Application Supervisory For Supervisory Writs Denial of Motion To Recuse Judge Timothy E. Kelley in The Matter of Lewis v. LSU Et Al #708092

COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
_________________________________________________________
COURT OF APPEAL NO ___________________

_________________________________________________________
PLAINTIFF
SHARON LEWIS
VERSUS
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY ET AL
DEFENDANTS
________________________________________________________________
ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY WRITS FROM THE

CIVIL DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 708082
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY E. KELLEY

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
SEC: 22
____________________________________________________________
REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION

FROM A JUDGMENT
DENYING PLAINTIF’S MOTION TO RECUSE AND MOTION TO STAY
_____________________________________________________________
ORIGINAL APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY WRITS FILED

ON BEHALF OF SHARON LEWIS
_____________________________________________________________
LARRY ENGLISH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
Louisiana Bar Roll # 22772
423 WEST 127TH STREET 7TH FL.
NY, NY 10027
Phone: (917) 531 3909
Facsimile: (646) 370 5755
Englishlaw2008@gmail.com
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
SHARON LEWIS
INDEX
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………… 3
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION………………………………………….…4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE……………………………………………….…5
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR DETERMINATION…………………………….…8
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR…………………………………………………8
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR

SUPERVISORY WRITS……………………………………………………...8
PRAYER FOR RELIEF……………………………………………………….20
REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RELIEF……………………………………………22
VERIFICATION………………………………………………………..…….23
APPENDIX
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT………………………………………………..A
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT…………………………..…………..B
MOTION TO RECUSE/MOTION TO STAY……………………………C
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT MOTION TO RECUSE AND

MOTION TO STAY………………………………………………………D
T P DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO

MOTION TO RECUSE…………………………………………………..E
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT………………………………………….……F
NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPLY FOR SUPERVISORY WRITS...........G
MOTION TO LEAVE TO FILE CORRECTED COPY OF

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT………………………………..……….H
RETURN DATE……………………………………………………….…..I
2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Daurbigney v. Liberty Personal Ins. Co., et al, 18-929, (La. App. 3 Cir.
05/09/2019) 272 So.3d 69 ......................................................................... 10,17,18
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) ........................................... 12
In re Dover, 2019-0401 (La. 5/6/19), 268 So. 3d 1024........................................... 16
In Re Greenburg, 9 So.3d 802 (La. 2009) ............................................................... 16
In Re Kirby, 354 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Minn. 1984) ................................................... 15
In re Spears, 2019-1895 (La. 3/9/20), 290 So. 3d 645 ............................................ 16
Kelley v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am 168 So.3d. 528 (1st Cir. 2014).............................. 6, 10
Rippo v. Baker , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 905, 197 L.Ed. 2d 167 (2017) ............. 10
State v. Bartie, 303 So.3d 628 (La. 2020) ............................................................... 19
State v. Diagle, 241 So. 3d. 999, 1000 (La. 2018) .................................................. 10
STATUTES
La. C.C.P 154 (A) .................................................................................................... 19
La. C.C.P. Art. 151(A)(4) ........................................................................................ 17
La. C.C.P. Art. 151(B)............................................................................................. 17
La. Code Civ. Proc. Art. 151(A)(4) and (B)............................................................ 11
OTHER AUTHORITIES
ABA Model Rules 8.4(d) and 8.4(g) ....................................................................... 15
Article 5, Section 10. ................................................................................................. 4
Judicial Cannon 3(C) ............................................................................................... 18
Judicial Cannons 2(A) , 2(B), 3(A)(1), 3(A)(3) and 3(A)(4) ................................ 12
Judicial Cannons 3(A)(5), 3(B)(3) and 2(B) .......................................................... 16
Louisiana Rule of Professional Conduct (LROPC) Rule 3.5(d) and 8.4(d) ............ 15
Rule 4 of the Uniform Rules of the Louisiana Courts of Appeal .............................. 4
3
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
`
The supervisory jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to Rule 4 of
the Uniform Rules of the Louisiana Courts of Appeal and Louisiana Constitution
Article 5, Section 10.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 8, 2021 Plaintiff filed federal complaint against all defendants in
Louisiana Middle District (No. 3:21-cv-198) including federal civil RICO claims
against Robert Barton (Barton), Shelby McKenzie and Vicki Crochet (hereinafter
referred to as “TP Defendants,” “LRA Defendants” and “Defendants”). On May
27, 2022 Plaintiff filed a state complaint in the 19th JDC, including Louisiana
Racketeering Act (“LRA”) claims against the TP Defendants.1 All defendants filed
Exceptions of No Cause of Action, No Right of Action and Prescription. On July
23, 2021 the LSU Board of Supervisrs (BOS) filed a motion to stay the state court
proceedings under the theory of les pendens that was adopted by all defendants
except the TP Defendants. The TP Defendants filed a limited opposition asking
Judge William Morvant to set the hearing on their exceptions before hearing the
BOS Motion to Stay. The court granted the request of TP Defendants.
On August 23, 2021 Plaintiff filed a motion to recuse2 against Judge
Morvant alleging he had a conflict. On August 23, 2021 Judge Morvant recused
himself and the matter was assigned to Judge Timothy E. Kelley. On December
12, 2021, Federal District Court Judge Susie Morgan ruled that the federal court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s civil RICO and Section 1981
claims against the BOS under the Eleventh Amendment3 rendering BOS’ motion to
stay moot.
1 Appendix A
2 On May 19, 2021 all the district court judges of the Middle District recused themselves. R.
Doc. 9. The matter was assigned to Judge Susie Morgan of the Eastern District.
3 R. Doc. 165
4
On a Zoom status conference on December 3, 2021, Judge Kelley disclosed
his 40-year friendship and a prior attorney-client relationship with Michael Walsh,
a partner at the Taylor Porter law firm. Judge Kelley further disclosed Mr. Walsh
represented him in his divorce. On the call representing TP Defendants was J.
Cullens, a named partner with the law firm Walters, Papillion, Thomas and Cullens
LLC (WPTC). At the December 3, 2021 status conference, Judge Kelley requested
all counsels submit a written objection or waiver of conflict in response to his
disclosure.
After further research Plaintiff’s counsels determined Judge Kelley failed to
disclose to litigants WPTC represented him in the matter of Kelley v. Gen. Ins. Co.
of Am 168 So.3d. 528 (La. 1st Cir. 2014). Plaintiff’s counsels further determined
Darrell Papillion (Papillion), co-counsel of record for TP Defendants, was also co-
counsel of record in Judge Kelly’s personal injury case. Plaintiff’s counsels further
determined WPTC secured Judge Kelley a personal injury judgment of
$422,500.00. Plaintiff further determined Papillion and Cullens, in their initial
pleadings, listed WPTC as their law firm, but then dropped the firm’s name from
their signature block. Plaintiff filed a motion to recuse Judge Kelley in accordance
with La. Code of Civ. Proc. Art. 151(A)(4) and (B).
On February 8, 2022, the matter came for a hearing. Under oath, Judge
Kelley testified that Attorney Edward Walters, of WPTC, was the lawyer who
handled his case and he did not recognize Cullens. Judge Kelley assured Ad Hoc
Judge Emile R. St. Pierre and Plaintiff he could be fair and impartial. Judge St.
Pierre denied Plaintiff’s recusal motion. Plaintiff did not appeal.
On March 28, 2022 Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint.4 All
Defendants again filed Exceptions of No Cause of Action, No Right of Action and
4 Appendix B
5
Prescription (Exceptions). On April 19, 2022 The TP Defendants filed for Article
863 Sanctions. (Sanctions) against Plaintiff and her attorneys Larry English,
Bridget Brown5 and Tammye Brown.6 Both matters were set for a hearing on May
26, 2022. Plaintiff filed a motion to continue the hearing as to all defendants
because of late and multiple filings by defendants. The TP Defendants did not
oppose the Motion To Continue, but asked that their Exceptions be heard on May
26, 2022. Judge Kelly granted Plaintiff’s motion to continue as to all defendants
except the TP Defendants and set a hearing date of July 26, 2022. Judge Kelley
granted the TP Defendants request that their Exceptions and Sanctions motions
remain on the May 26, 2022 docket.
At the May 26, 2022 hearing after arguments on the TP Defendants
Exceptions, Judge Kelley granted their motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s LRA
claims against Barton, Crochet, and McKenzie with prejudice and declared his
judgment as final. Judge Kelley adopted the TP Defendants memorandum in
support of their Exceptions as his written reasons.
Judge Kelly then listen to arguments on TP Defendants Article 863
Sanctions. In the hearing J Cullens called Plaintiff’s Attorney, Larry English
“sophomoric” and referred to Attorneys Bridget Brown and Tammye Brown, who
are both African-American as the “Brown Sisters.” Plaintiff’s counsel English
responded to Cullens that his comments were offensive. Judge Kelly remained
silent.
Judge Kelley granted TP Defendants motion for sanctions and stated
without any basis in fact and law, Plaintiff’s counsel Larry English had made up
Plaintiff’s LRA claims and, in the process, violated the Rules of Professional
conduct. Judge Kelley then adopted TP Defendants memorandum in support of
5
Attorney Bridget Brown withdrew from the case.
6
Attorney Tammye Brown withdrew from the case.
6
their sanctions as his written reasons. Plaintiff’s counsel asked Judge Kelley to
issue his own written reasons but he declined. Judge Kelley set a contradictory
hearing for September 2, 2022 to determine the nature and amount sanctions.
On June 1, 2022 Judge Kelley issued final judgments as to TP Defendants
Exceptions and Sanctions. On June 15, 2022 Plaintiff filed Notice of Intent to
Apply for Supervisory Writs on the sanctions. On June 28, 2022 Plaintiff filed a
Motion to Appeal Judge Kelley’s final judgment granting TP Defendants
Exceptions. Plaintiff filed a motion to extend the return date because her request
for transcripts were backed up due to covid in the Court Reporters office. On July
8, 2022 Judge Kelley issued an order extending the return date to August 18, 2022
because of a backlog of court reporter transcripts.
On July 8, 2022 Plaintiff filed a second motion to recuse and motion to stay7
until the court reporter could provide hearing transcripts for Exceptions, Sanctions
and recusal hearings. On July 14, 2022 Plaintiff filed a memorandum in support of
her motion to recuse and notion to stay.8 TP Defendants filed opposition to motion
to recuse/Motion To Stay.9 On July 15, 2022 Judge Kelley denied Plaintiff’s
Motion To Recuse and Motion To Stay.10 On July 15, 2022 Plaintiff filed Notice of
Intent to Seek Supervisory Writ on denial of Motion To Recuse and Motion To
Stay.11 On July 15, 2022 Plaintiff filed a motion to leave to file a corrected copy of
Plaintiff’s memorandum in support.12 The trial court set the return date for August
15, 2022.13 Judge Kelley’s exparte moved the hearing on all other Defendants
Exceptions to August 11, 2022. Plaintiff now files this Supervisory Writ.
7 Appendix C
8 Appendix D
9 Appendix E : Verge Ausberry, Garrett Danos, Robert Yarborough, and Stanley Jacobs adopted
TP Defendants memorandum in opposition in full.

10 Appendix F
11 Appendix G
12 Appendix H: Although no opposition was filed to the motion to leave, the trial court has not
approved.
13 Appendix I
7
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR DETERMINATION
1. Whether the probability of actual bias on the part of Judge Timothy E.

Kelley is too high to be constitutionally tolerable?
2. Whether Judge Timothy E. Kelley committed an abuse of discretion when he

refused to recuse himself and/or have an Ad Hoc Judge to hear recusal
motion?
3. Whether Judge Timothy E. Kelley committed an abuse of discretion when

he denied Sharon Lewis’ Motion To Stay?
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR
1. The probability of actual bias on the part of Judge Timothy E. Kelley is

too high to be constitutionally tolerable.
2. Judge Timothy E. Kelley committed an abuse of discretion when he refused to

recuse himself and/or have an Ad Hoc Judge hear the recusal motion.
3. Judge Timothy E. Kelley committed an abuse of discretion when he denied

Sharon Lewis’ Motion To Stay.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY WRITS
I. The probability of actual bias on the part of Judge Timothy E. Kelley

is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.
With respect to every ruling Judge Kelley has made since his appointment in
this case -each bearing on the fundamental fairness of the case/trial, he has shown
actual bias toward TP Defendants and WPTC. While his rulings alone are not
sufficient to warrant recusal, the record in this case, when viewed collectively,
shows Judge Kelley (1) knowingly failed to disclose his previous attorney/client
relationships with attorneys in this case; (2) falsely accued Plaintiff’s counsel of
violating the Rules of Professional Conduct; (3) falsely accused Plaintiff’s counsel
of manufacturing Plaintiff’s LRA claims; (4) without any basis of fact and law
imposed Article 863 Sanctions against Plaintiff and her legal counsel; (5) without
any basis in fact and law dismissed Plaintiff’s LRA claims against the law firm that
previously represented him; (6) refused to admonish and/or sanction TP
8
Defendants lawyers for calling Plaintiff’s African-American attorneys
“sophomoric” and the “Brown Sisters”; and (7) failed to apply Louisiana Law in a
fair and impartial manner that collectively demonstrates actual bias that rises to a
level that is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. Rippo v. Baker , ––– U.S. –––
–, 137 S.Ct. 905, 197 L.Ed. 2d 167 (2017); Daurbingney v. Liberty Pers. Ins. Co.,
272 So.3d 69,73 (La. 3rd Cir. 2019); State v. Diagle, 241 So. 3d. 999, 1000 (La.
2018). Moreover, given the record of these proceedings, any objective, well-
informed observer would reasonably question Judge Kelley’s impartiality: Id.
Simply put, since Judge Kelley’s appointment to this case, he has demonstrated
a bias in favor of his former law firms, as well as an inability to objectively
consider evidence. Likewise, Judge Kelley’s recent and shocking decisions to
impose Sanctions on Plaintiff and her lawyer and ruling TP Defendants lawyers
reference to Plaintiff’s attorneys as “sophomoric” and the “Brown Sisters” as “not
objectively offensive” confirms Judge Kelley’s recusal from this case is warranted.
Accordingly, for the following reasons, Judge Kelley’s denial of Plaintiff’s Motion
To Recuse/Motion To Stay should be reversed and Judge Timothy E. Kelley
should be recused from this case:
a. Judge Kelley actual bias in favor of TP Defendants and WPTC
On a Zoom status conference on December 3, 2021, Judge Kelley disclosed
his 40-year friendship and a prior attorney-client relationship with Michael Walsh,
a partner at the Taylor Porter law firm (TP). Mr. Walsh represented Judge Kelley
in his divorce. Judge Kelley made this disclosure because Barton is the managing
partner at TP; Crochet is a senior partner at TP; and McKenzie is a retired senior
partner at TP. On the zoom call Judge Kelley requested all counsel submit a
written objection or waiver of conflict to the court in light of his disclosure.
9
After further research Plaintiff’s counsel learned Judge Kelley also had a
prior attorney/client relationship with the law firm WPTC that is representing TP
Defendants. Plaintiff discovered WPTC represented Judge Kelley in the matter
of Kelley v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am and had obtained a personal injury judgment of
$422,500.00 on his behalf. However, although J. Cullens, counsel of record for TP
Defendants was on the zoom call, Judge Kelley knowingly failed to disclose
WPTC had represented him. Upon learning this information, Plaintiff filed a
motion to recuse Judge Kelley in accordance with La. Code Civ. Proc. Art.
151(A)(4) and (B).
On February 8, 2022, the matter came for a hearing and Judge Kelley
testified Attorney Edward Walters was the lawyer who handled his case and he did
not recognize Cullens. Judge Kelley’s explanation as to why he did not disclose his
prior relationship with WPTC is not plausible. Although Cullens was not listed as
attorney of record in Judge Kelley’s personal injury case, his law partner and co-
counsel, Papillion was. Additionally, Judge Kelley had to have noticed that
Papillion and Cullens, in their initial pleadings, listed WPTC in their signature
14
block and that Papillion and Cullens subsequently removed it. It is simply not
plausible that Judge Kelley was unaware the law firm that obtained a $422,500.00
judgment on his behalf was representing the TP Defendants in this matter.
Nevertheless, Judge Kelley assured the Ad Hoc Judge and Plaintiff he
could be fair and impartial. The Ad Hoc Judge denied Plaintiff’s recusal motion.
Plaintiff relied on Judge Kelley’s testimony under oath, that despite this admitted
conflict, he would be fair and impartial and did not appeal the Ad Hoc Judge’s
decision. However, in subsequent rulings in this case it became clear to Plaintiff
14 See Exhibit 1 Request For Notice attached to Memorandum in Support of Recusal

10
Judge Kelley broke his promise to the trial court and Plaintiff that he could be fair
and impartial.
b. May 26, 2022 hearing on TP Defendants Exceptions and Sanctions
Despite Judge Kelley’s assurances he would be fair and impartial, after
arguments on TP Defendants Exceptions and Sanctions, Judge Kelley without any
basis of fact in law granted TP Defendants Exceptions and imposed Article 863
Sanctions against Plaintiff and her attorney Larry English (English).15 At the
Sanction hearing Judge Kelley, in an angry tirade against Plaintiff and English,
accused English of manufacturing Plaintiff’s LRA claims and violating the Rules
of Professional Conduct. He then sanctioned Plaintiff’s counsel in part for
engaging in speech16 protected by the First Amendment, Gentile v. State Bar of

17
Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991), although Article 863 deals exclusively with
Plaintiff’s pleadings. Additionally, he sanctioned Plaintiff’s counsel for not calling
Defendant Stanley Jacobs to determine whether he made comments in Sports

18
Illustrated, although Jacobs was represented by legal counsel;19 he adopted TP
Defendants memorandums in support of their Exceptions and Sanctions as his
written reasons20 and when Plaintiff’s counsel asked that Judge Kelley issue his
own written opinion, he refused.
c. Judge Kelley’s rulings compared to Judge Susie Morgan’s rulings
Plaintiff filed federal civil RICO and state LRA claims against the same
Defendants based on the same set of facts.21 However, unlike Louisiana Courts,
15 See Memorandum in Support of Recusal

16See copy of Plaintiff’s counsel interview(s) to local media attached to Judge Kelley’s written
reasons granting TP Defendants motion for Article 863 Sanctions.
17 The Supreme Court held that a lawyer has a First Amendment Right to speak to the press to
“protect the rights of his client and prevent abuse of the courts.” Id. at 1058
18 This was a part of Judge Kelley’s oral reasons, which is unavailable because the court
reporters office suffered an outbreak of covid.

19 Jacobs in his filings in state court has never disputed this fact.
20 When Plaintiff’s counsel raised that it was improper and unfair to adopt Defendants
Memorandums in Support as his written reasons, Judge Kelley dismissed Plaintiff’s objections.
21 First Amended Complaint (FAC) ¶¶ 346-436: Plaintiff’s federal civil RICO claims filed
11
there is a Federal Rule 9 heightened pleadings requirement for bringing federal
RICO claims.22 Looking at the same set of facts and Defendants and applying them
to the civil RICO statute, Judge Morgan dismissed Plaintiff’s RICO claims in a
very narrow ruling23 reasoning Plaintiff failed to show RICO Defendants violations
of predicate acts were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s economic
injuries.24
However, Judge Kelley’s analysis of the same set of facts and Defendants and
applying them to the less stringent pleading requirements25 of the LRA statute,
ruled Plaintiff’s claims were “baseless,” “frivolous,” “absurd,” “nonsensical,”
“unsupported,” “implausible,” “egregious,” “objectionably unreasonable” and
“not warranted by existing law.” Judge Kelley, in his written reasons, wrote
without any support that English “made up facts,” “falsely accused TP Defendants
of engaging in criminal conduct” and Plaintiff filed her complaint to “draw media
attention” and for “improper purposes.”26 Thus, a comparison of Judge Kelley’s
and Judge Morgan’s written reasons reveal Judge Kelley’s actual bias and
prejudice against Plaintiff in favor of his former lawyers. A collective view of the
record shows Judge Kelley violated Judicial Cannons 2(A),27 2(B),28 3(A)(1), 29
3(A)(3)30 and 3(A)(4)31 and his presence in this case is constitutionally intolerable.
against the LSU Board of Supervisors; Louisiana Middle District 3:21-cv-198, R.Doc. 291
22 See Table 1 p. 4 in memorandum in support of Plaintiff’s motion to recuse.
23 See Judge Morgan’s Order and Reasons attached to Joe Alleva’s supplemental memorandum
in support of the peremptory exception of res judicata and no right of action.

24 Plaintiff currently has a motion to reconsider pending in federal court.
25 See Plaintiff’s memorandum in support of recusal motion discussion of the legal requirements
of the LRA.
26 See Judge Kelley’s written reasons granting TP Defendants Exceptions and Sanctions.
27 “A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”

28 “A judge shall not allow family, social, political, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment.”
29“ A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it”
30
“A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers”
31 “A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice.”
12
d. Judge Kelley defended TP Defendants lawyers racist and sexist comments.
At the May 26, 2022 hearing, TP Defendants lead counsel, J. Cullens called
Attorney Larry English “sophomoric” 32

and Attorneys Bridget Brown and
Tammye Brown the “Brown Sisters.”33 Plaintiff’s counsel stated in open court
Cullens’ comments were offensive. Cullens and his co-counsel Brandon Black
(Black) in their memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion For
Recusal/Motion To Stay doubled down on Cullens’ offensive statements and
stated: “a judge need not reprimand an attorney for either describing opposing
counsel conduct as sophomoric (especially if its accurate) or referring to sister-in-
laws as sisters and by their first last names.”
Plaintiff, in her motion to recuse, alleged Cullens comments were “racially
coded language” meant to demean Plaintiff and her attorneys. However, Judge
Kelley defended Cullens and Black, ruling their language was “not objectively
offensive.” Judge Kelley failed to define the difference between what is
“offensive” and “objectively offensive” in his courtroom.
Moreover, Judge Kelley’s ruling fails to consider the historical racist and
sexist treatment African-Americans, particularly African-American women, have
endured in our nations courts. Chief Judge Bernette Joshua Johnson, former Chief
Justice of the Louisiana State Supreme Court spoke to this painful history in June
8, 2020 Letter to the Judicial, Executive and Legislative Branches:
“Louisiana was built on principles of racism which have been written into our
laws for centuries – often through “race neutral” language. Throughout
history, we have only seen changes in the form of short-term policy
decisions made in response to tense moments of conflict, rather than
thoughtfully crafted long-term plans to dismantle systemic discrimination.
32 Webster Dictionary defines sophomoric as “conceited and overconfident of knowledge but

poorly informed and immature; lacking in maturity, taste, or judgment.” This was done to
push the narrative that Attorney Larry English, who has practiced criminal law in federal and
state court for thirty years and was at the center of a landmark U.S. Supreme Court death
penalty lacks the “maturity” and “judgment” to understand complex RICO litigation.
33
Cullens’ demeaning attack against two accomplished African-American women was not only
insulting to them, but to all women attorneys practicing in the 19th JDC. See In Re Kirby infra.
13
And so—as all the data shows—our laws and courts continue to perpetrate
the originally- intended racial inequities and injustices “
Despite this history34, Judge Kelley in his ruling dismissed Plaintiff and her
African-American attorney’s “perceptions” that Cullens and Black’s statements are
offensive. Plaintiff and English “perceptions” was based on in part Plaintiff’s
experiences during her employment at LSU. F. King Alexander, former President
of LSU stated the university has a “racist culture”35. The TP Defendants were
aware of Les Miles (Miles) racist and sexist behavior36 and shielded37 him from
accountability.38 However, even though Judge Kelley was required to assume the
allegations in Plaintiff’s complaints were true, he adopted the two white male
lawyers “perception” that their ugly words are “not objectively offensive.”
The facts here are analogous to those in In Re Kirby, 354 N.W.2d 410, 414
(Minn. 1984). In Kirby the trial court referred to two separate female attorneys as,
in one instance, a "lawyerette" and in another instance, an "attorney generalette."
The Supreme Court of Minnesota found “such appellations are offensive and tend
to demean and to place the lawyer referred to on a less than equal footing with
other lawyers. Id.
Here, the TP Defendants in memorandums in support of the Exceptions and
Sanctions, which Judge Kelley adopted as his written reasons, pedal the narrative
Plaintiff’s lawyers are incompetent and unethical.39 Cullens and Black’s clear
intent40 was to further that narrative by demeaning Plaintiff’s attorneys standing as
officers of the court and place them on “less than equal footing” with the white
34 See Fn. 12 and 13 in memorandum in support of recusal

35 FAC ¶179.
36 FAC ¶¶ 34-42
37 FAC ¶ 43
38 The Husch Blackwell Report a part of the record documented Miles sexist and racist behavior.
PP. 48-49
39 See Judge Kelley’s written reasons granting Article 863 Sanctions.
40 Cullens and Black are able and experienced trial lawyers who understood the impact of their
words and how it played into the offensive narrative they have been pushing to undermine
Plaintiff’s LRA claims.
14
defense lawyers in this case, thus, making it easier for Judge Kelley to overlook
the hundreds of pages of pleadings and exhibits in the record that support’s
Plaintiff’s claims.
Furthermore, Judge Kelley’s defense of Cullens and Black is in direct conflict
with Louisiana Rule of Professional Conduct (LROPC) Rule 3.5(d) and 8.4(d);
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules
8.4(d) and 8.4(g), and Louisiana Supreme Court precedent that specifically
prohibits Cullens and Black’s conduct. ABA Model Rules 8.4(d) and 8.4(g), states
a lawyer may not:
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of

justice;
(g) engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should

know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual
orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic
status in conduct related to the practice of law. 41
LROPC Rule 3.5(d), states a lawyer shall not “engage in conduct intended to
disrupt a tribunal.” LROPC 8.4(d) states” a lawyer shall not “engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice” Under paragraph 3.5 (d), a
lawyer is prohibited from engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal,
meaning lawyers are prohibited from cursing or expressing disrespect for the court,
opposing counsel or the judicial process. In In re Spears, 2019-1895 (La. 3/9/20),
290 So. 3d 645. Lawyers who engage in an inappropriate verbal exchange with
opposing counsel in open court may also be reprimanded. In In re Dover, 2019-
0401 (La. 5/6/19), 268 So. 3d 1024. The Louisiana Supreme Court sanctioned a
lawyer who called opposing counsel a “Jackass.” In Re Greenburg, 9 So.3d 802
(La. 2009).
41Comment 3 states “discrimination and harassment by lawyers in violation of paragraph (g)

undermine confidence in the legal profession and the legal system. Such discrimination incudes
harmful verbal or physical conduct that manifests bias or prejudice towards others.”
15
Moreover, Judge Kelly by his defense of Cullens and Black have placed
Plaintiff and her lawyers in an untenable position. Plaintiff’s lawyers are now
facing the choice of remaining silent while they are humiliated in open court and
pleadings or retaliate verbally and face certain sanctions.42 In Re Spears. By
defending Cullens and Black’s offensive statements Judge Kelley violated Judicial
Cannons 3(A)(5), 43 3(B)(3)44 and 2(B)
II. Judge Timothy E. Kelley committed an abuse of discretion when he

refused to recuse himself and/or have an Ad Hoc Judge to hear
recusal motion.
La. C.C.P. Art. 151(A)(4) provides, in pertinent part: “A judge of any court,
trial or appellate, shall be recused when he: Is biased, prejudiced or interested in
the cause or its outcome or biased or prejudiced toward or against the parties or the
parties' attorneys or any witness to such an extent that he would be unable to
conduct fair and impartial proceedings.” La. C.C.P. Art. 151(B) states: A judge of
any trial or appellate court shall also be recused when there exists a substantial and
objective basis that would reasonably be expected to prevent the judge from
conducting any aspect of the case in a fair and impartial manner. Louisiana Code
of Judicial Conduct Canon 3, further provides "a judge should disqualify himself in
a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned and
further provides that "[a] judge shall perform the duties of the office impartially
and diligently." Daurbigney v. Liberty Personal Ins. Co., et al, 272 So.3d at 73
provides, “[r]ecusal is required when, objectively speaking, ‘the probability of
actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be
42 Because Judge Kelley’s refused to follow the LROPC, ABA Model Rules and Louisiana
Supreme Court precedent, Plaintiff’s lawyers are forced to spend precious time and money
addressing race and sexism in his court room. This undermines Plaintiff’s right to a fair trial..
43 “A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from manifesting, by
words or conduct, bias or prejudice against parties, witnesses, counsel or others.”

