Dizon-Pamintuan v People armed persons appeared from the grassy
G.R. No. 111426 portion of the lot beside the house and
July 11, 1994; J. Davide Jr.
Facts:
 On or about and during the period from February
12, to February 24, 1988, inclusive, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused (Norma
Dizon-Pamintuan), with intent of gain for herself
or for another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly buy and keep in her
possession and/or sell or dispose of the
following jewelries, to wit: one (1) set of
earrings, a ring studded with diamonds in a
triangular style, one (1) set of earrings
(diamond studded) and one (1) diamond-
studded crucifix, or all valued at P105,000.00,
which she knew or should have known to have
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery committed by Joselito Sacdalan
Salinas against the owner Teodoro and
Luzviminda Encarnacion.
 On the basis of the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Teodoro Encarnacion
(one of the offended parties), Cpl. Ignacio Jao,
Jr., and Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez
 the trial court promulgated on 16 November
1990 its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved
the guilty of the accused for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1612 beyond
reasonable doubt, the accused Norma Dizon-
Pamintuan is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of prision mayor  to
NINETEEN (19) YEARS of reclusion temporal.
No civil liability in view of the recovery of the
items, subject-matter of this case.
 Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary,
Department of Public Works and Highways
testified that he has just arrived at his residence
located at Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque
at around 9:45 p.m. of February 12, 1988
coming from the Airport and immediately
proceeded inside the house, leaving behind his
driver and two housemaids outside to pick-
up his personal belongings from his case. It
was at this point that five unidentified masked
poked their guns to his driver and two
helpers and dragged them inside his house.
That the men pointed a gun at him and was
made to lie face down on the floor. The other
occupants, namely his wife, the maids and
his driver were likewise made to lie on the
floor. Thereafter, the robbers ransacked the
house and took away jewelries and other
personal properties including cash. After the
intruders left the house he reported the matter
immediately to the police. He was then
interviewed by the Parañaque police and was
informed that an operation group would be
assigned to the case.
 He likewise reported the matter to the Western
Police District on February 15, 1988. Two days
later, a group of WPD operatives came over to
his house and he was asked to prepare a list
of items of jewelry and other valuables that
were lost including a sketch of distinctive
items. He was later told that some of the lost
items were in Chinatown area as tipped by
the informer the police had dispatched. That
an entrapment would be made with their
participation, on February 14, 1988. As such,
they went to Camp Crame at around 9:00 a.m.
and arrived at the vicinity of 733 Florentino
Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at about 10:00
a.m.; that he is with his wife posed as a buyer
and were able to recognize items of the
jewelry stolen displayed at the stall being
tended by Norma Dizon Pamintuan; the
pieces were: 1 earring and ring studded with
diamonds worth P75,000 bought from
estimator Nancy Bacud (Exh. "C-2"), 1 set of
earring diamond worth P15,000 (Exh. "C-3")
and 1 gold chain with crucifix worth P3,000
 The recovery of the pieces of jewelry, on the
basis of which the trial court ruled that no civil
liability should be adjudged against the
petitioner, took place when, as testified to by
Teodoro Encarnacion, the petitioner
"admitted that she got the items but she did
not know they were stolen [and that] she
surrendered the items and gave them to [his]
wife."
 In convicting the petitioner, the trial court
made the following findings:
 The prosecution was able to prove by
evidence that the recovered items were part
of the loot and such recovered items belong
to the spouses Encarnacion, the herein
private complainants. That such items were
recovered by the Police Officers from the
stall being tended by the accused at that
time. Of importance, is that the law provides
a disputable presumption of fencing under
Section 5 thereof, to wit:
 Mere possession of any goods, article, item
object, or anything of value which has been
the subject of robbery or thievery shall
be prima facie  evidence of fencing.
 There is no doubt that the recovered items
were found in the possession of the accused
and she was not able to rebut the
presumption though the evidence for the
defense alleged that the stall is owned by
one Fredo. A distinction should likewise be
made between ownership and possession in
relation to the act of fencing. Moreover, as to
the value of the jewelries recovered, the
prosecution was able to show that the same
is Ninety Three Thousand Pesos
(P93,000.00).
 The Court of Appeals disposed of the first issue
in this wise:
 The guilt of accused-appellant was established
beyond reasonable doubt. All the elements of
the crime of fencing in violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law of 1979 (P.D. No. 1612), to wit:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been
committed;
2. A person, not a participant in said crime,
buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells; or in any manner deals in any article or
item, object or anything of value;
3. With personal knowledge, or should be
known to said person that said item, object
or anything of value has been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
4. With intent to gain for himself or for
another;
have been established by positive and
convincing evidence of the prosecution . . .
 The fact that a crime of robbery has been
committed on February 12, 1988 is
established by the testimony of private
complainant Teodoro T. Encarnacion who
immediately reported the same to Parañaque
Police Station of the Southern Police District
(TSN, Hearings of October 3, 1988, November
9, 1988 and January 11, 1989; Exh. A) and
submitted a list and sketches of the jewelries
robbed, among other things, from their
residence located at Better Living
Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila.
 The second element is likewise established by
convincing evidence. On February 24, 1988,
accused-appellant was found selling the
jewelries (Exhs. C-2, C-3 and C-4) which was
displayed in a showcase in a stall located at
Florentino Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
[Testimonies of Teodoro Encarnacion (id.
supra); Cpl. Ignacio Jao (TSN, Hearing of
February 13, 1989) and Pfc. Emmanuel
Sanchez (TSN, Hearing of June 4, 1989)].
 On the element of knowledge that the items are
derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery and of intent to gain for herself or for
another, the Anti-Fencing Law provides:
 Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. — Mere
possession of any good, article, item, object, or
anything of value which has been the subject of
robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence
of fencing.
 Knowledge and intent to gain are proven by
the fact that these jewelries were found in
possession of appellant and they were
displayed for sale in a showcase being
tended by her in a stall along Florentino
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.9
 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals was of
the opinion that there was not enough
evidence to prove the value of the pieces of
jewelry recovered, which is essential to the
imposition of the proper penalty under
Section 3 of P.D.
No. 1612. It opined that the trial court erred in
concluding that "the value of the recovered
jewelries is P93,000.00 based on the bare
testimony of the private complainant and the
self-serving list he submitted
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the decision of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila finding the petitioner guilty of the
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No.
1612) but set aside the penalty imposed and
ordered the trial court to receive additional
evidence on the "correct valuation" of the pieces
of jewelry involved for the sole purpose of
determining the penalty to be imposed.
Held:
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No.
1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is "the act of any
person who, with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy
and sell, or in any manner deal in any article,
item, object or anything of value which he
knows, or should be known to him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft."
Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be
prosecuted for and held liable as
an accessory, as the term is defined in
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. The
penalty applicable to an accessory is
obviously light under the rules prescribed in
Articles 53, 55, and 57 of the Revised Penal
Code, subject to the qualification set forth in
Article 60 thereof. Noting, however, the
reports from law enforcement agencies that
"there is rampant robbery and thievery of
government and private properties" and that
"such robbery and thievery have become
profitable on the part of the lawless elements
because of the existence of ready buyers,
commonly known as fence, of stolen
properties," P.D.
No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy
penalties on persons who profit by the
effects of the crimes of robbery and theft."
Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of
robbery and theft could be prosecuted as
such under the Revised Penal Code or under
P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he
ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes
a  principal  in the crime of fencing. Elsewise
stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on
the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are
separate and distinct offenses. 13 The state
may thus choose to prosecute him either
under the Revised Penal Code or P.D. No.
1612, although the preference for the latter
would seem inevitable considering that
fencing is a  malum prohibitum, and P.D. No.
1612 creates a presumption of fencing 14 and
prescribes a higher penalty based on the
value of the property.15
The elements of the crime of fencing are:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been
committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or
accomplice in the commission of the crime
of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells
or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or
anything of value, which has been derived
from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known
that the said article, item, object or anything
of value has been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent
to gain for himself or for another.
In his book on constitutional law, 22 Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz said:
Nevertheless, the constitutional presumption
of innocence may be overcome by contrary
presumptions based on the experience of
human conduct [People vs. Labara, April 20,
1954]. Unexplained flight, for example, may
lead to an inference of guilt, as 'the wicked
flee when no man pursueth, but the
righteous is as bold as a lion. Failure on the
part of the accused to explain his possession
of stolen property may give rise to the
reasonable presumption that it was he
himself who had stolen it [U.S. vs. Espia, 16
Phil. 506]. Under our Revised Penal Code, the
inability of an accountable officer to produce
funds or property entrusted to him will be
considered prima facie evidence that he has
appropriated them to his personal use [Art.
217]. According to Cooley, the constitutional
presumption will not apply as long as there is
"some rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the
inference of one fact from proof of another shall
not be so unreasonable as to be purely arbitrary
mandate" [1 Cooley, 639].
The petitioner was unable to rebut the
presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied
solely on the testimony of her brother which was
insufficient to overcome the presumption, and,
on the contrary, even disclosed that the
petitioner was engaged in the purchase and sale
of jewelry and that she used to buy from a
certain Fredo.23
Fredo was not presented as a witness and it was
not established that he was a licensed dealer or
supplier of jewelry. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612
provides that "all stores, establishments or
entitles dealing in the buy and sell of any good,
article, item, object or anything of value obtained
from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof,
shall before offering the same for sale to the
public, secure the necessary clearance or permit
from the station commander of the Integrated
National Police in the town or city where such
store, establishment or entity is located." Under
the Rules and Regulations24 promulgated to
carry out the provisions of Section 6, an
unlicensed dealer/supplier refers to any person,
partnership, firm, corporation, association or any
other entity or establishment not licensed by the
government to engage in the business of dealing
in or supplying "used secondhand articles,"
which refers to any good, article, item, object or
anything of value obtained from an unlicensed
dealer or supplier, regardless of whether the
same has actually or in fact been used.
We do not, however, agree with the Court of
Appeals that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the actual value of the recovered articles.
As found by the trial court, the recovered articles
had a total value of P93,000.00, broken down as
follows:
a) one earring and ring studded with diamonds
(Exh. "C-2") — P75,000.00
b) one set of earring (Exh. "C-3") — P15,000.00
c) one gold chain with crucifix (Exh. "C-4") —
P3,000.00
These findings are based on the testimony of
Mr. Encarnacion 25 and on Exhibit "C,"26 a list of
the items which were taken by the robbers on 12
February 1988, together with the corresponding
valuation thereof. On cross-examination, Mr.
Encarnacion re-affirmed his testimony on direct
examination that the value of the pieces of
jewelry described in Exhibit "C-2" is
P75,000.0027 and that the value of the items
described in Exhibit "C-3" is P15,000.00,
although he admitted that only one earring —
and not the pair — was recovered. 28 The cross-
examination withheld any question on the gold
chain with crucifix described in Exhibit "C-4." In
view, however, of the admission that only one
earring was recovered of the jewelry described
in Exhibit "C-3," it would be reasonable to
reduce the value from P15,000.00 to P7,500.00.
Accordingly, the total value of the pieces of
jewelry displayed for sale by the petitioner and
established to be part of the proceeds of the
robbery on 12 February 1988 would be
P87,000.00.
Section 3(a) of P.D. No. 1612 provides that
the penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon the accused if the value of the
property involved is more than P12,000.00
but does not exceed P22,000.00, and if the
value of such property exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty of  prision mayor should be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional P10,000.00; the total
penalty which may be imposed, however,
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
the penalty shall be termed reclusion
temporal and the accessory penalty
pertaining thereto provided in the Revised
Penal Code shall also be imposed. The
maximum penalty that can be imposed in this
case would then be eighteen (18) years and
five (5) months, which is within the range
of reclusion temporal maximum. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence law which allows
the imposition of an indeterminate penalty
which, with respect to offenses penalized by
a special law, shall range from a minimum
which shall not be lower than the minimum
prescribed by the special law to a maximum
which should not exceed the maximum
provided therein, the petitioner can thus be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
 ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor maximum, as minimum to
eighteen (18) years and five (5) months
of reclusion temporal  maximum
as maximum, with the accessory penalties
corresponding to the latter.
Mariano Lim v People
G.R. No. 211977
October 12, 2016; J. Velasco Jr.
Facts:
 That on or about January 16, 1997, in the City of
Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
accused, being then the proprietor of Basco
Metal Supply located at Matina, Davao City, with
intent to gain for himself, wilfully (sic), unlawfully
and feloniously purchased and received for
P400,000.00 one (1); unit komatsu Road
Grader with Chassis Model and Serial No. GD-
51R-100049 and bearing an (sic) Engine Serial
Number 6D951-55845 owned by Second Rural
Road Improvement Project (SRRIP) PMO-
DPWH of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, being lodged
for repair at the Facoma Compound of Poblacion
Norala, South Cotabato, and possessed the
same, knowing that said Komatsu Road Grader
was stolen, thereby committing an act of fencing
in violation of the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, to
the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid
complainant in its true value of P2,000[,]000.00.
 The prosecution presented two witnesses: (1)
Engr. Herminio Gulmatico, the project engineer
of the Second Rural Road Improvement Project
(SRRIP) PMO-DPWH of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat;
and (2) SPO4 Alfredo T. Santillana. The
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
summarized by the trial court, as follows:
 SPO4; Santillana testified that i.
[S]ometime in January 1997, he was an
investigator of the theft and robbery
section of Police Precinct No. 3, Talomo,
Davao City; ii. [I]n the afternoon of
January 31, 1997, Engr. Herminio
Gulmatico went to his office to seek
assistance in the recovery of a
Komatsu Road Grader bearing
Engine Serial Number 6D951-55 845
and Chassis No. GD-51R-100[0]49; iii.
[H]e was informed by Gulmatico that
said heavy equipment could be found
at Basco Metal Metal (sic) Supply
along Mc Arthur Highway, Davao
City; iv. [T]his information was
caused to be verified by the station
commander of said Police Precinct
and after finding out that it was
accurate, a search warrant was
applied for; and v. [T]he search
warrant was served on Basco Metal
Supply where the aforedescribed
heavy equipment was found.
Engr. Gulmatico for his part testified
that: i. [H]e is the project engineer of the
[SRRIP] PMO-DPWH of Isulan, Sultan
Kudarat; ii. [O]n July 1, 1996, he
received from Engineer Ireneo Veracion,
the former project engineer, the
aforesaid heavy equipment; iii.
