Working Paper

Racial Resentment, Lies, and White Support for Voter Suppression Laws in the U.S.

Ian Shapiro1
Brennan Center For Justice, at NYU School of Law2

Abstract
What explains support for election integrity laws being introduced and passed in state legislatures?
As states consider legislation that would restrict voting rights, understanding public support for such
laws is paramount. Yet, because elite rhetoric only turned towards “election integrity” after the 2020
election, there is a dearth of information regarding the publics’ response to this newly salient issue.
Using data collected from a nationally representative sample of white Americans (N=1427), I
examine how partisan and racial considerations influence support for new voting restrictions. I go
further, using a survey experiment to test racial priming theory in the context of voter fraud during
the 2020 election. Across four experimental conditions I show elite language has little to no effect
on whether racial resentment plays an active role shaping support for voting restrictions. Consistent
with recent failures to replicate the implicit/explicit model, I find this null effect because racial
resentment already strongly predicts support for election integrity laws and their provisions. In a
mediation model, I demonstrate that a substantial portion of racial resentment’s effect is mediated
via belief in rampant voter fraud. Finally, I show that racial resentment and ideology explain support
for voting restrictions even when individuals (correctly) think election integrity laws make it harder
for people to vote. The evidence suggests curbing support for voting restrictions is difficult in part
because individuals, specifically strong Republicans and the racially resentful, may view these
restrictions as politically convenient.

Election Integrity or Voter Suppression?

Do Americans view election integrity laws as a form of voter suppression? And if so, does
this acknowledgment decrease support for exclusionary reforms? During HBO’s Last Week Tonight,
comedian John Oliver mocked restrictive voting laws as, “solutions to problems that have been
deliberately and strategically manufactured.” In his telling of events, fraud in 2020 was conjured as a
justification for new voting restrictions. He went on to make clear who would be disproportionately
harmed by these reforms – black Americans. Outside late-night comedy, the connection between
election integrity and voter suppression was being discussed in more scathing terms. President Joe
Biden referred to new voting laws as “Jim Crow 2.0,” a nod to restrictions on blacks exercising
political power following the end of southern reconstruction. Broadcasting from different venues,

1 This a working paper. Please contact the author Ian Shapiro (shapiroi@brennan.law.nyu.edu) for questions,
corrections, and additional information. Replication files for tables and figures will be made available at a later date.
2 Thanks to the Brennan Center for their generous support and for funding this study. A version of this working paper

was presented at MPSA 2022. Thanks for the panel discussants for helping to guide the newest iteration. All mistakes are
my own.

1
both Oliver and President Biden sent a unified message – that so-called “election integrity” bills
were designed to reduce ballot access and suppress voters.
The substantive impact of any single election provision enjoys healthy debate (Neiheisal and
Burden 2012; Neiheisel and Horner 2019) but voting restrictions do not occur in a legislative
vacuum. Instead, they can be emblematic of a larger movement to restrict voting, control election
administration, and denigrate democracy at the state level (Grumbach 2022). During 2021, legislators
in at least 27 states introduced, pre-filed, or carried over 250 bills with restrictive voting provisions
(Brennan Center Roundup 2022). One example is stricter voter ID requirements, a provision in
Texas law documented to disproportionally harm black and Latino voting power (Fraga and Miller
2022). Generally, because costs of participating in politics are not felt equally (Verba, Schlozman,
and Brady 1995), additional barriers dampen the voices of those already marginalized in public life.

One result of increased legislative activity around fraud and election integrity is an uptick in
elite rhetoric and public posturing (Russell and Wen 2021). Supporters of election integrity
legislation, generally Republicans, claim new measures constitute a common-sense approach – and
one integral to maintaining public trust in elections. Opponents claim these laws fail to solve existing
problems, are motivated by racial and partisan considerations, and have disparate effects on the
political power of racial minorities. This war of words has been waged and observed by the
American public for over a year – and my study illuminates how the public has processed this
debate. Does the public believe election integrity laws are intended to suppress votes or ensure
secure elections? Does this belief about the law’s intent condition support? In addition, I interrogate
the role racialized rhetoric plays in explaining support for new voting restrictions.

I begin by developing a theory of how Americans shape attitudes about election integrity
laws and their provisions. I expect individuals will use both partisan and racial considerations when
forming attitudes. I also expect the perceived intent of election integrity laws will strongly factor into
an individual’s attitude formation. Next, I experimentally test whether racial priming theory applies
to the issue of voter fraud. My experiment tests whether racialized elite rhetoric around election
fraud made racial considerations more cognitively accessible for the public. Participants were
randomly assigned to read one of four vignettes about voter fraud during the 2020 election.
Vignettes talked about voter fraud using implicit racial cues, explicit racial cues, or partisan cues.
Other participants in the control condition read a short apolitical story about a dog.

2
 My core finding is that racial resentment increases support for restrictive voting laws among
white Americans. This is the case for election integrity laws generally, and individual provisions.
Inconsistent with racial priming theory, racial considerations are strong and consistent predictors of
support for election integrity laws in each experimental condition, not just when race is primed with
implicit cues. I demonstrate empirically that nearly a third of the effect of racial resentment on
support for voting restrictions is mediated through belief in rampant voter fraud in 2020. I also find
among those with the most to gain politically from restrictive voting laws (i.e., Republicans and
racially resentful whites), acknowledgment that these laws make it harder to vote does not curb
support. I finish by discussing the limitations of this study and discussing its contribution to the
larger discussion about racial attitudes, misinformation, and public opinion.

Theory Development
Barriers to political participation hinder the proper functioning of democracy. As it
becomes more difficult to hear and aggregate the true voice of the people, the core of
democratic theory crumbles (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). As a result, using fraud as a
pretext to pass laws that make it more difficult to vote harms American democracy in profound
ways. To date, there exists no evidence of systematic fraud in American elections. As an
empirically tractable phenomena, fraud is almost imperceptible (Minnite 2007). To the contrary,
election and government officials went out of their way to proclaim the 2020 election the most
secure in living memory (Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity & Infrastructure
Security Agency 2020). In the absence of evidence, why do narratives of rampant and pivotal fraud
persist?
Voter fraud provides a useful explanation for electoral loss among those who must
process defeat (Uscinski and Parent 2014, Miller, Farhart and Saunders 2021). Fraud conveniently
shifts accountability for a political loss from “us” to “them.” It allows supporters to maintain the
belief that under fair circumstances, their side would have prevailed. For candidates, it allows them
to save face and not be labeled a loser. However, this cognitive convenience comes at a cost.
Accepting convenient, but inaccurate, narratives limit collective introspection and motivation for
parties to learn from political loss (Masket 2020). By making fraud a salient issue, elites legitimize
and spread the doubt some citizens already have in election outcomes (Berlinski et al 2021,
Clayton et al. 2021).