44 “A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for
unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become aware.”
16
constitutionally tolerable.” Louisiana Supreme Court further provides that under
Rippo’s mandate to be applied in Louisiana courts, “evidence of actual bias is not
necessary to require recusal.” Id.
Judge Kelley, in his ruling denying Plaintiff’s recusal motion, stated Plaintiff
was required to prove actual bias. That is a legal error, as Plaintiff must only show
“the probability of actual bias.” Id. Using the objective test articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court, the question at issue now is: Would the tone, tenor, timing, legal
and factual basis of Judge Kelley’s rulings defending his former law firms and
attacking Plaintiff and her attorneys lead the reasonable person to conclude that
recusal is required when, objectively speaking, the probability of actual bias on the
part of the Judge Kelley is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.? Id.
Judge Kelley ruled he used “strong language “ to “explain why the issuance
of sanctions was required in this matter.” But no impartial judge reviewing
Plaintiff’s pleadings would have imposed sanctions on Plaintiff and her lawyers
and falsely accused English of violating the Rules of Professional Conduct. No
impartial judge would have ruled Cullens’ and Black’s offensive language is “not
objectively offensive.”
For the reasons stated supra an individual looking at this case objectively,
given the optics of Judge Kelley in each and every instance ruling in favor of the
law firms Taylor Porter45 and WPTC46; the tone of Judge Kelley’s oral and
written reasons defending his former law firms and attacking Plaintiff’s attorneys;
and Judge Kelley defending Cullens and Black’s racist and sexist comments, it is
implausible that Plaintiff or any reasonable client under the circumstances could
have trust in the impartiality of Judge Kelley. Daurbigney v. Liberty Pers. Ins.
Co., 272 So.3d at 76
45
Where his close friend is a partner and represented him in his divorce
46 Secured Judge Kelley a $422,000.00 personal injury judgment in 2014.
17
Plaintiff is an African-American woman who has accused present and former
members of the leadership of LSU of running a capture and kill scheme to protect
coaches and star athletes. Most of the members of the judiciary in Louisiana
attended LSU and LSU law school.47 This requires the judge hearing this case to
represent the highest standards of fairness and impartiality. And several have done
so: The entire federal bench of the Louisiana Middle District Court recused
themselves in Lewis v. LSU et al 3-21-cv-198. Judge William Morvant recused
himself from this case48. Yet, Judge Kelley, whose former law firms are at the
center of this case, has vigorously fought recusal. This exemplifies that Judge
Kelley’s presence in this case is simply not constitutionally tolerable and by failing
to recuse himself, Judge Kelley violated Judicial Cannon 3(C).49
a. Plaintiff’s motion for recusal was timely
La. C.C.P 154 (A) states:
“A party desiring to recuse a judge of a district court shall file a written motion
therefore assigning the ground for recusal under Article 151. This motion shall be
filed no later than thirty days after discovery of the facts constituting the ground
upon which the motion is based, but in all cases prior to the scheduling of the
matter for trial.”
Judge Kelley in his ruling denying Plaintiff’s motion to recuse ruled Plaintiff’s
motion was untimely because it was filed more than thirty days after the May 26,
2022 hearing. However, as stated supra and in Plaintiff’s motion, recusal is
warranted based on the collective view of the entire record and not one specific
triggering event. The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Bartie, 303 So.3d 628
(La. 2020) upheld the recusal of a trial judge for his collective conduct in the
47 It would not be a stretch to conclude that most are rabid LSU Football fans.
48 Judge Morvant recused himself because he taught at LSU Law School and was a member of
the Tiger Athletic Foundation.
49 “A judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned and shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which
disqualification is required by law or applicable Supreme Court rule.”
18
case.50
Furthermore, the final orders on TP Exceptions and Sanctions was issued June
20, 2022. At any point before his signing the final judgments Judge Kelley could
have corrected his actions. Plaintiff filed her motion to recuse on July 8, 2022 well
within thirty days of Judge Kelley’s finalizing his outrageous rulings and before
the next hearing date of July 26, 2022, that has now been extended to August 11,
2022. Therefore, it was an abuse of discretion for Judge Kelley to not recuse
himself or in the alternative direct that an Ad Hoc Judge be appointed to hear
Plaintiff’s motion.
III. Judge Timothy E. Kelley committed an abuse of discretion when

he denied Sharon Lewis’ Motion To Stay.
Plaintiff requested the court stay these proceedings until the transcripts of
the May 26, 2022 hearings on TP Defendants Exceptions and Sanctions and the
February 8, 2022, recusal hearing are completed to allow Plaintiff to properly brief
her motion to recuse. Those transcripts were essential to show the collective record
warranted Judge Kelley’s recusal from this case:
In support of her motion to recuse Plaintiff was unable to fully brief the exact
testimony Judge Kelly gave at the February 8, 2022 hearing where he specifically
pledged that despite his obvious conflicts, he would be fair and impartial. As a
result Plaintiff was unable to brief his promise to be fair and impartial in the proper
context, that showed Judge Kelley broke his promise to the Plaintiff and the court.
In support of her motion to recuse, Plaintiff was unable to brief Judge
Kelley’s outrageous oral reasons for granting TP Defendants motion for sanctions,
including but not limited to sanctioning English for failing to call Defendant
Stanley Jacobs and ask him if he gave an interview to Sports Illustrated and for
50Defendants in their motion to recuse argued the trial court judge should be recused because his
decisions had been repeatedly reversed by the Third Circuit. The Ad Hoc Judge granted the
recusal and the Third Circuit denied the State’s writ as did the Supreme Court.
19
English for exercising his constitutional right to speak to the press. Further, the
March 26, 2022 transcripts would show how angry, agitated, dismissive and
personal Judge Kelley’s attacks toward Plaintiff and her lawyers were.
In support of her motion to recuse Plaintiff was unable to fully brief the
context and demeaning tone in which Cullens called Plaintiff’s lawyers
“sophomoric” and the “Brown Sisters.” The transcript will show Plaintiff’s counsel
stated to Judge Kelley, Cullens comments were offensive and Judge Kelley
remained silent.
For the same reasons, this supervisory writ is not properly briefed. Plaintiff has
been informed by the court reporter the earliest her request for transcripts will be
available is August 15, 2022. However, Plaintiff is compelled to seek a supervisory
writ now because Judge Kelley is scheduled on August 11, 2022 to hear arguments
on all other Defendants Exceptions including Plaintiff’s LRA claims. Judge Kelley
has already falsely accused Plaintiff’s Attorney of being incompetent and unethical
and having manufactured Plaintiff’s LRA claims. He now has no choice but to
dismiss all of Plaintiff’s LRA claims on August 11, 2022. If Judge Kelley does not
dismiss Plaintiff’s LRA claims, it will show he had no basis in fact and law to
impose sanctions against Plaintiff and her attorney. Moreover, Judge Kelley having
found English is unethical and incompetent is likely to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s
remaining claims. Therefore, Judge Timothy E. Kelly’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion
to stay was an abuse of discretion.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The trial court committed an abuse of discretion in denying Plaintiff Sharon
Lewis’ Motion To Recuse/Motion To Stay and Plaintiff prays this court reverse the
trial court’s ruling denying her Motion To Recuse or in the alternative this matter
be stayed until Plaintiff is in possession of the requested transcripts and she can
20
properly brief this supervisory writ and/or she be allowed to properly brief her
Motion To Recuse and an Ad Hoc Judge be appointed to hear her Motion To
Recuse.
Respectfully submitted:
/s/ Larry English

Larry English, LSB No. 22772
LARRY ENGLISH, ATTORNEY AT
LAW
423 W. 127 Street, 7th Floor
New York, New York 10027
Telephone: (917) 531-3909
EMAIL: Englishlaw2008@gmail.com
Counsel for Plaintiff, Sharon Lewis
21
REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION
Judge Kelley is scheduled on August 11, 2022 to hear arguments on all other
Defendants Exceptions including on Plaintiff’s LRA claims. Judge Kelley has
already falsely accused Plaintiff’s Attorney of being incompetent and unethical and
having manufactured Plaintiff’s LRA claims against TP Defendants. He now has
no choice but to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s LRA claims against all other LRA
Defendants on August 11, 2022 and impose sanctions against Plaintiff for
continuing to pursue those claims.
Further, a contradictory hearing is scheduled for September 2, 2022 to
determine the nature and amount of sanctions to be imposed against Plaintiff and
English. Given Judge Kelley’s angry tirade against Plaintiff and English in the
sanctions hearings, Judge Kelly will almost certainly without any basis in fact and
law impose tens of thousands of dollars in sanctions on Plaintiff and English. This
will force Plaintiff to spend precious resources appealing Judge Kelley’s
outrageous rulings that will be overturned by the appellate courts.
Moreover, if this court does not stay these proceedings until Plaintiff is able to
properly brief her motion to recuse and/or this supervisory writ, it will not only
undermine Plaintiff’s ‘case, but also call into question whether an African-
American Plaintiff in litigation against some of the most powerful individuals and
institutions in this state can receive a fair trial.
22
Appendix A
Appendix B
19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH
STATE OF LOUISIANA
SHARON LEWIS CIVIL SUIT NO.: C-708092
Plaintiff
V.
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY ET Al
Defendants
FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL AND AMENDED
PETITION FOR DAMAGES
NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, comes plaintiff, Sharon Lewis, who
is of the full age of majority and domiciled in the Parish of East Baton Rouge who adopts each and
every word of her Original Complaint and attached Exhibits filed on May 27, 2021 as if made a
part of herein and who respectfully represents:
Made Defendants herein are:
1. Defendant, Louisiana State University (“LSU”), is a public university system organized and duly
authorized to operate under the laws of the State of Louisiana.
2. Defendant, Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical
College (the “Board,” “Defendant Board” or “LSU”), is a public constitution corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Louisiana to operate, manage and control the
LSU public university system including its campus in Baton Rouge, with its principal place of
business located at 3810 West Lakeshore Drive, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808.
3. Defendant, Garrett “Hank” Danos, a resident of Louisiana and of the full age of majority who at
various material times served as Chairman of the Board and made Defendant herein in his
individual capacity;
4. Defendant, Robert “Bobby” Yarborough, a resident of Louisiana and of the full age of majority
who at various material times served as served as Chairman and Chairman Elect of the Board and
made Defendant herein in his individual capacity;
5. Defendant, Stanley Jacobs, a resident of Louisiana and of the full age of majority who at various
material times served as the Chairman of the Board’s Athletic Committee and made Defendant
herein in his individual capacity;
6. Defendant, William Jenkins, is of the full age of majority and at various material times served as
Interim System President and Chancellor of Baton Rouge Campus and made Defendant herein in
his individual capacity;
7. Defendant, William Shelby McKenzie, is a resident of Louisiana and of the full age of majority
and is a partner at Taylor Porter and at various material times served as LSU’s Lead Legal Counsel
and made Defendant herein in his individual capacity;
8. Defendant, Vicki Crochet, is a resident of Louisiana and of the full age of majority and is a partner
at Taylor Porter and at various material times served as LSU Legal Counsel and made Defendant
herein in her individual capacity;
9. Defendant, Robert "Bob" Barton, is a resident of Louisiana of the full age of majority and the
Managing Partner at Taylor Porter and at various material times served as LSU Legal Counsel and
made Defendant herein in his individual capacity;
10. Defendant, Leslie Edwin "Les" Miles, is of the full age of majority and at various material times
served as LSU as Head Football Coach and made Defendant herein in his individual capacity;
11. Defendant, Joseph “Joe” Alleva is of the full age of majority and at various material times served
as Vice Chancellor and Director of Athletics and made Defendant herein in his individual capacity;
12. Defendant, Scott Woodward, is a resident of Louisiana and of the full age of majority and at
various material times served as Athletic Director of LSU and made Defendant herein in his
individual capacity;
13. Defendant, Verge Ausberry, is a resident of Louisiana and of the full age of majority and at various
material times served as Executive Deputy AD/Executive Director of External Relations and made
Defendant herein in his individual capacity;
14. Defendant, Miriam Segar, is a resident of Louisiana and of the full age of majority and at various
material times served as Senior Associate Athletic Director at LSU and made Defendant herein in
her individual capacity;
15. John Does (1-10) are other Defendants who may be identified through the course of litigation and
Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the petition to add Defendants as they become known.
16. Jane Does (11-20) are other Defendants who may be identified through the course of litigation and
Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the petition to add Defendants as they become known.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
17. This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter pursuant to La. Const. Article V§16 and LSA
R.S. 15:1351 et seq., LSA R.S. 23:967, La. Civil Code Article 2315, La. Civil Code Article 2330,
La. Civil Code Article 2324, La. Civil Code Article 2298, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 -1968, 901(A) of Title
2
IX of the Organized Control Act of 1970 as amended, otherwise known as RICO and 42 U.S.C.
§§1981, 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 42 U.S.C. § 1986
18. . Venue is proper pursuant to La. C.C.P. Article 74 because the offenses and/or quasi-offense and
damages alleged herein occurred in this parish.
OPERATIVE FACTS
19. Plaintiff, SHARON LEWIS, has played a vital role in LSU's Football Recruiting since 2001. Ms.
Lewis is a 1991 graduate of LSU who was a student worker in the Athletic Department and an All-
SEC heptathlete and high jumper for LSU's national championship women's track and field team.
Ms. Lewis was hired as the Coordinator for Recruiting Operations in 2001 under Nick Saban. Ms.
Lewis was promoted to Assistant Athletics Director for Football Recruiting and Alumni Relations
in 2007. Ms. Lewis has recruited the top football players in the nation to play football at the highest
level in college football for nearly 20 years. Ms. Lewis remained the Assistant Athletic Director
for Football Recruiting and Alumni Relations for nearly 13 years. Ms. Lewis was given a new title
as Associate Athletics Director for Football Recruiting and Alumni Relations in August 2020. Her
duties included management of full-time employees as well as 35-40 student workers. Ms. Lewis
also oversees all special events associated with recruiting, such as pregame and postgame events,
dinners, banquets and social outings for official visits. Additionally, she manages student workers
who help with the day-to-day recruiting tasks and planned activities. Ms. Lewis' recruitment
program has been consistently ranked in the top five (5) in the SEC and top five (5) nationally,
except in 2013 and 2018. Ms. Lewis oversees all of LSU’s Football on-campus recruiting activities
and manages the recruiting staff. Due to the success of the football recruiting program under Ms.
Lewis' leadership, LSU won the 2003 National Championship (Nick Saban); 2007 National
Championship (Les Miles); 2007 SEC Championship (Les Miles); 2011 SEC Championship (Les
Miles); 2011 played in the National Championship Game (Les Miles); 2019 SEC Championship
(Ed Orgeron) and 2020 National Championship (Ed Orgeron). Ms. Lewis modified the
expectations for the student workers to require student workers wear suits, dress more
professionally and develop administrative skills.
20. Plaintiff alleges she engaged in protected activity by reporting that LSU Coaches, Athletic
Employees violated state laws of Intentional Discrimination in Employment (LSA R.S. 23:332),
Sexual Battery (LSA R.S. 14:43.1 & 14:43.1.1), Battery of a Dating Partner (LSA R.S. 14:34.9),
Simple Battery (LSA R.S 14:35), Unlawful Communications (LSA R.S. 14:285) and defendants
3
retaliated against her in compensation, promotions and inadequate support.
21. Plaintiff alleges that she refused to participate in the LSU Athletic Department practice of
concealing violations of state law by LSU Coaches, Athletic Officials and LSU Football players
and LSU retaliated against her in violation of LSA R.S. 23:967 et seq.
22. Plaintiff alleges she has been intentionally retaliated against and she is entitled to compensatory
damages, back pay, benefits, reasonable attorney fees and court costs.
23. Plaintiff alleges the wrongful acts, pled herein, were either intentionally, directly or tacitly ratified,
approved, encouraged and endorsed by LSU, the Board of Supervisors, Senior Administrators of
LSU or alternatively, the intentional retaliatory acts of agents and employees were ignored by
upper and middle management with negligence and gross negligence, which contributed to the
cause, the harm, the damage and this is the basis of this complaint and subject action.
24. Plaintiff alleges she became aware, in March 2021, defendants had engaged in a pattern of
racketeering to hide violations of Intentional Discrimination in Employment (LSA R.S. 23:332),
Sexual Battery (LSA R.S. 14:43.1 & 14:43.1.1), Battery of a Dating Partner (LSA R.S. 14:34.9),
Simple Battery (LSA R.S. 14:35), Unlawful Communications (LSA R.S. 14:285) and sexual
misconduct investigations of LSU’s athletic officials and football players and her business and
property were injured as a result.
25. Starting in 2012 to present Verge Ausberry (Ausberry) has continually and systematically
retaliated against plaintiff for continuingly bringing LSA R.S. 14:43.1, 14:43.1.1, 14:34.9, 14:285
23:332 and 23:337 violations to his attention.
26. Miriam Segar (“Segar”) was the Athletics Department designee to receive and investigate Title IX
related complaints that included violations of Intentional Discrimination in Employment (LSA
R.S. 23:332), Sexual Battery (LSA R.S. 14:43.1 & 14:43.1.1), Battery of a Dating Partner (LSA
R.S. 14:34.9), Simple Battery (LSA R.S. 14:35), Unlawful Communications (LSA R.S. 14:285) at
all relevant times herein.
The Husch Blackwell
27. On November 2020 LSU retained the Husch Blackwell law firm to investigate the school’s
handling of several Title IX-related incidents as well as LSU’s Title IX policies and procedures.
28. On March 5, 2021, Husch Blackwell issued its investigative report and finding (hereinafter referred
4
to as “Husch Blackwell Report” or “Husch Blackwell.” 1
29. The Husch Blackwell Report found although Sharon Lewis was the only employee to report Title
IX complaints in LSU’s Athletic Department, she is the only Athletic employee that a PM-73
Investigation was ever initiated against.
30. Until the release of the report in March 2021, plaintiff was unaware the Board of Supervisors had
knowledge of the pervasive harassment, heightened risk of retaliation plaintiff, students and
employees suffered for reporting Title IX complaints and violations of state law. Plaintiff was also
unaware of the severe institutional level of procedural deficiencies that avoided discipline for
athletic coaches and athletic officials that retaliated against plaintiff for filing Title IX complaints
and violations of state law, creating a basis to impute knowledge of violations of state law and
and other wrongs to the Board of Supervisors.
FACTUAL BASIS FOR CLAIMS

(General Facts Underlying Claims of Employee Protection From Reprisal, Negligence,
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
Civil Conspiracy, Civil Rico and Enrichment Without Cause)
31. Plaintiff adopts and incorporate by reference the previously plead paragraphs as if fully plead
herein.
32. After the hiring of head coach Les Miles (Miles) in 2005, Miles, in his first meeting with plaintiff,
made racist comments and stated he “prefers the blonde over the brunette.” Shortly after, Miles
hired Shelley Roberts who was a white, blonde, female to lead LSU’s football recruitment and
stated to plaintiff, "now that's the face of recruiting.” Miles selected Shelley based solely on her
appearance after spotting her in the Athletics building. Miles later ordered plaintiff to fire Shelley
because he did not like that Shelley wore sweat suits to work, but plaintiff refused to comply with
his demand.
33. Starting in 2009, Plaintiff complained to her immediate supervisors Miles was sexually harassing
female student workers and they failed to take any action to investigate or discipline Miles.
Plaintiff complained to her immediate supervisors Miles was subjecting plaintiff and African-
American students to racist insults and they failed to take any action to investigate or discipline
Miles.
34. Plaintiff became concerned Miles had an inappropriate fixation on female student workers and
plaintiff reported her concerns to Ausberry, her immediate supervisor, who asked plaintiff to give
1 See Exhibit 1 attached to Original Complaint
5
him details but took no actions.
35. Miles complained to plaintiff about the appearance of the female students on the recruiting staff
and told plaintiff there were “too many Black girls,” “fat girls” and “ugly girls” employed in LSU's
Athletics and ordered plaintiff to fire them. Plaintiff again refused to comply. Miles stated to
plaintiff, the student female workers she hired looked like a "bad bowling team." That comment
became a joke among the coaching staff and throughout the football operations building and senior
athletic administration staff, including the cleaning staff.
36. On November 21, 2010, Miles stated in a staff meeting with the coaches and athletics department
staff he had ugly girls here and stated, when he was at Oklahoma State,2he took over interviewing
student female workers and hired them himself. Plaintiff felt embarrassed and isolated and
immediately reported what was said in the meeting to her superior Verge Ausberry, who took no
action against Miles for those and other racist and sexist statements.
37. Sometime in 2010 Miles also started labeling the female student workers as "AM and PM" girls
and stated to plaintiff that “there are two types of girls I like to hire: AM girls are the worker bee
types. They are for filing, typing and in office work. The PM girls are the pretty girls, ones that
people like to look at and we need to use for recruiting events” and Miles directed plaintiff to hire
“blondes with the big boobs.” Plaintiff reported these comments to Verge Ausberry (“Ausberry”)
and was told “you are making too big a deal about the comments that Coach Miles was making
about the girls and you need to just worry about doing your job and I hired prettier girls." Frank
Wilson, Running Back Coach, met with plaintiff with others present and directed them to tell
plaintiff to “hire prettier girls, more light skinned black girls and that would stop Miles from
bullying plaintiff.” Plaintiff complained to Bo Bahnsen, Sr. Associate Athletics Director, about
Miles’ sexist and racist comments, but was told maybe it was time for plaintiff to look for another
job.
38. After LSU lost the 2011 National Championship game, Miles' fixation on student workers grew to
an obsession and he complained to plaintiff that the student female workers were “too fat,” “too
ugly,” “too black” and demanded plaintiff hire "blonde girls" with "big boobs." The student
workers plaintiff hired were fairly evenly split racially between African-American and Caucasian
2 During Les Miles’ tenure at Oklahoma State (2001-2004) the cowboys orange pride program provided
female students as hostesses to recruits. The program was disbanded after allegations that hostesses had sex
with football recruits. See https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/sports/lsu/article_40f2f159-25ae-
5612-b40b-cb0168122733.html, citing Sports Illustrated 9/13/2013 article entitled Special Report on
Oklahoma State Football: Part 4 – The Sex.
6
but Miles only communicated with the Caucasian student workers. Plaintiff reported Miles' sexist
and racist comments to her superiors and no action was taken.
39. Sometime in 2012, Miles told an Athletics official to inform plaintiff he would take over the hiring
of female student workers and the interviews would take place in his office at night and requested
plaintiff set up the interviews. In a meeting with Sam Nadar and Haleh Samadnouri, plaintiff
expressed concerns of Miles' plan to interview student female workers at night in his office was
inappropriate, but she was subsequently ordered by Ausberry to set up the night interviews
between Miles and student female workers. Miles interviewed the female students at night in his
office and went to sorority houses to recruit female student workers.
40. Miles interviewed about 15 to 20 female LSU students for student recruitment staff positions.
Several of the girls interviewed by Miles reported to plaintiff Miles asked them about their sex
life. One student interviewed by Miles stated he asked her if she were a virgin. Plaintiff reported
Miles' conduct to Ausberry, Sam Nader (“Nader”) and Segar and was told by Ausberry, "if you
don't like it here, leave." Plaintiff noticed her superiors became hesitant to meet with her after
reporting Miles’ racist and sexist comments. Ausberry told her several times she needed to go find
another job and “she should have taken a job at Alabama.”
41. Sometime in 2013, a female student worker ("Student 1") came to plaintiff traumatized and very
upset about something that happened when she was alone with Miles. Student 1 stated Miles got
on top of her in his office. Student 1 requested plaintiff's assistance in confronting Miles and
plaintiff accompanied Student 1 to Miles’ office where Student 1 stated to Miles, “you know what
you did to me” and Miles repeatedly apologized to Student 1. Plaintiff immediately reported
Student 1's allegations to Miriam Segar. Student 1 met with Miriam Segar, but she took no action.
There is no record of Student 1’s complaint about Miles being investigated in a manner consistent
with the then-University policy.3
42. In February 2013, a second female student worker ("Student 2") reported to plaintiff she had
received contact, via social media and text messages, from Miles. Plaintiff immediately reported
Student 2’s complaint about Miles to Segar and provided Segar with text messages from Miles to
Student 2.
43. As part of the investigation, plaintiff was instructed to meet at Taylor Porter's offices in downtown
3See Exhibit 1 attached to Original Complaint
7
Baton Rouge where she met with Vicki Crochet and when she asked, “what happens next?” Vicki
Crochet told her it was legal because the student workers were of the “consenting age” and the
reported conduct was "not illegal, maybe immoral." On May 15, 2013, Taylor Porter issued a
written report which concluded Miles had not violated LSU's Sexual Harassment Policy nor his
contract. See Taylor Porter’s Written Investigation (hereinafter referred to as the “Miles Report”). 4
44. In around 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint (referenced herein as "Complaint 9") to Miriam Segar
against Verge Ausberry for verbal harassment, emotional abuse, belittling and open humiliation of
plaintiff.
45. Per a June 8, 2016, email to the Athletics Department staff, Joe Alleva, Athletics Director,
instructed “staff members should not attempt to conduct any investigation or make any
determination regarding alleged, reported or suspected misconduct. Instead, you are required to
report all potential issues so that they are properly addressed by trained university officials. Please
report these issues to either Miriam Segar, Sr. Associate Athletics Director Student Services or
Wendy Nall, Assistant Athletics Director HR. Both of these individuals have been trained in Title
IX law and can help facilitate the proper reporting that is required by law and university policy.”
46. Plaintiff received notice of the nude photograph of Samantha Brennan's (referenced herein as
"Student 3") complaint in 2016. Plaintiff reported the complaint to Segar.
47. In or about the Fall of 2016, plaintiff received a report of misconduct of a football player from
Calise Richardson (referenced herein as "Student 4") regarding a drink tossing incident at a local
bar. The Richardson complaint was reported to plaintiff, Keva Soil-Cormier and Ya’el Lofton. As
instructed by Athletics Department leadership, plaintiff reported Richardson’s complaint to Segar.
Plaintiff was specifically instructed not to conduct investigations of such complaints and did not
conduct an investigation of Richardson’s complaint.
48. In or around May 2016, female student worker (referenced herein as "Student 5") complained to
plaintiff of Earl Chevalier, a member of the athletics department coaching staff, seeking to date or
otherwise pursue an inappropriate relationship with the student worker. Plaintiff reported Student
5's complaint to Segar.
49. Another student (referenced herein as "Student 6") complained of Title IX related misconduct to
plaintiff in January or February 2017. Plaintiff reported Student 6's complaint to Segar as
8
repeatedly instructed.
50. In or around December 2017, plaintiff received the Gloria Scott (referenced herein as "Complaint
8") complaint and reported the complaint, along with text messages, to Segar and Ausberry.
51. In 2018, plaintiff received another complaint of a female student worker threatening a male
student (referenced herein as "Student 7") with Title IX type misconduct. Plaintiff reported
Student 7's complaint to Segar.
52. In 2019 plaintiff filed a Title IX complaint with Jeffery Scott, Title IX Officer requesting Segar
and Ausberry be investigated for failing to make mandatory Title IX reports and no action has ever
been taken.
CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT I
Violation of LSA R.S. 23:967
Employee Protection From Reprisal
(Louisiana Board of Supervisors, Danos, Yarborough, Jacobs, Alleva, Woodward,
Miles, Segar, Ausberry)
herein.
54. Plaintiff allege all Defendants retaliated against plaintiff for reporting violations of state law and
sexual misconduct by LSU athletic officials, coaches and star football players and perpetuated a
conspiracy which negatively affected plaintiff.
55. All Defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the retaliation perpetrated on plaintiff,
which were reported to agents of the University on various occasions, and because of the
prevalence of sexual misconduct and violations of state law at LSU. With this knowledge, it
was foreseeable that if Defendants did not adequately exercise or provide the duty of care owed
to its employees who reported violations of Title IX and state law, Plaintiff would be vulnerable
for retaliation.
56. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff reported violations of state law to her superiors in the
Athletics Department and Miriam Segar, Sr. Associate Athletics Director and pursuant to LSU
football operations, policies and procedures.
57. LSU Athletics Department staff was also reminded, via department emails and memos from the
Joe Avella, Athletic Director, of their responsibility as a State employee to immediately report any
knowledge you have of inappropriate conduct, sexual harassment or sexual assault. The Athletics
9
Department staff, such as plaintiff, was required to report such knowledge or complaints to Miriam
Segar.5
58. LSU has repeatedly and intentionally tolerated, inadequately addressed and been deliberately
indifferent to students, employees, faculty and plaintiff's complaints and reports of complaints of
violations of state law.
59. LSU's deliberate indifference to allegations of sexual harassment, sexual assault and violations of
other state laws made Plaintiff and those who reported vulnerable to and ultimately the subject of
harsh retaliatory treatment.
A. Plaintiff’s Protected Activity
herein.
61. Starting in 2009, Plaintiff complained to her immediate supervisors Miles was sexually harassing
female student workers and they failed to take any action to investigate or discipline Miles.
Plaintiff complained to her immediate supervisors Miles was subjecting plaintiff and African-
American students to racist insults and they failed to take any action to investigate or discipline
Miles.
62. Sometime in 2013, a female student worker ("Student 1") came to plaintiff traumatized and very
upset about something that happened when she was alone with Miles. Student 1 stated Miles got
on top of her in his office a violation of LSA R.S. 14:43.1.
63. Student 1 requested plaintiff's assistance in confronting Miles and plaintiff accompanied Student
1 to Miles’ office where Student 1 stated to Miles, “you know what you did to me” and Miles
repeatedly apologized to Student 1. Plaintiff immediately reported Student 1's allegations to
Miriam Segar. Student 1 met with Miriam Segar, but she took no action. There is no record of
Student 1’s complaint about Miles being investigated in a manner consistent with the then-
University policy. 6
64. In February 2013, a second female student worker ("Student 2") reported to plaintiff she had
received contact, via social media and text messages, from Miles a violation of LSA. R.S. 14:285.
Plaintiff immediately reported Student 2’s complaint about Miles to Segar and provided Segar

10
with text messages from Miles to Student 2.
65. As part of the investigation, plaintiff was instructed to meet at Taylor Porter's offices in downtown
Baton Rouge where she met with Vicki Crochet and when she asked, “what happens next?” Vicki
Crochet told her it was legal because the student workers were of the “consenting age” and the
reported conduct was "not illegal, maybe immoral." On May 15, 2013, Taylor Porter issued a
written report which concluded Miles had not violated LSU's Sexual Harassment Policy nor his
contract. 7
66. In or around 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint (referenced herein as "Complainant 9") to Miriam
Segar against Verge Ausberry for violation of La. R.S. 23:332 including but not limited to verbal
harassment, emotional abuse, belittling and open humiliation of plaintiff.
67. Per a June 8, 2016, email to the Athletics Department staff, Joe Alleva, Athletics Director,
instructed that “staff members should not attempt to conduct any investigation or make any
determination regarding alleged, reported or suspected misconduct. Instead, you are required to
report all potential issues so that they are properly addressed by trained university officials. Please
report these issues to either Miriam Segar, Sr. Associate Athletics Director Student Services or
Wendy Nall, Assistant Athletics Director HR.” 8
68. Plaintiff received notice of the nude photograph of Samantha Brennan's (referenced herein as
"Student 3") complaint in 2016, a violation of LSA R.S. 14:285. Plaintiff reported the complaint to
Segar.
69. In or about the Fall of 2016, plaintiff received a report of misconduct of a football player from
Calise Richardson (referenced herein as "Student 4") regarding a drink tossing incident with a
football player at a local bar. The Richardson complaint was reported to plaintiff, Keva Soil-
Cormier and Ya’el Lofton. As instructed by Athletics Department leadership, plaintiff reported
Richardson’s complaint to Segar. Plaintiff was specifically instructed not to conduct investigations
of such complaints and did not conduct an investigation of Richardson’s complaint.
70. In or around May 2016, female student worker (referenced herein as "Student 5") complained to
plaintiff of Earl Chevalier, a member of the athletics department coaching staff, seeking to date or
otherwise pursue an inappropriate relationship with the student worker a violation of LSA R.S.