[S]ometime in June of 1997 the heavy
equipment was in the Facoma
Compound in Norala, South Cotabato
undergoing repairs; iv. [Ajround the
third week of January, ; 1997, he was.
informed that the heavy equipment
was removed from that n compound
by-Petronilo Banosing; v. [H]e was
also told that the heavy equipment was
loaded on a ten wheeler truck and
brought to DaVao City particularly at
Km. 3 Mc Arthur Highway; vi. [A]rmed
with this information he proceeded to
Davao City and sought the assistance of
Talomo Police Precinct; vii. [T]he
consequent search warrant applied for
by the police officers of that precinct
was served on Basco Metal Supply
where the heavy equipment was
found.6
 Accused Mariano Lim did not present
testimonial evidence other than his and
testified, thus: i. [H]e bought the heavy
equipment from Petronilo Banosing for Four
Hundred Thousand (P400,000.00) Pesos; ii.
Banosings showed him a Certificate of
Ownership that stated that the heavy
equipment is his; and, iii. [H]e checked with
the DPWH in Manila and found out that the
subject heavy equipment is not included in
the inventory of equipment of the DPWH.
 The RTC found Lim guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of fencing under PD 1612
 In imposing the penalty, the trial court applied
the Indeterminate Sentence Law in relation to
Section 3(a) of PD 1612, based on its own
valuation of the heavy equipment considering
that the prosecution did not present any
 evidence on this matter. The trial court set the
value of the heavy equipment at one hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000) after finding that
essential parts of the engine were already
removed at the time of its discovery.
 CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
Issue:
whether or not the CA erred in
sustaining the petitioner's conviction. Central to
resolving this issue is determining whether or not
the elements of the crime of fencing were
established by the prosecution.
Held:
After a careful and thorough review of the
records, we are convinced that the trial court
erred in convicting herein petitioner.
On the first element, we find that the prosecution
failed to establish that theft had been committed.
Theft tinder Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code has been defined as the taking of
someone's property without the owner's consent,
for his personal gain, and Without committing
any violence against or intimidation of persons
or force, upon things. The elements of theft are:
(1) that there be taking of personal property; (2)
that said property belongs to another; (3) that
the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that
the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished
without the Use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon
things.15chanrobleslaw
While the CA correctly ruled that conviction
of the principal in the crime of theft is not
necessary for an accused to be found guilty
of the crime of fencing, we disagree with its
ruling that the prosecution sufficiently
proved the DPWH's ownership of the
Komatsu Grader.
During trial, the prosecution presented the
testimony of Engr. Gulmatico, the project
engineer for the SRRIP of the DPWH. Engr.
Gulmatico testified on his discovery of the theft
of one unit lyomatsu Road Grader with engine
number GD95L-558I45 allegedly owned by the
DPWH. However, except for his statement
that the subject' grader was procured by his
office, Engr. Gulmatico failed to establish his
or his office's ownership over the subject
grader.
On cross-examination, Engr. Gulmatico admitted
that he received no confirmation from the DPWH
Manila office as to who purchased the subject
grader. He merely through a memorandum
receipt, received it from the previous project
engineer.
Even the Memorandum Receipt submitted by
the prosecution and relied upon by the trial court
is wanting. Nowhere in the Memorandum
Receipt does it state that the subject grader
is owned by the DPWH. The portions which
should show the date acquired, property
number, classification number, and unit value for
the grader, were left blank. At best, the
Memorandum Receipt is a mere indicator that
the subject grader was received by Engr.
Gulmatico for his safekeeping arid responsibility.
Being the government agency in charge of
construction projects, the DPWH is expected to
have a database of all equipment and
materials it uses for easy reference of its
employees. The prosecution's failure to present
a sufficient proof of ownership of the grader
despite the  many opportunities it had to do so
places doubt on the DPWH's claim of ownership.
Thus, it cannot be said that the first element of
fencing had been established.
In fact, the prosecution even failed to
conclusively establish that the grader had been
stolen. Engr. Gulmatico's testimony on the
alleged act of theft should not be given any
weight considering that he had no personal
knowledge of the actual theft. Most, if not his
entire testimony, consisted of hearsay evidence
as he relied mostly on the information given to
him by various persons.
While under your
accountability, can
you recall if
anything happened
[with] this particular
unit?
A On January 26, 1997, I
was informed by my
driver that this said
grader was previously
lodged for repair in the
 compound of Petronilo
Banosing in the evening
of January 26, 1997.
Q Can you still recall who
informed you of the
taking of this unit by
one Petronilo Banosing?
A Yes, sir, it was my
driver because I [told]
him to visit once in a
while our area in
Nohralla.
Sec. 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides
that witnesses can testify only with regard to
facts of which they have personal knowledge;
otherwise, their testimonies would be
inadmissible for being hearsay.20 Evidence is
hearsay when its probative force depends on the
competency and credibility of some persons
other than the witness by whom it is sought to be
produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is
anchored on three reasons: (1) absence of
cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor
evidence; and (3) absence of
oath.21chanrobleslaw
Consequently, hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, has no probative value unless
it is shown that the evidence falls within any of
the exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided in
the Rules of Court.22 However, none of the
exceptions applies to the present case.
A cursory reading of Engr. Gulmatico's
testimony shows that his statements pertaining
to the alleged theft are all based on information
which he claims to have received from third
persons, all of whom were never presented to
testify under oath in court. Thus, it was
erroneous for the trial court to give probative
value on Engr. Gulmatico's testimony
considering that the truth and credibility of such
statements cannot be ascertained for being
mere hearsay.
Even assuming arguendo that theft had been
committed, the third element of fencing is
wanting in this case.
On the presumption that fencing had been
committed as provided by Sec. 5 of PD 1612, we
rule that petitioner was able to overcome the
same upon his presentation of the Affidavit of
Ownership which he secured from, Petronilo
Banosing.
Both the RTC and the CA failed to consider
that the Affidavit of Ownership given by
Petronilo Banosing to petitioner was a duly
notarized document which, by virtue of its
notarization, enjoys a presumption of
regularity.
Respondent argues that the presumption of
regularity of the notarized Affidavit of Ownership
had been overturned. We rule otherwise. As
pointed out by respondent, to overcome the
presumption of regularity of notarized
documents, it is necessary to contradict it with
"evidence that is clear, convincing and more
than merely preponderant." Contrary to
respondent's assertion, the ownership of the
subject grader was not conclusively established
by the prosecution As earlier stated, Engr.
Gulmatico was unable to confirm its ownership
in his testimony. Further, the Memorandum
Receipt also failed to establish this. Despite the
many opportunities to submit additional proof of
ownership, the prosecution failed to do so.
It appears that both the RTC and the CA
ruled that petitioner should have first
secured a Clearance or a permit from the
police, in compliance with Sec. 6 of PD 1612.
However, said provision is inapplicable to
the present case.
Clearly, the clearance stated in Sec. 6 of PD
1612 is only required if several conditions, are
met: first, that the person, store, establishment
or entity is in the business of buying and selling
of any good, articles item object, or anything of
value; second, that such thing of value was
obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier
thereof; and third, that such thing of value is to
be offered for sale to the public.