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 Despite the long-term costs, highlighting the threat of fraud (even when it rarely occurs)
remains a compelling and shrewd “political strategy for winning elections by tamping down
turnout amongst socially subordinate groups… that are the most in need of the simplest rules and
the easiest access” (Minnite 2010). Put simply, despite scant evidence, fraud narratives can be used
by political opponents to delegitimize the opposition and to make future elections less accessible.
This is consistent with empirical evidence that links belief in fraud to partisan identification and
motivations (e.g., Beaulieu 2014, Edelson et al. 2017).
In addition to partisan motivations, misinformation about fraud can justify support for
socially undesirable preferences or policies with disparate racial outcomes (Flynn and Krupnikov
2019). In the context of voting rights, if an individual believes fraud is a major problem, this belief
can justify support for laws that make voting more arduous, even when those laws harm minorities
disproportionately. These collateral consequences result from race-neutral sounding laws doing
harm to minorities trying to exercise political power (Holloway 2014). Misinformation about fraud
supplies rhetorical cover to individuals who support voting restrictions without fear of being viewed
as racist or motivated by racial considerations.
But we know race is a major consideration in the American political mind. Trump exploited
existing racial stereotypes held by white Americans, linking minorities and criminality (Peffley,
Hurwitz, Sniderman 1997) to win in a crowded primary field (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018).
White Americans who observe voting in a racialized context are more supportive of strict voter ID
laws (Wilson, Brewer, and Rosenbluth 2014). In addition, the racially resentful are less likely to
support restoring voting rights to felons (Wilson, Owens, and Davis 2015), despite the public in
general being favorable towards the restoration of voting rights Manza et al., 2004). If white
Americans believe minorities commit fraud at high rates or that fraud politically benefits minorities,
then racial resentment should be associated with support for policies that make it more difficult to
cast a ballot. Consistent with this line of thinking, I expect racial resentment will be associated with
greater support for election integrity laws (H1). This should be true in the abstract and in the context
of finite policies (H2). In addition, I expect this effect to be mediated through misinformation about
fraud in the 2020 election (H3).
The association between racial attitudes and belief in voter fraud may be a spillover effect
from Obama’s tenure as the first African American President (Appleby and Federico 2018).
Individuals believing Obama’s election to be the result of “special considerations” due to his race
(rather than the merits of his candidacy/campaign) were more likely to perceive electoral

4
malfeasance surrounding Obama’s 2008 election (Wilson and King-Meadows 2016). Further,
following the 2016 Presidential election, President Trump claimed millions of illegal votes were cast
for Hillary Clinton in California (leading to his national vote deficit). Susceptibility to this kind of
misinformation tracks with work showing anti-immigrant attitudes were related to belief in voter
fraud between 2012 and 2014 in the United States (Udani and Kimball 2018). After the 2020
election, this trend continued, with Trump and the extended party network claiming election
malfeasance occurred in swing states and especially in counties that contained pivotal cities
This association between voter fraud and race has disturbing implications for civil rights in
the United States. As the U.S. moves towards multiracial democracy, demographic change can be
perceived as a threat by white Americans (Craig and Richeson 2014; Craig, Rucker, Richeson 2018).
In the political arena, if white Americans believe their group’s political power is waning due to less
deserving groups acting through illegitimate means (e.g., election fraud), distrust in electoral
institution will rise and the social fabric between politically relevant groups will fray (Wilson and
Davis 2021). When individuals believe a group acts unfairly to gain political power, and the group is
otherwise undeserving, this anger will manifest as resentment, leading to support for policies that
curb the undeserving group’s political power.
Individuals sense threat from undeserving groups and must calculate how best to
maintaining political power given their circumstances. In this context, individuals should be more
concerned with relative group status than the negative effects of voting restrictions on turnout or
democratic health. Thus, among individuals most threatened politically by demographic change
(Republicans and racially resentful whites), I expect acknowledging “election integrity laws make it
harder to vote” will not decrease support for these restrictions (H4). This null effect of perceived
intent should occur precisely because partisan and racial motivations override other democratic
value considerations like fairness or equality.

Racial Priming Theory and Voter Fraud

Policies can appear race-neutral on the surface (e.g., law and order, election integrity) but
support can be linked to racial considerations by elites through priming - using coded language or
even visual cues. The implicit/explicit model of racial priming asserts when individuals recognize a
political message as racially charged (thus violating norms of equality), racial resentment will play a
smaller role in driving related attitudes (Mendelberg 2001). Because implicit racial cues (e.g., coded
language like “inner city” accompanied by images of blacks) function under the surface of conscious