11
23:332. Plaintiff reported Student 5's complaint to Segar.
71. Another student (referenced herein as "Student 6") complained of LSA R.S. 14:43.1 and 14:43.1.1
related misconduct to plaintiff in January or February 2017. Plaintiff reported the Student 6's
complaint to Segar as repeatedly instructed.
72. In or around December 2017, plaintiff received the Gloria Scott (referenced herein as
"Complainant 8") complaint and reported the complaint, along with text messages, to Segar and
Ausberry.9
73. In a February 14, 2018 Memo to LSU Athletics Staff, Joe Avella, Athletics Director, again
reminded staff of their "responsibility as a State employee to immediately report any knowledge
you have of inappropriate conduct, sexual harassment or sexual assault.... and further instructed
staff members to 'notify Miriam Segar, Sr. Associate Athletics Director, of any such issue.'" This
2018 memo again reminded staff "[p]lease don't try to investigate the claim or talk to any witnesses
on your own." 10
74. In 2018, plaintiff received another complaint of a female student worker threatening a male
student (referenced herein as "Student 7") with LSA R.S. 14:34.9 and 14:285 type misconduct.
Plaintiff reported Student 7's complaint to Segar.
75. From 2012 to 2016 Frank Wilson sexually harassed Plaintiff, female students and workers and
Plaintiff reported this conduct to Verge Ausberry and Miriam Segar and they failed to investigate
or take any action.
76. In 2013, as a result of being subjected to retaliation for bringing violations of state law to the
attention of her supervisors, plaintiff suffered a mental breakdown and underwent medical
treatment. Plaintiff continues to seek mental health support to cope with the continued retaliation
and harassment she is subjected to for bringing LSA R.S. 14:43.1, 14:43.1.1, 14:34.9, 14:285,
23:332 and 23:337 violations to the attention of her supervisors.
77. From 2012 to 2021 Plaintiff repeatedly reported violations of state law by athletic officials,
coaches and star football players.
B. LSU Retaliated Against Plaintiff
9 See Exhibit 1 attached to Original Compliant

10 See Exhibit 4 attached to Original Complaint.
12
herein.
79. In November of 2020 plaintiff went to Ausberry to complain about repeatedly being denied a
promotion and Ausberry told plaintiff she was not being promoted because “you use the word Title
IX too much and people are afraid of you.” 11
80. In December 2020, plaintiff again went to Verge Ausberry and asked why she was not being
promoted and Ausberry screamed at plaintiff “You will never be promoted because you file Title
IX complaints. You even filed one against me.” At both meetings Ausberry told plaintiff you can
complain to Scott Woodward but “he is my boy.”
81. In 2020 and 2021 Plaintiff's coworkers expressed their concern over Ausberry’s hostile treatment
of plaintiff to the senior leadership of the athletics department, but they took no actions and in
interviews with Husch Blackwell “Football Operations employees confirmed witnessing
Ausberry hollering and screaming at plaintiff over the course of the last several years.”12
82.Sometime in March 2021, in a staff meeting discussing the Husch Blackwell Report, it was stated
in plaintiff's presence the Athletics Department needed to have a Title IX policy for “Tattletales.”
83. From 2020 to 2021 plaintiff has sought to meet with Athletics Director Scott Woodward to
complain of violations of state law by Ausberry and others, but Woodward has refused to meet
with plaintiff and at all relevant times was aware of and enabled and conspired to the retaliate
against plaintiff for reporting violations of state law.
84. From 2020 to 2021 plaintiff has received significantly lower compensation than her similarly
situated male co-workers, despite this fact she has played a significant role in LSU’s Football
success. Plaintiff’s salary is $117,000 and her immediate supervisor Verge Ausberry’s salary is
$500,000.
85. In August 2020 Plaintiff was promoted to Associate Athletic Director of Football Recruiting and
Alumni Relations but received no increase in pay although her responsibilities were increased.
86.Sometime in March 2021, in a staff meeting, plaintiff asked to serve on a committee that was
drafting policies on managing Title IX complaints and was told it would not be appropriate for her
to be on that committee.
87. From 2020 to 2021 plaintiff was denied access to resources and support of administrative staff and
11 Reporting of state law violations triggered Title IX jurisdiction.

12 Exhibit 1 attached to Original Complaint
13
subjected to repeated disciplinary actions because of her repeated complaints of violations of state
law in the Athletics Department.
88. In December 2021 the LSU Board of Supervisors approved the hiring of Frank Wilson as Associate
Head Coach and on January 5, 2022, LSU Athletic Director Scott Woodward terminated Sharon
Lewis, who had reported Frank Wilson for sexual assault. Sharon Lewis termination violated state
law.
89. Until the release of the Husch Blackwell Report in March 2021, plaintiff was unaware the Board
of Supervisors had knowledge of the pervasive harassment, heightened risk of retaliation plaintiff,
students and employees suffered for reporting Title IX complaints and violations of state law.
Plaintiff was also unaware of the severe institutional level of procedural deficiencies that avoided
discipline for athletic coaches and athletic officials that retaliated against plaintiff for filing Title
IX complaints and reporting violations of state law, creating a basis to impute knowledge of Title
IX violations and violations of state law and other wrongs in the Athletic Department to the Board
of Supervisors.
90. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ reprisal plaintiff has sustained injuries and
damages including, but not limited to loss of concentration, loss of hair, loss of appetite, loss of
weight, insomnia, panic attacks, depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, medical
expenses associated with mental and physical health treatment, inconvenience, insult, mental
distress, humiliation, anxiety, emotional and physical pain and suffering, denial of pay raises,
denial of promotions, wrongful termination, loss of economic opportunities, and damage to her
professional reputation and other such injuries and physical manifestations as may appear during
the course of discovery and trial in this matter.
91. Plaintiff is entitled to monetary compensation for past damages and injunctive relief from all
Defendants, as damages alone are not adequate remedy for the Defendants’ ongoing negligence.
Defendant LSU and the LSU Board of Supervisors are vicariously liable for the damages caused
by the Individual Defendants, as they were all employees of LSU.
COUNT II
Violations of Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315
Negligence
herein.
14
93. Plaintiff allege negligence by all Defendants in their response to reports of sexual misconduct
and violations of state law and in perpetuating a conspiracy which negatively affected plaintiff.
94. At all relevant times, the Board of Supervisors and Individual Defendants owed plaintiff a duty
of reasonable care to ensure her safety and freedom from retaliation and harassment, by among
other things conducting investigations into her claims of retaliation and violations of state law
and enforcing LSU personnel policies and Title IX policy.
95. Defendants breached the duty of reasonable care by failing to take appropriate actions in several
circumstances, including but not limited to the following:
a. Failing to take reasonable protective measures to prevent the retaliation
after plaintiff reported violations of state law and Title IX;
b. Failing to report plaintiff’s disclosures of violation of state law to LSU’s
Title IX office and local law enforcement;
c. Failing to properly investigate plaintiff’s reports of violation of state law
and Title IX;
d. Failing to properly discipline Ausberry, Segar, Miles, Alleva and
Woodward for retaliating against plaintiff;
e. Failing to keep accurate records of plaintiff’s reports of violation of state
law and Title IX;
f. Failure to follow LSU’s policies in reviewing, investigating, and resolving
complaints of sexual misconduct pursuant to Title IX;
g. Failing to respond to plaintiff’s reports of sexual misconduct and violation
of state law against high-ranking LSU employees;
h. Failing to ensure LSU implemented its Title IX policies;
i. Failing to interview witnesses to sexual misconduct and violations of state
law as indicated by plaintiff;
j. Failing to discipline employees for violating LSU’s Title IX and state law;
k. Creating an environment where employees are retaliated against for
reporting violations of state law and Title IX;
l. Interfering in the enforcement of Title IX by hiring Crochet and Barton to
conduct an independent Title IX investigation;
m. Interfering with Title IX by concealing the Miles Investigation from an
15
official Title IX proceedings;
n. Violating state law by concealing the Miles Report 13 in Crochet, Barton,
Miles attorney’s Peter Ginsburg and A Edwin Hardin’s law offices from
2013 to 2021.
o. Interfering with Title IX by concealing the Miles Report in Crochet, Barton
and Miles attorney law offices.
p. Interfering with Title IX and violating state law by bribing complainant
students to drop their complaints against Miles
q. Interfering with Title IX and violating state law by pressuring professor to
allow student to retake an exam in exchange for her dropping a complaint
of sexual misconduct against Miles.
r. Initiating a fraudulent PM-73 Investigation against Plaintiff.
s. Terminating Plaintiff for reporting that Frank Wilson sexually assaulted
her.
96. But for the negligence acts and omissions of Defendants, Plaintiff would not have been injured.
97. Until the publication of the Husch Blackwell Report, Miles Report, Taylor Porter Billing
Records in March 2021 and the Louisiana Senate Select Committee On Children and Women
hearings, plaintiff was unable to know, in fact Defendants concealed from plaintiff the extent of
Defendants’ negligent acts and contribution of the same to the conspiracy to intentionally
deprive plaintiff of her rights.
98. All Defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the retaliation perpetrated on plaintiff,
which were reported to agents of the University on various occasions, and because of the
prevalence of sexual misconduct at LSU. With this knowledge, it was foreseeable that if
Defendants did not adequately exercise or provide the duty of care owed to its employees who
reported violations of Title IX and state law, Plaintiff would be vulnerable for retaliation.
99. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ acts and omissions, plaintiff has sustained
injuries and damages including, but not limited to loss of concentration, loss of hair, loss of
appetite, loss of weight, insomnia, panic attacks, depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress
disorder, medical expenses associated with mental and physical health treatment, inconvenience,
insult, mental distress, humiliation, anxiety, emotional and physical pain and suffering, denial of
16
pay raises, denial of promotions, loss of employment, loss of economic opportunities, and
damage to her professional reputation and other such injuries and physical manifestations as may
appear during the course of discovery and trial in this matter.
100. Plaintiff is entitled to monetary compensation for past damages and injunctive relief
from all Defendants, as damages alone are not adequate remedy for the Defendants’ ongoing
negligence. Defendant LSU and the LSU Board of Supervisors are vicariously liable for the
damages caused by the Individual Defendants, as they were all employees of LSU.
COUNT III
Violation of Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315, 2030
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
101. Plaintiff adopts and incorporate by reference the previously plead paragraphs as if fully
plead herein.
102. Plaintiff allege negligent infliction of emotional distress by all Defendants in their
response to reports of sexual misconduct, violations of state law and lack of prevention of
retaliation for reporting such conduct.
103. Defendants’ actions and inactions as described in this Complaint, including Defendants’
failure to respond appropriately to reports of sexual misconduct and violation of state law,
Defendants’ interference in and hinderance of a proper Title IX system at LSU, Defendants’
failure to conduct appropriate Title IX investigations, retaliation against the Plaintiff, failure to
properly discipline supervisors who retaliated against plaintiff, terminating plaintiff for reporting
Frank Wilson sexually assaulted her and failure to ensure that LSU and LSU’s Athletic
Department in particular were free of sex-based discrimination constitutes conduct so reckless as
to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether Plaintiff was injured.
104. The events described above would naturally and probably result in emotional distress.
Defendants’ negligent actions and inactions did cause severe emotional distress to Plaintiff.
105. Until the publication of the Husch Blackwell Report, Miles Report, Taylor Porter
Billing Records in March 2021 and the Louisiana Senate Select Committee On Children and
Women hearings, plaintiff was unable to know, in fact Defendants concealed from Plaintiff,
Defendants’ intentional pattern of extreme and outrageous conduct designed to retaliate against
employees who reported Title IX violations and violations of state law to protect the LSU
Football brand and the school’s money.
17
106. The emotional distress suffered by Plaintiff physically manifested itself in symptoms
including, but not limited to loss of concentration, loss of hair, loss of appetite, loss of weight,
insomnia, panic attacks, depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, medical expenses
associated with mental and physical health treatment, inconvenience, insult, mental distress,
humiliation, anxiety, emotional and physical pain and suffering, and other such injuries and
physical manifestations as may appear during the course of discovery and trial in this matter.
from all Defendants. Defendants LSU and the LSU Board of Supervisors are also vicariously
liable for the damages caused by the Individual Defendants, as they were all employees of LSU.
COUNT IV
Violation of Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315, 2030
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
108. Plaintiff adopt and incorporate by reference the previously plead paragraphs as if fully
plead herein.
109. Plaintiff allege negligent infliction of emotional distress by all Defendants in their
response to reports of sexual misconduct and violations of state law.
110. By dismissing Plaintiff’ reports of sexual misconduct and violations of state law by
coaches, athletic official and LSU Football players , failing to properly investigate such claims or
protect Plaintiff from retaliation, justifying the behavior of the supervisors, failing to properly
discipline the supervisors, openly mocking and spreading rumors about Plaintiff, isolating and
alienating Plaintiff, improperly disciplining and retaliating against and terminating Plaintiff for
reporting Frank Wilson sexually assaulted her, the LSU Defendants engaged in extreme and
outrageous conduct.
111. Until the publication of the Husch Blackwell Report in March 2021 and the Louisiana
Senate Select Committee On Children and Women Hearings, plaintiff was unable to know, in
fact Defendants concealed from Plaintiff, Defendants’ intentional pattern of extreme and
outrageous conduct designed to retaliate against employees who reported Title IX violations and
violations of state law to protect the LSU Football brand and the school’s money.
112. As a result of the LSU Defendants extreme and outrageous conduct, Plaintiff suffered
The emotional distress suffered severe emotional distress including but not limited to loss of
concentration, loss of hair, loss of appetite, loss of weight, insomnia, panic attacks, depression,
18
anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, medical expenses associated with mental and physical
health treatment, inconvenience, insult, mental distress, humiliation, anxiety, emotional and
physical pain and suffering and other such injuries and physical manifestations as may appear
during the course of discovery and trial in this matter.
from all Defendants. Defendants LSU and the LSU Board of Supervisors are also vicariously
liable for the damages caused by the Individual Defendants, as they were all employees of LSU.
COUNT V
Violation of Louisiana Civil Code Article 2324
Civil Conspiracy
plead herein.
115. Plaintiff allege a conspiracy between all Defendants to systematically and fraudulently
silence Plaintiff and deprive her of her Constitutional and federal rights to protect the reputation
and income of LSU athletics. The underlying acts of this conspiracy include the wrongful acts
alleged herein, including but not limited to intentional and other torts set forth herein, namely
implementing a deficient and secretive Title IX program and reporting scheme that was designed
to insulate the Athletic Department in order to protect the income from LSU football program
that goes to LSU and otherwise stymie LSU’s entire Title IX Policy in order to ensure a
profitable and successful LSU Football program that was able to continue competing unabridged
in interstate collegiate sports by protecting certain athletes, coaches, and athletic personnel from
viable Title IX claims and violations of state law and by stifling LSU’s Title IX policies as a
whole.
116. The LSU football program generates extraordinary revenue for LSU and benefit directly
and indirectly from ticket and merchandise sales; TV, radio, and internet contracts; advertising;
attracting students who want to attend a school with a strong football culture; and attracting
donors. Upon information and belief, the football team generated nearly $92 million during the
2018-2019 season, more than half of LSU Athletics’ total revenue of $157 million during the
same period.
Senate Select Committee On Children and Women Hearings, plaintiff was unable to know, in
19
fact Defendants concealed from Plaintiff, that all Defendants participated in the conspiracy to
intentionally deprive Plaintiff of constitutional rights and basic care under Louisiana tort law.
118. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conspiracy plaintiff has sustained
injuries and damages including, but not limited to loss of concentration, loss of hair, loss of
appetite, loss of weight, insomnia, panic attacks, depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress
disorder, medical expenses associated with mental and physical health treatment, inconvenience,
insult, mental distress, humiliation, anxiety, emotional and physical pain and suffering, denial of
pay raises, denial of promotions, wrongful termination, loss of economic opportunities, and
damage to her professional reputation and other such injuries and physical manifestations as may
appear during the course of discovery and trial in this matter.
119. Plaintiff is entitled to monetary compensation for past damages from all Defendants in
solido.
COUNT VI
Denial of Procedural Due Process
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment
plead herein.
121. Plaintiff allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants due to deprivation
of her property and liberty interests without adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity to be
heard in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
122. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, enforceable pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, deprivation of Plaintiff’ liberty and property interests arising out of
LSU’s Title IX Policy, and federal law and guidance cannot occur without notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.
123. Defendants created a practice and/or custom of deliberate indifference and cultivated a
culture of silence by failing to report complaints of sex discrimination and violation of state law,
initiate and/or conduct adequate investigations and grievance procedures under Title IX, and
ensure employees who reported violations of Title IX and state law were not retaliated against in
direct violation of the liberty and property interests of Plaintiff.
20
124. Throughout this deprivation, Defendants continuously failed to provide Plaintiff with
adequate notice of the actions to be taken with retaliation she had suffered for reporting
violations of Title IX and state law, as well as meaningful opportunities to be heard. Defendants’
history of pervasive deprivation of these rights gives rise to a need for a heightened process to
substantially reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation.
125. For instance, Plaintiff filed complaints of Title IX violations against Miles, Ausberry
and Segar and LSU failed to investigate.
126. Plaintiff reported to Ausberry and Segar that Frank Wilson sexually assaulted her and
LSU failed to investigate and on January 5, 2022 terminated Plaintiff for reporting Frank Wilson.
127. In particular, the initiation of a fraudulently PM-73 against plaintiff. Plaintiff should not
have been subject to any disciplinary measures for simply reporting a star football players Title
IX and state law violations. Plaintiff provided substantial evidence including the identities of
several witnesses who were not contacted or interviewed. This deprived Plaintiff of a meaningful
opportunity to be heard and deprived Plaintiff of her liberty and property interests in employment
and benefits.
128. Plaintiff informed her supervisors that a student worker complained that Miles had
gotten on top of her in his office. Plaintiff provided substantial evidence including the identities
of several witnesses who were not contacted or interviewed. This deprived Plaintiff of a
meaningful opportunity to be heard and deprived Plaintiff of her liberty and property interests in
employment and benefits.
129. Until the publication of the Report in March 2021 and the following Louisiana Senate
Select Committee on Women and Children Hearings, Plaintiff was unable to know, in fact
Defendants concealed from Plaintiff, that all Defendants intentionally denied Plaintiff of her
rights to Title IX investigations of reported violations by LSU and individual defendants as
outlined in LSU’s own policies and federal regulations.
130. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ deprivation of Plaintiff’ procedural due
process rights, Plaintiff have suffered and will continue to suffer medical expenses associated
with mental and physical health treatment, inconvenience, insult, mental distress, humiliation,
physical assault, anxiety, emotional and physical pain and suffering, a denial of access to
educational benefit, wrongful termination, loss of income and other economic and non-
economic damages.
21
131. Plaintiff is entitled to monetary compensation for past violations of constitutional rights
from the Individual Defendants in their personal capacities. Plaintiff seek injunctive relief for the
continuing violations of constitutional rights against the LSU Defendants. Plaintiff are entitled to
a permanent injunction requiring the LSU
COUNT VII
First Amendment Retaliation
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the First Amendment
(Louisiana Board of Supervisors, Danos, Yarborough, Jacobs, Alleva,
Woodward, Miles, Segar, Ausberry)
plead herein.
133. Plaintiff allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants due to retaliation
in response to protected speech. LSU Defendants and Individual Defendants in their personal
capacities are state actors and at all relevant times were acting under color of law.
134. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution enforceable pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, guarantees “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const.
amend. I. Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the prohibition extends to rules imposed by
state-authorized actors, such as public universities. U.S. Const., amend XIV.
135. At all relevant times, Plaintiff had a clearly established right to freedom of speech
pursuant to the First Amendment, of which a reasonable public official would have known.
Plaintiffs engaged in constitutionally protected speech when she disclosed instances of sexual
misconduct to the Individual Defendants and other LSU employees and when she publicly
criticized LSU’s handling of their complaints as violating the requirements of Title IX and state
law. Allegations of sexual misconduct associated with public entities, such as LSU, are a matter
of public concern deserving of First Amendment protection. The normal operations of LSU were
in no way disrupted by Plaintiffs’ disclosures of sexual misconduct in a manner that can be
attributed to Plaintiff.
136. Actions evidencing attempts to regulate the content of plaintiff’s speech by preventing an
ordinary person from reporting violations of state law, sexual misconduct and Title IX complaints
include, but are not limited to failing to seriously investigate and/or appropriately report allegations
of sexual abuse and/or misconduct; dismissing, laughing at and/or shaming plaintiff when plaintiff
reported sexual misconduct of coaches and athletic officials and her own retaliation and creating
a formal and informal policy of retaliating against employees who reported violations of Title IX
22
and state law and terminating Plaintiff on January 5, 2022.
137. The LSU Defendants retaliation against plaintiff’s speech serves no compelling state
interest. The adverse actions of the defendants were substantially motivated by Plaintiff’
constitutionally protected speech because the defendants did not want to address and properly
respond to plaintiff’s disclosures of violations of state law, sexual misconduct by coaches and star
football players as it would have negatively impacted LSU’s Football Team brand and RICO
Defendants individual economic profits and political influence. The Defendant’s retaliatory
actions of silencing and ignoring plaintiff’s report of violations of state law, sexual misconduct by
coaches and student athletes is a violation of the First Amendment of the United States.
Summons Louisiana Senate Select Committee on Women and Children
138. On April 7, 2021 the Louisiana Senate Select Committee on Women and Children issued
a summons to plaintiff to appear on April 8, 2021 at 10 a.m. to speak on her knowledge of LSU’s
intentional failure to investigate sexual harassment and Title IX complaints against LSU Athletic
Officials and star football players.
139. On April 8, 2021 the Board of Supervisors issued a letter to the Louisiana Senate Select
Committee on Women and Children informing the Committee, plaintiff could not answer
questions under oath because of her pending lawsuit in violation of plaintiff’s first amendment
right to speak before the committee on matters of legitimate public concern. 14
140. On April 8, 2021 Vice President of Legal Affairs and General Counsel of LSU Winston
DeCuir Jr. appeared before the Senate Select Committee on Women and Children and confirmed
he had instructed LSU employees summoned by the committee not to appear.
141. On January 5, 2022 LSU terminated Lewis for agreeing to speak Louisiana Senate Select
Committee on Women and Children about LSU violation of state and federal law.
142. Until the release of the Husch Blackwell Report and Miles Report in March 2021 and the
Louisiana State Senate Select Committee on Women and Children Hearings, plaintiff was unable
to know, in fact defendants concealed from plaintiff, that all defendants intentionally reacted to
the disclosures of Title IX and state law violations in a manner designed to deter any future
disclosures.
143. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s retaliatory actions of silencing and
14 Pickering vs. The Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)
23
ignoring plaintiff’s reports of sexual misconduct by coaches and athletic officials and preventing
her testimony before the Louisiana Senate Select Committee on Women and Children, plaintiff
has suffered and continue to suffer medical expenses associated with mental and physical health
treatment, inconvenience, insults, mental distress, humiliation, anxiety, emotional and physical
pain and suffering, wrongful termination, loss of employment opportunities and benefits, loss of
other economic or non-economic damages, for which she is entitled to just compensation.
144. Plaintiff is entitled to monetary compensation for violations of Constitutional Rights
against individual defendants in their personal capacity.
145. Plaintiff is also entitled to a permanent injunction requiring the LSU Defendants take
substantial steps to develop a systemic response to disclosures of sex-based discrimination at LSU
that does not include retaliatory action in violation of plaintiff’s Constitutional Rights. Plaintiff is
also entitled to a permanent injunction requiring the LSU Defendants to cease all retaliatory action
against employees who report sex-based discrimination and impose appropriate discipline and
remedial measures where retaliation is found to have occurred, as damages alone are not an
adequate remedy for the LSU Defendants’ ongoing retaliation in violation of the First Amendment
and Title IX
COUNT VIII
Denial of Equal Protection
42 U.S.C. § 1983 the Fourteenth Amendment
plead herein.
147. Plaintiff allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants and Individual
Defendants due to discrimination on the basis of sex and race that denied Plaintiff equal
protection under the law in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. All Defendants in their personal capacities are state actors and at all relevant times
were acting under color of law.
148. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, enforceable pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, discrimination based on sex is presumptively unconstitutional and
24
subject to intermediate scrutiny. Defendants’ discrimination against Plaintiff on the basis of sex
and race was not substantially or rationally related to any legitimate government interest.
149. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of sex and race by subjecting her
to a hostile environment and retaliation for reporting Title IX violations and failing to
appropriately respond to and investigate reports of sexual misconduct, discrimination and other
violations detailed previously in this Complaint. Defendants’ discrimination against Plaintiff on
the basis of sex and race, caused her wrongful termination, endangered her safety, and well-
being. Defendants’ actions and inactions deprived Plaintiff of her right to equal dignity, liberty,
and autonomy by treating her as second-class citizens at LSU.
150. Until the release of the Report in March 2021, Plaintiff was unable to know, in fact
Defendants concealed from Plaintiff, that all Defendants intentionally treated African-American
female employees like Plaintiff, differently than similarly situated white male employees for the
purposes of maintaining the LSU Football brand and soliciting donor funds.
151. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ denial of equal protection, Plaintiff has
suffered and will continue to suffer medical expenses associated with mental and physical health
treatment, inconvenience, insult, mental distress, humiliation, physical assault, anxiety,
emotional and physical pain and suffering, wrongful termination, loss of income, and other
economic or non-economic damages.
from the Individual Defendants in their personal capacities.
153. Plaintiff seek injunctive relief for the continuing violations of Constitutional Rights
against the LSU Defendants. Plaintiff are entitled to a permanent injunction requiring the LSU
Defendants to create a systematic response to disclosures of sex and race-based discrimination
that protects students’ Constitutional Rights, to take substantial steps to properly investigate
reports of sex-based discrimination at LSU, provide appropriate interim measures and reasonable
accommodations to complainants, and impose appropriate discipline and remedial measures in
situations where sex-based discrimination is found to have occurred, as damages alone are not an
adequate remedy for the LSU Defendants’ ongoing violations of Plaintiff’ right to equal
protection under the law.
25
COUNT IX
Conspiracy to interfere with Civil Rights
42 U.S.C. § 1983 the Fourteenth Amendment
plead herein.
155. Plaintiff allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 1986 against all Defendants, The
Defendants’ pattern, practice, and custom as alleged in this Complaint constitute a conspiracy to
permit state actors to deprive Plaintiff of Constitutional Rights to Free Speech, Due Process, and
Equal Protection. The defendants had knowledge that the wrongs conspired were to be
committed and, having the power to prevent or aid in preventing commission of the same,
neglected or refused to do so.
Senate Select Committee on Women and Children Hearings, Plaintiff was unable to know, in
fact Defendants concealed from Plaintiff that all Defendants participated in the conspiracy to
intentionally deprive Plaintiff of Constitutional Rights.
157. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of
her Constitutional Rights, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer medical expenses
associated with mental and physical health treatment, inconvenience, insult, mental distress,
humiliation, anxiety, emotional and physical pain and suffering, wrongful termination, loss of
income and other economic or non-economic damages.
from Defendants. Plaintiff seek injunctive relief for the continuing violations of her
Constitutional Rights against all Defendants.
159. Plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction requiring the LSU Defendants take
substantial steps to create a systematic response to disclosures of sex and race-based
discrimination that protects employees Constitutional Rights. Plaintiff is also entitled to a
permanent injunction requiring the LSU Defendants to discipline employees who are known to
discriminate on the basis of sex, as damages alone are not an adequate remedy for the
Defendants’ ongoing sex- based discrimination.
26
COUNT X
42 U.S.C. § 1981
Race Discrimination/Hostile Environment
plead herein.
161. From 2005 to present, plaintiff has suffered a continuing pattern of hostile work
environment based on her race as an African-American.
162. Sometime in 2013 in a meeting with Miles in her office, he demanded plaintiff fire a male
student worker because he looked gay and plaintiff reported this incident to her superiors and no
action was taken.
163. Sometime in 2013 plaintiff received a phone call from a student worker who was African-
American and was upset because Miles told her to leave the building because she was ugly.
Plaintiff reported this incident to her superiors, but they took no action.
164. From 2013 to present plaintiff was subjected to a pervasive and continuing pattern of
hostile environment in retaliation for her bringing Title IX complaints against coaches, athletic
officials and star football players that prevented her from participating in and benefitting from her
employment, which created a hostile work environment.
165. From 2013 to 2016 Miles' retaliation, which created a hostile environment against
plaintiff became so bad she would hide under her desk when she would hear him coming to avoid
him and would sometimes hide under her desk when Miles entered the building. When plaintiff
complained to Senior Athletics officials, she was told “just leave.”
166. Sometime in 2013 plaintiff reported Miles' conduct to Ausberry, Sam Nader (“Nader”)
and Segar that several of the girls interviewed by Miles reported to plaintiff Miles asked them
about their sex life and one student stated he asked her if she were a virgin and Ausberry,
responded to her "if you don't like it here, leave."
167. Sometime in 2013 plaintiff was eating lunch with a colleague and Miles walked in and
asked plaintiff “who hired these ugly girls?”
168. Sometime in 2013, Miles threatened to punch plaintiff “in her motherfucking mouth.
169. Sometime in 2014 plaintiff was hospitalized after a surgical procedure; Bo Bahnsen called
plaintiff at the hospital, screaming at her to write up a coach for something she did not observe,
27
was not present for and of which she was not aware. Bahnsen required Ms. Lewis to submit the
report the next day although she was still hospitalized and would still be hospitalized the next day.
170. Sometime in 2015 in a speaker phone discussion with staff, including plaintiff, Ausberry
called plaintiff a “stupid incompetent bitch” and Plaintiff went to Miriam Segar to ask for help and
requested a meeting with Joe Alleva to have him stop the harassment and hostile work
environment by Ausberry, but Alleva refused to meet with her. Plaintiff was later informed by a
co-worker that when Segar met with Joe Alleva and Verge Ausberry, they laughed and made a
joke about Ausberry calling her a “stupid incompetent bitch.”
171. From 2013 to 2021 Plaintiff continually went to Miriam Segar to complain of
Ausberry and others retaliation and creating a hostile environment and was told to stop being
emotional and defensive.
172. Sometime in 2017, Joe Alleva refused to send plaintiff to an NFL meeting as a
representative of LSU and when she asked to meet with him, he included Ausberry and Segar to
intimidate plaintiff and Alleva did not rescind his denial of plaintiff’s request and after the meeting
plaintiff was reprimanded by Ausberry “you only have relationships with the black players” and
Miriam Segar told plaintiff “you only have your position because of Nick Saban” in order to
intimidate plaintiff from bringing anymore complaints against Ausberry and others for retaliation,
which created a hostile environment.
173. In 2019 Plaintiff was denied the same athletic gear as coaches and athletics department
staff, although she was told she would receive this when she was promoted in 2007. Plaintiff
contacted Greg Stringfellow because she did not receive her athletic shoes post bowl game and he
sent her a size 12 male shoe which she reported to Ausberry and he laughed.
174. Sometime in June 2020 plaintiff was in a meeting with Ausberry, Woodward and Mark
Ewing who were all on a speaker phone call with Stephanie Remepe when she began to scream
and belittle plaintiff and neither Woodward nor Ausberry intervened and after the call plaintiff
asked Ausberry why didn’t he intervene, he laughed and said “I can’t make her like you.”
175. In December 2020, plaintiff again went to Verge Ausberry and asked why she was not
being promoted and Ausberry screamed at plaintiff “You will never be promoted because you file
Title IX complaints. You even filed one against me” and Ausberry then told one of plaintiff’s co-
workers who was present “don t be like her, she is known around here as the angry black woman.”
28
176. Sometime in March 2021, in a staff meeting discussing the Husch Blackwell Report it
was stated in plaintiff's presence, the Athletics Department needed to have a Title IX policy for
“Tattletales.”
177. In 2020 and 2021 Plaintiff's coworkers expressed their concern over Ausberry’s hostile
treatment of plaintiff to the senior leadership of the athletics department, but they took no actions
and in interviews with Husch Blackwell “Football Operations employees confirmed witnessing
Ausberry hollering and screaming at plaintiff over the course of the last several years.”15
178. There were multiple reports of a lack of institutional oversight of employees being
subjected to hostile environments in LSU’s athletic Department and Board of Supervisors actions
and inactions subjected plaintiff to additional retaliation and created a hostile working
environment in the athletic department.
179. On May 5, 2021 F. King Alexander in the Baton Rouge Business Report King Alexander:
Restaurant meeting with key board members a “Monday night massacre’ stated LSU had a “racist
culture.”
180. As a direct and proximate result of defendants willful racist and discriminatory behavior
plaintiff has suffered and continue to suffer medical expenses associated with mental and physical
health treatment, inconvenience, insults, mental distress, humiliation, anxiety, emotional and
physical pain and suffering, wrongful termination, loss of employment opportunities and benefits,
loss of other economic or non-economic damages, for which she is entitled to just compensation.
181. Plaintiff is entitled to monetary compensation for violations of Constitutional Rights
against the Board of Supervisors.
COUNT XIII
Violation of Louisiana Revised Statute 15:1351 et seq.
Civil Violations of the Louisiana Racketeering Act
Miles, Segar, Ausberry, Crochet, Barton, McKenzie)
plead herein.
183. In the May 7, 2021 in The Advocate: Why dethroning top officials has not changed
culture at LSU, where ‘secrecy continues’ F. King Alexander in a meeting with Remy Starns,
Chairman-elect of the LSU Board of Supervisors, to discuss issues facing LSU stated: “Remy
29
Starns slammed his hand down on the table and said that“ All of these things will take care of
themselves if we win a national championship.”
LSU Football Team
184. LSU is a member of the Power 5 conferences that generated more than $2.9 billion in
combined revenue in fiscal year 2019.
185. In 2020 LSU was compensated $4,200,000 dollars for the football team’s victory at the
NCAA Football National Championship.
186. In 2019 the LSU football program generated $92 million in revenue and the LSU football
program in 2020 generated $50 million in profit.
187. Nationwide popularity and high dollar value television agreements have paved the way
for the construction of unprecedented college football stadiums and basketball arenas 16 and in July
2019 LSU’s Athletic Department unveiled a new $28 million locker room for the football team
complete with nap pods, a pool, a theater and performance nutrition center for athlete recovery.
LSU now ranks number seven for football facilities in the nation according to website 247 sports.
188. In 2012 LSU’s Athletic Department generated an estimated $331.6 million for local
Louisiana businesses and in 2013 the Department created $397.5 million in sales in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana.
BOS Influence over LSU Football and Basketball
189. The Louisiana State University Board of Supervisors (BOS ) approves the appointment
and all other personnel actions relating to Head Coaches and Athletic Directors and appointment
and all other personnel actions relating to Coaches other than Head Coaches with a salary of
$250,000 or above.
190. The BOS sets the General Policy on tickets, parking permits and tradition funds for
athletic events including complimentary and priority ticketing for VIPs including state officials
who are given the option to purchase the best available seats and each BOS member gets three
complimentary tickets to each game in press box seating or limited access seating.
191. The BOS Athletic Committee is referred matters of policy concerning intercollegiate
athletics and the Chairman of the Athletic Committee is the most prestigious appointment on the
BOS.
16 The Value of Amateurism, Marquette Sports Law Review (2018)
30
192. The Athletic Committee exerts significant influence over the hiring and firing of the
Director of Athletics and Head Football Coach positions and in March 2021 Alexander stated in
an Oregon State Board of Supervisors meeting, “only the Board of Supervisors at LSU can hire
and fire the football coach” and there was a great deal of interference “from the Board in
Athletics.17
193. In 2013, the year Miles was accused of sexually harassing student workers, the BOS
amended his seven year contract to increase his salary to $4.3 million of which LSU would pay
an additional $150,000 each year into an account owned and controlled by LSU and Miles could
collect funds in the account totaling $750, 000 after serving the first five years of the contract. If
Miles was fired without cause, the buyout would be $15 million, if he was terminated prior to
December 13, 2015, it would drop to $12.9 million for the contracts fourth and fifth year and $8.6
million for the sixth year and $4.3 million for the seventh. And, in addition, Miles received
millions of dollars in outside deals including a shoe contract.
194. In October 2021 Head Football Coach Ed Orgeron who was accused in a Class Action
Lawsuit of covering up violations of state law by star football players was terminated for failing
to compete for SEC and NCAA National Championships. Orgeron contract buyout was $16.9
million dollars and he is to cooperate in defending LSU from Title IX lawsuits.
Governors influence over LSU’s Football program
195. The 16-member Board of Supervisors are nominated by the Governor of the State of
Louisiana and confirmed by the Louisiana State.
196. In 2011 Governor Bobby Jindal (“Jindal”) called the President of LSU and instructed
him to “no matter what it takes” retain Miles when another university was attempting to lure him
from LSU.
197. In 2011 Jindal called the President of LSU and instructed him not to make a counteroffer
to retain athletic director Joe Alleva who was being offered another position at a competing
university.
198. In 2012 Miles campaigned for Bobby Jindal’s re-election and in November 2015 Jindal
intervened to save Miles’ job; Jindal tweeted “@LSUCoachMiles is a great coach and a better
man. He is a fantastic ambassador for our state. I hope he remains our coach.”
17 https://leadership.oregonstate.edu/trustees/meetings/board-meeting-03172021
31
Title IX capture and kill scheme to protect LSU’s Football program
199. In 2013 Alleva designated Segar as the individual in Athletic Department to whom all
Title IX Complaints were to be reported and in 2018 sent a memorandum reminding LSU Athletic
employees to report all Title IX complaints to Segar. 18
200. Vicki Crochet and Bob Barton of Taylor Porter advised the Athletic Department and LSU
on Title IX issues
201. On December 7, 2012 the OCR in Docket #06-11-6001 LSU Compliance review sent a
letter to Jenkins, Barton and Segar notifying them of OCR’s disposition of a compliance review
of LSU and on information and belief OCR on April 24, 2015 sent Alexander, Segar and Barton
the Dear Colleague Letter as responsible persons for Title IX at LSU.
202. From 2012 to present Crochet, Barton and Segar as part of their participation in the
operation and management of the enterprise, engaged in a scheme to capture Title IX complaints
filed against football coaches, star football players and senior athletic officials and conceal them
from official Title IX proceedings.
203. In March 2021 former LSU President F. King Alexander stated LSU’s Athletic
Department handled Title IX complaints “differently” and were “siloing maybe 6 or 7 percent” of
all Title IX complaints. 19
LSU Basketball Program
204. On information and belief, on September 26, 2017 the FBI arrested ten people, including
four college basketball assistant coaches, as part of an investigation into bribes (pay for play) and
other corruption that routinely occur in college athletics and one year later, on October 24, 2018,
a jury convicted three of those arrested. LSU’s men’s basketball coach Will Wade (Wade) was
implicated in the sweeping probe of college basketball corruption and a transcript of a wiretapped
conversation that included Wade was read aloud at the first of two federal trials in
October 2018. 20
205. On information and belief in March 2019 former Athletic Director Joe Alleva suspended
Wade for his involvement in a FBI sting. The LSU Board of Supervisors ordered Alleva to
reinstate Wade and they subsequently fired Alleva and hired current Athletic Director Scott
18 See Exhibit 4 Alleva 2018 Memorandum attached to Original Complaint