In the present case, the first and third requisites
were not met. Nowhere was it established that
petitioner was engaged in the business of buy
and sell. Neither was the prosecution able to
establish that petitioner intended to sell or was
actually selling the subject grader to the public.
Accused was engaged in the business of
buying used equipment
 Finally, we- find that the conviction of petitioner
violated his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
The Information presumes that petitioner
knew of the alleged theft of the subject
grader, pertaining to the first part of the third
element of the crime of fencing.
The trial court, however, convicted petitioner on
the ground that he should have known that the
subject grader was derived from the proceeds of
theft, pertaining to the second part of the third
element.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to
prove the first and third essential element of the
crime charged in the information. Thus,
petitioner should be acquitted due to
insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt.
People v Renato Lagat
G.R. No. 187044
September 14, 2011; J. Leonardo-De Castro
Facts:
 Accused-appellants Lagat and Palalay were
charged with the crime of Carnapping as
defined under Section 2 and penalized under
Section 143 of Republic Act No. 6539. The
accusatory portion of the Information,4 reads:
 That on or about the 12th day of April 2005, at
Santiago City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, conniving with
each other, and mutually helping one another
and with intent to gain and without the
consent of the owner thereof, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away one (1) unit
YASUKI tricycle bearing Engine No.
161FMJ41535420 and Motor No.
LX8PCK0034D002243 then driven and owned
by JOSE BIAG, valued at ₱ 70,000.00, to the
damage and prejudice of the owner thereof.
 That in the course of the commission of
carnapping, or on occasion thereof, the above-
named accused, conspiring, conniving
confederating and helping each other, and with
intent to kill, did then and there assault,
attack and wound the said JOSE BIAG with
sharp and pointed instrument directing
blows against the vital parts of the body of
the latter thereby inflicting upon him multiple
stab and hacking wounds which directly
caused the death of the said JOSE BIAG.
 Both accused proposed to plead guilty to a
lesser offense.7 In their plea-bargaining
proposal,8 they asked that they be allowed to
plead guilty to the crime of Homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and
that the mitigating circumstances of plea of
guilty and/or no intention to commit so grave
a wrong be considered in their favor. They
also asked that damages be fixed at ₱
120,000.00. This proposal was rejected9 by the
prosecution
 The prosecution first presented Florida Biag
(Florida), the wife of the victim Jose Biag
(Biag), to testify on the circumstances
leading to Biag’s disappearance and the
discovery of his body, the recovery of Biag’s
tricycle, and the expenses she incurred and
the income she had lost as a result of her
husband’s death. Florida testified that her
husband was a farmer, a barangay tanod, and a
tricycle driver.11 On April 12, 2005, at around two
o’clock in the morning, her husband left to
operate his tricycle for public use. It was around
11:00 a.m. of April 13, 2005, when news
reached her that their tricycle was with the
Philippine National Police (PNP) of the
Municipality of Alicia and that her husband
had figured in an accident. After learning of
the incident, Florida sought the help of their
Barangay (Brgy.) Captain, Heherson Dulay,
who immediately left for Angadanan without
her. At around 2:00 p.m., Brgy. Captain Dulay
informed12 Florida of what had happened to
her husband.13 Florida then presented in
court the receipts14 evidencing the expenses
she had incurred for her husband’s wake and
funeral and for the repair of their tricycle,
which was recovered with missing parts. She
also testified as to the income Biag was
earning as a farmer, a tanod, and a tricycle
driver, and claimed that his death had
caused her sleepless nights.
 The second witness for the prosecution was the
he and Brgy. Captain Dulay received Florida’s
report, they Chief Tanod of Barangay Rizal, Poe
Rumbaoa, Sr. (Rumbaoa). He testified that on
April 13, 2005, after immediately went to the
Alicia Police Station, wherein they found
 Biag’s tricycle. The PNP of Alicia showed
them the identification card recovered in the
tricycle and told them that the tricycle was
used in stealing palay from a store in
Angadanan, Isabela that belonged to a
certain Jimmy Esteban (Esteban). Rumbaoa
and Brgy. Captain Dulay were also told that the
owner of the tricycle was killed and dumped
along the Angadanan and San Guillermo
Road. They were thereafter shown the two
suspects and the place where Biag’s body
was dumped. Rumbaoa said that he was able
to identify the body as Biag’s, which was
almost unrecognizable because it was
bloated all over, only because Biag had a
mark on his right shoulder, which Rumbaoa
knew of.
  Arthur Salvador, a member of the PNP in Alicia,
took the witness stand next. He testified that on
April 13, 2005, he was on duty along with other
colleagues at the Alicia PNP Station, when they
received a report from Esteban that the cavans
of palay stolen from him were seen at Alice
Palay Buying Station in Alicia, Isabela, in a
tricycle commandeered by two unidentified male
persons. PO2 Salvador said that upon receipt of
this report, their Chief of Police composed a
team, which included him, PO2 Bernard Ignacio,
and PO2 Nathan Abuan, to verify the veracity of
the report. At Alice Palay Buying Station, they
saw the tricycle described to them by their chief,
with the cavans of palay, and the two accused,
Lagat and Palalay. PO2 Salvador averred that
he and his team were about to approach the
tricycle when the two accused
"scampered"17 to different directions
 PO2 Salvador asseverated that when they
reached the station, they asked the two accused
if they had any papers to show for both the
tricycle and the palay, to which the two accused
did not answer. They allegedly kept silent even
after they were informed of their rights not only
to remain as such, but also to have counsel,
either of their own choosing, or to be assigned to
them if they cannot afford one.
 PO2 Salvador then continued that when they
unloaded the tricycle, they discovered
bloodstains inside and outside the sidecar. He
also personally found a wallet containing the
tricycle’s Certificate of Registration and Official
Receipt18 issued by the Land Transportation
Office in the name of Jose Biag. When they
asked the two accused about their
discoveries, Lagat and Palalay voluntarily
answered that the name in the papers is that
of the owner of the tricycle, whom they killed
and dumped along Angadanan and San
Guillermo Road, when they carnapped his
tricyle.
 PO2 Ignacio averred that they were not able to
recover the murder weapon despite diligent
efforts to look for it and that they had
questioned the people at Alice Palay Buying
Station and were told that the two accused
had no other companion. PO2 Ignacio also
admitted that while they informed Lagat and
Palalay of their constitutional rights, the two
were never assisted by counsel at any time
during the custodial investigation.
 The accused filed a Motion to Dismiss on
Demurrer to Evidence25 without leave of
court26 on the ground that the prosecution failed
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Lagat and Palalay averred that their
constitutional rights on custodial investigation
were grossly violated as they were interrogated
for hours without counsel, relatives, or any
disinterested third person to assist them.
Moreover, the admissions they allegedly made
were not supported by documentary evidence.
Palalay further claimed that Rumbaoa’s
testimony showed that he had a "swelling above
his right eye" and "a knife wound in his left arm,"
which suggests that he was maltreated while
under police custody.
 They averred that aside from the alleged
admissions they had made, the prosecution had
nothing else: they had no object evidence for the
bloodstains allegedly found in the tricycle; the
murder weapon was never found; and no
eyewitness aside from the police officers was
presented to show that they were in possession
of the tricycle at the time they were arrested.