5
thought, they are less likely to be rejected in an effortful manner by individuals trying to uphold
socially desirable democratic norms (Berinsky 2002). The implication is that racial prejudice and
resentment may only be exploited for political gain when primed subtly. If cues are explicitly racial -
drawing active attention to race, individuals should reject such rhetoric – since the racialized
language violates fundamental American values of tolerance and egalitarianism.
But this backlash may not materialize. Recent work suggests even explicitly racialized
language may fail to activate egalitarian countermeasures among the American public (Valentino,
Neuner, and Vandenbroek 2017). After the election of Barack Obama, the first African American
president, and in the wake of Donald Trump’s controversial 2016 candidacy, scholars have
questioned whether major differences between implicit and explicit racial priming remain
(Valenzuela and Reny 2020). After all, if Trump could use explicit racial rhetoric without negative
(and sometimes with positive) electoral consequence (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018), then perhaps
the study of implicit racial language is no longer of public concern (Newman 2020).
In this study, I consider a straightforward test of the implicit/explicit model of racial
priming. I want to understand if appending racial primes to political rhetoric about voter fraud
increases the salience of racial considerations for white Americans when forming attitudes related to
voting restrictions. The words of elites matter (Zaller 1992, Layman and Carsey 2002), but the
public’s response to competing elite frames around voter fraud in 2020 is not well understood.
When a party’s electoral fortunes are not tied to support from racial minorities, as is the case in
the modern Republican coalition (Mason 2019), they face less risk of political backlash from
their voters for racialized messaging (Banks and Hicks 2017). If elites use racial cues or
legitimizing beliefs around race and crime to link minorities to fraud, then elite rhetoric could
help drive support for voting restrictions.
Voting rights are not about race, but they may be understood by the public to be a group-
centric issue. Voting rights are explicitly linked to the fortunes of black Americans through formal
institutions like public education - and historically cannot be decoupled from race. Students learn
about the evolutions of voting rights in school - and these lessons discuss voting as an achievement
by black Americans during the civil rights movement. In this context, Americans learn about
restrictions to voting (e.g., Jim Crow, poll taxes, and literacy tests) and associated legal protections
(e.g., The Voting Rights Act). As a result, they may come to understand voting rights and voter
suppression as topics especially relevant to the fortunes of black Americans. Through this exposure,
associations are built and maintained, linking the fate of voting rights to the political fate of black

6
Americans. As voting become easier and more accessible, the political power of black Americans
will increase. As a result, the relative position of the dominant social group (i.e., whites) may be felt
to be threatened.
Two general possibilities emerge from the debate surrounding the enduring relevance of the
implicit/explicit model of racial priming. First, the effect of racial resentment on support for
election integrity laws may be greater when race is linked to voter fraud using implicit means, relative
to more explicit racial messaging (H5) (Mendelberg 2001). Alternatively, the effect of racial
resentment on support for election integrity laws could very well be the same regardless of whether
implicit or explicit racial cues are present when talking about voter fraud (H6) (Consistent with null
results from Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek 2017). In addition, I explore the possibility that
partisan cues around voter fraud can subtly prime racial considerations, an emerging possibility as
the two major parties continue to sort along racial lines (Mason 2019). In this case, the expectation is
that partisan cues function in the same manner as implicit racial cues have in the past (H7) (e.g.,
Mendelberg 2001).

Data
To test the proposed relationships between racial resentment, belief in fraud, and support
for voting restrictions (H1-H4), I obtained a nationally representative sample of 1427 white
Americans (U.S. Adults). Participants were pre-screened to identify as white before participating
since racial priming theory (Mendelberg 2001) and more recent work on racial resentment (Davis
and Wilson 2021) are centered on the experiences and reactions of white Americans. Otherwise,
sampling was geared towards national representation of other demographics. The study was fielded
online using Forthright Access. Data were collected in early March 2022. The study took participants
an average of nine minutes to complete. Participants were compensated for their participation.3
Descriptive Statistics of Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Income 1421 3.301 1.874 1 7
Education 1421 3.635 1.492 1 7
Female 1420 .495 .5 0 1
Age 1421 46.269 15.951 18 95
Party ID 1416 3.804 1.87 1 7

Outcome Variables

3 Each participant cost $3.50.

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 I measured attitudes towards the legitimacy of the 2020 election using two survey items. I
asked participants the frequency with which they believed fraud took place. I also asked to what
extent they believed the election of Joe Biden as president was legitimate or not.4 Another set of
dependent variables measured support for election integrity laws and support for the specific
components of these law. Specific components included provisions like strict ID requirements for
in-person voting, drop box accessibility, and support for state legislatures replacing local election
officials.5 6 While not exhaustive, these components were designed to tap into the breadth of
restrictions being considered at the state level. They include restriction that have been discussed
previously (e.g., Voter ID) and newer provisions (e.g., State Legislatures overturning local officials).

Independent Variables
A critical factor in this study is the concept of racial resentment. I expect racial
considerations influence support for restrictive voting law. Traditional racial resentment
conceptualizes racism as prejudice, a matter of individual psychology. The measure includes a
constellation of questions designed to tap into both anti-black affect and belief that blacks do not
subscribe to traditional American values associated with the protestant work ethic and patriotism
(Kinder and Sanders 1996). The measure arose as cultural norms regarding the biological inferiority
of blacks became less acceptable, yet whites still required a justification for unequal group-based
outcomes in the areas of criminal justice and economics. This symbolic racism includes the belief
that blacks get more than what they deserve (deservingness heuristic), that blacks simply need to
work their way out of their subordinate position (lack protestant work ethic), and perceptions of
whether blacks are given special treatment or privileges they have not earned. In line with other
studies, I measured racial resentment using the standard four questions employed by the American
National Elections Study (ANES).
In addition to this traditional measure of racial resentment, I also measure White’s
Resentment Towards African Americans (WRTA), a newly validated scale that more precisely

4
How often did fraud occur during the 2020 election? 5pt scale: Very Often-Very Rarely. Do you believe that Joe
Biden's victory in the 2020 presidential election was legitimate or not legitimate? 4pt scale: Definitely Legitimate-
Definitely Not Legitimate.
5
Support for the practice of ballot harvesting, local officials sending unsolicited mail-in ballot applications to citizens,
stricter ID requirements for mail-in voting, and reducing the number of ballot drop boxes were each measured.
6 Participants were prompted with a brief massage stating the election integrity laws contain different components and

that not everyone agrees with every single part. This was used to limit satisficing and anchoring effects since participants
were just asked about their general level of support for election integrity laws.