19 https://leadership.oregonstate.edu/trustees/meetings/board-meeting-03172021
20 https://www.si.com/college/2021/03/25/will-wade-lsu-basketball-fbi-scandal-investigation
32
Woodward in order to protect Wade employment in violation of LSU By-laws and Southern
Association of Colleges and Schools Rule 5.2 (b)
206. On information and belief When LSU officials learned LSU’s women’s basketball Coach
Pokey Chatman was having a consensual sexual relationship with one of her players, the school
gave her two hours to resign.
207. On March 7, 2022 the NCAA issued a Notice of Allegations to LSU in which it alleged
that from February 2012 to June 2020 LSU “failed to exercise institutional control and monitor
the conduct and administration of its football and men’s basketball programs.” See Notice of
Allegations attached as Exhibit 1.
208. On March 11, 2022 LSU fired Wade after receiving Notice of Allegation from NCAA.
209. On information and belief from 2012 to 2022 LSU Football and Basketball program has
been cited for eight (8) different Level 1 NCAA violations.
Frank Wilson
210. On March 3, 2022 USA Today published a story that three victims including Sharon Lewis
alleged that current Associate Head Football Coach Frank Wilson sexually assaulted and sexually
harassed them and they provided USA Today with contemporaneous text messages discussing
their concerns about Wilson conduct. 21
211. On March 23, 2022 LSU Head Football Coach Brian Kelley (Kelley) at a press conference
was asked the status of Frank Wilson in light of the allegations of sexual assault and harassment
against him and Kelley responded “We know of no lawsuit that has been filed regarding those
allegations that were made. His status here is unchanged, and we consider those as being
egregious and simply allegations that were unfounded. It does not affect Frank Wilson and the
person that we know. We stand behind him firmly as a member of our staff.” 22
212. On reason and belief Frank Wilson is the “member of the institution football staff” the
NCAA in its Notice of Allegation identified as having in January 2012 “connected the parents of
a then football student-athlete with John Paul Funes, a representative of the institution athletic
21 https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2022/03/03/lsu-whistleblower-sharon-lewis-
claims-coach-frank-wilson-sexually-harassed-her/9347184002/;
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_a6f9d096-9b46-11ec-bbc9-371a4bbf3e63.html
22 https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/sports/lsu/article_820ac8d6-aad6-11ec-9fb7-
7795e620a4c1.html
33
interest , to obtain employment in Baton Rouge because, they were relocating to the area” 23
213. On February 2, 2021 U.S. Department of Education notified LSU that it was conducting
an off-site campus crime program review of the University and issued a written request for access
to the records of staff, and students of LSU to evaluate LSU’s compliance with the Jeanne Clery
Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus.
214. Sometime in April 2021, after the release of the Hush Blackwell Report, the Office the
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) opened a directed investigation to examine whether the Louisiana
State University is in compliance with the requirements of Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 (Title IX) with regard to the university’s response to student complaints of sexual assault
and harassment. OCR’s investigation is examining the university’s handling of student complaints
of sexual assault and harassment from the 2018-2019 academic year to present.”
215. Plaintiff herein asserts her right to a private cause of action under LSA R.S. 15:1356(E).
216. Garrett “Hank” Danos, Robert “Bobby” Yarborough, Stanley Jacobs, James Williams,
Mary Leach Werner, Joe Alleva, William Jenkins, F. King Alexander, Scott Woodward, Les
Miles, Miriam Segar, Verge Ausberry, Shelby McKenzie, Vicki Crochet, Bob Barton, Robert
Dampf, Remy Voisin Starns and the Board of Supervisors Louisiana State University is a RICO
enterprise within the meaning of LSA R.S. 15:1532 (B) that is engaged in a continuing pattern of
racketeering.
217. The associate in-fact enterprise is separate and distinct from Louisiana State University.
218. Garrett “Hank” Danos, on information and belief at various material times served as
Chairman of the Board of Supervisors and served on the Athletic Committee and in such capacity
in such capacity participated in the operation and management of the enterprise’s affairs.
219. Robert “Bobby” Yarborough, on information and belief at various material times served
as Chairman of the Board of Supervisors and served on the Athletic Committee and in such
capacity in such capacity participated in the operation and management of the enterprise’s affairs.
220. Stanley Jacobs, on information and belief at various material times served as Chairman
of the Athletics Committee for the Board of Supervisors and in such capacity in such capacity
participated in the operation and management of the enterprise’s affairs.
23 See Exhibit 1 attached herein Allegations 1 and 11(a)
34
221. James Williams on information and belief at various material times served as Chairman
of the Board of Supervisors and Chairman of the Athletic Committee and in such capacity in such
capacity participated in the operation and management of the enterprise’s affairs.
222. Mary Leach Werner on information and belief at various material times served as
Chairman of the Board of Supervisors and Chairman of the Athletic Committee and in such
capacity in such capacity participated in the operation and management of the enterprise’s affairs.
223. Robert Dampf on information and belief at various material times served as a member of
the Board of Supervisors and in such capacity in such capacity participated in the operation and
management of the enterprise’s affairs.
224. Remy Voisin Starns on information and belief at various material times served as a
member of the Board of Supervisors and in such capacity in such capacity participated in the
operation and management of the enterprise’s affairs.
225. William Jenkins on information and belief at various material times served as Chancellor
of LSU Baton Rouge Campus and President of the LSU System and in such capacity in such
capacity participated in the operation and management of the enterprise’s affairs.
226. F. King Alexander on information and belief at various material times served as
Chancellor of LSU’s Baton Rouge Campus and President of the LSU System and in such capacity
in such capacity participated in the operation and management of the enterprise’s affairs.
227. Joe Alleva on information and belief at various material times served as the Vice-
Chancellor and Director of Athletics and in such capacity in such capacity participated in the
operation and management of the enterprise’s affairs.
228. Scott Woodward on information and belief at various material times served as the Director
of Athletics and in such capacity in such capacity participated in the operation and management
of the enterprise’s affairs.
229. Les Miles on information and belief at various material times served as Head Football
Coach at LSU and in such capacity directly and through his attorneys Peter Ginsberg and A.
Edward Hardin, Jr., participated in the operation and management of the enterprise’s affairs.
230. Miriam Segar on information and belief at various material times served as the Associate
Athletics Director and Senior Women’s Administrator and Title IX Coordinator in the LSU
Athletic Department and in such capacity participated in the operation and management of the
35
enterprise’s affairs.
231. Verge Ausberry on information and belief at various material times served as Associate
Athletics Director, the Executive Deputy Athletics Director and Executive Director of External
Relations and in such capacity participated in the operation and management of the enterprise’s
affairs.
232. Shelby McKenzie on information and belief at various material times served as LSU's in-
house legal counsel and partner at Taylor Porter and advised LSU on Title IX and legal matters
and in such capacity participated in the operation and management of the enterprise’s affairs.
233. Vicki Crochet, on information and belief at various material times advised LSU Athletic
Department on Title IX and legal matters and in such capacity participated in the operation and
234. Bob Barton, on information and belief at various material times advised LSU Athletic
Department on Title IX and legal matters and in such capacity participated in the operation and
235. The Board of Supervisors on information and belief at various material times was the
governing authority of the LSU system and in such capacity participated in the conduct of the
enterprise’s affairs.
236. This petition alleges, inter alia, violations of the Louisiana Racketeering Act
("RICO"), LSA R.S. 15:1351 et seq., and is brought by plaintiff in connection with a series of
schemes devised, conducted and/or participated in by the individual defendants (sometimes
referred to as the ''defendant persons" or “RICO Defendants” or “enterprise”), each of whom
participated in the enterprise. The individual defendant persons conducted or participated, directly
or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering,
that damaged plaintiff.
237. During the relevant times set forth herein, the individual defendants conspired with one
another to engage in a pattern of racketeering activities to damage plaintiff or any employee
who complained of or reported their unlawful activity, the multifarious racketeering activities
through which the broad objectives of the individual defendants were carried out through a
pattern of racketeering and the use of other instrumentalities that consisted of a complex
pattern of individual transactions and groups of transactions. It was part of the scheme to
36
shield LSU’s Athletics employees and football players from complaints or reports of violations
of Intentional Discrimination in Employment (LSA R.S. 23:332), Sexual Battery (LSA R.S. 14:43.1
& 14:43.1.1), Battery of a Dating Partner (LSA R.S. 14:34.9), Aggravated Assault upon a Dating
Partner (LSA R.S. 14:34.9.1) Simple Battery (LSA R.S. 14:35) and Unlawful Communications
(LSA R.S. 14:285), sexual misconduct and sexual harassment complaints and investigations
initiated by plaintiff, employees, students, faculty and others that the defendants would and did
agree to conspire together with the others to devise and participate in a plan of deceit, deception
and whereby they would and did abuse their positions of trust and fiduciary relationships with the
plaintiff, students, employees, faculty and others; they would and did abuse the discretion
granted to them and breached their obligations of loyalty and fidelity and their duty to act
honestly and faithfully in the best interests of the plaintiff, employees, students, faculty and
others, and they would and did use false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises
calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and due care and made material non-
disclosures and concealments of facts and information, all so as to unlawfully, intentionally and
with intent to defraud, that is, knowingly and with specific intent to deceive in order to cause
financial gain for themselves and pursue greater profits.
238. In carrying out the scheme to conceal violations of Intentional Discrimination In
Employment (LSA R.S. 23:332), Sexual Battery (LSA R.S. 14:43.1 & 14:43.1.1), Battery of a
Dating Partner (LSA R.S. 14:34.9), Simple Battery (LSA R.S. 14:35), Unlawful Communications
(LSA R.S. 14:285) and control of the LSU Football program, the individual defendants
engaged, inter alia, in conduct in violation or attempted violation of the following laws:
a. Extortion (LSA R.S. 14:66);

b. Public Bribery (LSA R.S. 14:118);
c. Corrupt Influencing (LSA R.S. 14:120);
d. Public Intimidation and Retaliation (LSA R.S. 14:122);
e. Injuring Public Records (LSA R.S. 14:132);
f. Filing or Maintaining False Public Records (LSA R.S. 133);
g. Abuse of Office (LSA R.S. 134.3); and
h. Public Payroll Fraud (LSA R.S. 14:138)
239. The enterprise, since May 15, 2013 to April 2021, has controlled the day to day operations
of the LSU Athletics Department, including the hiring and firing of personnel, and there has
been numerous and ongoing violations of Intentional Discrimination In Employment (LSA
37
R.S. 23:332), Sexual Battery (LSA R.S. 43.1 & 43.1.1), Battery of a Dating Partner (LSA R.S.
14:34.9), Simple Battery (LSA R.S.14:35) and Unlawful Communications (LSA R.S. 14:285)
and the enterprise has directed the reports of those investigations be concealed and/or destroyed
in order to shield them from public document requests and state oversight. 24
240. The predicate acts involved in the following scheme include, inter alia, violations of LSA
R.S. 14:120, LSA R.S. 14:132, LSA R.S. 14:133 and LSA R.S. 14:134.3.
A. SCHEMES
Scheme 1: Scheme to Conceal The Miles Report
from Public Document Request
plead herein.
242. Vicki Crochet and Robert Barton were at all material times during the scheme to
conceal the Miles Report from public documents request were conducting an independent
investigation in an official Title IX proceeding as directed by the Department of Education.
243. Shelby McKenzie at all material times during the scheme to conceal the Miles Report
served a dual role as LSU’s General Counsel and a partner at Taylor Porter.
244. Segar at all material times during the scheme to conceal the Miles Investigation was the
official Title IX Coordinator in LSU’s Athletic Department as directed by the Department of
Education.
245. In 2012 and 2013 two student workers complained to plaintiff Miles had sexually
harassed them and Student 1 stated to plaintiff and another Athletics department staff member
Miles got on top of her in his office on his couch. Plaintiff reported students' complaints to Segar
and Ausberry and subsequently Alleva reported students’ complaints to LSU President William
Jenkins.
246. McKenzie with Jenkins’ full knowledge and consent, designated his law partners Crochet
and Barton to conduct an independent Title IX investigation of Miles, which violated LSU's Title
IX and Sexual Misconduct Policy that states “Any investigation or complaints involving student
athletes or Athletics Personnel shall be handled and/or investigated by the LSU Title IX
Coordinator.”
247. The Husch Blackwell Report stated about Crochet and Barton’s designation to conduct
38
an independent Title IX investigation of Miles:
“ This designation raises conflicts of interest concerns as it is not clear how the
firm could have been neutral in the investigation. There was also no provision in the
applicable Title IX policy for these sorts of investigations to be outsourced to third
parties.”25
248. Barton and Crochet coordinated the Title IX investigation of Miles with Miriam Segar
and issued a written report (herein after referred to as the “Miles Report” 26) that concluded:
a. “Student 1” was employed in Football Operations
b. Student 1 reported she had a phone call and other reactions with Les Miles that made
her uncomfortable.
c. Miles had Student 1 baby sit for him, which is a violation of LSU policy.
d. Student 1 reported on one occasion when she was babysitting Miles’ children, he ended
up staying with the children instead and asked to join them when they went to a movie.
e. Student 1 reported she stayed at Miles’ apartment when she had some problems with
her apartment.
f. Student 1 reported a window was broken in Les Miles’ apartment and Miles made her
uncomfortable when he asked her to accompany him to check on the window repair.
g. “Student 2” was hired to work in recruiting and a couple of days after she began to
receive Facebook messages from Miles.
h. In March 2013 Student 2 had a meeting with Miles in his office regarding her future
plans and no one else was in the office.
i. Miles told Student 2 she could work for him on his personal business when she
graduated.
j. Miles told Student 2 to enter her phone number but to use an alias and he would do the
same with her number.
k. Miles initiated text messages with Student 2.
l. Student 2 met Miles off campus; got in his vehicle; and the two of them rode around.
m. Miles suggested they go to a hotel together and mentioned his condo as another meeting
place.
n. Miles drove Student 2 behind the Athletics Complex, parked the car, engaged in a sex
act and kissed her twice.
o. In 2012 Miles participated in interviewing female student employees
p. Miles made it clear he wanted female student workers to be attractive and blonde.
q. Miles told senior athletic supervisors female students who were not attractive and
blonde were to be given fewer hours or terminated.
249. In the Miles Report Miles’ name appears as ‘XXX” in order to hide his identity and
sections of the report stating Miles engaged in explicit sex acts with Student 2 were blacked out to

39
shield Miles from a possible criminal investigation for a sex crime.
250. Plaintiff reported to supervisors that a student worker had complained to her that Miles
had gotten on top of her in his office and Crochet and Barton failed to include this information in
their final report.
251. On information and belief in order to protect Miles from reports from criminal
investigations Crochet and Barton intentionally and falsely concluded in the Miles Report Miles
had not violated Title IX, state criminal statutes or the moral clause in his $30 million employment
contract and violated LSA R.S. 14:133.
252. On May 15, 2013 Danos (Chairman of the Board of Supervisors), Yarborough (Board
Chairman Elect), Jacobs (Chairman of the Board – Athletic Committee), McKenzie (LSU In-
House Legal Counsel and Partner at Taylor Porter), Alleva (Vice-Chancellor and Director of
Athletics), Segar (Senior Associate A.D./Senior Woman Administrator and Athletic Title IX
Coordinator), Crochet ( Partner at Taylor Porter and Title IX investigator ) and Barton (Managing
Partner Taylor Porter and Title IX investigator) individually and knowingly agreed to conceal the
Miles Report in Crochet and Barton’s law offices off campus away from public documents
request.27
253. Barton, Crochet, McKenzie, Miles, Danos, Yarborough, Jacobs, Jenkins, Alleva and
Segar individually and knowingly violated LSA R.S. 14:132 and LSA R.S. 14:133.
254. Danos, Yarborough, Jacobs, Jenkins, Alleva and Segar individually and knowingly
violated LSA R.S. 14:134.3 and LSA R.S. 14:120.
255. On April 29, 2013 Miles, Ginsberg, Hardin, Barton, Crochet and Alleva agreed to conceal
the Miles Report in Ginsberg, Hardin, Barton and Crochet’s offices off campus away from public
documents request.28
256. Ginsberg, Hardin, Crochet and Barton concealed the Miles Report in their law offices
from 2013 to 2021, until they were forced to release it by the court. 29
257. Ginsberg, Hardin, Barton, Crochet and Alleva each individually knowingly violated LSA
R.S. 14:132 and LSA R.S. 14:133
258. Alleva individually knowingly violated LSA R.S. 14:134.3 and LSA R.S. 14:120.