Lagat and Palalay argued that the prosecution
failed to establish an unbroken chain of events
that showed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
thus, they were entitled to enjoy the
constitutional presumption of innocence absent
proof that they were guilty beyond reasonable
doubt
 The RTC rendered a Decision finding accused
Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y
Villarosa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
qualified carnapping and hereby sentences each
of them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
They are also ORDERED TO PAY Florida Biag
the sum of Twelve thousand three hundred
 pesos (₱ 12,300.00) as actual damages plus
Fifty thousand pesos (₱ 50,000.00) for death
indemnity and another Fifty thousand pesos (₱
50,000.00) for moral damages.
After evaluating the evidence the prosecution
presented, the RTC agreed with the accused
that their rights were violated during their
custodial investigation as they had no counsel to
assist them. Thus, whatever admissions they
had made, whether voluntarily or not, could not
be used against them and were inadmissible in
evidence.31
However, the RTC held that despite the absence
of an eyewitness, the prosecution was able to
establish enough circumstantial evidence to
prove that Lagat and Palalay committed the
crime, to wit:
1. The accused were caught by the Alicia PNP in
possession of Biag’s tricycle, loaded with stolen
palay;
2. The accused ran immediately when they saw
the Alicia PNP approaching them;
3. The Alicia PNP found bloodstains on the
tricycle and Biag’s wallet with documents to
prove that Biag owned the tricycle;
4. The Alicia PNP contacted the PNP of
Santiago City to inquire about a Jose Biag, and
this was how the barangay officials of Santiago
City and Florida found out that Biag’s tricycle
was with the Alicia PNP;
5. Biag left early morning on April 12, 2005 and
never returned home;
6. The accused themselves led the Alicia PNP
and Barangay Captain Dulay and Rumbaoa to
where they dumped Biag’s body.32
 The RTC convicted Lagat and Palalay of the
crime of carnapping, qualified by the killing
of Biag, which, according to the RTC,
appeared to have been done in the course of
the carnapping
 Lagat and Palalay went36 to the Court of
Appeals, asserting that their guilt was not
established beyond reasonable doubt.37 They
averred that circumstantial evidence, to be
sufficient for a judgment of conviction, "must
exclude each and every hypothesis consistent
with innocence,"38 which was allegedly not the
case in their situation. They elaborated on why
the circumstantial evidence the RTC
enumerated could not be taken against them:
1. The accused’s possession of the tricycle
cannot prove that they killed its owner;
2. Their act of fleeing may be due to the stolen
palay (which is not the subject of this case), and
not the tricycle;
3. No evidence was given that would link the
bloodstains found in the tricycle to Biag himself.
They could have easily been Palalay’s, who was
shown to have a knife wound; and
4. The accused’s act of pointing to the police
and the barangay officials the ravine where
Biag’s body was dumped was part of their
interrogation without counsel, which the RTC
itself declared as inadmissible in evidence
 Lagat and Palalay went36 to the Court of
Appeals, asserting that their guilt was not
established beyond reasonable doubt.37 They
averred that circumstantial evidence, to be
sufficient for a judgment of conviction, "must
exclude each and every hypothesis consistent
with innocence,"38 which was allegedly not the
case in their situation. They elaborated on why
the circumstantial evidence the RTC
enumerated could not be taken against them:
1. The accused’s possession of the tricycle
cannot prove that they killed its owner;
2. Their act of fleeing may be due to the
stolen palay (which is not the subject of this
case), and not the tricycle;
3. No evidence was given that would link the
bloodstains found in the tricycle to Biag himself.
They could have easily been Palalay’s, who was
shown to have a knife wound; and
4. The accused’s act of pointing to the police
and the barangay officials the ravine where
Biag’s body was dumped was part of their
interrogation without counsel, which the RTC
itself declared as inadmissible in evidence
 CA affirmed with modification as increasing
actual damages to Php 14,900.
Issue:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT
Held:
Denied.
The elements of carnapping as defined and
penalized under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972
are the following:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other
than the offender himself;
3. That the taking is without the consent of the
owner thereof; or that the taking was committed
by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things; and
4. That the offender intends to gain from the
taking of the vehicle.45
The records of this case show that all the
elements of carnapping are present and were
proven during trial.
Lagat and Palalay’s intent to gain from the
carnapped tricycle was also proven as they were
caught in a palay buying station, on board the
stolen tricycle, which they obviously used to
transport the cavans of palay they had stolen
and were going to sell at the station. In
Bustinera, we elucidated on the concept of
"intent to gain" and said:
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal
act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the
motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the
important consideration is the intent to gain. The
term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary
benefit but also includes the benefit which in any
other sense may be derived or expected from
the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use
of the thing which was taken without the owner’s
consent constitutes gain.50
Having established that the elements of
carnapping are present in this case, we now go
to the argument of the two accused that they
cannot be convicted based on the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances
results in a moral certainty that the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, is the one who has
committed the crime.
A careful and exhaustive examination of the
evidence presented, excluding those that are
inadmissible, show that the circumstantial
evidence, when viewed as a whole, effectively
establishes the guilt of Lagat and Palalay
beyond reasonable doubt. We considered the
following pieces of evidence as convincing:
First, Lagat and Palalay were found in
possession of the tricycle the same day that it,
together with its owner Biag, was reported
missing.
Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a
palay buying station, with the stolen tricycle
packed with cavans of palay allegedly stolen in
Alicia, Isabela.
Third, Lagat and Palalay who were then on
board the tricycle, jumped and ran the moment
they saw the Alicia PNP approaching them.
Fourth, Lagat and Palalay could not explain to
the Alicia PNP why they were in possession of
Biag’s tricycle.
Fifth, Biag’s wallet and his tricycle’s registration
papers were found in the tricycle upon its
inspection by the Alicia PNP.
Sixth, Biag’s body bore hack wounds as
evidenced by the post-mortem autopsy done on
him, while his tricycle had traces of blood in it.
The foregoing circumstantial evidence only leads
to the conclusion that Lagat and Palalay
conspired to kill Biag in order to steal his tricycle.
Direct proof that the two accused conspired is
not essential as it may be inferred from their
conduct before, during, and after their
commission of the crime that they acted with a
common purpose and design.54 The pieces of
evidence presented by the prosecution are
consistent with one another and the only rational
proposition that can be drawn therefrom is that
the accused are guilty of killing Biag to carnap
his tricycle.
When a person is killed or raped in the course of
or on the occasion of the carnapping, the crime
of carnapping is qualified and the penalty is
increased pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act
No. 6539, as amended:
Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person
who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section Two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken,
be punished by imprisonment for not less than
fourteen years and eight months and not more
than seventeen years and four months, when
the carnapping is committed without violence or
intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and
by imprisonment for not less than seventeen
years and four months and not more than thirty
years, when the carnapping is committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or force upon things; and the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or
on the occasion thereof. (As amended by R.A.
No. 7659.) (Emphasis ours)
As there was no aggravating circumstance
attendant in the commission of the crime, the
RTC properly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
People v Enrile Donio
G.R. No. 212815
March 1, 2017; J. Peralta
Facts:
 Accused-appellant Enrile Donio y
Untalan (Donia) was charged with violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539, otherwise known
as AntiCarnapping Act of 1972, as amended
by R.A. No. 7659. Co-accused Val
Paulino (Paulino) and one
@Ryan (Ryan),  both remains at-large, were
similarly charged. The accusatory portion of
the Information reads:
 That on or about the 26th day of November
2003, in the Municipality of Mabalacat, Province
of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with
intent of gain and without the knowledge and
consent of the owner, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away with them one (1) Honda TMX 155
tricycle, colored black and with Body [No.]
817, valued at Ninety-Six Thousand
([P.]96,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency,
and on the occasion thereof, Raul L. Layug,
being the driver and owner of the said Honda
TMX 155 tricycle, was killed with the use of a
mini jungle bolo.
 At his arraignment, Donio, assisted by his
counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged
 Six police officers of the Concepcion Police
Station, Tarlac City, headed by SP04
Leodegario Taberdo (SP04 Taberdo ),
conducted a checkpoint along the junction of
MacArthur Highway in relation to the
campaign of the Philippine National Police
against hijacking, camapping, and
kidnapping, hailing cargo trucks and closed
vans, and issuing cards to southbound
vehicles.5
 At 2:30 in the morning on November 26, 2003, a
speeding tricycle abruptly stopped a few
meters from the checkpoint and caught the
attention of the police officers. SP04 Taberdo
and two others approached the vehicle. The
driver, later identified as Donio, was
noticeably agitated while repeatedly kicking
the starter of the tricycle. When asked for his
identity, he introduced himself as Raul
Layug (Raul)  and then handed to SP04
Taberdo a temporary license bearing the said
name. The police officers asked the driver and
 his companions, co-accused Paulino and Ryan,
to bring the vehicle, a Honda TMX 155
tricycle with Body No. 817, to the checkpoint
when they failed to produce its certificate of
registration and the official receipt.6
 Upon visual search of the vehicle, they
discovered a bloodstained mini jungle bolo
inside. They seized the tricycle and the bolo,
and then brought the three to the police
station. At 9 o'clock in the morning, Donio
asked permission to leave in order to get the
registration papers. The officers allowed him,
however, he did not return
 In a Decision dated November 4, 2013, the CA
 Meanwhile, around 6:30 in morning of the same
date, Rodrigo Layug (Rodrigo) was searching
for his brother Raul, the victim, who has not
returned home since last night. Raul was the
driver of Rodrigo's Honda TMX 155 tricycle with
Body No. 817. Rodrigo met with his tricycle
driver cousin from Mawaque to ask him if he saw
his brother. His cousin accompanied him to
Barangay Madapdap where they found the
remains of Raul. Words spread about his
death. Thereafter, a tricycle driver informed
them that he saw a vehicle similar to
Rodrigo's at the Concepcion Police Station.
Rodolfo, Raul and Rodrigo's other brother,
went to the station where he learned that
Paulino and Ryan were released.8
 Defense's sole witness, Donio, a 35-year-old
grass cutter and a resident of Madapdap,
Mabalacat, Pampanga, denied the accusations.
As a sugarcane plantation worker, he has a long
palang for harvesting and cutting. It was not
similar to the sharp and pointed mini jungle bolo.
As a stay-in plantation worker, he does not leave
the workplace for six months. His wife visits him
instead.
 On November 24, 2003, he was harvesting
sugarcane in Capas, Tarlac. However, from the
evening of November 25, 2003 until the next
day, he was at home after his wife fetched him
to tend to their sick child. He first learned of the
carnapping charge when the police officers
came to his house looking for a certain Val
Paulino. He was taken to the municipal hall
where he was investigated and detained for five
days. Three officers beat and electrocuted him
for three hours forcing him to admit the crime.
 The trial court ruled that the prosecution
established all the elements of the crime. Donio
failed to substantiate his presence at another
place at the time of the perpetration of the
offense or the physical impossibility of his
presence at the locus criminis or its immediate
vicinity at the time of the incident. 12 Under the
Rules, SP04 Taberdo's action as police officer
enjoys the presumption of regularity. In the
absence of evidence showing that he was
motivated by bad faith or ill-will to testify against
Donio, SP04 Taberdo's categorical identification
of the accused stands.13
denied Donio's appeal and affirmed the decision
of the RTC. The CA found his averment that he
was taken from his house, tortured and made to
sign a blank sheet of paper as highly
implausible. His sworn affidavit was replete with
details which were unlikely the product of
creative imagination of the police. There was no
proof that the police singled him out, or was
impelled by an evil or ulterior motive. The said
affidavit was voluntarily and freely executed with
the assistance of counsel
Issue: Whether the prosecution has successfully
proven beyond reasonable doubt that Donio is
guilty of the crime of carnapping with homicide.
Held:
Yes.
At the outset, the CA noted that the prosecution
should have filed an Information for the special
complex crime of qualified carnapping in
aggravated form.19 while it is necessary that the
statutory designation be stated in the
information, a mistake in the caption of an
indictment in designating the correct name of the
offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the
designation that is controlling but the facts
alleged in the information which determines the
real nature of the crime.20 Recently, it was held
that failure to designate the offense by the
statute or to mention the specific provision
penalizing the act, or an erroneous
specification of the law violated, does not
vitiate the information if the facts alleged
therein clearly recite the facts constituting
the crime charged.21 The recital of the ultimate
facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information determines the character of the
crime and not the caption or preamble of the
information or the specification of the provision
of the law alleged to have been violated.22 In the
case at bar, the acts alleged to have been
committed by Donio are averred in the
Information, and the same described the acts
defined and penalized under Sections 2 and 14
of R.A. 6539, as amended.
The elements of carnapping as defined and
penalized under the R.A. No. 6539, as
amended are the following:
1. That there is an actual taking of the
vehicle;
2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other
than the offender himself;
3. That the taking is without the consent of
the owner thereof; or that the taking was
committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things; and
4. That the offender intends to gain from the
taking of the vehicle
Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A.
6539, as amended, the prosecution has to prove
the essential requisites of carnapping and of the
homicide or murder of the victim, and more
importantly, it must show that the original
criminal design of the culprit was camapping and
that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof  "24 In other words, to prove the
special complex crime of camapping with
homicide, there must be proof not only of the
essential elements of carnapping, but also that it
was the original criminal design of the culprit and
the killing was perpetrated in the course of the
commission of the camapping or on the
occasion thereof
After a careful perusal of the records, this Court
finds that the confluence of the following pieces
of circumstantial evidence, consistent with one
another, establishes Donio's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt:
First,  Donio was driving the tricycle when he,
Paulino and Ryan were accosted during a
checkpoint at the junction of the MacArthur
Highway by elements of the Concepcion Police
Station at around 2:30 in the morning on
November 26, 2003;
Second,  his possession of the vehicle was not
fully explained as he failed to produce its
registration papers;
Third, he was in possession of the victim's
temporary license. He even presented it and
introduced himself as Raul to the police;
Fourth, a bloodstained mini jungle bolo was
found inside the tricycle;
Fifth,  Rodrigo ascertained that Raul was the
driver of his tricycle, and that he was looking for
him on the same day that Donio and the others
were flagged down;
Sixth,  Raul was last seen driving the tricycle at
10:00 in the evening on November 25, 2003
when he passed by at the Mawaque Terminal at
the comer of MacArthur Highway and Mawaque
Road.34
Seventh, the Bantay Bayan of Madapdap
Resettlement found Raul's body at around 6:30
in the morning on November 26, 2003 at a
vacant lot towards the road to Sta. Lucia
Resettlement comer Barangay Dapdap.