8
measures resentment towards underserving groups. This measure is distinct from symbolic racism. It
conceptualizes and measures resentment as a reaction to perceived violations of justice norms,
motivated by individual level just-world beliefs. This separates the concept from its previous
entanglements with related factors like anti-black affect (i.e., pure prejudice) and principled
conservatism (Davis and Wilson 2021). As a third measure related to group affect, I measure the
importance of white identity in predicting support for voting restrictions (Jardina 2017).7
A novel contribution of this study is that I have collected one of the first direct measures of
public belief regarding the intentions of election integrity laws. Participants were directly asked, “Which
comes closer to your personal views? Election integrity laws are designed to (1) make it harder to
cheat or (7) make it harder to vote.” Perceived intent acts as both an independent factor for
estimating support for voting restrictions and potentially an insightful moderating factor, revealing
what happens when good normative values (e.g., voting should be accessible) are in tension with
more narrow identity based interests (e.g., more people voting could be bad for my partisan/racial
group).8

Experimental Design

I use a survey experiment to evaluate my second set of hypotheses related to racial priming
theory (H5-H7). Participants read a story about allegations of voter fraud during the 2020 election.
The story was modeled after real messaging by political elites in the time period between November
4th 2020 (the day after the presidential election) and January 6th 2021. In the control condition
participants read a true short story about an Australian Shepherd puppy adopted from a shelter that
went on become a rescue dog.9 The three others contained a story about voter fraud and the need
for election integrity laws. Prevalence of voter fraud and the need for election integrity laws were
discussed while priming explicit racial conflict (e.g., using explicit mention of race and attributing
instances of election malfeasance at black Americans), implicit racial conflict (e.g., using coded

7 I asked, “If you identify as white, how important is being white to your identity?” We used a 5pt scale ranging from
Not at all important to Extremely Important. Only 2 respondents in our all white sample reported that they did not
identify as white. Those individuals were recoded into the “Not at all important” category, though all analysis is robust
to their inclusion/exclusion.
8 All models control for partisanship or ideology, in addition to several demographics (age, gender, income, education).

Race is not controlled for since the sample is all white American citizens.
9 “Rescued By Ruby” premiered on Netflix March 17, 2022. It stars Grant Gustin (WB’s The Flash).

9
language like inner cities and criminals), or partisan conflict.10 In the explicit condition, an image of
blacks asking for every vote to be counted was countered by an image of whites asking for “every
legal vote” to be counted. In the implicit condition, racial conflict was more subtle and only included
black Americans (i.e., no explicit white/black conflict). In the partisan conflict condition, traditional
party imagery (e.g., red/blue, donkey/elephant) was inserted in the same places the racial imagery
appeared in the other conditions.
Participants reported whether the story they read was racially insensitive or if it was about
racial conflict (Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek 2017; Reny, Valenzuela, and Collingwood
2019; Valenzuela and Reny 2021). I measure whether participants perceived the story to be racialized
across conditions. Participants were asked a two factual manipulation checks with discrete responses
(i.e., yes/no). These were asked after other substantive dependent variables to minimize the risk of
these questions priming racial considerations within treatment conditions where not intended.11
Finally, participants documented their belief in the prevalence of fraud in 2020 and were asked about
support for several laws that would restrict voting.

Results
To what extent were beliefs about election fraud in 2020 and subsequent support for
election integrity laws linked to racial considerations? Voter fraud makes no explicit mention of race,
but this does not mean the public cannot associate the issue with racial conflict. In the racially
explicit condition, individuals reported that the story was racially insensitive (53%) and focused on
racial conflict (40%) at the highest rates (figure 1). Rates were lower in both the implicit and partisan
conditions, ranging between 11-20%. Predictably, the control story about the shelter dog who got a
Netflix movie was viewed as the least racially insensitive (<10%).12 In total, when racial conflict was
made explicit, the public recognized and acknowledged this shift. This is consistent with previous
work showing citizens “recognize racially hostile content in political communications” (Valentino,
Neuner, and Vandenbroek 2017).

10
Experimental Conditions in full are found in the appendix.
11
Although this outcome is a manipulation check, it is informative. It tells us if the issues of fraud and election integrity
are viewed as racialized without elite interference. However, even if they are not actively recognized as racialized, racial
considerations can still play a role influencing support.
12
The pattern observed was the same for individuals scoring above and below the mean levels of racial resentment in
my sample. However the difference between high and low racial resentment participants was significant in my sample.
This suggests the even individuals who are more sensitive to racial consideration or social desirability (the low racial
resentment individuals) reacted similarly to those high in racial resentment (but at lower rates). These figures are in the
appendix.

10
 Differences across conditions suggest elites can use racialized language to make racial
conflict more salient when discussing issues of fraud and election integrity. Yet, even without
explicit racial framing, the public may see these issues as related to race. In the implicit condition, a
greater proportion reported the story was about racial conflict, relative to the partisan conflict
condition (.19 vs. .11, p>0.01). This difference did not appear for racial insensitivity, suggesting
implicit racial cues signaled racial conflict but stopped short of signaling more racial insensitivity
than modern partisan political conflict.

Figure 1: Racially Conflict and insensitivity Across Conditions

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 Next, I turn to evidence that racial resentment was associated with both belief in the
prevalence of fraud and the belief that Biden’s win was not legitimate. Results are from an OLS
mode (figure 2) In both models, racial resentment is positively related to misperceptions about the
2020 election. Respondents at the highest level of racial resentment were .29 points (0-1 scale)
higher in their belief that fraud occurred frequently compared to individuals at the lowest levels of
racial resentment. I observe the same direction and magnitude of effect when looking at belief in
Biden’s legitimacy (.28). Additionally, one-way ANOVA reveals participants exposed to implicit and
explicit racial primes changed their belief in the prevalence of fraud compared to participants in the
control condition.13 While differences in the change in belief in fraud are small (.02), they are
statistically distinct from zero, in the expected positive direction, and occurred within participants
asked the same question minutes earlier (just before reading the experimental vignette). Thus, even
with anchoring effects, racial priming appears to have increased belief in fraud when such crimes
were made out to be associated with race.14

13See Supplemental Appendix

14However, the effect on the difference in pre/post belief in fraud was not statistically distinguishable from the partisan
conflict condition, suggesting that simply talking about the issue rather than linking it to race may have increased its
salience.

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 Figure 2: OLS Estimates for Frequency of Fraud and Legitimacy of Biden

White resentment towards African Americans (Davis and Wilson 2021) was significant and
positive for both models, though to a lesser degree than racial resentment. The importance of white
identity (Jardina 2017) predicted greater belief in fraud but did not influence the perceived legitimacy
of Biden’s electoral victory – perhaps reflecting Biden’s own identity (white). While these two factors
arguably have greater conceptual clarity than traditional racial resentment, the standard mix of racial
animus tapped by the traditional scale predicts prevalence of fraud and belief that Biden did not win
the 2020 election.
These models provide a glimpse into the relative effect of partisan and racial considerations
that go into holding misperceptions about the 2020 election. One view of conspiratorial thinking
posits, “conspiracy theories are for losers.” That is, in the face of identity harming electoral losses,
individuals are more susceptible to fraud narratives that allow disliked electoral outcomes to be
explained in a way that helps losers maintain high self-worth (Uscinski and Parent 2014). Consistent
with this theory, party identification is the only variable that exceeds the substantive effect of racial
resentment in both models. It should be noted that party identification and racial resentment

13
dominate the model even after accounting for highly correlated concepts (e.g., ideology/ party ,
White’s resentment towards Blacks/racial resentment).
Next, I use OLS to model racial resentment’s influence on support for election integrity
laws. In short, support for election integrity laws is driven by racial resentment, ideology, and belief
in rampant fraud (figure 3). H1 stated racial resentment would leads to greater support for election
integrity laws – and this is supported. Individuals highest in racial resentment were .21 points (0-1
scale) higher in their support for election integrity laws compared to the individuals with the lowest
racial resentment. Three factors played substantively similar roles, ideology, belief in fraud, and
perceived intent of the laws. Those who identified as more conservative, those who perceived more
fraud, and those who genuinely believed the laws are designed to make it harder the cheat supported
election integrity laws.

Figure 3: OLS Estimates for Supporting Election Integrity Laws

Notably, support for election integrity laws is not related to partisanship despite the laws
being publicly supported by one group (Republicans) and publicly decried by the other (Democrats).
This trend dissipates slightly when looking at individual policy components (see table 2). Specifically,

14
 for in-person voting and vote by mail, support for strict identification requirements is related to
party. Republicans are more likely to support these provisions. Provisions like strict voter
identification have been discussed before and may be associated by the public with party positions.
Newer topics, like drop boxes or state legislatures overriding local election officials were not driven
by party.
In contrast to the limited influence of party, racial resentment influenced support for each
provision. The relationship is statistically significant and in the expected positive direction. In each
case, higher racial resentment is associated with greater support for policies that would restrict access
to and ease of voting. H2 is supported. Racial resentment is positively and significantly related to
support for individual provisions that restrict voting rights (b= .19-.37). White identity is also
positively related to support for voting restriction, but at a lower magnitude (b=.04-.11) White
resentment towards African Americans is not related to support for voting restrictions.

Table 2: OLS Regression Models Estimating Support for Election Integrity Laws and Components
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
General ID Dropbox State Leg Harvesting Unsolicited ID Mail
Believe Fraud .34*** .29*** .34*** .28*** .23*** .25*** .32***
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Biden Illegitimate -.09*** -.01 .19*** 0 .09*** .04 -.02
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Racial Resentment .21*** .21*** .15*** .23*** .25*** .29*** .27***
(.03) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.03)
White Identity .05** .05*** .11*** .07*** .05** .04* .05**
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
WRTA .02 -.02 .01 .01 -.04 -.05 0
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Intent -.26*** -.17*** -.09*** -.15*** -.11*** -.17*** -.18***
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Ideology .18*** .13*** .15*** .07* .14*** .13*** .12***
(.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Party ID .04 .08** 0 -.02 .04 .04 .09***
(.03) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.03)
Education .06* -.02 .02 -.06* -.01 .01 -.01
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Age -.09*** .05 -.03 -.03 -.06* .03 -.07**
(.03) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.03)
Gender .02* .01 -.01 .05*** -.01 .03* .02*
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Income .01 .06*** -.04 .02 -.01 -.01 .06**
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02)
Constant .36*** .38*** .13*** .46*** .41*** .36*** .38***
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Observations 1398 1400 1398 1400 1401 1401 1398
R-squared .49 .49 .53 .39 .42 .44 .53
Adj R2 .48 .48 .52 .38 .41 .43 .53

15
Standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

Was the effect of racial resentment on belief in fraud different across racial primes? Largely
no. Racial resentment’s predictive effect on belief in fraud are consistent in direction and magnitude
across experimental conditions (figure 4). Whether exposed to a highly racialized story, a story with
subtle racial cues, a partisan story, or one about a Netflix dog, racial resentment was highly
predictive of s belief in fraud. This was also the case for the effect of racial resentment on support
for election integrity laws and components of those laws. This is consistent with recent work that
fails to replicate the implicit/explicit model in a modern context (Valentino, Neuner, Vandenbroek
2017).15 In my experiment H6 is supported and H5 is rejected.
I do find small differences in the relevance of racial resentment across conditions (Figure 4)
– these are consistent with H7. In the fraud models, the interaction between racial resentment and
condition is significant when comparing the partisan condition to both the implicit (p=.004) and
control (p=.029) condition. H7 suggested a partisan prime would activate racial resentment as party
coalitions have become more homogenous across lines of race and ethnicity. Whites may see identity
politics as a corner stone of Democratic priorities and associate minority interests with the party.
Though the evidence is limited, racial considerations seemed to be most relevant when the issues of
fraud and election integrity were discussed in stark partisan terms.
The observed consistency of racial resentment’s effect across conditions conflicts with the
implicit/explicit model of racial priming, which predicts implicit cues activate racial considerations.
If anything, partisan language was most potent for activating racial resentment. This is important
because partisan language can be employed by elites to sidestep accusations of racist intent.
The substantive size of the observed priming effect is small, but notable as scholars continue to
monitor how and when racial considerations explain behavior in an environment where U.S.
political coalitions are increasingly divided along racial lines. In modern discourse, partisan cues may
supplant the theoretical position of traditional implicit racial primes. This possibility will require
more tests in the future especially if the parties continue to sort on the dimension of race.

15 Each comparison has its own visualization in the appendix.

16
 Figure 4: Racial Resentment’s Effect is Consistent Across Conditions.

It may not come as a surprise that political and racial considerations dominate models of
support for restrictive voting laws. These identity-based considerations are important in part due to
their interaction with another key correlate of support, the perceived intent of the law. I asked
respondents to report if they believed election integrity laws were “designed” to make it harder to
cheat or harder to vote? I use a 7-point scale with the two ends being “Harder to cheat” and
“Harder to vote.” As expected, believing the laws are designed to make it harder for people to vote
decreases support for such provisions (effect ranges from .09 - .26 on a 0-1 scale).
This is consistent with a public that rejects laws when they perceive ill-intent. This would
seem to be good for American democracy. However, acknowledgment of a law’s ill-intent may not
sufficiently curb support for voting restrictions. H4 suggested perceived ill-intent of election
integrity laws would decrease support, but that this effect would fade as fairness considerations are
supplanted by racial animus or party loyalty. Among individuals with the highest levels of racial
resentment, support for election integrity laws are not moderated by belief that laws are designed to
make it harder for people to vote. Put another way, at high levels of racial resentment, individuals
can know the ill-intent of the laws but not be phased. Similar identity considerations occur among

17
partisans. When Democrats acknowledge election integrity laws are designed to make it “harder to
vote” support for provisions like strict voter identification decreases. This dynamic is not shared
among Republicans. Republicans who believe election integrity laws are intended to make it “harder
to vote” are just as supportive of voter identification as Republicans who believe the laws are
designed to make it “harder to cheat” (Figure 6).16 It may be the case that people do not make the
connection between election integrity laws and their individual provisions. This would explain the
significant interaction between intent and voter identification and the null interaction between intent
and election integrity laws generally. However, because my survey explicitly told participants the
provisions were components of election integrity laws, this seems unlikely.

Figure 5: Knowledge of Ill-Intend Stops Mattering at high Levels of Racial Resentment

16
Republicans do support the laws less generally when they acknowledge bad intent (in appendix). However, this effect
is smaller than among Democrats and Independents. The negative effect of intent evaporates when participants are
asked about each individual policy component of the laws.

18
 Figure 6: Knowledge of Ill-Intent Does Not Matter among White Republicans for Some Voting
Restrictions

Mediation Analysis
Is there a causal link between racial resentment in the public, acceptance of fraud narratives, and
support for voting restrictions? My theoretical expectation is that the effect of racial resentment on support
for election integrity laws will be mediated through the false belief that voter fraud occurred at high levels in
the 2020 election (H3).17 I use the causal mediation approach described by Imai et al. (2011) to demonstrate
the causal pathways between racial resentment and support for election integrity laws. Despite my data being
collected as part of a larger survey experiment, the data in this model is observational. As a result, even
though I use several controls in my model, omitted variables could bias estimates of my average causal
mediation effect. When unaccounted covariates influence both levels of support for election integrity laws
and belief in the prevalence of fraud, then the resulting error terms in each model will lead to a biased
estimate of the average causal mediation effect. I address this in part by including related control variables in
the model specification (e.g., partisanship, white identity, white’s resentment towards blacks.). Alongside my
controls for various demographic differences, I include sensitivity analysis in the appendix to quantify the
likelihood that I violate sequential ignorability assumptions. 18

17 I also considered that my IV (racial resentment) merely moderates the effect of belief in fraud on support for laws. I
do find that among those high in racial resentment, they supported the laws at higher levels at the lowest level of fraud
belief. But these differences dissipate quickly and do not explain differences in support for the law among those who
believe fraud is common.
18 I report the sensitivity analyses in the appendix. The figure plots the predicted value of the ACME across the full

range of the sensitivity parameter ρ (this rho is the correlation of the error of the frequency if fraud mediation model
with the error term of the election integrity law model). To conclude that the average causal mediation effect is not
significantly different from zero, we must assume that some unobserved and unmodeled confounding variable is

19
 My mediation model used general support for election integrity laws as the outcome variable
(continuous scale). However, results are similar when the outcome is any of the components of the laws. My
mediator was belief in the prevalence of fraud (continuous scale).19 My focal independent variable is racial
resentment (Sanders and Kinder 1996). I control for partisanship, white identity importance, white’s
resentment towards blacks, intent, education, gender, income, ideology, and age. In the models above (figures
2 and 3), I show that racial resentment (iv) predicts belief in fraud (mediator). I also illustrated that my
mediator (belief in fraud), was associated with support for election integrity laws and their components. With
both conditions satisfied, I can separate the influence of racial resentment on support for these laws into
direct, indirect, and mediated effects.20 Below is a diagram of the mediation model that I have tested. The
effect of racial resentment on support for election integrity laws is partitioned into average direct effect, and
the indirect effect of racial resentment through the mediator (belief in fraud). I find that belief in the
prevalence of fraud mediates 29% of racial resentment’s effect on support for election integrity laws.21 The
mediation effect is substantial in for each outcome, ranging from 21%-29% of the total effect of racial
resentment mediated though belief in misinformation about the frequency of fraud in the 2020 presidential
election.
The mediating effect is not conditional on the type of voting restriction being evaluated. Part of the
reason the racially resentful support voting restrictions is because they responded to narratives about election
fraud spread by elites and conservative media after the 2020 election. My interaction models demonstrate
Republicans support some restrictions like strict voter identification laws even when they know they designed
to make it harder to vote. Racially resentful whites (both Democrats and Republicans) support voting
restrictions - and fraud narratives provide race neutral rationalization to support reforms that exclude
minorities from participating in American Democracy.

affecting both support for the laws and belief in fraud, in the same direction such that the correlation between the error
term of the law model and the error term of the fraud model exceeds ρ>0.16. “While ρ cannot be directly known and
there is no formal cutoff for what an ideal ρ might be, lower ρ suggest the greater sensitivity of the results to the
presence of unmeasured confounds compared to models with higher ρ.” Thanks to Dr. Jennifer Wolak (MSU) for
making this aspect of mediation understandable.
19 Using legitimacy of Biden’s victory was a less robust mediator, mediating roughly 11% if racial resentment’s effect

instead of the roughly 30% accomplished by the fraud mediator.

20 My analysis was run in Stata, using the sgmediation2 package, from("https://tdmize.github.io/data/sgmediation2"). In

addition to Sobel-Goodman mediation tests of indirect effects, I obtained bootstrapped estimates of the standard errors
and confidence intervals for the indirect effect a*b.
21
.095(indirect effect)/.326 (total effect)= .291 ~29% of total effect is mediated.

20
 Figure 9: Mediation Model, Effects of Each Causal Pathway

Mediator
(Believes Fraud)
b = 0.31, p = 0.00 b = 0.30, p = 0.000

Racial Re- Election

sentment Integrity Bills
Direct e↵ect c’, b = 0.232, p = 0.00
Indirect e↵ect, b = 0.094, Total E↵ect c, b = .326
Percentage of Racial Resentment’s e↵ect through mediator=29%

Conclusion
Racial resentment is related to both belief in fraud and support for several voting restrictions
currently being proposed and passed in state legislatures across the United States. Generally, when
citizens acknowledge the ill-intent of these laws, they reject them. Unfortunately, this effect of
perceived intent is not unconditional. Concerns about group status and political power among white
Americans can trump knowledge of ill-intent. Specifically, white Republican and the racially resentful
support, or at least tolerate, restrictive voting laws even when they acknowledge they are designed to
make it harder for citizens to vote. My survey experiment text racial priming theory in the context of
voter fraud and voting restrictions. I show the effect of racial resentment on support for voting
restrictions is high regardless of how elites choose to talk about these issues. Finally, I demonstrate
that this consistent effect of racial resentment on support for voting restrictions is substantially
mediated through the belief that voter fraud was rampant in 2020.
Accusations of widespread and pivotal voter fraud are among the most pernicious pieces of
disinformation in the United States. Despite scant evidence, fraud narratives can produce negative
consequences for democracy. Stories about rampant fraud make it difficult to maintain public
confidence in elections outcome and since the ability of individuals to fairly choose their
representatives strikes at the heart of legitimate governance, doubt in this area may lead citizens to
believe ordinary political channels cannot lead to preferred outcomes. When ordinary political
channels are deemed defunct, individuals seek new methods of attaining their goals or redressing
grievance. This can include the use of violence as illustrated by the January 6th attack on the U.S.
Capitol.
Political elites can use illegitimate and manufactured concerns about fraud as a
rationalization for implementing restrictive voting laws. This legislative approach to constrict the
scope of political conflict is asymmetrical in incentive and effect. A political party with majority

21
support in the population would not try to restrict voting – as they would likely not benefit.
However, elites from minority parties (e.g., the modern Republican party) may benefit from casting
doubt on election outcomes and restricting groups from voting through legal means. If politicians
benefit from portraying racial minorities as the perpetrators of fraud, there is little hope that we can
transition peacefully to a multiracial democracy.22
This study investigated under what conditions politicians can get away with explicitly
connecting voter fraud to black Americans in political communications. For the segment of the
public high in racial resentment, the answer is far too often. Because states are responsible for
administering and regulating elections, those who preside in positions of authority at the state level
can shape access to the vote using a variety of legislative and regulatory means. A sober evaluation
of America’s history with federalism and restrictive voter provisions demonstrates a convincing link
between exclusionary reforms and racial considerations. Further, recent scholarship on
contemporary attempts to limit voter participation reveal that electoral competition, waves of
turnout among blacks, and unconstrained Republican control of state governments lead to both the
proposal and passage of more restrictive voting laws (Bentele and O’Brien 2013, Hicks et al 2015).
My study suggests elites are limited in their ability to connect racial minorities to the crime of voter
fraud. Unfortunately, this may be because these associations are already engrain in the public.
Narratives about voter fraud do not need to be racialized by elites. They are racialized by default.

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Mason, Lilliana. Uncivil agreement: How politics became our identity. University of Chicago Press, 2018.

Mendelberg, Tali. The race card. Princeton University Press, 2017.

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Minnite, Lorraine. 2010. The Myth of Voter Fraud. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

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Neiheisel, Jacob R., and Rich Horner. "Voter Identification Requirements and Aggregate Turnout in
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Uscinski, Joseph E., and Joseph M. Parent. American conspiracy theories. Oxford University Press, 2014.

Valentino, Nicholas A., Vincent L. Hutchings, and Ismail K. White. "Cues that matter: How political
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Joint Statement on Election Security

24
 https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/11/12/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-
government-coordinating-council-election

Appendix: Experimental Vignettes

Explicit Condition
Election Integrity Laws are creating conflict between Blacks and Whites

State legislatures across the nation have taken up the issue of election integrity. Bills have been introduced by lawmakers
in response to the record-breaking volume of voter and election fraud accusations being made in large black dominated
cities after the 2020 presidential election. Proponents say new provisions like more strict voter ID requirements, reduced
ballot drop boxes, and giving state legislatures oversight over election management by local county boards will decrease
fraud and increase public trust in election outcomes going forward. In a public statement, supporters of election integrity
laws said, “You see those animals stuffing stacks of ballots into drop boxes, vote counts mysteriously flipping in the
dead of night, or local election officials refusing access to poll watchers. You know we’ll put a stop to it and save
our democracy.”

The statement also detailed specific policies being considered to ensure the purity of future elections. “Voter ID
requirements are a must. Proper ID ensures people are who they say they are. Frankly, it’s degrading to say black people
can’t get the same identification that most every other white American has. We are also elevating ballot harvesting - an
African American favorite - to a third-degree felony. It’s a crime and we need to treat it like one.”

25
Representatives went on to say, “It’s an all-hands on deck moment. The current system is an open-house for fraud.
Dead people are voting, ballot harvesting decimates chain of custody, and local black officials let votes fluctuate in the
dead of night. It didn’t make sense what we saw in black run cities like Atlanta, Detroit, or Milwaukee. People didn’t
vote like that in 2016 or even 2008. Every legal vote is sacred. When white folks’ votes are stolen or diluted by the fraud
seeping out of black cities then our democracy is finished. Without election integrity, we are not going to have a country
anymore."

Implicit Condition
Election Integrity Laws are creating conflict between Inner Cities and Rural America

State legislatures across the nation have taken up the issue of election integrity. Bills have been introduced by lawmakers
in response to the record-breaking volume of voter and election fraud accusations being made in America’s inner cities
after the 2020 presidential election. Proponents say new provisions like more strict voter ID requirements, reduced
ballot drop boxes, and giving state legislatures oversight over election management by local county boards will decrease
fraud and increase public trust in election outcomes going forward. In a public statement, supporters of election integrity
laws said, “You see those criminals stuffing stacks of ballots into drop boxes, vote counts mysteriously flipping in the
dead of night, or local election officials refusing access to poll watchers. You know we’ll put a stop to it and save our
democracy.”

The statement also detailed specific policies being considered to ensure the legality of future elections. “Voter ID
requirements are a must. Proper ID ensures people are who they say they are. Frankly, it’s degrading to say city people
can’t get the same identification that most every other American has. We are also elevating ballot harvesting - an inner
city favorite - to a third-degree felony. It’s a crime and we need to treat it like one.”

26
Representatives went on to say, “It’s an all-hands on deck moment. The current system is an open-house for fraud.
Dead people are voting, ballot harvesting decimates chain of custody, and local city officials let votes fluctuate in the
dead of night. It didn’t make sense what we saw in corrupt cities like Atlanta, Detroit, or Milwaukee. People didn’t vote
like that in 2016 or even 2008. Every legal vote is sacred. When rural folks’ votes are stolen or diluted by the fraud
seeping out of lawless inner cities then our democracy is finished. Without election integrity, we are not going to have a
country anymore."

Party Conflict Condition

Election Integrity Laws are creating conflict between Republicans and Democrats

Republican Controlled state legislatures across the nation have taken up the issue of election integrity. Bills have been
introduced by GOP lawmakers in response to the record-breaking volume of voter and election fraud accusations being
made in America after the 2020 presidential election. Republicans say new provisions like more strict voter ID
requirements, reduced ballot drop boxes, and giving state legislatures oversight over election management by local
county boards will decrease fraud and increase public trust in election outcomes going forward. In a public statement,
supporters of election integrity laws said, “You see Democrats stuffing stacks of ballots into a drop boxes, vote counts
mysteriously flipping in the dead of night, or some local Democrat officials refusing access to poll watchers. You know
Republicans will put a stop to it and save our democracy.”

The statement also detailed specific policies Republican lawmakers are considering to ensure the integirty of future
elections. “Voter ID requirements are a must. Proper ID ensures people are who they say they are. Frankly, it’s

27
degrading to say some people can’t get the same identification that most every American has. We are also elevating ballot
harvesting – a Democrat favorite - to a third-degree felony. It’s a crime and we need to treat it like one.”

Republican representatives went on to say, “It’s an all-hands on deck moment. The current system is an open-house for
fraud. Dead people are voting, ballot harvesting decimates chain of custody, and local Democrat officials let votes
fluctuate in the dead of night. It didn’t make sense what we saw in Democrat run cities like Atlanta, Detroit, or
Milwaukee. People didn’t vote like that in 2016 or even 2008. Every legal vote is sacred. When Republicans votes are
stolen or diluted by the fraud seeping out of corrupt Democrat cities then our democracy is finished. Without election
integrity, we are not going to have a country anymore."

Control Condition

From Shelter to Hero! One Pup's Heartwarming Tale

There’s a K-9 dog in Rhode Island that has such a remarkable storied past, she’s inspired a Netflix movie. Ruby, an
Australian shepherd and border collie mix, was adopted by Captain. Paul O'Neil in 2011, who was in need of a search-
and-rescue dog for work. At the time, the rambunctious eight-month-old pup had been adopted and returned to the
Rhode Island Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals shelter by five families before she found her place with
O'Neil.

O’Neil, 41, enrolled Ruby into a K-9 training course, where she reportedly graduated at the top of her class. In October
2017, O’Neil and Ruby rescued a teenage boy who had fallen into a ravine and remained unconscious. "I was beside
myself and overwhelmed," O’Neil told the Associated Press, when recalling that fateful day. "So many things had to fall
into place for this to happen the way it did," he said. "The universe works in mysterious ways." I'm so happy to have
Ruby.

28
Appendix: Supplementary tables and figures

Correlated of Belief in Fraud and that Biden’s win was Illegitimate

(1) (2)
Fraud Biden
Racial Resentment .29*** .28***
(.04) (.04)
White Identity .07*** .01
(.02) (.02)
WRTA .1*** .11***
(.03) (.03)
Intent .07*** .03
(.03) (.02)
Party ID .4*** .47***
(.04) (.04)
Ideology .15*** .18***
(.04) (.04)
Education -.08** -.09***
(.04) (.03)
Age -.25*** -.12***
(.04) (.04)
Gender .05*** .05***

29
 (.02) (.01)
Income 0 -.04
(.03) (.03)
Constant .06* -.09***
(.03) (.03)
Observations 1401 1402
Adj R-squared .43 .49
Standard errors are in
parentheses
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

General ID Dropbox State Leg Harvesting Unsolicited ID Mail
Believe Fraud .34*** .29*** .34*** .28*** .23*** .25*** .32***
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Biden Illegitimate -.09*** -.01 .19*** 0 .09*** .04 -.02
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Racial Resentment .21*** .21*** .15*** .23*** .25*** .29*** .27***
(.03) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.03)
White Identity .05** .05*** .11*** .07*** .05** .04* .05**
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
WRTA .02 -.02 .01 .01 -.04 -.05 0
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Intent -.26*** -.17*** -.09*** -.15*** -.11*** -.17*** -.18***
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Ideology .18*** .13*** .15*** .07* .14*** .13*** .12***
(.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Party ID .04 .08** 0 -.02 .04 .04 .09***
(.03) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.03)
Education .06* -.02 .02 -.06* -.01 .01 -.01
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Age -.09*** .05 -.03 -.03 -.06* .03 -.07**
(.03) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.03)
Gender .02* .01 -.01 .05*** -.01 .03* .02*
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)

30
Income .01 .06*** -.04 .02 -.01 -.01 .06**
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02)
Constant .36*** .38*** .13*** .46*** .41*** .36*** .38***
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Observations 1398 1400 1398 1400 1401 1401 1398
R-squared .49 .49 .53 .39 .42 .44 .53
Adj R2 .48 .48 .52 .38 .41 .43 .53
Standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

31
Manipulation checks across levels of racial resentment.

32
Visualivation

33
34
35