28 Id.
29 Kenny Jacoby v. Galligan, Suit No. 703746, 19th JDC Parish of East Baton Rouge
40
Board of Supervisors
259. On August 5, 2020 USA Today submitted a public documents request for the Campus
Police report on Darrius Guice to Interim President Thomas Galligan (Galligan), the custodian of
records for LSU in accordance with La. R.S. 44:32 and the Board of Supervisors refused to
produce the police report. The state court found LSU “was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious
in its refusal and delay and the redacted manner in which the documents were produced. 30
260. On December 14, 2020 USA Today submitted a public documents request for the Miles
Report to Interim President Thomas Galligan (Galligan), the custodian of records for LSU in
accordance with La. R.S. 44:32 and on January 14, 2021 LSU responded that the Miles Report
was not subject to public documents request and on January 19, 2021 USA Today filed a writ of
mandamus against LSU and Galligan petitioning they be ordered to comply with La. R.S. 44:32
and produce the Miles Report. 31
261. On information and belief the full BOS directed Crochet and Barton to oppose USA
Today’s writ of mandamus and directed Crochet and Barton to notify Ginsberg and Hardin per
the April 29, 2013 agreement between Ginsberg, Hardin, Barton, Crochet and Alleva and on
February 4, 2021 Ginsberg on behalf of Miles filed a petition to intervene in Kenny Jacoby v.
Galligan, opposing USA Today’s public documents request in furtherance of the scheme to
conceal the Miles Report from public document request.
262. The full Board of Supervisors, Miles, Crochet and Barton knowingly violated of LSA R.S.
14:132 and LSA R.S. 14:133.
263. The full Board of Supervisors individually and knowingly violated LSA R.S. 14:134.3
and LSA R.S. 14:120.
264. Jacobs, in a March 9, 2021, Sports Illustrated Article “Former LSU Board Member Goes
Inside Decision to Keep Les Miles” stated he and his co-conspirators met “multiple times” in face-
to-face meetings” and had “countless phone calls” to discuss the matter and deliberate on Miles’
future and that “Attorneys along with Jenkins” demanded he and other board members keep the
Miles Investigation secret.
30 See Kenny Jacoby & S.B. v. Thomas Galligan et al C-700649 21/D, 19th JDC Parish of East Baton Rouge
31 Kenny Jacoby v. Galligan, Suit No. 703746
41
265. Jenkins, Danos, Yarborough and Jacobs violated LSU By-Law 9 (A) (1) that requires“ any
matter having a significant long-term impact directly and indirectly” on any campus required the
full board approval.
266. In March 2021 BOS member Lee Mallet who was also a BOS member in 2013 stated
about the concealment of the Miles Title IX Investigation: “I am tired of being blamed for a
situation over which I had no control and wasn’t even told about.” 32
267. In April 2021 the Board of Supervisors passed a resolution expressing disapproval of
Jacobs, Yarborough and Danos for their participation in the concealment of the Miles Title IX
Investigation.
268. The Husch Blackwell Report concluded the Miles Investigation was not handled “in a
manner consistent with then-existing legal guidance, well recognized best practices, and
institutional policy.”33
269. The investigation of Miles’ sexual misconduct from 2013 to 2021 has never been reported
to LSU Human Resource Department in violation of LSU policies.
270. It was not until March 2021 when plaintiff read in The Advocate the Miles Report, Taylor
Billing Records that Barton, Crochet, McKenzie, Miles, Danos, Yarborough, Jacobs, Jenkins,
Alleva and Segar had conspired to conceal the Miles Report from public documents request to
protect Miles’ employment and to target plaintiff by denying her pay raises, bonuses and
promotions in retaliation for her reporting Miles’ sexual misconduct.
R.S. 14:118 and LSA R.S. 14:120.
Scheme 2: Scheme To Tamper With A Witness
plead herein.
273. Crochet and Barton at all material times during the scheme to tamper with a witness were
conducting an independent investigation as part of an official Title IX proceeding as directed by
the Department of Education.
274. Segar at all material times during the scheme to tamper with a witness was the official
32 https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/education/article_50b5f770-97df-11eb-950f-
3f13d1718c43.html
42
Title IX Coordinator in LSU’s Athletic Department, the Miles Investigation as directed by the
Department of Education.
Change student grade
275. May 5, 2013, Crochet and Segar called Human Resources Director A.G. Monaco
(“Monaco”) and asked him to help convince a professor to let the student who filed a Title IX
complaint against Miles, retake a failed quiz to corruptly dissuade student from testifying in Title
IX proceedings against Miles and Crochet told Monaco he could not speak a word of their
conversation, but Monaco refused to keep the conversation a secret or instruct the professor to
rescind the failing grade and Monaco reported Crochet’s phone call to LSU Provost Stuart Bell
and LSU Vice President Robert Kuhn and the three of them agreed to inform William Jenkins, but
Jenkins took no actions and in June 2013 Monaco informed new President F. King Alexander
about Crochet’s call, but Alexander took no actions.
276. Crochet, Segar, Jenkins and Alexander each individually knowingly violated LSA R.S.
14:118 and LSA R.S. 14:120.
Meeting in New Orleans
277. On information and belief on or about July 1, 2013 Ginsberg, Complainant Student
attorney travelled to New Orleans to meet Vicki Crochet and Bob Barton to discuss the exchange
of money with student to corruptly dissuade student from bringing a criminal complaint against
Miles and in furtherance of the scheme to tamper with a witness Crochet, Barton and Miles each
individually knowingly violated LSA R.S. 14:118 and LSA R.S. 14:120.
Segar had multiple meetings, phone calls and emails with Miles' legal counsel, the student's family
and legal counsel to discuss the exchange of money to dissuade her from filing a criminal
complaint against Miles and on information and belief Miles and student reached a private
settlement in 2013.
279. On information and belief sometime in 2013 Miles and student who filed a complaint
against Miles exchanged money to dissuade her from brining criminal charges against Miles.
280. On February 24, 2021 LSU Vice-President of Communications Jim Sabourin stated about
the exchange of money between Miles and student “we have heard about settlement, but LSU is
43
not a party to it and we have not seen it. 34
Segar each individually and knowingly violated LSA R.S. 14:118 and LSA R.S. 14:120.
282. It was not until February and March 2021 when plaintiff read in The Advocate the Miles
Report, Taylor Billing Records, Monaco’s account of Crochet and Segar contacting him to
pressure a professor to allow a student who complained of sexual harassment against Miles to
retake an exam and that Miles had reached a private settlement with a student who accused him of
sexual harassment that she realized Barton, Crochet, McKenzie, Miles, Danos, Yarborough,
Jacobs, Jenkins, Alleva and Segar had conspired to tamper with a witness to protect Miles’
employment and to target plaintiff’s property interest in her employment and business by denying
her pay raises, bonuses and promotions in retaliation for her reporting Miles’ sexual misconduct.
R.S. 14:118, LSA R.S. 14:120. LSA R.S. 14:132, LSA R.S. 14:133, LSA R.S. 14:134.3 and LSA
R.S. 14:138.
Scheme 3: Scheme to Defraud the State of Louisiana
plead herein.
285. Crochet and Barton were at all material times during the scheme to defraud LSU
286. Shelby McKenzie at all material times during the scheme to defraud LSU served a dual
role as LSU’s General Counsel and a partner at Taylor Porter.
287. In furtherance of the conspiracy to conceal the Miles Investigation from the LSU Board
of Supervisors Crochet and Barton submitted invoices by United States Mail to LSU for eighty
($80,000.00) thousand dollars which included the following material omissions:
(1) Barton and Crochet conducted a Title IX investigation of Miles for sexual misconduct
and concealed it the full BOS;
(2) Barton and Crochet concealed the Miles Report in their offices from public
34See https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/sports/lsu/article_596f5cfe-7646-11eb-8cb0-
733b53e58af8.html
44
documents request; and
(3) Barton, Crochet and McKenzie facilitated an exchange of money between Miles and
complainant student to dissuade her from filing a criminal complaint against Miles.
288. On information and belief McKenzie, in his dual role as LSU’s General Legal Counsel
and a partner at Taylor Porter with the full knowledge and consent of Jenkins, approved the
fraudulent invoices for payment by LSU.
289. LSU relied on Crochet, Barton, McKenzie and Jenkins’ misrepresentation that Crochet
and Barton conducted legitimate legal work on behalf of LSU.
290. The Board of Supervisors agreed to pay Taylor Porter eighty ($80,000.00) thousand
dollars for the fraudulent investigation of Miles. 35
291. On information and belief LSU in April 2021 LSU fired Taylor Porter after 80 years of
representation for its role in directing a fraudulent investigation of Miles and concealing the written
report of the investigation in its offices and ongoing concealment and their position in operation
and control of the criminal enterprise.
292. Barton, Crochet, McKenzie and Jenkins individually knowingly violated LSA R.S. 14:118
and LSA R.S. 14:120.
Billing Records, she realized Barton, Crochet, McKenzie and Jenkins, as part of the scheme to
cover up the Miles Title IX investigation, Barton, Crochet, McKenzie and Jenkins conspired to
defraud LSU out of eighty-thousand dollars in furtherance of the scheme to conceal the Miles
Investigation and Miles Report to protect Miles’ employment and to target plaintiff’s property
interest in her employment and business by denying her pay raises, bonuses and promotions in
retaliation for her reporting Miles’ sexual misconduct.
R.S. 14:118, LSA R.S. 14:120, LSA R.S. 14:134.3 and LSA R.S. 14:138.
Scheme 5: Ongoing Scheme to Control LSU Football Program
plead herein.
45
Woodward and Ausberry
296. On or about April 16, 2019 Chairman of LSU Board Of Supervisors James Williams
(Williams), Chairman of the Athletic Committee Mary Leach Werner (Werner), Chairman-elect
of the LSU Board of Supervisors Robert Dampf (Dampf) and Remy Voisin Starns (Starns) met
LSU President F. King Alexander in a backroom at Juban's Creole Restaurant in Baton Rouge
and directed him to fire Athletic Director Joe Alleva and hire Texas A&M Athletic Director Scott
Woodward.36
297. At the meeting Williams wrote on a cocktail napkin the amount of Woodward's salary,
handed it to Alexander and told him “This is what we’re paying our new athletic director” and
Williams then directed Alexander to “take care of Verge” and the next day Alexander met with
Alleva and told him the “board leadership has hired a new athletic director and I’ve got to fire
you.”
298. Before LSU announced Alleva’s firing LSU Tiger Athletic Founder Richard Lipsey
confirmed to the USA Today Network Alleva had been terminated when he stated “Yes it’s done.
I expect an official announcement from LSU either later today or Thursday morning.”
299. On April 17, 2019 LSU announced Woodward was replacing Alleva as Athletic Director
and on the same day Jacobs stated in The Daily Advertiser about Alleva’s firing “I tried to take
him out years ago, but I swung and missed. And now it looks like the board and administration
have finally got it. I tried fervently.”.
300. On May 6, 2019 the BOS, without conducting a national search or interviewing any other
candidate, the BOS hired Woodward and awarded him a six-year, $7.95 million employment
contract.
301. Alexander stated the “backroom four” ordered him to protect and promote Ausberry and
less than three weeks after Woodward was hired, Ausberry was promoted to Executive Athletic
Director and his salary increased from $250,000 to $500,000 annually. 37
302. Williams, Werner, Dampf, Starns, Woodward and Ausberry violated the Southern
36 https://www.chronicle.com/article/in-a-back-room-lsus-board-pushed-for-a-sports-shake-
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/sports/lsu/article_0e1d6916-add8-11eb-8fa2-
a34ad4d2c61f.html; https://www.businessreport.com/business/king-alexander-restaurant-meeting-with-
key-board-members-a-monday-night-massacre; https://www.wrkf.org/show/talk-louisiana/2021-05-
05/wednesday-may-5th-f-king-alexander
37 https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/sports/lsu/article_0e1d6916-add8-11eb-8fa2-
a34ad4d2c61f.html
46
Association of Colleges and Schools Rule 5.2 (b) that states the university’s chief executive “has
ultimate responsibility for and exercise appropriate control over the institution’s intercollegiate
athletic program.”
303. On May 5, 2021 F. King Alexander in the Baton Rouge Business Report King Alexander:
Restaurant meeting with key board members a “Monday night massacre’ speaking about the April
16, 2019 meeting at Juban’s stated:
It violates university policy, accreditation standards, to have a small number of board
members-without others knowing-that they had worked out a deal and…were paying him
substantially more than we were paying Alleva…I have never experienced anything like it
in 20 years as a public university president. To replace an athletic director without myself
or anyone on my staff knowing about it is quite an extraordinary intrusion into university
governance and shared governance.”
304. On March 26, 2021 Dampf and Leach testified under oath at the Louisiana Select Senate
Committee on Women and Children and Leach was questioned about the April 2019 Juban’s
meeting and Dampf, who was sitting next to Werner, failed to inform the Committee he was in
attendance at the “backroom” meeting at Juban’s and gave testimony that suggested he had little
or no interest in LSU Athletics. 38
305. On information and belief Williams, Werner, Dampf and Starns in furtherance of the
scheme to control LSU’s Athletic program promoted Ausberry and doubled his salary in order to
appease Ausberry for not being promoted into the Athletic Director job as he had been promised
and to ensure his continued participation in the operation and management of the criminal
enterprise.
306. On information and belief in April 2019 Williams, Werner, Dampf, Starns, Woodward
and Ausberry knew of the associate in-fact enterprise’ common plan to retaliate against witnesses
to intimidate them from testifying in official Title IX proceedings
307. On information and belief Williams, Werner, Dampf, Starns, Woodward and Ausberry in
April 2019 were aware of the associate in-fact enterprise’ common plan to control LSU’s lucrative
Football program for the individual RICO Defendants personal gain in legal fees, salaries,
38 See https://senate.la.gov/s_video/videoarchive.asp?v=senate/2021/03/032621SCWC_0
47
awarding concession contracts to their associates and to gain political favor by awarding political
and business leaders with tickets to LSU’s football games.
Woodward and Ausberry targeted plaintiff’s employment
308. From 2019 to present Woodward and Ausberry continued the enterprise’s retaliation
against plaintiff denying her pay raises, bonuses and promotions.
309. In November of 2020 plaintiff went to Ausberry to complain about repeatedly being
denied promotions and Ausberry told plaintiff she was not being promoted because “you use the
word Title IX too much and people are afraid of you” and told plaintiff you can complain to Scott
Woodward but “he is my boy.”
being promoted and Ausberry replied “You will never be promoted because you file Title IX
complaints. You even filed one against me” and told plaintiff you can complain to Scott Woodward
but “he is my boy.”
311. From 2019 to present Scott Woodward has refused to meet with plaintiff to discuss the
ongoing retaliation she has been subjected to from Auberry and others.
312. In furtherance of the scheme to control the LSU Football program and to injure Plaintiff,
Williams, Werner, Dampf, Starns, Woodward, Alexander and Ausberry each individually
knowingly violated, LSA R.S. 14:118, LSA R.S. 14:120, LSA R.S. 14:134.3 and LSA R.S. 14:138.
313. It was not until February and March 2021 when plaintiff read in Chronicle of Higher
Education that Williams, Werner, Dampf, Starns, Woodward and Ausberry in furtherance to the
scheme to control LSU’s lucrative Football program had conspired to terminate Alleva, hire
Woodward and promote Ausberry was a part of the enterprise common scheme to continue to
injure Plaintiff target denying her pay raises, bonuses, and promotions in retaliation for her
reporting sexual misconduct and violation of state laws in LSU’s Athletic Department.
314. Plaintiff’s employment has been injured and interfered with by predicate acts, inter alia,
physical pain and suffering, loss of employment opportunities and benefits, loss of other economic
or non-economic damages, for which she is entitled to just compensation.
315. The predicate acts injured plaintiff’s business and property include, inter alia, violations
48
of LSA R.S. 14:120, LSA R.S. 14:122, LSA R.S. 14:132, LSA R.S. 14:133 and LSA R.S. 14:134.3.
Scheme 6: Scheme to Damage Sharon Lewis
plead herein.
317. Segar at all material times was the official Title IX Coordinator in LSU’s Athletic
Department as directed by the Department of Education guidelines.
318. Despite being the only employee in LSU’s Athletic Department to report Title IX
violations, plaintiff is the only athletic employee whom a PM-73 investigation has been opened
against.
Lewis reported reported violations of state law
319. From 2011 to present plaintiff is the only employee in LSU’s Athletic Department who
has reported Title IX complaints and violations of state law and the RICO Defendants targeted
her business and employment in retaliation.
320. Segar confirmed to Husch Blackwell plaintiff reported Miles’ sexual misconduct and a
Title IX complaint with her for retaliation and other inappropriate treatment by Athletic officials
including a specific complaint against Ausberry.39
321. After plaintiff filed Title IX complaints against Miles and Ausberry, Alleva refused to
meet with plaintiff to address her complaint that Miles, Ausberry and others were retaliating
against her and Alleva denied plaintiff pay raises, bonuses and promotions from 2013 to 2019.
322. Sometime in 2015, plaintiff filed a Title IX complaint to Miriam Segar against Verge
Ausberry who was targeting her for intimidation, verbal harassment, emotional abuse, belittling
and open humiliation in retaliation for brining Title IX complaints against Miles and others and
Segar took no action in violation of Title IX .
323. Sometime in 2017, Joe Alleva refused to send plaintiff to an NFL meeting as a
representative of LSU and when she asked to meet with him, he included Ausberry and Segar in
order to intimidate plaintiff from bringing anymore complaints against Ausberry and others for
retaliation.
324. From 2019 to present Woodward refused to meet with plaintiff to address her complaint
Ausberry was verbally harassing and intimidating her for bringing Title IX complaints and
49
violations of state law against him and Woodward denied plaintiff pay raises, bonuses and
promotions.
325. In November of 2020 plaintiff went to Ausberry to complain about repeatedly being
denied a promotion and Ausberry told plaintiff she was not being promoted because “you use the
word Title IX too much and people are afraid of you.”
being promoted and Ausberry screamed at plaintiff “You will never be promoted because you file
Title IX complaints. You even filed one against me.” At both meetings Ausberry told plaintiff you
can complain to Scott Woodward but “he is my boy.”
Physical threats and intimidation
327. Sometime in 2013, Miles threatened to punch plaintiff “in her motherfucking mouth” in
retaliation for plaintiff reporting that Miles had violated state law.
328. Football operation employees confirmed to Husch Blackwell they witnessed Ausberry
‘hollering’ and ‘screaming’ at Lewis over the last several years.40
329. Ausberry from 2012 to 2021 verbally abused and intimidated plaintiff for bringing a Title
IX complaint and reporting violations of state law.
330. Miles and Ausberry knowingly used threats, intimidation to induce plaintiff from
reporting violations of state law in violation of LSA R.S. 14:122.
Fraudulent PM-73 Investigation of Lewis
331. On October 1, 2018 Segar and Ausberry falsely reported to LSU’s Title IX office
plaintiff was aware LSU football player Drake Davis assaulted his girlfriend and did not report it
to the Title IX office, although they knew she was instructed by Athletic Director Alleva and
Ausberry that all Title IX complaints in the Athletic Department were to be directed to Segar.
332. As a result of Ausberry and Segar’s false allegations, LSU’s Title IX office opened up a
PM-73 investigation against plaintiff and during the Title IX investigation Jeffrey Scott, Title IX
Lead Investigator, intentionally failed to interview multiple material witnesses plaintiff named
and determined Miriam Segar and Verge Ausberry were the only two “material observers” that
warranted testifying in the investigation. 41

50
333. Scott knowingly issued a false report that concluded plaintiff failed to follow the
mandatory Title IX reporting requirements even though plaintiff identified two witnesses who saw
her report the matter to Segar and neither witness was interviewed by Scott.
334. Plaintiff appealed Scott’s decision to the Title IX Coordinator Stewart who relied on
Scott, Segar and Ausberry’s material omissions and on January 19, 2019 she denied her appeal on
the basis there was no evidence plaintiff made a Title IX complaint. 42
335. Plaintiff's appeal included detailed accounts of abuse by Ausberry, but the Title IX office
did not open a Title IX investigation of Ausberry.
336. Human Resources determined Scott’s investigation was fraudulent and in consultation
with LSU’s in-house attorney communicated to plaintiff the discipline was removed “from the
file,” however the PM-73 investigation remains in plaintiff's personnel file to intentionally damage
plaintiff's property interest in her employment and business.
337. Interim LSU President Thomas Galligan on March 10, 2021 testified under oath at the
Louisiana Senate Select Committee on Women and Children Segar and Ausberry “did not tell the
truth” about their involvement concealing Title IX violations in the Athletic Department. 43
338. In March 2021, after the Husch Blackwell Report was released Ausberry was suspended
for 30 days and Segar was suspended for 21 days for their failures to properly report and investigate
allegations of sexual misconduct and domestic violence at LSU and, in April 2021 Ausberry was
removed from attending LSU’s football games for his role in the Athletics Department's failure to
investigate sexual misconduct and domestic violence at LSU.
339. Segar and Ausberry remain employed at LSU.
340. It was not until February and March 2021 the release of the Husch Blackwell Report, the
Miles Report and Taylor Porter Billing Records the enterprise had targeted her property interest
in her employment and business by denying her pay raises, bonuses and promotions in retaliation
for her reporting violations of state law by Athletic Officials and LSU Football players.
341. Plaintiff’s employment has been injured and interfered with by predicate acts, inter alia,
42 Id.
43 https://senate.la.gov/s_video/videoarchive.asp?v=senate/2021/03/031021SCWC_0;
51
physical pain and suffering, loss of employment opportunities and benefits, loss of other economic
or non-economic damages, for which she is entitled to just compensation.
Count 1: Violation of LSA R.S. 15:1353 (C)
Mary Leach Werner, Joe Alleva, William Jenkins, F. Alexander King, Scott Woodward, Miriam
Segar, Verge Ausberry, Shelby McKenzie, Vicki Crochet, Bob Barton, Robert Dampf and Remy
Voisin Starns and Board of Supervisors Louisiana State University, who operated, managed and
participated in the conduct of the affairs of a RICO (Defendants and Actors) by engaging in a
pattern of racketeering activity, comprised of repeated predicate acts as listed above.
343. By reason of the RICO Defendants violation of LSA R.S. 15:1353 (C), plaintiff is entitled
to recover her actual and consequential damages in an amount to be proven at trial, treble damages,
attorney fees and costs. Additionally, by their engaging in a pattern of racketeering, other
employees, students and faculty have been damaged.
Count 2: Violation of LSA R.S. 15:1353(D)
344. As evidenced by their acts and omissions set forth above, the RICO Defendants and
Actors agreed and conspired to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering, in violation of LSA R.S. 15:1353(D).
345. By reason of the RICO Defendants and Actors violation of LSA R.S. 15:1353(D), plaintiff
is entitled to recover her actual and consequential damages, in an amount to be proven at trial,
treble damages, attorney fees, cost of investigation and litigation Additionally, by their engaging
in a pattern of racketeering, other employees, students and faculty have been damage
Count XIV
CIVIL RICO CLAIMS
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) and (d)
(Louisiana State University Board of Supervisors)
plead herein
347. Plaintiff herein asserts her right to a private cause of action under 18 U.S. Section 1962
(c) and (d).
348. Garrett “Hank” Danos (Danos), Robert “Bobby” Yarborough (Yarborough), Stanley
Jacobs (Jacobs), Joe Alleva (Alleva), William Jenkins (Jenkins), F. King Alexander (Alexander)
52
Scott Woodward (Woodward), Les Miles (Miles), Miriam Segar (Segar), Verge Ausberry
(Ausberry), Shelby McKenzie (McKenzie), Vicki Crochet (Crochet), Bob Barton (Barton), Board
of Supervisors Louisiana State University (BOS) is a RICO enterprise within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 1961 (4) that is engaged in and affects interstate commerce.
349. The associate in-fact enterprise is separate and distinct from Louisiana State University.
350. Title IX proceedings are “official proceedings” as defined under 18.U.S.C. § 1515
(a)(1)(C).
351. This complaint alleges, inter alia, violations of the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § § 1961-1968, and is brought by plaintiff in
connection with a series of schemes, devised, conducted and/or participated in by the
individual defendants (sometimes referred to as the ''defendant persons" or “RICO Defendants”
or “enterprise”), each of whom participated in the enterprise. The individual defendant persons
conducted or participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering and conspired to do so, all to the detriment of the business and
property of the plaintiff.
352. During the relevant times set forth herein, the individual defendants conspired with one
another to destroy plaintiff's property rights in her business and employment. The multifarious
racketeering activities through which the broad objectives of the individual defendants were
carried out through interstate travel and the use of other instrumentalities of interstate
commerce consisted of a complex pattern of individual transactions and groups of transactions.
It was part of the scheme to capture and kill Title IX complaints against coaches, star football
players and senior athletic officials initiated by plaintiff, employees, students, faculty and
others that the defendants would and did agree to conspire together with the others to devise and
participate in a plan of deceit, deception and whereby they would and did abuse their positions
of trust and fiduciary relationships with the plaintiff, students, employees, faculty and others;
they would and did abuse the discretion granted to them and breached their obligations of loyalty
and fidelity and their duty to act honestly and faithfully in the best interests of the plaintiff,
employees, students, faculty and others, and they would and did use false and fraudulent
pretenses, representations and promises calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and
due care and made material non-disclosures and concealments of facts and information, all so
as to unlawfully, intentionally and with intent to defraud, that is, knowingly and with specific
53
intent to deceive in order to control LSU’s Football program for the specific purpose to award
legal fees to McKenzie, Crochet and Barton, direct millions of dollars in concession contracts to
associates and gain financial and political power by favoring political and business leaders with
tickets to LSU football games including SEC and National Championship games.
353. In carrying out the schemes to knowingly conceal Title IX complaints and
investigations from official Title IX proceedings, tamper with witnesses to dissuade their
testimony in official Title IX proceedings, conceal documents from an official Title IX
proceedings, defraud LSU through fraudulent legal bills, control LSU’s football program and
target plaintiff’s business and employment for reporting Title IX complaints, the individual
defendants engaged, inter alia, in conduct in violation of the following laws:
a. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (relating to mail fraud);

b. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (relating to wire fraud);
c. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim or an
informant);
d. 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim or an
informant); and
e. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (relating to interstate travel in aid of racketeering);
354. The enterprise, since 2013 to 2021, utilized the above predicate acts to control the LSU
Athletic program, retaliate against employees and students who reported Title IX and criminal
complaints against coaches and star football players and capture and kill Title IX complaints
against coaches, star football players and athletic officials.
A. Schemes
355. The predicate acts involved in the following scheme include, inter alia, violations of 18
U.S.C. § 1341, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, 18 U.S.C. § 1512.
Scheme I: Scheme to corruptly, obstruct, impede an official Title IX

Proceeding.
plead herein.
357. Vicki Crochet and Robert Barton were at all material times during the scheme to conceal
the Miles Investigation were conducting an independent investigation in an official Title IX
proceeding as directed by the Department of Education.
54
358. Shelby McKenzie at all material times during the scheme to conceal the Miles
Investigation served a dual role as LSU’s General Counsel and a partner at Taylor Porter.
359. Segar at all material times during the scheme to conceal the Miles Investigation was the
official Title IX Coordinator in LSU’s Athletic Department as directed by the Department of
Education.
Co-Conspirators First Agreement
360. On May 15, 2013 Danos (Chairman of the Board of Supervisors), Yarborough (Board
Chairman Elect), Jacobs (Chairman of the Board – Athletic Committee), McKenzie (LSU In-
House Legal Counsel and Partner at Taylor Porter), Alleva (Vice-Chancellor and Director of
Athletics), Segar (Senior Associate A.D./Senior Woman Administrator and Athletic Title IX
Coordinator), Crochet ( Partner at Taylor Porter and Title IX investigator ) and Barton (Managing
Partner Taylor Porter and Title IX investigator) met to discuss the Miles Report and after multiple
in person meetings, emails, text messages and phone calls individually agreed to and accepted the
recommendation of Barton and Crochet not take any action against Miles and not to inform the
full Board of Supervisors and agreed to conceal the Miles Investigation from an official Title IX
proceeding.44
Segar each individually knowingly violated 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (c) (2) and 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (K).
Wire Fraud
362. In furtherance of the scheme to conceal the Miles Investigation from an official Title IX
proceeding, Barton, Crochet, Miles and Segar used telephone and email communications
affecting interstate commerce and Barton, Crochet, McKenzie, Miles, Danos, Yarborough,
Jacobs, Jenkins, Alleva and Segar each individually knowingly violated 18 U.S.C. § 1343
including but not limited to:45
From To Date Content
Crochet Ginsberg 4/05/2013 Emails on meeting with Ginsberg

on April 10, 2013
Crochet Ginsberg 4/18/2013 Telephone call in furtherance of

scheme to hide Miles Investigation
Crochet Ginsberg, Segar 5/03/2013 Email on the status of
44Exhibit 2 attached to Original Complaint

45See Exhibit 3 Taylor Porter Billing Records; Exhibit 5 Plaintiff’ RICO Case Statement attached to Original
Complaint.
55
Crochet Ginsberg 5/16/2013 Email on the status of

Crochet Ginsberg 5/15/2013 Telephone call on the status of


Crochet Ginsberg, Alleva 5/29/2013 Email on the status of


Crochet Ginsberg 5/29/2013 Telephone call on the status of


Crochet Alleva, Ginsberg 6/13/2013 Telephone call on the status

Crochet Ginsberg 8/01/2013 Telephone call on the status

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation
Crochet Ginsberg 8/02/2013 Email on the status

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation
Crochet Segar, McKenzie 8/06/2013 Email on the status

Ginsberg of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation
Crochet Ginsberg, McKenzie 8/07/2013 Telephone call on the status

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation
Crochet Ginsberg 8/07/2013 Multiple Emails on the status

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation
Ginsberg Crochet 8/15/2013 Email on

status of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation
56
of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation
Crochet Ginsberg, Segar 8/22/2013 Multiple Emails on the status

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation
Crochet Ginsberg. 8/22/2013 Multiple Emails on the status

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation
Crochet Ginsberg. 8/23/2013 Emails on the status

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation
Crochet Ginsberg 8/23/2013 Emails on the status

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation
Crochet Ginsberg, Alleva 8/26/2013 Emails on the status

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation
from Title IX reporting
requirements
Crochet Ginsberg 8/28/2013 Emails on the status

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation
Crochet Ginsberg, McKenzie 8/29/2013 Emails on the status

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation
Ginsberg Crochet 9/04/2013 Email on the status

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation
Crochet Ginsberg, Yarborough 9/10/2013 Email on the status

of scheme to hide
Miles Investigation
Mail Fraud
363. In furtherance of the scheme to conceal the Miles Investigation from an official Title IX
proceeding, Barton and Miles used United States Postal Service affecting interstate commerce
57
and Barton and Miles each individually knowingly violated 18 U.S.C. § 1341 including but not
limited to:46
Miles Attorney Barton 3/19/13 Letter in furtherance of the

scheme
to hide Miles investigation
364. In response to plaintiff reporting student workers complaint of Miles’ sexual harassment,
Alleva, Segar and Ausberry conspired with Miles to place plaintiff under Miles’ direct
supervision and Miles in conspiracy with Alleva, Ausberry and Segar, targeted plaintiff’s
employment by denying her pay raises, bonuses and promotions and when plaintiff
complained to Ausberry about Miles’ failure to promote her and award her deserved pay raises,
bonuses, and promotions, Ausberry told plaintiff to find another job.
365. As part of the Title IX investigation of Miles, plaintiff was instructed to meet Crochet at
Taylor Porter offices in downtown Baton Rouge and when she asked what happens next,
Crochet told plaintiff Miles’ conduct was not a violation of Title IX because the student
workers were of the “consenting age” and Miles’ conduct was "not illegal, maybe immoral."
366. It was not until March 2021 when plaintiff read in The Advocate the Miles Report and
Taylor Billing Records 47 and the Husch Blackwell Report, plaintiff realized Barton, Crochet,
McKenzie, Miles, Danos, Yarborough, Jacobs, Jenkins, Alleva and Segar had conspired to
conceal the Miles Title IX investigation to protect Miles’ employment and to target plaintiff’s
property interest in her employment and business by denying her pay raises, bonuses and
promotions in retaliation for her reporting Miles’ sexual misconduct.
U.S.C. § 1341, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, 18 U.S.C. § 1512
Scheme 2: Scheme to conceal Miles Report from an

official Title IX proceeding
plead herein.
369. Crochet and Barton were at all material times during the scheme to conceal the Miles
46 Exhibit 3; Exhibit 5 attached to Original Complaint

47 Attached as Exhibit 3 to Original Complaint
58
Report conducting an independent investigation as part of an official Title IX proceeding as
directed by the Department of Education.
370. Shelby McKenzie at all material times during the scheme to conceal the Miles Report
served a dual role as LSU’s General Counsel and a partner at Taylor Porter.
371. Segar at all material times during the scheme to conceal the Miles Report was the official
Title IX Coordinator in LSU’s Athletic Department as directed by the Department of
Education.
Co-Conspirators Second Agreement
372. At the May 15, 2013 meeting, Barton, Crochet, McKenzie, Miles, Danos, Yarborough,
Jacobs, Jenkins, Alleva and Segar agreed Crochet and Barton would conceal the Miles Report
in their offices off campus away from public documents request and an official Title IX
proceeding.
Segar knowingly violated 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (c)(1),18 U.S.C. § 1512 (c) (2) and 18 U.S.C. §
1512 (K).
374. On April 29, 2013 Miles, Ginsberg, Hardin, Barton, Crochet and Alleva agreed to conceal
the Miles Report in Ginsberg, Hardin, Barton and Crochet’s offices off campus away from
public documents request and an official Title IX proceeding. 48
375. Ginsberg, Hardin, Crochet and Barton concealed the Miles Report in their law offices
from 2013 to 2021, until they were forced to release it by the court. 49
376. Ginsberg, Hardin, Barton, Crochet and Alleva each individually knowingly violated 18
U.S.C. § 1512 (c)(1),18 U.S.C. § 1512 (c) (2) and 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (K).
377. On August 5, 2020 USA Today submitted a public documents request for the Campus
Police report on Darrius Guice to Interim President Thomas Galligan (Galligan), the custodian
of records for LSU in accordance with La. R.S. 44:32 and the Board of Supervisors refused to
produce the police report. The state court found LSU “was unreasonable, arbitrary and
capricious in its refusal and delay and the redacted manner in which the documents were

49 Kenny Jacoby v. Galligan, Suit No. 703746, 19th JDC Parish of East Baton Rouge
59
produced.50
was not subject to public documents request and on January 19, 2021 USA Today filed a writ
of mandamus against LSU and Galligan petitioning they be ordered to comply with La. R.S.
44:32 and produce the Miles Report.51
Today’s writ of mandamus and directed Crochet and Barton to notify Ginsberg and Hardin
per the April 29, 2013 agreement between Ginsberg, Hardin, Barton, Crochet and Alleva and
on February 4, 2021 Ginsberg on behalf of Miles filed a petition to intervene in Kenny Jacoby
v. Galligan, opposing USA Today’s public documents request in furtherance of the scheme to
conceal the document from an official Title IX proceeding.
380. The full Board of Supervisors, Miles, Crochet and Barton knowingly violated of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512 (c)(1),18 U.S.C. § 1512 (c) (2) and 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (K).
Wire Fraud
381. In furtherance of the scheme to conceal the Miles Report from an official Title IX
proceeding, Barton, Crochet, McKenzie, Miles, Danos, Yarborough, Jacobs Jenkins, Alleva
and Segar knowingly used telephone and email communications affecting interstate commerce
and Barton, Crochet, McKenzie, Miles, Danos, Yarborough, Jacobs Jenkins, Alleva and Segar
each individually violated 18 U.S.C. § 1343 including but not limited to:52
Barton Ginsberg 8/22/2013 Emails discussing “revisions

to directive letter proposed by
coach’s counsel”
in which Miles will agree to
certain disciplinary terms and
in return the RICO Defendants
will conceal the Miles Report
Mail Fraud
382. In furtherance of the scheme to conceal the Miles Report from an official Title IX
50 See Kenny Jacoby & S.B. v. Thomas Galligan et al C-700649 21/D, 19th JDC Parish of East Baton Rouge
51 Kenny Jacoby v. Galligan, Suit No. 703746
60
proceeding, Barton, Crochet and Miles knowingly used the United States Postal Service and
Federal Express affecting interstate commerce and Barton, Crochet, McKenzie, Miles, Danos,
Yarborough, Jacobs Jenkins, Alleva and Segar each individually knowingly violated 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 including but not limited to:53
Barton, Crochet Ginsberg 8/29/2013 Federal Express Letter

directing Ginsberg and Hardin
to conceal Miles Report
from an official
Title IX proceeding and public
documents request in their offices
Billing Records that Barton, Crochet, McKenzie, Miles, Danos, Yarborough, Jacobs, Jenkins,
Alleva and Segar had conspired to conceal the Miles Report from an official Title IX
proceeding to protect Miles’ employment and to target plaintiff by denying her pay raises,
bonuses and promotions in retaliation for her reporting Miles’ sexual misconduct.
384. Ginsberg, Hardin, Barton, Crochet and Alleva each individually knowingly violated 18
U.S.C. § 1512 (c)(1),18 U.S.C. § 1512 (c) (2) and 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (K).
U.S.C. § 1341, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, 18 U.S.C. § 1512, 18 U.S.C. § 1951
Scheme 3: Scheme to tamper with witness in an official Title IX proceeding
plead herein.
387. Crochet and Barton at all material times during the scheme to tamper with a witness in
an official Title IX proceeding were conducting an independent investigation as part of an
official Title IX proceeding as directed by the Department of Education.
388. Segar at all material times during the scheme to tamper with a witness in an official Title
IX proceeding was the official Title IX Coordinator in LSU’s Athletic Department, the Miles
Investigation as directed by the Department of Education.
53 Id.
61
Change student grade
389. May 5, 2013, Crochet and Segar called Human Resources Director A.G. Monaco
(“Monaco”) and asked him to help convince a professor to let the student who filed a Title IX
complaint against Miles, retake a failed quiz to corruptly dissuade student from testifying in
Title IX proceedings against Miles and Crochet told Monaco he could not speak a word of their
conversation, but Monaco refused to keep the conversation a secret or instruct the professor to
rescind the failing grade and Monaco reported Crochet’s phone call to LSU Provost Stuart Bell
and LSU Vice President Robert Kuhn and the three of them agreed to inform William Jenkins,
but Jenkins took no actions and in June 2013 Monaco informed new President F. King
Alexander about Crochet’s call, but Alexander took no actions.
390. Crochet, Segar, Jenkins and Alexander each individually knowingly violated 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512 (b )(1), 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (b )( (2 ) (A), U.S.C. § 1512 (c) (2) and 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (K).
Meeting in New Orleans
391. On or about July 1, 2013 Ginsberg, Complainant Student attorney travelled to New
Orleans to meet Vicki Crochet and Bob Barton to discuss the exchange of money with student
to corruptly dissuade student from testifying in Title IX proceedings against Miles.
392. In furtherance of the scheme to tamper with a witness in an official Title IX proceeding
Crochet, Barton and Miles each individually knowingly violated 18 U.S.C. § 1951
Dissuade student from testifying in an official Title IX proceeding
Segar had multiple meetings, phone calls and emails with Miles' legal counsel, the student's
family and legal counsel to discuss the exchange of money to dissuade her from testifying
against Miles in an official Title IX proceeding and on information and belief Miles and student
reached a private settlement in 2013.
394. Sometime in 2013 Miles and student who filed a Title IX complaint against Miles
exchanged money to dissuade her from testifying in an official Title IX proceeding.
395. On February 24, 2021 LSU Vice-President of Communications Jim Sabourin stated about
the exchange of money between Miles and student “we have heard about settlement, but LSU
62
is not a party to it and we have not seen it. 54
Segar each individually knowingly violated 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (b )(1), 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (b )(
(2 ) (A), U.S.C. § 1512 (c) (2), 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (K).
Wire Fraud
397. In furtherance of the scheme to tamper with a witness in a Title IX proceeding Barton,
Crochet, McKenzie, Miles, Danos, Yarborough, Jacobs, Jenkins, Alleva and Segar used United
States Mail, telephone and email communications affecting interstate commerce and Barton,
Crochet, McKenzie, Miles, Danos, Yarborough, Jacobs, Jenkins, Alleva and Segar each
individually knowingly violated 18 U.S.C. § 1343 including but not limited to:55
Ginsberg Crochet 7/02/2013 Email on meeting

in New Orleans with Miles Lawyer,
Student’s Lawyer to facilitate a
financial settlement between
Miles and Student
Crochet Ginsberg 7/03/2013 Email on meeting in

New Orleans to facilitate a
Miles and Student
Barton Student’s Lawyer 7/03/2013 Telephone call on meeting

in New Orleans with Miles Lawyer,
Student’s Lawyer to facilitate a
Miles and Student

Miles and Student
Barton Crochet, Student 7/05/2013 Telephone call on meeting

Lawyer to facilitate a
Miles and Student

Miles and Student
Crochet Ginsberg, Unknown 7/08/2013. Multiple Emails on

McKenzie meeting in New Orleans with
Miles Lawyer, Student Lawyer
54 See https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/sports/lsu/article_596f5cfe-7646-11eb-8cb0-
733b53e58af8.html
63
Crochet Jacobs, Ginsberg, 7/09/2013 Telephone call on meeting
McKenzie to facilitate a
Miles and Student
Barton Crochet, Alleva 7/09/2013 Emails on revising LSU

Segar, Miles Lawyer policies that facilitated the
RICO Defendants ability to
conceal the Miles Investigation
Barton Crochet, Miles Lawyer 7/10/2013 Emails to facilitate a

Student Lawyer financial settlement between
Miles and Student
Crochet Ginsberg, McKenzie, 7/10/2013 Telephone call on meeting

Unknown to facilitate a
Miles and Student
Crochet Ginsberg, McKenzie, 7/12/2013 Telephone call on meeting

to facilitate a
Miles and Student
Crochet Ginsberg 7/12/2013 Email on meeting

to facilitate a
Miles and Student
Barton Crochet, Miles Lawyer 7/12/2013 Telephone calls to update

on calls with Student’s Lawyer to
facilitate a financial settlement
between Miles and Student
Crochet Ginsberg 7/15/2013 Email on meeting

to facilitate a
Miles and Student
Crochet Ginsberg 7/22/2013 Email to facilitate a

Miles and Student
Barton Miles Lawyer 7/23/2013 Multiple Emails on

Miles and Student

Miles and Student to bribe
Student
Crochet Ginsberg 7/26/2013 Telephone call to facilitate a

Miles and Student

Miles and Student
64
Barton Miles Lawyer, 7/26/2013 Telephone Conference on
Crochet financial settlement between
Miles and Student
398. It was not until February and March 2021 when plaintiff read in The Advocate the Miles
Report, Taylor Billing Records, Monaco’s account of Crochet and Segar contacting him to
pressure a professor to allow student who complained of sexual harassment against Miles to
retake an exam and that Miles had reached a private settlement with a student who accused
him of sexual harassment that she realized Barton, Crochet, McKenzie, Miles, Danos,
Yarborough, Jacobs, Jenkins, Alleva and Segar had conspired to tamper with a witness in an
official Title IX proceeding to protect Miles’ employment and to target plaintiff’s property
U.S.C. § 1341, 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
Scheme 4: Scheme by Crochet, Barton and McKenzie to defraud LSU
plead herein.
401. Crochet and Barton were at all material times during the scheme to defraud LSU
402. Shelby McKenzie at all material times during the scheme to defraud LSU served a dual
role as LSU’s General Counsel and a partner at Taylor Porter.
403. In furtherance of the conspiracy to conceal the Miles Investigation from an official Title
IX proceeding, Crochet and Barton submitted invoices by United States Mail to LSU for eighty
($80,000.00) thousand dollars which included the following material omissions:
(4) Barton and Crochet conducted a Title IX investigation of Miles for sexual misconduct
and concealed it from an official Title IX proceeding and the full BOS;
(5) Barton and Crochet concealed the Miles Report in their offices from an official Title
IX proceeding; and
(6) Barton, Crochet and McKenzie facilitated an exchange of money between Miles and
complainant student to dissuade her from testifying against Miles in an official Title
65
IX proceeding.
404. On information and belief McKenzie, in his dual role as LSU’s General Legal Counsel
and a partner at Taylor Porter with the full knowledge and consent of Jenkins, approved the
fraudulent invoices for payment by LSU.
405. LSU relied on Crochet, Barton, McKenzie and Jenkins’ misrepresentation that Crochet
and Barton conducted legitimate legal work on behalf of LSU.
406. In furtherance of the scheme to submit fraudulent billing records to LSU, Barton,
Crochet, McKenzie and Jenkins used United States Mail, telephone and email communications
affecting interstate commerce and Crochet, Barton, McKenzie and Jenkins each individually
knowingly violated U.S.C. § 1343 and 1341 including but not limited to:56
Wire Fraud
Barton, Crochet LSU 3/31/13 Emailed billing invoices

with material omissions
Crochet, Barton LSU 3/31/13 Emailed billing invoices





Barton LSU 6/27/13 Emailed billing invoices



Crochet LSU 7/31/13 Emailed billing invoices


56 Exhibit 3; Exhibit 5
66
Crochet LSU 8/31/13 Emailed billing invoices


Mail Fraud
Barton, Crochet LSU 3/31/13 Mailed billing invoices

Crochet, Barton LSU 3/31/13 Mailed billing invoices




Crochet, Barton LSU 5/31/13 Mailed fraudulent billing invoices

Barton LSU 6/27/13 Mailed billing invoices



Crochet LSU 7/31/13 Mailed billing invoices


Crochet LSU 8/31/13 Mailed billing invoices



407. In April 2021 LSU fired the Taylor Porter law firm after 80 years of representation for its
role in concealing the Title IX investigation of Miles from the full BOS and official Title IX
proceedings.
67
Billing Records, she realized Barton, Crochet, McKenzie and Jenkins, as part of the scheme to
cover up the Miles Title IX investigation, Barton, Crochet, McKenzie and Jenkins conspired to
defraud LSU out of eighty-thousand dollars in furtherance of the scheme to conceal the Miles
Investigation and Miles Report to protect Miles’ employment and to target plaintiff’s property
U.S.C. § 1341, 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
Scheme 5: Ongoing Scheme to control LSU’s Football Program

in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1961 (d)
plead herein.
411. In furtherance of the scheme to control the LSU football program and to damage
plaintiff’s property interest in her employment and business Williams, Werner, Dampf, Starns,
Woodward, Alexander and Ausberry each individually knowingly violated 18 U.S.C. 1961 (d).
was not subject to public documents request and on January 19, 2021 USA Today filed a writ of
mandamus against LSU and Galligan petitioning they be ordered to comply with La. R.S. 44:32
and produce the Miles Report.
Today’s writ of mandamus and directed Crochet and Barton to notify Ginsberg and Hardin per
the April 29, 2013 agreement between Ginsberg, Hardin, Barton, Crochet and Alleva and on
February 4, 2021 Ginsberg, on behalf of Miles, filed a petition to intervene in Kenny Jacoby v.
Galligan, opposing USA Today’s public documents request in furtherance of the scheme to
conceal the document from an official Title IX proceeding.
414. After the release of the Husch Blackwell Report Alexander stated: “The board leadership
wants accountability and transparency now, and they’re the ones who met me in the back room of
68
Juban's. They’re trying blame the Bobby Jindal (board members) for secrecy and the secrecy still
continues.57
415. In 2021, Williams was named Chairman of the Search Committee to select a new
President of the LSU System and Chancellor of the Baton Rouge Campus and Werner and
Ausberry were also appointed to the committee; 58 Dampf and Starns voted on the selection of a
new President.
416. In furtherance of the scheme to conceal the Miles Report from official Title IX
proceedings the LSU Board of Supervisors knowingly violated 18 U.S.C. 1962 (d).
417. The predicate acts injured plaintiff’s business and property include, inter alia, violations
of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, 18 U.S.C. 1512 and 18 U.S.C. § 1513
Scheme 6: Scheme to target Sharon Lewis’ business and employment
plead herein.
419. As attorneys advising LSU Athletic Department on all Title IX issues, Crochet and Barton
were aware of the Fraudulent PM-73 investigation and conspired with Segar and Ausberry to
damage Plaintiff’s employment and business.
420. Crochet, Barton Segar and Ausberry in furtherance of the criminal enterprise’ common
plan to retaliate against plaintiff and injure her property interest in her employment and business
each individually knowingly violated 18 U.S.C. 1512 (c ) (2) and 18 U.S.C. 1512 (k),
Wire Fraud
421. In furtherance of the scheme to injure plaintiff’s business and employment through a
fraudulent PM-73 Investigation, RICO actor Jeffrey Scott used email communications affecting
interstate commerce and knowingly violated 18 U.S.C. 1343 by sending the following emails:59
Scott Lewis 10/5/2018 Email notifying Lewis that

a PM-73 Investigation is being
initiated against her
Scott Lewis 11/16/2018 Email of Final Report Of

fraudulent
57 https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/sports/lsu/article_0e1d6916-add8-11eb-8fa2-
a34ad4d2c61f.html
58 https://lailluminator.com/2020/12/17/lsu-official-who-didnt-report-domestic-violence-remains-on-
presidential-search-committee/
59 Exhibit 4
69
PM-73 Investigation that
contained
material omissions that Segar
was designated as the person
that all Title IX complaints were
to be forwarded to.
Scott Lewis 11/20/2018 Email of Final Report Of

fraudulent
contained
material omissions that Segar
was designated as the person
that all Title IX complaints were
to be forwarded to.
Scott Lewis 1/11/2019 Email on fraudulent PM-73

Investigation of Lewis.
Mail Fraud
422. In furtherance of the scheme to injure plaintiff’s property interest in her business and
employment through a fraudulent PM-73 Investigation, RICO actor Jeffrey Scott used the United
States Mail affecting interstate commerce and knowingly violated 18 U.S.C. 1341 by sending the
following:60

Scott Lewis 11/16/2018 Final Report Of Fraudulent
contained material omissions
that Segar was designated to
receive all Title IX
complaints in Athletic
Department
Physical threats and intimidation
423. Sometime in 2013, Miles threatened to punch plaintiff “in her motherfucking mouth” in
retaliation for plaintiff bringing a Title IX complaint against him to influence, delay and prevent
her testimony in an official Title IX proceeding.
424. Football operation employees confirmed to Husch Blackwell they witnessed Ausberry
‘hollering’ and ‘screaming’ at Lewis over the last several years.61
425. Ausberry from 2012 to 2021 verbally abused and intimidated plaintiff for bringing a Title
IX complaint against him to influence, delay and prevent her testimony in an official Title IX
proceeding.
60 Exhibit 4
61 Exhibit 1
70
426. Miles and Ausberry knowingly used threats, intimidation to induce plaintiff from
testifying in official Title IX proceedings in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1512 ( 2 ) (A), 18 U.S.C. 1512
(2) (B) and 18 U.S.C. 1512 (k).
427. In furtherance of the enterprise’s common plan to target plaintiff by injuring her property
interest in her employment and business, Miles and Ausberry each individually knowingly violated
18 U.S.C. 1512 (k), (B), 18.U.S.C. 1513 (b) (1) and 18.U.S.C. 1513 (f).
Plaintiff’s property interest in her employment irreparably damaged
428. The PM-73 (Title IX) investigation of plaintiff has been reported in local and national
media and LSU has never issued a public statement that the PM-73 findings was overturned and,
in April 2021, plaintiff was named as a defendant in a class action lawsuit over LSU’s failure to
properly report and investigate allegations of sexual misconduct and domestic violence.
429. Plaintiff, a senior athletic official, who is both African-American and a woman, now has
a PM-73 (Title (IX) violation in her personnel record, is a named defendant in a Title IX class
action lawsuit; her name has repeatedly been associated with a national sex scandal and as a result
plaintiff’s opportunity for advancement in Power 5 NCAA Football athletics has been destroyed.
Porter Billing Records, and the Husch Blackwell Report did plaintiff realize she was being denied
pay raises, bonuses and promotions from 2013 to present as part of a common plan by the RICO
Defendants to retaliate against her for filing Title IX complaints against Miles, Ausberry, Segar
and others.
431. The injuries to plaintiff’s business and property include, inter alia, interference with her
right to earn a living, loss pay, loss of benefits, loss of promotions, loss of bonuses, loss of
career in Power 5 Athletics, exposure from lawsuits and damage to her employment and
business as a result of the activities of the RICO Defendants.
432. It was reasonably foreseeable by RICO Defendants the RICO violations stated herein,
would directly and proximately injure her property interest in her employment and business and
being denied pay raises, bonuses, promotions and her employment destroyed in Power 5 NCAA
Athletics were a natural consequence of the defendants RICO violations previously plead herein.
Count 1: Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c)
71
Mary Leach Werner, Joe Alleva, William Jenkins, F. King Alexander, Les Miles, Scott
Woodward, Miriam Segar, Verge Ausberry, Shelby McKenzie, Vicki Crochet, Bob Barton and
Board of Supervisors Louisiana State University operated, managed and participated in the
conduct of the affairs of the RICO enterprise by engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity,
comprised of repeated predicate acts as listed above.
434. By reason of the RICO Defendants violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c), plaintiff has been
injured in her business and property, entitling her to recover her actual and consequential damages
in an amount to be proven at trial, treble damages, attorney fees and costs.
Count 2: Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (d)
435. As evidenced by their acts and omissions set forth above, the RICO Defendants agreed
and conspired to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (d).
436. By reason of the RICO Defendants’ violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (d), plaintiff has been
injured in her business and property and entitled to recover her actual and consequential damages,
in an amount to be proven at trial, treble damages, attorney fees and costs. Additionally, by their
willful and intentional actions to conceal the sexual harassment investigation of Head Football
Coach Les Miles and the Miles Report from an official Title IX proceeding, tamper with a witness
in an official Title IX proceeding, control LSU Athletic program, shield coaches and star football
players sexual harassment and criminal complaints from the reporting requirements of Title IX,
and to target plaintiff’s employment and business in retaliation for reporting Title IX complaints
against coaches and star football players, plaintiff, students, faculty and employees of LSU have
been damaged in their business and property.
COUNT XV
Violation of Louisiana Civil Code Article 2298
Enrichment Without Cause
(All Defendants
plead herein
438. Plaintiff allege enrichment without cause against all Defendants. This cause of action is
plead in the alternative in the event no other remedy at law is available to Plaintiff.
439. Defendants were enriched by the millions of dollars that the LSU football program was
able bring into the school because of Defendants’ scheme of retaliating against employees who
72
reported Title IX violations and violations of state law by coaches, athletic officials and LSU
football players and the other benefits as alleged herein. There is no justification for denying
retaliating against Plaintiff and denying her a workplace free of harassment and discrimination
under the United States Constitution, Louisiana Constitution, federal law, and state law.
440. Defendants concealed this scheme from Plaintiff. Plaintiff became aware of this scheme
upon the publication of the Husch Blackwell Report, Miles Report and Taylor Porter Billing
Records in March 2021.
441. Plaintiff are entitled to monetary compensation damages to the extent of Defendants’
enrichment without cause.
442. To the extent the Court finds any causes of action alleged herein are inconsistent, Plaintiff
urge each such cause of action in the alternative.
LEGAL CAUSE OF ACTION
443. Plaintiff pleads that all her injuries and damages were directly and proximately caused by
the Defendants' intentional violations of various state statutes which are pled herein above or
alternatively by negligence and gross negligence of the executives, agents, and managers of the
defendants University.
444. Plaintiff pleads and asserts entitlement to damages pursuant to the legal theories of failure
to train, vicarious liability and respondent superior for acts and omissions of LSU and the LSU
Board of Supervisors by individual defendants acting at the direction or on behalf of LSU for any
and all causes of actions asserted herein. Plaintiff further pleads and asserts entitlement to damages
as a direct and proximate cause of LSU and the LSU Board of Supervisors and their employees,
agents, assigns and successors for the intentional and ongoing deliberate failure to comply with its
own policies and governing regulations.
445. As a direct and proximate result of the above-described conduct, Plaintiff suffered
general, special, incidental, and consequential injury and damages, past, present, and future, in an
amount that shall be fully proven at the time of trial. These past, present, and future damages
include but are not limited to the following:
a. Plaintiff seeks past, present and future economic and non-economic damages in an amount to be
determined at trial
b. Plaintiff seeks past wages, bonuses and promotions (18 U.S. § 1962 (c) and (d))
73
c. Plaintiff seeks past, present, and future general, special, incidental and consequential damages in
an amount to be determined at trial
d. Plaintiff seeks any appropriate statutory damages
e. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and
f. Plaintiff seeks cost of this suit
g. Plaintiff seeks interest based on damages, as well as pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as
allowed by law;
h. Plaintiff seeks damages for emotional pain and distress and mental anguish.
i. Plaintiff seeks damages for humiliation and suffering of discrimination.
j. Plaintiff seeks damages for loss of enjoyment of life and inconvenience.
k. Plaintiff seeks damages for loss of earning potential.
l. Plaintiff seeks damages to her physical health and mental health.
m. Plaintiff seeks treble damages under 18 U.S. § 1962 (c) and (d) and; R.S. 15:1356(E) and under
any applicable state laws.
n. Plaintiff seeks reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and interest to the fullest extent allowed by law;
o. Plaintiff seeks liability in solido among all defendants;
p. Plaintiff seeks damages of injury to their reputation, character, economic opportunities and
defamation;
q. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to stop the violation of law and to require defendants to provide a
workplace free of discrimination and racketeering and to make the Plaintiff whole in her job, duties
and opportunities for advancement; and
r. Plaintiff seeks all additional and/or further relief as this Court deems just and equitable under the
circumstances.
s. Medical expenses;
t. Pharmaceutical expenses;
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff demands trial by jury.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiff Sharon Lewis, respectfully prays for judgment against Defendants, individually,
jointly and severally, for monetary damages in an amount reasonable under the premises together
with legal interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs against Louisiana State University and all
74
named Defendants, pursuant to LSA R.S. 23:967, 18 U.S.C § 1961 et seq , LSA R.S. 15:356(E) and
with respect to RICO the following:
I) Declaring that the RICO Defendants’ conduct constituted violations of LSA R.S.
15:1351 et seq, 18 U.S.C § 1961 et seq.;
II) Determine plaintiff’s injuries are due to the RICO Defendants’ actions and holding
RICO Defendants liable, jointly, severally and in solido for the plaintiff’s actual
and consequential damages shown at trial and
III) Providing reasonable restrictions on future activities or conduct of the RICO
Defendants.
WEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully requests Defendants' be required to respond to this
Petition for Damages and the Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents attached
hereto within the time delays required by law.
_/s/Larry English_________
Attorney at Law
917-531-3909
englishlaw2008@gmail.com
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
75
76
Appendix C
Appendix D
Appendix E
SHARON LEWIS : SUIT NO.: 708092, SECTION 23

:
: 19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
VERSUS :
: PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
LOUISIANA STATE :
UNIVERSITY, ET AL : STATE OF LOUISIANA
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S SECOND

MOTION FOR RECUSAL AND MOTION TO STAY
BY TAYLOR PORTER DEFENDANTS
NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, come defendants, Vicki Crochet,
Robert Barton, and Shelby McKenzie (the “Taylor Porter Defendants”), who respectfully oppose
Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal and Motion to Stay (“Motion”) filed herein on July 8, 2022. For
the following reasons, the Taylor Porter Defendants respectfully suggest that Plaintiff’s untimely
Motion is completely without merit and should therefore be DENIED summarily pursuant to
LSA—C.C.P. art. 154(C) without the appointment of an ad hoc judge or a hearing.
In a rather transparent and desperate attempt to continue the currently set hearings in this
matter and unnecessarily delay this proceeding, Plaintiff has now filed a second Motion to Recuse
Your Honor and stay this matter pending the resolution of her unfounded Motion.
Because Plaintiff clearly fails to meet the requirements of Louisiana’s new recusal articles,
the Taylor Porter Defendants respectfully show that Plaintiff is not entitled to a hearing before an
ad hoc judge regarding her Motion and that Your Honor should summarily deny Plaintiff’s Motion
by issuing written reasons for the denial.
1. No Ground for Recusal Under Article 151 has been Adequately Pled by Plaintiff
LSA—C.C.P. art. 154(A) mandates that a party desiring to recuse a judge must assign “the
ground for recusal under Article 151.” Although Plaintiff makes the unsupported and conclusory
assertion that Your Honor “has demonstrated he is unable to conduct a fair and impartial
proceeding and therefore, Judge Kelley should be recused from this case in accordance with La.
Code Civ. Proc. Art. 151(A)(4) and (B),” any reading of her Motion reveals that she clearly failed
to assign a sufficient ground for recusal under Article 151 that warrants the appointment of an ad
hoc judge or a hearing.
Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4, of her Motion regarding Your Honor’s alleged bias were
previously raised by Plaintiff in her first motion to recuse filed in December 2021. On February
8, 2022, ad hoc Judge Emile St. Pierre (retired) conducted a hearing to determine the merits of
Plaintiff’s first motion to recuse. Your Honor voluntarily testified at this hearing and Plaintiff’s
#100522561v11 1
counsel examined you under oath. At the conclusion of this hearing, ad hoc Judge St. Pierre
correctly found no basis for Plaintiff’s motion to recuse and denied the same. Although nothing
prevented Plaintiff from taking a writ from this ruling if she believed it was erroneous, Plaintiff
did not object or appeal this ruling in any way. Clearly the “bias” alleged in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3,
and 4 of Plaintiff’s current Motion have already been considered and dismissed; therefore,
Plaintiff’s attempt to relitigate these “bias” issues should be dismissed out-of-hand and, in any
event, cannot be considered a valid “ground for recusal under Article 151.”
Similarly, Paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of Plaintiff’s Motion are simply criticisms of Your
Honor’s rulings following the May 26, 2022, hearings regarding the Taylor Porter Defendants’
exceptions and motion for Article 863 sanctions. If Plaintiff disagrees with Your Honor’s rulings
announced at the May 26th hearing, she has the right to appeal the same. In fact, Plaintiff has
already filed both a notice of appeal and a notice to file a supervisory writ regarding these separate
rulings. Just because a district court judge dismisses all of plaintiff’s claims against a defendant as
being unfounded in law and fact and further rules that Plaintiff and her counsel violated Article
863 by filing objectively unreasonable pleadings, does not mean that he is “unable to conduct a
fair and impartial proceeding” pursuant to Article 151. Simply stated, ruling against a party is not
a valid “ground for recusal under Article 151.”
Plaintiff’s only “new” allegations of “bias” are found in Paragraph 8 of her Motion:
8.
At the May 26, 2022 hearing, TP Defendants lead counsel, J. Cullens, called
Attorney Larry English “sophomoric” and Plaintiff’s former attorneys Bridget Brown and
Tammye Brown the “Brown Sisters.” Judge Kelley failed to admonish Cullens for
insulting Plaintiff’s attorneys with racially coded language in open court.
First, calling someone “sophomoric” is not “racially coded language.”1 Second, upon information
and belief, Bridget Brown and Tammye Brown are in fact sisters-in-law; therefore, calling sisters-
in-law “sisters” by their common last name, “Brown,” is not offensive or racially charged in any
way. If Tammye and Bridget’s last name was “Green,” for example, would calling them the
“Green Sisters” be offensive or racially charged? Of course not. Because a judge need not
reprimand an attorney for either describing opposing counsel’s conduct as “sophomoric”
(especially if it is accurate) or for referring to sisters-in-law as sisters and by their last names, there
was simply no reason for Your Honor to “admonish” an attorney for such conduct. More
1 The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “sophomoric” as conceited and overconfident of knowledge but poorly
informed and immature; a sophomoric argument.
#100522561v12 2
importantly, for recusal purposes, Your Honor’s alleged failure to “admonish” an attorney in open
court, given Plaintiff’s unfounded allegations here, clearly does not constitute “a substantial and
objective basis that would reasonably be expected to prevent the judge from conducting any aspect
of the cause in a fair and impartial manner,” as is required to be considered a valid basis of recusal
pursuant to Article 151(B).
2. Any “New” Ground for Recusal Related to the May 26th Hearing is Untimely
Furthermore, even assuming for the purposes of argument only that Plaintiff has
sufficiently “assign[ed] the ground for recusal under Article 151” in her Motion (she clearly has
not), any “new” claim of bias or unbecoming conduct that allegedly occurred at the May 26th
hearing that could be an appropriate “ground” for recusal must have been asserted by Plaintiff by
June 27, 2022 at the latest. LSA—C.C.P. art. 154(A) provides that any motion to recuse “shall be
filed no later than thirty days after discovery of the facts constituting the ground upon which the
motion is based.” Both Larry English and Sharon Lewis participated and attended the May 26th
hearing via Zoom. Both heard opposing counsel describe English’s conduct as being “sophomoric”
and both heard opposing counsel refer to the Brown sisters-in-law as the “Brown sisters” on May
26th. If Plaintiff truly believed that these occurrences warranted a formal recusal motion (they
categorically do not), she was required by Article 154(A) to file her Motion within thirty days of
the May 26th hearing. She did not. Therefore, even if one were to assume that Plaintiff’s
unfounded allegations gave rise to a valid “ground” for recusal under Article 151 (they do not),
they were not timely filed and should be summarily dismissed.
3. No Ad Hoc Judge or Hearing Regarding Plaintiff’s Motion is Necessary
According to LSA—C.C.P. art. 154(C):
If the motion to recuse is not timely filed in accordance with Paragraph A of this
Article or fails to set forth a ground for recusal under Article 151, the judge may deny the
motion without the appointment of an ad hoc judge or a hearing but shall provide written
reasons for the denial.
Because Plaintiff’s Motion is both untimely and fails to set forth a ground for recusal under Article
151, the Taylor Porter Defendants respectfully suggest and request that Your Honor summarily
deny Plaintiff’s Motion without appointing an ad hoc judge or setting a hearing. According to
Article 154(C), if Plaintiff’s Motion is summarily denied, Your Honor must provide written
reasons for the denial.
#100522561v13 3
4. Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Taylor Porter Defendants pray that Plaintiff’s Motion
be summarily denied without a hearing and that the currently scheduled hearings before Your
Honor on September 2, 2022 (regarding Article 863 damages) be maintained.
Filed this 13th day of July, 2022.
WALTERS, PAPILLION, JONES WALKER LLP

THOMAS, CULLENS, LLC
/s/ J. E. Cullens, Jr. /s/ Brandon K. Black

J. E. CULLENS, JR. (La. #23011) BRANDON K. BLACK (La. #24298)
DARREL J. PAPILLION (La. #23243) PAULINE F. HARDIN (La. # 6542)
RENEE C. CRASTO (La. #31657) JOHN GUENARD (La. #36483)
12345 Perkins Road, Bldg. 1 445 North Blvd., Suite 800
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70810 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802
Tel: 225.236.3636 Tel: (225) 248-2128
Fax: 225.236.3650 Fax: (225) 248-3128
cullens@lawbr.net bblack@joneswalker.com
papillion@lawbr.net phardin@joneswalker.com
crasto@lawbr.net jguenard@joneswalker.com
Counsel for Defendants, W. Shelby McKenzie, Vicki M. Crochet, and Robert W. Barton
#100522561v14 4
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was furnished, via email to all counsel of
record, on the 13th day of July, 2022, as follows:
John C. Walsh Darren A. Patin

Jeffrey K. Cody Special Assistant Attorney General
Mary Ann White (Lead Counsel) HAILEY, MCNAMARA, HALL,
628 St. Louis Street (70802) LARMANN & PAPALE, L.L.P.
P.O. Box 4425 3445 N. Causeway Blvd., Suite 800
Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4425 Metairie, Louisiana 70002
Tel: 225-346-1461 Telephone: (504) 836-6500
Fax: (225) 346-1467 Facsimile: (504) 836-6565
john@scwllp.com dpatin@hmhlp.com
jeffreyc@scwllp.com Counsel for Defendant, Verge Ausberry
maryannw@scwllp.com
Counsel for Defendant, Miriam Segar
Michael A. Patterson Rudolfo J. Aguilar, Jr.

S. Brooke Barnett-Bernal T.A. Magadalen Blessey Bickford
Seth F. Lawrence Camille R. Bryant
LONG LAW FIRM, L.L.P. McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC
180 City Farm Drive, Building 6 601 Poydras Street, Floor 12
Baton Rouge LA 70806 New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Telephone: (225) 922-5110 Telephone: 504.586.1200
Facsimile: (225 922-5105 rudyaguilar@mcglinchey.com
map@longlaw.com mbickford@mcglinchey.com
bbb@longlaw.com cbryant@mcglinchey.com
sfl@longlaw.com Attorneys For Scott Woodward
Attorneys for Joseph “Joe” Alleva
Jimmy R. Faircloth, Jr. (T.A.) Susan W. Furr

Barbara Bell Melton Shelton Dennis Blunt
Mary Katherine Price Molly C. McDiarmid
FAIRCLOTH MELTON SOBEL & BASH, LLC 400 Convention Street, Suite 1100
105 Yorktown Drive Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802
Alexandria, LA 71303 Telephone: 225 346 0285
Phone: (318) 619-7755 Facsimile: 225 381 9197
Fax: (318) 619-7744 susie.furr@phelps.com
jfaircloth@fairclothlaw.com molly.mcdiarmid@phelps.com
bmelton@fairclothlaw.com Attorneys For Board Of Supervisors Of
kprice@fairclothlaw.com Louisiana State University And
Attorneys For Defendants, Agricultural And Mechanical College
Garrett “Hank” Danos, Robert “Bobby”
Yarborough, And Stanley Jacobs
J. Christopher Zainey, Jr.
Larry English The Lambert Firm, PLC
Attorney at Law 701 Magazine St.
423 W. 127 Street, 7th Floor New Orleans, LA 70130
New York, NY 10027 Phone: 504-581-1750
Englishlaw2008@gmail.com czainey@thelambertfirm.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Attorney for Les Miles
Bridgett Brown Tammye C. Brown

BROWN & ASSOCIATES Campbell Brown Law & Consulting
418 DeSoto Street 1220 E. Northside Drive, Suite 170-176
Alexandria, LA 71301 Jackson, MS 39211
Lawyer4u.bridgett@gmail.com tbrown@campbellbrownlaw.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Attorney for Plaintiff
/s/ J.E. Cullens, Jr.

#100522561v15 5
Appendix F
Appendix G
Appendix H
SHARON LEWIS SUIT NO.: C-708092 SEC.: 23

VERSUS
PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY, ET AL STATE OF LOUISIANA
FILED: ______________________ ______________________________

DEPUTY CLERK
MOTION TO LEAVE TO FILE CORRECTED COPY OF PLAINTIFF’S

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SECOND MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE
TIMOTHY E. KELLEY
Plaintiff Sharon Lewis through undersigned counsel, files this Motion To Leave to File
the attached Corrected Copy of Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion To Recuse
replacing Original Memorandum in Support filed on July 14, 2022 for the following reason:
1.
The Original Memorandum in Support contained several typos that were corrected.
2.
Plaintiff’s Counsel mistakenly failed to attach Exhibit 1 referenced in Footnote 1 and
Exhibit 2 referenced in Footnote 18 in Original Memorandum in Support.
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the
attached Corrected Copy be filed in the record replacing Plaintiff’s Original Memorandum In
Support filed on July 14, 2022.
/s/ Larry English

LARRY ENGLISH, ATTORNEY AT LAW
917-531-3909
englishlaw2008@gmail.com
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above has this day been served
on all known counsel of record by electronic mail and placing a copy of same, postage prepaid and
properly addressed in the Electronic mail to all Defense Counsels of Record, this 15th day of July,
2022.
/s/Larry English
OF COUNSEL
1
SHARON LEWIS SUIT NO.: C-708092 SEC.: 23

VERSUS
PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY, ET AL STATE OF LOUISIANA
FILED: ______________________ ______________________________

DEPUTY CLERK
ORDER
Considering the foregoing Motion To Leave To File Corrected Copy of Plaintiff’s
Memorandum in Support of her Motion To Recuse replacing the original filed in the record on
July 14, 2022.
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Sharon Lewis Motion To Leave To File Corrected Copy
of Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of her Motion To Recuse replacing the original filed in
the record on July 14, 2022 is hereby granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Baton Rouge, Louisiana this ______ of______________2022.
__________________________________
HONORABLE TIMOTHY KELLEY
JUDGE
2
19th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH
STATE OF LOUISIANA
SHARON LEWIS CIVIL SUIT NO: C-708092
V.
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY, ET. AL. SECTION 22
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT TO MOTION TO RECUSE
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:
Plaintiff in her Motion To Recuse has requested the court stay these proceedings until the
transcripts of the May 26, 2022 hearings on Taylor Porter Defendants Exceptions of No Cause of
Action, No Right of Action and Prescription and Motion for Article 863 Sanctions on February 8,
2022, Recusal Hearing are completed and Plaintiff can properly brief her Motion to Recuse. The
trial court cannot make an objective decision on Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse without reviewing
the May 26, 2022 and February 8, 2022 transcripts. Plaintiff respectively request that this matter
be stayed until she can file a Memorandum in Support that incorporate the May 26, 2022 and
February 8, 2022 transcripts. In support Plaintiff offers the following:
LAW AND ARGUMENT
La. C.C.P. Art. 151(A)(4) provides, in pertinent part: “A judge of any court, trial or
appellate, shall be recused when he: Is biased, prejudiced, or interested in the cause or its outcome
or biased or prejudiced toward or against the parties or the parties' attorneys or any witness to such
an extent that he would be unable to conduct fair and impartial proceedings.” La. C.C.P. Art.
151(B) states: A judge of any trial or appellate court shall also be recused when there exists a
substantial and objective basis that would reasonably be expected to prevent the judge from
conducting any aspect of the cause in a fair and impartial manner. Louisiana Code of Judicial
Conduct Canon 3, further provides "a judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned and further provides that "[a] judge shall
perform the duties of the office impartially and diligently." Daurbigney v. Liberty Personal Ins.
Co., et al, 18-929, (La. App. 3 Cir. 05/09/2019) 272 So.3d 69 provides, “[r]ecusal is required when,
objectively speaking, ‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is
too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”’ Rippo, ___ U.S. at ___ (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at
47). This principle flows from the case of Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, which, quoting In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625 (1955), stated, “[n]ot only is a biased decision maker
1
constitutionally unacceptable but ‘our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness.’’’ (Emphasis added.). Louisiana Supreme Court further provides that
under Rippo’s mandate to be applied in Louisiana courts, “evidence of actual bias is not necessary
to require recusal.” Id.
On a Zoom status conference on December 3, 2021, Judge Kelley disclosed his 40-year
friendship and a prior attorney-client relationship with Michael Walsh, a partner at the Taylor
Porter law firm, and that Mr. Walsh represented him in his divorce. On the Zoom status call
representing TP Defendants was J. Cullens, a named partner with Walters, Papillion, Thomas and
Cullens LLC. Darrell Papillion, also a named partner at the firm, is co-counsel of record for TP
Defendants. Papillion and Cullens, in their pleadings, list Walters, Papillion, Thomas and Cullens
LLC as their law firm. 1 At the status conference, Judge Kelley requested that all counsels submit
a written objection or waiver of conflict to the court in light of his disclosure.
After further research Plaintiff’s counsel determined that Judge Kelley at the status
conference knowingly failed to disclose to litigants that Walters, Papillion, Thomas and Cullens
LLC represented him in the matter of Kelley v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am 168 So.3d. 528 (1st Cir. 2014),
in which he received a personal injury judgment of $422,500.00. Plaintiff filed Motion To Recuse
Judge Kelley in accordance with La. Code Civ. Proc. Art. 151(A)(4) and (B).
On February 8, 2022, the matter came for a hearing and Judge Kelley testified that Attorney
Edward Walters was the lawyer that handled his case, and he did not recognize Cullens, even
though Darrell Papillion is listed as an attorney of record in his personal injury case.2 Despite this
obvious conflict, Judge Kelley assured the trial court and Plaintiff that he could be fair and
impartial. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s recusal motion.
Despite Judge Kelley assurances, without any basis of fact in law 3, Judge Kelley granted
TP Defendants Exceptions and Sanctions. He falsely accused Plaintiff’s counsel of manufacturing
his LRA claims and violating the Rules of Professional Conduct. He then sanctioned Plaintiff’s
counsel in part for engaging in speech 4 protected by the First Amendment, Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991), 5 even though Article 863 deals exclusively with Plaintiff’s
1
See Request For Notice attached as Exhibit 1: Realizing that having the firm’s name on their pleadings would
highlight their conflicts, Cullens’ and Papillion dropped the name from their signature block.
2
It is not plausible that Judge Kelly after reading the pleadings filed up until that point was not aware Papillion was
a co-counsel of record and that Cullens was partner in Walters, Papillion, Thomas and Cullens LLC.
3
A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. Louisiana Judicial Cannon 3(A)(1)
4
See copy of Plaintiff’s counsel interview(s) to local media attached to TP Defendants Sanctions motion.
5
The Supreme Court held that a lawyer has a First Amendment Right to speak to the press to “protect the rights of
his client and prevent abuse of the courts.” Id. at 1058
2
pleadings. Further, he sanctioned Plaintiff’s counsel for not calling Stanley Jacobs to determine
whether he made comments in Sports Illustrated, 6 even though Jacobs was represented by legal
counsel.7 He adopted TP Defendants Memorandums in Support of their Exceptions and Sanctions. 8
No reasonable trier of fact reviewing the mountain of documents and evidence in the record would
conclude that Plaintiff manufactured her LRA claims and her attorney violated Article 863.
Judge Kelley adopted the narrative TP Defendants are pushing in state court that Plaintiff’s
counsels are unethical and incompetent. At the May 26, 2022 hearing, TP Defendants lead
counsel, J. Cullens, called Attorney Larry English “sophomoric” 9 and Attorneys Bridget Brown
and Tammye Brown the “Brown Sisters.”10 Judge Kelley remained quiet as Cullens littered the
sanctity of his courtroom11 with dog whistles, that beckoned to a time where African-American
lawyers’ competence were routinely questioned, 12 and their presence in the courtroom was treated
with open contempt.13 The TP Defendants in their Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s
motion for recusal doubled-down unapologetically defended calling a 66 year-old African-
American Attorney “sophomoric” and two African-American Female lawyers the “Brown
Sisters”14 in open court15. Unable to rebut the overwhelming facts in the record against them, TP
Defendants Counsels continue to inject coded racial language into the proceedings that aligned
6
Supra
7
Jacobs in his filings in state court has never disputed this fact.
8
When Plaintiff’s counsel raised that it was improper and unfair to adopt Defendants Memorandums in Support as
his written reasons, Judge Kelley dismissed Plaintiff’s objections. Judge Kelley allowed his prior relationships with
the law firms Taylor Porter and Walters, Papillion, Thomas and Cullen LLC to influence his conduct and judgment.
Louisiana Judicial Canon 2(B).
9
Webster Dictionary define sophomoric as “conceited and overconfident of knowledge but poorly informed and
immature; lacking in maturity, taste, or judgment”. This was done to push the narrative that Attorney Larry
English, who has practiced criminal law in federal and state court for thirty years and was at the center of a
landmark U.S. Supreme Court death penalty case (https://harvardlawreview.org/2018/11/mccoy-v-louisiana/ ),
lack the “maturity” and “judgment” to understand complex RICO litigation.
10
The demeaning of Plaintiff’s two accomplished African-American attorneys in open court by a fellow member
of the bar, without consequences , undermines Plaintiff’s ability to receive a fair trial.
11
A judge shall maintain order and decorum in judicial proceedings. Louisiana Judicial Cannon 3(A)(2); A judge
shall take appropriate disciplinary measures against a lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge
becomes aware. Louisiana Judicial Cannon 3(B)(3)
12
The second African-American lawyer to practice in Louisiana was Louis A. Bell, a 29-year-old graduate from
Howard University’s law school, who was admitted to the Bar in New Orleans in 1871. When he died at the age of
32, the New Orleans Weekly Louisianian, Oct. 10, 1874, printed a story entitled “A Colored Attorney, Obituary,
Louis A. Bell” stated: “colored lawyers will for a long time be few and far between, and for obvious reasons their
field of practice must be limited.” https://www.lsba.org/documents/publications/BarJournal/Journal-Feature2-
August2005.pdf
13
See Emancipation: The Making of the Black Lawyer, 1844-1944. J Clay Smith Jr. (Author) Thurgood Marshall
(Contributor); https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-celebration-of-black-lawyers-past-and-present;
14
What Mr. Cullens and Mr. Black fail to understand is that if the attorneys last names were “Green”, it would be
offensive to call them the “Green Sisters” in open court. It was not that Plaintiff’s counsels names were a shade of
color: African-Americans have earned the right and the Rules of Professional Conduct require they be addressed as
“Attorney” or “Counselor” in an open court and not be subjected to racially coded taunts. That Mr. Cullens and Mr.
Black chose defend this offensive conduct in their Memorandum only goes to show the legal nihilism that Judge
Kelley bias has allowed to flower in his court. An impartial court would sanction them for this behavior.
15
Plaintiff urge the court to speak with his African-American colleagues and ask if Cullens comments were
offensive?
3
with Judge Kelley’s ruling Plaintiff and her legal counsel made up her LRA claims. 16 But if the
attack on Plaintiff and her legal team humanity was not enough17, the TP Defendants are now
using Judge Kelly improper imposition of Article 863 sanctions to intimidate Plaintiff into
dropping her claims against them.18
No reasonable trier of facts reviewing Plaintiff’s complaints and the hundreds of pages
of exhibits attached would have found Article 863 sanctions were warranted in this matter.
Judge Kelley failed to apply the facts to the law in this case:
The Louisiana Racketeering Act19 (LRA) is modeled after the Federal Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations (`RICO') Act. " State v. Touchet, 759 So. 2d 194, 197 (La. App. 3 Cir.
4/5/00). Therefore, federal decisions regarding RICO are persuasive when interpreting the LRA.
Id.; CamSoft Data Sys., Inc. v. Elecs. Supply, Inc. 2019 La. App. Unpub. LEXIS 203 at p.9 (citing
Maedaa v. K.A.P. Enterprises, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167127, at p. 6 (W.D. La. 12/1/14)). While
the LRA is modeled after RICO there are substantial differences:
Table I.
LRA RICO
Racketeering means committing, attempting to A person who violated or conspired to violate 1962 (a)
commit, conspiring to commit, or soliciting, coercing, (b) or (c).
or intimidating another person to violate the LRA.
Enterprise means any individual, sole proprietorship, Enterprise is any individual, partnership, corporation,
partnership, corporation or other legal entity, or any association or other legal entity, and any union or
unchartered association, or group of individuals group associated in fact, although not a legal entity.
associated in fact and includes lawful enterprises and §1961 (4). Governments cannot be a enterprise.
governmental as well as other entities.
Pattern of Racketeering is at least two incidents of At least two predicate acts within a ten year period and
racketeering provided the last such incident occurs must be separated by a reasonable amount of time.
within five years after the prior incident of racketeering
activity.
LRA Defendant may be employed by or associated RICO Defendant must be separate and distinct from the
with the enterprise and must knowingly conduct, criminal enterprise. Defendant must participate in the
participate in, directly or indirectly in the enterprise operation and management of the criminal enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering.
Plaintiff has a claim if she is injured by any reason of Injury must be the direct and proximate cause from a
any violation of the predicate act and shall have a cause violation of the predicate act.
of action against any person engaged in racketeering
activity who violates LRA.
Damages include three times the actual damages Economic Damages only. Treble damages and attorney
sustained or ten thousand dollars, whichever is greater. fees.
Plaintiff shall also recover attorney fees in trial,
appellate courts and cost of investigation and litigation
reasonably incurred.
16
This plays into the racial stereotype that African Americans cannot be trusted because they are by nature
untrustworthy and mentally immature.
17
This is consistent actions of TP Defendants documented in the Husch Blackwell Report were women who
reported sexual assault were seen as threats to their hold on LSU athletics rather than victims. Interjecting race is
just part of the playbook. See https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/01/09/recy-taylor-oprah-
winfrey-and-the-long-history-of-black-women-saying-metoo/
18
See June 21, 2022 from TP Defendants to Plaintiff’s counsels attached as Exhibit 2
19 La. R.S. 15:1351 et al
4
Prescription commences anytime within five years after Injury Discovery Rule
the conduct in violation of the LRA terminates or the
cause of action accrues
Defendants liable in solido Defendants liable in solido
1353 (d) prohibits a person from conspiring to violate 1962 (d) prohibits a person from conspiring to violate
1353 (c) 1962 (c)
No Heightened Pleading Requirement For LRA Rule 9 Heightened Pleading Requirement For RICO
Pleadings Pleadings.
The language of La. R.S. 15:1351 et al is clear and unambiguous. When a law is clear and
unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied as
written, with no further interpretation made in search of the legislative intent. Swat 24 Shreveport
Bossier Inc., v. Bond, 808 So.2d 294, 302 (La. 2001). “A long line of jurisprudence holds that
those who enact statutory provisions are presumed to act deliberately and with full knowledge of
existing laws on the same subject, with awareness of court cases and well-established principles
of statutory construction, with knowledge of the effect of their acts and a purpose in view, and that
when the Legislature changes the wording of a statute.” Borel v. Young, 989 So.2d 42, 48 (La.
2007). As Table I shows the Louisiana Legislature purposely wrote the LRA to be more expansive
than the Federal RICO statute. Under Louisiana law the RICO statues are to be liberally construed
to effectuate its remedial purposes. State v. Davenport 316 So.2d 888, 947 (La. 4th Cir. 2017)
(citing Boyle v. United States 556 U.S. 938 (2009)).
In granting TP Defendants Exceptions 20 and Article 863 Sanctions21, Judge Kelley ignored
the facts and law supporting Plaintiff’s LRA claims:
A. Plaintiff Stated A Cause Of Action TP Defendants violated the LRA.
The determination of specific criminal intent is a question of fact and may be inferred from
circumstances and actions of the defendant." State v. Lang, 128 So.3d 330 (La. 5th Cir. 2013).22
Specific intent exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the
prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act. State v. Lindsey, 543 So.2d 886 (La.1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074, 110 S.Ct. 1796, 108 L.Ed.2d 798 (1990); State v. McCray, 621 So.2d
94 (La. App. 2d Cir.1993).
1. The TP Defendants conspired to violate La. R.S. 14:132.
The essential elements of R.S. 14:132 (injuring public records) as they pertain to Plaintiff’s
LRA claims are as follows:
20
Plaintiff Memorandum in Opposition to TP Defendants Exception
21
Plaintiff Memorandum in Opposition to TP Defendants Sanctions
22
"A plaintiff advancing a claim under civil RICO is not required to establish that the defendant was or will be
criminally convicted under RICO." Sedima, S. P. R. L. v . Imrex Co., Inc., et al 473 U.S. 488-89 (1985)
5
1. Intentional removal or concealment;
2. of a public record;
3. that the public record had been filed or deposited;
a. The Miles Report
The Miles Report written by TP Defendants clearly states the LRA Defendants intentions
to unlawfully conceal the Miles Report in TP Defendants, Ginsberg (Ginsberg) and Hardin
(Hardin) law offices. Mendoza v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 77 So.3d 18, 23 (La. App. 2011).
Plaintiff draws the court’s attention specifically to the Taylor Porter Memo To File 23 (TP Memo)
and Miles Disciplinary Letter 24 (MDL) within the Miles Report. The TP Memo states:
“Following a comprehensive discussion of the attachments, all copies were returned to
Taylor Porter to maintain in its file… Also, those present 25

agreed that this was
appropriate administrative action that could and should be taken without further review
of the full Board. 26
TP Defendants stated in Miles Report about concealing the Miles Report from a public records
request:
“ In order to attempt to minimize the possibility of this, we suggest that the written
directive to XXX (as described above) be sent by our law firm to the law firm
representing XXX. Each law firm would maintain copies of the document in its
files.” 27
The Taylor Porter Billing Records (herein after referred to as “TPBR”) show starting on August
14, 2013, Ginsberg and TP Defendants negotiating, drafting and revising the MDL culminating in
28
its execution on August 29, 2013. The MDL executed by Hardin, Ginsberg, Barton, Crochet,
and Alleva states:
“The original and all copies of this letter will be maintained in the files of your law offices,
and undersigned counsel’s law offices only.”
23
Exhibit 1 attached to Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Sanctions
24
Exhibit 2 attached to Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Sanctions
25
Husch Blackwell Report (herein after referred to as “HBR”) p. 49 ¶ 5, p. 50 ¶ 1
26
The TPBR show that Crochet billed LSU for preparing for a meeting March 15, 2013, the same day the TP Memo
state that the LRA Defendants met and agreed to conceal the Miles Report in TP Defendants law offices and conceal
the Miles Investigation from the full Board of Supervisors.
27
See Miles Report p. 8, ¶ 3
28
See TPBR
6
Neither TP Defendants, Ginsberg nor Hardin have ever been designated as Custodian of Records
for LSU.29
After agreeing to unlawfully conceal the Miles Report, the TP Defendants and their co-
conspirators agreed to keep the knowledge of the documents secret. LRA Defendant Stanley
Jacobs (Jacobs) stated in Sports Illustrated, the TP Defendants demanded that he and other BOS
30
members keep the Miles Investigation confidential. TP Defendants, Ginsberg and Hardin
“intentionally stored offsite”31 the Miles Report in their law offices for eight years until forced to
deposit them with LSU by the courts. 32 LSU BOS member Lee Mallet stated: “Taylor Porter
should be let go and never hired again” for their concealing the Miles Report. 33 A reasonable
attorney assuming the allegations of Plaintiff’s complaints are true would conclude this satisfies
the first element of the R.S. 14:132.
The trial court in its oral and written reasons does not dispute the Miles Report is a public
document as defined by R.S. 44:1(A)(2). A reasonable attorney reviewing these facts would
conclude this satisfies the second element of R.S. 14:132.
Multiple state and federal laws and policies required the LRA Defendants to file the
documents. State v. Gomez 433 So. 2d 230, 239-240 (La. 1983). LSU PM-73 Policy required that
all documents generated in a Title IX investigation be kept in accordance with Louisiana law and
34
Federal law. La. R.S. 44.1 et seq required that the documents be deposited with the Custodian
of Records of LSU, and they were not.35 LSU PM-73 policy required that the Miles Report be
filed in his Personnel File, and it was not.36 The April 4, 2011 Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) issued
by the Department of Education (DOE) required that the Miles Report be filed with DOE Office
37
of Civil Rights (OCR), and it was not. A reasonable attorney reviewing these facts would
conclude this satisfies the final element of R.S. 14:132.
29
A custodian is defined in R.S. 44:1(A)(3) as the public official or head of any public body having custody of a
public record or a representative specifically authorized to respond to requests to inspect any such public records.
30
FAC ¶ 264; Judge Kelley stated at the sanction hearing that Plaintiff counsel could not believe what was written
in Sports Illustrated and Plaintiff counsel should have called Jacobs to verify, even though the court was required to
assume that this allegation was true.
31
HBR p. 50, ¶ 2
32
FAC ¶ 261
33
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/education/article_50b5f770-97df-11eb-950f-
3f13d1718c43.html; FAC ¶ 266
34
HBR Fn. 29; At all material times Taylor Porter Defendants advised LSU on all Title IX issues. HBR p.8 ¶7, p. 9
¶1
35
See R.S. 44:401, R.S. 44:402, R.S. 44: 410, R.S. 44:412, R.S. 44:423. The TP Defendants after concealing the
document for eight years, in 2020 were forced to deposit the documents with LSU Custodian of Records after USA
Today filed a lawsuit. See FAC ¶ 260
36
LSU PM-73 states: “Employment actions in violation of this policy will be filed in the employee’s respective
Employment Relations File”. See the link to LSU PM-73 Policy in HBR Fn. 29
37
HBR Fn. 18
7
b. Miles Settlement Documents
The TPBR38 shows the TP Defendants assisted Ginsberg in negotiating a settlement
agreement with Les Miles (Miles).39 However, the LRA Defendants intentionally concealed the
documents.40 A reasonable attorney would conclude this satisfies the first element of R.S.
14:132. Because TP Defendants billed 41 LSU for the work on the settlement negotiations, the
resulting settlement documents are public documents under R.S. 44:1(A)(2)(a). A reasonable
attorney would conclude this satisfies the second element of R.S. 14:132. The TP Defendants
were required by state and federal law and policies to deposit settlement documents with the
custodian of records of LSU.42 A reasonable Attorney reviewing these facts would conclude this
satisfies the final element of R.S. 14:132.
c. Miles predatory behavior was not protected by a right to privacy.
The trial court in its written oral and written reasons agreed with TP Defendants that
concealing the Miles Report in their law office was justified because Miles’ private attorney
“insisted on confidentiality and threatened suit if LSU violated his privacy rights.” 43 However, a
state employee being investigated for sexual misconduct in the workplace has no reasonable
expectation of privacy. Capital City Press v. East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council, 696
So.2d 562 (La. 1997); Hilburn v. State, ex rel. Division of Administration, 745 So.2d 1189 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1999). The Court in Hilburn 745 So.2d at 1190 held that the investigative report
concerning the alleged improprieties of a state employee was not entitled to protection under the
right of privacy. The Court further reasoned that facts, which concerned the “daily operation of a
public agency,” are not protected by law from disclosure, as they are not “private in nature.” Id.
Similarly, the allegations against Miles were based on sexual misconduct in the workplace and the
law did not protect the Miles Investigation from public disclosure. Id.
Additionally, the public had the right to know that the head football coach of LSU had
been accused of sexual harassment and assault. Parish Nat. Bank v. Lane, 397 So.2d 1282, 1286
(La. 1981).44 And under Title IX, even if the student requested confidentiality, LSU had the
38
TPBR dated August 13, 2013
39
FAC ¶¶ 277-281
40
FAC ¶280
41
See TPBR
42
supra
43
Trial Court Written Reasons p. 4 ¶ 1; Miles Report p. 8, ¶ 3
44
The La. Supreme Court held the right of privacy is limited by society’s right to be informed about legitimate
subjects of public interest.
8
authority to discipline and/or terminate Miles for his sexual misconduct.45 Moreover, assuming the
allegations in Plaintiff’s complaints are true, Miles and TP Defendants bribed the student for her
silence.46 Therefore, assuming the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaints are true, a reasonable trier
of facts would conclude the TP Defendants and their co-conspirators had the requisite criminal
intent to violate R.S. 14:132. State v. Lang, 128 So. 3d at 333.
2. LRA Defendants violated R.S. 14:133 (Filing or maintaining false public records)
and R.S. 14:120 (Corrupting Influence).
The essential elements of R.S. 14:133 as they pertain to Plaintiff’s LRA claims are as
follow:
1. Filing or depositing for record in any public office or with any public official, or the
maintaining as required by law, regulation, or rule, with knowledge of its falsity, of any of the
following:
2. Any document containing a false statement or false representation of a material fact.
In 2020, after USA Today filed a lawsuit for the release of the Miles Report, the TP
Defendants was forced to file the Miles Report with LSU Custodian of records, which they knew
47
contained false statements and false representations of material fact. A reasonable attorney
reviewing these facts would conclude this satisfies the first element of R.S. 14:133.
a. The Miles Report contained the following false statements and false
representation of material fact.
1. The Miles Report included the false statement and false representation of material fact
that Miles’ sexual misconduct was not a violation of applicable law. 48 The Husch Blackwell
Report disagreed.49 Athletic Director Joe Alleva (Alleva) disagreed and on April 19, 2013, the
following email50 was sent to Chancellor Williams Jenkins (Jenkins):
45
See HBR Fn. 29; LSU current PM-73 policy states: “If a respondent is an employee, LSU may also be required
to act on alleged misconduct irrespective of a complainant wishes.” p. 18-19.
46
FAC ¶¶ 271 through 281
47
48
TP Defendants knew this was false as they had advised the Athletic Department on workplace harassment. See
HBR p. 29, ¶ 5
49
HBR p. 49, ¶ 4; FAC 250
50
Id. p. 50, ¶ 3; OC ¶ 117
9
On June 21, 2012, Alleva sent the following email 51 to incoming LSU President F. King
Alexander (Alexander):
that Miles conduct was not a violation of his employment contract. As stated supra Miles’ boss
Alleva wrote an email to Jenkins and Alexander stating Miles should be terminated. 52 Before his
tenure at LSU, Miles was embroiled in a sexual scandal at Oklahoma.53 Despite these facts, TP
Defendants knowingly falsely stated in the Miles Report that Miles did not violate his employment
contract.”54
that Miles had a right to privacy that required them to conceal the Miles Report in their law offices.
As stated supra Louisiana jurisprudence is clear that a state employee being investigated for sexual
misconduct has no reasonable expectation of privacy. Hilburn 745 So.2d at 1190.
b. The TPBR contained the following false statements and false representation of
material fact:
51
Id.
52
Miles reached a private settlement with a student who accused him of sexual misconduct: FAC ¶¶ 278 through
280
53
HBR p. 51
54
A reasonable attorney reviewing Alleva emails and Miles conduct documented in the Miles Report would have
concluded that Miles violated his employment contract and recommended his termination.
10
1. The TPBR entry on March 1, 2013, characterized the complaints against Miles as a
“football HR Complaint”. However, the TP Defendants were conducting a Title IX investigation
triggered by complaints of sexual misconduct against Miles.55 TP Defendants purposely used a
generic description of complaints against Miles as to not alert the BOS, OCR, and the public to
Miles’ sexual misconduct. This was a false representation of material fact.
2. The TPBR entries on August 27, 2013, August 28, 2022, and August 29, 2022 described
the MDL as a “directive letter.” However, the MDL was a Letter disciplining Miles for
inappropriate behavior with student employees in the workplace.56 TP Defendants purposely used
a generic description of the MDL as to not alert the BOS, OCR, and the public to Miles’ sexual
misconduct. This was a false representation of material fact.
Crochet and Barton drafted and filed the Miles Report and TPBR with McKenzie’s direct
knowledge and approval of the falsity. 57 State v. Carpenter, 772 faSo.2d 200, 207 (La. 3rd Cir.
2000). Filing these false statements and false representation of material fact was a part of the LRA
common plan to conceal the Miles investigation to protect their control over LSU’s lucrative
football program.58 A reasonable attorney would conclude this satisfies the second element of
R.S. 14:133.
Therefore, a reasonable attorney assuming the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint are true
would conclude the TP Defendants had the requisite criminal intent to violate R.S. 14:133. State
v. Lang, 128 So. 3d at 333.
3. TP Defendants violated R.S. 14: 118 (public bribery).
The essential elements of R.S. 14:118 as they pertain to Plaintiff’s LRA claims are as
follows:
1. The giving or offering to give, directly or indirectly, anything of apparent present or
prospective value to any of the following persons, with the intent to influence his conduct in
relation to his position, employment, or duty:
2. Public officer, public employee, or person in a position of public authority.
3. Witness, or person about to be called as a witness, upon a trial or other proceeding before
any court, board, or officer authorized to hear evidence or to take testimony.
55
HBR pp. 47 through 53
56
It is clear from Joe Alleva’s emails to LSU leadership that Miles had been engaging in inappropriate behavior
with students for some time and had been warned by Alleva.
57
FAC ¶ 288
58
11
On May 5, 2013, Crochet and Segar attempted to pressure LSU HR Director A.G. Monaco
(Monaco) to allow the complaining student to retake a failed quiz. 59 On July 1, 2013, Crochet and
Barton met with Ginsberg, complaining student, and her father in New Orleans to negotiate a
settlement between Miles and Student. 60 A July 2, 2013 entry in the TPBR confirms that Barton
updated Alleva, Alexander and “board members” about the negotiations. 61 Miles with the direct
assistance of TP Defendants paid the complainant student to drop her complaint. A reasonable
attorney reviewing these facts would conclude the first element of R.S. 14:118 is satisfied.
The student worker, a public employee,62 was a witness in an official Title IX proceeding 63
of the DOE and potential criminal investigation. A reasonable attorney would conclude this
satisfies the second element of R.S. 14:118.
The facts here are analogous to those in State v. Hingle, 677 So. 2d 603 (La. 2nd Cir. 1996)
writ denied, 96-1969 (La.1/10/97), 685 So.2d 141. In Hingle, an attorney arranged with his clients
to pay the debts of a witness in order to influence her testimony in a criminal proceeding. The
appellate court ruled the evidence showed the attorney had specific intent to influence the witness
when he engaged in an elaborate scheme to assist his clients to pay off the witness personal debt
in exchange for favorable testimony and then camouflaged the loan payments. Id. at 608.
64
Similarly, the TP Defendants were hired to conduct an impartial investigation of Miles, who
then assisted Miles in a scheme to bribe the student worker to withdraw her complaint. 65 In acts of
camouflage (1) the TP Defendants never deposited the Miles Report and settlement documents
with LSU as required by state law66; (2) Crochet told Monaco not to disclose their conversation to
anyone67; and (3) TP Defendants demanded their LRA co-conspirators not tell anyone about the
Miles Investigation.68
59
FAC ¶¶ 273 through 276; TPBR entry by Crochet on May 5, 2013 show Crochet spoke with HR Dir Monaco.
60
FAC ¶¶ 277 through 281; HBR p.50 ¶ 2; A July 1, 2013 entry in TPBR stated Barton and Crochet met with
“coach’ counsel and family’s counsel.”
61
The TPBR show multiple emails and phone conversations between TP Defendants, Miles lawyers and student
worker and her father negotiating a settlement between Miles and student worker.
62
Student worker is a public employee under R.S. 14:2(A)(9), R.S. 14:118(B)
63
18 U.S.C. § 1515 (1)(c) defines “official proceeding” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1512 as a “proceeding before a
Federal Government Agency which is authorized by law.”.
64
HBR pp. 49-53
65
July 2, 2013 TPBR entry by Barton states” Emails with Ginsberg re: new offer”
66
This was a violation of R.S. 14: 132; supra
67
FAC ¶ 275
68
supra
12
Therefore, assuming the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaints are true, a reasonable attorney
would conclude the TP Defendants and their co-conspirators had the requisite criminal intent to
violate R.S. 14:118 and R.S. 14:120 (Corrupting Influence). 69
4. TP Defendants Defrauded LSU 14: 138 (payroll fraud).
The essential elements of R.S. 14: 138 that are pertinent to this case are:
1. Any person knowingly receive payment or compensation;
2. for services grossly inadequate for the payment;
TP Defendants submitted an invoice and did receive $80,000.00 for conducting an “impartial
investigation” of the sexual misconduct charges against Miles. 70 A reasonable attorney reviewing
the facts would conclude this satisfied the first element of R.S. 14:138.
However, McKenzie71, who was acting as LSU General Counsel, hired his law partners,
Crochet and Barton, to conduct an “impartial investigation”. This was a conflict of interest. The
April 4, 2011 Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) issued by the Department of Education (DOE) stated:
“A school’s investigation and hearing process cannot be equitable unless they are impartial.” 72
LSU’s PM-73 policy specifically stated that “Any such investigations shall be conducted by the
Campus Title IX Coordinator.”73 The HBR found that the hiring of TP Defendants was a conflict
of interest. 74
Nevertheless, McKenzie and LSU Chancellor William Jenkins (Jenkins) knowing Crochet
and Barton had not conducted an “impartial investigation” approved the fraudulent invoices for
the work the TP Defendants had not done.75 A reasonable attorney reviewing these facts would
conclude this satisfies the second element of R.S. 14:138. Therefore, a reasonable attorney
assuming the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaints are true would conclude the TP Defendants had
the requisite criminal intent to violate R.S. 14:138.
69
Corrupt influencing is the giving or offering to give anything of apparent present or prospective value to, or the
accepting or offering to accept anything of apparent present or prospective value by, any person, with the intention
that the recipient shall corruptly influence the conduct of any of the persons named in R.S. 14:118 (public bribery) in
relation to such person's position, employment, or duty.
70
FAC ¶ 290
71
HBR Fn. 132
72
HBR Fn. 131
73
See LSU PM-73 Memorandum No. 73 (PM-73) Title IX and Sexual Misconduct Policy attached as Exhibit A to
HBR.
74
FAC ¶ 247; HBR Fn. 131
75
FAC ¶ 288
13
5. LRA Defendants violated R.S. 14:122.
The essential elements of R.S. 14:122 that is pertinent to this case are:
1. The use of threats with the intent to influence her conduct in relation to her
employment, or duty of the following person:
2. Public employee
Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show LRA Defendants used threats with the intent
to influence Plaintiff from exercising her duty 76 to report complaints of sexual harassment
in the Athletic Department. In 2013, Miles threatened to punch Plaintiff in her “motherfucking
mouth” for fulfilling her duty to report allegations of sexual conduct against him. 77 In 2020,
Ausberry threatened to withhold pay raises, bonuses, and promotions from Plaintiff to influence
her not to exercise her duty to report complaints of sexual misconduct in the Athletic
Department. 78 The HBR stated about Ausberry conduct toward Plaintiff:
“In interviews with Husch Blackwell, Football Operations employees confirmed
witnessing Ausberry “hollering” and “screaming” at Lewis repeatedly over the course of
the last several years. As one employee put it, “there’s just certain things that Verge does
to Sharon. I don’t know if they think—and I don’t understand it.”79
A reasonable attorney reviewing these facts would conclude this satisfies the first element
of R.S. 14:122. Plaintiff at all material times was a public employee, and this satisfies the final
element of R.S. 14:122. A reasonable attorney assuming the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint
are true, would conclude the LRA defendants had the requisite criminal intent to violate R.S.
14:122
Assuming that the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaints are true, a reasonable trier of facts
would conclude the TP Defendants and their co-conspirators engaged in racketeering conduct, by
knowingly attempting to, conspiring to, and did violate R.S. 14:132, R.S. 14:133, R.S. 14:118, R.S
14: 120, 14:122 and R.S. 14:138 of the Louisiana Racketeering Act.
76
HBR p. 62 Fn. 160
77
FAC ¶ 327
78
FAC ¶¶ 364, 40
79
HBR Fn. 166
14
B. Plaintiff’s injuries were proximately caused by the violations of predicate acts by
LRA Defendants.
When the LRA Defendants met on March 15, 2013, and agreed to conceal the Miles Report
in TP Defendants law offices, they began an eight (8) year pattern of racketeering that violated
R.S. 15:1353 (C)80. The HBR stated about the concealing of the Miles investigation:
“It is difficult to meaningfully determine the full extent of the impact this incident and the
University’s handling of it had on the climate within the Athletics Department—both in
terms of creating a culture which tolerated sexual misconduct and dissuaded employees
from reporting that misconduct. It certainly was not positive.” 81
One impact of LRA Defendant’s conduct was that Plaintiff was specifically targeted by the
enterprise whom they determined her to be a threat. In the HBR, a long-time LSU Football staff
member stated Plaintiff was targeted for reporting Miles:
“and then—poor Sharon [Lewis] though. I mean, like I said, she had most of the brunt
of it because she was over the girls.” 82
The HBR further documented the retaliatory conduct Plaintiff faced:
The only person in the entire University who has ever been disciplined in any form for
failing to make a report under PM-73 is Athletics Department employee Sharon Lewis, a
long-time Football Operations employee and current Associate Athletic Director for
Football Recruiting and Alumni Relations. This is ironic because Lewis has lodged several
reports of sexual harassment throughout her tenure. 83
Plaintiff has plead sufficient material facts to show “direct relation between” Plaintiff’s injuries
and the LRA Defendants RICO conduct. Hemi Grp. LLC v. City of New York, 130 S.Ct. 983,989-
990 (2009) (citing Holmes v. Securities Investor 503 U.S. 258 (1992)). Plaintiff alleges that the
LRA Defendants’ RICO violations was not only the but for cause of plaintiff’s injury, but was the
proximate cause as well.” Jackson v. NAACP, 546 F. Appx. 438, 442 (5th Cir. 2013). LRA
Defendants placed Plaintiff under the direct supervision of Miles.84 Ausberry and Miles then
denied Plaintiff pay raises, promotions, and bonuses85 with the intent to drive her from her job. 86
80
supra
81
HBR p.52 ¶ 3;
82
HBR p.53 ¶ 1
83
HBR p.47 ¶ 3
84
FAC ¶ 364
85
Id.
86
When Plaintiff reported violations of Title IX she was told repeatedly go find another job. R.Doc. 219 ¶¶ 34, 38,
164, 243, 245
15
But for LRA Defendants violating R.S. 14:132 and 14:133 ,87 Miles would have been terminated
from his job88 and Plaintiff would have never been placed under his direct supervision. It was the
TP Defendants and their co-conspirators violation of the LRA that that led directly to Plaintiff’s
injuries. Molina-Aranda v. Black Magic Enters., L.L.C., 983 F.3d 779, 784–85 (5th Cir. 2020).
There is no plausible argument that Plaintiff’s economic injuries were caused by “the caprice of
chance." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Plambeck, 802 F.3d 665, 676 (5th Cir. 2015).89
Further, in 2020, Ausberry knowingly violated R.S. 14:122, which was the direct and
proximate cause of Plaintiff’s employment injuries. Id. Ausberry’s threats to Plaintiff could not
have been clearer: “You will never be promoted because you file Title IX complaints. You even
filed one against me.”90 Then in a thuggish statement that goes to the heart of the criminal
conspiracy91 Auberry told Plaintiff, “you can complain to Scott Woodward but he is my boy.” 92
This was no idle threat by a co-worker. Woodward and Ausberry had complete control over
Plaintiff’s career. 93 Assuming that the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaints are true, a trier of
fact must assume that Ausberry meant and did carry out his threat. It is simply not plausible there
was some intervening event between Ausberry’s threat and his failure to promote Plaintiff. Id.
Therefore but for Ausberry’s violation of RICO, Plaintiff would have been promoted and
Ausberry’s RICO conduct was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s economic injuries.
Moreover, the question of whether Plaintiff’s RICO injuries were the direct and proximate
cause of LRA Defendant’s violation of the LRA is a fact to be determined at trial. In determining
whether proximate cause exists for RICO standing, factors that are weighed include,
“preconceived purpose, specifically intended consequence, necessary or natural
result, reasonable foreseeability of result, the intervention of independent causes, whether the
87
supra
88
When the LSU Board of Supervisors became aware that Taylor Porter had concealed the Miles investigation in
2013 they were terminated. Upon the release of the Husch Blackwell Report Miles was terminated as the Head
Coach at Kansas( https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/31030339/les-miles-kansas-jayhawks-head-
football-coach). Upon the release of the Husch Blackwell Report F. King Alexander was forced to resign as the
President of Oregon State. (https://www.wafb.com/2021/03/23/f-king-alexander-resigns-osu/). It is reasonable to
conclude that Miles would have been terminated for sexual misconduct in light of Alleva’s emails that show Miles
had been repeatedly warned to leave the student workers alone, and he ignored Alleva’s direct warnings. See
Alleva’s emails supra.
89
The LRA Defendants in their filings have never alleged there were intervening factors that caused Plaintiff’s
economic injuries. TP Defendants do not dispute Plaintiff was injured only that her injuries were “employment-
related”.
90
FAC ¶ 80; In November 2020 Ausberry told Plaintiff “ you use the word Title IX too much and people are afraid
of you”.
91
Woodward and Ausberry were hired and promoted in the back room of Juban’s Restaurant. FAC ¶¶ 296-305
92
Woodward is LSU Athletic Director and Ausberry is LSU Athletic Director and they had complete control over
Plaintiff’s career. This was no idle threat by a co-worker.
93
From the day Woodward was hired, he never met with Plaintiff even though she was a Senior Athletic official.
FAC ¶ 311
16
defendant's acts are a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation, and the factual
directness of the causal connection.” Livingston Downs Racing Ass'n Inc. v. Jefferson Downs
Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 519 (M.D. La. 2001). Plaintiff is not required to prove those elements in
her pleadings. She only has to state sufficient material fact that her injuries were the direct and
proximate cause of LRA Defendants violation of the R.S. 1353 (C). Plaquemine Marine, Inc. v.
Mercury Marine, 859 So.2d 110, 115 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/25/03).
Assuming that the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaints are true, a reasonable attorney
would have concluded Plaintiff has stated sufficient material facts that LRA Defendants violation
of the LRA was the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.
C. Plaintiff’s LRA claims have not prescribed.
The trial court in its written and oral reasons wrongly concluded that Plaintiff’s LRA
claims are facially prescribed as a matter of law.” 94 La. R.S 1356(H) states in part:
“Not withstanding any other provision of law, a criminal or civil action or proceeding
under this Chapter may be commenced at any time within five years after the conduct in
violation of provisions of this Chapter terminates or the cause of action accrues.” 95
As stated supra, the Louisiana Legislature chose not to adopt the federal courts “injury
discovery rule”96 in the LRA. A straightforward reading of The LRA clearly shows that the statute
sets two prescriptive limits within which to bring a LRA action, namely five (5) years after LRA
Defendants violations of the statute terminated or Plaintiff’s cause of action accrues. Campo v.
Correa, 828 So.2d 502, 510 (La. 2002). Prescriptive statutes are strictly construed against
prescription and in favor of the obligation sought to be extinguished. Miley v. Consolidated Gravity
Drainage Dist. No. 1, 642 So.2d 693, 697 (La. 1.Cir 1994) (citing Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So.2d
624,629 (La 1992).
When presented with two possible constructions, the court should adopt the construction
which favors maintaining, as opposed to barring, an action. Id. Worm v. Berry Barn LLC, 332
So.2d 86, 88 (2021).97 As part of their common plan to conceal the Miles Investigation and target
Plaintiff the TP Defendants and their co-conspirators violation of LRA statues continued into 2021.
94
The trial court in its written reasons granting TP Defendants Exception of Prescription engaged in extensive
discussions about TP Defendants Federal RICO claims. However, the only RICO claims pending against TP
Defendants at the May 26, 2022 hearings were state LRA claims.
95
See Plaintiff Memorandum in Opposition to TP Exception of Prescription discussion of contra non valentum.
96
Love v. Nat'l Med. Enterprises, 230 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2000)
97
The Appellate court reversed the trial court granting on exception of prescription were there were two different
constructions of prescription.
17
98 Thus, when Plaintiff filed her complaint the LRA Defendants violation of the LRA had not
terminated and even if it had, Plaintiff filed her complaint well within the five year prescriptive
period. Assuming the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaints are true, a reasonable trier of facts
would have concluded Plaintiff’s complaint had not prescribed on its face and the burden of
proving Plaintiff’s claims remained with the TP Defendants. 99 The TP Defendants did not and
could not meet that burden.
Plaintiff’s Attorney First Amendment Speech
Even though Article 863 Sanctions are based explicitly on Plaintiff’s pleadings, Judge
Kelley imposed sanctions because Plaintiff’s counsel commented to the media about issues, which
were public knowledge. Judge Kelley had no authority under Article 863 to impose sanctions on
Plaintiff and her attorney for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. Gentile v.
State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). Assuming the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaints
are true, a reasonable attorney in a trial involving one of the highest profile football programs in
the country would conclude he has a duty to engage the press to “protect the rights of his client
and prevent abuse of the courts.” Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S at 1058.
Taylor Porter Billing Records Exhibit
Judge Kelley accused Plaintiff’s counsel of being creative in interpreting fraudulent mail
and wire communications. 100 This is a disingenuous argument because Plaintiff in her Federal
RICO claims 101 were required to plead with specificity the time, place, content and person(s) using
mail and wire to further their fraudulent schemes. 102
Plaintiff’s counsel during his pre-trial investigation became aware of the TPBR in a news
story in the Advocate.103 A close review of each entry of the TPBR shows the TP Defendants and
their co-conspirators conspiring to violate the LRA. The first entry March 1, 2013, is conference
with Crochet, Alleva and Segar on “football HR complaint.” The billing invoices dated August
13, 2013 and September 13, 2013 show the TP Defendants and Miles attorneys negotiating and
finalizing the MDL. Assuming the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint is true, each phone call,
email or letter sent by TP Defendants from March 1, 2013 through September 30, 2013 was done
98
supra
99
Campo v. Correa, 828 So.2d at 509.
100
Plaintiff did not allege that Taylor Porter Defendants violated Federal wire and mail fraud statutes in her OC and
FAC.
101
The only party that Federal RICO claims are pending against in state court is the LSU Board of Supervisors.
102
Federal Rule Civil Procedure 9(b)
103
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/sports/lsu/article_66929b8e-8bff-11eb-bda4-175354618886.html
18
in furtherance of the criminal enterprise conspiracy to conceal the Miles Investigation and violate
the LRA. Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. at 647 (citing Schmuck v. United States,
489 U.S. at 712).
Plaintiff Motion To Recuse is Timely
La. C.C.P 154 (A) states:
“A party desiring to recuse a judge of a district court shall file a written motion therefore
assigning the ground for recusal under Article 151. This motion shall be filed no later than thirty
days after discovery of the facts constituting the ground upon which the motion is based, but in
all cases prior to the scheduling of the matter for trial.”
The Final Orders on TP Exceptions and Sanctions was issued June 20, 2022. Plaintiff filed her
Motion To Recuse on July 8, 2022 well within thirty days and before the next hearing date July
26, 2022. Daurbigney v. Liberty Pers. Ins. Co., 272 So.3d at 76.
But it is Judge Kelley’s continued presence in this case that warrants his recusal. At
Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse hearing, Judge Kelley promised despite his incurable conflict, he
would be fair and impartial. Judge Kelley broke that promise not only to Plaintiff, but the Court.
Judge Kelley is scheduled to oversee Multiple Defendants Exceptions of No Cause of Action, No
Right of Action and Prescriptions and various other motions on July 26. 2022. Judge Kelley has
already falsely accused Plaintiff’s Attorney of being incompetent and unethical. He now has no
choice but to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s pending claims at the next hearing.104.
Ms. Lewis is an African-American woman who has accused the senior partners of the
most powerful law firm in the state of engaging in racketeering conduct. The divorce of Judge
Kelley was handled by Taylor Porter and Cullens and Papillion law firm secured him a $422,500
dollar judgment. “The public trust and confidence in the judiciary is already suffering.” Id. Judge
Kelley presence in this case and his failure to admonish Cullens, reinforces far too many
Americans belief that the Courts only work for wealthy and powerful white Americans. “Looking
at this case objectively, given the optics, the tone,” and “timing” of Judge Kelley’s rulings “ it is
implausible that Plaintiff or any reasonable client under the circumstances could have trust in the
impartiality” of Judge Kelley when he has issued a ruling defending his former attorneys “ and
attacking Plaintiff’s attorneys.” Id.
"All those who minister in the temple of justice, from the highest to the lowest, should be
above reproach and suspicion. None should serve at its altar whose conduct is at variance with
104
If he does not, the Defendants will challenge his ruling at some point.
19
his obligations." Daurbigney 272 So.3d at 76 (citing State ex. rel Attorney General v. Lazarus, 1
So.361, 376 (1887). For the reasons stated surpa Judge Timothy E. Kelley presence in this case
is constitutionally unacceptable. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Judge Timothy E. Kelley should recuse himself from this case
or the matter be stayed until transcripts are complete and this matter be set for a recusal hearing
in accordance with the law.
/s/ Larry English

LARRY ENGLISH, ATTORNEY AT LAW
Telephone: (917) 531-3909
EMAIL: Englishlaw2008@gmail.com
Counsel for Plaintiff, Sharon Lewis
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th of July 2022, a copy of this pleading has been
served on all counsel of record by electronic mail.
/s/Larry English
20
Exhibit 1
Exhibit 2
Edword J. Wolters, Jr. * Speciol Counsel

Dorrel J. Popillion
Dovid Abboud Thomos
WALTERS J- Neole deGrovelles
J. Cullens "t PAPILLION O( Counsel

And16e Molherne Cullens John S. Mclindon, l-l-C
Hoyden A. Moore THOMAS Michelle McCune Sorrells, l-tC
Jennifer Wise Moroux
Rene6 C. Crosto
CULLENS Colleen C. Milfelt Business Monoger
S. Loyne lee ATTORNEYS - LAW
P:225.236.3636
' Bood Ceilified in Civil hiol Adrccocy, NBI A t:225.236.3650
I Aneicon Boord of Prolessionol Liobility At oneys
June 21 ,2022
i AWB R,Ii F,]
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND EMAIL
Sharon Lewis
c/o her attorneys of record:
Larry English
Attorney at Law
423 W, 127 Street, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10027
Certified Mail No. 7020 0640 0002 3043 1266
Albert Van-Lare
Attorney at Law
125 Maiden Lane, Suite 510
New York, NY 10038
Certified Mail No. 7020 0640 0002 3043 1273
RE Sharon Lewis v, Louisiana State University, et al.

Case No. 21-198; U.S. Middle District of Louisiana
-and-
Sharon Lewis v. Louisiana Stale Universily, el al.
Case No. 708092; Section 23; Igth Judicial District Courl
Dear Mr, English and Mr, Van-Lare:
Please share this coffespondence with your client, Sharon Lewis, by delivering a copy to
her
As you are aware, at the May 26tt'hearing before the Honorable Judge Kelley of the 19tl'
JDC in Louisiana, all of Plaintiff s claims against my clients, Vicki Crochet, Robert Barton, and
Shelby McKenzie (the "Taylor Pofter Defendants"), were dismissed with prejudice for a number
of reasons. Additionally, Judge Kelley ruled that both Sharon Lewis personally and her lead
counsel, Larry English, violated La,C.C.P. art. 863 ("Article 863") for filing and pursuing claims
against the Taylor Porter Defendants that are, in essence, unfounded in law and fact. Judge Kelley
has set a hearing on September 2,2022, to deterrnine the nature and amount of any damages to
award against Sharon Lewis personally and/or Larry English for violating Article 863.
12345 pERKrNs noao i BAToN RoucE I toutstANA i z0Br0

Sharon Lewis
June 2i ,2022
Page 2
Additionally, on June 16, 2022, federal Judge Morgan dismissed all of Plaintiff s claims
against the Taylor Porter Defendants pending in federal Court with prejudice. On September 21,
2021, my clients filed a Rule I I motion against you, Sharon Lewis, and your attorneys seeking
sanctions that are comparable to the Article 863 Sanctions that Judge Kelley may award in
September. Earlier today, my clients filed a second Rule 11 motion that addresses the unfounded
factual and legal allegations found in Plaintiff's Amended Complaints and related filings made
after our original Rule I 1 motion was filed. To date, Judge Morgan has not yet ruled on our pending
Rule 11 motions.
To date, the Taylor Porter Defendants have incurred hundreds of thousands of dollars in
attorneys' fees and expenses to defend against the unfounded claims made against them. If we are
forced to prove up our claims at the Article 863 hearing, we will most certainly seek an award of
hundreds of thousands of dollars against both Sharon Lewis and Lany English. In addition to our
attorneys' fees and expenses, we currently intend to seek all damages of any kind that are allowed
by Louisiana law. Although we have not yet expended the necessary effort and time to determine
the exact nature and full extent of our damages, suffice it to say that you (Sharon Lewis) and your
lead counsel (Larry English) are facing a potential damages award that is substantial.
We appreciate that you, Sharon Lewis, are not an attorney and we assume that you may
have relied upon the legal advice of your counsel to file and continue to pursue unfounded claims
against the Taylor Porter Defendants. We also appreciate that you may sincerely believe that you
were treated unfairly by your employer andlor others whom you interacted with during your
employment at LSU. However, as a matter of uncontested fact, my clients were never your
employer and never represented you. In essence, my clients were hired by LSU to provide legal
advice regarding incidents involving a former football coach and a student worker which occurred
rn20I3. You, Ms. Lewis, as a matter of fact and law, were not directly harmed by any of the work
that my clients performed for its client almost a decade ago. Under the circumstances, to make
public allegations that my clients engaged in criminal conduct is, as Judge Kelley stated in open
Court, "unconscionable. "
With all of that in mind, the Taylor Porter Defendants are willing to dismiss their right to
seek all damages against you personally, Ms. Lewis, if you simply dismiss all claims and appeal
rights against them in both state and federal court with prejudice and agree not to pursue them any
longer in any venue. This offer would also result in my clients dismissing their pending Rule 11
motions in federal court against you personally and forgoing any future claims for defamation or
damages against you of any kind which may exist.
My clients do, however, reserve all rights against your attorneys, including Larry English,
regardless of whether you voluntarily dismiss your claims at this time or not.
Sharon Lewis
June 21 ,2022
Page 3
This offer will remain open for fourteen (14) days from today, or until July 5, 2022, at
which time it will be immediately withdrawn without fuither notice.
After July 5, 2022,itwill be necessary for us to expend more time and effort regarding this
matter; therefore, it is likely that our potential damages against you and your counsel will increase
over time.
We thank you for your consideration of this offer
WAL PAPILLION
THO , LLC
J Jr
JEC/kr
Appendix I

Application Supervisory For Supervisory Writs Denial of Motion To Recuse Judge Timothy E. Kelley in The Matter of Lewis v. LSU Et Al #708092

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Application Supervisory For Supervisory Writs Denial of Motion To Recuse Judge Timothy E. Kelley in The Matter of Lewis v. LSU Et Al #708092

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COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEAL NO ___________________

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY ET AL

ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY WRITS FROM THE

THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY E. KELLEY

REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION

ORIGINAL APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY WRITS FILED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE……………………………………………….…5

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR DETERMINATION…………………………….…8

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR

PRAYER FOR RELIEF……………………………………………………….20

REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RELIEF……………………………………………22

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT…………………………..…………..B

MOTION TO RECUSE/MOTION TO STAY……………………………C

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT MOTION TO RECUSE AND

T P DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO

NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPLY FOR SUPERVISORY WRITS...........G

MOTION TO LEAVE TO FILE CORRECTED COPY OF

Article 5, Section 10.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 8, 2021 Plaintiff filed federal complaint against all defendants in

referred to as “TP Defendants,” “LRA Defendants” and “Defendants”). On May

Exceptions of No Cause of Action, No Right of Action and Prescription. On July

except the TP Defendants. The TP Defendants filed a limited opposition asking

BOS Motion to Stay. The court granted the request of TP Defendants.

On August 23, 2021 Plaintiff filed a motion to recuse2 against Judge

represented him in his divorce. On the call representing TP Defendants was J.

all counsels submit a written objection or waiver of conflict in response to his

After further research Plaintiff’s counsels determined Judge Kelley failed to

determined WPTC secured Judge Kelley a personal injury judgment of

$422,500.00. Plaintiff further determined Papillion and Cullens, in their initial

with La. Code of Civ. Proc. Art. 151(A)(4) and (B).

Pierre denied Plaintiff’s recusal motion. Plaintiff did not appeal.

Defendants again filed Exceptions of No Cause of Action, No Right of Action and

remain on the May 26, 2022 docket.

At the May 26, 2022 hearing after arguments on the TP Defendants

judgment as final. Judge Kelley adopted the TP Defendants memorandum in

support of their Exceptions as his written reasons.

Judge Kelly then listen to arguments on TP Defendants Article 863

Sanctions. In the hearing J Cullens called Plaintiff’s Attorney, Larry English

are both African-American as the “Brown Sisters.” Plaintiff’s counsel English

Judge Kelley granted TP Defendants motion for sanctions and stated

conduct. Judge Kelley then adopted TP Defendants memorandum in support of

On June 1, 2022 Judge Kelley issued final judgments as to TP Defendants

Motion to Appeal Judge Kelley’s final judgment granting TP Defendants

because of a backlog of court reporter transcripts.

to recuse/Motion To Stay.9 On July 15, 2022 Judge Kelley denied Plaintiff’s

Intent to Seek Supervisory Writ on denial of Motion To Recuse and Motion To

TP Defendants memorandum in opposition in full.

1. Whether the probability of actual bias on the part of Judge Timothy E.

2. Whether Judge Timothy E. Kelley committed an abuse of discretion when he

3. Whether Judge Timothy E. Kelley committed an abuse of discretion when

1. The probability of actual bias on the part of Judge Timothy E. Kelley is

2. Judge Timothy E. Kelley committed an abuse of discretion when he refused to

3. Judge Timothy E. Kelley committed an abuse of discretion when he denied

I. The probability of actual bias on the part of Judge Timothy E. Kelley

previously represented him; (6) refused to admonish and/or sanction TP

informed observer would reasonably question Judge Kelley’s impartiality: Id.

a bias in favor of his former law firms, as well as an inability to objectively

consider evidence. Likewise, Judge Kelley’s recent and shocking decisions to

reference to Plaintiff’s attorneys as “sophomoric” and the “Brown Sisters” as “not

To Recuse/Motion To Stay should be reversed and Judge Timothy E. Kelley

should be recused from this case: