybius's own boxing-context example : XXVII, 9, 1
- 10, 1.
41 The predecessor of Eumenes had already acted as a signatory on the Roman side,
that is, against Perseus's father Philip, at the peace treaty of Phoenice in 205 B.C. (Lrv.,
XXIX, 12, 13) : M. Holleaux, Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques , 2nd ed.,
Paris, 1969, pp. 258 ff.
42 The treaty of Apamea (188 B.C.) made it impossible for the Seleucid king to carry
out any foreign policy west of the Taurus mountains (Liv., XXXVIII, 38, 2-12). "They
must retire from Europe and from all Asia on this side of the Taurus" (Polyb., XXI, 17,3).
43 Ptolemy VI succeeded his father in the year 180 B.C., at the age of four. His mother
was his guardian until her death (176 B.C.). Eulaeus and Lenaeus, who took over the
guardianship, were not the sort of persons to join a Perseus in a common foreign policy.
See W. Otto, Zur Geschichte der Zeit des 6. Ptolemäers, Berlin, 1934, pp. 1-8 ; O. Mork-
holm, Eulaios and Lenaios, in Class, et Mediev ., 22 (1961), pp. 32-43.
44 It was Prusias who "had begged and entreated for her" (Liv., XLII, 12, 3), Apama,
Perseus's sister. But no political alliance came from this. At the decisive moment, Prusias

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122 D.GOLAN

rating with barbarian Kings

far from encouraging even
loyalty and support. It soon
been surrounded gradually by
Even a Perseus could underst
tation between Macedón and
actively with Rome 45. The va
the ring of his isolation convi
Perseus certainly felt that t
political conjunctures and t
Romans of his goodwill and
Polybius formally reshaped
into a logical sequence of
universal validity and adapt
therefore that King Philip
responsibility for it (Polyb
uneasy about this statement c
placed it. Polybius surrounde
arguments of other writers, w
reached many different concl
to undermine his own formal
decide on a war that broke
necessarily over-sophisticated

"had determined to refrain from ar

Perseus attacked by the Romans.
Note how the less inimical "Pers
wipes out by his kindness the memo
other hand, an Archon declared that
we will follow the Romans" (ibid.,
46 "Polybius simplifies and ration
vague, Polybius is too simple" : A.
1969, p. 1 19. Cp. P. Pêdech, La mé
"Wenn man jedoch nun erwartet,
cutía, itpóçpamç and ápxv noÀëpov
K. Ziegler, art. cit, col. 1511, 11. 58
the opportunity to be more sincere
the guilt of the accused Perseus.
47 "Polybius's own explanation is cle
his last ten years Philip V was pl
of the Third Macedonian War: Re
1974 [1977]), pp. 81-94.

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 POLYBIUS AND THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 1 2 3

tor of his father's martial scheme (/oc. cit.) 48. Yet, one may wonder
whether Polybius believed in the validity of his formal contention. He
certainly felt relieved at being able to overcome another difficulty : writing
for two very different audiences, the Greek and the Roman 49.
In a generalizing sentence expressed in the name of the Greeks, as it
were, not in his own, and rather less enthusiastic for the Roman way of
treating the Macedón of Perseus than it might have been, Polybius says
that "at first they [the Romans] made war with every ( nãcri ) nation
until ... their adversaries had confessed that they must obey them and
execute their orders. But now ... against Perseus..." (XXXVI, 9, 6). Was
Perseus less submissive in this respect than his father Philip? Polybius
produced two answers for the tacit question of guilt for the Third
Macedonian War then current among Greeks. Some Greeks, who justified
Rome's attack on Perseus, viewed it in terms of political wisdom and
statemanship (XXXVI, 9, 3). Other Greeks, we are told by Polybius, took
the opposite view, stating the fact that the Romans were ignoring the very
principles ( npoaípeaiv , XXXVI, 9, 5) thanks to which they had won the
supremacy. Whichever of those two was Polybius's "Greek" answer, it is
clear that each of them held the Romans responsible for the outbreak of
the Third Macedonian War. In the given circumstances, Polybius could
not present his view other than in such a convoluted argument.
Polybius presented a short, though instructive discussion about the
bitter end of the Macedonian kingdom against the setting of the historical
occurrences of the year 186/5 B.C. Polybius found it historically meaning-
ful to focus, albeit briefly, on that gloomy event only two years after the
Romans had imposed on the defeated Antiochos III (and not without the
aid of Perseus's father, the King of Macedón) the belittling peace terms
of Apamea. "From this time forward," we are told by Polybius, "dates the
commencement of the catastrophes that were fatal to the royal house of
Macedón" (XXII, 18, 1). Polybius had certainly not chosen accidentally

48 Focusing on Rome's behaviour towards Carthage ("for the Carthaginians had been
guilty of no immediate offence to Rome" : XXXVI, 9, 8), Polybius is clearly pointing to
a new Roman policy which "had treated them with irremediable severity" (ibid.). One may
assume that Polybius wanted his serious reader to associate the "Case of Carthage" with
that of Perseus, mentioned in the previous passage, in spite of his being found guilty
according to the aÍTÍa-npóq>amç-ápxv model (XXII, 18, 10). Note also the view that
Polybius, who "si dia la pena di registrare con tale ampiezza e rilievo le varie reazioni
dell'opinione pubblica greca è qualcòsa di eccezionale" : A. Momigliano, La storiografia
greca, Torino, 1982, p. 262.
Cp. K. Sacks, Polybius on the Writing of History, Berkeley, 1981, p. 76 f.

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 124 D.GOLAN

the medial form of ¿epiteto to

sentence.

He dared not accuse the Romans, yet even to blame the royal house of
Macedón for any dangerous or treaty-breaking activities would have been
misleading. On the other hand, this lukewarm verb focused even more
attention on the time factor ánò tovtwv twv xaipwv, of the sentence.
Polybius seems to have found a decisive and epoch-making change in the
years immediately following the victory over Antioch. Rome ceased
viewing the area east of the Adriatic sea as a compound of rival entities
to be disintegrated by various political activities for the safety of Rome,
and began to treat its components as political subjects whose survival
depended wholly on conforming with Rome's expectations and whims 50.
In his summarizing passage on the first Punic War, Polybius advises his
reader to distinguish between the early stage at which the Romans had
only "gained the courage to aim at universal dominion" (I, 63, 9) and the
later one wherein they had "executed their purpose" {ibid.). It seems that,
concerning the area east of the Adriatic sea, the planning stage, according
to Polybius, ended with the Treaty of Apamea (188 B.C.), and henceforth
the Romans set out to execute "their purpose" (rfjç itpoOêoewç, ibid.).
Accordingly, Polybius charged neither Perseus nor Philip V with the
responsibility for the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War 51.
The best Polybius could do to refute the formal contentions he was
expected to produce concerning the causes of the Third Macedonian War,
was to retell the case of the Macedonian king's legation to Rome led by

50 Note the reaction of Q. Caecilius Metellus (185 B.C.) while visiting Argos (Polyb.,
XXII, 10, 2-11). Caecilius became so indignant at none of his requests having been granted
that he did not even consent to receive the answer of the (Achaean) magistrates, but went
away without any ( ibid., 13). This behaviour clearly implies that a Roman dignitary after
"Magnesia and Apamea" ( 1 90- 1 88 B.C.) felt that local authorities within the Balkan area,
whether kings or magistrates, were bound to obey. Cp. R. M. Errington, op. cit, p. 168 ;
J. Deininger, op. cit, pp. 121 ff.
Polybius sometimes ignores certain facts (cp. A. Momigliano, op. cit, p. 261), as
did the Aratus much admired by Polybius in his "exceedingly truthful memoirs" (H. W.
Porter, Plutarch's Life of Aratus, London, 1937, p. xvn). However, apart from the formal
position that had to be preserved, Polybius developed a method of isolated allusions
revealed by cross reading. Note, for example, the allusion to the outbreak of the Third
Macedonian War in XXVII, 3, 3, to wit : "Hagesilochus, ..., had previously [that is before
entering office of prytanis, October/November 172 B.C. : F. W. Walhank, A Commentary
on Polybius, III (Oxford, 1979), p. 296], when it became evident that the Romans were
about to make war on Perseus..." etc. We are instructed by Polybius that it was the view
of a Greek (=Rhodian) magistrate of that time that it were the Romans, not Perseus, who
concocted the plot leading to the Third Macedonian War.

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 POLYBIUS AND THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 1 25

Solon and Hippias (XXVII, 6, 1 fiF.). It is therefore of substantial impor-

tance to note the phrasing Polybius chose to describe the reasons that the
Senate ordered the Macedonian legates to quit Rome at once. We are told
that the Senate at this period of time "had long since decided on war"
(XXVI, 6, 3). On the other hand Polybius described the unceasing efforts
made by Perseus in order to avoid the threat of war with Rome. We learn
that Perseus, in an exemplary manner, did not respond to a call for armed
help from those loyal to him in Boeotia "owing to his truce with Rome"
(XXVII, 5, 7). Polybius could not provide stronger evidence for the
sincerity of this peace craving Macedonian king 52.
When he ponders a universal question whether "avarice does not make
fools of us", Polybius reveals another personal view relevant to our case.
He firmly states, while dealing with Eumenes, that for a king to fall into
"disagreement" with the Romans (XXV, 9, 5) has proven to be extremely
dangerous. Once he was declared an "enemy" ( noÀéfiioç , ibid.) of Rome,
he would indubitably lose his kingdom "and perhaps his life" too.
However, Polybius knew that King Eumenes, although he had forfeited the
confidence of Rome, died in peace (159 B.C.), and that his kingdom had
survived for another generation before being bequeathed to the Romans
by Attalos III. Yet Polybius was not wrong ; he, obviously, drew his
conclusions from the fate of Perseus and the Macedonian kingdom. Their
declared "hatred of the Romans" (cp. Liv., XLII, 6, 2), Polybius guides
his reader to understand, implied ipso facto the Romans' resolved decla-
ration of war. Yet the subsequent opening of martial activities depended
on the optimal conjunctions as defined and evaluated by Rome's policy
makers ".

52 These asides of Polybius gain additional strength by comparison with the formal
accusations of Rome, presented in the rogatio for the war against Perseus and Macedón,
to the effect that Perseus "had entered on plans for preparing war against the Roman
people, and had assembled arms, soldiers and fleet for the said purpose..." (Liv., XLII, 30,
1 1 ). This clearly reveals that Perseus could not have been accused of initiating any martial
action or bloodshed.
" Modern historiography after Mommsen, who saw the cause of the Third Macedonian
War in Macedon's quest "seine formelle Souveränität in eine reelle zu verwandeln"
(Th. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte , Berlin, 1881, p. 763), has been widening the range
of assumptions [see L. Radusa, Bellum Persicum Recent Views of the Third Macedonian
War, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, I, 1 (Berlin - New York, 1972),
pp. 576-589 ; and E. S. Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, II
(Berkeley - Los Angeles - London, 1984), pp. 408-423, and passim]. However, Polybius
shows that the Romans' decision sprang from the free choice of men who considered ruling
( regere ) over alien peoples and countries as a challenge, not a source of shame.

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126 D. GOLAN

We read in the Res Graecae of

leaders in Greece were already
Rome in the Balkan theatre in th
done at the Romans' nod" (Lr
later, the famous Philopoemen,
importance to Polybius, could
Greeks will be forced to yiel
XXIV, 13, 6). Other men of di
been compelled to total obedienc
could then ignore the "Rom
Perseus The indisputable pred
ranean theatre 56 could only re
a Perseus.
Polybius does criticize Pers
Macedonian War. He thinks t
necessary stand against a far we
are told by Polybius that Pers
the cause of his misfortunes"
to his own misfortune - a '
terms). Perseus failed to assess
against him and his kingdom.
Rome's campaign against him
oppression" {ibid., 4, 9), rath
those circumstances one may re
Perseus : "to me seems to be an

54 In the eighties, Polybius remarks

they had been freed from great fea
launched by the Romans. This great f
is clearly attested by Livy's paraphr
55 The high appraisal of Philopoeme
from the days of Antigonos Doson (P
mid-eighties (that is, after Rome's vic
will be forced to yield complete ob
have escaped even Perseus's attention
56 To what extent the Macedón of
as easy prey may be deduced from th
foiled to receive Macedón as his provin
to invade Macedón by an overland r
the haruspices announced on the eve o
and prorogatio imperii " (Liv., XLII,

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 POLYBIUS AND THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 1 27

to Polybius to be "the most difficult thing in life is ... to know one's

situation ; and in this Perseus failed" {ibid., 10, 1) 57 .
Polybius depicts Perseus as not being aggressive and as a man of
moderate behaviour. He even chose his friends from among the moderates
(XXV, 3, 8). Polybius shows that, in matters of the highest importance,
Perseus was in favour of moderation, which he believed "would earn the
support of gods and men alike" (XXVII, 8, 4). Polybius also strengthened
his picture by presenting Perseus in a "boxing contest" context as the
"humble and much inferior combatant" {ibid., 9, 3). In the same context
Rome is described as being "a celebrated and seemingly invincible athlete"
{loc. cit.). Polybius interpreted the sympathetic reaction of the Greeks to
the victory of the Macedonian horsemen in the Callinicus skirmish (May,
1 7 1 B.C.), as deriving from "a natural instinct to favour the weaker" ( ibid.,
5). Polybius leaves no doubts about the long-established assumption
among the Greeks that the Macedón of Perseus would not survive a
Roman war58. One may disbelieve a notion that all this remained
concealed from Perseus's own discretion and that of his moderate friends.
Polybius shows his reader - though in a circuitous way - that Perseus
by no means began that war. In a letter to the Rhodians, and through
special envoys, Perseus begged the ßovArj of Rhodes to attempt a recon-
ciliation "should the Romans attack Perseus and the Macedonians in
violation of the treaty" {ibid., 4, 5).
More than that even a pro-Macedonian historian could not have said
in order to clear up the question of responsibility for the outbreak of the
Third Macedonian War 59, and to clarify Perseus's and Macedon's inno-
cence of such responsibility.

University of Haifa, David Golan.

Israel.

57 Polybius counterbalanced this rationalizing distinction in a particular way in order

to lessen the alleged culpability of Perseus for the Third Macedonian War : "Fortune",
reflects Polybius upon the fate of Perseus, "... never compacts with life ... always defeats
our reckoning ... and this now happened in the time of Perseus" (Polyb., XXIX, 21, 5-8).
For Ti'che in Polybius, see F. W. Walbank, A Commentary on Polybius, I (Oxford, 1957),
pp. 16-26.
58 Note Polybius's axiom : "espousing the cause of Perseus" by a Greek political entity
equalled "giving way to insensate and childish excitement" (XXVII, 2, 10).
59 What appears at first glance as a failure of Polybius "to apply his science of causes
adequately to a war whose history he knew intimately" (sc. the Third Macedonian : W. V.
Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, Oxford, 1979, p. 227), is certainly not
the result of his intellectual shortcomings, but rather part of the oblique way he had to
choose when presenting his personal view of the fate of Perseus and Macedón.

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