Eighth,  Raul sustained multiple stab wounds
caused by a sharp instrument as depicted in the
post-mortem examination sketch by Dr. Dizon
and reflected in the Certificate of Death, which
states:
Ninth,  Donio was subsequently apprehended
and SP04 Taberdo positively identified him as
the driver they flagged down at the checkpoint. 36
Likewise, the victim's lifeless body was found
sprawled with multiple stab wounds and was
noted in a state of rigor mortis. Rigor
mortis,  which consists in the stiffening of the
muscular tissues and joints of the body setting in
at a greater or less interval after death, may be
utilized to approximate the length of time the
body has been dead. In temperate countries, it
usually appears three to six hours after death
but in warmer countries, it may develop earlier.
In tropical countries, the usual duration of rigor
mortis is twenty-four to forty-eight hours during
 cold weather and eighteen to thirty-six hours
during summer. When rigor mortis  sets in early,
it passes off quickly and viceversa
The RTC is correct in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua  considering that there was
no alleged and proven aggravating
circumstance.
People v Macabando
G.R. No. 188708
July 31, 2013; J. Brion
Facts:
 The prosecution's evidence showed that at
around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, the
appellant broke bottles on the road while holding
a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get
even ("manabla ko").3 Afterwards, he uttered
that he would burn his house.
 At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano
heard his neighbors shout that there was a fire.
When Cornelio went out of his house to verify,
he saw smoke coming from the appellant’s
house. He got a pail of water, and poured its
contents into the fire.5 Eric Quilantang, a
neighbor whose house was just 10 meters from
that of the appellant, ran to the barangay
headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When
Eric approached the burning house, the
appellant, who was carrying a traveling bag and
a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant
then fired three (3) shots in the air.6 The
appellant also told the people around that
whoever would put out the fire would be killed.
 Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI
Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot
investigation of the incident, and concluded,
among others, that the fire started in the
appellant’s house; and that it had been
intentional.10 Barangay Chairman Modesto
Ligtas stated that the fire gutted many
houses in his barangay, and that he assisted
the City Social Welfare and Development
Department personnel in assessing the
damage
 The appellant declared on the witness stand that
he lived in the twostorey house in Barangay 35,
Limketkai Drive, which was owned by his sister,
Madji Muslima Edemal.12 He admitted that he felt
angry at around 2:00 p.m. on December 21,
2001 because one of his radio cassettes for sale
had been stolen.13 The appellant claimed that he
went to sleep after looking for his missing
radio cassette, and that the fire had already
started when he woke up. He denied making a
threat to burn his house, and maintained that he
did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots
heard by his neighbors came from the explosion
of firecrackers that he intended to use during the
New Year celebration.14
 Lomantong Panandigan, the appellant’s
cousin, stated, among others, that he did not
see the appellant carry a revolver or fire a
shot on December 21, 2001.15 Dimas
Kasubidan, the appellant’s brother-in-law, stated
that he and the appellant lived in the same
house, and that the latter was asleep in his room
at the ground floor before the fire broke out. 16
 The prosecution charged the appellant with the
crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended,
before the RTC.17 The appellant pleaded not
guilty to the charge on arraignment. 18 In its
judgment dated August 26, 2002, the RTC found
the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
 On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in
toto.
Held:
We deny the appeal, but modify the crime
committed by the appellant and the penalty
imposed on him.
We point out at the outset that no one saw the
appellant set fire to his house in Barangay 35,
Limketkai Drive, Cagayan de Oro City. The trial
and appellate courts thus resorted to
circumstantial evidence since there was no
direct evidence to prove the appellant’s
culpability to the crime charged.
It is settled that in the absence of direct
evidence, circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient to sustain a conviction provided that:
"(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived have
been proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances results in a moral certainty that
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the
one who has committed the crime. Thus, to
justify a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, the combination of circumstances
must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused."
In the present case, the following circumstances
constitute an unbroken chain that leads to an
unavoidable conclusion that the appellant, to the
exclusion of others, set fire to his house: first,
the appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe,
acted violently and broke bottles near his house
at around 4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001;
second, while he was still in a fit of rage, the
appellant stated that he would get even, and
then threatened to burn his own house; third,
Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the appellant’s
room approximately two hours after the
appellant returned to his house; fourth, the
appellant prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several
other people from putting out the fire in his
house; fifth, the appellant fired shots in the air,
and then threatened to kill anyone who would try
to put out the fire in his house; sixth, the
appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire;
and finally, the investigation conducted by the
fire marshals of the Bureau of Fire Protection
revealed that the fire started in the appellant’s
house, and that it had been intentional.
The combination of these circumstances,
indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that
the appellant set fire to his house. We find it
unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to
prevent his neighbors from putting out the fire in
his house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if
he had nothing to do with the crime.
In sum, "Article 320 contemplates the malicious
burning of structures, both public and private,
hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels,
aircraft, factories and other military, government
or commercial establishments by any person or
group of persons."20
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613,21 on the
other hand, currently governs simple arson.
Section 3 of this law provides:
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of
Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall
be imposed if the property burned is any of the
following:
1. Any building used as offices of the
government or any of its agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well
or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing
crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or
forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill
central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or
warehouse. [italics and emphasis ours]
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious
burning of public and private structures,
regardless of size, not included in Article 320 of
the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659.22 This law punishes simple arson with a
lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it
have a lesser degree of perversity and
viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes
with less significant social, economic, political,
and national security implications than
destructive arson.23
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2)
of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is
an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these
elements have been proven in the present case.
The Information alleged that the appellant set
fire to his own house, and that the fire spread to
other inhabited houses. These allegations were
established during trial through the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and
appellate courts found credible and convincing,
and through the report of the Bureau of Fire
Protection which stated that damaged houses
were residential, and that the fire had been
intentional. Moreover, the certification from the
City Social Welfare and Development
Department likewise indicated that the burned
houses were used as dwellings. The appellant
likewise testified that his burnt two-story house
was used as a residence. That the appellant’s
act affected many families will not convert the
crime to destructive arson, since the appellant’s
act does not appear to be heinous or represents
a greater degree of perversity and viciousness
when compared to those acts punished under
Article 320 of the RPC. The established
evidence only showed that the appellant
intended to burn his own house, but the
conflagration spread to the neighboring houses.
The nature of Destructive Arson is
distinguished from Simple Arson by the
degree of perversity or viciousness of the
criminal offender. The acts committed under
Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code
constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes "for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and
which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
and perversity are repugnant and outrageous
to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society." On the other hand, acts
committed under PD 1613 constituting
Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree
of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other
words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes
with less significant social, economic,
political and national security implications
than Destructive Arson.
The Proper Penalty
Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613,
the imposable penalty for simple arson is
reclusion temporal, which has a range of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day, to reclusion
perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty imposable should be an
indeterminate penalty whose minimum term
should be within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree, which is prision mayor, or six
(6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years,
and whose maximum should be the medium
period of reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua, or sixteen (16) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years, taking into account the
absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances that attended the commission of
the crime. Taking these rules into account, we
therefore impose on the appellant the
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen
(16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the assailed February 24, 2009
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 00208-MIN is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) appellant Alamada Macabando is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson
under Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No.
1613; and
(2) he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty often (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
People v De Leon
G.R. No. 180762
March 4, 2009; J. Ynares-Santiago
Facts:
 An Information3 was filed charging Gaudencio
Legaspi, Carlito de Leon, Bien de Leon, Cornelio
Cabildo and Filoteo de Leon with the crime of
arson. The accusatory portion of the Information
reads:
 That on or about the 5th day of April, 1986, in
the Municipality of Peñaranda, Province of
Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually aiding and helping one
another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously burn or set on fire the house of
one RAFAEL MERCADO, an inhabited house or
dwelling, to the damage and prejudice of said
Rafael Mercado in an amount that may be
awarded to him under the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
 At around 8:30 in the evening of April 5, 1986,
Aquilina Mercado Rint (Aquilina) and her sister
Leonisa Mercado (Leonisa), together with their
nephew Narciso Mercado Jr., (Junior) were
inside a hut owned by their father Rafael
Mercado10 (Rafael) located on a tumana in
Polillo, San Josef, Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija. The
loud and insistent barking of their dog prompted
Aquilina to peep through the window and saw
five men approaching the premises whom she
recognized as Gaudencio Legaspi and herein
appellants. Aquilina and Leonisa hurriedly went
out of the hut and hid behind a pile of wood
nearby while Junior was dispatched to call for
help.
 From their hiding place, they saw appellants
surround the hut11 and set to fire the cogon
roofing.12 While the hut was burning, Leonisa
 grabbed a flashlight from her sister and focused
the same at the group in order to see them more
clearly. Upon seeing a light focused on them,
Gaudencio ordered the others to leave and the
men immediately fled the premises.13 By the
time Junior arrived with his uncles, the hut was
already razed to the ground.
 Police Officer Lucio Mercado (Lucio) conducted
an investigation at the scene of the crime and
saw a big wood still on fire. A certain Julio took
pictures of the remains of the hut.14
 Aquilina and Leonisa valued the hut at
P3,000.00 and claimed that a pair of earrings,
some beddings, rice, P1,500.00 in cash and
plenty of wood were also lost in the fire. 15 They
also testified that prior to the incident,
appellants had been to the premises,
destroyed the plants, the fence and a hut
which was first built therein. Appellants
likewise physically attacked their father and
issued threats that if he would not give up
his claim on the land, something untoward
would happen to him; and that their father
Rafael filed several cases for Malicious
Mischief, Forcible Entry and Serious Physical
Injuries against appellants.
 Appellants denied the charge against them.
 Carlito alleged that on the day of the alleged
incident, he was working in Cavite where he had
been staying for a year with his family; that his
uncle Gaudencio was originally in possession of
the tumana contrary to Rafael’s claims; that his
uncle used to plant vegetables and make
charcoal therein until 1975 when he took over
upon the latter’s request; and that when
Gaudencio passed away in 1987, he applied for
a patent over the tumana with the Bureau of
Lands.16
 Carlito also alleged that there was actually no
structure on the premises because Rafael’s
attempt to build a hut was foiled by his helper,
herein appellant Nelio.17 On cross-examination
however, he admitted that on March 12, 1986,
he destroyed the first hut constructed by Rafael
on the subject tumana when the prosecution
confronted him with evidence which showed that
he was found guilty of Malicious Mischief in
Criminal Case No. 1985 filed against him by
Rafael before the Municipal Trial Court of
Peñaranda
 Nelio testified that on the day of the incident, the
appellants were in their respective homes and
could not have gone to the tumana  to commit
the crime as charged; that the burnt parts
depicted in the pictures presented by the
prosecution were actually parts of tree trunks
turned to charcoal; and that the cogon and
bamboo shown in the pictures were materials
brought by Rafael into the landholding during the
latter’s unsuccessful attempt to build a hut on
the tumana.19
 Bien also vehemently denied the charges
against him and attributed the same to
complainants’ desire to grab the tumana which
rightfully belongs to his mother. He testified that
since 1982, he has been living in Rizal, Nueva
Ecija which is about 35 kilometers away from
Peñaranda.20 For his part, Filoteo corroborated
the claims made by his co-appellants.21
 , the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
 In the light of the foregoing, the prosecution had
established the guilt of all the accused
Carlito de Leon, Bien de Leon, Cornelio "aka"
Nelio Cabildo and Filoteo de Leon beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of arson, and
they are hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of 10 years and 1
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, and to pay jointly and severally
the heirs of Rafael Mercado the sum of
P3,000.00 representing the value of the
burned hut.
 CA Affirmed
Held:
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.
161324 amending the law on arson provides:
Sec. 3. Other Cases of Arson. – The penalty of
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed if the property burned is any of the
following:
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
Section 4 of the same law provides that if the
crime of arson was committed by a syndicate,
i.e., if it is planned or carried out by a group of
three or more persons, the penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
Under the following provision, the elements
of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning;
and, (b) what is intentionally burned is an
inhabited house or dwelling. The appellate
court correctly found that the prosecution
was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the presence of the two essential elements of
the offense.
Although intent may be an ingredient of the
crime of arson, it may be inferred from the acts
of the accused. There is a presumption that one
intends the natural consequences of his act; and
when it is shown that one has deliberately set
fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to
produce further evidence of his wrongful
intent.25 If there is an eyewitness to the crime of
arson, he can give in detail the acts of the
accused. When this is done the only substantial
issue is the credibility of the witness.26
In the instant case, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, found the testimonies of
witnesses Aquilina and Leonisa worthy of
credence, thus:
enjoy, as a rule, a badge of respect, for trial
courts have the advantage of observing the
demeanor of witnesses as they testify. Only the
trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush
of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or
sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or
full realization of an oath — all of which are
useful aids for an accurate determination of a
witness’ honesty and sincerity.31 Proof of
the corpus delicti is indispensable in the
prosecution of arson, as in all kinds of criminal
offenses. Corpus delicti means the substance of
the crime; it is the fact that a crime has actually
been committed. In arson, the corpus delicti is
generally satisfied by proof of the bare
occurrence of the fire, e.g., the charred remains
of a house burned down and of its having been
intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated
testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may
be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to
warrant conviction.32 The corpus delicti has been
satisfactorily proven in the instant case.
The appellate court correctly imposed the
penalty in its maximum period, i.e., reclusion
perpetua considering the presence of the
special aggravating circumstance. The crime
was committed by a syndicate since it was
carried out by a group of three or more
persons.

The inconsistencies and contradictions

presented in the case at bench do not detract
from the fact that Rafael’s house was
intentionally burned by accused-appellants who
were positively identified by witnesses Aquilina
and Leonisa. In the face of these positive
declarations, accused-appellants’ puerile
attempt to discredit them crumples into dust. 27

Positive identification, where categorical and

consistent, without any showing of ill-motive on
the part of the eyewitness testifying on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are
negative and self-serving evidence undeserving
of weight in law. The appellants had not shown
that it was physically impossible for them to be
present at the time and place of the crime.30

Thus, we find no reason to disturb the trial

court’s reliance on the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses. Findings and conclusions
of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses